Notes and References For a list ofabbreviations used in this section please see pp. xi-xii. See also the note on p. 290. INTRODUCTION I. Keynes (2); Mantoux; Gilbert, Roots of Appeasement; Cairns, 'A Nation of Shopkeepers in Search of a Suitable France: 1919-1940', American Historical Review, 79, 3 Qune 1974); McDougall. 2. On Chanak see Walder. 3. Capt. Basil H. Liddell Hart, the military expert, published a book in 1932 entitled The British Way in Waifare. Bond (1), 65--70. 4. Guedalla, 75. 5. Cairns, 'Nation of Shopkeepers'; Osgood, 'Le mythe de "Ia perfide Albion" en France: 1919-1940', Cahiers d'Histoire, XX, I; Schmidt, 161 n. 367; Landon, 'Liaison with the French Army', Army Quarter!J, XCIX, I (Oct. 1969); Guyard; Avice; Trevelyan; Zeldin, II. 6. An early and still valuable study that did was Wolfers'sBritain and France between Two Wars. CHAPTER I: THE BRITISH GROPE FOR A POLICY: JULY-NOVEMBER 1934 I. See the discussion of France's system of eastern alliances in Chapter 2 below. 2. CP 301(31). Cab. 24/225, I. 3. Lawford (London, edn), 268. 4. His predictions were not always correct. On 8Jan. 1936, for example, Sargent wrote that he did not believe that Germany would reply to French ratification of the Franco-Soviet Alliance by remilitarising the Rhineland. FO 371/19855, C6 2/1/17. 5. CP 30 I (31). Cab. 24/225. See also Gilbert, ch. 13, and Bright, 5 7-8. On the Geneva Protocol and the similarity of government and opposition views of it, see Taylor (3), 216--17; Johnson, in Waites, 100-24. 6. Steed, 8. 7. CID 1113-B (also COS 310), para. 10. Cab. 4/22. 8. Ibid., paras. 22, 24-5, 59-60. 9. CP 240(33), para. 34. Cab. 24/243. 10. The Defence Requirements Committee (DRC) was composed of the three Chiefs of Staff, the Permanent Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Sir Robert Vansittart, the Permanent Secretary of the Treasury, Sir Warren Fisher and the Secretary to the Cabinet and CID, Sir Maurice Hankey, who also acted as chairman. II. CP64(34), paras. 31-2. Cab. 24/247. See also Gibbs, ch. IV; Meyers, 231-44. 12. DC(M)(32)120, Cab. 27/511. 13. Roskill (2), II, 172. 14. Gibbs, 106. 249 250 Notes and References to pp. 19-25 15. CP 205(34), para. 53. Cab. 24/250. 16. CP 205(34), para. 61. Cab. 24/250. 17. DC(M)(32) 44th cons., Cab. 27/507, 104. 18. 292 HC Deb., 5s., 2339. 19. Gibbs, 127. 20. CP 205(34), paras. 30-5; section IX, para. 7; App. III, para. 9. Cab. 24/250. 21. Ibid., para. 25 and n.; Gibbs, 112. 22. Sargent to Phipps, 12 March 1934. PHPP 2/10. 23. Gilbert (I), 508-9. 24. DBFP, 2, XII, Nos. 171 and 134. Weinberg, 203-4etpassim. 25. DBFP, 2, XII, No. 136, with instructions that the Service Attaches should act as ifHMG tacitly acknowledge Germany's violation of Part V so that they would not be cut off from their sources of information. Phipps should avoid making the Embassy 'particeps criminis'. 26. DBFP, 2, XII, No. 159. 27. Quoted in Vansittart, 'The Origins of Germany's Fifth War', 28 Nov. 1939. VNST 1/26; Colvin, 345; Rose, 94. See generally, Schmidt, 211-19. 28. Perowne, minute, 1 Feb. 1935. FO 371/18824, C785/55/18. See also Sargent to Churchill, 13 Nov. 1934 and Churchill's speech of 16 Nov. on the imperative of resisting German expansion in Europe. FO 800/275, p. 204; Gilbert (I), 566--7; Gladwyn, 59. 29. CC 41(34)2, 21 Nov. 1934. Cab. 23/80,214. 30. Gilbert (1), 571. See also Poliakoffto Phipps, 3 Dec. 1934. PHPP 3/4. 31. E.g. MacDonald diary, 20 Nov. 1934; 23 Jan. 1935; Chamberlain to Ida Chamberlain, 14 March 1936, NC 18/1/951. Cross I 72-3; Jones, 204. 32. Keynes, 78. See also Chamberlain diary, 21 Oct. 1935. James (1), 73; 426; James (2), 317; Taylor (2), 118; Gilbert (1), 855. 33. On MacDonald's last agonising years, see Marquand, 693ff. See also Max Beloffs interesting comment, Imperial Sunset, I, 140 n. 3; Roskill (1), III, 162-3. MacDonald regularly noted that Simon was inadequate in his job, that criticism of his performance was 'richly deserved', and that he was indecisive. See Mac­ Donald's diary entries for 8, 12 and 28 Nov., and 3 Dec. 1934. 34. Chamberlain diary,Jan. 1934 and 3 Dec. 1934; Macmillan, Past Masters, 19. 35. Vansittart (2), 427. 36. C. P. Scott, editor of the Manchester Guardian, so judged Simon in 1923. Trevor Wilson, 390-1. 