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Libya Weekly Security Preview January 31, 2021 Prepared by: Risk Analysis Team, Libya GardaWorld Proprietary GardaWorld © 2021 GardaWorld Proprietary 1 202 © 1 Table of Contents Outlook .................................................................................................. 3 Short Term Outlook .............................................................................................................................. 3 Medium to Long Term Outlook ............................................................................................................. 3 Executive Summary ............................................................................... 3 Political Developments ......................................................................................................................... 3 Military Developments .......................................................................................................................... 4 Security Developments ......................................................................................................................... 4 Oil & Gas .............................................................................................................................................. 5 Threat Matrix .......................................................................................... 5 Key Dates .............................................................................................. 5 Assessment ........................................................................................... 6 Political Developments ......................................................................................................................... 6 Oil & Gas .............................................................................................................................................. 7 Coronavirus .......................................................................................................................................... 7 Regional Assessment ............................................................................ 7 Tripolitania Region ................................................................................................................................ 7 Cyrenaica Region ................................................................................................................................. 9 Fezzan Region ..................................................................................................................................... 9 Acronym List ........................................................................................ 11 GardaWorld .......................................................................................... 12 Information Services ........................................................................................................................... 12 Global Leader in Comprehensive Security and Risk Management.................................................... 12 This is an abridged version of the GardaWorld Weekly Libya .Xplored report. To subscribe to our full report or to request a quote for security services in Libya please contact Nicholas Bennett, Regional Director, Libya. GardaWorld Proprietary GardaWorld 1 202 © 2 Outlook Short Term Outlook ▪ The Libyan Political Dialogue Forum (LPDF) is making some progress, especially in the military and economic tracks, however, in general, it remains characterized by uncertainty. The north-west of Libya continues to see worsening political rifts as politicians vie for positions within a future government. The east remains unstable in the wake of the failed military offensive of 2019/20 with key individuals looking to rebrand, reposition, and rebuild their support bases, both domestically and internationally. ▪ The Sirte/Jufra frontline remains largely quiet as work goes on to establish an international ceasefire monitoring team in the area although tensions remain, and sporadic confrontations remain possible. The LNA has created a defensive line along the axis as it seeks to protect its hold over the oil crescent. The complexities in the southern region are resulting in a more fluid situation and it is more likely at present to see confrontations however not all of these will be driven by the national power struggle. ▪ With deepening rifts in the north-west, tensions between different armed groups and their patrons are expected to persist. These could lead to sporadic armed confrontations in the short to medium term as different power structures look to expand their areas of control and influence in Tripolitania. ▪ The risk posed by COVID-19 continues to effect Libya as well as movement in and out through Tunisia and Turkey. The situation remains dynamic and will continue to evolve over the longer term with localized restrictions been implemented with little to no notice. Levels of infection inside Libya have begun to increase again and globally, there is an increased threat from new strains of the virus which could cause further travel disruption however at present, PCR testing is helping to keep travel corridors open. ▪ Crime (including carjacking's, armed robberies, murders, and kidnappings) remain common in many areas of the country with perpetrators exploiting local gaps in security to carry out attacks. Crime reporting has seen an increase over the past few months in all regions. Medium to Long Term Outlook ▪ The current political turmoil which has been driving a period of repositioning inside and outside Libya since the end of the 2019/20 conflict has taken on a new dimension with the inauguration of a new administration in the US. While the political process is seeing some progress under the auspices of the UN, gains remain fragile and progress can cause short term destabilization as the country and its stakeholders adjust. Should the LPDF fail, there would be a heightened threat of a return to hostilities while key international stakeholders could become increasingly assertive. ▪ Islamic State continues to suffer attrition in Libya and remains mostly dormant from an operational perspective. However, the ongoing fragmentation of the country and political instability will continue to create conditions in which the group could begin to reconstitute some of its capability. There were possible indications of an intent to try and re-establish an operational capability in Tripolitania at the end of 2020 with a possible aim of increasing tensions during political negotiations. Other terrorist factions also remain active with some representing a kidnap threat, especially in more remote areas, while some have exploited the last conflict with the LNA to embed themselves within security forces in Tripoli. Executive Summary Political Developments ▪ Libya is about to enter a new critical political phase with the LPDF heading to Geneva for a week in the hopes a new interim executive authority will be voted in by February 05. This last week has seen a flurry of political activity as various individuals and factions strike last-minute deals aimed at GardaWorld Proprietary GardaWorld 1 202 © 3 shaping the outcome. There are 24 candidates for the presidential council and 21 for the prime ministers’ position. ▪ The vote and the implementation of any new executive authority will be a significant test for Libya and give a good indication on whether the country is ready to progress. Acting SRSG Stephanie Williams has asked that the UN Security Council dissolve all parallel authorities in Libya once the new interim authority is voted in, marking a potentially significant shift in power for some individuals and factions. As such, tensions are expected to be heightened over the next couple of weeks and could lead to action by spoilers looking to disrupt or derail the process. ▪ An agreement by the 13+13 committee (HoR and HCS) in Bouznika caused a notable backlash in Tripolitania this week. The agreement saw sovereign positions divided up between regions. Armed groups in Tripoli were particularly opposed, seeing the deal as a betrayal after they fought to push the LNA back in 2019/20. Around 24 members of the HoR and 40 members of the HCS also objected. The committee has now reportedly stated that the deal will not be enacted until the new interim authority is in place and the HCS and HoR have voted on it. The issue highlights the difficulties in reaching compromises at present, exacerbated by the last conflict. ▪ Acting SRSG Stephanie Williams gave her final briefing to the Security Council on January 28 before Jan Kubis takes his position at the start of February. She stated that “a year after the Berlin conference, intra-Libyan dialogues facilitated by UNSMIL through complementary political, military, economic tracks, have produced tangible results.” Military Developments ▪ There has been some pressure from both Germany and the UK this week for compliance with the October 23 ceasefire. Both have called for foreign fighters to withdraw and for the coastal road between Misrata and Sirte to be reopened. The UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres added his voice as well at the end of the week calling for all foreign forces to be withdrawn to Tripoli and Benghazi initially before “leaving the Libyans alone.” The deadline for foreign fighters to leave Libya expired on January 23. ▪ The 5+5 Military Committee is believed to be holding its second meeting in Sirte on February 04, the day before the LPDF meeting is expected to end. The meeting will