AND DOMINATION:

RESISTANCE WITHIN THE AND THE DEFENCE OF POLITICAL

Kevin Blachford, University of Bristol

PSA Paper 2018- Draft paper not for circulation or citation

INTRODUCTION

Republicanism is a theory of liberty that is distinguished by its central desire for ‘political freedom’ (Buttle 2001, 331). It is a tradition that is focused on securing the and political of citizens within a free polis. For citizens to enjoy the good life within a polis, republican thinkers have historically stressed the need for individual citizens to enjoy a level of political liberty which includes the right to participate in the life of the polis without fear of tyrannical control. Republican political liberty therefore combines positive and negative elements; as free citizens must partake in the civic life of the polis in order to secure their own liberty. The active participation of citizens acts as a check against the corrupting influence of power, as it is the accumulation of unrestrained power that has traditionally been seen by republican thought as a “ fit for slaves” (Arendt 1970, 44). In making this distinction between a free citizen and a slave, republicanism presents an older language of liberty that views liberty as antithetical to slavery. Within republican thought, freedom rests on political participation and independence from any ‘master’ with powers that go unchallenged and unrestrained. As Philip Pettit (1997, 35) has argued, the republican approach is based on

1 freedom as non-domination because ‘even the slave of a kindly master- the slave who suffers no interference- is unfree’, as the slave is dependent on the benign goodwill of an arbitrary master able to restrict the freedom of the slave at will.

Contemporary political theorists have used the republican ideal of non-domination as a way to critique political policy and political institutions. It has become a way to call for social , to prescribe new forms of political policies and to understand contemporary forms of domination (Owen 2014; Costa 2015; D Casassas & J De Wispelaere 2016). This strand of modern republican thought centres on an ideal of communal liberty that can be used to critique the excessive market fundamentalism and of neoliberalism (Pettit 2016).

In constructing a theoretical approach to non-domination, contemporary theorists have focused on republicanism as a normative and structural ideal. Heavily inspired by early modern thought, republican scholarship has developed by focusing on the discursive ideals of republican literary debates. Less well recognised is that republicanism is a historical practice that has been ‘shaped and adapted by those who drew on it in order to fit their circumstances’, thereby, ‘explicitly appealing to various precursors, but reinterpreting them in the process’

(Hammersley 2012, 337). Republicanism therefore exists as both a philosophical tradition and concurrently through the historical practice of veritable republican polities, such as the city states of Renaissance Italy, the Dutch, Genevan, and Venetian , as well as the republic of the United States. Looking to the historical examples of actual republics can show how republicanism has been adopted in practice. This paper looks to the practice of republican polities to show how domination is resisted. If the dichotomy between a slave and a free citizen defines republicanism, then it is important to understand how slavery is resisted and liberty is

2 secured. The neo-Roman school has defined non-domination as the republican ideal of liberty, but less attention has been focused on how republicans have struggled against domination.

The following argues that republicanism is defined by its contestorary nature of conflict and resisting domination. This argument is in contrast to our contemporary understanding of liberty which takes the cohesive state of republican polities for granted. Recognising the fractrious nature of republican politics can also shed light on why republicans have historically resisted slavery for themselves while dominating others. Republican thinkers have historically tied their understanding of liberty to resistance. If a person did not resist domination then they could be considered a slave because they expressed no character of virtue. To explore this argument, the following paper develops in three sections. Section one argues modern neo-

Roman thought takes the existence of a unified community for granted. Contemporary neo-

Romans see republicanism as a corrective to an impoverished civic life (Connelly, 2015, 10). For modern republicanism the virtue of the republican ideal is its ability to speak for the ‘general will’ of the community (Dagger 1997). However, as section two shows, republican communities were divided and it was the continuing strife and fluidity of the balance of power that prevented domination within the polis. Contesting and resisting the threat of unchecked and accumulated power formed the basis of political liberty. Section three therefore looks to how republicanism has resisted unaccountable power. Using the example of universal monarchy this section shows republicans had to resist domination by the hierarchical order of kingship. This paper therefore concludes by calling for further investigation into resistance and the history of republican polities from a critical perspective.

