University of Nebraska - Lincoln DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln

Faculty Publications, Department of Psychology, Department of

1989

Creativity and

John H. Flowers University of Nebraska-Lincoln, [email protected]

Calvin P. Garbin University of Nebraska-Lincoln, [email protected]

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Flowers, John H. and Garbin, Calvin P., "Creativity and Perception" (1989). Faculty Publications, Department of Psychology. 453. https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/psychfacpub/453

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Psychology, Department of at DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications, Department of Psychology by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. Published (as Chapter 8) in Handbook of Creativity, edited by John A. Glover, Royce R. Ronning, and Cecil R. Reynolds (New York & London: Plenum Press, 1989), pp. 147-162. Copyright © 1989 Plenum Press (Springer). Used by permission.

Creativity and Perception

John H. Flowers and Calvin P. Garbin

Department of Psychology, University of Nebraska–Lincoln, Lincoln, NE 68588.

Informal about the nature of mental oper- dealing with the topic of creativity, most of these refer- ations important to creative behavior suggests ences refer to related to specific about that perceptual processes are of considerable impor- individual differences in perceptual styles or process- tance. The ability to “see relationships among ele- ing modes, as opposed to broader contemporary is- ments” is an attribution commonly made toward au- sues of perceptual processing. Clearly, most research- thors of major scientific discoveries or of noteworthy ers in the field of perception have not touched upon artistic achievements. For example, Shepard (1978, the topic of creativity, and relatively few researchers 1981) documented self-reports from several creative in creativity have chosen to integrate their work with scientists and authors that strongly emphasize the perceptual issues. role of visual imagery and the manipulation of visual codes in the creative process. Given the anecdotal and self-report evidence for a Why Have Perceptual Psychologists Had Little to relationship between creative behavior and aspects of Say about Creativity? perceptual processing, it initially may seem surprising that there is a notable void in either research or theoret- One that may have inhibited psychologists ical articles specifically focused on these issues. In pre- who were studying aspects of perception from be- paring this chapter, for example, we noted that, during coming involved in research on creativity is the fact the last six volumes of the Journal of Creative Behav- that the term itself is not viewed as a scientifically ior, there was only one title that included the word per- “tight”‘ concept of the variety preferred by relatively ception, and that paper (Goodman & Marquart, 1978) “operationalistic” behavioral scientists. As has been was limited to a one-page abstract. In addition, we noted in earlier research (e.g., Stein, 1956; Taylor, noted that among seven current textbooks in percep- 1960), as well as the contributors to this volume, pro- tion that presently reside on our bookshelves, none viding an easily agreed upon operational definition contain the term creativity in their indexes, nor is the of creativity that can be related to specific aspects of term creative ability addressed at any point in the texts. observable behavior or specific -process- Although references to the term perception occasionally ing operations is problematic. Although there is gen- can be found in indexes of monographs specifically eral agreement among researchers in human thinking

147 148 F l o w e r s & G a r b i n i n H a n d b o o k o f C r e a t i v i t y (1989) that a key component of creativity is the process of review), most theories approach perception as an in- generating novel mental representations, assessment formation reduction process whereby noisy, variable, of creativity by society is generally done on the basis and impoverished patterns of environmental energy of product; that is, does a particular solution, inven- become resolved into stable and consistent inter- tion, discovery, or artistic contribution meet the joint nal representations optimal for human performance. criteria of novelty and worthwhileness? Obviously, Terms such as perceptual organization and perceptual a wide variety of mental operations and processes constancy reflect emphasis on the information reduc- could contribute to the characteristics of a product tion processes. The latter term, in particular, empha- that elicit those subjective evaluations. sizes the role of perception in providing an individ- The lack of existing explicitly relating is- ual with similar or identical mental representations of sues in perception to the study of human creativity events that may have widely varying physical repre- may also be attributable, in part, to fundamental dif- sentations in the environment. ferences in the “level of approach” among behavioral If a major function of “efficient” perceptual pro- scientists who study fundamental characteristics of cessing is to provide perceptual constancy, as well as mental and behavioral processes common across in- to encourage different observers to obtain similar or dividuals, as opposed to those having primary in- identical representations from common environmen- terest in differences among individuals. Both histor- tal stimuli, then it does indeed seem that this organi- ically and at present, the majority of research efforts zational aspect of perception works against the gen- directed at perceptual processes has eration of novel representations. One might therefore been directed at theories, models, and descriptions predict that some measures of perceptual performance of behavior that apply to perception in general, as that tap perceptual organizational processes would be opposed to individuals. The very term creativity, on negatively related to measures of creative ability. A the other hand, denotes an attribute that individuals potential consequence of such a relationship would be presumably possess (or at least exhibit) in different a positive association between perceptual deficiencies amounts, hence, its study generally assumes an indi- or handicaps and creative ability. Case study instances vidual differences approach. supportive of a relationship between perceptual hand- In our view, however, neither the fuzziness attrib- icaps and creative behavior can, in fact, be found in uted to the definition of creativity nor its degree of discussions of artistic and musical achievement. For association with ideographic rather than nomothetic instance, some of the innovative stylistic changes in approaches is as responsible for the lack of an exist- Beethoven’s later works are commonly attributed to ing body of literature relating creativity and percep- the increasing severity of his hearing impairment. tion as is the fact that perception traditionally has However, there are many to believe that been studied as a process of organizing information some aspects of perceptual performance should be within the nervous system, whereas studies of mental positively correlated with creative ability—or at least processes associated with creative behavior usually with the output of creative products. Many prod- imply the generation of novel representations of in- ucts of creative activity are not simple spontaneous formation within the nervous system. At first inspec- generations, but result from effortful production, in- tion, these two classes of mental activity seem to have terspersed with the evaluation of feedback. Thus, little to do with each other—or worse yet, they may handicapping the senses at a peripheral level (e.g., even be viewed as incompatible operations. blindness or deafness) would certainly disrupt the ability to evaluate visual and auditory productions as they are being created. Despite what has been said Is Perceptual Organization Incompatible with about Beethoven’s deafness, it seems absurd to pre- Creative Thought? dict that there would be a general negative relation- ship between basic measures of auditory sensitiv- Although individual theories of perception may ity and frequency discrimination ability and creative differ substantially in their emphasis upon the im- output of among composers, or a negative rela- portance of stimulus structure versus mental orga- tionship between visual acuity measures and creative nizational processes (see, e.g., Hochberg, 1981, for a output of painters. C r e a t i v i t y a n d P e r c e p t i o n 149

