European Master's Degree in Human Rights and Democratisation
Katholieke Universiteit Leuven
Civil society in Serbia before and after Milosevic A perspective on Non-Governmental Organisations in South-East Serbia
Student: Marco Zecchinato
Supervisor: Prof. Katlijn Malfliet
Academic year 2002/2003 Abstract
In this thesis I analyse the situation of civil society in former Yugoslavia and in Serbia in particular. In the first chapter I discuss the importance of the concept of civil society, both in liberal democracies and in communist countries. In the second chapter I describe the role of civil society under Tito and the changes occurred in the '90s, when Slobodan Milosevic had come to power. The third chapter is an analysis of the legal framework regulating the Third Sector in Serbia, heritage of the Milosevic era. It introduces the fourth part, a picture of Serbian non-governmental organisations (NGOs) after Milosevic's fall in October 2000. It includes a detailed description of problems, resources and perspectives of Serbian civil society in its relations with authorities, international organisations, donors and beneficiaries. The last part is the result of some interviews with different NGOs in the region of Nis, in the South-East of Serbia, in May 2003. For different reasons this area - where I spent two months as a volunteer for an Italian NGO in the summer 2002 - is of striking importance to understand the evolving of Serbian society. My conclusion suggests some conditions that local NGOs should observe for a positive development of Serbian Third Sector.
2 Contents
Contents ...... 3 Why this thesis? ...... 6 Introduction...... 7 Chapter 1...... 9 In search for a definition of "civil society"...... 9 Why is civil society so important?...... 11 Mediation between individuals and the state, and education for democracy...... 12 Civil society under authoritarian and totalitarian regimes in Eastern Europe ...... 14 Chapter 2...... 20 Civil society in Yugoslavia...... 20 The communist period ...... 21 The post communist period, manipulation of the society...... 24 Two important actors in the development of Serbian nationalism...... 26 The Milosevic period...... 28 Milosevic and Serbian society...... 31 Characteristics of NGOs and Civic Movements...... 37 The role of media ...... 39 NGOs and the Kosovo War ...... 41 The role of the international community ...... 42 Stability Pact and Civil Society...... 44 Chapter 3...... 47 Legal framework...... 47 Introduction...... 47 General laws ...... 47 Constitutional framework...... 48 Types of organisation and registration ...... 49 Foreign associations and associations of foreigners...... 50 Internal governance ...... 52 Economic activities...... 52
3 Dissolution, winding up and liquidation of assets ...... 52 Tax laws...... 53 Mergers and split-ups ...... 54 Political activities...... 54 Conclusions...... 54 Chapter 4...... 56 NGOs today...... 56 Common features of Serbian NGOs...... 56 Media and authorities...... 60 Composition of NGOs ...... 63 Working conditions ...... 64 Projects and beneficiaries ...... 65 Donors...... 66 Regional distribution ...... 67 Conclusions...... 68 Chapter 5...... 70 NGOs in South-Eastern Serbia ...... 70 Energy for Democracy...... 70 From theory to concrete examples; NGOs in the region...... 71 Protecta...... 73 MECI...... 75 Open Society Fund...... 76 ASKA...... 78 G17...... 79 Otpor!...... 80 Committee for Civic Initiative ...... 81 Yugoslav Scout Association...... 82 Pralipe...... 83 Resource Center ...... 84 Common aspects of NGOs in South East Serbia ...... 86 Conclusion ...... 88
4 Bibliography...... 92
Abbreviations for Serbian political parties:
DS Democratic Party DSS Democratic Party of Serbia GSS Civic Alliance JUL Yugoslav United Left ND-PS New Democracy - Movement for Serbia SPO Serbian Renewal Movement SLS Serbian Liberal Part SPS Socialist Party of Serbia SRS Serbian Radical Party
5 Why this thesis?
In the summer of 1997, I was for the first time personally involved in the Balkans and in the consequences of a war, participating at a project of animation and reconstruction in a small village on the Croatian coast. After that shocking experience, I decided to learn more about the area and a conflict that remained, for the majority of the Europeans, something unclear, far away, only "Balkan". After many experiences in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia, I decided last summer to discover the "others", the Serbs, and I spent two months in Nis as a volunteer for an Italian non-governmental organisation (NGO), the Italian Consortium of Solidarity (ICS), in the framework of the European Voluntary Service. My tasks were monitoring and reporting on some activities that were co-ordinated by the ICS but developed by local NGOs, addressing vulnerable classes of people, such as refugees, internally displaced persons (IDPs), women, children. I conceived this thesis as a sort of "reparation" for my premature departure from Serbia to attend the European Master. I tried to study from an academic point of view the dynamics, the problems and the resources of the Third Sector in Serbia, and in particular I concentrated my research on organisations operating in the South of Serbia, the area in which I worked last summer. It is thanks to the people that I met there - these strange, contradictory, proud and warm people, often situated on the "wrong" side of History - that I decided to concentrate my efforts on this subject. I hope that it can help to a better understanding of the social situation in Serbia and, perhaps, can even give some suggestions for the future.
6 Introduction
In this thesis I will discuss the importance of civil society in the modern State and in post- communist countries, focusing my attention on the former Yugoslavia and on Serbia in particular. I will analyse the phases and the changes of civil society under Tito and during the last 15 years, when Slobodan Milosevic had come to power. Yugoslavia followed a different history from other Eastern European countries, where the totalitarian approach to political participation was linked with a radical stance towards society. Marxist regimes created a political system "that not only compelled every citizen to endorse a common socio-political program but excluded the very notion of a pluralist society with autonomous interests"1. While many regimes came quite close to "obliterate the dividing- line between state and society"2, in other countries, such as Poland or Yugoslavia, national societies retained a certain degree of political resilience. In Yugoslavia however, it did not happen at the same stage in all its republics: in Serbia, as we will see, the socialist intelligentsia failed to embrace a civic culture rooted in respect for the individual as opposed to the nation and it opened the way in the '90s to the irresistible rise of Slobodan Milosevic, who was able to ride ethnic and nationalistic impulses. A country's political culture and its political society are closely intertwined. This raised the confusion in the definition of civil society especially in countries like Yugoslavia where the meanings range from small opposition movements under communist regime to the notion of minorities' resistance under Milosevic, from religious confessions and university circles to labour unions and non-governmental associations in the recent years. The intervention (or sometimes non-intervention) of the international community, especially of the European Union, produced controversial effects. The international scenario had played a fundamental role for Yugoslavia under Tito, who was able to present himself as the champion of the Non-Aligned Countries. After his death, external influence became even more important. Indifference and misunderstanding prevented an efficient remedy to nationalistic tendencies before the collapse of Yugoslavia; the
1 B. Parrott, Perspectives on postcommunist democratization, in K. Dawisha and B. Parrott, Politics, power, and the struggle for democracy in South-East Europe, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, p.13. 2 Ibid.
7 contradictory European behaviour adopted during the Yugoslav war, international inaction, (failed) mediations, the embargoes and the final legitimisation accorded to Milosevic to reach the Dayton agreements, disoriented the weak internal opposition. The following events, the imposition of new sanctions, the program "Energy for Democracy", the Kosovo war and NATO intervention and the present trial against Milosevic in The Hague, then contributed to complicate the whole picture. Finally, the massive presence, for a rather short period, of international organisations in Serbia, impeded the growth of a developed civil society. To arrive at the core of my thesis, namely the condition of NGOs in the last years and in particular after the changes that took place in Serbia on 5 October 2000, it is necessary to understand the causes which led to the present situation. In order to support my analysis, I will bring some concrete examples of the NGOs' world in the region of Nis, in the South of Serbia. The choice of this area is of striking importance to determine the development of the future for the whole Serbian society: Nis was one of the first towns to be governed by the "opposition" parties in 1997, while the smaller villages around the town remained a "feud" of the SPS, Milosevic's party. This contrast between the situation in the town and the countryside is something typical for the former Yugoslavia, strictly related to the existence and the development of civil society. The South-East of Serbia is also important for other reasons: in this zone the international presence was sporadic and more limited in time, while in Belgrade and in other areas we assisted in the last years to a concentration of international organisations, development projects and a consistent flow of money from foreign donors. It is one of the poorest regions of the whole former Yugoslavia and unemployment rate is twice as high as the national average, while structures, services and salaries are inferior to any other part of Serbia (with the notable exception of Kosovo and its peculiar story). If we want to understand how Serbia is changing and how difficult this mutation will be, I think this is a privileged point of observation. Belgrade alone, for example, counts an amount of NGOs that is superior to the number in the rest of the country. Analysing the Third Sector starting from the capital could be misleading, since access to information, communications, funds and "visibility" are incomparably superior there than in the region I observed.
8 Chapter 1
In search for a definition of "civil society"
The concept of civil society is nowadays largely used (and sometimes abused) by the media to describe a large number of groups and organisations. During the recent war in Iraq, for example, different analysts argued that civil society is the only power in the world that can oppose the USA in the coming future. The demonstrations against the war or those against the G8 summits or the meetings in Porto Alegre, are undoubtedly examples of the effort to strengthen a global civil society. The importance of NGOs is recognised by all democratic countries as well as by the UN system, the European Union, the new International Criminal Court (ICC). Despite its large visibility, it is quite difficult to understand what is "civil society" and where the borders of its definition can be traced. Percy Allum, a specialist in the relations between State and society, defines civil society as "the area where the individuals organise themselves in various autonomous associations (parties, social movements, groups of interest) and express themselves in different activities (civic participation, social solidarity, subculture)"3. He describes it as "a) a whole of not homogeneous but structured social relations; b)… whose structure has a basic historic dimension; c) and it is not static. If civil society is the place where the social relations are built, it is also the place of conflict, of political fight. And political fight, changing social and political relations, changes the structure of civil society."4 The third point is important: "the structure of civil society is the result of struggles of successive generations. It is during these struggles that different conceptions of life were diffused both as ideologies, common sense and political traditions."5 With regard to the role of civil society, sociologist Peter Berger proposed the following definition: "a whole of institutions placed between the private sphere and the institutions of a modern society. Civil society is the institution that enters in the public reality; it is not the State neither the market, not the government or the economic institutions… Civil
3 P. Allum, Democrazia reale. Stato e società civile nell'Europa Occidentale, Padova, Liviana Editrice, 1991, p.23. 4 Ibidem, p.57.
9 society can be referred to a very restricted group of individuals that, outside, does not reflect any formality or structure."6 The American sociologist Edward Shils stressed the importance of the adjective "civil" referred to society, with three essential components; the first two are necessary conditions, but they are not sufficient: the presence of institutions different from the clan and the family, autonomous but in relation with the State. The third aspect is crucial: when autonomous institutions are in conflict with each other or with the State without any rules we do not have civil society. "Fair play", or respect for the rules, is necessary for a "true" civil society. 7 Also Alting von Gesau recalls the term "civil" from the Latin civis, citizen, and civitas, city, as a group of citizens. The city is the main place where individuals have the possibility and the necessity to connect those so-called "civil society" relations. Civil society is defined as "a network of associations independent of the institutional political power, but competing to influence it. They assumed this role in the past, thanks to the sharing of a "common city" rather than a common heritage"8. It is a quite interesting observation, particularly pertinent in the context of former Yugoslavia: many observers pointed out how the Bosnian war, in many aspects, had been a war of the countryside against the towns, a sort of "urbicidium"9. The term "civil society" refers to voluntary social activity not compelled by the state. In short, "civil society" is the whole web of spontaneous social relationships that lies outside the institutions of political order and legal duty. No society is a free society if it curtails or prohibits this independent activity. On the contrary, as George Schoepflin, an expert of post-communist political systems, notes: "… civil society must be free to challenge the state in order to preclude the bureaucratic rationality of the state action from attaining the kind of paramountcy that would generate rigidity"10.
5 Ibidem, p.105. 6 P. Berger, To empower people- From state to civil society, in www.cde.org.za/lecture1.htm. 7 E. Shils, The virtue of civil society, in Government and opposition, vol. 26, n.1, 1991, p.4. 8 F. A. M. Alting von Gesau, Europe 1992 East and West, cit. in T. Stojanovic, Balkan worlds, the first and the last Europe, Armouk (New York), M. E. Sharp, 1994, p. 291. 9 See for example P. Rumiz and Nenad Fisher, Juish Community of Sarajevo, in La linea dei mirtilli, Roma, Editori Riuniti, 1997, p.174. 10 G. Shoepflin, Nations Identity Power, London, Hurst and Company, 2000, p. 37.
10 Although civil society must be regulated by the state, it is the essence of civil society that retains its autonomy with respect to the political order. The institutions of civil society have their own rules to which the laws of the state form boundaries. Within those boundaries, civil society is the location of voluntary and independent thought and action. Included in the idea of civil society is the whole range of civic action independent of formal political institutions, the multiplicity of civic groups such as service associations, philanthropic groups, cultural groups, religious organisations, labour unions, athletic organisations, and youth groups. In addition, the realm of civil society encompasses economic relations, organisations and activities that are not owned nor directly controlled by the state. The existence of civil society depends "not only on the presence of large numbers of associations and organised groups but on the spirit in which they act"11. This is an essential observation to understand the modern meaning of civil society.
Why is civil society so important?
Civil society plays a number of indispensable roles in the liberal democratic order. Unless these functions operate at least at a minimal level, the situation of liberal democracy is precarious indeed. One of civil society's key roles is its capacity to integrate lone individuals or exclusive groups into the larger social order by offering avenues of social contact, alliance and cohesion. This is a significant function because modern society tends to separate people from each other. Associations draw relatively lone individuals out of themselves into potentially ameliorating social contact that can provide avenues of involvement that direct interest and purpose and build networks of trust. Civil society can also positively affect isolated groups, peacefully integrating ethnic and other minorities into society without surrendering their identity. The socialising forums and networks of civil society are not a panacea for these conditions. But they can prevent some social pathologies and they have the capacity to ameliorate and in some cases to restore social health. Civil society can act as a cohesive element against the fragmenting forces of modern life.
11 B. Parrott, Perspectives on postcommunist democratization, in K. Dawisha and B. Parrott, op. cit..p 22.
11 A second and essential function of civil society lies in its ability to disperse power. It does so by creating numerous centres of thought, action, and loyalty12. The independence of these separate associations and organisations from direction by the state is the hallmark of civil society's dispersal of power. A result of this dispersal is that the associative life of civil society has the capacity to protect the individual in significant ways. Membership in civil society associations can act as psychological, social, and economic barriers between individuals and political or social forces that demand submission against the individuals will. The varieties of associational solidarity available in a developed civil society can strengthen individual or group resolve and resources against external pressures to conform or capitulate. In addition, the activities of some organisations of civil society supplement or substitute government programmes by providing similar services of their own. For example, community groups share such tasks as caring for the sick, the aged and the disabled as well as the able bodied who are poor, homeless, or mentally deficient. National, regional or local associations may organise programmes that parallel other government activities. Churches, labour unions, private foundations, neighbourhood or other organisations may engage in activities related to health, education, social welfare, recreation or numerous other activities that have the effect of dispersing power by offering alternative sources of government services.
Mediation between individuals and the state, and education for democracy
As Norberto Bobbio notes, civil society has been one part of a changing series of antitheses: civil society vs. state of nature; civil society vs. rude or barbarous society; and civil society vs. state13. The organisations and activities of civil society are in fact also able to act as a mediator between the individual or family and the state. Especially in large, modern political systems individuals may feel dwarfed by the scale of the modern state and unable to make their voices heard. Membership in labour unions, religious organisations and professional associations among countless others provides a context
12 C. F. Bahmueller, The role of civil society in the prolmotion and maintenance of constitutional liberal democracy, in www.civnet.com.
12 and opportunity for discussion of all levels of public issues. Many independent organisations involve themselves in political issues; through membership and participation individuals can make their voices heard in the councils of power, and more clearly than through formal political representation alone. In this way membership can result in a more stable society by linking individuals to the community as a whole and to its political institutions in particular. To Adam Ferguson's mind civil society was a moral category, the criteria of evaluation being degrees of public, political action. He applies it as a measuring rod for governments and societies. Another function of the association life of civil society is its role in improving a democratic citizenship. Political participation is a leading virtue of democracy, since it requires, after all, at least a minimum of participation to function adequately and to ensure itself against internal atrophy and decay. While it is not necessary for democracy's survival that everyone participates or participates in ways that require political skills, a certain degree of participatory ability and spread throughout society is a necessary staple of democratic life. Civil society and political culture are twin notions, Attila Agh suggests 14. In its absence, action must be undertake n predominantly or solely by an elite and to the degree that this occurs democracy rests on more or less shaky foundations. The organisations of civil society can provide training ground for democratic action. Participating in meetings, recruiting members, organising activities, public speaking and the practice of quiet persuasion are some of the activities in which civil society can cultivate skills for the art of civic membership. Furthermore, as organisations are self- governing, participation in them pr omotes experience and values of democratic citizenship by allowing the experience of internal autonomy. At the same time, the association life of civil society can promote experience of social pluralism by acquainting individuals with others that are different than themselves. This experience may go far toward fostering essential democratic values such as respect and tolerance towards others. A society is civil only if "its constituent groups demonstrate a substantial measure of self-restraint rooted in a recognition of the legitimacy of the
13 N.Bobbio, Gramsci & the Concept of Civil Society, in J.Keane (ed.), Civil Society & the State, London, Verso, 1988, pp.78-80. 14 A. Agh, ibid.. See also K. Dawisha and B. Parrott, Politics, power, and the struggle for democracy in South-East Europe, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, pp. 22-23.
13 interests of other groups… and a commitment to forgo violence as means of deciding social conflicts"15.
