The Second Republic He rose up like a bright and morning star A man shaped by many tribulations He whimpered thither and tither but got far Father to a people he barely won Son of heroes, leader of two nations Call him a Zambian, tactics lacked he none BRIEF INTRODUCTION This chapter discusses the Second Republic and the reign and downfall of President Kaunda. Of particular interest is the institution of the One-Party State in Zambia which many have considered the greatest detour in Zambia’s democratic quest. MAJOR THEMES: Politics ≈ Democratic Detour ≈ Dictatorial Tendencies §8.1 Critical Themes here are two themes emphasized in this chapter: breaking the heart of oppression in Zambia and redirecting the soul of the nation on a full democratic trajectory. I will discuss what I conceive to be the steepest detour in Zambia’s democratic quest. I will T 1 borrow significantly from the analysis of the Second Republic from Hamalengwa’s 1992 work. In my view, his work proffers the most comprehensive review of the Second Republic. The Second Republic is generally the period between 1972 and 1991. Zambia became a multiparty democratic Republic in 1964. With several parties2 involved in the political process, Zambia was on its path to full democratic development. During the period from Zambia’s independence to 1972, also referred to as the First Republic, Zambia’s young democracy thrived with notable economic prosperity in many respects.3 §8.2 Undemocratic Tendencies The Second Republic was necessitated by two major developments, both in the ruling party, UNIP, and in the country as a whole. First, it was the results of the 1967 elections for the 1 Hamalengwa, Class Struggles in Zambia 1889-1989 & The Fall of Kenneth Kaunda 1990-1991 (New York: University Press of America, 1992), especially Chapter 10 from page 135 to page 151. 2 Including the NPP, a defunct of Sir Roy Welensky’s UFP; ANC; and Hugh Mitcheley, an MP from Gwembe North who stood as an independent after ditching ANC! 1 3 It would not be forgotten, however, that it was only a matter of time before the magma of economic troubles began to erupt, mainly owing to depleted resources sanctioned by the Federation. Page members of UNIP’s Central Committee. This was the first post-independence election in Zambia. It would go to test whether Kaunda was to remain the true hero of Zambia’s independence and if he would kvetch under the puncture of “Absolute power corrupts absolutely.” According to Hamalengwa, “Posts in the [Central] Committee were crucial and those who held them wielded tremendous power and influence over the decision-making process which allocated scarce resources to regions, communities and individuals in Zambia.”4 However, elections in the Central Committee were held on tribal lines, creating very stiff competition among the party faithful. Kaunda and UNIP had learned a lesson a year earlier when the United Party (UP) was formed by break away dissidents in UNIP. According to Hamalengwa, “The UP was a product of the growing disenchantment and relative deprivation felt by many political leaders of Lozi origin within UNIP over what they regarded as the neglect of Barotseland (now Western Province) in terms of system distributive outputs and also in view of what they regarded as Bemba dominance of the party.”5 In other words, things in UNIP were not as palatable as Kaunda had envisioned. His own cling to power was endangered. Multiparty politics was proving to be a threat to Kaunda’s continuation as president. The above recitation warrants a brief review. Most leaders begin on a path of democracy until power gets to their heads. This was the case with Kaunda. What these leaders forget is that democracy is predicated upon competition. Democratic leadership is earned and not coerced upon the people. A leader who delivers in terms of economic growth may win majority support, while the one who fails to deliver stands to be booted out of office in an election. Kaunda understood perfectly well that the continued wrangles in UNIP over territorial supremacy portended a loss of grip on power. Moreover, Kaunda knew this when he movingly stated at a General Conference in 1967:6 We have canvassed so strongly and indeed, viciously, along tribal, racial and provincial lines, that one wonders whether we really have national or tribal and provincial leadership. I must admit publicly that I have never experienced in the life of this young nation, such a spate of hate, based entirely on tribe, province, race, color and religion, which is a negation of all that we stand for in this Party and Government. I do not think that we can blame the common man for this. The fault is ours fellow leaders – we, the people here assembled.7 Second, UNIP was