Averroes on God’s Knowledge of Being Qua Being. THÉRÉSE-ANNE DRUART Aristotle’s claim in Metaphysics, XII, ch. 9, that “it must be itself that [divine] thought thinks (since it is the most excellent of tbings), and its thinking ís a thinking on thinking (noéseos noésis)” is still puzzling. Averroes reflections on this particular claim and on the whole issue of God’s Knowledge are even more puzzling. Scholars disagree not only about what Averroes’ view is but also about how well he handíes this difficult Ibeme. Kogan working mainly on te Tahdfut al-Tahclfut (Incoherence of the Incoherence or Destructio desiructionis) concurs with 5. Van den Bergh’s view tal te t.heory expressed Ihere at first glance “. .makes te term ‘knowledge’ as applied to God not only incomprehensible but meaningless”2. Kogan then tries to rescue Averroes by proposing a more subtle interpretation of God’s causal knowing but concludes tbat ‘when te theory of causal knowing is recognizably epistemie, it is not causal, and when it is causal, it is not epistemie”3. As for Jolivel who works on te Long Corn¡nentary on íhe Metaphysics, Averroes really deparLs from Aristotle in his handling of God’s tbinking4. Rosemann, on te other hand, argues that Averroes is a faithful Aristotelian in bis commentary on God’s thinking about thinking5. Finally, Flynn shows how deep is te influence of Averroes on Thomas Aquinas’ reflections on God’s Knowledge and on whieh 1074b33-35, W. O. Ross’ transíation in Tite Complete Works ofAristotle. Tite Revised <hford Transíation, cd. by Jonaihan Baines, vol. 2 (Bollingen Series, LXXI-2). Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1984, p. 1698. 2 Barry 5. Kogan, Averroes and tite Metaphysies of (iausation, Albany, Síate University of New York Press, 1985, p. 230. Idem, p. 246 and “Some retlections oit te problem of future contingency it’ Alfarabi, Avicenna, and Averroes”, in Divine Omntscience ami Omnipotence in Medieval Philosophy, cd, hy Tamar Rudavsky. Dordrecht, D. Reidel, 1985, p. lOO. J. Jolivel, “Divergences entre les métaphysiques dIbn Ru.~d et dAristote”. Arab,ca, 29 (1982), p. 235. ~ Philipp W. Rosemana, “Noésis Noéseos und Ta’aqqul at-ta’aqqul’. Das Aristotelische Problem der Selbsthezúglichkeit des Unbewegten Bewegers iii der Kommentierung I1,n Ruíds”, ZeitsehrijY ¡dr Philosophisehe Forsehung, 40(1986), Pp. 543-561. Anaquel de Estudios Árabes, IV (1993) 40 Thér~se-Anne Druarí poinis Aquinas quotes Averroes either as an authority to be followed or as an adversary to be fought6. These scholars have brought to light many interesting poinis buí have nol really focused on the core of Averroes’s position on Ihe divine thought and, in particular, on how God may have any Knowledge of the sublunary world. In the four main relevant texts, i.e., the Taháful al-Tahúfut (The Incoherence of ¡he Incoherencef, [be Damiina (know as dic Appendi.x, a brief treatise on God’s Knowledge)8, [be Fasí al-Magal (known as The Decisive Treatise or Qn (he Harrnony of Religion and Philosophy)9, and [be Long Co¡nmeníary on the MewphysicstO, Averroes consisteníly claims [bat God’s Knowledge is nelíher particular ííor universal. He also asserLs thai [be word ‘knowledge” is said of God’s Knowledge and of ours only equivocallyít. The equivocity is grounded in [be fact [bat God’s Knowledge is [be cause of beings whereas beings are ifle cause of our knowledge’2. Alt [bese negative views are well kiiown buí in one passage Averroes offers something positive besides [be fainous claim <bat God’s J. 6. Flynn, “St. Thomas and Averroes on ihe Knowledge nf God”, Abr-Nahrain, 18(1978- 79), pp. 19-32. Arabie edition by Matrice Bouyges, S.J.: Averroes, Tahafot at-Tahafot (Bibliotheca Arabica Scholasticoru,n, série arabe, tome III). Beinil, Dar el-Machreq, 1930 Ireprinted at dic sane place in 19871. Englishtranslation by Simon Van den Bergh: Averroes’ Tahñfutal-Taháfut(Tite Incoherence of tite Incoiterence), 2 vol. (E.J.W. GibÉ Memorial, NS. XIX). London. Luzac, 1969. 8 Arabic text edited hy George F. Hourani: Ibn Rushd (Averroes), Kitñb Fasí al-Maqál with its appendix (Damíma) ami an extraet ¡ram Kitdb al-R’ashf ‘an Manñiti) al-Adida. Leiden, EJ. Brilí, 1959, pp. 41-45. English Iransíation by George F. Hourani: Averroes, On tite ¡la rmony of Religion andPhilosophy (E.J.W. Gibb Memorial, NS. XXI). London, Luzac, 1976, Pp. 72-75. Arabic edition by George F. Hourani: Ibn Rushd (Averroes), Kitdb Fasí al-Maqál. pp. 3-40. English transíation hy George F. Hourani, Averroes, O,, tite llarmony of Religion and Pitilosophy. 44-71. 