EPR (nuclear reactor) Computer generated view of an EPR power plant The EPR is a third generation pressurized water reac- tor (PWR) design. It has been designed and developed mainly by Framatome (now Areva NP) and Électricité de France (EDF) in France, and Siemens in Germany. In Europe this reactor design was called European Pres- surized Reactor, and the internationalized name was Evolutionary Power Reactor, but it is now simply named EPR by Areva. Four EPR units are under construction. The first two, in Finland and France, are both facing costly construction delays (to at least 2018). Construction commenced on two Chinese units in 2009 and 2010.[1] The Chinese units were to start operation in 2014 and 2015,[2] but are now expected to come online in 2016 and 2017.[3] 1 Design The main design objectives of the third generation EPR design are increased safety while providing enhanced economic competitiveness through improvements to pre- vious PWR designs scaled up to an electrical power out- put of around 1650 MWe (net)[4] with thermal power 4500 MWt. The reactor can use 5% enriched uranium oxide fuel, reprocessed uranium fuel and 100% mixed uranium plutonium oxide fuel. The EPR is the evolution- ary descendant of the Framatome N4 and Siemens Power Reactor pressure vessel of the EPR Generation Division “Konvoi” reactors.[5][6] The EPR design has several active and passive protection continues for 1 to 3 years after the reactor’s initial measures against accidents: shutdown (i.e., 300% redundancy) • Leaktight containment around the reactor • Four independent emergency cooling systems, each providing the required cooling of the decay heat that • An extra container and cooling area if a molten 1 2 2 OLKILUOTO 3 (AREVA’S FIRST PLANT) core manages to escape the reactor (see containment building) • Two-layer concrete wall with total thickness 2.6 me- ters, designed to withstand impact by aeroplanes and internal overpressure The EPR has a design maximum core damage frequency of 6.1 × 10−7 per plant per year.[7] The EPR was designed to use uranium more efficiently Olkiluoto-3 under construction in 2009. It is scheduled to start than older Generation II reactors, using approximately electricity production in 2018, a delay of nine years. 17% less uranium per unit of electricity generated than these older reactor technologies.[8] scheduled to go online in 2009,[13] but the project has The Union of Concerned Scientists referred to the EPR suffered many delays, and according to Areva operations in Dec 2007 as the only new reactor design under con- are expected to start in 2018.[14] The plant will have an sideration in the United States that "...appears to have the electrical power output of 1600 MWe (net).[4] The con- potential to be significantly safer and more secure against struction is a joint effort of French Areva and German [9] attack than today’s reactors.” Siemens AG through their common subsidiary Areva NP, On 4 November 2009, the nuclear power regulatory au- for Finnish operator TVO. Initial cost estimates were thorities in France, Finland and the United Kingdom is- about €3.7 billion,[15] but the project has since seen sev- sued a joint letter to Areva, citing serious problems with eral severe cost increments and delays. the EPR’s digital Instrumentation and Control systems (I&C).[10] The letter stated: 2.1 Progress “The issue is primarily around ensuring the adequacy of the safety systems (those used to In May 2006, construction delays of about one year were maintain control of the plant if it goes out- announced, following quality control problems across the side normal conditions), and their indepen- construction. In part the delays were due to the lack dence from the control systems (those used to of oversight of subcontractors inexperienced in nuclear operate the plant under normal conditions). construction.[16][17] The delays led to disappointing finan- Independence is important because, if a cial results for the Areva NP. It blamed delays on the safety system provides protection against the Finnish approach to approving technical documentation failure of a control system, then they should and designs.[18][19] not fail together. The EPR design, as origi- In December 2006, TVO announced construction was nally proposed by the licensees and the manu- about 18 months behind schedule so completion was now facturer, AREVA, doesn’t comply with the in- expected 2010–11, and there were reports that Areva was dependence principle, as there is a very high preparing to take a €500 million charge on its accounts degree of complex interconnectivity between for the delay.