3 THE REPUBLICAN POLIS AS A HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE

Republican political theory is defined by its desire to secure political liberty. For republican thinkers, liberty can only be secured in situations of non-domination. Dependence, unchecked power and the potential interference of an unaccountable actor, all present a threat to the defence of republican liberties. Republicanism contrasts the freedom of citizens to the domination of slavery in making this distinction between liberty and arbitrary power. The following explores this liberty-servitude connection and argues for the importance of recognising the role resistance plays within republicanism.

Republicanism is a forerunner to modern and the two strands of thought share many common elements (Onuf 1998, 3). But, it is the republican desire to secure liberty for individuals acting as an interdependent community which separates the two approaches.

For modern liberal theory, ‘liberty’ is often defined by ’s conception of positive and negative liberty. If positive liberty is the value of self-mastery, for Berlin negative liberty and the ideal of ‘non-interference’ is viewed today as the ‘core liberal value’ (Gray 2000, 31). Liberty is understood by republicans in terms of freedom from both domination and potential domination. This is in contrast to the negative conception of liberty which is about interference and limiting an individual's choices. This subtle difference has large implications, as whilst there are similarities between the two positions, the republican ideal is not non-interference but non- domination. Within political theory, Philip Pettit has been instrumental in defining republicanism as a theory of non-domination. Pettit (1997, 5) argues that the republican conception of freedom rests on the distinction that an individual is unfree if subject to the

4 ‘capricious will’ of another. Living as a slave entails an absence of freedom because it depends on the goodwill and ‘arbitrary’ behaviour of any master (Pettit, 1997, 32). This leads to a third account of liberty unaccounted for by Berlin’s dichotomy (Viroli 2002, 40). Through rejecting the prospect of arbitrary interference, republicanism accepts that freedom ‘is not the atomistic good associated with non-interference’ and modern notions of neoliberalism. Instead, republicanism argues freedom is a social good that can only be enjoyed by individuals if ‘it can be enjoyed by the salient groups to which these individuals belong’ (Pettit 1997, 125). In contrast to atomistic conceptions of liberty, republican thought has traditionally argued the importance of recognising that ‘human association comes first. In the absence of association

(republic, ) there is no agency and there can be no agents’ (Onuf 1998, 5).

Liberty is a communal good within republican thought, because only by participation in a political community can an individual be protected from the mutual vulnerability people face by the threat of domination through concentrations of power. It is a theory of liberty that argues individuals within a republic, ‘maintain each other's freedom from domination’ through strong ties of ‘obligation and solidarity’ (Bohman 2001, 5). The republican philosopher

Montesquieu recognized that, as an individual, ‘if a citizen could do what [the laws] forbid, he would no longer be possessed of liberty because all his fellow citizens would have the same power’ (Honohan 2002, 83). Unlike liberalism based on individualistic rights, republicanism recognised that liberty under the law is a collective good for interdependent individuals. An individual can be vulnerable to multiple forms of domination and republicanism recognizes that liberty is more than just a story of license to do as one pleases, because freedom is not the absence of interference, but independence from arbitrary domination (Viroli 2002, 9). Because

5 of the interdependence of individuals, a continuing theme in the republican tradition is to place an emphasis on security as a means to political liberty for the community. Discussions in the

17th and 18th centuries on English republican freedoms, focused on how ‘civil liberty was precarious’, and ‘only by having political rights- the right to participate in some way in the determination of what the laws were to be- could civil liberty be protected. Thus republican liberty was essential to all freedom’ (Goldsmith 1994, 200).