Civil society under authoritarian and totalitarian regimes in Eastern Europe
The idea of civil society may be more clearly understood by comparing the position of civil society in liberal democracies to its position in other systems of government. In liberal democracy, all social activity within a wide latitude is legally permitted and protected. Under authoritarian regimes, by contrast, the state seeks to regulate and control civil society with an intensity that is the very measure of its authoritarianism. Under totalitarianism, however, civil society disappears altogether, as the state demands total control of every group and all forms of social expression, organised or not. Nothing lies outside political control. Such activity requires the sanction of the state, that is all organised social activity is politicised. Thus, under the old regime in the communist countries, independent political expression was illegal and dissidents were treated harshly. But with the end of totalitarianism, social and political groups quickly emerged, and expression of all kinds sprang up spontaneously. In the Soviet satellites, also in the far less virulent post-Stalinist regime in Poland, for example, almost no independent social organisation was tolerated, with the significant exception of the Catholic Church. But the situation in the Soviet Union was even worse. The more we go eastwards, the less we find embryos of civil society, both during communism and in the post-communist era. Although communist regimes have generally pursued similar social and economic policies, the effects of communist rule have varied among countries and have contributed to different national patterns of post-communist political change. It depended, among other factors, of the attitude of the ruling elites towards the opposition, their openness to compromise and reforms, but also of the strength of the dissident movements and the support by the population. In Yugoslavia, for example, "the state had successfully maintained a formal framework of total power, but in order to avoid protracted confrontations and open chaos it had been obliged to reduce
15 B. Parrot, op. cit., p. 23.
14 its monopolistic power claims and to make small concessions to quasi-independent strivings for civil liberty"16. Ironically, it was the character of the post-Stalinist regimes of Eastern Europe that gave rise to the currency that the idea of civic society enjoys today. After that the hopes of the Prague Spring of 1968 were shattered by Soviet tanks, it seemed clear that political action was useless; surely political action directed toward changing the state seemed unavailing17. This was the context in which Eastern European philosophers resurrected and refurbished the idea of civil society in the late '70s and early '80s. "Civil society had been a magic word under state socialism and was also given a certain mystique during the initial period of democratisation"18. Civil society, even though it was not free from state domination, could be conceptualised as a new arena of independent and imaginative ethical thought and action. The idea of civil society took centre stage in Eastern Europe, especially in Poland, as a programme of resistance to communism. However, in these countries, the notion of civil society was "plainly not embodied in a ramified network of independent social organisations and associations"19. At first it was only the courageous few who dared to carry on secret or even open independent activities, though they were harassed or broken up by the police. In Poland even before the creation of the Solidarity movement, a "floating university," as it was known, travelled from flat to flat in Warsaw in defiance of the regime. The "university," moreover, made a point of carrying on its activities openly. It, too, was attacked by the police.
"Moral resistance, though seemingly hopeless against systems that are based on political and military force, functions like a grain of sand in the cogwheels of a vast but vulnerable machine. The idea of a civil society even one that avoids overtly political activities in favour of education, the exchange of information and
16 J. Keane (ed.), Civil Society and the State. New European Perspectives, London, Verso, 1988, p. 3. 17 M. Groh, Working for a civil society in Eastern Europe end the Balkans, in www.pietisten.org . 18 A. Agh, Emerging Democracies in East Central Europe and the Balkans, Cheltenham (UK), Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 1998, p. 21. 19 B. Parrott, op. cit., p. 23.
15 opinion, or the protection of the basic interests of particular groups has enormous anti-totalitarian potential."20
Civil society was conceived as an arena of social action in which morally whole men and women could be confirmed in their wholeness. And they could draw large numbers of those who were previously quiescent into active resistance. In this way, organising civil society can play a major role in the creation of democratic societies as well as in strengthening both new and developed democracies. Antonio Gramsci utilises the concept of civil society with a new suggestion. In his view, civil society is a sphere of autonomous organisations where the dominant ideology of the State and the economic system is excluded, or at least limited. The bourgeoisie loses its absolute hegemony and civil society is therefore presented as the heel of Achilles of the capitalistic system, through which, in the long run, it is possible to change the whole system. 21 The theory of civil society as picklock to subvert the system (capitalistic or communist) was a common idea among dissidents of many Eastern European countries in the '70s. Schoepflin emphasises the reciprocal relationship between state and civil society, seen as players of an interactive game and not of a zero-sum game where the State is stronger. His observation about ethnic groups and civil society are also pertinent in the Yugoslav context: before an ethnic minority can validate its existence, status and aspirations in the eyes of the majority, the majority must have acquired the self-confidence and self- awareness to recognise that the minority is an unavoidable and not automatically damaging aspect of its own identity. That, in turn, means that there has to be a civil society. Civil society is used in the sense that there exists a politically significant core in all ethnic groups which is ready to accept a growing number of political actors, with new resources and new rules. In this concept, civil society is as much a process as a state of being22. The experience of communism is an important study of the process by which particular pathologies - engendered by forty or fifty years of regime - marred the subsequent development of democracy in post-communist societies. The dislocations of communism,
20 B. Geremek, "Civil Society then and now," Journal of Democracy, Vol. 3, No.2, April 1992, pp. 4. 21 See N. Bobbio, Gramsci e la concezione della società civile, Milano, Ed. Feltrinelli, 1976, pp. 34-37.
16 the extinction of individual initiative and responsibility, the uprooting of rural populations and their forceful incorporation into half -way urbanised settlements, and its hyper-rationality, created a situation where most horizontal bonds between individuals were destroyed, prompting a new dispensation which in the post-communist period would come all too easily in the form of ethnicity23. According to Schoepflin, communism “produced ... forms of dependence and individuation, in which interpersonal connections and interactions ... were laden with suspicion, distrust and a zero-sum game mentality, to create an atomised society. In this context, the warm bath of emotion of ethnic nationhood appeared as a deus ex machina, a means of overcoming atomisation at a stroke” 24. Schoepflin sees this as one of the most destructive legacies of communism. Ethnicisation also led to another curious identity formation, where the ethnic majority would see itself as the oppressed victim, having been excluded as a group from power under communism. This is obvious in the Serb-Croat relationship that in many ways has been at the heart of the troubles in the Balkans. The zero-sum mentality engendered by communism provided only a shaky foundation for the construction of democratic regimes after 1989. Elsewhere in Eastern Europe, state structures remained sufficiently robust to contain ethnic conflict, yet their societies remained mired in the transition between the communist past and a capitalistic future. Western policymakers, in strengthening the so- called reform process in Eastern Europe, are usually aware that they ought to begin by strengthening civil society. This means funding independent media; maintaining ties not only with governments and regimes but also with their opposition; providing aid and assistance to strengthen the key institutions of civil society, judiciary and police; developing charitable and voluntary associations so that the population ceases to look to the state and begins to look to its own strengths; developing non-governmental channels for the delivery of Western technical aid and assistance, and educational and cultural exchanges. A civil society strategy for strengthening reform and democracy starts with the search for partners outside the state, the leading parties and the bureaucracy. This
22 G. Shoepflin, op. cit., pp. 152. 23 See e.g. S. White, J. Gardner and G. Shoepflin, Communist Political Systems: an introduction, London, The MacMillan Press LTD, 1982, pp. 75 and further. 24 G. Shoepflin, op. cit., p. 155.
17 means that democracy is not enough. Indeed, democracy will degenerate into authoritarian populism unless the democratic habits of debating what needs to be done and then organising to get it done take root in civil society's institutions themselves. All of the post-communist regimes are nominally democratic, but in practice the levers of power have usually remained in the hands of the old nomenclature. All of those societies are nominally capitalist in orientation, yet their economies remain locked in mid- transition as inefficient hybrids of state enterprise and maffia affairs. In a state like Serbia, the fall of communism has actually strengthened the old nomenclature, enabling it to secure democratic mandates for their brand of authoritarian populism by cynically fomenting nationalist hysteria. Likewise, a market economy coexists with a huge subsidised state sector, the one feeding off its semi-criminal links with the other. Formal democracy cannot become real democracy until civil society becomes strong enough to offer the old nomenclature effective competition and opposition. It is in the institutions of civil society - a free press, independent universities, trade unions, banks, commercial firms, publishing houses, and so on - that the leadership of a democratic society is trained and recruited. Without a free and robust civil society, market capitalism risks to turn into maffia capitalism. The question in Eastern Europe is whether a social form that emerged from below, by accident and over centuries, can now be established "from above, by design and in a hurry"25. In Western Europe, civil society took centuries to emerge from the bottom up. But Eastern European societies need it immediately. Without a robust independent society it is hard to see how they can withstand political demagogy and the shocks of economic transition. On the other hand, the experience of the Eastern European dissidents in the '70s and '80s shows how quickly an embryonic civil society can emerge in the interstices of communism, if there are enough courageous individuals who understand what it is they want and who has the political cunning and tenacity to seek it. In this light, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe have actually fared rather well. Nonetheless, Schoepflin sees ‘post-communism’ as a genuine, distinct political system rather than simply as a transition period. It is the inability of these societies (both communist and nationalist) to deal with change that makes this claim plausible. Indeed,
25 E. Gellner, Conditions of Liberty: Civil Society and Its Rivals, London, Penguin, 1994, p. 75.
18 democracy in crucial ways is built on a foundation of contingency. "Chance, sweeping economic forces, uncontrollable social developments all impact on the composition of the community and the electorate; the availability of electoral options; the formation of interests and perceptions both collectively and individually; on the give and take that is the hallmark of democratic governance, including compromise and respect for other opinions and interests in short, on the political process as a whole."26 This puts democracy in conflict with the "sacralised" and ideologised notions of nationhood that Schoepflin describes abstractly and that are so prevalent in Eastern and Central Europe. While democratic processes (elections, parliamentary coalition-building, all governed by law) may be in place in many of these countries, they are superimposed on structures that are a-democratic, possibly anti-democratic.
26 G. Shoepflin, op. cit;, p. 106.
19 Chapter 2
Civil society in Yugoslavia
Compared to other Eastern European countries, Yugoslavia followed a tragically different pattern in its way towards post-communism. The requirements of civil society were scarcely present in the Yugoslav community before the war. These lands had a different socio-cultural development from other countries of Central and East Europe: the domination for three centuries of Venetian, Absburg and Ottoman empires brought a strict control of the public scene, due to exigencies of military defence, denying the development of civil society relationships. After the First World War, we saw the rise of semi-dictatorial regimes that made the destruction easier for the communism of already weak social and economic ties27. During the Tito regime, citizens as individuals received no consideration and had not any space to create their own opinion or a sense of "participative responsibility"28. Popular immaturity with regard to political culture remained also after the rejection of communism, giving rise to a sort of "pseudo- democracy"29. These transition regimes include some democratic elements (free elections, multipartitism, etc.) without including the real meaning of democracy; the power is transferred from the dictator to the majority, while the country remains de facto a totalitarian State. Nevertheless, we can find some forms of social organisation at least at a rural level. Many examples of leagues and confederations between the villages and solidarity associations testify the presence of a civil life. The separation between the cities and the rural areas is a constant in the Yugoslav history. In the past the city was the centre of the political and military power geared by foreign governors. Smaller communities were quite free to organise themselves with a high level of autonomy. These solidarity networks however, had only a local impact and did not embrace one of the basic requirements of a civil society: they had no interactions with the State, without any mediation function between
27 T. Stojanovich, Balkan Worlds, the first and the last Europe, Armouk (New York), M. E. Sharp, 1994, p. 291. 28 S. Bianchini, Sarajevo, le radici dell'odio, Roma, Ed. Associate, Editrice Internazionale, 1996, pp. 42-43.
20 the power and the citizens. It was a sort of "primordial" civil society, based on local, familiar, restricted ties. The objective was to protect and isolate the local community against the oppressor, rather than promote an interactive relation 30.
The communist period
Despite some overtures, for example in Gramsci's ideology, the concept of civil society is inherently hostile to a regime of real socialism. Civil society requires a place for public debate and political transparency, which are naturally opposed by a totalitarian system. The repression denies both the freedom of expression and the possibility of creating independent organisations. It pushes towards a "social atomisation": system impositions, more than fear for the State, refrain individuals from forming social relations. In Yugoslavia the civic organisations existing before the Second World War were suppressed. The only groups tolerated were tied to the Party or they were strictly controlled by the State apparatus. The State had "the monopoly of the public sphere"31. Not only did the communist regime prevent the participation of the individual; it also acted at a deeper level, denying even the relevance and the importance of the individuals. Communist institutions were based on group representation; collective values were dominant over individual ones. Private initiative and a sense of responsibility of the population were not encouraged, and citizens relied upon the State for all basic services. This mentality surely did not help the emerging of a dynamic society and made difficult the development of a democratic political culture. "Parliament", "political parties", "democracy" were abstract concepts for the common people in Yugoslavia; cynicism and lack of confidence in the system were the normal behaviour in a society disillusioned and frustrated by the public authorities, seen as corrupted and distant from the daily life32. If the political immaturity was a constant aspect in all the Eastern European countries, in Yugoslavia it was aggravated by the particular feature called "paternalism". The
29 M. Panebianco, C. Acolese, A. Tafuri, Dossier ex-Jugoslavia, Salerno, Elea Press, 1993, p. 79. 30 See T. Stojanovich, op. cit., p. 293. 31 G. Di Palma, Why democracy can work in eastern Europe, in "Journal of Democracy", vol. 2 no.1, 1991, p. 78. 32 See L. Holmes, Post-communism- an introduction , Cambridge, Polity Press, 1997, p. 17.
21 charismatic figure of Tito, who detained absolute powers, occupied the entire public sphere. He had a relationship of affection and respect with the population; who protested against the lack of freedom or the economical situations often attacked the corruption of the bureaucracy instead of the system, embodied by Tito. To defuse the possible social conflicts, Tito was able to alternate concessions and repression: especially during the '70s, he suppressed many national, political and independent movements, according at the same time an extension of national rights and autonomy. In 1968, when the students' manifestations claimed for a "real socialism" against the "traitors" of the revolution, Tito seconded their reasons and condemned the wrong deviations from the orthodox communist idea. The students stopped their demonstrations, feeling that the "good father" of the country had shared their feelings. Once the situation came back to normality, Tito purged the organisations and the intellectuals that supported the protest. The Yugoslav Third Road was imaged as "a self governing socialism": a socialisation reform was seen as a mediation between, on the one hand, state socialism with a centrally planned economy, a unitary state and a collectivist-egalitarian social order and, on the other hand, a private economy, with political pluralism and individual competition. But the self-management system, despite a high decentralisation, "did not give society influence over the political-economic decisions made at the top"33. All the non-profit organisations, endowments, legacies and funds were nationalised and confiscated. The new organisations that were established at that time had to work within the communist system and were under the state control. Until 1990 there were about 19,000 different non-profit organisations, but with no new types of NGOs, such as human rights organisations, peace groups, ecology associations, or other local organisations dealing with broader social problems in the public sphere 34. The authoritarian paternalism is still important in the recent history of Croatia and, especially, Serbia. It is no a coincidence that these countries opted for semi-presidential regimes, with an excessive confidence in strong and charismatic leaders, often seen as a
33 W. Morawski, Economic Change and Civil Society in Poland, in P. G. Lewis, Democracy an Civil Society in Eastern Europe, New York, St. Martin's Press, 1992, p. .97. 34 Source: CRNPS, Center for the development of non-profit sector, Belgrade, in www.crnps.org.yu.
22 "father" or a "saviour". Schoepflin spoke of a sort of infantilism in these societies, referring to the consequences of paternalistic government35. In the '80s, however, some urban centres gave birth to new forms of associationism: in Belgrade, Zagreb, Sarajevo and Lubljana new groups of pacifists, feminists and ambientalists appeared. On the contrary the rural areas lagged extremely behind and closed to any form of new participation. After the fall of the communist regime, these groups were expected to help in the rise of a new civil society, but it did not happen. Social movements became in general less active than in the previous years (with the partial exception of Slovenia) and in the first post-communist period prejudices, contests of the rules and violence spread out in the entire social context 36. The "fragmentation" of the opposition, once had the common "enemy" disappeared, became more evident. It remained one of the most important elements that permitted Milosevic, during the '90s, to maintain the leadership of the country. It is important to note that in Yugoslavia civil society was initially conceived as an alternative rather than an opposition. As a sphere distinct from, independent of and opposed to the sphere of state action, it was an alternative to socialism. "It was first articulated as 'socialist civil society', but it was found very soon that this was a contradiction in terms"37. In Slovenia, where civil society had appeared earlier, we find a phenomenon called "totalitarianism from below"38. After the repression by the state, state violence ceased to be political as soon as civil society internalised it: the violence turned against the appearances of "otherness" in public and aimed at the elimination of the social spaces of difference. "Civil society turned against its own democratic potentials"39. This term of social control failed, too, and new social movements emerged as the focus of an unprecedented level of social mobilisation. Yet this also led to a reduction of social diversity, as the independent sphere became more homogenous and politicised. It took on a nationalist form to counter opposition from the multinational Yugoslav authorities (in which Serbian influence predominated). The concept of civil society elaborated by the intellectuals in Yugoslavia was something utopian, far from the reality of a market economy; after the first disillusion, many of them
35 G. Shoepflin in L. Holmes, op. cit., p. 18. 36 E. Shils, The virtue of civil society, in Government and opposition, vol. 26, no. 1, 1991, p. 5. 37 T. Mastnak, Civil Society in Slovenia: from Opposition to Power, in P. G. Lewis, op. cit., p. 134. 38 Cf. T. Mastnak, op. cit., pp. 137-141.
23 turned to the nationalistic ideology, able to fill the gap created by the sudden changes. Nationalism and ethnicity became the source of legitimisation for the new elites and an easy identification symbol for the population. The slogan "Brotherhood and Unity" was replaced by the national claims of the single republics, with the large support of the rural populations and of the most recent suburbs of the towns. The rapid urbanisation of the '70s had in fact created a new class of "rural-urbanised" people with uncertain social identity. Once again the dualism city/campaign (or mountains) is dramatic: some of the worst episodes of the war in Vukovar and Sarajevo, were provoked by the latent antagonism between the "new immigrants" and the old urban class, regardless their ethnic belongings40.
The post communist period, manipulation of the society
Many theories support the idea that, once communism failed, the ancient nationalistic rivalries exploded, emerging after years, if not centuries, of latent hate. The way in which communism prepared the pattern for nationalism is more complicated. Nationalism and communism are not connected in an automatic way, as affirmed by Adam Michnik, one of the Solidarity leaders 41. Rather, it seems that nationalism finds a very fertile ground in the combination of socialism and capitalism. Since it is not a real ideology, it often needs the support of a more organic whole of concepts, values, political and theoretical elaboration42. That is one of the reasons why Milosevic and the old communist elites could transform the messages and the slogans, and finally found new forms of legitimisation. Even if they seem antithetic, communism and nationalism have many common features: they exalt the concept of "people" and consider individual rights as a threat to communitarian integrity; they build their legitimacy on collective rights; they try to identify the State with the society and the Party; they are based on radical collectivism, inherent militancy or messianic impulse. The citizen is not free to choose his political
39 Ibid. 40 See between the others P. Rumiz, Maschere per un massacro, Roma, Editori Riuniti, 1996 and C. Bennett, Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse, Causes, Course and Consequences, New York, New York University Press, 1995, pp. 62-63. 41 A. Michnic, cited in R. Ivekovic, La balcanizzazione della ragione, Roma, Manifestolibri, 1995, p. 47. 42 See P. Matvejevic, Ex Yugoslavia, diario di una guerra, Napoli, Edizioni Magma, 1995, pp. 34-35 and R. Ivekovic, op. cit., p. 48.