The Importance of Executively Controlled Processing

In our view, however, there are other aspects of per- ception for which performance measures ought to re- late positively to creativity—in particular, processes under the conscious control of the perceiver. These in- clude the ability to control various aspects of selective attention, to control figural organization when ambig- uous sensory data are presented, to perform manip- ulations of internal visual and/or auditory represen- tations of perceptual information, and the ability to equate perceptual experiences obtained from different sense modalities (cross-modal abilities). Although the earlier stages of perceptual processing leading to per- ceptual organization (e.g., sensory transduction, fea- ture extraction, figural synthesis) typically are viewed as involuntary processes not under executive control, Figure 1. The Necker Cube—a familiar example of how con- it is clear that perceptual organization and pattern rec- trolled visual attention can change perceptual organization. In Example A, where the cube is essentially “transparent,” two ognition are influenced jointly by both involuntary or distinct organizations of depth can be obtained with moder- automatic and executively controlled processing. ate ease. In Example B, the shading and obscuring of the in- At the level of perceptual organization, consider ternal contours provide additional context making one orga- the examples of the Necker cube and of the reversible nization dominant, although the second organization can still or ambiguous figures commonly found in most intro- be obtained with effort. In Example C, shading of other parts ductory psychology textbooks as well as in textbooks of the figure makes the opposite depth organization domi- nant. In Example D, where the internal contours are totally re- on perception (some examples are given in Figure 1). moved, the alternative depth organization cannot be obtained In each of these examples, there are contextual cues at all (by typical subjects), even with considerable mental ef- that cause a particular organization of the object to be fort. Note also that, after viewing cube C, it is easier to view perceived upon initial inspection. In most versions of cube A (and even cube B) in the same organization as is domi- these objects, observers have an ability to reverse the nant for cube C. organization through voluntary changes in visual at- tention, although the time and effort required for such Thus, we see two distinct categories of perceptual reversals, as well as which of the possible organiza- processes for which individual variation among dif- tions is most likely to be initially seen, can be greatly ferent observers might well relate to creativity. The influenced by modifying the contextual cues sup- first category contains the largely involuntary pro- porting either of the organizations. With some mod- cesses of perceptual organization. These are informa- ifications, reversal becomes virtually impossible, and tion-reducing processes that promote stability and thus only one interpretation is obtained. Executively organization of percepts, and thus normally tend to controlled processes can, within limits, significantly act against the formation of novel representations of modify figural synthesis and organization, allowing a information. The second category of perceptual pro- single physical stimulus to have multiple perceptual cesses, those under executive control of the observer, representations. Such processes may thus a role serve to modify and control the actions of the invol- in the generation of novel mental representations of untary processes and also may serve to encourage the information, which, in turn, could form the basis for generation of novel representations of information. creative products. Indeed, it is this kind of processing Extensive data exist on how each of these classes of that appears to contribute to high-performance levels processes affects performance as a function of stimu- on tests, such as Guilford’s (1967) divergent produc- lus and task parameters. Unfortunately, the data base tion test, that are specifically aimed at measuring in- on individual differences among either of these cate- dividual differences related to creativity. gories of processes is limited. Thus, it is difficult to re- 150 F l o w e r s & G a r b i n i n H a n d b o o k o f C r e a t i v i t y (1989) late directly specific empirical findings from existing to the same perceptual mechanisms that are normally perceptual studies to either the prediction of creative coupled to the analysis of sensory input, and that are behavior in individuals or to modification of the en- responsible for many aspects of perceptual organiza- vironment to encourage creativity. We feel this indi- tion. According to Shepard, these highly evolved and cates a need for additional basic research in individ- specialized perceptual mechanisms have the ability to ual differences per se, as well as research that directly operate upon data other than that obtained from nor- relates these individual differences to creative ability. mal sensory input, when decoupled from the sensory environment, as in such altered consciousness states as . It is conceivable that the ability to use such A Configural Conception of Creativity spontaneously generated mental constructions in cre- ative thought could be relatively independent of an The particular topics (and perceptual tasks) that individual’s power of executively controlled mental we will be discussing are selected largely because operations, but positively correlated with the strength they focus on the joint role of involuntarily and ex- of perceptual organizational processes. ecutively controlled processes in perception. We are This three-factor view of creativity, directly based guided by a broad conception of creativity that as- upon perceptual mechanisms, suggests therefore, a sumes that there are essentially three factors that highly configural, nonlinear relationship between cre- influence an individual’s creative potential. One ative ability in the population and specific individual involves the relative “looseness” of involuntary orga- differences in mental processes. By looking—from an nizational processes. An individual for whom the in- individual differences perspective—at various per- voluntary processes operate somewhat less determin- ceptual tasks that seem likely to tap differentially in- istically (but perhaps less efficiently) is more likely voluntary organizational processes and executively to represent environmental data mentally (as well as controlled processes, researchers may be in a better data recalled from ) in novel ways. The po- position to form a more detailed relating spe- tential relationship between and cre- cific representational and transformational processes ativity (Keefe & Magaro, 1980; Prentky, 1979) would to creative behavior. Additionally, such research seem to illustrate this factor. might guide development of programs or products The second factor involves the power of execu- for the enhancement of creative ability. tively controlled processes, such as spatial selective attention, manipulation of mental images, and con- trolled cross-modal representation. Presumably, an Impairment of Sensory Processes individual having superior executive control of these processes is able to produce novel representations of One of the most highly noticeable individual dif- information through effortful construction and mod- ference variables in perception is that of impairment ification of mental representations. This concept of of one or more of the primary senses—at least insofar “creativity through controlled mental effort” is very as distinguishing normal individuals (including pros- different from the concept of creativity attributable thetically correctable persons) from those who have to “loose organizational processes.” For example, apparent handicaps. Case study analyses of creative schizophrenics and individuals with schizotypic pat- output from visually or auditorily handicapped indi- terns of cognitive activity are notably weak on per- viduals is a topic that deserves intensive study on its formance measures that presumably tap executively own; our limited mention of the topic here is merely controlled mental processes. to recognize that the broad categories of differences The third factor, we feel, is of importance, particu- in perceptual and cognitive processes that character- larly to creative thought that involves sudden , ize adaptation to severe defects in either hearing or that involves processes not under executive control vision obviously can the creative process, albeit nor driven by sensory data, but that produces seem- in complex ways. It is a well- known principle of de- ingly spontaneous mental representations, often in- velopmental psychobiology that prolonged depriva- volving visual imagery. Based largely upon self-re- tion of sensory experience, from birth or early in life, ports of creative scientists and authors, Shepard can result in permanent changes in neural structures (1978,1981) attributed this aspect of creative activity that often prevent full recovery of function, even if C r e a t i v i t y a n d P e r c e p t i o n 151 the handicap is later repaired. Furthermore, neural stimulation upon creative thought processes. In partic- structures may adapt functions qualitatively differ- ular, the