Restructuring the banking system – in August 1996. The third, and current, phase is marked by the entry of the case of Brazil foreign banks.1 The Banco Central do Brasil (BCB), with discretionary power to intervene in financial markets and close financial institutions, played a key Geraldo Maia* role in the first phase. The institutional arrangements that provide for these discretionary powers are known as Special Regimes, which include intervention, a mechanism for temporary special management (Regime de Administracão Especial Temporária (RAET) and extrajudicial (out-of-court) liquidation. The second phase is marked by the restructuring of private and Introduction state-owned banks. The two programmes (PROER and PROES) aimed to protect the interests of depositors and to transfer the shareholding The implementation of the Real Plan in July 1994 triggered a major control of troubled banks. Two fundamental objectives were to guaran- process of structural changes in the Brazilian financial system. Years of tee the normal functioning of the payments system and to preserve high inflation had created the incentives for an overbranched banking confidence in the banking business generally. This helped to prevent bank system in order to benefit from the accumulation of relatively low- runs and to keep moral hazard to a minimum. interest rate deposits. With currency stabilisation, hyperinflation ended The third phase involves the entry of new foreign institutions, a and Brazilian banks were forced to retrench, find new sources of farreaching process which, together with the policies of bank closure and financing and redirect their activities. restructuring, is bringing about significant changes in the structure of the The evolution of the financial system since then can be roughly banking industry. divided into three, partly overlapping, phases. The first phase followed immediately the inception of the Real Plan and was marked by the use of official intervention and liquidation to reduce the number of banks. The The magnitude of the problem second phase was characterised by the implementation of the Programa de Estímulo à Reestruturacão e ao Fortalecimento do Sistema Financeiro Inflation had provided banks with an important source of revenue (“the Nacional (Programme of Incentives for the Restructuring and Strength- float”) as the real value of sight deposits fell each day and as time ening of the National Financial System) PROER in November 1995 and deposits carried interest rates that were typically below the rate of the Programa de Incentivo ã Reducão do Setor Público Estadual na Atividade inflation. By the early 1990s, banks’ “inflationary revenue” had grown to Bancária (similar, but for the state-owned financial system) – PROES around 4 0/0 of GDP, accounting for almost 40 0/0 of the revenue from financial intermediation (i.e. the difference between interest receipts and payments) and other services (Table 1). It fell to 2 0/0 of GDP in 1994, and by 1995 it was negligible. A comparison of 1994 figures with the * I would like to acknowledge my colleagues at the Central Bank of Brazil, especially Luis Gustavo da Matta Machado, Lúcio Rodrigues Capelletto, Silvânia Vieira de Miranda, Carlos Takeshi Yonezawa and Cleofas Salviano Júnior for helpful comments and data. I also benefited 1 Significant improvements in banking regulation and supervision have also been recently from insightful discussions with Philip Turner, Jozef Van ‘t dack, Elmar Koch, John Hawkins, implemented. Although the measures adopted constitute an important element of the restruc- Pablo Graf and Serge Jeanneau of the BIS. The ideas and conclusions expressed here do not turing policy, they are not analysed here. See Almeida Júnior, Mansueto and Mendonca de Barros necessarily reflect the opinion of the Central Bank of Brazil. Any remaining errors or omissions (1996, 1997), Banco Central do Brasil (1998), IMF (1998) and Tombini (1999) for a discussion on are the sole responsibility of the author. this matter. 106 107 Table 1 The combination of a low-inflation environment (loss of the float) The inflationary revenue of banks with the (temporary) surge in bank credit expansion (increase of NPLs) thus served to destabilise a financial system that had long lived under Year As 0/0 of GDP As 0/0 of Bank Value Added high and volatile inflation rates and that had yet to develop a solid “credit 1990 4.0 35.7 culture”. 