Eastern Illinois University The Keep Masters Theses Student Theses & Publications 1989 The nitU ed States and German Reunification: The Stalin Note of 1952 Klaus P. Grillmaier Eastern Illinois University This research is a product of the graduate program in History at Eastern Illinois University. Find out more about the program. Recommended Citation Grillmaier, Klaus P., "The nitU ed States and German Reunification: The tS alin Note of 1952" (1989). Masters Theses. 2415. https://thekeep.eiu.edu/theses/2415 This is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Theses & Publications at The Keep. It has been accepted for inclusion in Masters Theses by an authorized administrator of The Keep. For more information, please contact [email protected]. THESIS REPRODUCTION CERTIFICATE TO: Graduate Degree Candidates who have written formal theses. SUBJECT: Permission to reproduce theses. 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Grillmaier THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF Master of Arts IN THE GRADUATE SCHOOL, EASTERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY CHARLESTON, ILLINOIS 1989 YEAR I HEREBY RECOMMEND THIS THESIS BE ACCEPTED AS FULFILLING THIS PART OF THE GRADUATE DEGREE CITED ABOVE �� ���IC��DATE s..� \\�<\ ;j_�/%1 DATE iii Abstract This thesis discusses the American and West German reaction to the Soviet note of March 10, 1952. In this so- called Stalin Note the Soviet dictator proposed the reunification of Germany on terms of neutrality and acceptance of the Oder and Neisse rivers as the German-Polish border. By launching his proposal Stalin sought to prevent the integration of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) into the Western alliance system. The paper starts out sketching the emergence of the United States and the Soviet Union as superpowers after World War II. It also analyzes the impact the . Cold War had on Europe . After this introductory section the author discusses American-West German relations during the time between the founding of the FRG and spring 1952, when the Stalin Note was presented to the Western ambassadors in Moscow. During the first• three years of the Bonn government , American policy toward Germany gradually shifted away from the objective of controlling the defeated enemy . Instead, the Truman Administration increasingly pursued a policy of cautious cooperation in order to contain Soviet expansionism. Although this change in Washington 's course was accelerated by the outbreak of the Korean War in mid-1950, the occupation iv of Germany lasted until 1955, the year in which west Germany received sovereignty and joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. After 1949, it was West German Chancellor Adenauer 's foremost goal to restore full independence to the German government through close cooperation with the Western Al lies , especially the United States . Adenauer was prepared to postpone the reunification of his country for the time being. Hoping to create a strong power basis for the FRG in the West European alliance, he expected to gain the necessary strength for successful negotiations with Moscow about Germany 's unity. To a large extent Bonn 's policy harmonized with that of the Truman Administration. Prior to the creation of two German states , the Soviet Union had followed a rather aggressive course in its policy toward Germany which climaxed with the Berlin Blockade of 1948 . Being confronted with the failure of its strategy and facing a tremendous We stern armament program after the invasion of South Korea , the Kremlin changed its strategy. During the second half of 1951 and spring 1952, Moscow di spatched several initiatives for German reunification of which the Stalin Note was the most conciliatory one. The United States rej ected Moscow' s proposal of March , 1952 because Washington did not want to cancel its defense plans for Western Europe in exchange for a new power constellation on that continent which Washington considered v fragile and dangerous to American security interests . The author of this paper concludes that American opposition to the Soviet plan was the major Western obstacle with respect to sincere four-power talks on German unity in 1952. French , British and West German concurrence with America's attitude considerably facilitated this policy. The author, however , questions the thesis of some historians that Adenauer 's concurrence with Washington 's course was essential to the United States' refusal of the Stalin Note. He holds that a possible west German disagreement concerning Washington 's course would not have resulted in serious four-power talks. Adenauer 's political lever was too weak as to press successfully for a constructive Western approach to Moscow's initiative. Bonn had only the chance to threaten a suspension of further talks on the FRG's integration into the Western alliance system until the Soviet plan had been thoroughly probed--a move that would have caused severe frictions among the We stern Allies and Adenauer. Such a strategy would have jeopardized if not destroyed the basis for continued cooperation between the Western powers and the Federal Republic without resulting in Germany 's reunification. vii TABLE OF CONTENTS Abstract ..................................................iii Introduction ............... ................ .. ...............1 Chapter I. American Engagement in Global Politics After World War II •••••.•...••.•.....••... .•....•••.••.••.•.•5 II. The Evolution of Closer American-German Relations and the Solidification of the Division of Germany 1949-1952 .....•...........•........... .......•...•...•11 1. U.S. Policy Toward Germany and the Impact of the Korean War •••••.• •..•••••••••••••11 2. Chancellor Adenauer's Diplomatic Struggle for West German Sovereignty •••••••.•••••••...••33 3. The Social Democratic Opposition to Adenauer' s Po licy •••...••••••• •••••••.•.••••.•43 III. Stalin 's Note of March 10 , 1952 ••••••••.••.....••.•.•.56 1. Soviet Policy Toward Germany 1949-52 •••••••••••56 2. Moscow's Proposal to Create a United and Neutralized Germany •••••••••••••••••••.••••70 IV. The American Reaction and the "Battle of Notes" ••••..•79 1. American Diplomacy ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••79 2. Reactions to the Stalin note by the American Press ...............................113 3. Adenauer ' s Maneuvers •••••.•••••.•••••..•••.•.122 4. The Nationalistic Attitude of the German Social Democrats •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••141 V. West Germany 's Road to Full Sovereignty ••••••••••••••153 VI. Conclusion .... .... ...................................161 Bibliog-raphy.... .............................. ............16 7 1 Introduction The East-West conflict that emerged during World War II rendered Germany a divided country for an inde finite time . For fourty years the Germanies were separated by an iron curtain. Still today they are integrated into military alliances directed against one another. The question whether the Stalin Note of 1952 was a sincere proposal of a united, neutral Germany or a mere diplomatic trap raised a persistent dispute among po liticians , political observers , and historians . The key to this problem, however, lies in the state and party archives in Moscow which remain closed to historical research. Some historians have pointed out that in 1952 the Western occupation powers and We st German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer missed a chance for a thorough examination of the Kremlin's proposal. These scholars hold that by rejecting negotiations with the Soviets the Allies and Adenauer also missed an opportunity for Germany's democratic reunification . • The recent mass exodus from the German Democratic Republic (GDR) and the powerful demonstrations demanding freedom and democracy in that state anew indicate the importance of the decisions made in 1952. Could all this have been avoided had the western Allies agreed to the Soviet initiative for a four- power conference in that year ? 2 This thesis focuses on the policy of the Truman Administration and the Adenauer government toward Moscow 's March 195 2 proposal. Washington and Bonn's perception of the Soviet note and their reaction to it will be the center of the discussion. It goes without saying that the United States as the Western superpower was the dominant factor in German­ American relations at this time. One might raise the question , however , whether Washington could have successfully pursued its policy of integrating one part of Germany--the Federal Repub lic of Germany (FRG)--into the western alliance system if it had been opposed by the FRG ' s government. In other words: did Chancellor Adenauer possess the lever to force the United States and its allies to deal more constructively with the question of German unity ? An introductory chapter of this