in danger of defeat in the 1970 election especially following the resignation of UNIP’s second highest ranking officer, Vice-president Kapwepwe. Kapwepwe’s formation of the United Progressive Party (UPP) in 1972 gave Kaunda the most terrifying opposition, and by extension, a stiff competitor in the 1970 general elections. Kaunda understood this as well. However, Kaunda was ill-wired to withstand competition at this time. To offset this weakness, he would resort to demagoguism, including the use of the very laws of the land to enslave people and curb rivalry. Kapwepwe’s UPP, whose “constituency was based on the Copperbelt and in Northern Province quickly gathered support from some key members from UNIP, the Copperbelt, Northern and elsewhere. [Disgruntled] members of [the party were] also defecting from UNIP. There was a likely coalition with the ANC. And elections were just around the corner in 1972. It was clear UNIP was in trouble and something had to be 4 Hamalengwa1992, supra., p. 137 5 Ibid., also see §5.13 and note specifically the rise of a group calling itself the Barotseland Freedom Movement (BFM). 6 The General Conference was UNIP’s highest governing body which also elected the UNIP president and 20 members of the Central Committee. Just below the General Assembly was the National Council which was the policy-making body of UNIP and met twice every year. 2 7 Zambia Information Services, Mulungushi Conference – Proceedings of the Annual General Conference of the United National Independence Party held at Mulungushi 14th - 20th August, 1967, as quoted in Hamalengwa 1992, supra., p.137 Page done or it would go down in defeat.”8 Consequently, Kaunda and UNIP accused Kapwepwe and UPP of threatening public security, detained9 Kapwepwe and banned UPP. The detaining of Kapwepwe and the banning of his UPP was a deep blow to multiparty democracy in Zambia. By eliminating tangible opponents, Kaunda was slowly moving towards a One-Party State, a state in which there would be no competition, and a state in which Kaunda would be the sole candidate in an election. To do so, he had to look for a plausible justification. §8.3 Which People? Not surprisingly, Kaunda found ample justification among the very people he deemed to represent; the people of Zambia. It is argued that democracy is the rule of the people, by the people, for the people.10 There are three “people” involved in this definition and each of those “people” mean differently to different constituencies. Traditionally, the rule “of the people” has always been interpreted to mean that the people of Zambia have the right to rule their own country. However, the people who rule are politicians, thus, the rule “of the people.” “By the people” means those who have found entrance into political power, the political elites, like those in the ruling party. And “for the people,” which “people” here mean the same as punching bags. Kapalaula asks, “Which people?”11 The way in which people are perceived to participate in the governance of their country is redundant. Democracy is not the best form of government; it is only the least evil of all forms of government. Democracy tends to pay only lip-service to the participation of the people in governance. The opinion of one single person, usually the Head of State, may be enshrined in political jargons and interpreted as the will of the majority. Kaunda’s One-Party State is a good example. Moreover, the people who legislate and suppose to make decisions for the people may be completely out of touch with the general populous. Yet, whenever they make decisions, they consider them the will of the people. This is attributed to the representative nature of constitutional democracy. Arguably, rule by referenda comes much closer to representing the will of the people. But the task is daunting, the exercise time-consuming and the undertaking very expensive. Weak as democracy may be, One-Party rule is the weakest of all. Whereas in representative or plural politics the people may have a chance to elect people who hold different views from the ruling elites, in a One-Party regime, only the will of the president prevails. Thus, by its nature, a One-Party State is a form of dictatorship, albeit a Tyranny of the Majority. This happens because 8 Hamalengwa 1992, ibid., p.138 9 Hamalengwa gives a succinct review of the law of detention in Zambia from page 146 of his book Class Struggles in Zambia 1889-1989 & The Fall of Kenneth Kaunda 1990-1991: By Ordinance No. 5 of 1960, the Legislative Council of Northern Rhodesia enacted the Preservation of Public Security Ordinance, which empowered the Governor to detain people, or require people to do work or render services. On July 28th, 1964, Government Notice No.