1991 3.9 41.3 To make matters worse, the fiscal position of most of the state 1992 4.0 41.9 governments began to deteriorate from 1995: here, too, the slowness to 1993 4.2 35.3 1994 2.0 20.4 adapt to the low-inflation environment and the devastating effects of high 1995 0.0 0.6 real interest rates were the main reasons for renewed problems. Source:ANDIMA/IBGE:Financial system:an analysis as from the national accounts – 1990/1995. Bank intervention and closure average from 1990 to 1993 suggests that banks lost about R19 billion in inflationary revenue from stabilisation.2 The legislation that deals with bank intervention and closure, established Such a huge loss meant that financial institutions would have to make in Law 6,024/74, Decree-law 2,321/87 and Law 9,447/97, covers the cases radical changes in order to adapt to the new low-inflation environment. of (a) insolvency, (b) bad management and (c) violation of banking laws As a result, many banks began a process of adjustment involving the and regulations. Under these legal provisions, private and non-federal closing of branches that were no longer economically viable and the public financial institutions can be made subject to certain procedures, dismissal of employees. known as Special Regimes, such as intervention, the so-called temporary The other side of the coin was that, with the end of hyperinflation, it special management (RAET) and extrajudicial liquidation. became more attractive to hold bank deposits, which grew dramatically The decree and the management of a special regime is the responsi- following stabilisation (“remonetisation”).3 To relend these deposits, and bility of the central bank. The provisions of the general Bankruptcy Law to compensate for the loss of inflationary revenue, the banking system (Decree-law 7,661/45) are also applicable to financial institutions under was under some pressure to expand lending. Therefore, in order to extrajudicial liquidation. forestall an excessively rapid growth of bank credit, the authorities In addition, financial institutions may also be dissolved by the share- increased the reserve requirements on sight deposits from 48 0/0 to 100 0/0 holders (ordinary liquidation), following the provisions of the Brazilian (at the margin) right at the outset of the Real Plan. Even so, financial Corporate Law (Law 4,595/64).6 Moreover, the bankruptcy of financial sector loans to the private sector grew by almost 60 0/0 during the institutions can be declared by judicial order; in this case, the general first year of the Plan.4 Such rapid growth of bank loans at first partly provisions of the Bankruptcy Law are applicable. compensated for the loss of the “float”, postponing the adjustment of the financial system. But the downturn in economic activity in the second Special Regimes quarter of 1995 as a result of increased interest rates after the Mexican The Special Regimes of intervention, extrajudicial liquidation and RAET crisis led to a substantial increase of non-performing loans (NPLs).5 essentially provide the early, structured intervention mechanisms (exit 2 See Almeida Júnior, Mansueto and Mendonca de Barros (1997). 3 Sight deposits grew by 165 0/0 during the first six months of the Real Plan. 6 In the ordinary liquidation, assets are disposable and liabilities are enforcable, but the 4 See Almeida Júnior and Mendonca de Barros (1997). institution stops setting up new operations. Authorisation to operate is cancelled as obligations 5 The delinquency rate reached a peak of about 10.5 0/0 in July 1996. are met. 108 109 Diagram 1 Table 2 Special regimes Liquidation, intervention, temporary special management (RAET) and bankruptcy since the Real Plan (July 1994 – December 1998) Intervention Temporary special management – RAET Type of Intervention Number of Institutions Intervention 2 Extrajudicial liquidation Return to normal activities Extrajudicial Liquidation 28 Ordinary Liquidation 3 RAET 5 Bankruptcy 10 Total 48 Bankruptcy procedures Source: Central Bank of Brazil. policy) of the financial system: whenever there are cases of insolvency, bad management or infractions of banking laws, the central bank can, the maturities of all liabilities are brought forward to the date of the at its discretion, take action (Diagram 1). Accordingly, there is no liquidation. Interest payments are not necessarily due.9 Moreover, quantitative rule triggering a Special Regime.7 Under a Special Regime, the inflation correction is not applied to liabilities.10 The period of an the directors of the financial institution concerned automatically and intervention shall not exceed six months; the central bank may renew immediately lose their offices. An Intervenor, a Liquidator and a Board of this period only once (i.e. for at most another six months). Directors are appointed by the central bank and are granted the power Contrary to intervention and extrajudicial liquidation, however, the to conduct the transformation, merger, split or transfer of the share- adoption of a RAET will not affect the normal activities of the financial holding control of the institution (including federalisation). Managers and institution. Moreover, the duration of a RAET is set more flexibly (i.e. is majority shareholders assume joint responsibility for the institution’s not limited to at most one year). uncovered liabilities: during this process, they are not allowed to sell any If the institution does not return to its normal activities, intervention properties they own. and the RAET are ultimately followed by extrajudicial liquidation, while In the case of intervention, there occurs “a suspension of liabilities bankruptcy procedures follow the extrajudicial liquidation.