80 Arabic ~dition by Matrice Bouyges, 5.1.: Averroes, Tafdr md Md at-Tabtat 00 “Grand Commentaire” de la M¿taphysique’dAristote, 3 vol, + notice (Bibliotheca Axahica Scholasticorum, serie arabe, tome VII). Beirut, Dar el-Machreq, 1938-52 Ireprinted at the sanie place in 19731 (rIte Commentary on Bk. XII u in vol. 3 but the pagination is continuous for dic 3 vol, of edition). English transiation by Charles Généquand: ¡be Rusitd’s Metaphysies. A Transíation with Introduetion of lbn Rus/vis Commentary on Aristotle ‘s Metaphysies, Rook 1am (Islamic Philosophy and Theology: Texta and Studies, 1). Leiden, EJ. Brilí, 1984. Commentamy, Bouyges, p. 1708 and Généquand, p. 197; Dami’ma, Arabie. pp. 130-31 asid Enghsh, Pp. 74-75; Tite Incoherence oftite Incoherente, Bouyges, p. 462 and Van den Bergh. p. 280. It it hecause of ffiis equivocity thaI when speaking of God’s Knowledge we are capitalizing Knowledge. 82 Cotnmentary, Bouyges, p. 1708 and Généeiuand. p. 197; Damúna, Arabic, p. 130 and English, p. 74; Ineoiterence, Bouyges, p. 468 and Van den Bergh, p. 285. Averroes on God’s Knowledge of Being Qua Being 41 Knowledge is causal. fle Co,nmentary on Hk. XII, section 51, brings a new and very interesting note wbich will be [be focus of my refiections. “te First, ¡nay He be praise, is te one who knows the nature of being inasmuch as it is being without qualification (bi- ‘itl&q or 3. sñnpliciter) which is Himself [or His essence]”’ This sounds very much as if God’s Knowledge is metaphysics and [bis knowledge is supposed to solve alí [be puzzles raised by our difficulty to understand God’s truly eterna] Knowledge of anything outside Himself and especially of what is here below. Reflecting on [bis claim and some of its implications 1 would like to retrace [be arguments in order to elucidate [bemeaning of <bis statement as well as to determine whetber Averroes’ final clañn in <bis commentary on Metaphysics, Bk. XII, section 51, does indeed resolve alí [be puzzles. Rosemann claims [bat it does but he also hints <bat Averroes’ position may be somewhat inconsistentt4 First, 1 shall address [be issue of what is meant by <he claim [bat God’s Knowledge and ours are equivocal since [bis general asgertion is [be underpinning for [be view [bar God’s Knowledge is nei[ber universal nor particular. Second, 1 shall examine what it means to claim [bat God’s Knowledge IS nei[ber panicular nor universal. Third, 1 shall discuss some points related to <be denial of God’s Knowledge of particulars. Fourth, 1 shallreflect on [bedenial of God’s Knowledge of universals. Finally, 1 shall examine [be claim [bat God knows being inasmuch as it is being and in [bis way cannot be said to be 13 Bouyges, p. 1708, 11.1-2. As the contexthelps understanding whatis at stake andas the text of he Medieval Latin transíation is rather shaky, 1 an, here providing a transíation of pan of te end nf C. SI: “This is whaí escaped Themistíus when he allowed thaI te intellect lof te unmoved mover or (Jodí thinks many intelligibles al once. ‘fliis is contrary lo our síateniení dial He tioinks Himself and does nol think anything outside Himself and ihat dic intellect and what it thinks are one o. every respect. For he t’I’hemistiusl says thai He lhinks ah things inasmuch as He thinks tal He is their principIe. AII of Ihis is Ihe atateniení of someone who does not understand Aristotíes demonstrationa here. BoL Ibis entails an objectionable consequence, e,, that dic deity be ignorant of what u here below. “Therefore, some people said diat He knows what is here below by means of universal knowledge aad not by means of particular knowledge”. “The trudi is that inasmuch as He knows only Hiniseíf, He knows te beings trough te exíslence which u Ihe cause of Iheir exisíences. An example of this is someone who knows only the heat of fire. Por it is not said of him that he does not know the nature of the heas existing in hot things. Rater such a person is te one who knows dic nature of heal inasmuch as it is heat. lo Ihe same way te First, may He be praise, is te one who Knows te nature of being inasmuch as it 15 being witouí qualification which is Himself. For tus reason, the name knowledge ti said equivocally of His Knowledge, may He be praised, and ours because His Knowledge is te cause of being whereas hesng .s te cause of orn knowledge. Hence, His Knowledge, may He be praised, cannol be qual.f.ed as universal or particular Arabie, Pp. 1706- 1708. 14 op. ca., p. 557, n, 41. 42 Thérése-Anne Druare ignorant of alí <bings. How is it <bat such a knowledge is neither universal nor particular? Is Thomas Aquinas who was fascinated by <bis passage right in his view [bat such knowledge is no proper knowledge at alí?. 1. Tijiz EQUIVOCITE BETWEEN HUMAN ANt) DIVINE KNOWLEDGE.