Romania’s Railway Development 1950-1989: Changing Priorities for Socialist Construction Romania’s Railway Development 1950-1989: Changing Priorities for Socialist Construction Turnock, David1 Introduction Due prominence was also given to Sta- In previous papers the author has exam- lin’s pronouncement of 1935 that a well-or- ined the developing railway system in Ro- ganised railway system was an essential Abstract mania – especially the state railway Căile pre-requisite for economic development, There was considerable development Ferate Române (CFR) - as a process funda- linking complementary regions and re- in the communist period when the rail- mental for the country’s modernisation but sources (Rădoi, 1954). Of course the sys- way was the principal means of transport also one that is closely tied up with a varied tem was already extensive with a network to support a programme of rapid indus- topography – with implications for route of 9,900kms in 1938 rising to 10,853 in 1950 trialisation. New construction took place selection – and politically-inspired evalua- and 11,348 in 1990. But since there were in many areas, but mainly to open up raw tion of economic and strategic concerns in many uncompleted projects it seemed like- material sources rather than improve the changing international contexts (Turnock, ly that the substantial achievements of ear- connectivity of the system through addi- 1999, 2004). While much of the country is lier years would be exceeded. The first post- tional routes across the Carpathians. Great well-adapted for railway construction there war communist leader Gh.Gheorghiu-Dej efforts were also made to widen track is also much evidence of ‘heroic’ achieve- was a former railway worker, ‘exiled’ from and electrify the heavily-used lines along ment in the sense of major resource allo- Bucharest to the north Transylvania town with modernisation of both motive pow- cation, engineering capacity and labour of Dej (duly incorporated into his sur- er and rolling stock to sustain econom- input by a developing country with lim- name!) in a bid to curb his union activity. ic growth based on a network of key cen- ited mechanical support. Mountain lines However despite an initial surge of activi- tres with limited spread to backward areas. have required considerable tunnelling and ty after the communists came to power, to- Many new projects remain outstand- bridge-building, while hilly regions are of- tal network length increased by only 3.0% ing despite some transfer from road to ten prone to instability through landslides from 11,012kms in 1970 and 11,348 in 1990. rail transport during the 1980s and signif- and the lowlands have also posed severe icant future completions are now unlike- challenges through major rivers with var- Expansion of the network ly. The paper also reviews the expansion of iable discharge and constant risk of flood The first two decades of communist rule narrow-gauge forestry lines that were es- damage (Plate 1). Since the communist era effectively abandoned ambitious pro- sential in the early post-war years before is often seen as eminently voluntaristic in grammes of railway network develop- road transport was developed. The Vâl- the sense of an ideologically-committed ment inherited from the inter-war years. cea case shows how rail systems were ex- leadership (in the Soviet mould) motivat- The government was initially anxious to tended across challenging terrain and al- ing nations to reach the ultimate goals of continue the major programme of public though they were almost all closed by 1965 human endeavour it is perhaps appropri- works and the First Five Year Plan envis- they form a significant part of Romania’s ate to consider Romania’s progress in rail- aged some 300kms.of new railway. It was railway age. way development against the ethos of what not revealed just which lines were involved is now seen as a highly-controversial phase but the only achievements were improved Key words: Reilway development, Roma- of its modern history. links with Bulgaria (through the Calafat- nia and Transport Although industry was always the pri- Vidin ferry of 1950 and the Giurgiu-Ruse ority under communism, transport was ‘Friendship Bridge’ of 1954) and short lines fundamental for growth in manufactur- in 1951 (a) from Piatra Neamţ to Bicaz (a ing and investment levels were always sub- base for future activity in cement produc- stantial, although the global investment tion and hydropower development) and (b) figures (hovering around ten percent of to- to Capul Midia from Constanţa-Palas and tal investment) do not allow the railway Dorobanţu (in connection with Black Sea interest to be separated from other trans- port facilities) (Figure 1). It is possible that port modes that attracted spending on the Curtea de Argeş-Râmnicu Vâlcea and such projects as the Bucharest-Piteşti mo- Întorsura