The threat of arbitrary power and the challenge this poses to republican liberty can be represented by the relationship between a slave and its master. It is the dichotomy between a free citizen and a slave which has formed the basis of Philip Pettit’s neo-Roman republican theory of liberty. The neo-Roman approach argues that the contrast between a liber or free person and the servus or slave is the ‘single most characteristic feature of Roman accounts of liberty’ (Pettit 1997, 32). Slavery is central to the understanding of freedom because the ‘source of rule is external to the slave’ (Brown 2001, 71). In tracing this liberty-servitude opposition from the , to the early modern period, the neo-Roman school has shown how this idea has formed the basis of republican theorizing about political freedom. Contemporary neo-Roman scholars have also shown the relevance of the freedom-slavery opposition within a diverse body of early modern textual authorities including Machiavelli, James Harrington and

Alexis de Tocqueville, who all sought to derive lessons from republican Rome (Pettit 1997, 20).

Much of the neo-Roman school has focused on transposing this tradition to tackle contemporary policy challenges (Lovett and Pettit 2009). But it is a school of thought that has focused on the discursive and literary fragments of the republican tradition. The neo-Roman school has said little about actual existing republics or the historical practice of republicanism.

6 This is particularly apparent in the way Pettit has taken a monistic view of domination that says little about actual historical examples of slavery (Watkins 2016).

Living under servitude forms a condition of domination because of the absence of freedom and the dependence of the goodwill of any master. But existing in such a condition of domination, the neo-Roman school does not examine in any detail how republicans are to fight against domination and resist forms of slavery. Pettit recognises that power is corrupting and that a well-marked tradition within republicanism is that ‘the price of liberty is eternal vigilance’

(Pettit 1997, 250). But there is little consideration of how to remain vigilant and to fight against unaccountable sources of arbitrary power. The neo-Roman school has been unable to fully address the challenge of resisting domination because the neo-Roman school says little about the historical practice of republics. This dilemma arises because of the gap between the discursive study of republican thought within literary texts and the historical practice of actual republican polities (Andrews 2011, pix). The republican tradition stresses the centrality of community and participation of citizens within the polis. For Pettit the republic is defined by the values of the community which suggests republicanism can resolve the conflicts within the community (Kapust, 2011, 21). From this position, the ideal of republicanism has been built on the concept that republicanism is best suited only to a small polis in which there exists a relatively high level of homogeneity (Levy 2006). Republican philosophy is therefore centred on constructing the ideal community bounded by civic virtue, yet, in historical practice republican polities have been highly divided . The following section explores these divisions within republican polities to demonstrate that such divisions had to be channeled to prevent forms of domination.

7

THE REPUBLICAN BALANCE OF POWER

Republicanism presents an older tradition of liberty which is centred on the freedom of the communal polis and recognises that political liberty rests on the interdependent nature of individuals within a community. Individuals acting by themselves with minimum demands on social life and no obligations other than self-interest, are likely to lose their political freedom and have their rights undermined. Political liberty is therefore understood by republicans as the result of the rule of law where power arises from the people in direct contrast to the rule of one human being over another in a position of domination. Republicanism also acknowledges that the freedom of political liberty is not a natural attribute. The following will examine historical examples of how republican polities have created checks and balances on power to resist forms of tyranny. Early modern history shows that republican polities developed forms of appointed resistance, in which power could be balanced through the appointed modes of magistrates, institutions and public forums. Recognizing these forms of resistance to unchecked power shows the conflictual nature of republican polities.

Contemporary republican thought has developed in part by focusing on the good life of

‘imagined communities’ created by the republican philosophers of early modern thought (Onuf

1994). These imagined communities sought to idealize the way a republican polity could be constructed and how republican citizens should live virtuous lives. In focusing on the discursive language of republicanism there is a danger in taking these imagined communities as a model, rather than, acknowledging the divided and fractious polities of actually existing republican

8 polities. Richard Dagger (1997) has sought to turn to republican thought as an inspiration for constructing civic virtues within contemporary politics. But Dagger (1997, 158) implicitly sees the contemporary metropolis of the globalized world as fragmented and divided, while seeking to reclaim the harmonious relations of the historical city-state. Republicanism is commonly understood to be suited only to small, homogenous places (Levy, 2006; Gray 2000, 126).