24 position, it is "naturally" given by his position in the productive system (in communism) or by his ethnic belongings (in nationalism). Civil society, trying to give more space to the individual choice, is an enemy of both systems. "Traitors", we will see in the analysis of Serbian NGOs, is the adjective more frequently used against the independent organisations, accused of not being patriotic enough. Individuals within civil society lose the protection for which they created the state and the community unified by agreed-upon values collapses. Ethnocratisation of society is a further obstacle to the development of civil society: citizenship alone does not guarantee the right to participate to the public life anymore. One of Schoepflin's rules is contradicted: the relationship between the State and civil society becomes a zero-sum game, the stronger the state, the weaker civil society. "Nationalism simply blocks the further development of a liberally oriented civil society since it is rooted in a doctrine which is incompatible with liberalism"43. In this context, the elites conduct the people to discover their national identities, exasperating the differences within the republics. In Serbia this operation started earlier. Already in 1987 Milosevic defeated Stambolic, the president of the republic and defender of a multinational country. Except some groups in Belgrade, the Serbian population did not understand the importance of what was happening. The society would react later, with the manifestations in 1991, but it was already too late. Belgrade, one of the most open and free towns of the Balkans after the Titoist period, returned to a gloomy nationalistic atmosphere. Ernest Gellner developed the theory that nationalism is a functional adaptation of modernisation, an attempt by the nation-state to provide the rituals of collective belonging and attachment formerly provided by the tribe, village and local community. National systems of education which inculcate national language, history and values have enabled modern civil societies to respond to the need for collective belonging within a market order characterised by alienation and anonymity44. Civic varieties of nationalism - that is ones that define membership of a nation in terms of shared adherence to civic values - are fully compatible with the necessary pluralism of
43 P. A. Heltai and Z. Rau, From Nationalism to Civil Society and Tolerance, in Z. Rau (ed.), The Reemergence of Civil Society in Eastern Europe and in Soviet Union, Oxford, Westview Press, 1991, p. 141. 44 E. Gellner, op . cit..
25 civil society. Ethnic nationalism - which defines belonging in terms of blood, ethnic origin or language - may or may not be compatible with civil society, depending on how such societies define the rights of ethnic and other minorities. In the Balkans, Western ideals of nationalism have proven disastrous. In a region where patterns of ethnic settlement are dispersed and heterogeneous and where ethnicity is deeply blurred by intermarriage and common settlement, the very idea of ethnic separatism is suicidal. In such ethnically heterogeneous regions, a civil society allowing individuals to collaborate as individuals on non-ethnic lines appears to offer the most rational prospect for social order. Yet the paradox of the Balkans is that while nowhere is the rationality of a non- ethnic civil society more obvious, nowhere has it proved more difficult to create. True, Yugoslavia enjoyed one of the most vigorous revivals of an independent civil society anywhere in the communist world in the 1960s and 1970s. Millions of young Yugoslavs believed they had emancipated themselves from ethnic ties. Yet when nationalist politicians, first in Serbia and then in Croatia, set out to create ethnic states on the ruins of Titoist Yugoslavia, the courageous defenders of a non-ethnic polity found themselves outnumbered, outvoted, and eventually outgunned. Yugoslavia illustrates the truth that a multiethnic, multicultural civil society cannot exist without a strong state. Without such a state as arbiter and guarantor of ethnic accommodation, civil society risks disintegrating into ethnic factions, and it does so because it is rational for individuals to seek their own protection. In other words, a multiethnic civil society was possible only as long as Marshal Tito guaranteed civil order. In the vacuum created by the collapse of the Titoist State, civil society proved incapable of self-regulation, and those brave Yugoslavs who preached against the madness of ethnic separation were drowned out in the violent rush to divide. Yugoslavia suggests that no civil society has the strength to withstand tribal or ethnic warfare once the state loses its capacity to maintain order.
Two important actors in the development of Serbian nationalism
I was surprised, while speaking with so called "democratic people" - NGOs leaders and open-minded friends - to notice how deep and "natural" are their nationalistic ideas and
26 feelings. Western politics identified Milosevic with bad side of the nationalism and thought, in a too simplistic way, that defeating him meant defeating the problem. It was not like that. Vuk Draskovic, for example, for many years Milosevic most serious opponent, founded his party on the myth of Serbian nationalism, going back to archaic roots and arriving to the glorification of the chetnik movement. Even more moderate leaders, as Kustunica or Djindjic, did not mask their nationalistic legacies. One of the reasons why nationalism had such a deep impact on the whole society was the open support given by the Orthodox Church and a large group of intellectuals. After a difficult period under Titoism, the Serbian church recovered his role of protector of Serbian culture and values between 1984 and 1987. As a counterpart for the new privileges, it concurred to legitimise the nationalistic claims of the regime. The orthodox clergy participated in the propaganda for the commemoration of the mythical Kosovo Polje battle and, in 1992, seconded the expansionistic ambitions to justify the war. Another factor with an important echo in the society was the Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts (1986). This document claimed that "the establishment of the full national and cultural integrity of the Serbian people, regardless of which [Yugoslav] republic or province it inhabits, is its historic and democratic right"45. It was soon to play a decisive role in the transformation of Slobodan Milosevic from an old- style communist apparatchik into the prophet of Serbian nationalism. The paradox is that, in their paranoid serbocentric view, the intellectuals condemned the nationalism, seen as the main reason of the crisis, using its same contents and accents. It probably the best example of that mix of communism and nationalism described above. One of the reasons why the Serbian intellectual elite supported and promoted the Greater Serbian ideology and the war waged in order to achieve its goals is suggested by the term "political intellectuals". Quite a few prominent intellectuals held high political offices in the Serbian government or in the main opposition parties, which have not opposed, but rather endorsed the Greater Serbian project. One of the most prominent Serbian philosophers, Professor Miailo Markovic, one of the authors of the Memorandum, served as Vice-President of the ruling Socialist Party of Serbia. Dobrica Cosic served as
45 In I. Primoratz, Serbian Intellectuals and the war in the Balkans, in " Sociological Imagination", 36 (2/3), 1999, pp 143-153.
27 President of the rump Yugoslavia, while Professor Svetozar Stojanovic, another leading philosopher, was his advisor. Most of those who were heading the opposition parties in Serbia were academics or prominent intellectuals: Professor Vojislav Seselj (Serbian Radical Party); Professor Dragoljub Micunovic, Professor Kosta Cavoski, and Dr. Zoran Djindjic (Democratic Party; Dr. Vojislav Kostunica (Serbian Democratic Party); Vuk Draskovic, a prominent writer (Serbian Renewal Movement); Professor Nikola Milosevic (Serbian Liberal Party). Their social role, unlike that of the cultural intellectuals, is that of producing and disseminating politically relevant ideas, i.e. ideologies. And their social status, unlike that of the cultural intellectuals, is based on their performance of this role. Political intellectuals are ideologists. Accordingly, their ideas are "much more the by-products of the laws of intellectual fashion; their concern is less with the truth of things than with ideas as weapons; their thoughts are usually predictable because they conform to the impersonal laws of ideological fashion; their categories are akin to a modish vocabulary, attachments to the transient vogue rather than the product of individual experience and reflection"46. In Serbia in the years preceding the break-up of Yugoslavia and the collapse of communism in Europe, their ideology of Greater Serbian nationalism was the obvious alternative to the old communist ideology, to which most of them used to subscribe: it was both intellectually fashionable and politically promising.
The Milosevic period
Attila Agh enumerates four peculiarities to describe why the most manifest contradiction between democratisation and nation building has occurred in Serbia47: - the overwhelming continuity of the ruling party; - the fact that the changes had been presented as "institutional dictates" of the ruling party. The role of parliament had been minimised and the opposition ignored, generating an "extreme case of polarised pluralism"; - the process of an emerging pluralism was contrasted by the breaking out of the war(s) which led to "extreme nationalist options in Serbia's political scene";
46 L. S. Feuer, Ideology and Ideologists, Oxford, Basic Blackwell, 1975, p. 202.
28 - the ruling party had turned towards nationalism populism to face the strong pressure on politics due to far more difficult economic and social conditions than in the other countries.
Nicholas J. Miller speaks of the case of Serbia as that of "a failed transition"48. Between the reasons he gives, we find the "failure of Serbia's intelligentsia to embrace a civic culture rooted in respect for the individual as opposed to the nation" and "… the inability of the Serbian people to produce a coherent, anti-authoritarian, anti-nationalist opposition to Milosevic"49. Serbian analysts who followed Milosevic career closely insist that he was not a nationalist, but that he was ruthlessly ambitious and prepared to use anybody and any ideology to fuel that ambition. His overwhelming lust for power was far more dangerous than nationalism50; he became the sponsor of the Serbs in Kosovo and from the beginning he understood the potential for control of minds through the media. He assured the media coverage of mass protest rallies against the other communist leaders and organised a so- called "anti-bureaucratic revolution" to justify the purges of the independent journalists51. But whereas Milosevic had promised much more than the defence of Serbs, ultimately he could not deliver on his other promises, like privatisation, efficient government, federal centralisation. It was for those reasons that the impulse for institutional democratisation started growing, as in the rest of Eastern Europe. In this context, opposition and civil society in Serbia were often used as synonyms; many authors writing about civil society in Serbia in the '90s, actually describe the problems, the developments and the divisions of the opposition parties. The reasons to this role's confusion are complex and have to be addressed both to Milosevic policies, and the opposition characteristics.
47 A. Agh, op. cit., p. 201. 48 N. J. Miller, A failed transition: the case of Serbia, in K. Dawisha and B. Parrott, op. cit., pp. 146 and further. 49 Ibid. 50 C. Bennett, op. cit., p. 82. 51 The term "anti-bureaucratic revolution" is used in many textes, see i.e. D. A. Dyker and I. Vejvoda, Yugoslavia and after, a study in fragmentation, despair and rebirth, New York, Wesley Longman Publishing, 1996, chap. 10, and N. J. Miller, op. cit., p. 153.
29 In a situation where it was almost impossible to organise free and independent organisations, the opposition parties, legalised in August 1990, became the natural references for those who were looking for a minimum level of democracy and pluralism. Many student leaders of the demonstrations in 1991, 1996 and 2000, and many independent journalists were at the same time members of some parties, or retained some political assignments, at least at the local level. At the same time, in the Serbian society a widespread detachment and diffidence was growing for all that was called "political", including politicians and party structure of the opposition. Also for that reason, the most important political parties had their own "NGOs", satellite-organisations whose task was to present the "clean" side of the different factions. They are also called "quaNGOs" (quasi-NGOs), to stress the fact that they are not created by citizens in a spontaneous way. But also the "real" civic organisations were almost obliged to take an active part in the political struggle. The movement Otpor! (Resistance) and the G17 group are probably the best example of the political nature of movements connected with the opposition's political parties. The behaviour of the opposition parties contributed to the creation of even more confusion. For these reasons I think that is impossible to write about civil society in the Milosevic era without mentioning the main episodes which characterised the political/partitical life in Serbia. A brief description of the different (often failed) attempts to form coalitions clarifies how fragmented and divided the opposition was, generating confusion and mistrust in a disoriented public opinion. In 1990 the United Opposition was formed: its member parties agreed to act as a single body in the second round of the republic election and to jointly support an opposition candidate, regardless of the party he came from. The coalition was short-lived and dissolved in squabbling after the elections. A few months later a new round of coalition- making began under a variety of names such as the United Serbian Opposition or the United Opposition of Serbia but in the end it remained only an attempt. Two years later, in 1992, a new coalition was called Depos. Its founders were the SPO, ND, a group of DS members (people who later joined the DSS) and the SLS. At the time the coalition consisted of fourteen parties and several thousand of Serbia’s leading intellectuals. Until the next elections in the autumn of 1992, Depos would consist of non- party figures, the SPO, ND, the Serbian Royalists Bloc, the Democratic Alliance of
30 Bulgarians, the SLS, the DSS, the Socialist Union of Serbia/Yugoslavia, the Rural Party of Serbia and the Serbian St Sava Party. In 1993 one of the parties of Demos II joined the government after winning seats on the opposition list, demonstrating the fragility of the coalition. In 1996 parliamentary opposition parties tried again to take common stands on a policy with the Parallel Parliament. It was one of the few agreements reached between the democratic opposition and the Radicals. However it broke up after the Radicals disagreed over the issue of minority rights. In 1997 the worker-rural-democratic Zajedno (Together), which brought together the SPO, the DS, the GSS, the DSS and the Association of Independent Trade Unions, suffered the greatest election defeat since 1990. Opposition coalitions have usually surged in waves and have been short-lived. It took a long time to realize that the democratic opposition was made up of several distinct groups, which could possibly never be united under a common leadership. Serbian politics does not polarise along a single axis. Serbia is a multi-party society in crisis and turmoil, a complex matrix of forces. In the aftermath of elections, the inaccurate pre-definitions of election campaigns usually result in leaders quarrelling about who “betrayed” whom. However the fact that in most local governments Zajedno has worked well despite the quarrels in the central headquarters of the parties indicates that this opposition coalition might not have been so prone to splitting had they been more successful in elections.
Milosevic and Serbian society
1990-1995: Between December 1990 and December 1993 Milosevic easily won four elections, demonstrating to have a large support in the Serbian society. His way of ruling was based on a continuos mobilisation of the country to face emergency situations, such as the Kosovo issue, the war in Croatia and in Bosnia; it allowed him to hide the growing poverty in the country, the stagnation of economic activities, the international isolation. He could count on the support of corrupted managers in the key-roles, which - to maintain the privileges conceded by the regime - assured their complete fidelity, but also
31 on the army and the media. In May 1992 the opposition boycotted the elections, but 60% of the Serbs gave their vote to the SPS or to Seselj's radicals. Milosevic won with… 104% of the votes! After some arrangements, the percentage was "adjusted" to a more "decorous" 98%. In June 1992, after the imposition of an embargo by the UN, the country was kneeling down52 and the regime disoriented. More than 200,000 people took part to the manifestations against Milosevic: monarchics, nationalists, democratics, pacifists and even the church and many intellectuals who had written the Memorandum accused Milosevic of being a traitor of the country. The movement however was ambiguous and fragmented and in December Milosevic obtained a new victory, even if through some difficulties. In 1993 Milosevic replaced the chief of the federal State, Dobrica Cosic, with the more faithful Zoran Lilic: the police crushed the protests and Draskovic was arrested. But once again Milosevic foresaw the atmosphere in the society. To present himself as the only moderate politician able to guide the country he broke the alliance with the radical Seselj, accusing the chetniks of war crimes and ethnic cleansing, at the same time laying the blame of the international community on someone else. In 1994, for the same reason, Milosevic began to cut some relations with the Bosnian Serbs. The Serbs refugees from Croatia and Bosnia were not well accepted in Serbia: when they were not rejected at the borders they were sent to Kosovo. If they wanted to stay in Serbia they could not receive the status of refugees, with any access to a salary or medical services. This was one of the reasons, explains Dusan Janjic, director of the Interethnic Centre and Minorities Protection, why in 1999 the protests had a massive following in the smaller provinces and not in Belgrade. In the capital there were 400-500,000 illegal refugees, whose only concern was to survive, not to take part in active political actions. They were often accommodated with relatives, thus contributing to a mitigation of the behavior of the Belgradians in a confused social context53. Even with the end of the war, sanctioning a military defeat for the Serbs, Milosevic was able to play the role of who could stabilize the region, both in front of the international
52 In 1992 Serbian a Montenegrin social product fell 26% in comparison with the previous year, in 1993 by another 30%. The per capita product in 1990 was 3300$, in 1993 it was 700$ and in 1994 1100$. "Federal statistics office" in Belgrade, reported in J. Teokarevic, Neither War nor Peace: Serbia and Montenegro in the First Half of the 1990s, in D. A. Dyker and I. Vejvoda, op. cit., p.187. 53 D. Janjic, in S. Matteucci (ed.), Gli altri Balcani. Associazionismo, media indipendenti e intellettuali nei paesi balcanici, Trieste, Asterios Editore, 2000, p. 192.
32 community and in the Serbian public opinion. He obtained the partition of Bosnia and a new state for the Bosnian Serbs, separated but strictly tied to Belgrade.
1996-1999: The regime and the opposition actually met in five electoral tournaments. There were usually protests in the aftermath. In fact there were six great waves of extended protests with hundreds of thousands of people in the streets (1991, 1992, 1993, 1996, 1997 and 1999). Thus elections never managed to achieve what they are actually meant for: the pacification of the political arena. Under such circumstances, the Serbian opposition actually took on the problematic task of solving the electoral equa tion in a variety of ways. In parliamentary games, the SPS usually came out with the highest score. When the scores were not high enough, which happened on several occasions, the SPS made coalitions with almost every player in the political game. This is another explanation of how Serbia is politically multipolar rather than bipolar. The November 1996 elections for the Federal Parliament were the first to be held in a relatively peaceful atmosphere. The electorate seemed exhausted, with the workers-rural- democratic Zajedno coalition winning just 969,296 votes. The ruling coalition and its now devoted fellow travelers, the Radicals, together won 2,600,000 votes. The second round of local elections came as a shock to the regime, still feeling secure after its result in the first round of parliamentary elections. The leftist coalition was unexpectedly defeated at the local level, while the Zajedno coalition, consisting of the Democratic Party, the Serbian Renewal Movement and the Civil Alliance of Serbia, won office in 36 municipalities, including Belgrade and other towns in the South, such as Nis, Pirot and Kragujevac. Caught off their guard after their initial success, the Socialists began making one mistake after the other. They were caught red-handed rigging the election and fell over themselves to deny it. All they managed to do, however, was make people even more aware of the fact that they had been cheated. People took to the streets in protests that lasted 88 days, from the autumn of 1996 to the spring of 1997, completely ignored by the regime's media. The protests ended in February 1997 when Milosevic ordered the Serbian cabinet and legislature to pass a lex specialis acknowledging opposition victory in the local elections.
33 In July 1997, parliamentary and presidential elections were called in Serbia. Draskovic's SPO was the only opposition party to take part in the consultations, stressing the persisting division among the oppositions. The Zajedno coalition dissolved prior to the elections in the conflict between Draskovic and Djindjic. Djindjic did his best to recover after his failed boycott. Draskovic went on tour from the opposition to the federal cabinet and back to the opposition. With the elections boycotted by a section of the opposition and half a million popular votes squandered, Seselj and his radical party made a grand comeback. But the situation in Serbia was getting worse and worse.
