The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law CUA Law Scholarship Repository Scholarly Articles and Other Contributions Faculty Scholarship 2010 Freedom not to Listen: A Constitutional Analysis of Compulsory Indoctrination Through Workplace Captive Audience Meetings Roger C. Hartley The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.edu/scholar Part of the Labor and Employment Law Commons Recommended Citation Roger C. Hartley, Freedom not to Listen: A Constitutional Analysis of Compulsory Indoctrination Through Workplace Captive Audience Meetings, 31 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 65 (2010). This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at CUA Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Scholarly Articles and Other Contributions by an authorized administrator of CUA Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Freedom Not to Listen: A Constitutional Analysis of Compulsory Indoctrination Through Workplace Captive Audience Meetings Roger C. Hartleyt Workplace captive audience meetings are assemblies of employees dur- ing paid work time in which employers compel employees to listen to anti- union and other types of proselytizing. Employers enforce attendance at workplace captive audience meetings by threats of discharge. Typically, em- ployers deny employees the right to ask questions or express disagreement with the anti-union views presented during these mandatory meetings. Soon after the enactment of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) concluded that workplace captive audience meetings discussingunionization are per se unlawful. However, the NLRB re- versed course following the enactment of the 1947 Taft-Hartley Amendments to the NLRA, concluding that employer free speech rights immunize captive audience meetingsfrom regulation. This remains the NLRB's view. In this Article, I demonstrate that employers' First Amendment free speech rights do not preclude a ban on captive audience meetings. Instead, employees are a "captive audience" whom the Constitutionprotects from be- ing force-fed the employer's religious and political ideology at the workplace. Employers, accordingly, have no free speech right to coerce workplace ideo- logical listening. The scope of employers' constitutionalright to free speech asjuxtaposed against employees'freedom not to listen is a timely issue. Several state legis- latures are considering--andtwo have enacted versions of-the Worker Free- dom Act, which bans workplace captive audience meetings discussing either religiousor political matters. Opponents of the Worker Freedom Act have ini- tiated legal challenges that are in the early stages of litigation, and many more such challenges are anticipatedas more states adopt the Worker Free- Professor of Law, The Catholic University of America. This Article is dedicated to my wife, Cath- erine Mack, whose exquisite legal mind and constant support have combined immeasurably to help bring this project to completion. 65 66 BERKELEY JOURNAL OF EMPLOYMENT & LABOR LAW Vol. 31:1 dom Act. The employer's allegedfree speech rights, as embodied in these meetings, and preemption of state law by the NLRA will be two key issues in this litigation. This Article demonstrates that the resolution of each of those issues will depend on whether the reviewing court acknowledges that employ- ees have a constitutionally-recognizedfreedom not to listen. I. INTRODUCTION ............................................ 67 II. THE DOMINANCE OF EMPLOYER FREE SPEECH CLAIMS IN CONTEMPORARY CAPTIVE AUDIENCE MEETING RULES.................72 A. The Lawfulness of Captive Audience Meetings in the Absence of Employer Free Speech Claims ...... ........ 72 B. The Emergence of Employer Free Speech Considerations in Shaping Captive Audience Doctrine ................ 77 III. THE EMPLOYEE'S FREEDOM NOT TO LISTEN AS A LIMITATION ON THE EMPLOYER'S FREE SPEECH RIGHTS .................... 79 A. The Origins of the Freedom Not to Listen.............. 79 1. The Freedom of Thought ........... ............ 79 2. The Constitution's Captive Audience Doctrine ............. 82 3. Freedom Not to Speak Cases: Precedent for Demonstrating a Constitutional Right Not to Listen.......... 83 4. Accommodating the Right of Free Speech and the Right Not to Listen.............. .............. 84 5. Conclusion ............................ ..... 89 B. Extending the Right Not to Listen to the Employment Context ...................................... 90 IV. POLICY IMPLICATIONS ARISING FROM CLARIFICATION THAT THERE IS No FREE SPEECH RIGHT TO HOLD A CAPTIVE AUDIENCE MEETING .......................................101 A. Implications for Congressional Labor Law Reform Legislation ............................. ...... 