However, the ideal of a homogeneous polis is a product of the French . Lacking the history of the Italian city-states which built republican ideas on local practice and tradition, the

French revolution sought to build a myth of grandeur based on ‘the single and indivisible republic’ (Venturi 1971, 19). The cohesive polis built on the ideal of shared liberty and active citizenry has inspired much of republican thought, but in historical practice, republican ideals have not always been widely shared. Within republican polities such as the English

Commonwealth, the ideals of republicanism were not widely held outside of London (Brenner

1993, 539) and within the republic of Florence, republican thinkers held no significant positions of power (Jurdjevic 2008, 170). The harmonious republican city state is a product of the imaginary polities constructed in discursive accounts that seek to consider the ‘good life’ within republican thought. Historical republics have often been divided and prone to collapse and decay because of their fractious nature. As the following explains, looking to Roman and early modern republicanism shows that the divisions within a republic were also an important part of resisting tyranny.

Since Sallust and Seneca, internal discord has been seen as a cause of disruption and failure for republics (Van Gelderen 1992, 194). Factionalism was considered by Machiavelli as ‘a deep-rooted disease of the Florentine body politic and a pervasive theme of the city’s history’

9 (Brock, Skinner and Viroli 1993, 12). For free societies, factions have long been seen as a danger to the stability of a republican polity. As argued by Machiavelli’s friend and contemporary,

Francesco Guicciardini, we can see the danger factions pose when looking to history of Rome.

According to Guicciardini (1965), ‘the principal reason for Rome’s ills was the corruption of the city, which, given over to avarice and pleasure, had so declined from its ancient customs that it gave rise to bloody divisions, which among a free people always lead to tyranny.’ Despite the tradition of professing the need for harmony within a republican polis, factionalism and divisions have also been recognised as acting as constitutive forces. For the ancient Roman thinker Sallust, the Roman political community was always fragmented and he sought not to do away with this, but how to channel it (Kapust 2011, 27). Joy Connolly (2015) also argues how

Rome's history of conflict shows that the contestation and antagonism of Roman politics were central to the forming of a republican political association. Early modern republican thinkers recognized the contestorary nature and divisions of a republican polis by stressing the role played by fortuna in shaping events. Fortuna was responsible for the uncontrollable forces that determined the course of events. It was fortuna which limited the ability of actors to place too much certainty in rational calculations and predictions. But fortuna also provided ‘unexpected chances’ (Gilbert 1965, 41) that had to be seized and directed.

The antagonistic politis of a republican polity show that contesting power and resistance to domination are a fundamental feature of republican liberty. Liberty is not the formation of consensus but the division of the community into conflicting groups in which resisting the accumulation of power prevents domination (Connolly 2015, 33). To avoid the centralization of power, republican polities have traditionally sought to secure liberty by balancing power within

10 the polis to check the unaccountable accumulation of power. Early modern Italian republics such as Venice, Florence, Genoa, Lucca and Siena were all praised for ‘possessing mixed constitutions with royal, oligarchic and popular elements’ (Haskins 2010, 455). The balance of power within the polis created appointed modes of resistance with rival centres of power used to check one another. The Venetian republic sought to ensure that each governing committee or council was checked by another so as to assure the rule of law. Executive tasks were carried out by boards rather than single individuals and the role of executive boards had grown over time in an ‘almost haphazard way’ (Gilbert 1965, 12) to divide power even further. The division of Venice’s ruling apparatus created several bodies of power with the Great Council, the

Senate, and the Council of Ten (Bouwsma 1968, 61). To prevent the centralization of power,

Venetian military commanders were also chosen by an elective process as a safeguard against nepotism (Lane 1973). It was the example of the Venetian model of ruling through councils that divided power which was later used to justify the establishment of Florence’s Great Council in

1494 (Muir 81, 45). The influence of guilds within Florence and assigning offices via a lottery

(Lane 1966), a practice also used in ancient republics (Rahe 2016), helped to also ensure a further diversity of interests.

