Unmanned Intratheater Airlift

Air University Lt Gen Allen G. Peck, Commander Air Command and Staff College Brig Gen Anthony J. Rock, Commandant Col Robert J. Smith, PhD, Dean Lt Col Kyle D. Gresham, PhD, Director of Research Col Brett E. Morris, PhD and Maj John L. Mansuy, Series Editors Budd A. Jones Jr., Essay Advisor Air University Press Gen John A. Shaud, USAF, Retired, PhD Director, Air Force Research Institute Dr. Richard Bailey, Project Editor Sandi Davis, Copy Editor Ann Bailey, Prepress Production Daniel Armstrong, Cover Design Please send inquiries or comments to Editor The Wright Flyer Papers Air Command and Staff College (ACSC/DEI) 225 Chennault Circle, Bldg. 1402 Maxwell AFB AL 36112-6426 Tel: (334) 953-6810 Fax: (334) 953-2269 E-mail: [email protected] AIR UNIVERSITY AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE Unmanned Intratheater Airlift KEVIN J. MCGOWAN Major, USAF Air Command and Staff College Wright Flyer Paper No. 45 Air University Press Air Force Research Institute Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama December 2010 This Wright Flyer Paper and others in the series are available electronically at the Air University Research Information Management System website at http:// research.maxwell.af.mil and the AU Press website at http://aupress.au.af.mil. Disclaimer Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of Air Univer- sity, the United States Air Force, the Department of Defense, or any other US government agency. Cleared for public release: distribution unlimited. ii Contents Chapter Page DISCLAIMER . ii FOREWORD . v ABSTRACT . vii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . ix EXECUTIVE SUMMARY . xi 1 INTRODUCTION . 1 Notes . 12 2 OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS . 15 Notes . 26 3 TECHNOLOGY REVIEW/PROOF OF CONCEPT . 27 Notes . 41 4 PROPOSED SOLUTION . 45 Notes . 51 5 SYNOPSIS OF CONCEPT OF EMPLOYMENT . 53 Notes . 59 6 CONCLUSION . 61 Appendix 1 Contract Lift Configurations . 65 2 John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 . 67 3 Service RPA Requirements . 69 4 Concept of Employment . 71 DEFINITIONS . 119 ABBREVIATIONS . 123 BIBLIOGRAPHY . 127 iii Foreword It is with great pride that Air Command and Staff College presents another in a series of award-winning student research projects from our academic programs that reach nearly 11,000 students each year. As our series title indi- cates, we seek to promote the sort of imaginative, forward- looking thinking that inspired the earliest aviation pioneers, and we aim for publication projects which combine these characteristics with the sort of clear presentation that per- mits even the most technical topics to be readily under- stood. We sincerely hope what follows will stimulate thinking, invite debate, and further encourage today’s air war fighters in their continuing search for new and better ways to perform their missions—now and in the future. ANTHONY J. ROCK Brigadier General, USAF Commandant v Abstract The movement of supplies and personnel within the Op- eration Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom areas of operation is currently extremely costly, hazardous, and inefficient. Frequent attacks against insecure lines of communication and difficult terrain have led to a constantly increasing tactical airlift requirement. As of September 2009, 75 percent of all troop locations in Afghanistan and Iraq required resupply by ground convoy, airdrop, or vertical- takeoff-and-landing aircraft. Unfortunately, the Department of Defense (DOD) currently lacks the capability to fulfill all tactical airlift requests. This paper investigates the DOD’s tactical logistical challenges and each service’s tactical lift requirements, espe- cially with respect to the movement of supplies from forward supply hubs to forward forces. To address these challenges and requirements, the author suggests the use of remotely piloted aircraft (RPA) as a potential solution. Focusing on existing and quickly emerging technologies as well as the joint operating requirements, the author pro- poses RPA performance and design characteristics along with a concept of employment that increases tactical lift capabilities and meets all current service requirements. vii Acknowledgments I would like to thank my research advisor, Budd Jones, for his guidance, insight, and assistance in reviewing, editing, and improving this paper. I also thank Donald Anderson, Air Mobility Command (AMC)/A9; Demetrius Glass, US Army/G4; Maj Thomas Heffern, US Marine Corps Unmanned Aircraft Systems Requirements; Maj Robert Hilliard, US Transportation Command/J3-ED; Robert Nagel, AMC/ A8XC; Lt Col Travis Burdine, AF/A2U; Mike Melnyk and LT Sidney Cochran III, Naval Safety Center; and LTC David Fleckenstein, US Army Combat Readiness Center, for their insight