fact that common resources are used in exec- ent from those assumed by corresponding structures utive control of mental representations and in the pro- in sensorily intact individuals. In , cessing of corresponding forms of sensory data implies the consequences of sensory handicaps may affect as- that perception within a particular modality may inter- pects of memory and that depend upon the fere with thought processes sharing a common form use and manipulation of auditory or visual “codes,” of representation. For instance, the generation and in addition to the ability to gain information from the manipulation of visual images are inhibited when the environment. Recognition of this fact has led re- a task requires processing visual input, and manipu- searchers and educators to develop specialized edu- lations of linguistic representations may be inhibited cational programs for hearing-impaired individuals by tasks requiring the processing of speech. The in- that are specifically adapted to differences in modes terference between perceptually generated and inter- of information processing among such individuals. nally generated codes that share a common modality In addition to producing performance differences per easily can be demonstrated by using a task developed se, differences in memory codes, attention, and other by Brooks (1968). In this task, subjects are required to control processes attributable to early sensory handi- imagine a moving dot traveling around a mental im- caps obviously have the potential for producing prod- age of a block drawn letter, such as a F (see Fig- ucts that are novel when compared with norms of the ure 2), and to respond orally yes or no based upon general population of nonhandicapped individuals. whether each comer constitutes an external angle (re- We see two major problems, however, in extrap- quiring a “right turn” on the part of the dot) or an in- olating general conclusions about creativity from ternal angle (requiring a “left turn”). Time to complete the study of the perceptually handicapped. The first the circuit with the oral response mode is generally problem is the extreme degree of heterogeneity in much less than that required for the same task when types and degree of impairment among such indi- subjects must check off Ys versus Ns in a visually pre- viduals; not to mention potential differences in com- sented answer sheet. However, when subjects are pre- pensatory processes among individuals who share sented with a linguistic search task, requiring them relatively similar physical impairments and develop- to indicate whether successive words in memorized mental histories. The second problem is that the ease sentences are nouns versus other parts of speech, the of retrieving examples of perceptually handicapped creative individuals from memory makes the topic ripe for attributions of correlations between the hand- icap and the creativity that may not be warranted (e.g., Kahneman & Tversky, 1973). One may be able to learn a great deal about the creative processes of a given handicapped individual through careful case study, protocol analyses, and other techniques, and such research potentially could be of tremendous value to the development of special therapeutic and educational approaches. As a simple individual dif- ference variable to be applied for understanding the Figure 2. An illustration of the sort of “imaginary stimuli” characteristics of creativity in the general population, used by Brooks (1968) to study the effect of verbal or visu- the handicapped-nonhandicapped dichotomy does ally guided response processes on the ability to search visu- not, on the other hand, appear to be very useful. ally coded information in active memory. Subjects were re- quired to mentally construct an image of a letter, such as this capital F, and to indicate whether each comer passed by the imaginary asterisk consisted of an external or an internal an- Environmental Constraints on Sensory Input gle. Subjects could perform better on this task if an oral yes-no response was used than if a visually guided manual response It may be more useful to consider the effects, within system was employed, indicating that manipulation of visual unimpaired individuals, of different levels of sensory codes shares resources with visual perception. 152 F l o w e r s & G a r b i n i n H a n d b o o k o f C r e a t i v i t y (1989) visually guided check-response mode produces con- formance. The base that is generated from siderably faster searches than does the oral yes–no such a research effort might prove very useful in the mode. Modality specific interference between imag- development of both text-related products and pic- ery and perceptual detection tasks also has been dem- ture-related software aids used in computer-assisted onstrated by Segall and Fusella (1970), who asked . More generally, however, such knowledge subjects to construct mental images, such as the ap- might prove useful in the development of techniques pearance of a tree (visual) or the ringing of a telephone for fostering increased output of creative activity in a (auditory), and showed selective deficits in the ability much wider range of settings, through the teaching of to detect weak auditory or visual signals. specific strategies for minimizing perceptual interfer- Because documented self-reports of mental events ence with image-based mental operations and other associated with creative thought often include ex- forms of mental code transformations. tensive use of mental imagery (Shepard, 1978, 1981), it seems plausible that creating an environment that minimizes potentially interfering sensory input might Altered and Transitional States— Decoupling be useful in facilitating manipulations of mental image Perceptual Mechanisms from Sensory Input processing and, hence, contribute to creative thought. Additional research in how regulation of stimuli (vi- Our discussion above has concerned the overlap sual and linguistic feedback from a display screen on a in resources between mechanisms normally tied to word processor) can affect the speed and of cre- the involuntary processes of analyzing and organiz- ative output is one area of applied perceptual research ing sensory stimulation and those of executively con- that has current value for product development. An trolled construction and manipulation of visual and increasing number of products are being released into auditory images. A related issue concerns the po- the personal and professional software markets that are tential role of the perceptual mechanisms normally designed to aid the initial stages of manuscript plan- driven by sensory input during unaltered states of ning and organization. These so-called processors observer consciousness, when those mechanisms are are aimed specifically at the facilitation of creative out- decoupled from sensory input. states, and put for a variety of applications (Kellogg, 1986). With perhaps some drug-induced states, represent exam- the increasing use of small computers in a variety of ples of such a decoupling. Shepard (1978, 1981) ar- settings, one might expect the developments of similar gued that transitions from such states represent a fer- products to continue. One attribute of at least some of tile ground for the development of creative , the existing hardware is that users are prevented from because the perceptual mechanisms automatically viewing previously entered text—a design feature that linked to organizing the sensory world (which are seems to assume that the availability of visual feed- normally transparent to our conscious experience) back, or at least the existence of printed text that stim- run “on their own,” occasionally constructing novel ulates the of the user, is detrimental to and useful percepts and images from fragments of in- performance. ternal neural noise and loosely guided consultations As Kellogg (1986) pointed out, evaluative research with memory. According to Shepard (1981), contact on these products and on prototypes for future re- with the linguistic system allows the abstract images lated software aids is woefully lacking. The same and relationships to be translated into communicable can be said for research that is not tied to a specific form. Shepard clearly viewed the mechanisms of per- product but that provides general information about ceptual organization that involve spatial relationships the production as a function of the presence of per- in particular as a powerful source of general knowl- ceptual stimuli of, for example, text, figural design, edge about relationships that can be analogically ap- and metaphorical or analogical relationships. Based plied to and : upon the implications of such studies as those of The creative productions of a brain presumably stem Brooks (1968), it may be the case that the presence of from whatever intuitive wisdom, whatever deep orga- auditory or visual stimuli, while an individual is at- nizing principles have been built into that brain as a re- tempting to “be creative,” can have certain interfer- sult of the immense evolutionary journey that has is- sued in the formation of that brain. If the arguments ing stimulus-related costs for mental representation sketched out in this chapter have any merit, the most and transformation, and, hence, inhibit creative per- basic and powerful innate intuitions and principles un- C r e a t i v i t y a n d P e r c e p t i o n 153