Within the Florentine republic, the divisions of power became an important source of preventing domination by aristocratic factions. The role of guilds and the use of a lottery to decide appointments over elections helped to prevent wealthy citizens using their influence to dominate popular elections (McCormick 2010). Preventing domination by elites also played a vital role in ensuring the security of the community. Machiavelli advocated his preference for a militia over the use of cavalry because it prevented the personal interests of the wealthy from

11 gaining too much power (Lukes 2004). Despite Machiavelli’s concern for factions, he does not place faith in a top down conception of the state personified by an idealized leader. As Mark

Jurdjevic (2007, 1249) argues, Machiavelli sought to ‘distribute authority as broadly as possible’ which ‘systematically diminishes the significance of individual offices’. The institutional checks against power within a republic created divisions, but these divisions strengthened the safeguarding of political liberty. For early modern republics, liberty could be threatened if power became subsumed by an unaccountable individual or group able to dominate others.

This understanding explains the republican skepticism of unrestrained . The concentration of power within the people suggested that the democratic populous would gain hegemonic control (Hobson 2009; Urbinati 2012).

The continued a republican tradition of creating divisions in order to balance against power and resist domination. The Dutch republic rebelled against Philip II of

Spain and believed they were fighting for their existing rights and privileges which had never been transferred to Philip II of Spain (Keene 2002, 46). In seeking to secure local political privileges, the Dutch republic was formed by political communities that each sought to contest power for their own rights (Arnade 2008, 307). In revolting against Spain, the 1579 Union of

Utrecht brought together the Dutch provinces in what was essentially a treaty that created in part a defensive alliance but simultaneously a constitution for a new federation (Congleton

2008, 38). The decentralized structure of the Dutch republic was therefore not dissimilar from the federal system of the United States in seeking to balance local autonomy against the centralization of power. The Dutch republic tied their understanding of liberty and civic virtue to the importance of constitutional charters and representative assemblies as a check on power

12 (Darby 2001, 157). To resist the domination of a single actor, the Dutch republic divided power between a federation of 7 provinces and 52 sovereign cities that each retained a role in its own decision making (Kyriazis & Metaxas 2011, 365). The decentralization of the Dutch republic was built on a competing rivalry between ‘provincial separatism...urban oligarchies, competition among the government colleges of the central bureaucracy in The Hague, and the dualist position of the Stadtholder’ (Hart 1989, 663). The contestation between these political bodies meant the republic was built on a ‘continuous shift of coalitions’ (Hart 1989, 674), as a plurality of interests sought to balance against centralization.

The division of power within a republic as a focal point for resistance remains a key part of the federal system created by the American Constitution. The checks and balances within the

US political system have long been celebrated for providing for a plurality of interests both within the state level and across the whole of the republic. Because of this balance of power, the states and the federal government were designed as two distinct sources of power. As the

Federalist Papers argue, ‘the compound republic of America, the power surrendered by the people is first divided between two distinct ’ (Publius [1788] 2000, 333). The division of power within the early American republic had a profound effect on restraining power and preventing the centralization of military power (Bashir and Gray 2015). Alexander

Hamilton stated, ‘power being almost always the rival of power, the general government will at all times stand ready to check the usurpations of the state governments, and these will have the same disposition towards the general government’ (Publius [1788] 2000, 171). Today, there is a widespread acknowledgment that Anglo-American law and the democratic process provide a check on power (Gifford 1995). As Shannon Brincat (2008, 219) argues, many of the ‘founding

13 principles’ of modern can be traced to the idea of legitimizing self-defence against unjust rule and the ‘illegitimate use of sovereign power’. But there is a widespread assumption that existing Anglo-American law and democratic processes provide a continuing check on power. The history of republican politics shows how these can be corrupted and prone to decay. As republican thinkers have long understood, the role of fortuna shows that checks on power can be corrupted and prone to collapse The following, expands on the role of corruption within republicanism and the hierarchical order of monarchy. For republicanism, it is important that when there is corruption then there must be a way to resist against the abuse of power.

