DOCSLIB.ORG

Restructuring the Banking System – in August 1996

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Restructuring the Banking System – in August 1996 Restructuring the banking system – in August 1996. The third, and current, phase is marked by the entry of the case of Brazil foreign banks.1 The Banco Central do Brasil (BCB), with discretionary power to intervene in financial markets and close financial institutions, played a key Geraldo Maia* role in the first phase. The institutional arrangements that provide for these discretionary powers are known as Special Regimes, which include intervention, a mechanism for temporary special management (Regime de Administracão Especial Temporária (RAET) and extrajudicial (out-of-court) liquidation. The second phase is marked by the restructuring of private and Introduction state-owned banks. The two programmes (PROER and PROES) aimed to protect the interests of depositors and to transfer the shareholding The implementation of the Real Plan in July 1994 triggered a major control of troubled banks. Two fundamental objectives were to guaran- process of structural changes in the Brazilian financial system. Years of tee the normal functioning of the payments system and to preserve high inflation had created the incentives for an overbranched banking confidence in the banking business generally. This helped to prevent bank system in order to benefit from the accumulation of relatively low- runs and to keep moral hazard to a minimum. interest rate deposits. With currency stabilisation, hyperinflation ended The third phase involves the entry of new foreign institutions, a and Brazilian banks were forced to retrench, find new sources of farreaching process which, together with the policies of bank closure and financing and redirect their activities. restructuring, is bringing about significant changes in the structure of the The evolution of the financial system since then can be roughly banking industry. divided into three, partly overlapping, phases. The first phase followed immediately the inception of the Real Plan and was marked by the use of official intervention and liquidation to reduce the number of banks. The The magnitude of the problem second phase was characterised by the implementation of the Programa de Estímulo à Reestruturacão e ao Fortalecimento do Sistema Financeiro Inflation had provided banks with an important source of revenue (“the Nacional (Programme of Incentives for the Restructuring and Strength- float”) as the real value of sight deposits fell each day and as time ening of the National Financial System) PROER in November 1995 and deposits carried interest rates that were typically below the rate of the Programa de Incentivo ã Reducão do Setor Público Estadual na Atividade inflation. By the early 1990s, banks’ “inflationary revenue” had grown to Bancária (similar, but for the state-owned financial system) – PROES around 4 0/0 of GDP, accounting for almost 40 0/0 of the revenue from financial intermediation (i.e. the difference between interest receipts and payments) and other services (Table 1). It fell to 2 0/0 of GDP in 1994, and by 1995 it was negligible. A comparison of 1994 figures with the * I would like to acknowledge my colleagues at the Central Bank of Brazil, especially Luis Gustavo da Matta Machado, Lúcio Rodrigues Capelletto, Silvânia Vieira de Miranda, Carlos Takeshi Yonezawa and Cleofas Salviano Júnior for helpful comments and data. I also benefited 1 Significant improvements in banking regulation and supervision have also been recently from insightful discussions with Philip Turner, Jozef Van ‘t dack, Elmar Koch, John Hawkins, implemented. Although the measures adopted constitute an important element of the restruc- Pablo Graf and Serge Jeanneau of the BIS. The ideas and conclusions expressed here do not turing policy, they are not analysed here. See Almeida Júnior, Mansueto and Mendonca de Barros necessarily reflect the opinion of the Central Bank of Brazil. Any remaining errors or omissions (1996, 1997), Banco Central do Brasil (1998), IMF (1998) and Tombini (1999) for a discussion on are the sole responsibility of the author. this matter. 106 107 Table 1 The combination of a low-inflation environment (loss of the float) The inflationary revenue of banks with the (temporary) surge in bank credit expansion (increase of NPLs) thus served to destabilise a financial system that had long lived under Year As 0/0 of GDP As 0/0 of Bank Value Added high and volatile inflation rates and that had yet to develop a solid “credit 1990 4.0 35.7 culture”. 