derlying verbal and nonverbal thought, alike, may well ductions. Mental constructions occurring during an be those governing the relations, projections, symme- altered or transitional state can be useful only insofar tries, and transformations of objects in space. (Shepard, 1981, p. 339) as they are remembered, and insofar as they can be evaluated for application and worthwhileness. It may Thus, Shepard described a very direct relationship be that the degree to which decoupled automatic per- between perceptual processes and creative thought, ceptual processes contribute to creative output has far making the claim that (1) implicit knowledge of vi- more to do with facility in higher level cognitive pro- sual relationships among objects, and rules for trans- cesses, such as memory storage, retrieval, search, and forming those relationships, may constitute the - comparison, than in individual differences in percep- damental mental operations inherent in much of tual organization processes per se. creative thought, and (2) that decoupling certain nor- Consideration of the role of stimulus-decoupled mally involuntary processes from their data source perceptual organization processes as a fundamen- may allow those same mechanisms to operate as a tal source of creative thought, as Shepard proposed, primary generator of creative thought. It seems ap- leads to an interesting conjecture about the link be- parent from Shepard’s descriptions of self-report data tween efficiency of perceptual organization and that this form of creative thought is not of the con- creativity—particularly with respect to how gen- trolled variety (as discussed in the previous section) eral cognitive defects, such as those associated with but is the product of involuntary mental operations schizophrenia, might relate to creative thought. One that lead to spontaneous insight. Thus, the effects of common view of why individuals who possess some decoupling of normal sensory input during alterna- of the traits of schizophrenic thought might be viewed tive states of consciousness should be viewed as dis- as creative is that deficiencies in the normal involun- tinct from restricting sensory input in a normal-wak- tary perceptual organization processes lead to an in- ing-state individual in order to prevent interference creased likelihood of an atypical representation of a with controlled manipulation of perceptual codes. perceptual event (see, e.g., Keefe & Magaro, 1980). In In popular religious and scientific circles, vast other words, it is the anomalous organization of sen- amounts have been written about alternative states sory input, coupled with sufficiently good higher or- of consciousness that involve such decoupling of sen- der processes to evaluate the potential worthwhile- sory input, although, in our view, it is sometimes dif- ness of a mental construction (or, alternatively, the ficult to determine into which of those circles a given opportunity for a peer to notice the worthwhileness piece of research/literature should be categorized. It is of a product even if the cognitively impaired individ- also apparent that, throughout much of the history of ual cannot perform the evaluation), that lead to cre- civilization, some human beings knowingly have ex- ative output. However, creativity that is attributable ploited alternative states (including dreams) as a de- to looseness in perceptual organization in the pres- liberate strategy for fostering creative behavior—not to ence of stimuli is very different from creativity that is mention the use of alternative consciousness states as attributable to perceptual organization processes de- a causal construct for particular creative acts. Like re- coupled from normal sensory inputs. An increased search relating either handicaps or psychopathology to frequency of transitions from hypnopompic or hal- creativity, selection biases and the availability heuris- lucinatory states (as might be reasonably expected to tic can play havoc with attempting to relate existing lit- occur in association with certain psychotic disorders), erature on alternate states and creativity either to indi- combined with unimpaired (or even superior) mech- vidual differences in creative potential or to research anisms of perceptual organization, thus represents into conditions that foster creativity. a potential alternative route for contributing to cre- It may, however, be profitable to study the extent ative thought by some individuals who possess dis- to which individual differences in dream recall might positions toward cognitive disorders. Moreover, the relate to instances of insightful creative thought, as relative weakness or looseness in organizational pro- well as to individual differences in attention and per- cesses and the ability to exploit involuntary organi- ceptual organization. Such data could provide for a zational processes decoupled from sensory input are better empirical grasp on the degree to which infor- suggested as distinct individual difference variables, mation processing in dream or transitional states ac- both of which might relate to creativity in the general tually constitutes a major source of creative pro- population. 154 F l o w e r s & G a r b i n i n H a n d b o o k o f C r e a t i v i t y (1989)

