The Catholic Lawyer

Volume 11 Number 3 Volume 11, Summer 1965, Number 3 Article 3

Morality and Intrinsic Evil

Thomas A. Wassmer, S.J.

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THOMAS A. WASSMER, S.J.*

M OST STUDENTS OF ETHICS understand early why the concept of sin is not introduced into a course of philosophical ethics. They know that sin is a theological term referring to a state of separation from God by an inordinate turning to a creature. The dual formality of an aversion from God (aversio a Deo) and a conversion or turning inordinately to a creature (conversio ad creaturam) is recognized to be present in every sin. The students easily understand how wrong- doing is a turning away from good and, in some way, a turning away from ultimate Good or God, but they raise many objections to the in- clusion within this notion of turning away from God any reference to offending Him, displeasing Him, or injuring Him. They have problems with reconciling wrongdoing with injury to God. They accept this theologically but seem to urge the detachment of the God of Deism when they reflect on the possible consequences of their evil acts in relation to the Divine. What possible harm to God can be done by our wrongdoing? They see early in philosophical ethics -that sin is a difficult term to introduce into the course and they accept in its place the concept of moral evil. But here, precisely, is the rub. If traditional Thomistic texts in philosophical ethics omit the term sin and readily adopt the term moral evil, non-Thomistic texts seem to give slight attention even to moral evil, employ it infrequently and, in many cases, ignore it al- together. Why is the term moral evil not used more often and con- sidered more profoundly than it is in philosophical ethics? Professor A.E. Taylor puts his finger on this inadequate treatment of the problem of moral evil and says that it is the outstanding defect of philosophical treatises on ethics. He points out that most writers on the subject seem to think that they have done all that is expected of them when they have tried to tell us what the good for man is, and what virtue, or the moral law, demands of us. The concern is with a

