The European Parliamentary Elections Bill [Bill 65 of 1997/98] Research Paper 97/120 19 November 1997 This Research Paper examines the background to the European Parliamentary Elections Bill (Bill 65 of 1997/98) and explains its provisions. The Bill provides for voters to choose between parties, rather than individual candidates, and further legislation to deal with the registration of parties is expected in this session, and this Paper does not cover that aspect. The introduction of a regional list form of election for the next European Parliament elections for 1999 will be the first time that proportional representation (PR) has been used throughout Great Britain (Northern Ireland uses the single transferable vote (STV) for European Parliamentary and local elections). Research Paper 97/26 Voting Systems - the Alternatives provides background to the various forms of PR used in other countries, and proposed for the United Kingdom. Oonagh Gay Home Affairs Section House of Commons Library Library Research Papers are compiled for the benefit of Members of Parliament and their personal staff. Authors are available to discuss the contents of these papers with Members and their staff but cannot advise members of the general public. Summary A commitment to introduce a uniform electoral system for elections to a new European assembly was part of the original Treaty of Rome but when the first direct elections were held in 1979 Great Britain used the First Past The Post system, with STV for Northern Ireland. The Commons had rejected on 13 December 1977, on a free vote, the option of a regional list system for Great Britain. Despite attempts by the European Parliament to devise common principles, the Council of Ministers has yet to implement a common, new system. Other EU states continue to use a variety of forms of election but all can be categorised as PR systems. The European Parliamentary Elections Bill introduces a regional list system for elections in Great Britain, and retains STV for Northern Ireland. If the Bill is passed, for the first time on voters in Great Britain will choose between parties, rather than individual candidates (although independent candidates are possible). Traditional territorial constituencies for the European Parliament would be replaced by nine electoral regions in England and one electoral region respectively for Scotland and Wales. These electoral regions are based on those used for the Government Offices for the Regions established in 1994. If passed, the new system should be in place for the 1999 elections. The European Union has yet to establish a uniform electoral system for all Member States. Legislation will be required to establish a system of registration for political parties in a regional list system and much of existing electoral law would need to be redrafted to acknowledge the presence of parties, rather than individual candidates in the electoral process. Such redrafting is also required for the proposed introduction of an Additional Member System to elect the Scottish Parliament and the Welsh Assembly. Such legislation is expected shortly. Under the Bill as currently drafted, voters will not have a choice between candidates on a party's list. The political parties would need to establish mechanisms for establishing an ordered list of candidates for each electoral region. The d'Hondt (or highest average) system is to be used to allocate votes between parties. Although many proponents of constitutional reform have welcomed the commitment to a PR system for the next European elections there have been some criticism of the lack of voter choice and the use of the d'Hondt system, which tends to favour larger parties. Others have queried the necessity for a new form of election at all, given that no uniform electoral system for the European Parliament has yet been agreed. CONTENTS Summary I Background 5 1. Uniform Electoral Procedure 5 2. The European Assembly Elections Bill 8 3. The De Gucht Report 11 4. The Plant Report 16 5. Recent Developments 17 6. Parliamentary Boundary Commissions 21 7. Selection of candidates 21 II The European Parliamentary Elections Bill [Bill 65 of 1997/98] 23 1. The Bill in Detail 24 2. Reactions to the Bill 30 Map of European Parliamentary Constituencies and Government Offices 32 of the Regions in England and Wales Appendix 1 Systems in other EU States 33 Appendix 2 Relevant electoral statistics 36 Research Paper 97/120 I Background 1. Uniform Electoral Procedure Article 138(3)1 of the Treaty of Rome required the European Parliament to "draw up proposals for elections by direct universal suffrage in accordance with a uniform electoral procedure in all Member States. The Council [of Ministers] shall, acting unanimously, lay down the appropriate provisions which it shall recommend to Member States for adoption in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements". Since her accession to the Community on 1 January 1973 the UK has been a party to this undertaking. Agreement to hold direct elections was finally reached on 20 September 1976 between all nine Member States with the signing of a Council Decision.2 The text was published in the UK as an annex to the Council of Ministers' decision as Cmnd 6623. Article 2 of the Act (EC) set out the number of seats allocated to each Member State. In May 1976 the Government arranged for the appointment of a select committee to consider proposals for direct elections to the Assembly. The Second Report of the Select Committee3 recommended the retention of the First Past the Post (FPTP) system in European constituencies formed by grouping parliamentary constituencies in a curtailed Boundary Commission procedure (paras 20-22). This report was never debated by the House. In April 1977 a White Paper with 'green edges' was published.4 Part I discussed the pros and cons of possible electoral systems but drew no conclusion except to insist "the special circumstances of Northern Ireland make it appropriate for direct elections there to be conducted by a system of proportional representation" (para 20). The Paper was debated on 20 and 25 April 1977.5 The White Paper suggested the use of existing economic planning regions for allocating Parliamentary seats to regions and a modified list system with an 'open' ballot paper so that the voter could choose between named candidates. 1 This Article has now been renumbered Article 190 following the Treaty of Amsterdam, where an addition to the text was made. See below p.15 2 (76/787/ECSC, EEC, Euratom) Act concerning the election of the Representatives of the Assembly by direct universal suffrage 3 HC 515 Session 1975/76 4 Direct Elections to the European Assembly (Cmnd 6768) 5 HC Deb. vol 930 c.200-33 and c.735-960 5 14. There are other considerations which result from some of the inherent characteristics of the existing British system. One of these characteristics is the tendency for swings in electoral opinion to be magnified in terms of seats won or lost. This is regarded by many as an advantage in the context of Westminster elections where a Government is being elected. In the context of European elections, however, it might be regarded as a less desirable feature. This would be especially so if, as some studies have suggested, the relatively small number of Assembly constituencies (81 as compared with 635 Westminster constituencies) further magnified the effect with a final result in terms of seats which was quite disproportionate to votes cast. There is the further point that, particularly if Assembly elections fell mid-way between General Elections to Westminster there could be a wide divergence between the balance of power at Westminster and the Party composition of the United Kingdom members of the European Assembly. In one respect, given the advisory nature of the European Assembly, this might not be a matter of much concern; but in a developing situation it could lead to friction between the Government at Westminster and the UK representatives in the directly elected European Assembly or even between the Government and the Assembly itself. 15. It would be possible to resolve some of these problems by adopting a system of proportional representation for elections to the European Assembly. Since the European Assembly does not constitute a legislature or provide a government, and since its members do not have the same constituency responsibilities as a Westminster MP, proportional representation for the European Assembly might not be open to the same objections as proportional representation for the Westminster Parliament. A different institution might warrant a different form of election. 16. A list system could be devised based on the whole of the United Kingdom or Great Britain; or on separate lists for their constituent parts; or England could be sub- divided into regions or constituencies, each being allocated a number of members on the basis of electorate. The adoption of a list system would bring us into line with the majority of our European partners and would ensure that the allocation of seats was more proportional to the votes cast for the competing Parties. It would also have advantages in the speed with which it could be brought into operation, since there would not be more than about a dozen regions and even if Boundary Commission procedures were necessary they would be less elaborate than would be required to define 81 new constituencies. (Annex B shows how a regional list system might work in practice.) 17. To abandon our traditional method in this way would be a major constitutional innovation, the consequences of which are difficult to foresee. It would mean the absence of the sort of constituency link with which we are familiar and could lead to changes in Party organisations, including giving the central or regional Party organisations a bigger role in nominating candidates.