1999-2000: In the post-war summer of 1999, in a Serbia devastated by NATO bombing, the opposition found itself at a crossroads. The SPO and New Democracy openly voted for the road to elections. The Alliance for Change opted to stage rallies throughout Serbia. It announced a general strike and a series of protests and social unrest as methods to overthrow Milosevic. The regime struck back, denouncing the leaders of the coalition, Djindjic in particular. Against this background a plan was launched to set up a transitional government of experts which would call new elections and take the necessary measures to restore broken international links. The regime would accept no compromise. The police was breaking up the Alliance’s protests. The spell of this new unification of all opposition forces lasted ten days, to the Transfiguration Day in August 19, 1999. The rally drew a seriously large number of people and was massive enough for its organisers to claim success, but too small to effect any kind of change. The scene played out by the major figures in front of 70,000 people showed how impossible it was to unify the opposition in a single block. On the one hand the Alliance for Change claimed that Milosevic could be overthrown by protest while on the other hand Vuk Draskovic called for early parliamentary elections. His party, he said, would not take part in the destabilisation and blockade of Serbia. Zoran Djindjic was giving ultimatums to the Serbian authorities. “It’s you or us,” he said, demanding their resignation. “It is common knowledge that policy is no longer made in debating chambers but in the streets and squares,” Djindjic told the crowd. The Transfiguration Day rally
34 demonstrated that not only the leaders, but also the supporters and activists of the parties were in conflict on the opposition stage. The following year was spent on an attempt to narrow the gulf between the SPO and the other opposition parties. Once the plan to negotiate election conditions within the Parliament had failed, the opposition parties agreed to coordinate pressure on the regime for early general elections by April 2000 at the latest. In the meantime the situation in the country was growing ever more complex, particularly on Kosovo issue. For the first time the protests were stronger in the provinces than in the capital and it happened for different reasons. As stressed by Dusan Janjic, civil organisations were growing slowly but surely and it was getting harder to try to stop them with special laws or the use of force. Through media censorship the regime could paralyse the opposition parties, which had centralized structures, but it was more difficult to control the local media. The propaganda was stronger in Belgrade, where a new wave of nationalism followed the NATO bombing. Intellectuals, politicians (often also from the opposition, Draskovic's SPO was at that moment allied with Milosevic) and the public opinion condemned the Western aggression forgetting the ethnic cleansing in Kosovo. In the South, on the contrary, population was constantly informed about Serbian actions in Kosovo, because many reservists came from that region. But a stronger reaction was provoked also by the fact that the provinces, especially in the South, were more seriously damaged by the bombing than Belgrade. The capital was the dark hole for political interest and corrupted bureaucracy, with a large bourgeois class frustrated and economically losing. The town, where the regime strength was higher than anywhere else, was divided between nationalists and refugees with a tenuous space for civic action, despite the great resources in term of people, institutions, and communications. The opposition probably failed to understand the real needs of the people, addressing the protests towards the elections, without answering the concrete demands of the families and trying to re-organise the local structures. A partial answer to the general dissatisfactions towards institutions was the creation of a specific form of non-partisan, NGO political activity in post-war Serbia: it was the growth of a civic parliament, a process which started in the city of Cacak and later spread
35 to numerous communities. According to the spokesperson for the Cacak parliament and a leading personality of this movement, Verica Barac, the civic parliament is a specific form of NGO activity. It "differs from other non-governmental organisations in that it is more politically active, and from political parties, in that it is not involved in the power struggle. The civic parliaments are fighting for the democratisation and decentralisation of Serbia, for an overall change of the Serbian constitutional and legal system, and the creation of conditions for change in the system which will form legal and responsible authorities”54. The first session of the Serbian People's Parliament took place in Cacak on 4 September 1999 and was attended by representatives of civic parliaments from eight different cities. They were in between opposition parties and local NGOs, with a political connotation anti-Milosevic but with civil society connections. They worked as parallel institutions against the regime and suffered a hard repression by the apparatus, both with physical and judicial means. With the growing influence of NGOs in addressing pressing societal needs, including fostering democratic changes, the attitude of political elites and the general public towards civic organisations seemed changing. In an atmosphere of fragmented and non- consensual political opposition, NGOs and civic movements were developing the organisational capacity and sophistication necessary to mobilise the citizens of Serbia to bring changes to their homeland, which was isolated from the international community and facing a general collapse. Recognition of NGOs as important agents for addressing the public however, also brought with it the danger, as it happened, that political parties might try to use existing NGOs, and possibly create new, to serve their party purposes. Maintaining non- partisanship, while working in broad coalitions and developing partnerships with various actors, including trade unions, local governments, church and political parties, was one of the biggest challenges for the successfully evolving NGO movement in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY).
54 V. Barac, cited in P. Demes, Civil society development in post-war Serbia, in www.ceu.hu .
36 Characteristics of NGOs and Civic Movements
Yugoslavia is the only area in Europe at the end of 20th century, where the term "civil" is used simultaneously in two completely opposite ways: civil society and civil war. This is not the only paradox found in the country, which was introduced by Slobodan Milosevic into a tragic situation. In spite of 10 year of oppression, a series of wars, international isolation and economic hardship, Serbia is not a “civic dead zone”, on the contrary. Over the last years there has been a remarkable growth of civic organisations and movements. A recent conference of NGOs in Belgrade demonstrated the surprising vitality of the civic sector and its readiness to act in the public policy arena as one of the main actors in the democratization process. Since the recent war with NATO, civic organisations have been even more active and publicly visible. They are creating broad coalitions and entering into partnerships with other pro-democracy players. Yugoslavia has a long history of association activity going back to the “brotherhoods” of the Middle Ages. In addition, social, economic and legal features of the previous period (including the “third chamber” enshrined in the 1974 Constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) and the Workers’ Councils existing under the previous regime) have resulted in particularised experiences and expectations concerning the NGO sector in Yugoslavia. A major expansion of NGO activity occurred as a result of the armed conflicts among the former Yugoslav republics in 1991, primarily with organisations attempting to stop the war, assist victims, and protect human rights. A large number of new ad hoc associations emerged on the social scene, but only a few managed to develop either formal internal structures or specific missions or programs. NGOs are now moving into the next phase of transforming themselves into developed and stable organisations, with the necessary structure and infrastructure. However, this goal will be difficult to attain under the current legislative framework. Serbia and Montenegro are among few countries in Central and Eastern Europe in which the non-profit sector still predominantly operates under the laws enacted during the past regime.
37 In general, the NGO scene is quite similar to transitional societies in the region, displaying a mixture of older organisations which survived from the previous communist regime (National Front-type of NGOs) and newly created truly independent NGOs. According to the Center for the Development of the Non-Profit Sector, there are about 1,200 NGOs in the FRY that emerged after 1990, of which probably about half are active organisations. Their birth and expansion was predominantly a result of armed conflicts on the territory of former Yugoslavia. These organisations or ad hoc groups focused primarily on anti-war activities, assisting victims of the war and protecting human rights. The emergence of significant numbers of visible and active NGOs appeared during and after the period of mass civic protests, in 1996-97, in reaction to the government’s refusal to recognize the results of local elections in Serbia. A characteristic feature of these groups is that they are widespread and active mostly in civic and community development and less in humanitarian assistance projects. Their commitment and level of organisational development was observed at the first Forum of Yugoslav NGOs which took place in June 1998, attended by 140 participants from 116 NGOs. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is among the few countries in Central and Eastern Europe in which the non-profit sector still operates predominantly under the laws enacted during the former communist regime. The general legal framework of NGOs contains a number of serious shortcomings. Currently, the following types of non-governmental organisations are defined and categorised by the laws of the FRY: citizens associations, foundations, social organisations, trade unions, chamber of commerce, religious committees, and sport associations. The tax law framework for NGOs largely complies with international standards. However, due to the closed atmosphere of the current political situation, there is a great deal of misunderstanding regarding the role and purpose of NGOs. This factor renders any possibility for open discussion and dialogue for development of a favorable legislation for NGOs exceedingly difficult. NGOs are widely perceived as “anti- governmental” while civic activists are often exposed to government pressure.
38 The role of media
The control of the media was one of the Milosevic's first objectives already dating back to the end of the '80s, to "build the war in people's mind, exaggerating conflicts and antagonisms not still present in the society"55. The Serbian media had quite a good reputation in the previous years, making it easier for the population to trust them. In a de - structured, de-politicised and ignorant social context, television played a major role in "educating" people and communicating the messages of the regime. The few independent media were concentrated in Belgrade, but had almost no echo in the rest of the country. They were even functional to Milosevic's propaganda: he could present himself as democratic, allowing the expression of critical opinions. Vreme concentrated the first post-Tito dissidents: the Helsinki Committee, feminists, and ecologists. Borba, former official organ of the communist party, was strictly controlled by the nationalist leaders, but presented some forms of criticism "allowed" by the regime. Radio B 92 was born in 1989, in very difficult economic conditions, lacking paper, instruments, cameras and, after 1991, even the government license. It was addressing a young public, organising some important events like concerts, meetings for peace, solidarity initiatives with Sarajevo inhabitants. It co-operated with Studio B, of liberal inspirations, born in the '70s as free independent radio and become television in the '90s. The control of the media reached its highest points in proximity of the elections or in the crucial moments of the war. Journalists were purged on a regular basis and often openly threatened. From 1992 the nationalists also occupied also the radio sector, which until that year had been freer. Christopher Bennett compared the Serbian propaganda with the Nazis one during the '30s, with the notable difference that the media in the meantime had become much more powerful56. An interesting view on what should have been the role of the media is presented in a publication of the Italian Consortium of Solidarity57. In October 1998 the Parliament passed a new Law on Public Information that imposed several harsh restrictions on press freedom. The new law banned Serbian media organisations from transmitting foreign
55 P. Rumiz, op. cit., p. 50. 56 C. Bennett, op. cit., p. 144.
39 radio or television broadcasts related to Serbia. It allowed restrictions on media organisations that jeopardised Serbia’s or Yugoslavia’s “territorial integrity” or stirred “national, racial or religious intolerance and hatred”. It also said that the media would have been assumed guilty until proven innocent, with heavy sanctions against those journalists whose declarations would have been judged against the State. Many newspapers were forced to close for the impossibility to pay the fines. Two examples are emblematic: when the directors of Dnevni Telegraf and of Evropljanin refused to pay a very heavy penalty, authorities confiscated the copies and sold them as recycling paper. The director of the Dnevni Telegraf and other two journalist were condemned to five years of prison, but Slavko Curuvija, the director, was killed in the April 1999. His killer remained unknown. The adoption of "The Decree on Special Measure under Conditions of Threats by the NATO Armed Attacks" by the republican government on 8 October 1998 clearly indicated that violations and restrictions of human and especially civil rights in Serbia would be stepped up. The Decree, banning newspapers from publication of "defeatist texts" and radio and television stations from re-transmission of foreign programmes and texts of the foreign information media, was seen first as a warning to defiant media. The next step was their closure. The worst period for the media coincided with the bombing of Serbia by NATO; the regime had a good excuse for an open repression on all levels of society, with the justification of building a "unified" front to defend the country. Everyone defending the Western values was accused of being a traitor or a spy. The government took the power, normally delegated to the Parliament, of issuing dispositions to limit or abolish the constitutional rights, including those on information. Seselj, the radical leader, openly threatened with death the independent journalists. The Ministry of Information obliged all the media to follow precise criteria "in the interest of the country". Sasa Mirkovic, former director of B 92, decided to react to the situation. His radio was closed several times in 1991, 1996, 1997 and 1999. In his opinion "the independent media reacted in a more rational way than the political opposition: once threatened, they unified and co-ordinated their forces, collaborating with other NGOs, like Otpor, CeSID
57 S. Matteucci, op. cit., p. 194 and further.
40 and G 17…. B 92 (re-baptised B2-92 after Milosevic's men occupied the radio's studios) and ANEM (the Association of Independent Electronic Media in Serbia and Montenegro) were not only media in that period, but they also tried to canalise the positive energy of the people"58. In such a particular situation, the media had the duty to resist and mobilise the people against the regime. Campaigns such as "Rock for vote" or "Get out and vote" were organised by Otpor and Radio B 92 to push young people to go and vote and change the regime. Bozidar Andrejievic, one of the directors of the newspaper Danas, has a different opinion59. Danas is an independent newspaper with a very high professional standard. It followed democratic principles of tolerance and pluralism despite the harsh repression of the authorities. In Andrejievic's opinion, the media should not directly influence the political situation, but provide correct information for the public and thus have an indirect impact on the changes. Since in Serbia the access to information was not free, it was very difficult have a balanced opinion of the events. Milosevic moreover accused the media financed from abroad of being spies or traitors of the country, even when the funds were transparent and legal. The broadcasting licence, but also the paper supply, was completely controlled by the regime and many media were simply forced to ask somewhere else to survive. The directors of Nin, an old political periodical, and Radio Index, a free Radio in Belgrade, openly criticised the positions of their colleagues: the distinction of roles between journalists and politicians should be clear, they sustained, to permit the media to be really free and independent. The "political manipulation of the media", both on the governmental and opposition side, corrupted the ethics that the journalism should have 60.
NGOs and the Kosovo War
The war with NATO created new sets of challenges for the NGO community. Unlike previous conflicts among the former Yugoslav republics, this was an attack on Serbia from the outside, following the failure to find a diplomatic solution to the Kosovo crisis. NGO activists had enormous operational difficulties during the bombing due to
58 S. Mirkovic interviewed in S. Matteucci (ed.), op. cit., pp. 196 -198. 59 B. Andrejievic, interviewed in S. Matteucci, op. cit., pp. 198-200. 60 Stevan Niksic and Nenad Cekic, interviewed in S. Matteucci, op. cit., pp. 200-205.
41 technological breakdowns caused by the air strikes. Moreover, even before the start of the bombing many activists were accused of being Western agents and paid traitors. During the air strikes, the government increased pressures on the NGO sector through public threats, fines and even arrests. Some civic leaders left the country (temporarily or permanently). Despite all of these difficulties, the NGO sector remained active during the 78-days bombing campaign of the country. The most significant step in strengthening NGO cooperation, solidarity and involvement in the public policy arena during the war was the creation of a coalition called the Yugoslav Action Group (YAG). It was formed in the first days of the Kosovo War, in March 1999, "with the aim of helping NGOs survive, to protect members against regime oppression, and to act as an organised voice against ethnic cleansing, war and bombing". Including the five founding members, the coalition now has about 60 members. It is a broad coalition between well-known and respected NGOs and the trade union Confederation Nezavisnost. During the war, YAG succeeded, despite very difficult conditions including the imprisonment of some of its activists, in issuing public statements against the regime. It was able to establish international contacts with partners in Central and Eastern as well as in Western Europe. The European Movement and Civic Initiatives carry out the task of mobilising the NGO network. In the short period of its existence, YAG became a domestically and internationally recognised actor for democratic changes in Serbia and the FRY.
The role of the international community
Since the beginning of the Yugoslav wars in 1991, a number of contradictory interventions by the international community occurred in the Balkans. Serbia, in particular, was the target of economic sanctions in different periods until 1999, when NATO forces attacked the country in reaction to the ethnic cleansing actions operated by Milosevic in Kosovo. It is debatable how these interventions influenced Serbian society and its political evolution, weakening or strengthening Milosevic in his isolation. I will comment on some of the effects on local NGOs in the last chapter. Here I will describe
42 the first serious attempt by the international community to replace the previous, reactive crisis intervention policy in South Eastern Europe with a comprehensive, long-term conflict prevention strategy. On 10 June 1999, at the EU's initiative, the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe was adopted in Cologne. In the founding document, more than 40 partner countries and organisations unde rtook to strengthen the countries of South Eastern Europe "in their efforts to foster peace, democracy, respect for human rights and economic prosperity in order to achieve stability in the whole region". Euro-Atlantic integration was promised to all the countries in the region. At a summit meeting in Sarajevo on 30 July 1999, the Pact was reaffirmed. The idea for the Stability Pact arose in late 1998 and thus predates the Kosovo war. The NATO intervention acted as a catalyst in strengthening international political will for co-ordinated and preventive action in the region. The idea was that conflict prevention and peace building could be successful only if they started simultaneously in three key sectors: the creation of a secure environment, the promotion of sustainable democratic systems, and the promotion of economic and social well being. Progress in all three sectors is necessary for sustainable peace and democracy. In the founding document of the Stability Pact, the EU, which assumed a leading role in the Pact, undertook to draw South Eastern Europe "closer to the perspective of full integration ... into its structures", including eventual full membership. The European Union and its Member States are collectively the most important donors in the region. The intention was to increase economic, political and social co-operation between the EU and the countries through a new instrument, the aid regulation CARDS (Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Democratisation and Stabilisation). An amount of 4.65 billions Euro is allocated over the period 2002-2006 to accompany and support the reforms of the countries concerned. Donor funding for the region has been substantial since the creation of the Stability Pact. The overall bilateral and multilateral assistance to South Eastern Europe (macro financial assistance and budget support, reconstruction and economic development aid, humanitarian assistance) amounted to approximately € 6 billion in 1999. It exceeded € 6.6 billion both in 2000 and in 2001.
43 Stability Pact and Civil Society
Ambassador Robert Barry, former OSCE's Head of Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, stated that the goals and aims of the Pact must be nurtured from below rather than imposed from above. "We must not allow ourselves to believe that the challenges of building peace, democracy and stability can be solved by Presidents and Prime Ministers alone", he said. "In many ways, the success of the Stability Pact will depend on the ability of non-governmental organisations, political parties, business people and independent media to forge links across national boundaries within the region. In this case, the Stability Pact is as much about linking citizens as it is about linking states"61. "Helping those countries to help themselves" means aiding and encouraging the development of civil societies by every means possible. The non-governmental sector has an important role to play in fulfilling the potential of the Stability Pact, particularly in the field of democracy and human rights, in which results can be achieved only through long-term processes and a strong involvement of civil society. For example, NGOs are lobbying national governments for wide acceptance and implementation of existing human and minority rights obligations, and they are exercising a watchdog role aimed towards transparent, accountable and responsive governance based on human rights values and principles. NGOs can also contribute to preserving the multi-ethnic diversity of the countries of the region by overseeing the local implementation of effective anti-discrimination measures and legislation, and pleading for the development of mechanisms for minority representation in political and legal structures. In the lives of the citizens, NGOs function as instruments for raising public awareness of the importance of the development of democratic citizenship. Civil society assistance programmes should be developed on a long-term basis in order to support the creation of networks of domestic NGOs in each country and to identify the problems NGOs are facing in their relations with local authorities. Priority should also be given to facilitating the flow of information, disseminating good practices, networking existing initiatives and training regional experts and agents of change.