[20][21] the control and safety systems.” At the end of June 2007, it was reported that In 2013 EDF acknowledged the difficulties it was hav- Säteilyturvakeskus, the Finnish Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority, had found a number of safety-related ing building the EPR design, with its head of produc- [22] tion and engineering, Hervé Machenaud, saying EDF had design and manufacturing 'deficiencies’. In August lost its dominant international position in design and con- 2007, a further construction delay of up to a year was re- struction of nuclear power stations. Machenaud indicated ported associated with construction problems in reinforc- EDF was considering designing two new lower powered ing the reactor building to withstand an airplane crash, and the timely supply of adequate documentation to the reactors, one with output of 1,500 MWe and the other [23][24][25] 1,000 MWe. Machenaud stated there would be a period Finnish authorities. of reflection on the best way to improve the EPR design In September 2007, TVO reported the construction de- to lower its price and incorporate post-Fukushima safety lay as “at least two years” and costs more than 25% improvements.[11] over budget.[26] Cost estimates by analysts for the over- run range up to €1.5 billion.[27] A further delay was announced in October 2008, mak- 2 Olkiluoto 3 (Areva’s first plant) ing the total delay three years, giving an expected online date of 2012.[28] The parties are in arbitration to resolve The construction of the Olkiluoto 3[12] power plant in a dispute over responsibility for the delays and final cost Finland commenced in August 2005. It was initially overruns.[29][30] 3 As of May 2009, the plant was at least three and a half the welds inspected in the secondary containment steel years behind schedule and more than 50 percent over- liner are not in accordance with norms, and that cracks budget. Areva and the utility involved “are in bitter dis- have been found in the concrete base. EDF stated that pute over who will bear the cost overruns and there is a progress was being made on these issues raised very early real risk now that the utility will default”.[31] In August in construction;[44] however, on 21 May ASN ordered a 2009, Areva announced €550 million additional provi- suspension of concrete pouring on the site.[45] A month sions for the build, taking plant costs to €5.3 billion, and later concreting work resumed after ASN accepted EDF’s wiped out interim operating profits for the first half-year corrective action plan which included external oversight of 2009.[32] checks.[46] The dome of the containment structure was topped In May 2009 professor Stephen Thomas reported that af- out in September 2009.[33] 90% of procurement, 80% ter 18 months of construction and after a series of qual- of engineering works and 73% of civil works were ity control problems, the project is “more than 20 per- completed.[34] cent over budget and EDF is struggling to keep it on [31] In June 2010, Areva announced €400 million of fur- schedule”. ther provisions, taking the cost overrun to €2.7 bil- In August 2010 the regulator, ASN, reported further lion. The timescale slipped to the end of 2012 from welding problems on the secondary containment steel June 2012,[35][36] Areva’s Overruns at Finnish Nuclear liner.[47] The same month EDF announced that costs had Plant Approach Initial Cost with operation set to start in increased 50% to €5 billion, and commissioning was de- 2013.[37] In December 2011, TVO announced a further layed by about two years to 2014.[47] [38] delay to August 2014. As of July 2012, the plant was In July 2011 EDF announced that the estimated costs had scheduled to start electricity production no earlier than escalated to €6 billion and that completion of construc- 2015, a schedule slippage of at least six years.[39] In De- tion was delayed to 2016[48] cember 2012 Areva’s Chief Executive estimated costs to €8 billion.[40] On 3 December 2012 EDF announced that the estimated costs had escalated to €8.5 billion[49] In September 2014 Areva announced that operations would start in 2018.[14] In December 2012 the Italian power company Enel an- nounced it was relinquishing its 12.5% stake in the project, and 5 future EPRs, so would be reimbursed its 3 Flamanville 3 (EDF’s first plant) project stake of €613 million plus interest.[50][51] In November 2014 EDF announced that completion of See also: Nuclear power in France construction was delayed to 2017 due to delays in com- ponent delivery by Areva.[52] First concrete was poured for the demonstration EPR re- In April 2015 Areva informed the French nuclear regula- actor at the Flamanville Nuclear Power Plant on 6 De- tor that anomalies had been detected in the reactor vessel cember 2007.[41] As the name implies this will be the steel, causing “lower than expected mechanical toughness [3] third nuclear reactor on the Flamanville site and the sec- values”.