REPUBLICANISM AND DOMINATION: RESISTANCE WITHIN THE REPUBLIC AND THE DEFENCE OF POLITICAL LIBERTY Kevin Blachford, University of Bristol PSA Paper 2018- Draft paper not for circulation or citation INTRODUCTION Republicanism is a theory of liberty that is distinguished by its central desire for ‘political freedom’ (Buttle 2001, 331). It is a tradition that is focused on securing the rights and political liberties of citizens within a free polis. For citizens to enjoy the good life within a polis, republican thinkers have historically stressed the need for individual citizens to enjoy a level of political liberty which includes the right to participate in the life of the polis without fear of tyrannical control. Republican political liberty therefore combines positive and negative elements; as free citizens must partake in the civic life of the polis in order to secure their own liberty. The active participation of citizens acts as a check against the corrupting influence of power, as it is the accumulation of unrestrained power that has traditionally been seen by republican thought as a “government fit for slaves” (Arendt 1970, 44). In making this distinction between a free citizen and a slave, republicanism presents an older language of liberty that views liberty as antithetical to slavery. Within republican thought, freedom rests on political participation and independence from any ‘master’ with powers that go unchallenged and unrestrained. As Philip Pettit (1997, 35) has argued, the republican approach is based on 1 freedom as non-domination because ‘even the slave of a kindly master- the slave who suffers no interference- is unfree’, as the slave is dependent on the benign goodwill of an arbitrary master able to restrict the freedom of the slave at will. Contemporary political theorists have used the republican ideal of non-domination as a way to critique political policy and political institutions. It has become a way to call for social justice, to prescribe new forms of political policies and to understand contemporary forms of domination (Owen 2014; Costa 2015; D Casassas & J De Wispelaere 2016). This strand of modern republican thought centres on an ideal of communal liberty that can be used to critique the excessive market fundamentalism and individualism of neoliberalism (Pettit 2016). In constructing a theoretical approach to non-domination, contemporary theorists have focused on republicanism as a normative and structural ideal. Heavily inspired by early modern thought, republican scholarship has developed by focusing on the discursive ideals of republican literary debates. Less well recognised is that republicanism is a historical practice that has been ‘shaped and adapted by those who drew on it in order to fit their circumstances’, thereby, ‘explicitly appealing to various precursors, but reinterpreting them in the process’ (Hammersley 2012, 337). Republicanism therefore exists as both a philosophical tradition and concurrently through the historical practice of veritable republican polities, such as the city states of Renaissance Italy, the Dutch, Genevan, and Venetian republics, as well as the republic of the United States. Looking to the historical examples of actual republics can show how republicanism has been adopted in practice. This paper looks to the practice of republican polities to show how domination is resisted. If the dichotomy between a slave and a free citizen defines republicanism, then it is important to understand how slavery is resisted and liberty is 2 secured. The neo-Roman school has defined non-domination as the republican ideal of liberty, but less attention has been focused on how republicans have struggled against domination. The following argues that republicanism is defined by its contestorary nature of conflict and resisting domination. This argument is in contrast to our contemporary understanding of liberty which takes the cohesive state of republican polities for granted. Recognising the fractrious nature of republican politics can also shed light on why republicans have historically resisted slavery for themselves while dominating others. Republican thinkers have historically tied their understanding of liberty to resistance. If a person did not resist domination then they could be considered a slave because they expressed no character of virtue. To explore this argument, the following paper develops in three sections. Section one argues modern neo- Roman thought takes the existence of a unified community for granted. Contemporary neo- Romans see republicanism as a corrective to an impoverished civic life (Connelly, 2015, 10). For modern republicanism the virtue of the republican ideal is its ability to speak for the ‘general will’ of the community (Dagger 1997). However, as section two shows, republican communities were divided and it was the continuing strife and fluidity of the balance of power that prevented domination within the polis. Contesting and resisting the threat of unchecked and accumulated power formed the basis of political liberty. Section three therefore looks to how republicanism has resisted unaccountable power. Using the example of universal monarchy this section shows republicans had to resist domination by the hierarchical order of kingship. This paper therefore concludes by calling for further investigation into resistance and the history of republican polities from a critical perspective. 3 THE REPUBLICAN POLIS AS A HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE Republican political theory is defined by its desire to secure political liberty. For republican thinkers, liberty can only be secured in situations of non-domination. Dependence, unchecked power and the potential interference of an unaccountable actor, all present a threat to the defence of republican liberties. Republicanism contrasts the freedom of citizens to the domination of slavery in making this distinction between liberty and arbitrary power. The following explores this liberty-servitude connection and argues for the importance of recognising the role resistance plays within republicanism. Republicanism is a forerunner to modern liberalism and the two strands of thought share many common elements (Onuf 1998, 3). But, it is the republican desire to secure liberty for individuals acting as an interdependent community which separates the two approaches. For modern liberal theory, ‘liberty’ is often defined by Isaiah Berlin’s conception of positive and negative liberty. If positive liberty is the value of self-mastery, for Berlin negative liberty and the ideal of ‘non-interference’ is viewed today as the ‘core liberal value’ (Gray 2000, 31). Liberty is understood by republicans in terms of freedom from both domination and potential domination. This is in contrast to the negative conception of liberty which is about interference and limiting an individual's choices. This subtle difference has large implications, as whilst there are similarities between the two positions, the republican ideal is not non-interference but non- domination. Within political theory, Philip Pettit has been instrumental in defining republicanism as a theory of non-domination. Pettit (1997, 5) argues that the republican conception of freedom rests on the distinction that an individual is unfree if subject to the 4 ‘capricious will’ of another. Living as a slave entails an absence of freedom because it depends on the goodwill and ‘arbitrary’ behaviour of any master (Pettit, 1997, 32). This leads to a third account of liberty unaccounted for by Berlin’s dichotomy (Viroli 2002, 40). Through rejecting the prospect of arbitrary interference, republicanism accepts that freedom ‘is not the atomistic good associated with non-interference’ and modern notions of neoliberalism. Instead, republicanism argues freedom is a social good that can only be enjoyed by individuals if ‘it can be enjoyed by the salient groups to which these individuals belong’ (Pettit 1997, 125). In contrast to atomistic conceptions of liberty, republican thought has traditionally argued the importance of recognising that ‘human association comes first. In the absence of association (republic, society) there is no agency and there can be no agents’ (Onuf 1998, 5). Liberty is a communal good within republican thought, because only by participation in a political community can an individual be protected from the mutual vulnerability people face by the threat of domination through concentrations of power. It is a theory of liberty that argues individuals within a republic, ‘maintain each other's freedom from domination’ through strong ties of ‘obligation and solidarity’ (Bohman 2001, 5). The republican philosopher Montesquieu recognized that, as an individual, ‘if a citizen could do what [the laws] forbid, he would no longer be possessed of liberty because all his fellow citizens would have the same power’ (Honohan 2002, 83). Unlike liberalism based on individualistic rights, republicanism recognised that liberty under the law is a collective good for interdependent individuals. An individual can be vulnerable to multiple forms of domination and republicanism recognizes that liberty is more than just a story of license to do as one pleases, because freedom is not the absence of interference, but independence from arbitrary domination (Viroli 2002, 9). Because 5 of the interdependence of individuals, a continuing theme in the republican tradition is to place an emphasis on security as a means to political liberty for the community. Discussions in the 17th and 18th centuries on