61 Cited in Daft Special Report:The Civil Society Dimension Of The Stability Pact For South-Eastern Europe, in www.naa.be .
44 Co-operation between different NGOs is particularly important for them to maximise the impact of their work and influence. The establishment of civic forums representing a large number of NGOs facilitates their dialogue with the governments and thereby ensures the pa rticipation of civil society in the decision-making process on fundamental national issues. This, in turn, guarantees that the citizens will be fully committed to the measures decided. The European Commission has proposed the creation of a regional network of civil society promoting an active involvement of civil society in the implementation of the Stability Pact. This orientation toward a systematic co-operation with civil society has been confirmed by the decision to establish a mechanism of consultations with NGOs. The first consultation with more than 70 regional and international NGOs was held in Thessaloniki on 6 June 2000. The Agenda for Stability adopted by the Regional Table in Thessaloniki gives due recognition to the important role NGOs can play in South-Eastern Europe. No institutional role, however, was recognised for NGOs in the Stability Pact. At the beginning, the Pact excluded Yugoslav authorities because its government contravenes the Pact's basic principles. Within the so called "Szeged Process", a mechanism that had originally been established to support democratic forces in the FRY at the time of the Milosevic regime, more than 40 partnerships have been concluded with cities and local authorities governed by opposition parties in Serbia. Serbian opposition, despite the strong condemnation of EU sanctions, joined the Stability Pact in November 1999. The international community, through the Stability Pact, accepted the idea that political changes in Serbia could occur only with the participation of internal opposition and civil society. It was consequently necessary to make a difference between public authorities and Serbian citizens. The program "Energy for democracy" was an example of European "selective aid to opposition municipalities against the regime, but for its limited extension it was proved to be more political than economical"62. European and U.S. pressure for democratisation in Serbia and Montenegro was not always well accepted by Yugoslav society. When the opposition was
62 M. Glamotchak, Conséquences politique du pacte de stabilité pour l'Europe du Sud-Est en Serbie, ou historique d'une transition "commandée" 1999-2001, in E. Kheir (ed.), Stabilisation des Balkans?, Paris,
45 asked to help the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) against persons accused of crimes against humanity, many representatives boycotted the meeting with European Ministers in October 1999. One of the reasons was the fear of retaliation by Milosevic, but it also signed a different perception of priorities between the internal opposition and the international community. A programme where Serbian NGOs had a formal role recognised by the international community, was the Stability Pact Anti-Corruption Initiative (SPAI). The project was adopted in February 2000, but Serbia joined the Initiative only in 2001. The main areas addressed by the SPAI were the following: the adoption and implementation of international legal instruments against corruption; the promotion of good governance; the strengthening of the rule of law; the promotion of transparency and integrity in business operations; the development of an active civil society. The deep link between politics and organised crime, proved for example by the assassination of the Prime Minister Dindjic in March 2003, is one of the main obstacles for true democratisation in Serbia. The support of the whole civil society to this plan is therefore a necessary condition for the development of normal political relations in the country.
CIRPES, 2002, p. 58. For a more complete description of the program "Energy for Democracy", see chap. 4.
46 Chapter 3
Legal framework
Introduction
Due to the rather old legislative framework for NGOs, the terms: "non-profit organisations" and "non-governmental organisations" have not been accepted as yet, with the only exceptions of the income tax law and the new Montenegrin Law on Non- Governmental Organisations. A great deal of misunderstanding about the role and purposes of non-governmental organisations makes them still widely perceived as “anti- governmental” organisations frequently exposed to government oppression. The gap in legislation is often indicated as one of the most important "handicaps" to the development of a true civil society sector. To understand how and why Serbian NGOs have difficulties from the legisla tive point of view, I will give a short analysis of the current situation, concentrating on the provisions regarding Serbia and only marginally those regarding Montenegro.
General laws
The following laws govern the non-profit sector in Serbia and Montenegro: 1. The Law on Association of Citizens in Associations, Social Organisations and Political Organisations Established for the Territory of Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (1990) – hereinafter: Federal Law on Association, or Federal Law. 2. The Law on Social Organisations and Associations of Citizens of the Socialist Republic of Serbia (1982) – hereinafter: Serbian Law on Associations or Serbian Law. 3. The Law on Legacies, Foundations and Funds of the Republic of Serbia (1989) – hereinafter: Serbian Law on Foundations. 4. The Law on Non-Governmental Organisations (Associations and Foundations) of the Republic of Montenegro (1999) hereinafter: Montenegrin Law.
47 All associations whose field of competence is the entire Federation are subject to federal regulations and hence must register with the federal registration body. On the contrary, if they have only local tasks they are subject to republic regulations. The first problem is that the two legislations are not harmonised and are inconsistent with each other. No federal law governs foundations.
Constitutional framework
Article 41(1) of the Yugoslav Constitution of 1992 guarantees the freedom of association within political groups, trade unions and other organisations. The Yugoslav Constitution provides for special guarantees with respect to the freedom of association for members of national minorities, including the right to collaborate with international NGOs. Freedom of speech is recognized as a basic constitutional right, but none of the respective constitutions directly addresses the issue of whether organisations, in addition to individuals, enjoy this freedom. The restrictions set forth by the three constitutions (Federal, Serbian and Montenegrinian) with respect to the freedom of association and the freedom of speech regard the prohibition to found a paramilitary or secret organisation, or an organisation whose activities are aimed at violent destruction of the public order, violation of the territorial integrity of FRY, violation of the guaranteed rights and liberties of citizens, or the incitement of national, racial, religious or other intolerance and hatred. It is interesting that these restrictions are the only lawful bases to refuse the registration of an association. The discretionary power of the competent registration authorities is the real problem in the application of such restrictions, otherwise in line with regional and international standards. The fact that Yugoslavia (now "Serbia and Montenegro") was not (until January 2003) a member to the Council of Europe prevented its citizens and NGOs from addressing the issue of application of those restrictions before the European Court of Human Rights.
48 Types of organisation and registration
The following types of NGOs can be found in the law of FRY: citizens’ associations, foundations, social organisations, trade unions, chambers of commerce, religious communities, sports associations, and political parties. One of the examples of the lack of harmonisation between the Republics and the Federation concerns the registration requirements for associations. The Federal and the Montenegrin Laws on Associations require that associations be registered with the respective ministries of justice, while the Serbian Law prescribes that the registration authority shall be the Ministry of Interior. It obliged many associations operating in Serbia to register at the federal level, because the Serbian authorities were too restrictive and conditional. Registration is mandatory for all associations, and no activities are allowed before the registration is complete. This solution falls short of the internationally recognised standards, which allow citizens to associate for any lawful purpose without having to register. An association (or its part) acquires the status of legal entity on the date of registration. The registry is open to the public. Under the Federal and Serbian Laws, to establish an association at least 10 physical persons eligible to vote (“citizens”) are required. Hence, persons under the age of 18 and legal entities cannot be founders of an association. Foreign persons can also not be founders of an association. About foreigners' membership of an association the law is not clear; they can probably participate as honorary members. Special rules exist in Serbia for membership in foreign citizens’ associations. The Serbian Law set some specific restrictions for the founders; in particular persons convicted of certain categories of crimes cannot be founders of an association during the five-year period after completion of the sentence. Furthermore, persons charged with criminal offences cannot be founders of an association, pending the investigation. These provisions give rise to serious concern. Not only do they breach the recognised international standards with respect to freedom of association, but their constitutionality is also somewhat doubtful.
49 The Federal Law provides that the competent body will decide upon the application for the registration within 15 days of its submission; if the competent body does not respond within the prescribed deadline, it will be presumed that an association is registered. It is not quite clear, however, what is the practical impact of this favorable presumption. For example, without the certificate of registration an association will hardly be able to open a bank account, lease an office or obtain a seal. By contrast, the Serbian Law does not provide for a favorable presumption and sets forth a 30-day deadline for the response to a registration application. If the application for registration is denied, an appeal can be filed with the Federal Court. The Serbian Law does not specifically envisage any kind of legal remedies for denial of an application. However, the Serbian constitution provides that any individual decision of the respective state authorities is subject to appeal. However, the aggrieved party may resort to the remedies provided in general administrative law. On this issue, the Serbian Supreme Court in general confirmed the Ministry of Interior’s decision to deny registration to the Serbian association of judges. No property is required to establish an association. Nevertheless, an association may acquire property through donations, membership fees, gifts, grants, public funding, etc. The property of an association can only be used for advancing the association’s statutory goals.
Foreign associations and associations of foreigners
One of the most critical issues in Federal and Serbian Laws concern the registration of foreign associations. None of the laws addresses this issue, despite the fact that there are a number of foreign associations operating in the country. Rather, foreign associations operate in a legal vacuum and are exposed to political will. The only exception is for those associations operating under the UNHCR umbrella thanks to a bilateral agreement between the UN and the Federal government. The UNHCR however, has often been reluctant to expand the number of collaborations, fearing that it could provoke the government to break its agreement with UNHCR. Under the Serbian Law, it appears that associations of foreigners residing in Yugoslavia can be established for any lawful purpose but are required to register with a separate
50 registry. In the past, these associations were established primarily by members of the diplomatic community residing in former Yugoslavia to carry out humanitarian activities or activities aimed at bolstering cultural relations between former Yugoslavia and a particular country. The law provides that a decision denying registration of such an association can be appealed to the government, whose decision on the matter is binding and not subject to any kind of further appeal. It is probably easier to establish a foundation; the laws of the respective republics provide that both natural and legal persons, including foreigners, may establish a foundation. Interestingly, a foreign person may establish a foundation in Serbia or Montenegro regardless of his/her domicile, residence or place of business. The Serbian Law on Foundations requires that the founding endowment be appropriate for advancing the objectives of the foundation. Since no further guideline is provided in the laws with respect to this requirement, this gives the registration authorities a great deal of discretion. While the foregoing provisions largely comply with best regional practices, the provisions of the Serbian Law on Foundations on the powers of the registration body give rise to serious concern. The law provides that the registration body decides not only on the permissibility of the foundation’s purposes, but also on the necessity of establishing such a foundation. Hence, a foundation can be prevented from registering (and thereby from doing its work) even if its purposes are entirely lawful. The Federal Law on Association sets forth that membership in international associations is permissible, insofar as the programme and the activities of such an association do not violate the Constitution and the law. As drafted, this provision does not seem to raise any substantial concerns. However, the language used in the Serbian Law on Associations regarding this issue is somewhat vague. According to the Federal and Serbian Laws, an association shall notify the respective registration authority about its having joined an international association within the prescribed deadline (30 days for those registered at the federal level and 15 days for those registered in the Republic of Serbia).
51 Internal governance
With the exception of the Montenegrin Law, which specifically provides that no same person can serve as members of both the managing board and the supervisory board for a foundation, no other conflict of interest rules or standards of behavior are set forth for the members of the management board, or for other persons who are conferred the power to represent an association or a foundation. It is not clear which standards are tailored and generally applicable to the members of the management board and other authorized persons in non-governmental organisations. Nevertheless, to the extent an organisation is engaged in economic activities and is liable for taxes, it appears that the members of the managing board are required to exhibit the diligence of a prudent business person. Accordingly, the conflict of interest rules set forth in the Company Law should apply at least to the extent the organisation is engaged in economic activities.
Economic activities
With the exception of the Montenegrin Law, none of the laws on associations address the issue of permissible economic activities. However, both the Serbian and Montenegrin Income Tax Laws seem to allow non-governmental organisations to engage in related and unrelated economic activities.
Dissolution, winding up and liquidation of assets
The competent authorities can decide that the association must be dissolved if its activities aim at: a) violent destruction of the public and constitutional order; b) violation of the territorial integrity of the country; c) violation of the guaranteed rights and liberties of citizens; or d) incitement of national, racial, religious or other intolerance and hatred.
In addition to the foregoing reasons, the Federal Law provides that an association may be dissolved if it is established that it ceased its activities for a period exceeding one year or if the number of its members is inferior to 10 citizens. No guidance is provided in the
52 law, however, as to the minimum activities the organisation is required to maintain in order to avoid involuntary dissolution. The Serbian Law on Associations contains even more vague provisions in this regard: the registration authority, in addition to the foregoing reasons, may disband an association if it is established that it ceased its activities, with no further reference to the lapse of a certain period of time. Hence the registration authorities are given a great deal of discretion with respect to involuntary dissolution. An association may initiate an appeal procedure before the Federal Court against the decision of a federal body to disband it. Even if the Serbian and the Montenegrin Laws also provide an appeal procedure, the Serbian Law provides that this procedure may not delay the execution of the registration authority’s decision.
Tax laws
In contrast to the general legal framework, the tax laws appear favourable toward NGOs, especially regarding to economic activities. For example, the Law on Income Tax seems to recognize that any NGO may engage in related and unrelated economic activities. Pursuant to the Serbian and Montenegrin Income Tax Laws, the profit generated in the prior fiscal year from an organisation’s economic activities will be exempt from taxes under the following conditions: a) if it does not exceed 300,000 dinars; b) if it is not distributed to the founders of an organisation, or to its employees, members of the management board or persons affiliated with them; c) if the salaries of the members of the management board and employees do not exceed double the amount of the average salary paid in the field of economic activity in which an organisation is engaged. In addition, an exemption shall be granted to a non-profit organisation that generated a profit of 300,000 dinars in the previous fiscal year, provided the organisation is able to prove that such profit was spent for purposes for which it was established. Other sources of income (membership, endowments, donations, contributions) are not taxable insofar as they are not related to the organisation's economic activities.
53 Donations of a corporation to public benefit organisations are tax deductible to the extent they do not exceed the 3% of the corporation’s total income. On the other hand, donations of an individual to public benefit organisations are tax deductible to the extent they do not exceed 10% of his or her income subject to taxation. Grants and salaries paid by an NGO to natural persons are not tax exempt.
Mergers and split-ups
An association may merge with another association or split up. There are no special rules regulating this procedure for NGOs, which implies that general civil law principles governing a legal entity’s mergers and split-ups should apply. Special rules regarding the merger of foundations are provided in the Serbian Law on Foundations. According to the Serbian Law, if a foundation is showing losses, the competent state authority will determine whether it should merge with another foundation with similar objectives. This decision is contingent upon obtaining consent of both the founders of the troubled foundation and the foundation into which it may merge. The Law, however, does not provide any threshold with respect to the losses that would trigger such a decision.
Political activities
No regulation about NGOs’ political activities is addressed in the Yugoslav law. In practice, those activities proved to be almost unrestricted, and this contributed to the public misperception of NGOs role in the society. Especially worrisome is the practice of NGOs directly lobbying with respect to the elections of a particular candidate or a party.
Conclusions
The general legal framework in FRY and Serbia, largely inherited from the communist regime, is rather unfavourable for the development of the third sector and contains a number of serious shortcomings like: the lack of consistency between the respective constitutions and the laws; unwarranted restrictions on the freedom of association for persons who have been sentenced or convicted; broad discretionary power of the
54 registration authorities in some ins tances; mandatory requirement for registration for both associations and foundations; failure to address the issue of foreign NGOs; and somewhat vague conditions prescribed for the dissolution of a foundation and the membership in international organisations. The tax law framework for NGOs in FRY, on the other hand, is more advanced and, to the extent it addresses specific issues, largely complies with international standards and best regional practices. There are no empirical data, however, that would reveal to what extent the tax authorities apply those provisions.
55 Chapter 4
NGOs today
Common features of Serbian NGOs
One of the best collections of information about the third sector and in particular NGOs in Serbia is provided by a research of the NGO Policy Group63. The report summarises the findings of a survey of 821 NGOs in Serbia and it is a remarkable exception in the general lack of material about this subject. It is an indispensable instrument to examine the actual situation of NGOs in the country, Kosovo excluded. The report reveals that, despite the legislative gap analysed before, local NGOs are mushrooming and both formal and informal co-operation with the government has improved. However, many steps have to be taken to strengthen transparency and confidence, since contacts between associations and authorities tend to be personal rather than institutional. Many NGOs still look with diffidence to a relation with the State, as they fear to be co-opted, mistrust local officials or simply ignore the mechanism for a better co-operation. Other negative aspects emerging by the survey include lack of defined constituency, not planned involvement of volunteers, lack of strategic plans, low accountability and impact evaluation and weak planning boards. On the other hand, the NGOs express a high potential: they showed a good flexibility, capacity to manage their activities in difficult and hostile environment, growing solidarity between NGOs and ability to learn from the past errors. The new strategies to strengthen the impact of Serbian NGOs include a deeper knowledge of institutions, more support to independent research on the third sector, a better co- operation between NGOs themselves and a decreasing dependence from foreign donors. A profile summarising the most common features of Serbian NGOs includes the following data: · Registered with the Federal Ministry of Justice.
63 NGO Policy Group, Third sector in Serbia, Status and Prospect, Belgrade 2002.
56 · Although activists generally have a shared vision, the mission is not yet clearly defined and the organisation has not yet formulated a strategic plan. · As a result of many changes from one type of activity to another (in response to changes in the operating environment), NGOs' identity is still unclear and it shifts focus between civil society development, service provision, environmental protection, youth, culture, and education. · Most likely NGOs are based in Belgrade or Vojvodina and least likely in Sandzak or Northeastern Serbia. · There is a core group of activists, who are contracted on project basis. Volunteers are recruited occasionally, mostly for short-term engagements. Core activists work as volunteers between projects. There are a few full-time employees (whose health, pension and other social contributions are paid by the NGO) because the organisation does not have secure funding. · Most activists and volunteers are formally employed in the public sector. They are teachers, lawyers, economists, journalists, pedagogues, artists, engineers and physicians. The educational level of NGO activists is much higher than in other sectors and far above the average for Serbia. · There is a gender balance among activists, and most are aged between 30 and 50. · Most board members however are men. · The organisation either does not have its own office space or it rents it on a monthly basis. In an office, there is a PC but usually no modem, printer, fax or photocopier. The NGO does not have a car and uses private vehicles for transportation. It has a very meager administrative budget. · Total budget ranges from DEM 1,000 – 5,000 and reaches up to DEM 10.000. Key funding sources are foundations and international NGOs, with modest local contributions. · Implements one to three projects, mostly autonomously and not in co-operation with other NGOs. Despite this, it values networks and is ready to become a member of one or more networks. · Activists communicate informally and in meetings that are scheduled as needed. Communication with citizens occurs mostly through the media. NGOs communicate directly with beneficiaries.