1991 3.9 41.3 To make matters worse, the fiscal position of most of the state 1992 4.0 41.9 governments began to deteriorate from 1995: here, too, the slowness to 1993 4.2 35.3 1994 2.0 20.4 adapt to the low-inflation environment and the devastating effects of high 1995 0.0 0.6 real interest rates were the main reasons for renewed problems. Source:ANDIMA/IBGE:Financial system:an analysis as from the national accounts – 1990/1995. Bank intervention and closure average from 1990 to 1993 suggests that banks lost about R19 billion in inflationary revenue from stabilisation.2 The legislation that deals with bank intervention and closure, established Such a huge loss meant that financial institutions would have to make in Law 6,024/74, Decree-law 2,321/87 and Law 9,447/97, covers the cases radical changes in order to adapt to the new low-inflation environment. of (a) insolvency, (b) bad management and (c) violation of banking laws As a result, many banks began a process of adjustment involving the and regulations. Under these legal provisions, private and non-federal closing of branches that were no longer economically viable and the public financial institutions can be made subject to certain procedures, dismissal of employees. known as Special Regimes, such as intervention, the so-called temporary The other side of the coin was that, with the end of hyperinflation, it special management (RAET) and extrajudicial liquidation. became more attractive to hold bank deposits, which grew dramatically The decree and the management of a special regime is the responsi- following stabilisation (“remonetisation”).3 To relend these deposits, and bility of the central bank. The provisions of the general Bankruptcy Law to compensate for the loss of inflationary revenue, the banking system (Decree-law 7,661/45) are also applicable to financial institutions under was under some pressure to expand lending. Therefore, in order to extrajudicial liquidation. forestall an excessively rapid growth of bank credit, the authorities In addition, financial institutions may also be dissolved by the share- increased the reserve requirements on sight deposits from 48 0/0 to 100 0/0 holders (ordinary liquidation), following the provisions of the Brazilian (at the margin) right at the outset of the Real Plan. Even so, financial Corporate Law (Law 4,595/64).6 Moreover, the bankruptcy of financial sector loans to the private sector grew by almost 60 0/0 during the institutions can be declared by judicial order; in this case, the general first year of the Plan.4 Such rapid growth of bank loans at first partly provisions of the Bankruptcy Law are applicable. compensated for the loss of the “float”, postponing the adjustment of the financial system. But the downturn in economic activity in the second Special Regimes quarter of 1995 as a result of increased interest rates after the Mexican The Special Regimes of intervention, extrajudicial liquidation and RAET crisis led to a substantial increase of non-performing loans (NPLs).5 essentially provide the early, structured intervention mechanisms (exit 2 See Almeida Júnior, Mansueto and Mendonca de Barros (1997). 3 Sight deposits grew by 165 0/0 during the first six months of the Real Plan. 6 In the ordinary liquidation, assets are disposable and liabilities are enforcable, but the 4 See Almeida Júnior and Mendonca de Barros (1997). institution stops setting up new operations. Authorisation to operate is cancelled as obligations 5 The delinquency rate reached a peak of about 10.5 0/0 in July 1996. are met. 108 109 Diagram 1 Table 2 Special regimes Liquidation, intervention, temporary special management (RAET) and bankruptcy since the Real Plan (July 1994 – December 1998) Intervention Temporary special management – RAET Type of Intervention Number of Institutions Intervention 2 Extrajudicial liquidation Return to normal activities Extrajudicial Liquidation 28 Ordinary Liquidation 3 RAET 5 Bankruptcy 10 Total 48 Bankruptcy procedures Source: Central Bank of Brazil. policy) of the financial system: whenever there are cases of insolvency, bad management or infractions of banking laws, the central bank can, the maturities of all liabilities are brought forward to the date of the at its discretion, take action (Diagram 1). Accordingly, there is no liquidation. Interest payments are not necessarily due.9 Moreover, quantitative rule triggering a Special Regime.7 Under a Special Regime, the inflation correction is not applied to liabilities.10 The period of an the directors of the financial institution concerned automatically and intervention shall not exceed six months; the central bank may renew immediately lose their offices. An Intervenor, a Liquidator and a Board of this period only once (i.e. for at most another six months). Directors are appointed by the central bank and are granted the power Contrary to intervention and extrajudicial liquidation, however, the to conduct the transformation, merger, split