UNIVERSAL MONARCHY, CORRUPTION AND RESISTANCE

The divisions within the early modern republican polis created a check on power but also helped to secure the liberty of its citizens. The appointed resistance of councils, executive boards and senates provided for a political arena which was open for a level of citizen debate and plurality. The opposite order within the polis to republican plurality would be an absolutist monarchy, where the differences arising from debate would be silenced by the prerogative and will of a single individual (Canovan 1983, 294). As the following explores, the early modern experience of republican resistance to monarchy was based on the slave-liberty dichotomy.

Republicans feared monarchical power for its ability to dominate through arbitrary interference and its nature of acting without accountability. The republican resistance to corruption was therefore a fundamental check on the abuse of power. To examine this resistance to corruption, the following considers the republican defence of regicide and the support of

14 republican militias as a form of resistance to power. These examples show a form of resistance to monarchical domination and the tyranny of unaccountable power.

Early modern republics were defined by their fragmentary and conflicting divisions. The security challenge republican polities faced was in keeping these contestations within the polis from becoming tyrannical. Existing at a time when universal monarchy was the norm, republican states faced an ‘inherent risk of a coup d’etat’ (Serna 2013, 19) as corruption could lead to the rise of tyrannical power. As the historian Helmut Koenigsberger (1997: 44) argued, the liberty of a republican polis was equated with liberty from both domination by ‘one of their own number’ and ‘dominion by an outside power’. Republican polities had to prevent tyrants arising within the polis and concurrently guard against outside intervention within the politics of the polis. The divisions within a republican polity resulted in a situation of power and order being tumultuous and constantly in flux (Bouwsma 1984, 4). The continuous shift of the republican balance of power was therefore in direct contrast to the rigidity and hierarchical order of universal monarchy. Inspired by the history of Republican Rome, much of early modern republicanism expressed a fear of corruption and the potential for the rise of a monarchical figure within the polis. The emergence of a tyrant who would gain unaccountable power and control was understood through direct reference to the experience of Rome. Machiavelli (1999,

274) warned how Caesar was the ‘first tyrant in Rome, as a result that city was never again free’. It was the history of Caesar’s domination through centralized military control that provided the example of corruption republicans have long feared. The prospect of power being unaccountable was seen to risk repeating ‘the rise of Caesars in Rome’ (Shalev 2006, 127).

15 The example of Caesar was interpreted with reference to the early modern context of universal monarchy. Early modern republicans equated tyranny and monarchical rule to domination because it was seen to lead to rule for personal gain (Scott 2004, 596). Republicans were not opposed to monarchy as such, it was the tradition of hereditary monarchs to see ‘the body politic as their personal property’, which republican thinkers opposed (Dagger 2006, 153).

The Florentine Friar, Savonarola, saw the definition of a tyrant as one who follows their own private interest (Viroli 1992, 124). While in The Excellence of a Free State (1656), Marchamont

Nedham also argued, a monarch acts ‘according to their own will and interests’ through

‘executing laws to the prejudice of the people’s liberty’. This is a common theme within republican thinkers who viewed domination in terms of a tyrant or despotic figure denying citizens their political liberties. For republican authors such as Machiavelli and Rousseau, domination was expressed not just by denying liberties, but by ‘usurping’ power ‘for one’s own ends and benefits’ (Thompson 2015, 4). The Federalist authors equally warned against the

‘usurpation of authority’ (Publius [1788] 2001, 99) and power because it was understood as a form of arbitrary domination. A single actor ‘usurping’ power for their own ends was seen as antithetical to the republican concern of liberty as a communal good for the polity.