57 · The public knows very little about them. Citizens are not sure what they stand for or what they do. · Activists participated in seminars about civil society development, human rights, non- violent communication, and NGO operations and management, but still feel the need for additional training and skills development, especially in the areas of needs assessments, proposal design, volunteer recruitment and management, team work, business planning, marketing, management. They are interested in foreign languages and computer skills, PR and media relations, environmental protection and everything and anything to do with civil society development. · In the past, they did not have many interactions with authorities (except of the unwanted kind), but now they are starting to communicate with the government at all levels.
The characteristics mentioned above are shared predominantly by the largest group of NGOs, called "mini-organisations". Their solidarity, enthusiasm and activism help them to overwhelm the difficulties due to their limited resources, budget and organisation. A second group, medium-sized NGOs, concentrated in urban areas, has annual budgets from Euro 5,000 to 50,000, a discrete area of expertise and different donors. The last group, the smallest in terms of numbers of NGOs but the largest in term of funding, is composed of support organisations and expert groups. They usually have the main offices in Belgrade or in Vojvodina, they are focused on policy and sectoral activities and their great visibility conditions the public opinion idea on NGOs. The number of associations present in Serbia at the end of 1999 was 19,12964:
Serbia Type of Organisation Vojvodina Central Serbia Kosovo Total Citizens' associations 692 792 69 1,553 Social organisations 5,526 10,888 1,162 17,576 Total 6,218 11,680 1,231 19,129
64 Source: Federal Ministry of Justice, reported in NGO Policy Group, op. cit., p. 22.
58 Most of the organisations had been registered before 1990. Around 2,000 NGOs had been established between 1990 and 2000 and 900 only in the 2001:
Year Number 1994 196 1997 695 2000 2,000 2001 2,900 (July) NGOs registrations
From 1997 we saw an impressive growth of associations and NGOs. In part it was possible through the results of the 1997 elections, which allowed - in the 33 cities guided by the opposition - the establishment of many student, youth and civic organisations. But it was the quality of the NGOs to be improved; as we saw, in Serbia a humanitarian organisation has the same "status" as a football team or a fishing club. Many of the new associations were "real" NGOs, with "ethical" tasks and purposes that met the repression of the regime. In the last three years, after Milosevic's fall, the number of NGOs has grown extremely quickly. The media and the authorities have being showing new interest and co-operation and the attitude of the population towards these subjects is changing. During the previous years, the public opinion had a very bad perception of NGOs. They were described by the regime as "foreign money takers", NATO spies or, in general, as parasites of society. The openness of the government and the fact that many NGOs raised their professional profile contributed to give a more positive idea of the Third Sector. The active participation of many NGOs in the pro-election campaign and the growing number of government officials who had personal experience in the Third Sector helped the creation of direct links with many organisations both personally and officially. Some NGOs took advantage of these opportunities, while others felt disoriented by the informal ways of communication, fearing that it would have fostered privileges and inequality. Another group of NGOs was worry of being co-opted by the state and wished to maintain a total independence.
59 Media and authorities
About the relations between NGOs and local authorities, the survey suggests some initiatives to improve productive contacts. For example, representatives in the municipal Executive Council (without vote), NGOs contact persons in the municipal assembly, consultations and involvement of NGOs on particular issues, establishment of community development councils with politicians, NGOs and private representatives. One of the most interesting information is the perception by the NGOs themselves about their relations with the authorities and the changes occurred after the elections in October 2000. Prior to Milosevic's fall, 52.5% of NGOs did not co-operate with any ministry and among those who did the co-operation was bad for 37.75%, good for 13.36% and excellent only for 1.32%. The main reasons for explaining the negative judgements are the fact that the government "ignored this NGO" (13.83%), that they were "ideologically and politically confronted" (7.86%), and that the regime "prohibited the access to independent media" (3.49%). Other explanations concern the lack of funds, the impossibility to register the association, the corruption of the system. The positive aspects of co-operation were the existing of "some level of understanding and response to our requests" (4.37%), the fact that "they gave some money" (1.02%) and "some ministries were more open than others" (0.87%) and "the sanitary inspections by the authorities gave the permission for import" (0.58%). The majority did have no co-operation with the government; the reasons are that the NGO was "not interested in co-operation" in 20.52% of the cases, "ignorance of authorities and lack of readiness for co-operation" (9.46%), long process of registering (6.84%), and political reasons (4.8%). Other significant percentages indicated the prohibition of work by the regime, questions and "visits" by the police and the secret services. Even if the co-operation was higher at local rather than at central level, the relations with local authorities were not easy. The main reason why the co-operation was judged bad is that the local government ignored NGOs (7.57%). The second is that NGOs were "persecuted and considered as the NATO traitors" (6.18%). General ideological and political confrontation is the third reason (3.40%). Other significant complains regarded
60 the "lack of understanding" (2.63%) and the fact that authorities gave "very little money" (1.24%). Between the associations that defined "good" the co-operation with the local authorities, most of them hold their activities in centres administrated by the opposition parties. "They helped as much as they could, showed great understanding" was the most common comment (12.67%). For 6.18% "because the opposition that took the power, they helped with money and premises, invited NGOs to the media". "There were no problems" for 3.55%, "they neither helped not made NGO work difficult" was chosen by 2.63%, while another 2.47% recognised that "it could be better". Who defined the relations "excellent" explained that "the previous government (Milosevic) knew what the third sector was" (1.39% ) and that local authorities "were ready for co-operation". The last group is formed by those NGOs without co-operation with the municipalities; "they were not interested in organisations that were not run by the state" for 7.26%, "they did not know that this NGO existed" for 4.02%, or "this NGO was not interested in co- operation" as expressed by 4.02%. Other reasons were that the local government "made the co-operation impossible" (2.63%) or the NGO simply did not exist at that time (6.18%). Even more interesting is trying to evaluate NGOs perceptions one year after the political changes of autumn 2000. 58.5% of NGOs did not see any significant improvement in their relations with the government, 21.75% spoke of a complete change, 17.46% did not perceive any change and only 2.3% thought that relations became worse. Analysing the changes in the environment, 38% perceived significant changes, 31.5% partial changes and 30% did not notice any changes at all. The main changes were a better atmosphere, openness of the authorities and a more open approach to problem solving (20.5%), "citizens wish to participate in NGO activities" (8.3%), "there are no obstacles" (5.67%) and "we can communicate and express opinions more freely" (4.22%). Other opinions indicated, among others, a diffuse optimism: the country is more open to other countries, there is a better treatment in the media but also a negative attitude of the new authorities towards the NGO, there are incompetent cadre in the local government, lower standards of living and the fact that donors' funds were going to the state and not to NGOs.
61 Among the NGOs which did not perceive changes the main reasons were "bad co- operation and ignorance of authorities (5.7%), attitude of authorities has not changed (5.5%), they had no problems with the authorities before or the time was too short to see visible changes in co-operation (2.6%). In other cases the NGO had not been active before (1.5%) or the relationship had nothing to do with political changes considering the nature of NGO activities (1%). A large number of NGOs however, saw only a partial change because "the atmosphere is better, but co-operation did not improve, the authorities show more understanding, but nothing else" (19%). To the question "What NGOs can offer to the local authorities, 12.7% answered expertise and education, advice, ideas and experience for foreign students; 11.8% offered to resolve problems of the local self-governance; 11.5% individual experiences and co-operation in their field of expertise; 9.5% field researches and databases; 8.6% assistance in developing democracy, projects in the sphere of human rights protection and improvement. Other interesting answers concerned a critical attitude towards authorities, independence, tolerance and enthusiasm, international contacts, identifying the priorities of the community and a significant 3.3% answered "everything they want, all types of co- operation". Around 20% of NGOs have frequent contacts with authorities, 50% only time to time, another 20% rarely and 13.4% never met them. The ways the associations communicate with the authorities are informal in 39.5%; the authorities promote the meetings in 34.5% of cases, 24% of meetings happen at public conferences, 23% by post. What emerges from the results of the survey is that there is still a no clear situation in the relations between NGOs and government. NGOs seem to overestimate their capabilities and expertise and have often unrealistic expectations from the government. The lack of a transparent, institutionalised system of co-operation undermines the quantity and the quality of exchanged information and contributions. The situation changes from one municipality to another, but too often the government officials are not aware of the great potential of the Third Sector. The legislative gap does not clarify the situation, but often the NGOs themselves have no clear objectives and strategies. Some of them, for example, chose to have strict contacts with the government, despite the risk of being co-opted or manipulated. Others preferred maintaining their autonomy and being more active in
62 exchange with the public sector. Some NGOs have no need or they do not want to interact with the state. In many areas and sectors, the confusion of roles between the state and the association is evident. NGOs cannot replace the state, but in the last years they often were the only answer to many needs of the community; the state should learn from the expertise of these organisations, but everyone should have its own role. The quasi-political activities of many NGOs, in the same way can be something positive for co-operation or in confrontation with the government, but NGOs should find the way to co-ordinate their requests and not act as competitive political parties. NGO Yugos lav Forum or other forms of national co-operation are not only welcome, but also necessary to discuss and negotiate their views on community and social development.
Composition of NGOs
A useful part of the research provided by the NGO Policy Group regards the social composition of NGOs, their working conditions and their relations with the beneficiaries65. The overwhelming majority of NGOs (77.34%) has no regular employees, 17% have between one and five, 3.3% between six and ten, and only 0.85% have a large number of employees, more than 40. What is more surprising is that 37.6% of NGOs did not engage activists in 2001, activities being implemented only by the founders of the association. The gender-balance is balanced, but in the Executive Boards there is a clear supremacy of men. Some considerations should be spent on the educational background of the activists. 58.5% of them is a university graduate, 5.4% have Masters' degrees and 4.5% hold a PhD. These data are much higher than the average Serbian population, where only the 9.3% have a post-secondary school degree. Serbian NGOs were often accused to be "elitist"; if from one side it is natural that educated people show more interest for NGOs, especially in the political scenario before October 2000, is legitimate to ask how far from the "man of the street" these organisations are. The majority of activists is employed in the public sector or is a student and this can explain their higher education. The struggle of NGOs to professionalise their work requested the presence of specialists in
63 Psychology, Sociology, Medicine, Engineering, Law and Politics. They also helped to prevent an even more dramatic brain drain. However, it is desirable that in the future NGOs will recruit more activists from categories such as the elderly, unemployed and private workers, to enhance their legitimacy, profile, relevance and, by extension, successful fundraising. With a new labour legislation, working for an NGO can mean becoming a formal employee.
Working conditions
The wor king conditions inside the NGOs are judged bad in 53.5% of the cases and excellent only in 6.5%. The main reasons are the lack of equipment and space: 45.68% of NGOs have no desk, 47.38% have no computer. Printers, modems, telephone lines or photocopiers are also a luxury for many associations. Internet in particular would be fundamental for many of them to break the isolation of the last ten years. Different organisations often share the same office and many use private accommodations for NGOs meetings. Only 4.5% have a car and they usually use private transports. Lack of funds for basic expenditures and no support by authorities are the main complaints. Who is satisfied in general possesses own premises and equipment (12.7% and 10.7%), or however has everything he needs for his work (16.2%). Reality - as showed by the survey - is quite different from the public perception, which thinks NGOs as rich foreign founded organisations. Many activists, volunteers or employers participated in trainings organised by NGOs themselves or other institutions. In particular learning events were focused on human rights and society development (44.6%), organisational development (27.7%), environmental protection and women's rights (8.8%), humanitarian work, children's issues, media relations and integration in international institutions (from 3.5% to 7.5%). In general was observed a good communication between NGOs about these events, but certain areas needed more attention: marketing, NGO management and team building; individual skills, like computer skills, foreign languages and educational processes; public and media relations; legal assistance. The great turnover of NGOs activists requests permanent training and continuous events, which permit to establish personal
65 NGO Policy Group, op. cit..
64 contacts between members. NGOs periodicals and presence in the media is also necessary to spread information on their activities.
Projects and beneficiaries
One of the peculiar features of Serbian NGOs is the short-term length of their projects. Since they used to work in precarious conditions and without certitudes for the future, their activities are usually planned 3 to 9 months ahead, also depending on external sources of founding. 60% of NGOs indicated access to funding as the main obstacle to projects planning and implementation. More than half are implementing more than one project at the same time and 23% more than 3 projects, while around 18% work on one single activity. Most of NGOs identify their activities in the area of civil society development and environmental protection. Other important fields are education, humanitarian assistance, culture, social services and human rights protection. Recently more energy has been dedicated to community development, European integration, international and multicultural co-operation. As pointed out by the NGO Policy Group, many associations do not distinguish their missions from the activities, and fail to classify their beneficiaries in a systematic way. Only a few NGOs have well-defined targets (Roma people, refugees, disabled etc.), while many others shift their attention to different areas or offer the same service to different groups. When asked what types of aid NGOs provide to the citizens the majority answered "humanitarian aid" (27.8%), to be intended in a broad sense. Legal aid (16%), education (16.6%), expert and specialised aid (14%), information and media (12.5%) are the other more common options. Medical, psychological aid, sport and ecology events, seminars, culture, support to women are also present. NGOs show to have a high (maybe too high…) esteem of their projects: despite the lack of an organised system to have a feedback about their activities, 82% think that the beneficiaries were satisfied and only 0.9% recognises that they were not. The main problems regard technical, organisational or financial issues. NGOs believe that citizens have enough information on their activities in 43.2% of cases, while 40.7% think the contrary. A closer link with the citizens is indicated as a priority by 58.7% of associations, even if around 60% of them are satisfied with citizens' perceived
65 satisfaction with their performance. Beneficiaries, however, are too often seen as mere recipients of assistance and the communication with them is often through "passive" ways, posters, websites, public announcements. It is probably due to the habits of keeping a "low profile" by NGOs during the Milosevic time, but it should be improved to include a larger number of people in Third Sector activities.
Donors
NGOs were often accused of being "foreign money takers" in the past years. What is true is that too often their projects are based on foreign donors' assistance on short/medium terms. The majority of the organisations complain about their modest budget, but more than half refused to disclose data regarding their budgets. The first reason is that many NGOs have no fixed budget, but operate only with ad hoc contributions by donors. Another reason is related to the perception about financial matters as a threat; because of the past repression many NGOs are naturally suspicious and are used to hide their economic data. It is especially the case for larger associations, but in the future they will be obliged to become more transparent, thanks to donor and peer pressure, more visibility and increasing interest in NGOs, now that the threat is reduced. More transparency is requested also at the donors' side: as pointed out by the Italian Consortium of Solidarity66, the problems started when foreign organisations and foundations began to choose single local partners as mediators to address financial aid to Serbia. These organisations found themselves in a monopolistic position for taking decisions and choosing the activities to finance, without any mandate by the local partners. This process led to a clash between different NGOs, rather than to a mutual reinforcement. While 47% of NGOs seems satisfied of its communication with the donors (basically through recommendations, personal contacts, intermediary or other NGOs), 25% is not and 28% only partially. They asked for an easier access to donors; for a de-centralisation of the decision taken by donors, less directive and more familiar with local exigencies and differences; more transparency and equal-opportunity in donors criteria; more rigorous criteria to select their partners; more co-ordination between different donors; comprehensive and long- term support in the programmes; more differentiation of donors' field of interest; more
66 attention to micro-level initiatives. The comparison in financial terms between 2000 and the following period, shows anyway an increasing activity in Serbia: 55.3% of NGOs have a bigger budget today, 33% have more or less the same and only 11.5% have a smaller projects' budget.
Regional distribution
The regional distribution of NGOs in Serbia is related to socio-economic and demographic features of the different areas. Most of the organisations are concentrated in Belgrade and in Vojvodina and they are generally larger, better organised and more diversified than in the rest of the country. Moreover, they have easier access to information and can communicate better with international partners and donors. Unlike the rest of the country, Belgradian NGOs prefer contacts with the central government rather than with local authorities. In the two areas we find a concentration of universities, research institutions and libraries which facilitate the development of expertise and specialist teams. These NGOs are often involved in the planning of strategic developments and decision-making. If the most common activities of NGOs in Serbia are related to education, civil society development, environmental protection and youth, in Central and North-Eastern Serbia there is a predominance of humanitarian organisations. It is an answer to the high number of refugees and IDPs in Vojvodina, which provokes tensions and conflicts in this area where industry is collapsing. The fact that in Western and Southern Serbia NGOs engage a higher percentage of volunteers - while Belgrade and Vojvodina have the lowest rate of activists - is interesting. One possible explanation is that due to the lack of resources NGOs in the South-West are obliged to recruit more non-salaried volunteers. Belgrade, despite the brain drain in the country, is still able to attract experts in the Third Sector and consequently can propose high qualified (paid) expertise. In the rest of the country, most organisations have no formally employed staff; their activities cover large areas with a low population density and it is not easy to reach a deep impact on local communities.
66 S. Matteucci (ed.), op. cit, p.185.
67 While the average activist is between 25 and 40 years old, we can notice that elderly citizens are more present in Belgrade and in Vojvodina; in ethnically mixed and less urbanised regions (Eastern Serbia) the associations seem not being able to include teenagers and children in their project.
Conclusions
Before addressing some specific cases in Southern-Eastern Serbia, we can draft some considerations on the conditions of NGOs in the country emerging from the survey of the NGO Policy Group. It will allow a comparison between these data and the research I conducted in the field with concrete examples. The Third Sector in Serbia is weak and fragmented, despite the rapidly growing number of associations and activists. Apart from a few of large organisations that hold the dominant part of resources and founds, there are many fragile mini-NGOs that only in the very last period tried to organise themselves in networks. The legislation, especially in the fiscal and labour field, does not help the establishment of NGOs as proactive social partners. In addition we find, as in many other Eastern European countries, a problematic relation between NGOs and political power. Independent organisations should have the duty to mediate between citizens' interests and the government and to act as a critical stimulus towards the authorities. On the other side, political actors in Serbia were the natural allies of civil society against Milosevic, and NGOs leaders are often members of, or connected with, political parties. There is (surprisingly) no consensus among NGOs regarding political change in Serbia; nevertheless, the majority thinks that the situation has improved, especially in terms of freedom and interest. It pushed many NGOs to find some forms of contact with authorities, most at the local level. The establishment of permanent NGO forums and networks can help to find some common positions towards the political power and develop together common strategies. Even if things are changing, NGOs still remain dependent from external support and did not develop enough skills and capacities for efficient fund raising. This undermines the capacity for long term projects and the sheer existence of many organisations.
