THE DEVELOPMENT RESPONSE TO VIOLENT EXTREMISM AND INSURGENCY Putting Principles USAID POLICY into Practice BUREAU FOR POLICY, PLANNING AND LEARNING SEPTEMBER 2011 USAID THE DEVELOPMENT RESPONSE TO VIOLENT EXTREMISM AND INSURGENCY POLICY SEPTEMBER 2011 i Message from the Administrator USAID Policy /The Development Response to Violent Extremism and Insurgency MESSAGE FROM THE ADMINISTRATOR President Obama’s National Security Strategy and Global Already today, close to 60 percent of State and USAID’s for­ Development Policy both stress that successful development eign assistance goes to 50 countries that are in the midst of, is essential to advancing our national security objectives. or trying to prevent conflict or state failure.This policy is crit­ ical to supporting our staff on the frontlines of our greatest Consistent with these broader strategic frameworks, this pol­ national security and development challenges. Our Agency’s icy provides USAID with a clear mandate and specific renewed emphasis on learning, innovation and risk­taking guidance on the development response to violent extremism means we will study and improve our work in exactly those and insurgency.This policy comes at a critical time; develop­ areas that have proven most difficult. ment assistance is increasingly called upon as an integral component of the interagency response to complex national With this policy, the Agency and its field Missions can now security and development challenges. rely on a clear set of common concepts and definitions, engagement criteria, and programming principles to support In line with our USAID Forward reform effort, this policy rep­ and guide our work, enhance its impact and ensure we resents an ongoing drive to use our long experience and vast deliver sustainable results. Most importantly, its implementa­ knowledge base to provide crucial thought leadership to the tion will be characterized by close cooperation with development field.The policy is not defined simply by our interagency, international, and local partners as we continue involvement in recent conflicts like Afghanistan and Iraq. It to address these pressing global challenges while learning builds upon the Agency’s experience in countries seized with from ongoing efforts. violent extremism and insurgency in other parts of Asia and the Middle East, as well as Africa and Latin America. Clarifying USAID’s role in the context of violent extremism and insurgency does not come without controversy. Some hold strong views on whether development agencies gener­ ally—and USAID in particular—should engage on these Rajiv Shah issues. Programming resources to respond to violent extrem­ Administrator ism and insurgency requires the Agency to assume greater U.S. Agency for International Development institutional and operational risk. But as the World Bank’s recent 2011 World Development Report made clear, the costs of conflict—developmentally, economic and human—are simply too costly to ignore. By not confronting where we can those development related factors that drive conflict and, specific to this policy, violent extremism and insurgency, we will ignore the plight of many around the world in great need. ii USAID Policy /The Development Response to Violent Extremism and Insurgency Acknowledgements ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS A PolicyTaskTeam (PTT), chaired by Melissa Brown from the These USAID staff worked intensively and collaboratively in Bureau of Policy, Planning and Learning (PPL), produced service to this critical policy work, and will continue to serve as USAID’s Policy on The Development Response to Violent Extrem­ important resources in the policy’s implementation. ism and Insurgency. The PTT consisted of seven individuals selected from across the Agency for their recognized knowl­ The PTT was launched in September 2010 with a USAID Evi­ edge and expertise on these issues: dence Summit that brought together representatives from the interagency, donor, and academic communities who specialize in ■ Brian Bacon (Bureau of Policy, Planning and Learning), violent extremism and insurgency­related research and evalua­ ■ Lisa Chandonnet­Bedoya (Bureau for Democracy, Con­ tion. The PTT consulted with USAID experts serving both in flict and Humanitarian Assistance (DCHA)/Office of Washington and the field. Outside of USAID, the PTT con­ Conflict Mitigation and Management), ducted consultations and briefings with key interagency ■ Stacia George (DCHA/Office ofTransition Initiatives), partners, interested Congressional staff, and external experts. ■ Angela Martin (Africa Bureau), Their contributions substantially improved and informed the ■ Craig Mullaney (Office of Afghanistan and Pakistan final policy. Affairs), ■ Leah Werchick (DCHA/Office ofTransition Initiatives), and ■ Oliver Wilcox (Middle East and Asia Bureaus). iii Executive Summary USAID Policy /The Development Response to Violent Extremism and Insurgency EXECUTIVE SUMMARY This policy on The Development Response toViolent Extremism In the context of the U.S. Global Development Policy and the and Insurgency is the first of its kind produced by USAID. Its pur­ Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR) on pose is to provide a policy framework that USAID can use to enhancing civilian power, the policy identifies ways that USAID improve the effectiveness of its development tools in responding can work with its interagency partners and amplify the develop­ to violent extremism and insurgency, as well as its capacity to ment voice within the USG. It also emphasizes the importance interact constructively with its interagency and other partners in of local partnership with committed stakeholders and enhanced these challenging environments. The policy will also help USAID engagement with bilateral counterparts and multilateral institu­ focus more tightly on capacity building and sustainability which tions. are critical to our long­term security and development goals. The policy affirms the importance of the development discipline The policy defines terms necessary for a shared understanding to, and USAID’s distinct and critical role in, addressing these criti­ within USAID of these challenges and differentiates at a general cal national security and development challenges. This includes level between a development response to violent extremism USAID’s focus on sustainability and building ownership and and a development response to insurgency. At the same time, it capacity at all levels. If applied correctly, a development response acknowledges that each situation is different and that these can serve as an effective tool to address these issues. terms and the development response will need to be defined and understood in their particular context and guided by U.S. Specifically, the policy directs the Agency to: foreign policy. (1) Consider key engagement criteria at the earliest Building on a growing knowledge base, the policy identifies those stage of program development, recognizing that the factors, or drivers, that can favor the rise of violent extremism or development response is part of a broader USG effort. insurgency as well as those that can influence the radicalization of These criteria include: individuals. Broadly speaking, these include structural “push” fac­ tors, including high levels of social marginalization and ■ an assessment of the drivers of violent extremism and fragmentation; poorly governed or ungoverned areas; govern­ insurgency, host country (government and popula­ ment repression and human rights violations; endemic corruption tion) commitment, and potential development and elite impunity; and cultural threat perceptions. Simultane­ responses; ously, “pull” factors that have a direct influence on individual level ■ a determination of an appropriate and critical role for radicalization and recruitment include access to material development assistance; resources, social status and respect from peers; a sense of ■ a determination that an adequate level of security belonging, adventure, and self­esteem or personal empowerment exists to permit implementing partners to operate that individuals and groups that have long viewed themselves as and communicate with USAID; victimized and marginalized can derive from the feeling that they ■ identification of risks to the Agency,our partners and are making history; and the prospect of achieving glory and fame. related development investments, as well as a plan to The policy identifies what USAID has learned strategically and mitigate risk; and, programmatically about the role of development assistance to ■ consideration of program, management, and resource counter these drivers and affect a country’s development. plans. iv USAID Policy /The Development Response to Violent Extremism and Insurgency Executive Summary (2) Apply a core body of program principles at all For Operational and Management stages of the programming cycle.The following princi­ Responsiveness ples will guide USAID’s design and implementation of development programming targeted at violent extrem­ ■ Flexibility, agility and procurement speed. USAID will ism and insurgency. These are informed by our increase its capability to procure rapidly, adjust as con­ knowledge base as well as USAID’s broader stabilization ditions change, and expand its work with and through experience. local partners. ■ Intensive program management. USAID will ensure For Analysis, Planning, and Design staff are trained and equipped to provide hands­on management and oversight required for results. ■ Focus on the drivers