International Conference KNOWLEDGE-BASED ORGANIZATION Vol. XXVII No 1 2021 COOPERATION PLANS BETWEEN SOE AND NKVD REGARDING THE ROMANIAN AREA DURING JANUARY-MAY 1944 Marian ZIDARU Black Sea House Association, Constanța, Romania [email protected] Abstract: The main S.O.E aim seems to have been the utilization of political circles in an endeavour to overthrow the government and get Romania out of the war or at least to bring about the removal of its array from the Russians front, and to deny the national resources to Germany. The USSR has been constant in its disinclination to play with Maniu or associates itself with British planes until they are convinced that some concrete contribution at their war aim would results. They would however be ready to discuss unconditional surrender with the emissary of the Romanian government, capable of putting it into effect. The evolution of these SOE plans will be presented in this article. Keywords: SOE, NKVD, Romania, Antonescu, Maniu 1. Introduction V. D. representative said that they saw no SOE and NKVD had an operative base in difference between the policies of Romania made up of agents and Antonescu and Maniu and that in fact what collaborators. At a meeting, S.O.E. – the Romanians want to be a guarantee from Foreign Office in February 1941, the Russia that the latter would give to representatives of S.O.E. informed that after Romania a large slab of Russian territory in the departure of the members of the return for a vague promise that a successful Bucharest diplomatic mission, their coup d’état would be brought about. program in Romania depended on After 2 weeks an S.O.E. representative cooperation with Maniu and the Christian - lunched with the N. K. V. D. representative Democrat circles. One of the most and it was pretty clear that they have important Soviet agents in Romania was received an answer from Moscow and that Emil Bodnaras. He was arrested by the the answer was definitely no. [2] SOE sent Siguranta and settled in Braila. the Ranji team to Romania in 1943. The Bodnaras travelled freely, to Bucharest and head of the mission, major David Russell, to Targu-Jiu. He met Gheorghiu-Dej who was killed and the wireless operator on 4 April have instructed Patrascanu, Turcanu escaped and arrived in Bucharest. Bodnaras, and Ion Gheorghe Maurer to join After his arriving to Bucharest in autumn the other political parties to overturned the 1943, he was given shelter by friends and Antonescu government [1]. began transmissions for Maniu. Police On the 3rd July 1942, the talk between contacts warned him whenever German S.O.E. with the N.K.V.D. took place in traits followed him, but on 10 July 1944, London regarding coup d’état, and the Abwehr located him and he was arrested by Anglo-Russian guarantee asked for Iuliu Romanian police. He has hidden his radio Maniu Bessarabia and Bukovina. The N. K. and recovered it after 23 August, using it, to DOI: 10.2478/kbo-2021-0024 © 2015. This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial-No Derivatives 3.0 License. 153 communicate with the Americans who sent military co-operation with allied nations. bombers to attack German positions at Stirbey states Romanians not willing to Otopeni airfield on 26 August [3]. surrender to Russians alone but prepared to Another team sent by SOE to Romania was capitulate to the British; even though it was composed of Lt-Col by Chatelain, Major only to a token force in form of a parachute Ivor Porter, and Captain Silviu Metianu. battalion; when endorsing mission pointed Chatelain and his party had many out it would in their opinion be useless until relationships in the political world in Stirbey could promise prompt action Bucharest. But they were arrested by the against Germans. Arrangements being Romanian Police when they were made for secret onward transmission of parachuted in the wrong place [4]. Stirbey to Cairo for discussions with In early February, Pravda strongly attacked representatives of allied, none of above the deployment of the Chastelain team to details to be communicated to Russians Romania. On 6 February, Ambassador without prior consultation British Clark Kerr wrote to the Head of SOE: ambassador. “From one or two fairly high up Soviet The first meeting in Cairo of allied officials we have had more than half a hint representatives with Stirbey went off better that stupid Pravda article which caused than expected and the ambassador believed such a to-do last month was due, in part at it might be considered the basis for further any rate, to the dropping of those three discussions. Full details telegraphed by the officers in Romania gather from the ambassador to SOE leader. It noted that any Foreign Office that the dropping happened indication as to Russian reactions