or transfer of the share- adoption of a RAET will not affect the normal activities of the financial holding control of the institution (including federalisation). Managers and institution. Moreover, the duration of a RAET is set more flexibly (i.e. is majority shareholders assume joint responsibility for the institution’s not limited to at most one year). uncovered liabilities: during this process, they are not allowed to sell any If the institution does not return to its normal activities, intervention properties they own. and the RAET are ultimately followed by extrajudicial liquidation, while In the case of intervention, there occurs “a suspension of liabilities bankruptcy procedures follow the extrajudicial liquidation.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Brazil's Largest Private Banks: an Economic and Sociopolitical Profile
    Sociologias vol.3 no.se Porto Alegre 2007 Brazil’s largest private banks: an economic and sociopolitical ∗∗∗ profile Ary Cesar Minella Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (Federal University of Santa Catarina). Email: [email protected] ABSTRACT This study examines elements of the power of financial institutions, emphasizing control over capital flow – characterized as financial hegemony – the constitution of economic or financial groups, the structure of representation of the segment's class interests, and its participation in the political process and in State decision-making mechanisms. Considering the economic restructuring undergone by Brazil in the 1990s, the work draws a profile of the ten largest private banks based on selected economic and sociopolitical indicators. Beyond their stance as mere financial intermediaries, it indicates the degree to which those banks become economic groups and, especially, larger organizational units, which is shown in connections with the State and in the class's actual organization and actions in the corporate and political realms. Key words: Financial system, bank concentration, financial groups, financial hegemony, class representation. Introduction To discuss the theme of this issue’s dossier, it is important to consider the role of the financial system in the process of wealth concentration in Brazil in recent years. With a relatively high degree of concentration of financial operations in a few state and private institutions, the financial system has made use of several mechanisms to accumulate wealth. The importance of each mechanism has varied ∗ This work is related to the research project " América Latina: uma visão sociopolítica das transformações e das perspectivas do sistema financeiro – III etapa " (Latin America: a sociopolitical view on the changes and prospects of the financial system – stage 3), with support from CNPq (Brazilian National Council of Research).
    [Show full text]
  • Financial Market Development, Monetary Policy and Financial Stability in Brazil
    Financial market development, monetary policy and financial stability in Brazil João Barata R.B. Barroso1 and Fernanda Nechio2 Abstract Financial market development affects financial intermediaries, corporations and households, setting the grounds on how these agents can act in the economy. Brazil’s comprehensive reform agenda in recent years has promoted the deepening of credit markets, with households and corporations gaining increased access to credit domestically. These developments have a wide range of implications for monetary policy transmission and financial stability. JEL classification: E5, E51, E62, G1. Keywords: financial market development, crowding in, financial inclusion. This note was written in December 2019. 1 Central Bank of Brazil and International Monetary Fund (OEDBR) 2 Central Bank of Brazil BIS Papers No 113 55 Introduction Financial market development affects financial intermediaries, corporations and households, setting the grounds on how these players can act in the economy. To the extent that the transmission of monetary policy hinges on credit access, financial market development becomes a first-order concern for most central bankers. Brazil has come a long way with regard to financial market development in recent years. Changes to legislation, as well as specific government policies, have promoted the deepening of local credit markets. Households and corporations are gaining increased access to domestic credit markets, a development with a wide range of implications for monetary policy transmission and financial stability. These developments, combined with the global liquidity trends in place since the Great Financial Crisis, also affect the foreign exchange rate markets. This note discusses financial market development in Brazil, focusing on local credit and FX markets, and the impact on monetary policy.