Assessing Individual Variation in Perceptual Or- task required of the subject was to detect the “odd- ganization Ability ball” quadrant as rapidly as possible, and choice reac- tion time (RT) was the dependent variable. In Example Our discussion thus far suggests that obtaining a A, the baseline task involves choosing the oddly ori- better understanding of patterns of individual varia- ented single parenthesis, located in this example in the tion in perceptual organization tendencies might be upper left. This display requires a quite effortful scru- highly useful in examining the role of perceptual orga- tiny as the mean RT obtained by Pomerantz et al. was nization processes in creative thought. Unfortunately, 2,400 msec. However, adding the four extra context el- with the exception of various measures of embedded ements in the display leads to a perceptual grouping figures performance, Gestalt grouping processes and phenomenon that makes the oddball element stand other related “automatic” processes of perceptual orga- out, reducing the RT by nearly a second (for a group nization have not been subjected to systematic individ- average obtained with college student subjects). Now, ual difference measurements. Performance measures consider the display shown in Example B. Here, differ- on tasks, such as those involving embedded figures, ent context elements are added (rotated parentheses) often do not provide a convenient way of separating for which the result of organizational processes pro- performance attributable to loose perceptual organi- duces objects perceptually less distinct than the single zation (failure to group), from performance attribut- parentheses, resulting in an average increase in RT of able to strong, executively controlled focused attention 550 msec. Thus, in these examples, we have two highly (ability to break apart). It appears to us, however, that similar tasks, one for which Gestalt organization helps, one should be able to separate the contributions of au- one for which it hurts. tomatic organization and efficient focused attention, Presumably, individuals with weak organizational by selecting a combination of structurally similar tasks, processes would fail to gain as much benefit from the including some in which perceptual organization is helpful context, in comparison with more typical sub- helpful to performance, and others for which percep- jects, while performing tasks such as that of Exam- tual organization is harmful. ple A. On the other hand, such subjects also might be As an example of such an approach, consider the less susceptible to interference from context stimuli example of the stimulus displays shown in Figure that disrupt performance of typical subjects. In con- 3, used by Pomerantz, Sager, and Stover (1977). The trast, subjects possessing nominal automatic group- ing processes, but exceptionally powerful executively controlled focal attentional processes, might exhibit far less interference from the harmful context, while still maintaining benefits from the helpful context. A related of classification or sorting tasks that have the potential for separately assessing looseness of involuntary perceptual organization and the strength of voluntary visual attention is the one used by Pomer- antz and Schwaitzberg (1975). In this experiment, there were three different basic sorting tasks required of a subject, and the stimulus response mappings for each of these is shown in Figure 4. In Condition A (the con- trol condition), subjects sorted stimuli on the basis of orientation of the leftmost parenthesis; the orientation of the right parenthesis was held constant. In Condi- tion B, which required subjects to divide attention and Figure 3. Examples of stimuli used in an “oddball quad- attempt to ignore the irrelevant rightmost parenthe- rant” detection task employed by Pomerantz, Sager, and Sto- sis, the response assignment was determined by the ver (1977). In Example A, the addition of the context elements causes Gestalt grouping processes that make the unique quad- left parenthesis, and the right parenthesis varied in a rant more distinctive, whereas in Example B, the rotated con- manner orthogonal to the left parenthesis. In this con- text elements obscure the distinction (see text for details). dition, classification times were considerably slower C r e a t i v i t y a n d P e r c e p t i o n 155

