https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=19900015684 2020-03-19T22:00:14+00:00Z NASA Contractor Report 4272 Keeping the Dream Alive: Managing the Space Station Program, 1982-1986 Thomas J. Lewin University of Kansas Lawrence, Kansas V. K. Narayanan Rutgers Univer,_ity New Brunswick,, New Jersey Prepared for NASA History Office under Contract NASW-4248 National Aeronautics and Space Administratior Office of Management Scientific and Technica, Information Division The views expressed in this publication are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. PREFACE This monograph describes and analyzes the management of the formative years of the space station program (1982-1986) in the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). The time period covered begins with the :iuccessful initiative for program approval launched by Administrator James Beggs, through the initial program structure with the lead center at Houston, Texas, and culminates in the decision to bring program management to Reston, Virginia, a suburb of Washington, D.C. By the term "management history" we mean a chronicle of the challenges faced by NASA managers and the processes used to meet those challenges. Since companion works dealing with the history of constituency building (authored by Howard McCurdy) and international participation (by John Logsdon) in the space station program are under way, we have placed greater emphasis on internal management issues related to the implementation of the various phases of the program from 1982 to 1986. Although we have tried to minimize overlap, some discussion of key external factors is necessary in order to place NASA's management chzllenges in their proper context. We have invoked the: metaphor of "an experiment," as provided by John Hodge, director of the Space Station Task Force, during our interviews with him, to describe NASA's efforts to arrive at a viable management struc! ure for the space station program. We believe this term accurately captures the thinking of the key decision makers. The main players understood that the major program management decisions made in 1984 would be evaluated at the end of the detailed definition period in light of their experiences during that time. Only after such evaluation would the program move to the design and development phase. We structure our narrative around four interrelated themes: the problem of bringing programmatic and institutional interests together and focusing them to forward the program; centralized versus decen- tralized control of the program, and how each option was affected by the requirements of technology and the program, the environment within NASA, and the budgetary constraints under which NASA was operating at the time; how the history of NASA and the individual centers affected the decisions that were made; and the pressure from those outside NASA (the external constituencies). The monograph is divided into four section s that are chronologically overlapping in some aspects: 1) the decision to build the space station, 2) the design of the management experiment, 3) the experiment comes to life, and 4) the decision reversal. Part I presents the process by which NASA gained Presidential approval for the program. In chapter 1 a new Administrator (James Beggs) viewed the space station initiative as a means to revitalize NASA's technical and scientific competence. Only after revamping the reporting relationships between the field centers and headquarters 3id he openly work on the space station initiative. He wanted the space station to be an agency-wide program, have more than one prime contractor (unlike the shuttle where only one had been used), and be I:uilt "by the yard" (starting with an initial capability and adding onto that as funds became available). And during this early period he identified the key individuals who would spearhead the space station initiative. In chapter 2 we cover the four major organizational entities that were involved in this phase.• of the program: the Space Station Task Force, the Space Station Technology Steering Committee, the l_etcher Committee, and the Office of Space Science and Applications. Over time the task force becaJne the focal point for delineating the details of the program. The unique iii managementofthetaskforce,anditslocationatheadquarters, promoted program integrity and mini- mized decentralizing forces within NASA. Frequent interaction among those in key leadership positions at all levels allowed the integration of both programmatic and institutional perspectives into the management and technological guidelines of the program. (Proponents of the institutional perspective focused on NASA as an ongoing organization, whereas program proponents viewed the organization as an instrument to accomplish major projects.) From a management perspective, the leadership style of Beggs and the management of the task force enabled NASA to win Presidential approval of the program. Part II deals with how NASA arrived at the original program structure. The initial decisions and consideration took place at headquarters and within the Program Planning Working Group of the Space Station Task Force. As the prospects for approval improved, NASA included institutional elements at the field centers through meetings at Wallops and Langley, which are covered in chapter 4. These two meetings endorsed the lead center form of organization for managing Phase B of the program. Based on NASA's recent experience in the shuttle project, the lead center approach was the first attempt to find a balance between centralization and decentralization for the space station. In chapter 5 we begin the discussion of division of responsibilities among the centers, in the form of work packages. This process took much longer than had ever been anticipated. The ever-present need for sustained con- gressional support and institutional considerations made this decision quite difficult and the decision was finally made at headquarters. In Part III we analyze the management of the program at headquarters and at the program management level. Included in this section is a discussion of the skunk works (chapter 7), formation of the headquarters program office (chapter 8), the formation of Level B (chapter 9), and the Phase B studies (chapter 10). During this period the resource and time requirements of the complex management structure became more apparent. Part IV considers the evaluation of the lead center organization structure and the associated work package decisions. Chapter 11 deals with the turbulence caused by the departure of key space station program officers (including Administrator James Beggs, Deputy Administrator Hans Mark, Program Manager Neil Hutchinson, and the lead field center director Gerald Griffin) and the effect the Challenger accident had upon NASA as a whole and the space station in particular. Chapter 12 considers then Acting Administrator James Fletcher's decision in May 1986 to bring management of the space station program to headquarters, abandoning "the experiment" for a more traditional NASA form of management. This narrative addresses an audience far broader than management professionals. We have made every effort to simplify our treatment of complex management issues so that the immense management challenges NASA faced can be appreciated by a greater number of people. We have analyzed documents from NASA's archives, although we have given great importance to oral sources of information. We have benefitted from many hours of interviews with NASA personnel, both at headquarters and at the field centers, in our reconstruction of the management story. The story is multifaceted. We have striven to represent the differing, sometimes divergent, perspectives. We have also tried to elucidate the perceptions of the players in the decision process. We owe an enormous debt of gratitude to those iv NASA personnel who h_lve given freely of their time; we hope we have represented their accounts accurately. Those who generously shared their insights and opinions are listed in appendix A. We would especially like to acknowledge the following people for their contribution to the completion of this project. We thank Philip Culbertson, John Hodge, Robert Dotts, and Sylvia Fries for their comments on earlier drafts of the manuscript. We also appreciate the continuous encouragement given by James Begs, Robert Freitag, Lee Tilton, Neil Hutchinson, Jerry Craig, William Raney, Terence Finn, Jo_m Aaron, and Aaron Cohen. We are indebted to the archival support from Manfred _Dutch" von E_renfried, Lee Saegesser, Adam Gruen, and the NASA History Office in Washington, DC; Mike Wright at Marshall Space Flight Center; Donald Hess, Joey Pellarin, and Janet Kovacevich of the Histoq, Office at Johnson Space center; and Lee Tilton for his copious personal fdes on the space station prob,'am. Administrative suppc.rt for the contract was provided by the Institute for Public Policy and Business Research at the Universily of Kansas. Anthony Redwood and his capable staff at the Institute were an important factor in completion of this project. We particularly acknowledge Mary Brohammer for her dedication, patience, and ingenuity in bringing this monograph to publication. KEEPING THE DREAM ALIVE: MANAGING THE SPACE STATION PROGRAM, 1982,-1986 °°° Preface .................................................... m PART I: THE NEXT LOGICAL STEP 1. Keeping the Dream ?dive ...................................... 3 2. Managing