would be on December 2nd and that the Russians welcome. were not told until some days later. As the Romanian government decided not to main brunt of the war against Romania has defend the Dniester; any opposition will be fallen upon the Russians, they are sensitive by Germans only. about that country, and I suggest that if any In reply to the request by Antonescu for such operation is contemplated again it advice on what to do regarding Hitler’s might be prudent to let them know summons to his H.Q. general, Wilson beforehand and thus forestall trouble”[5]. telegraphed that acceptance invitation would be considered by the British as final 2. Peace negotiations in Cairo evidence of Romanian collaboration urged On 29th February 1944, an SOE report immediate surrender to the allied nations. noted that one of Maniu’s delegates When Soviet troops entered Romania, (Constantin Visoianu) who was expected to Soviet Foreign Minister Viacheslav land by plane on Cyprus Sunday has not Molotov released a statement saying that arrived. Prince Stirbey was reported to be The Soviet Union ‘does not pursue the aim due in Istanbul. arrangements are being of acquiring Romanian territory or of made for his secret onward journey to altering the existing social structure of Cairo. Maniu's emissary price Stirbey Romania [6]. arrived in Istanbul on march 1st. His In reaction, the German Minister of Foreign mission primarily informative but endorsed Affairs, Joachim von Ribbentrop, not only by Maniu and Antonescu but also characterized publicly the Molotov’s by the king and the Romanian communist declaration, as insincere and underlined the party should his inquiries disclose danger the Soviets represent for Romania conditions likely to be acceptable he will be [7]. On 2 April 1944, de Chatelain was invested with authority to negotiate and taken to see Maniu. Maniu informed him Romanian military attaché Ankara and that he had disclosed the existence of the former M.A Budapest would be attached to ‘Reginald’ transmitter to the Romanians – assist working out details of Romania’s the reason for doing so was not clear – and 154 it was this set that was used to send objects of a Romanian SOE mission in Antonescu’s message. Antonescu’s Russian-occupied Romania would be to tolerance and use of the channel with Cairo recruit agents for infiltration into of underlined the significance to the British of additional agents from liberated Romanian the line of communication offered by the territory. SOE presence in Romania. In psychological All British past efforts to find suitable both terms, it provided an enormous boost to in Cairo and in America have failed almost active opponents of the Antonescu regime, entirely owing to lack of suitable bodies principally Maniu and King Michael, but in [8]. London would like to have SAM’s political ones, it shed no light on the view regarding Soviet NKVD agreeing to a intentions of the Western Allies towards Rumanian SOE mission in Russian- Romania. occupied Romania in the event of the Although Bucharest affirms that two Romanians continuing to fight on the side Antonescu returned from Hitler HQ. of the axis. without having undertaken fresh If they agree Cairo should very much be commitments, peace negotiations are being liked to send a small SOE mission from drawn out by Romanians under various here. SOE has in mind a mission of say 2 pretexts. No reactions received as yet to the British 1 American officer 1 w/t operator most helpful Molotov declaration. (British) an American reserve W+T W/T contract resumed on April 13th. operator. London should like to send major Armistice terms sent in but no answer yet Boxshall as leader of the party. received. George Boxshall has again come In the event of a Romanian surrender this on air but contracts interrupted for the SOE/OSS mission could no doubt join with second time as a result of the bombing of the British American missions’ which Bucharest on night 16th. Further W/T set would be sent to Romania. has been infiltrated. OSS have so far not been approached had W/T resumed on April 20th. No answer to but suggest they should be invited to peace terms yet received but a long participate. Assume London will take up telegram from Maniu showed a desire to this hatter with the British ambassador in bargain and a total lack of understanding of Moscow after hearing SAM’s view [8]. In real facts. To this sent very balanced but in the SOE vision, this team follows to spite of this unlikely Maniu will prove of cooperate with NKVD to infiltrated further value. From a psychological point of paramilitary in German-occupied Romania view, the British bombing was in SOE view in the case that Germans are withdrawn to ill-timed.
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