Influence and Marginalisation Norway’s Adaptation to US Transformation Efforts in NATO, 1998–2004 A dissertation for the degree of Dr. Polit. Submitted to the Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Oslo, July 2005 Tormod Heier Table of Contents PREFACE ...........................................................................................................................VI PART I: BUILDING A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK ............................................ 1 Defining the Norwegian Room for Manoeuvre ............................................................ 2 Limitations .................................................................................................................... 3 Building A Case Study Research Strategy .................................................................... 4 Controlling for Confounding Influence ........................................................................ 6 Why Do We Choose the DCI? ...................................................................................... 8 What is the DCI? ........................................................................................................ 11 Sources ....................................................................................................................... 13 Structuring the Thesis ................................................................................................. 14 CHAPTER 1. HISTORICAL CONTEXT ................................................................................. 16 Periods of Flux - How did Norway Respond? ............................................................ 16 The First Example: 1948–1953 .............................................................................. 17 The Second Example: 1975–1985 .......................................................................... 21 The Third Example: 1991–1999 ............................................................................. 25 How can the Norwegian Approach be Explained? ..................................................... 29 CHAPTER 2. STRATEGIC CONTEXT ................................................................................... 35 What is the US Rationale for European Transformation? ......................................... 36 How Should Europe Proceed? ................................................................................... 43 What are the US Expectations? .................................................................................. 50 Conclusion .................................................................................................................. 55 CHAPTER 3. EXPLAINING INFLUENCE .............................................................................. 59 Realism: Influence Through International Structures ................................................ 60 Step One. Anarchy and National Security Concerns .............................................. 62 Step Two. Balancing Threats and Escalating Disputes .......................................... 63 Step Three. Military Assistance and Dependency .................................................. 66 Step Four. Invitation and Access ............................................................................ 68 Institutionalism: Influence Through Processes .......................................................... 70 Step One. Common Challenges and Incentives for Co-operation .......................... 72 Step Two. From Co-operation to Issue-Linking ..................................................... 74 Step Three. From Issue-Linking to Commitments ................................................. 75 Step Four. Displaying Solidarity ............................................................................ 77 A Model of Explanation .............................................................................................. 80 ii PART II: NORWAY’S EXTERNAL ROOM FOR MANOEUVRE .......................... 83 CHAPTER 4. US INFLUENCE – A REALIST PERSPECTIVE .................................................. 84 What are the Motives? ................................................................................................ 87 The External Motive: Sustaining US Security Guaranties ..................................... 87 The Internal Motive: Accelerating Military Reforms ............................................. 95 Summing Up ........................................................................................................... 98 What are the Evidences? ............................................................................................ 99 Norway’s Initial Response ..................................................................................... 99 Amendments on Norway’s Defence Concept ....................................................... 106 Norway’s Broader Pace of Reform ...................................................................... 109 Conclusion ................................................................................................................ 111 Finding I: Explaining US Influence as a Strategy of Attraction .......................... 111 Finding II: Explaining US Influence as a Quest for Access ................................. 115 CHAPTER 5. US INFLUENCE – AN INSTITUTIONALIST PERSPECTIVE ............................... 121 What are the Motives? .............................................................................................. 123 The External Motive: Corroborate NATO’s Cohesion ........................................ 123 The Internal Motive: Providing Affordable Capabilities ..................................... 129 Summing Up ......................................................................................................... 133 What are the Evidences? .......................................................................................... 134 Norway’s “Beauty Contest” in NATO ................................................................. 135 The Quest for Affordable Forces .......................................................................... 143 Conclusion ................................................................................................................ 147 Finding I: Explaining US Influence as a Result of Commitments ....................... 148 Finding II: Explaining US Influence as a Result of Force Reductions ................ 152 CHAPTER 6. EVALUATING THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK ........................................... 155 Anaytical Control of Other Intervening Variables ................................................... 155 Norwegian Adaptation and Realist Validity ............................................................. 158 Norwegian Adaptation and Institutional Validity .................................................... 159 Conclusion ................................................................................................................ 161 PART III: NORWAY’S DOMESTIC ROOM FOR MANOEUVRE ....................... 162 CHAPTER 7. ADAPTATION AND ACCOUNTABILITY ......................................................... 167 Methods and Theory ................................................................................................. 168 The MoD’s Transformation Context ........................................................................ 170 Balancing US and UN/EU Relations ........................................................................ 171 Balancing Allied and National Prerogatives ........................................................... 178 Conclusion ................................................................................................................ 183 iii CHAPTER 8. AN INCONSISTENT FOREIGN POLICY? ........................................................ 185 The Operative Context in Norway’s Broader Foreign Policy .................................. 186 US Transformation Efforts and Political Relevance ................................................ 189 Military Adaptation and Foreign Policy Objectives ................................................ 198 Conclusion ................................................................................................................ 205 NATO as the Only Point of Military Reference ................................................... 205 Reconciling Combat and Post-Combat Capabilities ............................................ 206 CHAPTER 9. PERSPECTIVES ON DOMESTIC RESTRAINTS ................................................. 207 On Receptiveness and Hesistancy Towards a Key Ally ............................................ 208 On Defence Planning Priorities ............................................................................... 211 Conclusion ................................................................................................................ 214 PART IV: BRIDGING EXPECTATIONS AND DEMANDS ................................... 215 CHAPTER 10. MILITARY MECHANISMS AND POLITICAL INFLUENCE .............................. 218 Access Through Central Positioning ........................................................................ 219 Influence Through A Focused Concept .................................................................... 222 Conceptual Guidelines ............................................................................................. 225 The First Example: Special Forces ....................................................................... 226 The Second Example: Mechanised Infantry