Claremont Colleges Scholarship @ Claremont CGU Theses & Dissertations CGU Student Scholarship 2012 Religion and the Evolution of Democracy: A Revised Selectorate Model for the Arab Spring Amir K. Bagherpour Claremont Graduate University Recommended Citation Bagherpour, Amir K., "Religion and the Evolution of Democracy: A Revised Selectorate Model for the Arab Spring" (2012). CGU Theses & Dissertations. Paper 53. http://scholarship.claremont.edu/cgu_etd/53 DOI: 10.5642/cguetd/53 This Open Access Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the CGU Student Scholarship at Scholarship @ Claremont. It has been accepted for inclusion in CGU Theses & Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Scholarship @ Claremont. For more information, please contact [email protected]. RELIGION AND THE EVOLUTION OF DEMOCRACY: A REVISED SELECTORATE MODEL FOR THE ARAB SPRING by Amir Bagherpour Claremont Graduate University 2012 © Copyright (Amir Bagherpour), 2012 All rights reserved APPROVAL OF THE REVIEW COMMITTEE This dissertation has been duly read, reviewed, and critiqued by the Committee listed below, which hereby approves the manuscript of Amir Bagherpour as fulfilling the scope and quality requirements for meriting the degree of doctor of philosophy (Ph.D) in Political Science. Jacek Kugler, Ph.D., Chair Claremont Graduate University Elizabeth Helms Rosecrans Professor of World Politics Mark Abdollahian, Ph.D. Claremont Graduate University Clinical Professor Hal Nelson, Ph.D. Claremont Graduate University Assistant Professor ABSTRACT 2011 was a seminal year in the history of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). Popularly referred to as the Arab Spring, the region has experienced a wave of revolutions and instability. It can be classified in three broad categories within 2011: Uprisings that have resulted in the overthrow of standing regimes, uprisings that have failed to overthrow standing regimes, and states that have not experienced popular revolts. In the first category Libya, Egypt, Yemen, and Tunisia have all experienced uprisings resulting in the respective departure of Muamar Gaddafi, Hosni Mubarak, Ali Abdullah Saleh, and Zine Al Abidine Ben Ali. In contrast Syria and Bahrain have experienced uprisings that have not resulted into the toppling of their regimes thus far. Finally, countries such as Saudi Arabia and Iran have experienced none of the instability observed in 2011 within the same time period. In tracking the evolution of selectorates, I identified the rise of actors within the newly developing coalitions whose Islamist preferences are unaccounted for in the standard Selectorate Model. As later explained in detail, Selectorate Theory is driven by the public-private goods argument. The theory states that a leader’s political survival is based on the mix of private payoffs he can provide to his selectorate and public goods provided to the general population. The once secular despots are either gone or are on the way out as evident by the removal of Hosni Mubarak, Zine Abidine Ben-Ali, Saddam Hussein, Muamar Gaddafi, Ali Abdullah Saleh, and the currently embattled Bashar Al- Assad. They are being replaced or have already been removed by governments that are led by Islamic Parties. Therefore, newly elected or appointed leaders must take into account the role of religion in their calculus for political survival in a way that they did not before. This begs the question: what about the regimes in my case studies that have not been toppled such as Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Bahrain? Although these are highly autocratic governments, the leaders of such governments have a legitimacy that is derived from implicit approval of their Islamist allies. This strengthens the argument that religion must be accounted for beyond the standard Selectorate Model rationale for political survival in MENA. In such context I provide a revised Selectorate Model explanation that accounts for the role of religion. I conclude that the standard Selectorate Theory is insufficient for MENA because it is does not account for the role of religion. By testing the coalitional distribution and evolution of selectorates, I developed a revised Selectorate Model that includes the role of religion along with the standard private payoffs – public goods argument. The role of religion is expressed by the presence of religious stakeholders in the agent based model such as clerics, shura councils or Islamic parties present in all selectorates in MENA. I tracked the selectorates through a series of predictions made throughout the course of 2011 using the Senturion agent based model. It serves as a powerful alternative to standard historical analysis and wisdom. I provide an explanation of why certain regimes fell while others remained relatively stable and why some governments experiencing similar instability remain using agent based modeling (ABM) in application to Selectorate Theory. Table of Contents I. Introduction and Overview…………………………………………………………………………………………1 II. Problem Statement……………………………………………………………………………………………...