68 Lack of trans parency in the relationship with donors and inadequate internal good governance are other critical points that should be solved soon. There is no power sharing among staff, but confusion of roles and communications too often follow informal channels. In the near future, in NGO Policy Group's opinion, the majority of NGOs will have a greater role in the following fields: - Longer term social service delivery. - Decentralisation. - Access to information and alternative choices for citizens. - Civic education, vocational training. - Advocacy for policy changes. - Community development alliances.
69 Chapter 5
NGOs in South-Eastern Serbia
Situated at the crossroads of the Balkan and European roads, connecting Asia Minor to Europe, Nis is one of the oldest cities in the Balkans, and has from ancient times been considered a gateway between the East and the West. With more than 300,000 inhabitants, it is the centre of the whole South-Eastern part of Serbia, the natural, social, economic, educational, medical, cultural and sports centre. Nis is one of the most important industrial centres in Serbia, well known for its industry of electronics, its industry of mechanical engineering, the textile industry and the tobacco industry. Statistics show that the system of education is quite elaborate: 21 secondary schools and 10 faculties in a university with around 14,000 students. On 17 November 1996, after the local elections, and the attempted fraud by the supporters of the ruling party, the citizens of Nis stood up in peaceful protest. It took the citizens 100 days of protest rallies to force the regime to accept the election results.
Energy for Democracy
Nis, together with Pirot, was chosen as a pilot municipality for the programme "Energy for Democracy", aimed at delivering heating fuel to the municipalities run by the opposition. The two municipalities met the following conditions: they were currently ruled by opposition forces, they needed heavily on heating fuel, and they were close to the border, thereby minimising the threat of diversion en route to or within the municipalities. Household heating in the FRY relied heavily on electricity and central heating installations. The combination of poor maintenance during recent years, the oil embargo and lack of financial resources to import energy for heating purposes meant that a large part of the Serbian population faced difficult conditions during the winter. In order to improve everyday life for the people, and to make clear that the consequences of the oil embargo should be laid at the door of the FRY leadership, the democratic opposition
70 forces, particularly the G17, approached the European Commission and Member States for help in seeing them through the winter proposing a plan called "Energy for Democracy". This aimed at alleviating the heating situation of the country, while minimising the risk that actual deliveries would be seized, diverted or otherwise misused by the Belgrade regime or others. The plan was approved in principle by the General Affairs Council (GAC) on 11 October 1999. The Energy for Democracy programme had the following characteristics: - It provided limited assistance to municipalities in need. - It helped the Union to meet the political expectations that the concept of energy for democracy had raised. - It was a test delivery scheme. If successful, it could be expanded to other municipalities and/or types of assistance. Equally if it proved impractical, it could rapidly be halted.
- It focused on heating oil, thereby limiting, but not completely eliminating, the risk of alternative use in case of seizure. - It minimised the financial transactions within Serbia, to limit the possibility of mismanagement, seizure of funds or corruption. - It employed a mechanism that would have enabled other donors to participate. - It relied as much as possible on contractual mechanisms, which had been proven in Community assistance programmes.
From theory to concrete examples; NGOs in the region
After a period as volunteer in Nis in the summer 2002, I came back in May 2003 to meet some local NGO leaders and to have a more "direct" idea about the situation of civil society in Serbia and in this region. In particular after having studied and read a lot on the issue, I had a good opportunity to "test" my opinions with the concrete experience of many NGOs on the field. It is never easy to organise a meeting with Serbian organisations: even if with some of them I had already co-operated last summer, the first problem I faced was the
71 impossibility to contact them. They often have no email or fixed address, telephone numbers change often and there is no official register for NGOs67. I met the typical difficulties of the Serbian Third Sector: informal contacts are more useful than official ones, there is a lack of communication, activists are burdened with their "official" work and NGO activities, members of the associations' boards sometimes do not know fundamental details about their organisation, I received contradictory explanations of the same events by different persons of the same NGO. On the other ha nd, beyond my expectations, I found a chaotic but vital environment, new energy and awareness of the growing importance of NGOs in the Serbian context. Many of the activists I met were enthusiastic about their job and extremely pleased that someone from abroad looked for information about their condition. The choice of the NGOs to interview, given the short time I spent there and the problems explained above, was problematic. I tried to meet organisations with very different characteristics, size, budgets and field of activities. I have not the pretence to give an exhaustive description of the Third Sector in the region, but the different problems and perspectives I met in a wide spectrum of activities, gave very interesting hints for reflection. Moreover I met both NGOs born after October 2000 and "older" NGOs, but also NGOs active in the past but "officialised" only recently. I will describe one-project oriented NGOs (about Roma, for example) as well as organisations with a wide spectrum of activities, from semi-political (or partitical) NGOs (G17, for example) to more technical ones (CeSID). I also met representatives of local radio and television as well as people working for international organisations. Here is the list of associations: -Protecta, Society for Civil Development, Nis. -MECI, Office for Multiethnic and Multicultural Integration, Nis. -CeSID, Center for Free Elections and Democracy, Nis and Bela Palanka. -Otpor, Nis. -Committee for Civic Initiatives, Nis. -Yugoslav Scout Association, Nis. -Resource Center, Nis.
67 The Center for Development of Non-profit Sector indicated in Nis, in 2000, 55 active NGOs, but without any detail about them. In www.crnps.org.yu .
72 -G17, Bela Palanka. -Radio Otpor, Bela Palanka. -Open Found Society, Aleksinac. -Pralipe, Pirot. -ASKA, Association for the Affirmation of Culture, Bela Palanka.-Urban Modus, Bela Palanka. -Remizijana, Scout association, Bela Palanka. -two meetings with journalists of NTV Nis (local television). -ICS, Italian Consortium of Solidarity.
Protecta Protecta, Society Center for Civil Development, is one of the most affirmed realities in Nis and can be taken as paradigmatic example to explain the development of the associationism in this town. It started its activities in October 1998, created by three young friends with the aim of organising some democracy-related activities. For two years they operated with very limited resources: they had no office for meetings and they hid the proofs of the association's existence to avoid police inspections. The paradoxical situation (trying to enlarge the organisation maintaining at the same time a very "low profile") was aggravated by the impossibility to receive transparent contributions from local or international donors. As explained by Nenad Dimitrijevic, one of the leaders, when they finally could register Protecta it had the same legal status as the Red Star (a famous football team in Belgrade), without any facilitation but with rigorous controls on foreign contributions. The political atmosphere in Nis, where the opposition parties came to power in 1997, allowed the survival of the NGO and in 2000 Protecta had the necessary skills to profit from the political changes in the country. Today Protecta has 20 paid employees and a database with 600 volunteers to contact for ad hoc initiatives. The age of the activists ranges from 20 to 32 years, plus some older professional experts like psychologists and engineers for specific programmes. It opened new offices in other municipalities of the region, as Leskovac, Pirot, Vranje and Prokuplje. It is active in
73 fields related to democracy, human rights, youth programmes, culture, humanitarian aid, environment, non violent conflict resolution and providing professional advice for companies involved in the privatisation process. Its budget is increasing, in 2001 it was around $85,000, in 2002 it was $125,000. The main part of the budget is coming from international organisations, while local authorities and private companies seemed less interested in supporting the association. The central government, in co-operation with UNICEF and UNESCO, supported, through the Ministry of Education and Sport and the new Department for Youth, the initiative for an "Educational Server", an Internet initiative addressed to young people. In any case, even if the good will is present, resources are limited to almost symbolic contributions. The government promised to change the law on donations to NGOs, but for the moment it has different priorities and at the same time the pressure by international NGOs diminished, since their interest moved to other countries (Afghanistan, Iraq). Dimitrijevic however, recognises that Protecta has its own responsibilities too: the Executive Board (all males!) has no meetings on a regular basis and the organisation needs to change its funding structure to achieve medium/long term projects. Positive news is the establishment of a Commission for local initiatives at municipal level. The Commission is asking assistance to the existing NGOs to provide better services, information, networks and resources. The hope is that in the near future projects will be evaluated by local authorities and funds will be granted in a transparent way. It will partially compensate the distance from the neuralgic power/information centre that is Belgrade. In Dimitrijevic 's opinion, for example, only the major NGOs in the capital will be able to take advantage of the recent access of Serbia to the Council of Europe. At the same time, the new initiative will let NGOs be more independent in choosing their projects. Protecta, he admitted, until 2001 was influenced by donors' exigencies in its activities, while only in the last period, when it got sufficiently known, it was possible to strike a balance between donors' interests, beneficiaries' needs and Protecta's ideas.
74
MECI A complete different story is that of MECI, Office for Multiethnic and multicultural integration. MECI was founded in 2001 and its president, Radoslav Salijevic, was already a member of CeSID, an important national NGO with electoral monitoring tasks. Contrary to Protecta, MECI is not very well known in Nis. It s objectives are rather regional, developing tolerance and dialogue between different ethnic groups and minorities in the Balkans, inside and outside Serbia. "The presence of significant cultural, social and ethnic differences is the dominant characteristic of the city of Nis "68; therefore MECI is trying to promote peaceful conflict resolution, prevention and mutual cultural exchanges between Serbs, Roma, Albanians Hungarians, Macedonians and all the other nationalities in the Balkans. It is also part of FENS69 and it is actually working with Hungarian, Croatian and Bosnian NGOs. The fact that many members of MECI are also active in other organisations (especially in CeSID and G17) facilitated the possibility of networking for this NGO. Radoslav Salijevic received me in his living room that is also the "office" of MECI. He is the first Roma person I met in an organisation whose activities are not exclusively addressed to Roma. In MECI there are around 30 people working and only the co- ordinator receives some money, but not on regular basis. The donors, especially the Regional Center for Democracy, contribute to single projects, making the payment of technical equipment, like computers or printers difficult. The budget in the last six months was limited to 350 Euro, but despite that MECI realised the project "Democracy on line", where for the first time the non-profit and profit sectors worked together. 200 organisations, for the first time also Roma ones, joined a common Internet connection thanks to the technical assistance provided by private companies.
68 In http://hosted.regionalnet.org/meci . 69 The Federation of NGOs of Serbia, FENS, was established at a conference entitled “Associated Citizens” in Belgrade on 16 February 2003. This is the widest NGO network established to date, which includes all representatives from all spheres of activity in which associations in 102 municipalities in Serbia engage. For more details see www.gradjanske.org .
75 MECI has almost no contacts with local authorities; it is quite surprising, considering that one of its main objectives is promoting the creation of a new political generation, educating young people to travel and to know different cultures. To overcome the sense of frustration spreading out between the members for the low budget and limited resources, MECI proposed to the authorities that every NGO had at least one person paid by the government. This idea, apart from being utopian, reveals also an "ideological" misunderstanding: if NGO activists become public employees, where is the meaning of being NON governmental? It seems that sometimes, in order to achieve concrete benefits, Serbian NGOs forget the aim of their constitution and the spirit of being part of the Third Sector. It is understandable, even though not justified, considering all the difficulties these NGOs are facing day by day. MECI's director also criticised the European Union's behaviour: they supported NGOs, he complained, only until it was functional to overthrow Milosevic. Once that happened, they showed no more interest. However the needs on the ground remained. In particular, to finance organisations the European Commission asks for too restrictive criteria, such as having a "flourishing" bank account, but only a few NGOs can fulfil these conditions. One of the solutions, in Salijecic's opinion, is to make the representatives of NGOs stronger at local and national level, but in order to achieve this it is necessary, as first step, to change the attitude of the population towards the Third Sector, which is still influenced by the negative propaganda of the past regime.
Open Society Fund One of the most interesting meeting I had in Serbia was with Olgica Bajic, the co- ordinator of the Society for the Development of Creativity, an NGO that was part of the project of Open Clubs funded by the Open Society Foundation in Aleksinac. Aleksinac, 30 km North of Nis, has around 20,000 inhabitants; the town has been governed by the ruling coalition ever since the first elections back in 1991. With the economic crisis, Aleksinac faced grave problems. It was a target of the 1999 NATO bombing and suffered loss among civilians. Some 3,000 refugees, out of whom 2,000 came from Kosovo, dwell in Aleksinac. Besides refugees, around 2,000 Aleksinac Roma
76 live a hard life. Such circumstances considerably burden the Aleksinac Open Club's activities. The Club was opened in May 1997 and from the beginning its members have suffered from attacks by police, problems with their jobs and have received open threats by local authorities. In 1998, despite the repression, the Center organised a large number of events, computer courses, free Internet access for young people, festivals, street activities for children, seminars and workshops on democracy. The Club quickly managed to become a unique and popular meeting place for a number of young people and children, so popular that even local authorities were "obliged" to recognise it, because of its growing impact on citizens' life. The NGO gained more space on local radio, television and newspapers and organised so many events that it received the attention of the official bulletin of the municipality. It was simply impossible to ignore this reality; as Olgica confessed, many local deputies attacking the association in the parliament were sending their children to the Club's activities. In the local context, where the democratic parties were almost absent, the Club became the main centre of opposition, even if without links with political movements. Until 2000 it was financed exclusively by the Open Fund (Soros Foundation), an NGO registered in Belgrade but active in many municipalities. Even if Algica refused to declare their budget, we can presume that it is quite high: she receives 800 dinars per month working three hours per week, when the normal salary for a teacher is around 1,500 dinars per month. In 2000 the NGO opened new self-sustainable activities and the work of "dissemination" of the previous years showed its effects: they started new co-operations with USAID, Caritas, European Commission, ICS and other international organisations, shifting their projects to new categories of beneficiaries, such as IDPs or Roma people. An interesting activity carried on by the Open Club is the organisation of seminars for NGO managers, open also to the local authorities. Since the European Union is pushing them to co- operate with NGOs, but the governmental bodies often do not know how and what to achieve, these trainerships can be particularly useful for a better co-ordination. After the political conditions improved in the last two years, Open Club activities decreased and lost the "spirit" of the beginning. It was due both to the lack of interest of
77 external donors and of the new attitude of the beneficiaries, who are now looking for practical activities to earn money rather than creative means to increase a democratic culture. The positive changes regard the capacity of the association to establish new connections and networks, becoming a solid reference for all the other organisations in the region.
ASKA Bela Palanka, 50 km from Nis towards the Bulgarian border, is a poor municipality (50 Euro per month is a medium salary) of about 15,000 inhabitants, 20% of which are Roma plus hundreds of refugees and IDPs from Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo. If the economic and social situation is critical, some signs of change arrived during the electoral campaign in 2000. Some Otpor activists occupied the local radio and, assisted by ANEM (Association for Independent Media), broadcasted independent programmes and sponsored the "get out and vote" campaign, to sensitise the population to go and vote against Milosevic. The young journalists received an approbation from the municipality to continue their work, but politicians tended to exclude them from all the decisional meetings. This is why they appear demotivated and why many of them left the city, continuing the dramatic brain drain trend from Bela Palanka. Dynamics in a small centre are different from Nis. Everybody knows each other and often the most dynamic persons occupy different positions. It is the case of Milan Jovanovich, at the same time member of the local parliament and president of the association Urban Modus, working with children, refugees and IDPs; but also Dragan Jocic, at the same time president of ASKA and referent of G17 for Bela Palanka. ASKA is the most active NGO in the city; its members started their activities in 1996, as "Fun Club", an association sponsored by local shops which organised sport events and recreative activities for youth. In 2001 ASKA was registered at the federal level, supported by the Ministry of Culture and with a symbolic contribution by the local authorities (the budget is around 12,000 Euro). The activists (the oldest is 27 years old) are around 50: 15 members of the executive board and the others participate when it is needed. They tried to spread out optimism in a very depressed context, involving the
78 population in stimulating activities (theatre workshops, performances and concerts) and contacting many national and international NGOs, to bring "new life" in the city. I personally took part last summer in a concert that brought together many emerging groups from different cities. The number of people somehow involved in the projects is around 3,000 but, as Dragan complains, there is the need to address more attention to change the population's attitude towards NGOs and international partners. ASKA received a lot of pressure from local political parties (the municipal assembly is divided between DOS and SPS) and being a small association it was not always easy to resist. However they could count on the support of the local Radio Otpor, of the Italian Consortium of Solidarity and on the Group G17, which shares with them the office and some technical facilities (they still have no computers, printers and telephone line).
G17 G17 was born in Nis during the three months of demonstrations in the 1996/97 winter as a group of economists and social sciences experts to promote economic development, rule of law and a democratic society. It created a common platform with the best economists of the country to offer an economic plan for Serbia and promote the democratic rebirth of the society (it was G17, for example, to address the European Commission for the "Energy for Democracy" project). The removal of the corrupted oligarchy from the government was seen as a necessary pre-condition to reform the economic system and that is the reason why G17, which had obvious political goals, worked together with the opposition parties. Its programme was positively accepted by a large part of social classes and especially by students and G17 had a prominent role in supporting the democratic movement in 2000 and addressing some economic reforms in the last two years. The behaviour of the organisation, however, was also hardly contested by other civil society leaders. Dusan Janjic, founder of the Interethnic Relations Forum, director of the Center for the protection of minorities and member of the Social Sciences Institute in Belgrade, indicated G17 as one of the responsible of the failure of the demonstrations after the war in Kosovo. G17 in 1999 organised a public meeting in Belgrade with the opposition parties before having decided on common objectives and
79 programmes. In the capital, as we saw, the atmosphere was still not ready for massive protests and the meeting created confusion among the citizens and lack of confidence in reunions and debates70. The confusion between political aspects and NGO characteristics was recognised also by Dragan Jocic: G17 is now changing its nature. From one side it will continue its activities of promotion of democracy focused on educated young people, while another part recently became a political party, called G17 PLUS. I already stressed the dangers of an unclear separation between political parties and NGOs and the reasons why in Serbia it became very difficult to distinguish them. But I was very surprised when I heard that even Otpor, the famous students' movement against Milosevic, was preparing to run in the next elections.
Otpor! Otpor (Resistance) was born in 1998 during the students protests in the University of Belgrade and rapidly grew becoming one of the promoters of the mass-manifestations in the capital. More than 30 students' organisations joined the movement, asking for free elections, abrogation of the law on information and on university. Its clear political goals and the open challenge to the regime obliged Milosevic to react arresting dozens of activists and repressing the organisation. The strong internal links between the members and the radicalisation of the struggle reinforced the spirit of Otpor, which increased its activities also in non-university centres. Despite the large literature available on the Internet about Otpor, in Nis, at the present, it is almost non-active. Finding the office, for example, was quite complicated since no one knows about recent Otpor initiatives in the town. As admitted by Tamara, a young activist who joined Otpor only last year, for a long period in Nis there was no "need" of their presence and they spent their energies in smaller pro-SPS villages. At this moment the situation is not clear. Born as a radical young movement, Otpor reached a large visibility during the protests, but for its natural structure it became less active once Milosevic left the power. The recent decision to turn to a political party "betrayed" in a way the original mission of the first students. It is probable that, once it will be involved
70 D. Janjicc in S. Matteucci, op. cit., p. 193.
80 in that particular game called Serbian politics, it will stop to be the idealistic symbol of Serbian liberation from dictatorship.
