both countries on the north bank of – Pangong Lake in . This was followed by a buildup of military Border Crisis forces at multiple junctures farther 7 north along LAC where Ladakh Jeff M. Smith meets Tibet, including at Hot Spring, Gogra, the Galwan Valley, and, later, the south bank of Pangong Lake. Brief, nonviolent encounters between Chinese and Indian border patrols are not uncommon along the LAC but are generally well-managed thanks to a detailed set of de-escalation pro- tocols. Prolonged standoffs at the LAC, in which Chinese forces set up camp beyond established patrol lines, are more uncommon. But they have been growing in frequency since he crisis that began at the dis- 2013, the year Xi Jinping was elected puted China–India border in president (and one year after he be- T early 2020 was not the first - and came General Secretary of the Cen- almost certainly will not be the last - tral Committee of the Communist standoff at the Party). (LAC). But the crisis was unique and The summer of 2017 saw a new form its implications for China–India rela- of border crisis emerge when Chinese tions are likely to be far-reaching. It and Indian troops engaged in a underscored the degree to which the standoff in territory disputed by longstanding border dispute, and the China and Bhutan, not far from a increasingly troubled relationship, sensitive sector of the China–India have entered a new and more volatile border. India retains outsized influ- chapter. ence over Bhutan’s foreign and secu- A great deal of ink has already been rity policy and when Chinese forces spilled analyzing the standoff, which began extending a road southward began in May 2020 when People’s into disputed territory, nearby In- Liberation Army (PLA) soldiers ad- dian forces intervened, prompting a vanced to occupy a “grey zone” near prolonged standoff. the LAC claimed and patrolled by The ten-week crisis was unprece- Indo-Pacific Perspectives │ 29 China–India Border Crisis dented in some ways, including the infrastructure. The 2020 crisis began unusually incendiary rhetoric that when, following a tense encounter be- emerged from official outlets in Bei- tween border patrols, several hun- jing, which threatened India with dred Chinese soldiers pressed for- war-like ultimatums if it did not ward toward Finger 4, establishing withdraw from the standoff site uni- new camps and staking more perma- laterally. However, like the pro- nent claim to the grey zone behind longed standoffs in Ladakh in the them. Soon after, satellite imagery years prior, the Doklam crisis was revealed a major buildup of Chinese eventually de-escalated peacefully forces at other volatile sectors of the following the negotiation of a mutual LAC farther north in Ladakh. Unu- withdrawal agreement. sually, this included the forward po- sitioning of tanks and artillery. They Then, in 2019, amateur videos began were met by a comparable buildup of surfacing online showing unusually Indian forces at forward positions hostile encounters between Chinese and a substantial escalation of politi- and Indian patrols near the LAC, en- cal tensions. gaging in fistfights and rock-throw- ing, including along the banks of Initial attempts at de-escalation Pangong Lake. There are a handful turned tragic in June when Chinese of disputed sectors in Ladakh where and Indian forces engaged in a bout the two sides disagree about the pre- of medieval combat by moonlight, re- cise location of the LAC; the videos sulting in 20 Indian casualties and helped to underscore how, in recent an unknown number of Chinese cas- years, Pangong Lake has become one ualties. It marked the first deadly of the most volatile. The lake also outbreak of hostilities at the border registers a disproportionate share of in over 40 years. The multilayered Chinese “transgressions” of the LAC, standoff endured through 2020, with according to official Indian statistics. India later occupying strategically valuable heights along the southern In years prior, an unstable status banks of Pangong Lake. Eventually, quo had emerged on the north bank negotiators reached terms on an in- of Pangong Lake, in a grey zone be- terim de-escalation agreement which tween an Indian military encamp- saw both sides pull back from for- ment near “Finger 4” and a Chinese ward positions at Pangong Lake. The encampment several miles to the buildup of forces at the standoff sites east, near “Finger 8.” Both sides pa- farther north in Ladakh persist, even trolled this area, although China en- as the two militaries remain on their joyed superior access and respective sides of the LAC. The PLA