…….5 III. Literature Review ……………………………………………………………………….………………………….…8 IV. Method and Organization………………………………………………………………………………………….20 V. The Case of Egypt……………………………………………………………………………..…………………….…23 VI. The Case of Libya……………………………………………………………………………………………………….32 VII. The Case of Saudi Arabia……………………………………………………………………………………………40 VIII. The Case of Iran…………………………………………………………………………………………………………45 IX. The Case of Syria……………………………………………………………………………………………………….52 X. The Case of Bahrain…………………………………………………………………………………………………..62 XI. Conclusion……………………………………………………………………….………………………………………..67 Appendix 1. Complete Predictions on Egypt……………………………………………………………………………….……....82 2. Complete Predictions on Iran……………………………………………………………………………….………….103 3. Complete Predictions on Libya…………………………………………………………………………..……………117 4. Complete Predictions on Syria………………………………………………………………………………..……….141 5. Complete Predictions on Yemen………………………………………………………………………………………163 6. Complete Predictions on Saudi Arabia……………………………………………………………………………..172 7. Complete Predictions on Bahrain………………………………………………………………………………….…180 8. Stakeholder Inputs and Data……………………………………………………………………………………….….185 9. Works Cited………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….…199 Page Intentionally Left Blank I. Introduction and Overview 2011 was a seminal year in the history of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). Popularly referred to as the Arab Spring, the region has experienced a wave of revolutions and instability. It can be classified in three broad categories within 2011: Uprisings that have resulted in the overthrow of standing regimes, uprisings that have failed to overthrow standing regimes, and states that have not experienced popular revolts. In the first category Libya, Egypt, Yemen, and Tunisia have all experienced uprisings resulting in the respective departure of Muamar Gaddafi, Hosni Mubarak, Ali Abdullah Saleh, and Zine Al Abidine Ben Ali. In contrast Syria and Bahrain have experienced uprisings that have not resulted into the toppling of their regimes thus far. Finally, countries such as Saudi Arabia and Iran have experienced none of the instability observed in 2011 within the same time period. In tracking the evolution of selectorates, I identified the rise of actors within the newly developing coalitions whose Islamist preferences are unaccounted for in the standard Selectorate Model. As later explained in detail, Selectorate Theory is driven by the public-private goods argument. The theory states that a leader’s political survival is based on the mix of private payoffs he can provide to his selectorate and public goods provided to the general population (Bueno de Mesquita, et al., 2003). The proportion of private versus public goods determines the type of government the leader will have. However, with the rise of Islamist Parties, leaders in MENA must take into account preferences that are not driven only by financial benefits, but also social and religious preferences. The once secular despots are either gone or are on the way out as evident by the removal of Hosni Mubarak, Zine Abidine Ben-Ali, Saddam Hussein, Muamar Gaddafi, Ali Abdullah Saleh, and the currently embattled Bashar Al- Assad. They are being replaced or have already been removed by governments that are led by Islamic Parties. Therefore, newly elected or appointed leaders must take into account the role of religion in their calculus for 1 political survival in a way that they did not before. This begs the question: what about the regimes in my case studies that have not been toppled such as Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Bahrain? Although these are highly autocratic governments, the leaders of such governments have a legitimacy that is derived from implicit approval of their Islamist allies. This strengthens the argument that religion must be accounted for beyond the standard Selectorate Model rationale for political survival in MENA. In such context I provide a revised Selectorate Model explanation that accounts for the role of religion. This dissertation evaluates the Selectorate Model in application to the Middle East. I conclude that the standard Selectorate Theory is insufficient for MENA because it is does not account for the role of religion. By testing the coalitional distribution and evolution of selectorates, I developed a revised Selectorate Model that includes the role of religion along with the standard private payoffs – public goods argument. The role of religion is expressed by the presence