    [Show full text]
  • Is There a Case for Independent Monetary Authorities in Brazil
    Law and Business Review of the Americas Volume 10 Number 2 Article 2 2004 Regulatory and Supervisory Independence: Is There a Case for Independent Monetary Authorities in Brazil John William Anderson Jr. Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/lbra Recommended Citation John William Anderson, Regulatory and Supervisory Independence: Is There a Case for Independent Monetary Authorities in Brazil, 10 LAW & BUS. REV. AM. 253 (2004) https://scholar.smu.edu/lbra/vol10/iss2/2 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in Law and Business Review of the Americas by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu. REGULATORY AND SUPERVISORY INDEPENDENCE: Is THERE A CASE FOR INDEPENDENT MONETARY AUTHORITIES IN BRAZIL? John William Anderson, Jr.*' "I wish to assert a much more fundamental role for institutions in soci- eties; they are the underlying determinantof the long-run performance of economies."' -Douglas North I. INTRODUCTION ESPITE its importance, the issue of financial sector regulatory and supervisory independence ("RSI") has received only margi- nal attention in literature and practice. The present work at- tempts to fill this gap by revisiting the theoretical approach justifying RSI and by conducting a case study on the Brazilian institutional framework. The object of this paper assumes greater relevance in light of the cur- rent political and economic perspectives in Brazil. In May 2003, an amendment to article 192 of Brazil's Federal Constitution of 1988 regulat- ing the Brazilian Financial System was approved by the Brazilian Con- gress.2 With the approval of this amendment, considerable changes are *John William Anderson, Jr., Brazilian Attorney, LL.M.
    [Show full text]
  • State Government Bailouts in Brazil
    View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by Research Papers in Economics Inter-American Development Bank Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo Latin American Research Network Red de Centros de Investigación Research Network Working paper #R-441 State Government Bailouts in Brazil by Afonso S. Bevilaqua Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro ((PUC-Rio)PUC-Rio) March 2002 Cataloging-in-Publication data provided by the Inter-American Development Bank Felipe Herrera Library Bevilaqua, Afonso S. State government bailouts in Brazil / by Afonso S. Bevilaqua. p. cm. (Research Network Working papers ; R-441) Includes bibliographical references. 1. Intergovernmental fiscal relations--Brazil. 2. Debt, Public--Brazil. 3. Debt relief -- Brazil. I. Inter-American Development Bank. Research Dept. II. Title. III. Series. 336 B385--dc21 &2002 Inter-American Development Bank 1300 New York Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20577 The views and interpretations in this document are those of the authors and should not be attributed to the Inter-American Development Bank, or to any individual acting on its behalf. The Research Department (RES) produces the Latin American Economic Policies Newsletter, as well as working papers and books, on diverse economic issues. To obtain a complete list of RES publications, and read or download them please visit our web site at: http://www.iadb.org/res ii Abstract* As a result of the consolidation of democracy after the end of the military regime in the mid-1980s, Brazil has gone through a period of remarkable decentralization both in fiscal and political terms. The move towards decentralized management and control of public finances has been followed by a series of bailouts of state governments by the federal government.
    [Show full text]
  • Revista Da PGBC Revista Da Procuradoria-Geral Do Banco Central Volume 14 • Número 1 • Junho 2020
    Revista da PGBC Revista da Procuradoria-Geral do Banco Central Volume 14 • Número 1 • Junho 2020 Ficha catalográfica elaborada pela Biblioteca do Banco Central do Brasil Revista da Procuradoria-Geral do Banco Central. / Banco Central do Brasil. Procuradoria-Geral. Vol. 14, n. 1, jun. 2020. Brasília: BCB, 2020. Semestral (junho e dezembro) ISSN 2595-0894 1. Direito econômico – Periódico. 2. Sistema financeiro – Regulação – Periódico. I. Banco Central do Brasil. Procuradoria-Geral. CDU 346.1(05) Procuradoria-Geral do Banco Central Banco Central do Brasil SBS, Quadra 3, Bloco B, Edifício-Sede, 11º andar 70074-900 Brasília – DF Telefones: (61) 3414-1220 e 3414-2946 E-mail: [email protected] Revista da Procuradoria-Geral do Banco Central Volume 14. Número 1. Junho 2020 Editor-Chefe da Revista da Procuradoria-Geral do Banco Central Leandro Novais e Silva – Banco Central, MG Editor Adjunto da Revista da Procuradoria-Geral do Banco Central Marcelo Madureira Prates – Banco Central, DF Corpo Editorial da Revista da Procuradoria-Geral do Banco Central Conselheiros Dr. Álvaro Augusto Camilo Mariano – Universidade Federal de Goiás e Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Paraná, GO e PR Dr. Bruno Meyerhof Salama – Fundação Getulio Vargas, SP Dr. Edil Batista Junior – Banco Central, PE Dr. Ivo Teixeira Gico Junior – Centro Universitário de Brasília, DF Me. Jefferson Siqueira de Brito Álvares – Banco Central, DF Dr. Marcos Antônio Rios da Nóbrega – Universidade Federal de Pernambuco, PE Dr. Rubens Beçak – Universidade de São Paulo, SP Dr. Vincenzo Demétrio Florenzano – Banco Central, MG Me. Yuri Restano Machado – Banco Central, RS Consultores Dra. Ana Rachel Freitas da Silva – Centro Universitário de Brasília, DF Dr.