subjects had to apply effortful divided attention pro- cesses, either to try to perceptually group the parenthe- sis pairs or to separately evaluate each parenthesis and apply a classification rule. A typical pattern of results for these three tasks is shown in Figure 5, in which sorting time is plotted as a function of separation of the parentheses. Again, these data are based upon the means of subjects’ performances that were obtained by Pomerantz and Schwaitzberg (1975). One might expect, however, that individual dif- ferences in the potency of involuntary organizational processes and individual differences in the execu- tively controlled ability to break up perceptual con- figurations (as well as divide attention, in this case) would produce systematic differences in the func- tions from those shown in Figure 5. An appropriate application of psychometric scaling procedures to dif- ferences among such patterns, in addition to similar analyses of patterns in such tasks as the “oddball de- tection” examples in Figure 3, could lead to separate scales for strength of perceptual organization tenden- cies and power of voluntary selective attention. To our knowledge, there is no existing research on patterns of individual differences in the costs and Figure 4. Examples of stimuli used by Pomerantz and Schwait- benefits of the configural effects that might beob- zberg (1975) in a task illustrating how Gestalt grouping affects tained by systematic administration of these or sim- selective and divided attention in a visual classification task ilar tasks to large numbers of individuals, in order (see text for details). to obtain an index of relative organizational power among different individuals that might be of use for than those of the control condition, provided the spa- determining its relationship to creative behavior. tial separation between the parenthesis pairs was close. However, given that individual differences in more As the spatial separation between the elements was in- traditional measures of embedded figures tasks exist creased beyond a single typespace in other stimulus (even though the voluntary selective component has sequences, the interference from the irrelevant right not been factored out), and given the recent evidence parenthesis diminished. of the very unique and actually superior performance Condition C required that subjects split the four of schizophrenics (compared with normals) on tasks possible pairings of parentheses into two groups, such for which avoidance of grouping contributes to per- that the response assignment was determined by the formance (Place & Gilmore, 1980; Wells & Leventhal, combination of both parentheses. Unlike either Condi- 1984), we believe that such individual differences ex- tion A or Condition B, this task required an evaluation ist, are potentially measurable, and probably do bear of both the leftmost and the rightmost parentheses. At a relationship with other important cognitive attri- close separations, such grouping seemed to occur in- butes including creativity. Given that the presumed voluntarily, as subjects reported perceiving the paren- organizational looseness of schizophrenics is often re- thesis pairs as single objects. In this case, classification lated to creative thought in individuals who perhaps times were actually shorter than for Condition B, be- have a lesser degree of the deficiency (e.g., Keefe & cause the objects assigned to each category appear to Magaro, 1980), the data on the psychiatric popula- share common perceptual attributes (e.g., “the fat ones tions are of considerable interest and are encouraging vs. the skinny ones”). However, at wider separations, for clarifying the “creativity-madness” association in which involuntary grouping processes break down, that has been around for centuries. 156 F l o w e r s & G a r b i n i n H a n d b o o k o f C r e a t i v i t y (1989)

Figure 5. A graphical representation of results obtained by Pomerantz and Schwaitzberg (1975) for Tasks A, B, and C of Figure 4. Sorting times for decks of 32 cards displaying these stimuli are plotted as a function of the physical separation between the pairs of parentheses. Stimulus sets involving wide spatial separations between the two stimuli greatly slowed sorting in the divided at- tention task (Task C of Figure 4), while allowing subjects to avoid interference from perceptual grouping in Task B. Presumably the form of such functions might differ for subjects differing in the potency of their involuntary perceptual organization processes as well as the power of their controlled visual attention. Reprinted by permission of LEA Associates.

Individual Variation in Intramodal Visual Code that, in general, reaction time was a monotonic func- Transformation tion of differences in the analog hand angles, provid- ing strong evidence that the task was mediated by In contrast to our lack of knowledge about individ- image comparison. In addition, however, subjects ual variation in perceptual organizing ability, psycho- were divided into “high-imagery” and ‘ ‘low-imag- metric tests that directly tap the ability of individuals ery’? groups, on the basis of a median split of perfor- to compare transformed visual objects (e.g., rotated mance on a composite of Guilford’s Block Visualiza- block drawings, folded and unfolded block figures) tion Test, the Minnesota Paper Form Board, and the have been available for decades (e.g., see Guilford, Thurstone Space Relations Test. High-imagery sub- 1967). Individual variation in abilities to perform jects produced RTs that averaged about 1 second such operations is clearly measurable, and it is ap- faster at each level of angular difference than low-im- parent that performance on such psychometric tests agery subjects. In contrast, a similar split of the sub- correlates with performance of mental tasks or prob- ject population on the basis of a verbal fluency mea- lems that appear to be mediated by use of visual ana- sure (Paivio, 1971) produced no differences between log codes. groups. This study as well as numerous others (e.g., One specific example is a study by Paivio (1978), see Paivio, 1971, 1978 for a review) provide relatively who measured subjects’ reaction times for determin- convincing evidence that individual differences in ing which of two clock times (given as digital expres- ability to perform top-down manipulation and trans- sions) would produce the smallest angle between formation of visuospatial codes can be predicted ef- the hands of a standard analog clock. Paivio found fectively with existing psychometric instruments. C r e a t i v i t y a n d P e r c e p t i o n 157

Given the apparent importance of fluent visual must be noted that most of the anecdotal reports of coding in anecdotal reports of creative cognition, such spontaneous insight, summarized by Shepard it seems intuitive that psychometric measures of and others, have come from individuals who were such visual abilities should relate positively to mea- likely to score very high on measures of mental abil- sures of creative behavior, particularly for those in- ities and who were (or still are) known to have put in dividuals whose creative work is arrived at primar- large amounts of controlled mental effort on prob- ily through the effortful, voluntary route. One must lems related to their creative achievements. The se- keep in mind, however, that simple possession of a lection, refinement, and use of images spontaneously mental ability does not necessarily imply that ability generated during transitional or altered states likely will be used to produce novel and worthwhile prod- may depend upon effortful executive processes, ucts. Creative behavior requires an evaluative com- suggesting that spontaneous insight should not be ponent for recognizing when a particular novel rep- viewed as a totally involuntary occurrence. More- resentation is of value. Given these considerations, over, mental activity that substitutes for the sen- and our configural view of the creative process, one sory signals that normally drive mechanisms of should not expect extremely high linear correlations perception, insofar as they are influenced by mem- between measures of visual coding fluency and cre- ory activities, may be highly structured by previous ative behavior per se. effortful mental code manipulations. In short, spon- One issue of importance in determining how spe- taneous insight may not be so spontaneous and is cific information-processing characteristics relate to conceivably quite closely related to mental transfor- creativity is whether it is appropriate to view indi- mation abilities of both intramodal and intermodal vidual differences in performance of specific classes varieties. of perceptual tasks as measures of relatively nar- rowly defined information-processing abilities, or whether correlations among specific task perfor- An Example of the Interplay of Involuntary mances suggest the existence of a general ability and Executively Driven Creative Processes: “factor.” Guilford (1981, 1983) argued that processes, and Cross-Modal Representations such as visual code manipulation and cross-modal transformations (which we will discuss presently), Previously, we have posited that these two very are all part of a general “transformational ability” different processes might produce similar creative that is a key component of creative thought. Indeed, products. In this section, we will look at two related one can make a rather strong psychometric argu- processes, one perceptual (automatic) and one cogni- ment for that position, as Guilford has done. On the tively mediated (executively controlled), that do in- other hand, perceptual psychologists who are aware deed seem to lead to similar and potentially creative that different neural structures may be involved in representations of the environment. intramodal versus cross-modal transformations, Theorists and long have recognized the cor- and also that common neural structures may be in- respondences, interrelationships, and interdepen- volved in both voluntary and involuntary process- dencies of the senses as they are used to capture in- ing of visually coded information, are more likely to formation about the world. Aristotle and other early have interest in specific comparisons among tasks. thinkers posited various relationships of cross-modal One research question that bears upon the relation- process or product, and Bishop Berkeley added his ship between specific visual information-process- notion of their ontogeny. More recently, Stevens (e.g., ing abilities and our configural model of creativity 1959), Gibson (1966), and Marks (e.g., 1978, 1982) have is whether fluency in controlled visual transforma- provided more refined theories and hypotheses about tions might be related to the frequency of spontane- the nature, workings, and meanings of these corre- ous insight in creative thought. We have thus far im- spondences. Particularly for Marks, the evidence of plied, as has Shepard (1978, 1981), that spontaneous artistic awareness and of creative use of these corre- novel constructions are basically the result of invol- spondences adds weight to various laboratory stud- untary representational processes, decoupled from ies that are in support of the theoretical ideas of cross- their normal sensory source of data. However, it modal equivalences and sensory unity. 158 F l o w e r s & G a r b i n i n H a n d b o o k o f C r e a t i v i t y (1989)

