CHAPTER 9 CRUMBLING RESISTANC E APAN'S three-pronged thrust into Malaya was succeeding on all fronts J by 13th December . British hopes of halting the enemy near the frontie r were rapidly diminishing. Concern increased lest part or the whole of th e British forces in northern Malaya be cut off, and thus divorced from thei r primary task of protecting the Naval Base . l Close relationship became necessary between these forces, both east an d west of the main range, to avoid isolation from each other and from th e forces in the south. Thus they became increasingly committed to a con- tinuous process of retreat, accompanied by delaying actions to gain time during which, it was hoped, sufficient reinforcements would arrive to tur n the tide of battle . General Heath's recommendation—reinforced by wha t was happening at Jitra—that the 8th Brigade be withdrawn from Kelantan , was accepted by General Percival at their conference on 12th December . It was approved by Air Chief Marshal Brooke-Popham with the provis o that the enemy must be prevented from using the railway . On the night of the 12th-13th Percival placed his reserve, the 12th Indian Brigade, a t the disposal of the III Indian Corps and sent it forward by rail to Ipoh , where the leading battalion, 2/Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders , arrived on the afternoon of the 13th . Heavy fighting occurred on the 12th and 13th at Machang, 25 miles south of Kota Bharu, and the junction of a road to the east coast . The Japanese were sufficiently checked to enable the withdrawal to the railhead at Kuala Krai to be continued with - out serious interference . A.I.F. Headquarters in Malaya had followed the course of operation s with growing concern . As senior staff officer, Colonel Thyer had come t o the conclusion that the Japanese would move towards Endau from Kuan- tan, and that any landings from the sea in eastern Johore would be at Endau rather than Mersing. Assuming, as was extremely likely, that the Japanese were aware of the strong defence system established by the Aus- tralians in the Mersing area, it certainly was not improbable that th e enemy would seek an alternative to head-on encounter where it wa s strongest. At any rate, Thyer recommended that the detachment at Endau be strengthened, and that a company be placed at Bukit Langkap to pre - vent a thrust down the Sungei Endau which might cut the road fro m Jemaluang westward to Kluang . In this Brigadier Callaghan, in charge of the Australian division during General Bennett's absence in the Middle East, concurred, and he redisposed his troops accordingly . I Brooke-Popham received from the Chiefs of Staff in the latter part of December a cable stating : "His Majesty 's Government agree your conception that vital issue is to ensure security o f Singapore Naval Base . They emphasise that no other consideration must compete with this . " 154 CRUMBLING RESISTANCE 10-16 Dec General Bennett, who had returned to Malaya on 10th December, toure d his units on the 12th . When he found that his dispositions had been altere d he was emphatic in his disapproval, on the ground that the effect was t o commit units to definite roles and areas before the enemy intentions were known. In particular he was adamant that the 2/30th Battalion shoul d be retained intact for counter-attack in the event of the Japanese reaching Jemaluang, or (a hint perhaps of the direction in which his thoughts were turning) for action elsewhere with the 27th Brigade, instead of being committed in part to forward positions . Thus he ordered the former posi- tions to be resumed . On 13th December Bennett wrote to the Australian Minister for th e Army : "The third brigade of my division would have been a godsen d to us now. As you know, it has been repeatedly asked for, and m y requests have been repeatedly refused. However, we will have to do the best with what we have. ."2 In a letter to Australian Army Headquar- ters he wrote that "the morale of our men has never been higher", but , referring to there being insufficient air cover for the defending troops, h e said "I fear a repetition of Crete" . Anticipation of a Japanese landing in the south was sharpened when on the same day a message was received from Malaya Command that a large convoy was moving from the southern tip of Indo-China towards the south-east coast of Malaya. Percival called next day on Bennett, who recorded : He is anticipating a possible attack on Singapore Island direct from the sea, an d asks what would be the position of the A .I.F. if such an attack developed and hel p from the A.I.F. were required . I replied that the A.I.F . were here to defend Singapore and that if the troops on the island needed help, the A .I.F . would certainly go to their assistance. He realises that there are insufficient troops on the island to defen d it effectively and is very perturbed at the danger . I told him that I needed more troops to defend Johore effectively, implying that the Mersing front should not b e weakened unless the emergency were grave .3 Although the anticipated landing did not occur, it further emphasised the insecurity of the forces on the mainland of Malaya, and reinforced the policy of withdrawal . At this time also, with the prospect of congestion of airfields on Singapore Island resulting from progressive evacuation of those in the north, Air Headquarters ordered that stocks of bombs with refuelling and rearming parties be withdrawn to Sumatra, so that facilitie s might be developed there for the transit of reinforcing aircraft and th e operation of bombers . On the 16th, referring to the situation in northern Malaya, Bennett wrote to Army Headquarters in Melbourne : I have seen a total absence of the offensive spirit, which after all is the one grea t remedy for the methods adopted by the Japanese . Counter-attacks would put a stop to this penetration . The position has arrived when something must be done —urgently. I strongly urge that, should the request be made, at least one divisio n of the A.I.F. from the Middle East be transferred to Malaya . 2 H. G . Bennett, Why Singapore Fell, p . 69. 2 Bennett, p. 70. Dec 1941 TACTICAL INSTRUCTIONS 155 Bennett also sent a letter to be read to all ranks of his command, in which he said : The recent operations in northern Malaya have revealed the tactics adopted b y the Japanese in their offensive movements. It is simply that they endeavour to infiltrate between posts, or if that is difficult, to move small parties via the flan k to threaten the flank or the rear of our position. This is not a new system ; it is as old as war itself. Our training during the past twelve months has been t o outflank any enemy position which is being held ; similarly in any attack, the mai n attack should come from the flanking party . All units in defence will hold a small reserve in hand which will have the duty of moving around the enemy flanks and creating despondency and alarm by firing into their rear elements . Should it be possible for a small party of the enemy to penetrate between two posts and open fire on the rear of posts, arrangements must be made for alternate sections in a post to face the rear and deal with this enemy party by fire. At the same time a patrol must be sent forward to capture or destroy the enemy which has been successful in penetrating the position . It is imperative that the offensive spirit b e maintained . There will be no withdrawal; counter-attack methods, even by small parties, will be adopted. A few days later, in an instruction on tactics to be employed, Perciva l also emphasised that enemy outflanking and infiltration tactics must not lead to withdrawals, which, he said, should take place only on order o f higher authority . The enemy could not be defeated by sitting in prepare d positions and letting the Japanese walk round them . "We must play th e enemy at his own game and attack on every occasion, " he declared, addin g that the efficiency, cunning and alertness of the individual were of primar y importance. 4 An example of the kind of jungle warfare in which the Japanese ha d been schooled was provided on 18th December, when four carriers of the 2/ 12th Frontier Force Regiment were ambushed by troops wh o dropped grenades into them from the branches of trees they had climbed . This simple ruse might have been suggested by falling coconuts, but it was far removed from the training which most of the British forces had bee n given. Nevertheless, the 8th Brigade's withdrawal was well controlled, an d losses of men and materials were relatively light. Evacuation by rail from Krai of stores and equipment was carried out so successfully under th e direction of Lieut-Colonel Trott, 5 the senior administrative officer of th e 9th Division (an Australian who had transferred from the A .I.F. to the Indian Army in January 1918) that of the 600 motor vehicles with th e force only sixty were lost in Kelantan. Forty casualties occurred whe n the railway station was bombed during the morning of 19th December, but the railhead had been evacuated by the end of the day .