The history of early modern republics was a struggle to prevent monarchical domination through the centralization of power. This focus on unaccountable power was particularly the result of debates over standing armies. Growing military power and standing armies were understood as directly linked to the growth of absolute monarchy and led to the detriment of republican liberty (Schwoerer 1974, 5-6). English republican authors such as and Marchamont Nedham criticised the ‘entrenchment of the hereditary principle’ because it

16 encouraged monarchs to see their countries, including the army, as their own possessions rather than in trust for the good of the public sphere (Wootton 1994, 69). Standing armies were understood as disruptive to commercial interests and acted only in the name of dynastic interests. The Dutch revolt against absolutism had grown out of disputes during the 1560s which saw the first concerted opposition to Philip II in order to protest the garrisoning of

Spanish troops along the Netherland’s southern border (Parker 1970, 77). This republican revolt against standing armies evolved in protest to the practice of Spanish soldiers being lodged in private homes and the fear of private lands being confiscated (Congleton 2008, 38). In breaking away from Habsburg universalism the Dutch republic sought both economic and political freedom from domination. The Dutch Act of Abjuration in 1581, declared all magistrates in the provinces in the Union of Utrecht to be absolved of their oath of allegiance to their nominal

King, Philip II of Spain. The language of this Act stresses how the people are not created as

‘slaves to the Prince’ and if the Prince seeks ‘opportunities to infringe their ancient customs and privileges, exacting from them slavish compliance, then he is no longer a Prince, but a tyrant’.

The language of ‘slavery’ and ‘servitude’ that was used by the republic of the United Provinces was based on people seeking to avoid the usurping of local powers (Arnade 2008, 307-311). The modern language of nation states and self-determination disguises that the Dutch revolt was based on a mixture of religious dissent, republican ideas of resistance and the desire to secure

‘customary rights and privileges’ (Nexon 2009, 225).

The second experience which shaped Dutch reactions to tyranny and standing armies was the near coup of 1650. William II who became stadtholder in 1649 sought to launch a military coup in 1650 and create a more centralized political structure similar to European

17 monarchical powers. Only his chance death by smallpox led instead to the stadtholderless period that prevented a new stadtholder from emerging in Holland and Zeeland for twenty years. The next twenty years were defined instead by Johan de Witts period of “True Liberty”

(Rowen 1986, 1-3). Because of these experiences, Dutch republican thought was based on the insistence that ‘the soldiery be subordinated to civilian priorities’ (Israel 1998, 267), in order to ensure the security of citizen liberties and property. The Dutch militia as a body of citizens were seen to speak for the community in defending political liberty and act as an opposition to the absolutism of a standing army (Prak 1997, 446). For these early modern republics, the advantage of a militia force, despite its questionable military prowess, was that ‘a militia force was low in cost, and this would have an impact on levels of taxation’ (Prak 2015, 113-4). In arguing against centralized military power through a standing army, republicans stressed the value of the militia as a source of republican liberty and the ideal of citizens securing the political rights of the community. These concerns are reflected within the American

Constitution (1788) and the Bill of Rights (1791), which defends the rights of armed citizens.

Within these early American debates is a neglected aspect of republican thought that links community and security. The debates over the right to bear arms were based on a republican understanding of the access to arms based on ‘a communal, rather than an individual right’

(Cress 1984, 26), as the existence of the ‘militia was a precondition for the right to arms’

(Williams 1991, 555).

