1 CRITICAL COMMENTS ON THE EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND THE DETAILED PROJECT REPORT (DPR) (DATED 12 TH MARCH 2009) OF DMRC, ON THE PROPOSED PUNE METRO RAIL PROJECT BG -5’6” SG -4’8.5” Coach Width 3.66m Coach Width 2.9m BY V.K.J.RANE - IRSE (Retd.) Ex-MD/IRCON Core Group Member –Metro Rail PUNE 28 th April 2009 2 INDEX 1) MAP OF PUNE SHOWING THE PROPOSED ALIGNMENT 2) CRITICAL COMMENTS ON THE FORWARD OF DPR 3) CRITICAL COMMENTS ON THE SALIENT FEATURES OF DPR 4) CRITICAL COMMENTS ON THE EXECUTIVE SUMMARY & DPR 5) ANNEXURE A) SALIENT FEATURES B) COMPARATIVE COST OF CORRIDORS I & II FOR BG & REVISED SG & DPR ESTIMATE ON SG C) GUIDELINES OF MoUD FOR DPR PREPARATION 3 PROPOSED METRO RAIL FOR PUNE Prepared by V K J Rane based on the DPR 4 Date 28 th April 2009 CRITICAL COMMENTS ON THE EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND THE DETAILED PROJECT REPORT (DPR) (DATED 12 TH MARCH 2009) OF DMRC, ON THE PROPOSED PUNE METRO RAIL PROJECT By V K J Rane – IRSE (Retd.) Ex-MD/IRCON INTRODUCTION--The project report dated 12.03.09 (DPR) received by PMC from DMRC, comprise of a Foreword, Salient Features of the Project, Executive Summary and 15 Chapters of the DPR, including A4 size plans without dimensions. Detailed drawings incorporating Index Plan and Section, layout of Depot, layout of Stations Bridges, Alignment with locations of columns and other details, in A2 size drawings, as prepared for Mumbai Metro and Hyd Metro, have not been received. Hence a detailed technical appreciation could not be made . No reference has been made to the meaning of the Short Forms used at a large number of places. This should have been done at the beginning of the chapter 1 as these reports will be read and seen not only by experts within the country but also those at international levels. Generally all professional reports do cover such clarifications. 1) Comments on Foreword – 1.1 Terms of Reference of PMC - Foreword does not indicate, any reference in DPR to the terms of reference given by PMC to DMRC for undertaking the preparation of DPR of the project. Though the foreword has been signed by MD / DMRC, he, nor his deputy, seem to have even glanced through the attached report before submission to PMC, as seen from the obvious inconsistencies, deficiencies, omissions, deletions of references to Ludhiana and Faridabad during copy pasting, and the general substandard quality of contents and presentation. This report is to be presented to the State cabinet for approval and sanctions and will be read by International experts & consultants. 1.2 Alternative Studies - The Foreword does not make any reference to DPR regarding alternative studies of BG, with indigenous wider coaches or MG (LRT) with the indigenous technology, available within the country. The State Cabinet, before taking techno-economic decisions on this project, would have been, in a better position, to convince the citizens, the techno-economic merits of the project and safeguarding the public interest, for its implementation. The report is biased in favour of SG with imported coaches and adoption of technology not required for the performance stipulated in the report. Our detailed para wise comments on the justification for adopting SG with imported coaches, at exorbitant cost as given at para 4.3 of chapter 4 of the DPR, are given in our comments under that chapter. 2) COMMENTS ON SALIENT FEATURES & EXECUTIVE SUMMARY- 2.1 Details of the salient features - of this project as furnished in the DPR by DMRC are attached as annexure 1 to this report, for ready reference. It is seen from this annexure that the total length of these two corridors is 31.515 km with Corridor 1--PCMC to Swargate is 16.589 km and Corridor 2 -- Vanaz to Ramvadi all elevated (14.925 kms). Corridor 1 is underground for a length of 5.019 kms with 6 UG stations, & balance 9 stations of Corridor 1 and 15 stations in corridor 2 are all elevated. 2.2 Track Connectivity - The salient features do not make a mention, that there is NO track connectivity between the two corridors and that the Corridor 2 crosses Corridor 1 over its UG section, at ASI station, necessitating physical interchange by commuters from 12.5 m above the ground level to about 22m below the ground level. The salient features also do not indicate the number and locations of the river crossings, the under river crossing alignment for Mutha river and that the railway track crosses a number of lines across the middle of station yard. These are important features deciding the technical feasibility, the period of construction and the cost of the project and therefore should have been brought out in this para. 5 2.3 Traffic forecast up to 2031 - It is seen from salient features that the traffic forecast has been assessed for the two corridors for two decades only up to the period 2031, the project has been planned to be commissioned in the year 2014, so the assessment has been done only for a period of 17 yrs after commissioning. This assessment should have been done for a period of at least 50 yrs or a minimum of 30 yrs that is up to 2045. This would have covered the life cycle period of the rolling stock. 