37. Simon, 95-6; 106--8. Vansittart (2), 427-8; Hazlehurst, 17; 98; 112; Thorne, Limits of Foreign Policy 95-6; Middlemas and Barnes, 804; Rowse, 15-16; Gilbert and Gott,passim; Avon (I), 245; Cowling, 74--5; Marquand, 705-6; 867 n. 10. Hall, 'The Foreign Policy-Making Process in Britain, 1934--1935, and the Origins of the Anglo-German Naval Agreement', Historical}., 19 (1976). 38. Chamberlain diary, Jan. 1934; Chamberlain to Hilda Chamberlain, 17 Nov. 1934, NC 18/1/896. An example of Simon's method is his handling of the Saar question. On 28 Nov. 1934, he presented the Cabinet with four choices without indicating a preference. When the Cabinet finally agreed to send troops to police the plebiscite, a suggestion that Chamberlain seems to have originated and pushed through, and then every other government approved, Simon behaved as if he had invented the idea. In fact, he had strongly deprecated sending British forces to the Saar. CC Notes and R~ferences to pp. 25-32 251 41(34)3, 21 Nov. 1934. Cab. 23/80, 249-50. MacDonald diary, 28 Nov. 1934; Chamberlain to Ida Chamberlain, 9 Dec. 1934, NC 18/1/896. 39. CC 41(34)2, 21 Nov. !934. Cab. 23/80,215. 40. GR (34)2; Cab. 27/572. The British defined 'a first-line regular squadron' as '[a] squadron containing aeroplanes and pilots properly organised and located in its station'. In May 1935, the government decided to include non-Regular units in this calculation, at least until 1937. Non-Regular units used identical equipment and had satisfactory training. The government assumed that the speed of German expansion had to reduce the short-term fighting efficiency of the Luftwaffe. CP 100(35), paras. 14-18. Cab. 24/255. 41. DBFP, 2, XII, No. 201 (3), DDF, I, VIII, No. 142. 42. GR (34) 1st mtg., 22 Nov. 1934. Cab. 27/572, 15. 43. Ibid., II. 44. GR (34) 3rd mtg., 25 Nov. 1934. Cab. 27/572, 21. 45. GR (34) 1st mtg., 22 Nov. 1934. Cab. 27/572, 13. 46. GR (34) 3rd mtg., 25 Nov. 1934. Cab. 27/572, 17. 47. GR (34) 1st mtg., 22 Nov. 1934. Cab. 27/572, 10. 48. MacDonald diary, 26 Nov. 1934. 49. Clerk appears not to have been the sort of man who would spring to mind if one were seeking help in deciding a policy. C. Gladwyn, ch. XV. 50. C. Gladwyn, 219. 51. DBFP, 2, XII, No. 208. 52. Lawford (Boston ed.), 343. 53. DBFP, 2, XII, No. 99. My emphasis. 54. DBFP, 2, XI, No. 208. 55. See, e.g., Gladwyn, 51-69,etpassim. On 6Feb. 1935, Col. B. C. T. Paget, Head ofMI3 (Military Intelligence: Europe except Russia and the Baltic, and the Near East and Abyssinia) wrote: 'Russia is now, and is likely to remain for a long time, a greater potential threat to our security than Germany.' WO 190/299. 56. DBFP, 2, XII, No. 208. 57. DBFP, 2, XI, No. 201 (2). 58. DBFP, 2, XII, No. 201 (!). 59. DBFP, 2, XII, No. 201 (2). 60. DBFP, 2, XII, No. 211; FO 371/17696, C7875/20/ 18; DDF, I, VIII, No. 166. 61. DBFP, 2, XII, No. 211. See also, Kaiser, ch. VI. 62. Gladwyn, 52-3; 5.">--6; 62. 63. DBFP, 2, XII, No. 211. 64. Ibid. See also ADAP, C, III, 2, No. 333; DBFP, 2, XII, No. 181. 65. Part V of the Treaty of Versailles was included in the American peace treaty with Germany of 1921. 66. DBFP, 2, XII, No. 211. 67. Ibid. 68. DBFP, 2, VI, No. 223. 69. DBFP, 2, XII, No. 208 (2). 70. GR (34) 3rd mtg., 25 Nov. 1934. Cab. 27/572, 20. 71. Ibid. MacDonald diary, 25 Nov. 1934. 72. CC 42(34)2, 26 Nov. 1934. Cab. 23/80, 255. For a different view, see Middlemas and Barnes, 787. 73. CC 42(34)2, 26 Nov. 1934. Cab. 23/80, 237-40. See also Gilbert(!), 572; Poliakoffto Phipps, 3 Dec. 1934, PHPP 3/4; Cowling, ch. 2. 252 Notes and References to pp. 32-{) 74. He was handed instructions in London and sent information by cable as to the known extent of German rearmament: 21 infantry divisions plus mechanised and cavalry formations (hardly ready for war) or 300,000 troops. The army's budget was I 72 million Reichsmarks. According to the information sent Phipps, the Luftwaffe had I ,000 military aircraft (also unready for war), including some bombers, and the air force budget was 210,187,650 Reichsmarks for 1934/5, up from 78,348,540 for 1933/4, which itself was some 35 millions more than the previous year's. German industry, moreover, had doubled aircraft production in the last six months. DBFP, 2, XII, Nos. 214; 215. The Air Attache in Berlin did not believe that German military aircraft exceeded 600 in number at this time, and recommended careful distinction between actual military craft and the bonafide Lufthansa (Germany's civil airline) planes ofpotential military value.