*A.B. (1938), Fordham University; Ph.L. (1943), Woodstock College; S.T.L. (1950), Weston College; Ph.D. (1954), Fordham University. Associate Professor of Moral Philosophy, St. Peter's College, Jersey City, N. J. INTRINSIC EVIL theory of good and little more; writers at all. This does not mean that there is a may set before us a "theory of good and special faculty by which good is known, evil" but the student will have to be satis- and it does not mean that one cannot be fied with the perfunctory consideration mistaken in judgments of value; but it given to moral evil. The influential Prin- does mean that such questions as whether cipia Ethica of G.E. Moore barely men- or not, and to what extent, a thing is good tions the term. It might not be going too are in no sense subject to argument or far to say that, of the principal philoso- capable of being clarified by reasoning. phers who have dealt expressly and at Propositions to the effect that something length with the moral life of man (in- is intrinsically good are not debatable: dependent of a theological tradition), there "No relevant evidence can be adduced: are only two, Plato and Kant, whose lan- from no other truth, except from them- guage reveals an acute and constant sense selves, can it be inferred that they are of human evil. Professor Taylor denies either true or false." that this interest in the problem of moral This is just a capsule summary of the evil can be found in Aristotle, Descartes, notion of intrinsic good to Moore. He Spinoza, Leibnitz, or Hegel. He finds it barely mentions evil in his Principia not prominent in even such vigorous sup- Ethica but there is more than mere men- porters of an "eternal and immutable" tion of evil in the traditional Thomistic morality as Cudworth, Clarke, and Price. texts on ethics. In fact, where Moore was Throughout the history of moral philos- primarily interested in the intrinsic good, ophy there is the paradox of a preoccu- the Thomistic ethician leads many students pation by so many thinkers with the prob- to believe that his primary interest is in lem of the good while reducing almost to moral evil and frequently in intrinsic evil. relative unimportance the agonizing prob- It is here that I come to the heart of my lem of moral evil. reflections on philosophical ethics and Just briefly let us consider once again moral evil. Let me put it this way. The G.E. Moore for whom the basic problem Thomistic moral philosopher finds it easier, in ethics upon which all others depend is it appears, to define intrinsic evil than to the meaning of good in its intrinsic sense. discover satisfactory examples to illustrate The intrinsic sense of good is the one in the definition. It should make the moralist which if a thing is good in that sense "it reflect on whether it is not unwise to de- would be a good thing that the thing nominate some moral act intrinsically evil in question should exist, even if it existed without fearing that he may possibly have quite alone" without any further accomp- painted himself into a corner. To retreat animents or effects whatever. What then from this position requires some delicate does intrinsic good mean? The fact is that footwork. intrinsic good cannot be defined; it is a This calls for some elaboration. Let me simple, unique, irreducible characteristic, explain why it appears to me that the term it can be known only immediately or in- intrinsic evil is not a viable term in moral tuitively. The knowledge of the goodness philosophy and why it causes more prob- of a thing is directly apprehended when lems than it attempts to solve or even to the thing is known, if it is apprehended explain adequately. I shall try to defend 11 CATHOLIC LAWYER, SUMMER 1965 this position by considering the meaning cide, is a more interesting one to consider. of "intrinsically evil" and then by ex- Homicide, the killing of a man-just this amining the representative acts which are act, viewed from its object-is morally in- usually designated as intrinsically evil. different. It requires the addition of several An act is considered to be intrinsically factors to become an act morally evil. evil if, viewed just from its moral object, Not every homicide is the same. Which cir- prescinding from circumstances and mo- cumstances have to be added to homicide tive, it is always in difformity with the to constitute an act of murder? These are proximate norm which is rational human circumstances that are required even to nature. The moral object of an act is that constitute the physical integrity of the act relationship which it bears to the norm of of murder, but what is interesting, is that morality. The object of an act is the what- these very circumstances that change a ness of the act. For example, homicide has mere act of homicide into an act of murder a different moral object than murder; also are the circumstances that change the fornication has a different moral object moral object of indifference to a moral than adultery. If the act is regarded solely object of evil. What is added to homicide from its object and found to be repugnant to make a case of murder? Here is where to rational human nature (adequately con- the moral philosopher becomes even more sidered), then such an act is characterized technical and begins to add elements that as intrinsically evil. The object of most almost inflate the original moral object of acts, or to phrase it more precisely, most mere homicide. What is murder for the acts, viewed just from their objects, pre- moralist? scinding from circumstances and motive Murder for many moralists is unjust are morally indifferent. Walking, smoking, killing of another man. What really does even killing are morally indifferent acts this mean? When spelled out it becomes considered just from their objects. It is this expanded definition which, as John only when walking is done under certain Hospers says, dilutes the original moral circumstances and with this or that motive rule "do not kill" almost into a tautology. that it acquires the moral dimension of This is the articulated meaning for unjust being either morally good or morally bad. killing or murder: the direct killing of an- Likewise, it is only when smoking is done other man on one's own authority outside in excess by someone whose health may a case of legitimate self-defense. Direct become endangered that the act assumes killing refers to the act of killing intended a moral dimension of good or bad. Inci- as an end or as a means to an end and on dentally, this latter example provides a one's own authority means that one is ex- rash of problems because, while smoking ercising right over another person's life in excess may involve consequences upon which he does not have. By the inclusion physical health, there is no doubt that of self-defense within the definition, the it provides psychologically good conse- definer surely wants to exclude from mur- quences which may well be intended to der the act of killing the assailant. But counterbalance the possible harmful con- what happens if someone considers it just sequences to physical health. for a society to exercise capital punish- The last example cited above, of homi- ment? In order to exclude capital punish- INTRINSIC EVIL ment as an act of murder when the criminal clude a consideration of similar problems is killed, does this not compel the advocate in the cases of suicide, lying, and steriliza- of the above definition to include this ex- tion. It seems to lead to the conclusion ception? Murder then assumes this defini- that the moral philosopher must struggle tion: the direct killing of another man on to develop the most authentic meaning for one's own authority outside a case of le- murder, suicide, lying and sterilization, but gitimate self-defense and capital punish- after he has constructed such a moral act, ment. If anyone wants to designate this he should be very hesitant to designate it moral act with its expanded, articulated as intrinsically evil. Why is this so? Be- object, an act morally wrong, he will re- cause by characterizing this act with all of ceive wide acceptance in western society. its qualifications as intrinsically evil, he However, suppose this definition is of- has little ground on which to move unless fered to the pacifist who takes the moral he is willing to re-examine each of the rule not to kill literally; suppose it is sub- qualifications and admit that the definition mitted to the Hindu who extends the pro- is malleable. The problem with the person hibition against -taking life to all forms of who readily designates an act to be in- life; suppose is it submitted to Dr. Schwei- trinsically evil is that he will tolerate very tzer? little modification within the definition of Now, I do not quarrel with the fact that the moral act as he proposes it. In fact, there is general acceptance in many quar- does not the very term intrinsicevil seem to ters of the definition of murder. What I imply that modifications are not in order? do suggest is that murder has been so de- However, any student of the history of fined that it excludes everything that we ethics knows well that modifications are regard as not exercises of murder and it very much in order arising from a more is here that some moralists with one con- penetrating knowledge of human nature stellation of values will add or subtract and the complexities of the human act. cases and other moralists with a different An examination of most texts in ethics constellation of values will add or sub- will reveal a general reluctance to refer to tract other cases. If then, for us, murder any act as intrinsically evil. Most books is defined as it was above-direct killing of mention blasphemy and stop there; others another man on one's own authority out- dishonesty, infidelity and dishonor, but side a case of legitimate self-defense and these latter are really dodging the issue capital punishment - and if this act of because they do not specify the very moral murder is then considered to be merely act which is an act of dishonesty, infidelity evil from its object, intrinsically evil from or dishonor. Any moral act can be built its object, just how viable has this notion up into something approaching the notion of intrinsically evil become? Viable for all of intrinsic evil if we construct upon the who accept, but not viable for those who simple moral object of the act a variety dissent from, our own constellation of of circumstances and motives which will values, our own value system. alter its moral species from moral indiffer- ence to moral evil. But how far does This speculation on the problems that this construction have to go before we are sure arise from any designation of an act to be intrinsically evil can be extended to in- (Continued on page 236) 11 CATHOLIC LAWYER, SUMMER 1965