2.4 Contradictions in number of coaches - There is a contradiction in the figures given in the tables presented at Table 0.5 at page 15/36 under para 0.6 –TRAIN OPERATION PLAN of the Executive summary and at table 5 TRAIN OPERATION at page 2/4 of the Salient features. The number of coaches as per table 5 at salient features for Corridor –I for the year 2031 work out to 25 x 4 = 100, as against 88 mentioned for the same year in table 0.5 of the executive summary. Similar mistakes are seen for the year 2011. Similarly for Corridor 2 the number of coaches required for the year 2011 should be 40 (10x4) instead of 28 and for the year 2021 it should be 48 (12x4) instead of 40, and for the year 2031 it should be 80 (20x4) instead of 40. It is not clear on what basis the cost has been assessed for the Rolling Stock in the project estimates. There are many such contradictions and mistakes and the report need to be sent back to DMRC for corrections. 2.5 PERMANENT WAY—Justification given for adoption of SG for Metro systems in Pune is neither convincing nor logical particularly in the context of capacity requirements, compatibility, connectivity and existing standards in the country including economy. Para wise comments on this justification have been included in the appropriate chapter of our comments on the DPR. It is necessary to adopt the Track Structure for the Metro System, so as to provide connectivity with the existing BG system in Pune Rly Division to enable commuters to travel without interchange from Lonavala to Hadapsar and back. SG Structure proposed involves importation of rails and Turn outs. 2.6 SYSTEM TRACTION—Techno-economic justification for adoption of a costly 25 KV AC overhead traction verses 750V DC system for such a low level of traffic has not been given in the report. Adoption of a 3-phase AC induction motors for the drive is NO reason to opt 25 KV AC supply Single Phase as the power has to be obtained through an inverter worked from a DC supply. Features of Disc Brakes or Air Springs adopted are not required for slow speed trains on Metro as these are required and are of advantage for high speed trains. Telecommunication and Fare collection systems proposed can also be provided on BG systems and are locally available 2.7 ROLLING STOCK – It is seen from this chapter that the width of the imported rolling stock has been limited to 2.9m wide only, as against 3.2m wide for Delhi, Mumbai , Hyd, Bangalore and other metros in the country. The axle load has also been limited to 16T as against 17 tons for other metros. This affects advantages of economies of standardization. There is NO provision for future adoption of wider Rolling Stock (Coaches) and increasing the capacity for future conversion to BG, to accommodate additional future traffic demand requirements beyond 25 yrs. This restricts the capacity permanently This should be known to the citizens and must be mentioned in the salient features so that the Cabinet members, are aware of the type of metro they would be approving, even though, it is against the benefits of future citizens . The justification for selection of the SG rolling stock at para f at page 7/36 of the executive summary is factually not correct and has not been proved with facts and figures and not compared with indigenous rolling stock. 2.8 DEPOT – (MAINTENANCE FACILITIES) & ASI STATION -- The salient features must indicate, for the benefit of the knowledge of the cabinet Ministers, that there is NO rail connectivity between the two Corridors and hence between the two depots. And that certain maintenance facilities required for Corridor 2 have been made provision of, at Corridor 1 Depot, and carried out by transferring these coaches in dismantled conditions, in trailers by road. Similarly the need for physical interchange of passengers at ASI stations from elevated to UG and vice versa, for a level difference of 35m, and a costly station at ASI, due to non-connectivity of the two corridors, must be mentioned in the salient features itself.