Committee for Civic Initiative The Committee for Civic Initiative (CCI) originated during the three-month civic protests of 1996/1997 brought about the electoral fraud at local elections in 1996. Its original aim was to preserve at least part of the citizens' energy and enthusiasm and to contribute to the rise of civic consciousness. The CCI was founded by a group of citizens, most university professors and assistants, willing to invest their knowledge and energy in the development of an open and democratic civil society. Today the CCI has 27 active members (most of them professors of the University of Nis) and more than 200 volunteers in the region of South and East Serbia. The main stream of the CCI's activities is the education of citizens for active participation in a democratic, multicultural, pluralist society. It organises schools, seminars, public lectures and other educational programmes for citizens, but also co-ordinates various activities in which civic activism is fully expressed. Due to the range of activities and the number of members and volunteers, the CCI is at the present one of the biggest NGOs in Serbia. Its secretary-general, Bogdan Durovic, explained to me the different phases of this organisation. In 1997 the 15 members encountered many difficulties: they had no experience, no funds and they were often threaten by the police. To avoid too many controls, they acted as an informal group of private citizens without office or other equipment. Enthusiasm and personal energies were the best resources for this NGO, which became soon relatively known, organising seminars for students and young activists. The war in Kosovo coincided, in Durovic's opinion, with the worst period, because the repression got stronger and the sustain of the population decreased. The following year a new life started for this NGO which enlarged its programmes to the entire region and became a valid centre for a democratic development. It is demonstrated by the number of donors now co-operating with this reality: among the others, the European Commission, the Council of Europe, Olaf Palme Centre, USAID/DTI, Pax Christi, Netherlands Embassy, Westminster Foundation for Democracy, Fund for an Open Society, East-West Institute. The projects, twenty in six
81 years, regard education for democracy, social researches, publications on human rights and minorities. At the present the CCI is involved in an interesting activity sponsored by the European Commission, to strengthen local NGOs in South East Serbia: it was the first time that in Nis I heard about a project of three years! Other activities concern the question of guilt and the answer for responsibility, a school for future Roma politicians and training about communication skills for young activists of the democratic parties. Even if Durovic assures that 99% of the members are not political parties' members, links with the political world are unavoidable: in fact they participated in the foundation of a federation of NGOs (350 delegates) aimed at creating a credible counterpart for the government in the discussion about a new NGOs' legislation. Considering the very positive feedback of working in a network, the CCI founded another group of associations to sustain biggest projects and to count more on the local authorities. It will balance, they hope, the decreasing interest of foreign donors for their activities in a situation where social tensions have not disappeared. Unemployment in the region is officially estimated around 20%, but the real numbers touch the 50% of the active population. In this situation the CCI appears as a happy island, with a budget that is 20 times higher than at the beginning; only for one project they will receive 300,000 Euro for three years (and they have at least three projects going on…). The negative effect, as recognised by the secretary-general, is that it risks to become a normal paid job, with a consequent loss of enthusiasm and dedication and ever more difficulties in recruiting volunteers, especially among young people.
Yugoslav Scout Association The meeting with Nikola Pektovic, a young scouts' leader in Nis, was interesting for different reasons: apart from our common belonging to this world-wide organisation, the Yugoslav Scout Association is one of the oldest organisations in Serbia (it was established in 1919). It was one of the founding members of WOSM (World Organization of the Scout Movement) and it is one of the rare examples of a Serbian member in an international association context.
82 Being a scout during the communist times was not easy. The members of the party disbanded the official association and in 1950 WOSM withdrew its recognition (Serbia was readmitted only in 1995). Under Milosevic the movement was controlled by the regime which used it to spread its ideology. In 1989 the association counted around 12,000 scouts, while now it is less than 3,000. In 2000 all the leaders were changed but many of the new members were accused of corruption and stealing money, and the former communists came back to control the organisation for two years. Nikola is a new young leader who is trying to innovate and change the association from inside; he participated with his boys and girls at international and regional scout meetings to learn and understand different realities. The WOSM is now trying to help the discredited Yugoslav association both with funds and training courses to educate new leaders. Despite the problems at central level and in the ruling bodies, activities for boys and girls are increasing and, with very limited resources, the scout organisation in the region is attracting every year more and more young people. The omen is that in a near future the Yugoslav Scout Association could come nearer to the international standards of the other scout organisations in the world.
Pralipe Given the important percentage of Roma in the South East of Serbia, a meeting with one of the biggest Roma organisations in the region was necessary. Pralipe (Fraternity in Roma language) was registered at the federal level in 2001 and it is part of a network of 13 NGOs and member of the national Ethnic Minorities Network, where it is the only representative from the municipality of Pirot. The advantages of being part of a network are resumed by the president Radovan Askovic in having technical support, educational seminars and easier access to information, concourses and funds. Pralipe is the largest organisation in Pirot, with around 30 activists (90% are Roma people) and more than 500 members. The first task of this NGO is the improvement of education for young Roma, that is now clearly inferior to the national average, also because too often the parents do not pay enough attention to their children's education. To achieve this goal Pralipe finances scholarships for students and founded the Roma Educational Centre, in co-
83 operation with UNICEF, the German NGO THV and the Society for the improvement of Roma Settlements. The most important message is convincing Roma people that they should not wait for external support, and this is the reason why great importance is given to the growth of new young leaders, able in the future to guarantee the sustainability of the association. For every single project Pralipe receives from its donors (other donors are UNHCR, IOM, OSCE, USAID, Open Society Foundation) around 30,000 Euro for two years, but it is trying to make its activities self-sustainable. Difficulties arise from the political context in Pirot: even if local authorities accepted in principle to co-operate with Pralipe, they often tried to infiltrate their members in the organisation, while the continuous struggle between different parties paralysed the political activity of the municipality. The relations with the police, in the past particularly aggressive against Roma people, are now more positive, but they still registered some problems when Roma participate in political demonstrations. To help the integration, Pralipe is now conducting a survey to determine problems and perspectives among Roma and Serbian people. It covers family status, educational and economic conditions, relationships with neighbours and work colleagues. The partial results seem to certify that in Pirot, despite the Roma critical economic conditions, there is not any form of discrimination against them.
Resource Center Stela Jovanovic is the director of the Resource Centre in Nis and until March 2003 she worked as a journalist for NTV, a local television. The relations between NGOs and media were decisive during the campaign to overthrow Milosevic, but are still very important today. As stressed by Stela, NGOs should be seen as partners and not merely as customers paying to have a space. The community needs the development of a strong civil society and television is the most powerful mean to give result to organisations' activities, results and necessities. Even if NTV has a proper room for NGOs which want to participate in the broadcasting, the relationship between the non-profit sector and media should be improved, because only the largest organisations (which maybe have less need to be known) have the possibility to pay for sporadic presence. Also for this reason the NGO is part of a network of five Resource Centres in Nis, Leskovac, Novi
84 Pazar, Bor and Negotin (all in the South-East of Serbia) and co-operates with many Serbian organisations, like YUCOM (Lawyers Committee for Human Rights), Women in Black, B92, Otpor, CHRIS Network. The development of civil society, support of other NGOs, minorities and education for youth are the main tasks of the Nis Resource Centre, registered in April 2002 but already active as human rights centre since 2000. The three salaried people receive around 200 Euro per month, while all the equipment, in particular computers and free Internet for young people, is financed by the Swedish Helsinki Committee for Human Rights (SHC) and the Swedish International Development Co- operation Agency (SIDA).
CeSID Many activists of the NGOs I met in Nis are also members of CeSID, Centre for Free Elections and Democracy. This organisation was established in Belgrade in 1997 with the main task of organising domestic electoral monitoring during elections. It is active in 165 municipalities and can count on 21.000 volunteers who are fully trained for impartial domestic elections monitoring. CeSID monitored the main electoral competitions since 1997, acting until 2000 without a formal accreditation by the government, always denied by Milosevic. The idea to establish the Centre for Free Elections and Democracy came from the need to approach elections in Serbia and Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in an objective and non-biased way, obeying the rules of democracy, with respect for the procedure and the rule of law. Another important task is also to disseminate knowledge about democratic institutions, to enhance citizens’ awareness of the importance of free and fair elections, especially human rights involved and to attract volunteers and educate them to be competently engaged in democracy-related activities. The fact that many CeSID observers were in some way involved to some democratic parties apparently did not undermine the credibility of this NGO. It has a large support among the population and reached such high international standards to be called to monitor elections in many countries in Eastern Europe.
85 Common aspects of NGOs in South East Serbia
As I anticipated, I chose to describe very different organisations that can be taken as examples for a wider understanding of the Third Sector in South-East Serbia. Despite the differences, however, we can find some similarities common to many NGOs, partially in line with the results presented by the survey of the NGO Policy Group I described above. In the region of Nis, NGOs were born in two periods: during the protests in 1996/97 or after the regime's fall, in 2000/01. Especially in Nis, civil society developed earlier than in the rest of the country, also thanks to the support of the international community. Nevertheless almost all the organisations complained that the initial interest by the European Union and other foreign donors disappeared too early, after the change of regime in October 2000. The recent access of Serbia to the Council of Europe and the prospects about a future access to the European Union do not interest too much NGOs in this part of the country. They feel far from the capital were these issues are discussed and are much more concerned about everyday-life, concrete problems and lack of funds. NGOs founded before 2000 recognise that the political atmosphere changed for the better, they receive more attention by the media and there are no more problems with the police or the secret services. The relations with local authorities, however, are still difficult. The majority thinks that even when the attitude is positive, they often do not know how helping the associations and the general lack of resources oblige them to address energies to different priorities. To surmount these problems many NGOs became part of one or more networks, with positive feedback about technical support, greater impact on the society, circulation of new ideas. Another problematic issue is represented by the links between NGOs and political parties inside the organisations. Apart from the fact that in a few cases they received external pressures, many activists are also part of political movements or hold public offices. It is not a problem per se, but it may raise some contradictions. It is tied to the recent history of Serbia, where civil society and democratic parties were allied to overthrow the regime. In a normal context NGOs have a critical attitude towards the government, acting as a sort of watch-dog. It is obviously more difficult doing this when the people and the positions were the same for a long period. It is particularly true during a phase of
86 transition which, as the recent assassination of Dindjic demonstrates, is not still concluded. At the local level, the political belongings to some local institutions can undermine transparency and independence; almost all the associations I heard complain about privileges and injustices suffered to the advantage of other NGOs. The solution would be, instead of a struggle between associations to control this or that position, the creation of a representative body called to regulate NGOs-related issues. The pre- condition to achieve this goal requires that organisations clearly understand their role in a democratic state: they are no more the "heroes" against a dictator, they should now act as mediators between the citizens and the power. They need to target their beneficiaries better, to calculate their resources and to plane a sustainable plan in medium/long terms. As pointed out by Special Associate Rapporteur to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly "at a time when South-Eastern European countries most need the benefits of substantial and effective NGO activity, the transition state of their economies plus a general lack of financial resources makes fund-raising very difficult. Hence the need for NGOs to find more efficient ways of becoming self-financing is a critical challenge. The success of this objective is dependent on a better understanding of NGOs' role and greater competency"71. The attitude of the population towards the Third Sector is therefore a crucial element: NGOs should spend much more energy to propose themselves as true representatives of the different groups and classes of citizens. It means not only differentiating their activities to include those who are now excluded, but also paying attention to the composition of the internal structures of the associations. Gender balance (especially in the executive boards), presence of non-educated people, more attention to minorities should be the priorities to increase their legitimacy.
71 C. Gheorghiu, Draft Special Report: The Civil Society Dimension Of The Stability Pact For South - Eastern Europe, in www.naa.be/archivedpub/comrep/2000/at-235-e.asp .
87 Conclusion
In 1987, Tomaz Mastnak, member of the Slovenian Academy of Sciences and Arts, wrote: "In Yugoslavia we are experiencing a process of the withering away of coherent state institutions. They are being absorbed by the emerging civil society. This represents one decisive respect in which Yugoslavia differs from the Soviet bloc, and yet it leads to the same unbearable situation - the absence of a civil society independent of legally circumscribed and coherent political institutions. The irony is that this result is fully in accord with a key proposition of scientific socialism"72. From the early post-Second World war period, Yugoslavia had been outside the Soviet sphere of influence; it had a very different state form from the Soviet bloc, marked by the notion of "self management", and had levels of openness, freedom to travel, and economic development, only dreamt of elsewhere in the region. It was nevertheless an authoritarian regime73. Dissidents were treated harshly, and challengers to Tito's hegemony were removed, one by one, whilst at the level of formal politics, there were alternate experiments with liberalisation and conservative control. Some embryos of civil society developed in the biggest towns, but they were too small and de-structured to have an important echo in the country. Citizens were demotivated and not interested in an active political involvement. Frustration and political immaturity of the population were exploited by the ruling elite and once that the charismatic figure of Tito disappeared became a tragic factor of destabilisation. In the transitions in Central and Eastern Europe which began in 1989, paradoxically the worst conflict occurred in the most libertarian country. The rise of civil initiatives and social movements, especially in Slovenia, coincided with a resurgence of Serbian centralising hegemony under Slobodan Milosevic. Referred to Serbia and other countries in the region, some authors called the process a "transition from socialism to feudalism"74. The transition has produced "great uncertainty about where government and
72 T. Mastnak, cited in J. Keane, Democracy and Civil Society, London, Verso, 1988, p. 146. 73 For a description of the term "authoritarianism" and its difference from "totalitarian", see Rupnik J., Totalitarianism Revisited, in Keane J., Civil society and…., pp. 277-279. 74 K. Verdery, What Was Socialism, And What Comes Next?. Princeton, University Press, 1996, chap. 8.
88 law actually resided… a personalisation and parcelling out of power, and the rise of non- market distribution forms, including the rise of maffias"75. In the Milosevic era independent associations were smothered by continuous emergencies: Milosevic used the wars in Croatia, in Bosnia, in Kosovo and that one against NATO to extend his control over the country and monopolise the public sphere. Control of media, harassment against opposition supporters and minorities repression prevented the country from a democratic development. In the meantime nationalism spread over the country involving also many democratic groups. The legal framework, heritage of the communist time, allowed a great discretionality by the executive power against parties, associations and non-profit organisations, in particular with regard to the requirements for registration and towards foreign NGOs. Penalties, threats and imprisonments were the risk to pay to carry on independent activities. The term "non- governmental" became in the '90s synonym of "anti-governmental". Winter 1996 signed a turning-point in Serbian society. The opposition won local elections in 36 municipalities and popular demonstrations prevented the regime from invalidating the results. In the towns ruled by the democratic parties civil society created new NGOs and at a certain degree collaborated with the opposition. Democratic forces however demonstrated to be unable to have success in the whole country because of internal fragmentation, lack of experience and police repression. NATO bombing in 1999 coincided with the worst period for many NGOs but showed to the majority of Serbian population that no future was possible for the country if Milosevic maintained the power. After the electoral defeat of Milosevic in October 2000, many people expected a new life for Serbian Third Sector. The concrete examples I examined demonstrate how it was only partially true. One of the main problems I observed is their failure of Serbian NGOs in the mediation between individuals and the state, that is one of the most important functions of civil society. It happens for many reasons. First of all the relation between Third Sector and authorities needs to be regulate in more transparent and structured ways. NGOs should represent wider sectors of the population, while today they are too often limited to small circles of educated people. Networking can be a valid instrument to reach these goals, but
75 Ibidem.
89 what is fundamental is the attitude of the population towards associations in general. The media can play a very important role in this field, helping NGOs to present themselves and informing public opinion about their activities. Lack of confidence and indifference are one of the heaviest heritages of the past regime. The existing links between NGOs and political parties are a further obstacle for a transparent and "clean" image of Serbian civil society. In a society where corruption was a rule, associations have the duty to keep an irreproachable behaviour. Legal framework unfortunately rests unfavourable to the development of a transparent civil society. The lack of a special status for NGOs and of a regulation about the co-operation with foreign institutions obliges associations to operate in a dark area, especially with regard to economic matters. Moreover it prevents NGOs from planning long-term projects and from beginning a necessary action of consolidation in the society. In the region of Nis, especially in the smaller cities, access to information is more difficult than in the rest of the country. This problem affects local NGOs in their contacts with the central government and international institutions for participation in competitions, calls for application, grants and loans. With the progressive disengagement of many international organisations from this area, the future appears even more problematic. Too many associations are still depending from external aid and did not find a sustainable way for financing their activities. Implementing co-operation among regional NGOs - including exchange of technical assistance, information and expertise - is a necessary step for civil society development. Another key-issue in the region is the collaboration between non-profit e profit sector. At present only a few NGOs contacted private companies for sponsoring or partnerships. Civil society actors identified important concerns and sources of fear of close co- operation with the private sector (e.g. environmental concerns, double standards, lobbying and co-optation). They should probably increase their co-ordination with private companies by maximising communication from all sides such as media, education, university, strategic alliances and networks. If NGOs will fulfil the conditions listed above, a more favourable future is foreseeable in short/medium terms. Even more important will be a resource that academic researches
90 and official reports often forget to mention: the enthusiasm of the people I met is the best guarantee for a positive development of Serbian civil society.
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Internet sites:
http://auth.unimondo.org : Osservatorio sui Balcani. http://balkans.eu.org : Le Courrier des Balkans. www.bannet.org : The Balkan Network for the Prevention of Torture and Rehabilitation of Victims. www.ceu.hu : Central European University.
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Hvala Lijepo to:
Tamara Simonovic, Srdjan Vresnik, Bane Radulovic, ICS Nis staff, Cric Belgrade, Radovan Askovic (Pralipe), Olgica Bajic (Open Found Society), Nenad Dimitrijevic (Protecta), Bogdan Durovic (CCI), Igor and Tamara (Otpor!), Dragan Jocic (ASKA, G17), Milan Jovanovich (Urban Modus), Stela Jovanovic (Resource Center), Nikola Pektovic (Scouts Association), Radoslav Salijevic (MECI).
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