101 B. Implications for NLRB Action Without Legislative Amendment .......................... ......... 103 C. Implications for State Legislative Action................... 110 1. The Government's Dual Constitutional Roles ................. 110 2. Coerced Religious and Political Indoctrination at the Workplace ........................ ......... 113 3. State Legislative Response: The Worker Freedom Act.. 115 4. Objections to the Worker Freedom Act...... ....... 116 a. Garmon Preemption ............... ........ 118 b. Machinists Preemption................. ..... 123 2010 FREEDOMNOT TO LISTEN 67 V. CONCLUSION ............................................. 125 "[Ujnreplying attention to the words of another is known immemorially as an individualbadge ofservility." I. INTRODUCTION During the weeks preceding a union representation election, when communicating with bargaining unit employees is most critical, the work- place captive audience meeting is the employer's forum of choice.2 The reason is simple: the captive audience meeting furnishes employers a "de- cided advantage over the union." 3 The employer gains "virtually complete access to the minds of [the employees] during work hours"4 while the union normally is not entitled to a similar opportunity.s Employers stoutly defend their legal prerogative to conduct these meetings because they are so highly correlated with a favorable election day outcome.6 I Charles L. Black, Jr., He Cannot Choose But Hear: The Plight of the Captive Auditor, 53 COLUM. L. REv. 960, 966-67 (1953). 2 See Labor Relations Institute, Inc., Anti Union Campaign Tips-How Many Meetings, http://lrionline.com/anti-union-campaign-tips-how-many (last visited Apr. 21, 2010) [hereinafter Anti Union Campaign Tips] (stating that "[tihe captive audience meeting is management's most important weapon in a[n] [anti-union] campaign"); see also Kate Bronfenbrenner, Uneasy Terrain: The Impact of Capital Mobility on Workers, Wages, and Union Organizing, Ithaca, NY 81 (Table 8) (2000), available at http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article= 1002&context-reports/ (last visited June 29, 2009) [hereinafter Uneasy Terrain] (finding that employers held captive audience meetings in 92% of 400 NLRB-conducted union representation elections con- ducted between January 1, 1998 and December 31, 1999); JuLtus G. GETMAN, ET AL., UNION REPRESENTATION ELECTIONS: LAW AND REALITY 90-92 (1976) (reporting that in twenty-eight of thirty- one union representation elections conducted by the NLRB in 1972-73, the captive audience meeting was a fixture of the employer's anti-union strategy and employees far more likely to attend such meet- ings than union meetings held off the property). See ALFRED DEMARIA, How MANAGEMENT WINS UNION ORGANIZING CAMPAIGNS xvii (1980) (viewpoint from the perspective of an employers' labor consultant); see also Pub. Utils. Comm'n v. Pol- lak, 343 U.S. 451, 469 (1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("When we force people to listen to another's ideas, we give the propagandist a powerful weapon."); Anti Union Campaign Tips, supra note 2 (con- cluding that "[i]f you hope to win your NLRB election, you must conduct a minimum of 5 captive audi- ence meetings [and concluding that] the odds of a company victory increase with each captive audience meeting held . ."; Uneasy Terrain, supra note 2, at 73 tbl.8 (concluding that of the 400 union repre- sentation elections studied, the overall union win rate was 63% but in those where employers held cap- tive audience meetings the union win rate was 43%). 4 See DEMARIA, supra note 3, at xvii. 5 See Livingston Shirt Corp., 107 N.L.R.B. 400, 406 (1953); discussion infra notes 58-61 and accompa- nying text. 6 See DEMARIA, supra note 3, at xvii; see also id. at 9-10 (advising employer clients to schedule captive audience meeting soon after discovering union organizing effort); Kate L. Bronfenbrenner, Employer Behavior in Certification and First-Contract Campaigns: Implications for Labor Law Reform, in RESTORING THE PROMISE OF AMERICAN LABOR LAW 75 (Sheldon Friedman et al. eds., 1987) (reporting that a study of 261 union representation elections showed a correlation between number of captive audi- ence meetings conducted and employer likelihood of defeating employees' effort to unionize); William 68 BERKELEY JOURNAL OF EMPLOYMENT& LABOR LAW Vol. 31:1 But for the federal government's acquiescence, employers would not enjoy this unilateral captive-audience-meeting advantage. Ever since the NLRB withdrew its objection to the captive audience meeting in 1948, em- ployers have been legally permitted to compel employees to listen to anti- union proselytizing-under