Orthodox Jewish denominational schools Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations said yesterday they welcomed the state's of America, said that "the Orthodox Jew- interpretation of the use of federal school ish community welcomes this ruling be- funds. cause under it the greatest possible bene- Msgr. Raymond P. Rigney, superin- fits of the federal education act will be tendent of Catholic schools for the Arch- made available without discrimination to diocese of New York, called the ruling the maximum number of children, re- ''very encouraging." "We do hope that gardless of their school affiliation." we can cooperate to achieve the aims of Among the groups that have opposed this education act for all the children of the provisions of the act permitting federal this city," he said. aid to church-related schools, the Ameri- No immediate comment was available can Jewish Congress has said it would test from public school officials. the constitutionality of the program in the Moses I. Feuerstein, president of the courts.

INTRINSIC EVIL sterilization (temporary), may such a (Continued) sterilization be directly intended in the ab- sence of a pathological condition such as that the moral -act is intrinsically evil? menorrhagia, dysmenorrhea, or an irregu- Take sterilization as a further example. lar menstrual cycle? In other words, may Sterilization in itself is morally indifferent; this kind of sterilization be intended as a indirect therapeutic sterilization in the means for the further good of marital in- presence of a pathological disorder is timacy and in the presence of serious psy- morally good; direct punitive sterilization chological reasons? To say that direct would be acceptable to anyone who ac- sterilization is always wrong, to say that cepts the De Lugo position on the law- indirect sterilization is licit only in the fulness of direct killing of an aggressor in presence of a physical pathological condi- the case of legitimate self-defense. If the tion, is to narrow the area of moral dia- De Lugo position warrants direct killing of logue. a criminal in these circumstances, then a More can be said and should be said fortiori, direct sterilization of a criminal about the non-viability of the concept of can be allowed because to intend directly intrinsic evil. It is hoped that these reflec- the death of the man himself is something tions will stimulate some further discus- more serious than to intend directly the sion on the problem of moral evil in gen- mutilation of his generative system. The eral and on the prudent unwillingness to further problem with the moral dimen- characterize any moral act as intrinsically sion of sterilization is the formidable ques- evil. "Intrinsically evil," applied too tion involved in the controversy over the freely, can place an albatross around the anovulants: if the anovulant results in a neck of the user.