    [Show full text]
  • Foreign Investment in Brazil and the International Financial Markets
    LC/BRS/DT.014 February, 1998 Original: English ECLAC ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN Brasilia Office FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN BRAZIL AND THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL MARKETS Document prepared by Renato Baumann, Officer-in-Charge of ECLAC Brasilia Office for presentation at the Conference "Brazil in the World Context" (London, February, 1998). The views and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official position of ECLAC. 1 FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN BRAZIL AND THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL MARKETS * Renato Baumann I - Introduction As in several other developing economies, foreign investment has reached historically high record levels in recent years in Brazil, both as direct and as portfolio investment. The Brazilian case is particularly remarkable because in comparison to other developing economies the country was the major absorber of foreign resources until the late 1970s and presents perhaps the largest stock of foreign-owned capital. In spite of these credentials, Brazilian access to international capital markets remained rather limited for more than a decade. Reasons for these recent changes are to be found in the favorable international scenario as well as in the various policy measures implemented since the late 1980s but more intensely after 1991 (mostly portfolio) and 1994 (direct investment). Easier access to capital flows had remarkable effects on the Brazilian economy by reducing the financing cost of economic agents, financing current account imbalances, helping domestic price stabilization and fostering growth, among other benefits. But as most policy strategies, reliance on external financing has provoked sharp domestic criticism, in particular from those who fear the vulnerability associated with an increasing exposure to the variability of the international capital market.
    [Show full text]
  • Chapter 3: Political Framework and Legal Status52
    Political framework and legal status Chapter 3: Political framework and legal status52 Choices regarding the political framework and legal status of central banks present the following main issues: What powers should the central bank be given to make policy and discharge other functions, and how independent of the government should the bank be when using those powers? 3 What ownership structure and legal form best support the preferred delegation of powers and responsibilities to the central bank? sues s When placing the objectives of the central bank in law to protect them from short-term political considerations, how detailed and specific should the objectives be, and how deeply should they be embedded (how difficult to change)? The Main I Main The What other devices are available to protect central bank officials from pressures while still providing for appropriate accountability and the right of governments to govern? How can employment contracts of key officers be constructed so that dismissal and threats of non-renewal cannot be used to exert improper influence? 1. Introduction Legal mechanisms establish the central bank and endow it with rights and responsibilities – its mandate. Although economic considerations are involved, the choice of a precise mandate for the central bank is fundamentally a political decision. Thus, international variations in the legal framework for central banks reflect differences in social preferences and different political environments. More specifically, the central bank’s legal framework expresses society’s preferences for how independent of government the central bank should be in discharging its assigned responsibilities. The choice of framework will also affect the flexibility with which the central bank’s mandate can be adapted as circumstances change.