and assistance in gathering the data used in this study. ix Executive Summary Recent military engagements have seen a radical shift in adversary tactics. In addition to confronting traditional conventional forces, the US military now faces an increasing use of irregular warfare tactics to offset the US techno- logical and operational advantages. Long, slow, and predictable supply convoys along overstretched lines of communication also tend to place US supplies and troops at significant risk. This is further complicated by a general lack of logistical infrastructure and increasing requirements for US forces to assume positions in isolated and rugged locations. The low likelihood of these trends changing in future engagements places the DOD in a difficult position. How do you increase cargo movement to isolated forward operating bases (FOB) in relatively inaccessible locations while maintaining secure lines of communication? Operational and budgetary limitations coupled with tooth-to-tail ratio, shrinking force sizes, increasing logistical requirements, and deployment footprint concerns require immediate solutions, even if finding them means searching outside the box. This chal- lenge dictates a movement away from traditional resupply means and an accompanying paradigm and doctrinal shift. Advancements in technology, increased needs, and shrinking budgets present the DOD with both challenges and op- portunities. Augmenting the current tactical airlift system with a modular autonomous and/or semiautonomous unmanned tactical airlift aircraft offers a flexible, responsive, and inexpensive solution that will increase airlift capacity, minimize carbon footprint, reduce risk to ground and airlift crews, and reduce wear and tear on manned assets. The Problem The DOD’s use of the spoke and hub distribution method has proven itself as an efficient and effective means of supply distribution. However, while the strategic lift portion of the factory-to-foxhole chain is well established and relatively efficient for routine shipments, the “last tactical mile” segment is less than ideal. Depending upon a combination xi of fixed-wing, rotor wing, ground transport, host nation, and contract services, the last tactical mile segment of the cargo movement process is inefficient, typically service ori- ented, and in some cases extremely dangerous. In addition to an assortment of other factors, delivery delays resulting from the current tactical lift system can have a significant operational impact upon fielded forces from both a safety and a combat effectiveness perspective.1 In Operations Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Iraqi Freedom (OIF), insurgent and enemy force tactics and limited infra- structures have made the transport of supplies via ground both deadly and slow. These challenges have led to an increased reliance upon a combination of airdrop and airland flights to move supplies and personnel from major hubs directly to their points of need. Aircraft availability, weather, and terrain, however, have caused delayed movement and a requirement to move supplies by alternate means. In Afghanistan the general lack of passable roads to re- mote villages, FOBs, and deployed troops makes airlift the only viable option to resupply many locations. In fact, while FOBs have taken advantage of the limited number of run- ways, only about 24 percent of FOBs can be serviced by C-130 or larger aircraft.2 This lack of essential airland infrastructure has made vertical takeoff and landing (VTOL) airlift, ground convoy, and airdrop essential pieces of the logistics system in both theaters.3 To address these needs and limitations, the Army and Marines rely heavily upon formations of rotor-wing and tilt- rotor airlift assets to transport much-needed supplies and personnel.4 As most resupply is routine and predictable, regularly scheduled supply routes can be and typically are established. Unfortunately, although these routes tend to be effective, they are inefficient and tend to draw limited airlift assets away from their primary missions. Addition- ally, they waste fuel and time while exposing the flight crew and passengers to unnecessary risks. Furthermore, the increased utilization rates and harsh environments have also led to increased maintenance requirements and premature aging of the airlift fleet.5 Augmenting the military lift assets is an assortment of private and commercial fixed- and rotor-wing contract carriers. While the total quantity of cargo and passengers moved xii by these carriers pales in comparison to those lifted by military assets, these carriers provide an essential service. With significant passenger loads and cargo loads ranging from a few hundred pounds (lb.) to over 35,000 lb., these routine flights

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