Most people are familiar with the use of onomato- ucts have arisen. According to Marks (1978), synesthe- poetic words, such as “hiss,” “crack,” and “woff,” to sia has enjoyed two periods of extensive study, the first convey the auditory characteristics of a sound as well 40 years of the twentieth century, and an earlier period as its semantic meaning. But the sounds of words during the nineteenth century. It was during this ear- also seem to convey other information. Kohler (1947) lier period, when synesthesia was of interest not only showed that most people matched the pseudowords to scientists and physicians but also to musicians, that “maluma” and “takete” with the rounder and the creative products were introduced that clearly sprang more angular of two line figures, respectively. As a from the perceptual phenomena. Perhaps the best demonstration, Marks (1978) replicated the finding known of these were the multimodal concerts that using a production task in which two children were mixed music with colored lights and occasionally with asked to draw the visual representations of these odor. Louis-Bertrand Castel built the first light organ in words. The drawing of takete was clearly the more 1735. This organ and others like it produced a particu- angular for each person. As another example of how lar colored light along with each note as the keys were word sounds can supply nonauditory information, depressed. Numerous pieces were written for and per- Sapir (1929) and later Newman (1933) asked subjects formed with these instruments. Laser light shows are about the size of objects referred to by nonsense syl- a more recent version of this same artistic use of the lables and found the words containing the letter /a/ close relationship between color and tonality to pro- were judged to refer to larger objects than did those duce desired affective responses. containing /i/. Finally, most people in our society are Also, during the nineteenth century and later, familiar with the relationships between colors and there were numerous linguistic expressions of syn- temperatures—red is “hot” whereas blue is “cool.” esthesia-like experiences, or synesthetic . These types of correspondences are quite different The following examples of such are taken from the wholly involuntary phenomena of true syn- from Marks (1978): Charles Baudelaire’s “Correspon- esthesia, in which “a small minority of people experi- dences,” “perfumes fresh as children’s flesh, sweet ence a curious sensory blending, where stimulation of as oboes, green as prairies,” and Arthur Rimbaud’s a single sense arouses a melange of sensory images” “Sonnet of the Vowels” “A black, E white, I red, U (Marks, 1978, p. 83). In addition to truly synesthetic green, O blue.” Examples of synesthetic in individuals, there are widespread reports of involun- literature are (from Marks, 1982): “the sound of com- tary synesthesia produced by various consciousness- ing darkness” (Poe); “a soft yet glowing light, liked altering drugs, such as LSD and hashish. lulled music” (Shelley); and “music suddenly opened As interesting and well-documented as true in- like a luminous book” (Conrad Aiken). voluntary synesthesia is, it is not, in itself, a creative On interesting point concerning these uses of product, just as the novel representations of schizo- color-sound correspondence and poetic metaphor phrenic thought are not. Creative products require (which is an important difference between these pro- the additional processes of appropriate selection and ductions and those of schizophrenics) is that none of presentation of those novel representations. Unlike the these authors appear to have been truly synesthetic schizophrenics’ , which is often identified as cre- themselves (although one may conjecture about those ative after production, the synesthetics must choose authors who had a history of narcotic use, e.g., Poe). whether or not to capture their mental representa- Yet they were able to produce creative results using tions and present their novel version of the world. these correspondences in ways so compelling that we Furthermore, although loose perceptual organi- not only understand and agree with their meanings, zation is potential source of novel representations for but often do not even immediately notice that there synesthetics (as for schizophrenics), documentation are “crossed” or “mixed” modality-specific adjectives of creative products from true synesthetics is notably and nuances. Marks provided experimental evidence lacking. In part, the lack of documented examples sim- that most persons have (or can develop) a strongly in- ply may reflect the relative infrequency of true synes- ternalized correspondence of cross-modal relation- thetic individuals in the population, relative to schizo- ship between certain visual and auditory characteris- typic or schizophrenic individuals. But from each of tics (primarily brightness and loudness). Thus, we see these sources of anomalous percepts, numerous prod- that an automatic perceptual process—the capabil- C r e a t i v i t y a n d P e r c e p t i o n 159 ity and tendency toward cross-modal associations— that individual differences in cognitive processing that is necessary for the appreciation of creative products affect these three 4 “routes” to creative thought proba- generated by an executively controlled process. bly are not independent. For example, the looseness in In this discussion, we have tried to give an exam- perceptual organization that may characterize creative ple of how knowledge of an infrequent, perceptual, individuals with schizotypal thought patterns may and automatic phenomenon (synesthesia) can pro- well be negatively correlated with ability to make ef- vide the impetus for the use of executively controlled fortful mental transformations as well as the ability to processes to create artistic products. Finally, the ap- recognize that a novel mental representation is worth- preciation of these creative products greatly depends while. We do believe, however, that research efforts upon the ability to “perceptually resonate” with those into individual differences in specific perceptual char- products, an ability that seems to be nearly universal acteristics potentially can be useful in both increasing and automatic. our understanding of their relationships to creative be- havior, as well as for determining circumstances that might foster creative thought. As we have noted, re- Summary and Conclusions search literature describing individual differences in perceptual organization tendencies is notably lack- We have argued that the generation of creative be- ing. The study of individual differences in executively havior can result from a combination of involuntary controlled transformations of mental representations and executively controlled processes. These processes has received considerably more research effort, due rely heavily on neural mechanisms and systems that to a long existing presumption that such operations have evolved primarily as perceptual systems. How- are closely related to measures of basic mental abili- ever, these systems, which embody highly sophisti- ties. However, the “mental measurement” cated computational and inferential mechanisms, also for much of this research, has, in our view, directed re- serve to operate on mental codes actively retrieved searchers more toward the study of “common trans- from memory (e.g., conscious generation and modifi- formational ability factors” (e.g., Guilford, 1981, 1983) cation of imagery). In addition, there is anecdotal ev- rather than toward the properties of specific types of idence that these same mechanisms can be the source mental code manipulations, such as synesthetic meta- of spontaneously generated images or representations, phor. Lastly, the literature on spontaneous generation when their normal driving source of sensory stimula- of novel representations by perceptual mechanisms is, tion is decoupled, as in transitions from dreams or al- at present, highly speculative, and consists primarily tered states. Such spontaneous generation, if appropri- of self-report anecdotes. ately selected and recognized as useful, perhaps can produce the sudden creative characterized by many self-reports from creative individuals. A Flow Diagram of the Creative Process and Its According to our analysis, creativity thus can re- Implications sult from some combination of (1) novel percepts at- tributable to departures from the normal determinis- To summarize our view of how processes related tic processes of perceptual organization, (2) effortful to perception influence the creative process, -we of conscious mental activity involving manipulation and fer the flow diagram shown in Figure 6. In addition, transformation of codes that generate novel represen- Table 1 summarizes some of our conjectures about tations, and (3) spontaneous generation of novel rep- the relationships between various components of the resentations. Because the relative contributions of each flow diagram and some individual difference- vari of these to a specific creative achievement presumably ables potentially measurable by existing or design- varies markedly across both situations and individu- able assessment instruments and surveys. als, the relationship between specific cognitive abilities Essentially, Figure 6 is a visual summary of our or characteristics of processing and the likelihood of an previous discussions of a configural view of the cre- individual’s producing products judged to be creative ative process. It lists as sources of novel representa- is highly configural and thus difficult to measure. The tions (1) atypical involuntary processes of percep- configurality of factors is particularly problematic in tion, including both loose organizational processes 160 F l o w e r s & G a r b i n i n H a n d b o o k o f C r e a t i v i t y (1989)