Buzăului-Nehoiaşu lines were torway, Bucharest-Otopeni airport and planned in order to reduce pressure on the the Danube-Black Sea Canal to Constanţa. overloaded Ploieşti-Predeal-Braşov route. However the railway was always of prime But Peaha (1965) states that while some importance and Romanian writers gave outstanding main line projects were re- 1 David Turnock prominence to statements by Soviet lead- considered no work was undertaken at this Geography Department, University ers including Lenin’s advocacy of railways time. Another priority could have been of Leicester, Leicester LE1 7RH, United to link agriculture with industry and the the early completion of the Deva-Brad Geographica Pannonica 09/2005 Pannonica Geographica Kingdom, [email protected] countryside with the town (Soran, 1953). line (where the Stoeneşti-Dealul Fetii sec- 32 David Turnock tion had been outstanding since 1944) and the plugging of a further gap between Vâr- furi and Vaşcău to complete the strategic axis between Oradea and Craiova. Anoth- er possibility was a direct central railway from Cluj-Napoca to Târgu Mureş and Ciceu, for reports of 1948-9 referred to ac- tivity between Apahida near Cluj and even suggested that the line was almost ready. This appears to have been a gross exagger- ation but it is documented that the Odor- hei-Ciceu line - proposed by local interests during 1925-30 - was studied in 1950 and implemented in 1952. However, in view of the difficulties encountered through Vlăhiţa the project was given up in favour of others (unspecified) already under way. Subsequent studies produced four vari- ants for an easily-graded main line: a 60 km route with five tunnels (2.24kms) or six tunnels of (7.73 kms); or a shorter 50km route with three tunnels (19.95 kms) or four (22.59 kms) (Iordănescu and Georgescu 1986). There was also the Odorhei-Voslobe- ni variant via Sicaş Pass: a route of 59kms with 14 tunnels (6.15 kms). Overall how- ever the brutal forced labour regime un- leashed by the communists gave priority to Plate 1 Railway landscapes: a heavy freight moves through the southern suburbs of Iaşi on the the Danube-Black Sea Canal (Cernavodă- edge of the Moldavian Plateau coming from the Vaslui direction (top left); a row of semaphore Constanţa) to provide a Romanian link signals at Ciucea (between Cluj-Napoca and Oradea) with the forested Carpathians behind with ocean shipping at a time when the So- (centre left); a heavy freight moves westwards out of Cluj-Napoca with a 4,000hp diesel-electric viets controlled the key delta routes. locomotive piloting one the older 2,100hp types (bottom left); another freight train heading THE NEW COURSE after Stalin’s death westwards along the Mureş corridor at Deva with the Western Carpathians in the distance (top right); and in a Carpathian forest: a wagonload of sawn timber arrives at the foot of the inclined in 1953 brought a scaling-down of extrava- plane on the Comandău-Covasna forest railway. gant public works until adequate engineer- ing capacities were available (e.g. in the ica that involved sharp curves and a diffi- I began in 1964 and was ready in 1968, in hydropower domain). When Gheorghiu- cult bank at Strigoaia. The old route was good time for the completion of the hydro Dej addressed railway workers in 1953 he acceptable in the context of the original scheme in 1971 (whereupon the original line made no mention of new construction ‘Bukowiner Lokalbahn’ of 1888 (branch- through the gorge was flooded). Modifica- and his long speech was concerned entire- ing from the Suceava-Cernăuţi main line tions were also required as a result of the Olt ly with inefficiency (that nationalisation at Dărmăneşti) but was not appropriate for valley hydropower complex over a lengthy was meant to overcome) evident through the Cluj-Iaşi inter-city created by the ex- period extending from 1977 to 1988, particu- excessive shunting and re-marshalling of tension from Vatra Dornei to Ilva Mică in larly between Călimăneşti and Lotru. With freight trains, slow unloading, insufficient northern Transylvania in 1938. Construc- the additional complication of double track, full-wagon loads and simultaneous move- tion started during 1951-5 but was inter- a substantial amount of tunnelling was re- ment of empty wagons between yards in rupted for financial considerations and re- quired at Cârligu, Cozia, Lotrioara and both directions! With substantial skilled- sumed 1959-64. There was a single tunnel Turnu where a total of 10 single-bore tun- staff shortages, aggravated by poor train- (Lucăceşti: 426 m, finished in 1961) and six nels extended cumulatively over 7.34 kms. ing, Romania’s ‘ceferişti’ (the name used viaducts with a total length of 0.69 km. However, further effort was needed to cope for railwaymen based on the acronym More ambitious construction became with the expansion of extractive industries.