I.3. INCREASING TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY THROUGH DISCLOSURE OF POLITICAL PARTY AND ELECTION-CAMPAIGN FUNDING – 65 Chapter 3 Increasing transparency and accountability through disclosure of political party and election-campaign funding This chapter focuses on measures to ensure transparency and accountability in financing democracy. Comprehensive disclosure of income sources of political parties and candidates contributes to greater transparency, serving as a deterrent measure to limit undue influence. For disclosure of information to make sense and inform citizens, information needs to be organised in an intelligible and user-friendly way. The statistical data for Israel are supplied by and under the responsibility of the relevant Israeli authorities. The use of such data by the OECD is without prejudice to the status of the Golan Heights, East Jerusalem and Israeli settlements in the West Bank under the terms of international law. FINANCING DEMOCRACY: FUNDING OF POLITICAL PARTIES AND ELECTION CAMPAIGNS AND THE RISK OF POLICY CAPTURE © OECD 2016 66 – I.3. INCREASING TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY THROUGH DISCLOSURE OF POLITICAL PARTY AND ELECTION-CAMPAIGN FUNDING A cornerstone of ensuring transparency and accountability in political finance is the requirement for political parties and candidates to disclose information about how they raise and spend money. Such information can facilitate better informed voter decisions as well as effective oversight of political finance. Comprehensive disclosure of financial information can also serve as a deterrent measure to minimise the impact of undue influence. Reporting requirements as a tool for ensuring accountability in the decision-making process It is important to keep records of election campaigns expenditure as well as books and accounts of political parties and their affiliated entities. The primary rationale for disclosure is to enable public oversight institutions to check the books and accounts of parties, candidates and donors to verify their compliance with the law. The GRECO Thematic Review of the Third Evaluation Round stressed that “a system that fails to ensure that sources of income and accounts are properly disclosed makes it much harder to monitor the application of the law and impose necessary sanctions” (Doublet, 2012). While violators cannot be expected to admit to infringements in their reports, requiring them to provide financial accounts provides a paper trail that can assist in further investigations. Reporting requirements concerning activities and organisations covered (party organisations, candidates, fundraising organisations, donors) and the detail of information (assets and liabilities, income and expenses, organisation costs, electioneering activities, political advertising) vary widely across OECD countries. While regular financial reporting by political parties takes place in almost all OECD countries, 68% of OECD countries also require candidates to report on their campaign finances to the oversight body. In 65% of OECD countries, political parties must report on their finances in relation to election campaigns (Figure 3.1). Comprehensive disclosure of both public and private funding is crucial In some countries, reporting is limited to how public funding was spent. In this case, reporting requirements that apply to all recipients of public funds also extend to political parties. For the discussion on how money influences public policies, only providing such information has limited value. Public funding is generally tied to stronger rules and controls to ensure that they are provided fairly to all stakeholders. These controls have been increasingly strengthened after political scandals showcasing major irregularities in party funding. In Italy, for instance, public funding regulation was limited to reimbursement of actual campaign expenditures, rather than campaign expenditures and routine party activities, as it used to be prior to 1993 (Doublet, 2012). This has, however, led to scenarios in which candidates rely solely on private funding to avoid tighter controls. In the 2012 US presidential elections, for instance, both final candidates relied exclusively on private funding (US Federal Election Commission, 2014). I.3. INCREASING TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY THROUGH DISCLOSURE OF POLITICAL PARTY AND ELECTION-CAMPAIGN FUNDING – 67 Figure 3.1. Separate reporting of information on election campaigns by political parties and/or candidates in OECD countries Political parties do not have to report on their finances in relation to election campaigns Candidates do 35% not have to report on their campaign finances 32% Political parties Candidates have have to report on their to report on their finances in relation to campaign finances election campaigns 68% 65% Note: The statistical data for Israel are supplied by and under the responsibility of the relevant Israeli authorities. The use of such data by the OECD is without prejudice to the status of the Golan Heights, East Jerusalem and Israeli settlements in the West Bank under the terms of international law. Source: Adapted from IDEA (n.d.), Political Finance Database, www.idea.int/political-finance/ (accessed on 27 October 2015). Thorough auditing of political finance reports ensures transparency and accountability After reports have been submitted, it is of utmost importance to verify and audit the data submitted. However, even when election campaign accounts are submitted by the legal deadline, verification and audit of such data are not always carried out thoroughly, meaning that there is limited incentive for candidates and political parties to present accurate figures. Verification and audit of financial records are effective measures to spot irregularities of financial flow in politics (Box 3.1) and should be conducted by auditors and specialised experts. In Estonia, political parties are subject to a yearly financial audit by the tax authority and are required to submit electoral campaign reports and quarterly financial reports to the Estonian Party Financing Monitoring Committee (EPFMC). EPMFC also conducts analysis of political parties’ financial health and publishes the results on its website. In France, annual accounts of political parties are certified by two auditors and submitted to the National Commission for Campaign Accounts and Political Funding (CNCCFP). The CNCCFP can request as necessary the communication of any accounting or supporting document needed for the accomplishment of its control function. In the United Kingdom, a political party with a gross income or total expenditure in a financial year that exceed GBP 250 000 must have its statement of accounts audited. An audit is also required of any return of party election expenditure if the expenditure exceeds GBP 250 000 during a campaign period. In addition, the UK Electoral Commission undertakes its own FINANCING DEMOCRACY: FUNDING OF POLITICAL PARTIES AND ELECTION CAMPAIGNS AND THE RISK OF POLICY CAPTURE © OECD 2016 68 – I.3. INCREASING TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY THROUGH DISCLOSURE OF POLITICAL PARTY AND ELECTION-CAMPAIGN FUNDING compliance checks of the information it receives, e.g. checking the permissibility of donations, and cross-referencing statements made in different reports to identify any inconsistencies. Box 3.1. Verification of financial records sheds light on suspicious use of political funding in Japan In Japan, verification of financial records led to the discovery of a number of discrepancies in political funding reports of two support groups linked to the former trade minister in 2014. The two groups were both set up to aid her political activities. Among their initiatives, they organised an annual trip to Tokyo for local voters that included a private performance by a popular singer at a leading theatre. They collected fees for the event, but a discrepancy in the accounting was spotted following verification. The recorded contribution by tour participants was substantially smaller than the expenses the two groups reported paying the theatre. The discrepancy was reportedly around JPY 26 million (EUR 200 000 euro) in 2010 and 2011. The financial reports also showed that expenditures for theatre tours organised for the supporters in 2013 exceeded revenue by JPY 7.87 million (EUR 60 000 euro). While JPY 10.89 million (EUR 83 700 euro) was recorded as revenue in the reports, payments to the theatre in Tokyo totalled JPY 18.76 million (EUR 144 000). The reports were disclosed by the election board. If the declarations are correct, it would mean the two groups subsidised the trip, a likely violation of the election campaign law that prohibits bribing voters. But if the participants did in fact cover all costs, it would mean inaccuracy in reporting, a violation of the political funds control law. Allegations were also raised that the trade minister’s political funds were used to buy goods from shops run by her relatives, and other purchases ranging from baby goods to groceries. Source: Aoki, Mizuho and Reiji Yoshida (2014), “Two of Abe’s female ministers resign over separate scandals”, Japan Times, www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2014/10/20/national/politics-diplomacy/two-of-abes- female-ministers-resign-over-separate-scandals/. Where compulsory disclosure of information of all donors is not always feasible, donations above certain thresholds are usually disclosed to ensure transparency and mitigate the risks of undue influence In relation to disclosure provision, identifying individual donors is necessary