Figure 6. A schematic representation of our view of how involuntary and executively controlled perceptual processes contribute to creative thought (see text for details). and true synesthesia, (2) spontaneous (and involun- ceptual organization, SPO; (2) imagery ability, IM; tary) generation of insight and imagery, (3) conscious (3) general measures of transformation ability, T; (4) perceptual organization, (4) conscious intermodal schizotypal thought, ST; (5) drug usage, DU; (6) abil- transformations of representations, and (5) conscious ity to report dreams, DR; and (6) amount of reported cross-modal transformations of representations. In conscious effort expended on the problem for which addition, it includes the process of selection of novel a creative solution is found, EF. Note that these items representation and feedback to the executively con- constitute a nonexhaustive sample of potentially mea- trolled processes for purposes of refining the poten- surable individual differences variables. As we have tial creative product. mentioned previously, respected psychometric in- In Table 1, we have chosen to relate the uses of each struments exist that presumably tap some of these, of the potential sources of novel representations dis- whereas for others, instruments would need to be de- cussed in this chapter together with an “efficiency” ‘ veloped. Furthermore, measurement of some of the selection mechanism drawn from the following set of self-report variables (such as DR and EF) would most individual differences variables: (1) strength of per- likely involve both validity and reliability problems

Table 1. Hypothetical Associations between Modes of Generating and Selecting Creative Representations and Vari- ous Measures of Individual Differences (see text for a detailed explanation).

Source SPO IM T ST DU DR EF

Loose perceptual organization – – – + +? ? –? Synesthesia ? +? ? –? + ? ? Spontaneous imagery +? + + –? ? + + Conscious perceptual organization + + + – –? ? + Intramodal transformation + + + – – ? + Cross–modal transformation ? +? ? – ? ? +? C r e a t i v i t y a n d P e r c e p t i o n 161 that we will not address here. Given those disclaim- References ers, and with the additional disclaimer that nearly all the cell entries are based upon our own current per- Brooks, L. R. (1968). Spatial and verbal components of the sonal speculations as opposed to existing data, we of- act of recall. Canadian Journal of Psychology, 22, 349–368. fer this table of hypotheses as a guide for potential fu- Gibson, J. (1966). The senses considered as perceptual systems. ture research. The cell entries themselves consist of + Boston: Houghton Mifflin. and — signs to indicate presumed positive and nega- Goodman, K. J., & Marquart, D. I. (1978). 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