The Catholic Lawyer Volume 11 Number 3 Volume 11, Summer 1965, Number 3 Article 3 Morality and Intrinsic Evil Thomas A. Wassmer, S.J. Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/tcl Part of the Catholic Studies Commons This Symposium Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in The Catholic Lawyer by an authorized editor of St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. MORALITY AND INTRINSIC EVIL THOMAS A. WASSMER, S.J.* M OST STUDENTS OF ETHICS understand early why the concept of sin is not introduced into a course of philosophical ethics. They know that sin is a theological term referring to a state of separation from God by an inordinate turning to a creature. The dual formality of an aversion from God (aversio a Deo) and a conversion or turning inordinately to a creature (conversio ad creaturam) is recognized to be present in every sin. The students easily understand how wrong- doing is a turning away from good and, in some way, a turning away from ultimate Good or God, but they raise many objections to the in- clusion within this notion of turning away from God any reference to offending Him, displeasing Him, or injuring Him. They have problems with reconciling wrongdoing with injury to God. They accept this theologically but seem to urge the detachment of the God of Deism when they reflect on the possible consequences of their evil acts in relation to the Divine. What possible harm to God can be done by our wrongdoing? They see early in philosophical ethics -that sin is a difficult term to introduce into the course and they accept in its place the concept of moral evil. But here, precisely, is the rub. If traditional Thomistic texts in philosophical ethics omit the term sin and readily adopt the term moral evil, non-Thomistic texts seem to give slight attention even to moral evil, employ it infrequently and, in many cases, ignore it al- together. Why is the term moral evil not used more often and con- sidered more profoundly than it is in philosophical ethics? Professor A.E. Taylor puts his finger on this inadequate treatment of the problem of moral evil and says that it is the outstanding defect of philosophical treatises on ethics. He points out that most writers on the subject seem to think that they have done all that is expected of them when they have tried to tell us what the good for man is, and what virtue, or the moral law, demands of us. The concern is with a *A.B. (1938), Fordham University; Ph.L. (1943), Woodstock College; S.T.L. (1950), Weston College; Ph.D. (1954), Fordham University. Associate Professor of Moral Philosophy, St. Peter's College, Jersey City, N. J. INTRINSIC EVIL theory of good and little more; writers at all. This does not mean that there is a may set before us a "theory of good and special faculty by which good is known, evil" but the student will have to be satis- and it does not mean that one cannot be fied with the perfunctory consideration mistaken in judgments of value; but it given to moral evil. The influential Prin- does mean that such questions as whether cipia Ethica of G.E. Moore barely men- or not, and to what extent, a thing is good tions the term. It might not be going too are in no sense subject to argument or far to say that, of the principal philoso- capable of being clarified by reasoning. phers who have dealt expressly and at Propositions to the effect that something length with the moral life of man (in- is intrinsically good are not debatable: dependent of a theological tradition), there "No relevant evidence can be adduced: are only two, Plato and Kant, whose lan- from no other truth, except from them- guage reveals an acute and constant sense selves, can it be inferred that they are of human evil. Professor Taylor denies either true or false." that this interest in the problem of moral This is just a capsule summary of the evil can be found in Aristotle, Descartes, notion of intrinsic good to Moore. He Spinoza, Leibnitz, or Hegel. He finds it barely mentions evil in his Principia not prominent in even such vigorous sup- Ethica but there is more than mere men- porters of an "eternal and immutable" tion of evil in the traditional Thomistic morality as Cudworth, Clarke, and Price. texts on ethics. In fact, where Moore was Throughout the history of moral philos- primarily interested in the intrinsic good, ophy there is the paradox of a preoccu- the Thomistic ethician leads many students pation by so many thinkers with the prob- to believe that his primary interest is in lem of the good while reducing almost to moral evil and frequently in intrinsic evil. relative unimportance the agonizing prob- It is here that I come to the heart of my lem of moral evil. reflections on philosophical ethics and Just briefly let us consider once again moral evil. Let me put it this way. The G.E. Moore for whom the basic problem Thomistic moral philosopher finds it easier, in ethics upon which all others depend is it appears, to define intrinsic evil than to the meaning of good in its intrinsic sense. discover satisfactory examples to illustrate The intrinsic sense of good is the one in the definition. It should make the moralist which if a thing is good in that sense "it reflect on whether it is not unwise to de- would be a good thing that the thing nominate some moral act intrinsically evil in question should exist, even if it existed without fearing that he may possibly have quite alone" without any further accomp- painted himself into a corner. To retreat animents or effects whatever. What then from this position requires some delicate does intrinsic good mean? The fact is that footwork. intrinsic good cannot be defined; it is a This calls for some elaboration. Let me simple, unique, irreducible characteristic, explain why it appears to me that the term it can be known only immediately or in- intrinsic evil is not a viable term in moral tuitively. The knowledge of the goodness philosophy and why it causes more prob- of a thing is directly apprehended when lems than it attempts to solve or even to the thing is known, if it is apprehended explain adequately. I shall try to defend 11 CATHOLIC LAWYER, SUMMER 1965 this position by considering the meaning cide, is a more interesting one to consider. of "intrinsically evil" and then by ex- Homicide, the killing of a man-just this amining the representative acts which are act, viewed from its object-is morally in- usually designated as intrinsically evil. different. It requires the addition of several An act is considered to be intrinsically factors to become an act morally evil. evil if, viewed just from its moral object, Not every homicide is the same. Which cir- prescinding from circumstances and mo- cumstances have to be added to homicide tive, it is always in difformity with the to constitute an act of murder? These are proximate norm which is rational human circumstances that are required even to nature. The moral object of an act is that constitute the physical integrity of the act relationship which it bears to the norm of of murder, but what is interesting, is that morality. The object of an act is the what- these very circumstances that change a ness of the act. For example, homicide has mere act of homicide into an act of murder a different moral object than murder; also are the circumstances that change the fornication has a different moral object moral object of indifference to a moral than adultery. If the act is regarded solely object of evil. What is added to homicide from its object and found to be repugnant to make a case of murder? Here is where to rational human nature (adequately con- the moral philosopher becomes even more sidered), then such an act is characterized technical and begins to add elements that as intrinsically evil. The object of most almost inflate the original moral object of acts, or to phrase it more precisely, most mere homicide. What is murder for the acts, viewed just from their objects, pre- moralist? scinding from circumstances and motive Murder for many moralists is unjust are morally indifferent. Walking, smoking, killing of another man. What really does even killing are morally indifferent acts this mean? When spelled out it becomes considered just from their objects. It is this expanded definition which, as John only when walking is done under certain Hospers says, dilutes the original moral circumstances and with this or that motive rule "do not kill" almost into a tautology. that it acquires the moral dimension of This is the articulated meaning for unjust being either morally good or morally bad. killing or murder: the direct killing of an- Likewise, it is only when smoking is done other man on one's own authority outside in excess by someone whose health may a case of legitimate self-defense. Direct become endangered that the act assumes killing refers to the act of killing intended a moral dimension of good or bad. Inci- as an end or as a means to an end and on dentally, this latter example provides a one's own authority means that one is ex- rash of problems because, while smoking ercising right over another person's life in excess may involve consequences upon which he does not have.