    [Show full text]
  • Brazil Peer Review Report
    Peer Review of Brazil Review Report 19 April 2017 Peer Review of Brazil Review Report Table of Contents Foreword .................................................................................................................................... 3 Abbreviations ............................................................................................................................. 4 Executive summary .................................................................................................................... 6 1. Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 13 2. Trade reporting and systemic risk monitoring ................................................................ 14 3. Regulation and supervision of investment funds ............................................................ 29 Annex 1: Framework for the oversight of the financial system in Brazil ................................ 50 Annex 2: Structure of the financial system in Brazil ............................................................... 57 Annex 3: Data fields reported for different asset classes to TRs in Brazil .............................. 63 Annex 4: Examples of the use of TR data by authorities in Brazil.......................................... 65 Annex 5: Contagion analysis – The case of the “Car Wash” operation .................................. 73 Annex 6: Follow-up of other key FSAP recommendations ..................................................... 77 2 Foreword
    [Show full text]
  • Functions of the Central Bank of Brazil
    Functions of the Central Bank of Brazil Information up to October 2016 Frequently Asked Questions Series 1 “Frequently Asked Questions” Series Central Bank of Brazil 1. Interest Rates and Bank Spreads 2. Price Indices in Brazil 3. Monetary Policy Committee (Copom) 4. Fiscal Data 5. Regulated Prices 6. Public Securities and Public Debt Management 7. Brazilian Payments System 8. External Accounts 9. Country Risk 10. Inflation Targeting Regime in Brazil 11. Functions of the Central Bank of Brazil 12. Reserve Requirements 13. Market Expectations System 14. Monetary Policy, Open Market Operations and FX Swap 15. Economic Indicators 16. Banking Credit in Brazil 17. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) Economic Policy Deputy Governor Carlos Viana de Carvalho Team Coordinator André Barbosa Coutinho Marques Renato Jansson Rosek Carolina Freitas Pereira Mayrink Henrique de Godoy Moreira e Costa Luciana Valle Rosa Roppa Luiza Betina Petroll Rodrigues Authoring and publishing Manuela Moreira de Souza Investor Relations and Special Studies Department (Gerin) Maria Cláudia Gomes P. S. Gutierrez Brasília-DF Márcio Magalhães Janot This publishing is part of the Financial Education Program of the Central Bank of Brazil (BCB). 2 Central Bank of Brazil Functions1 This paper is part of the Banco Central do Brasil’s “Frequently Asked Questions” series (FAQ). This series, which is produced by the BCB’s Investor Relations and Special Studies Department (Gerin), provides information on economic topics of interest to investors and the general public. The Banco Central do Brasil (BCB) is producing this series as part of its ongoing efforts to enhance the transparency of the Brazilian economic policy and the effectiveness in communicating its actions.
    [Show full text]
  • The Importance of Data Disclosure of Subnational Governments
    Fiscal federalism in Brazil: the importance of data disclosure of subnational governments Joanilson de Carvalho Santos1 Abstract The fiscal crisis has shown the importance of data disclosure in all government levels. Over recent years there has been a great effort to increase the amount of information on subnational governments carried out by Brazilian agencies responsible for the publication of fiscal statistics, including the Central Bank and the Ministry of Finance. The aim of this paper is to show the advances and challenges in compiling fiscal information at the subnational level in Brazil, as well as the importance of transparency on both debt and fiscal results of states and municipalities, given the current framework of fiscal federalism and the rules for government borrowing. Keywords: Fiscal federalism; subnational governments; disclosure; debt. JEL classifications: H740, H770 1. Introduction The monitoring of government policies gained prominence after the outbreak of the global crisis in 2008. The evolution of public deficit and debt has received increasing attention from analysts and policy managers. Although the focus of attention is usually directed to the central government, the demand for information on subnational governments (SNGs) is on the rise because of the autonomy that these governments have achieved to manage their finances. This process has brought risks to fiscal stability, and several central governments have been asked to take on unpaid SNGs’ debts. Moreover, the default of SNGs may reduce the credibility of the general government. In order to prevent these problems, several measures have been adopted, including the enactment of laws regarding fiscal responsibility that impose limits and conditions for borrowing and require greater transparency of public accounts in order to avoid fiscal mismanagement.