Early modern resistance to unaccountable power focused on the control of military forces. But in rejecting monarchical power, republicans sought to justify their resistance through historical precedents. The Dutch rebellion against Spanish tyranny was based on a

18 theory of resistance that found inspiration within the historical precedents of deposed Kingship in the Old Testament (Dunthorpe 1997, 133). The contemporary neo-Roman school of republicanism has overlooked the role of religion in providing a justification to resist domination. The neo-Roman school expresses a form of presentism in supporting modern secular-humanist values (Wotton 1994, 14), and reducing the role of religion and biblical thought in developing republican conceptions of liberty (Perl-Rosenthal 2009; Shalev 2009;

Killeen 2011). But it is important to acknowledge the role religion played as a rationale for resistance. With both the Dutch war of independence and the English Parliamentarians of the interregnum period, the Old testament was used to show that the power of a ruler should be limited by law (Chernack 2000, 155). looked to the bible as he defended English parliamentarians by arguing that it was a necessary act of resistance to act in self-defence against the monarchy (Walker 2014, 303). Crucially, the English republicans defence of regicide was also aimed at both hereditary and elected officials. Their arguments focused on how any usurper of power was in practice a tyrant (Barber 1998 134). In creating the Two Acts to abolish kingship, English parliamentarians defended their actions by arguing how ‘use hath been made of the regal power and prerogative to oppress and impoverish and enslave the subject’ (Barber,

1998, 136). Republicans therefore justified their resistance by equating unchecked monarchical power to a condition of slavery. Recognising the call for resistance within republicanism suggests an inherent need for contestability in order to secure liberty. Republicanism in historical practice shows that the foundation of republican liberty derives from this ability to resist domination.

The preceding analysis has sought to highlight the fractious nature of republican politics

19 and argue that historical practices of resisting domination played a key part in the establishment of political liberty. For contemporary political theory, the ideal of political liberty is often understood through a Rawlsian interpretation which ignores these issues of contestation. As John Gray argues (2000, 81), Rawlsian liberalism is built on the belief that

‘basic liberties or rights cannot make genuinely conflicting demands’. However, the history of republican politics shows that political liberty within the polis was built on conflict, including violent conflict and resistance. The final section will therefore argue the need to take a critical approach in understanding the connections between conflict, republican liberty, and resistance to domination.

CONCLUSION

This paper has used examples of resisting domination to show that republican polities experienced a range of contentious and fractious politics in which citizens contested with one another for power. The republican polis is therefore inherently intertwined with the tumultuous and continuous shift in the balance of power. Questions of power, resistance and slavery suggests that republican liberty resulted in both winners and losers. In this respect, more attention needs to be focused on why republican liberty was often an ‘exclusive affair’

(Springborg 1990, 90). However, for modern political theorists, such as Pettit (1997, 6), the ideals of republicanism can be used as an aspirational and normative approach to make republican freedoms ‘universal’. The contemporary school of neo-Romans have used republicanism in support of a global (Bohman 2004), which can be used to

20 construct a global civil society (Kenny 2003), seek global justice (Laborde 2010; Bachvarova

2013; Bohman 2015), or even the foundations of a global republic (Martî 2010). For these neo-

Roman thinkers, issues of contestation and resistance to domination have been neglected.

Instead, they have stressed the solidarity and communal cohesion within republican thought

(Viroli 2002, 6) and make the same mistake as liberal internationalism in presupposing the existence of a political community (Rampton and Nadarajah 2016).

The neglect of republicanism in historical practice means that contemporary neo-Roman theorists are also neglecting the extent to which historical republican thinkers took the existence of slavery as a condition of normalcy. The Dutch and American republic in particular, were built on the foundations of slavery and colonialism. Re-historicizing our understanding of republicanism can open new avenues for investigation by looking to how republican citizens resisted domination through reference to slavery, but concurrently were involved in enslaving others. For the early American republic, understandings of political liberty were intertwined with ‘practices of subordination’ (Rana 2010, 3) for those considered unable to resist slavery. In rejecting the British empire, the American development of republicanism tied freedom to resistance (Furstenberg 2003, 1303). People proved their virtue by maintaining their freedom, to be a slave was to prove your lack of virtue. Bringing history back-in to our understanding of republicanism calls forth a need to investigate the connections between republican liberty and the historical practice of domination.

21

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