Indo-Pacific Perspectives │30 Smith has also reportedly blocked Indian complete with “feeder” roads extend- forces from patrolling near the LAC ing east toward the LAC. When New in the , though the Delhi refused to heed Chinese de- phenomenon appears to pre-date the mands calls to halt or dismantle this events of May 2020. infrastructure, Beijing may have cal- culated that it could compel such a What does this crisis tell us about change through military pressure. If the broader relationship and acceler- so, China was drawing from a similar ating rivalry? Why is the over-60- playbook it had adopted in years year-old China–India border dispute past, albeit with sharper edges and a heating up now? And why have the greater appetite for risk, paralleling two been unable or unwilling to re- a broader trend of Chinese “Wolf solve this legacy dispute? The secrecy Warrior” assertiveness in recent surrounding the Chinese Communist years. It is unlikely, however, that Party and its decision-making often Beijing foresaw the bloodshed that leaves analysts with more questions might arise from the adventure, or than answers. But the 2020 border the considerable blow it might deal to crisis was likely precipitated at least the already tense relationship. in part by India’s attempts to up- grade its infrastructure near the The episode also revives a bigger LAC, and China’s attempts to coerce question about whose purposes are India to halt these projects. served by the continuation of this border dispute. While the Indian gov- China has long enjoyed an infra- ernment has not publicly committed structure advantage near the LAC in to such a position, it is widely be- Ladakh and in recent years India has lieved New Delhi would at least give accelerated belated attempts to nar- due consideration to a form of status row that gap. This has prompted op- quo territorial “swap” that more or position from Beijing and several of less enshrined the LAC as the inter- the prolonged standoffs in Ladakh in national border. India would give up the mid-2010s arose out of attempts its outstanding claims to by the PLA to pressure India to halt in the “Western Sector”; China would or dismantle new infrastructure pro- do the same in the “Eastern Sector” jects. In some cases, it worked. where it claims most of the Indian At the outbreak of the 2020 border state of Arunachal Pradesh; and crisis, India was advancing several some minor adjustments would be new major infrastructure projects, in- made to the relatively less conten- cluding an important north-south tious “Middle Sector.” road running parallel to the LAC, Indo-Pacific Perspective │31 China–India Border Crisis

Such an agreement would appear to issues surrounding the 85-year-old be eminently practical given that, to- Dalai Lama’s eventual reincarnation. day, there is very little prospect of ei- In Tawang lies part of the history ther side “reclaiming” Aksai Chin or and traditions of Buddhism and the Arunachal Pradesh short of a major institution of the Dalai Lama. And in war that neither side desires. Aruna- recent years the Chinese government chal Pradesh has been an Indian has become increasingly concerned state or for nearly 50 with securing a greater hold over the years and will not be negotiated Tibetan plateau and Tibetan Bud- away or easily seized by force. And dhism, unveiling a wave of repressive the Indian government apparently measures, hand-selecting Buddhist has little interest in a conflict with a monks, and claiming sole authority nuclear-armed rival to seize the rela- over the selection of the next Dalai tively barren Himalayan territory of Lama. Aksai Chin. As many of India’s most astute China What is obstructing this seemingly watchers have argued, for Beijing the practical territorial swap? After reg- border dispute and Tibet are inextri- istering tangible progress between cably linked. China has long ex- 1993 and 2005, border negotiations pressed displeasure with India for its that have been ongoing for roughly hosting the Dalai Lama, the Tibetan 40 years slowed to a halt in 2007. Government in Exile, and a large That year, China signaled that any population of Tibetan exiles. It has territorial swap would have to in- repeatedly accused India of interfer- clude India ceding to China the town ing in its internal affairs on Tibet-re- of Tawang, a nonstarter for New lated issues. It is indignant about the Delhi. Perched in the Himalayas only possibility the Dalai Lama may iden- a dozen miles from the LAC in Aru- tify his successor within India’s bor- nachal Pradesh, Tawang carries his- ders. torical and religious significance as the birthplace of the sixth Dalai In its own way, China has repeatedly Lama. It was also the first refuge sought to signal to India that the bor- reached by the current Dalai Lama der dispute will remain an issue so when he made a hazardous two-week long as the question of Tibet goes un- trek to flee Chinese rule in Tibet in resolved. When the LAC was rela- 1959. tively peaceful, the costs of that strategy appeared to be modest. But As a result, Tawang has become en- with the dispute entering a more vol- meshed in the contentious set of atile phase, one more destructive to

Indo-Pacific Perspectives │32 Smith the overall bilateral relationship, it is becoming more costly for China to link the border disputes to Tibet. It remains to be seen whether China will double down on its more aggres- sive border tactics or reassess and re- adjust. ■

Jeff M. Smith Mr. Smith is a Research Fellow at The Heritage Foundation in Washington, DC. He is the author of Cold Peace: China–India Rivalry in the Twenty-First Century (Lexington Books, 2015), as well as numer- ous pieces of commentary and analysis on the Sino- Indian relationship.

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