    [Show full text]
  • A Panoramic View of the Supreme Court and Its Functions
    BRAZIL INSTITUTE A Conversation with Justice Teori Zavascki A Panoramic View of the Supreme Court and Its Functions THE WILSON CENTER, chartered by Congress as the official memorial to President Woodrow Wilson, is the nation’s key nonpartisan policy forum for tackling global issues through independent research and open dialogue to inform actionable ideas for Congress, the Administration, and the broader policy community. Conclusions or opinions expressed in Center publications and programs are those of the authors and speakers and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Center staff, fellows, trustees, advisory groups, or any individuals or organizations that provide financial support to the Center. Please visit us online at www.wilsoncenter.org. Jane Harman, Director, President, and CEO BOARD OF TRUSTEES Thomas R. Nides, Chair Public Members: The Honorable William D. Adams, The Honorable Elisabeth DeVos, The Honorable David Ferriero, The Honorable Carla D. Hayden, The Honorable Thomas E. Price, The Honorable David J. Skorton, The Honorable Rex W. Tillerson Private Citizen Members: Peter J. Beshar, Thelma Duggin, Barry S. Jackson, The Honorable David Jacobson, Nathalie Rayes, Earl W. Stafford, Jane Watson Stetson, The Honorable Louis Susman I A Note on the Rule of Law Series A Note on the Rule of Law Series Once seen as a mere formality in a land of impunity, especially for individuals in positions of power in society, Brazilian institutions have displayed in recent years a previously unsuspected capacity to bring people in high places to justice. Nowhere is this shift more evident than in two high profile cases separated by almost a decade and involving politicians, political operators, and business men accused of crimes of corruption.
    [Show full text]
  • Intervenção Estatal Na Economia: O Banco Central E a Execução Das Políticas Monetária E Creditícia
    FLORINDA FIGUEIREDO BORGES INTERVENÇÃO ESTATAL NA ECONOMIA: O BANCO CENTRAL E A EXECUÇÃO DAS POLÍTICAS MONETÁRIA E CREDITÍCIA DISSERTAÇÃO DE MESTRADO ORIENTADOR : PROFESSOR DOUTOR JOSÉ TADEU DE CHIARA FACULDADE DE DIREITO DA USP SÃO PAULO 2010 FLORINDA FIGUEIREDO BORGES INTERVENÇÃO ESTATAL NA ECONOMIA: O BANCO CENTRAL E A EXECUÇÃO DAS POLÍTICAS MONETÁRIA E CREDITÍCIA Dissertação de Mestrado apresentada à Banca Examinadora da Faculdade de Direito da Universidade de São Paulo, como exigência parcial para a obtenção do título de Mestre em Direito, sob orientação do Prof. Dr. José Tadeu De Chiara FACULDADE DE DIREITO DA USP SÃO PAULO 2010 Banca Examinadora ______________________________________________ ______________________________________________ ______________________________________________ Dedico este trabalho a meus pais Vera e Carlon. AGRADECIMENTOS Agradeço ao Professor Doutor José Tadeu De Chiara que me orientou desde os primeiros anos de graduação na Faculdade de Direito do Largo de São Francisco até a árdua, porém gratificante, pós-graduação. Foram preciosas as lições de Direito e, especialmente, as lições de vida aprendidas nesse período. Agradeço aos meus amados pais Carlon e Vera, pessoas maravilhosas e extremamente dedicadas a tudo o que fazem, verdadeiras fontes de inspiração. Também sou grata às minhas irmãs, Violeta e Bárbara, amigas para toda a vida, pelo apoio que não me deixaram faltar. Contribuiu decisivamente para a elaboração deste trabalho Otavio Yazbek, amigo querido e professor dedicado de todas as horas, a quem aqui registro meus sinceros agradecimentos. Devo agradecer ainda aos amigos Andrés Klenner e Ana Paula Corazzari a preciosa troca de experiências a respeito do tema e sobre tópicos da bibliografia. A todos aqueles que, em algum momento, torceram pelo sucesso deste projeto.
    [Show full text]