Corruption and Social Trust in Afghanistan Qiamuddin Amiry It Is

The Fletcher School Online Journal for issues related to Southwest Asia and Islamic Civilization Spring 2010

Corruption and Social Trust in Afghanistan Qiamuddin Amiry

“Someone begs President Karzai to control corruption in his administration. After listening carefully, Mr. Karzai asks him: ‘How much would you give me to do that?’” ‐ Contemporary Afghan joke

Since 2001, one of the main obstacles for Why has Afghanistan become mired in social good governance and development in distrust and corruption? Do corruption and Afghanistan has been the existence of pervasive distrust, as some scholars have claimed, have corruption in the country. Donor countries have cultural roots? The lack of strong and efficient repeatedly pressed President Hamid Karzai to institutions has harnessed a pattern of distrust address issues of corruption. In turn, Mr. Karzai among the Afghan people that was already in has placed blame on the members of his cabinet place, which in turn has led the country into a and the deputies in parliament.1 Besides President “social trap.” It is very difficult to get out of this Karzai and leaders of donor countries, ordinary trap, unless Afghanistan creates strong and Afghans are equally frustrated with corruption. trustworthy institutions to replace the presently For instance, “according to a survey conducted by corrupt infrastructure. Integrity Watch Afghanistan, corruption is endemic, It is very difficult to get with two‐thirds of respondents considering The concept of the corruption to be an established practice.”2 In 2005, “social trap,” was out of this trap, unless Afghanistan dropped from 117th to 176th in 2008 invented by Afghanistan creates on Transparency International’s corruption index, psychologist John Platt, strong and trustworthy and the country’s place rose from 11th to 7th on the who examined the institutions to replace failed states index.3 In addition to corruption in question, why in some the presently corrupt the government, Afghan society suffers from high countries do people trust levels of distrust within the general population. other people, while in infrastructure. other countries people are generally distrustful of strangers? This Qiamuddin Amiry, Fletcher MALD 2011, is a first‐ theoretical approach to corruption provides a lens year student concentrating in Development through which to analyze the relationship Economics and International Business Relations. He between Afghani state and society. In order to is an active member of the Fletcher Youth Initiative, understand whether or not there may be and the South Asian Society, and Fletcher Futbol. something unique about the Afghans’ relationship Before coming to Fletcher he received a B.A. in with their government that feeds a habit of

Government from Colby College. distrust, I will use this framework to look at the

© The Fletcher School – al Nakhlah – Tufts University 160 Packard Avenue – Medford, MA 02155-7082 USA – Tel: +1.617.627.3700 2 al Nakhlah history of state building and social distrust in In such a situation of distrust, in Professor Afghanistan These two sections will lead to an Rothstein’s words, “the end result of individual explanation of how a weak and corrupt state has rationality may very well be collective harnessed a pre‐established pattern of distrust in irrationality.”7 In acting upon their own best society. In conclusion, I will look at some of the interests, people will not cooperate with another, implications of distrust and corruption for even though their cooperation would bring more development. benefit to the community. This pattern of non‐ cooperative game theory is more common in SOCIAL TRAP AND NON-COOPERATIVE GAME some countries than others. THEORY Despite the fact that human beings are Corruption in a society is related to the level believed to be rational utility‐maximizing of trust, or lack of trust, among the members of individuals, there is great variation in the level of that society. As corruption has become pervasive social trust among people in different countries. in Afghanistan, the Afghan people have become In some countries, trust becomes a very rare more skeptical of the motives of others: the commodity. Francis Fukuyama defines trust as society is caught in a “social trap.” The “the expectation that arises within a community psychologist John Platt invented the concept of of regular, honest, and cooperative behavior, the “social trap,” which can be considered “an based on commonly shared norms, on part of ‘umbrella term’ for a number of other members of that strategic situations in which social As corruption has community.”8 Thus, social trust actors find themselves, in which the become pervasive in “can be seen as an example of central element is that their behavior Afghanistan, the what Douglass North has called is determined by their assessment of Afghan people have the informal institutions in a 4 society, which are established the future action of others.” The become more logic of the social trap is built off of systems of beliefs about the the principles of non‐cooperative skeptical of the behavior of others.” 9 In their game theory, which state motives of others: the research, “Political Corruption society is caught in a and Social Trust‐ an 1. Everyone wins if everyone “social trap.” Experimental Approach,” Bo chooses to cooperate. Rothstein and Daniel Eek found out that 16 percent of Romanian students thought 2. “But if people cannot trust that ‘almost that “most people can be trusted,” while 60 everyone else’ will cooperate, it is percent of Swedish students thought that way.10 meaningless to cooperate, because the end These findings led Rothstein to argue that there is is contingent on cooperation by almost a higher level of corruption in Romania than in everyone else.”5 The conclusion is that Sweden. Rothstein has argued “that high levels of “efficient cooperation for common corruption would cause low social trust;” and has purposes can come about only if people presented three interrelated causal mechanisms trust that most other people will also choose to for his corruption‐trust theory (adopted from cooperate. Rothstein 2005, ch. 5): 11

3. Lacking that trust, the social trap will 1. The inference from public officials: If slam inexorably shut. That is, we end up public officials in a society are known to in a state of affairs that is worse for be corrupt, citizens will believe that even everyone, even though, everyone realizes people whom the law requires to act in that they would profit by choosing to the service of the public cannot be trusted. cooperate.”6 They will therefore conclude that most common people cannot be trusted either.

Spring 2010 3 2. The inference from the general most other policemen and judges to do the same. population: Citizens will perceive that Afghanistan has been struggling with this most people in a society with corrupt dilemma, and the state has failed to build officials must take part in corruption in corruption‐free institutions necessary to gain the order to obtain what they feel is their trust of the population. rightful due. They will therefore conclude that most other people cannot be trusted. STATE AND SOCIETY IN AFGHANISTAN: A BRIEF HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 3. The inference from oneself. In order to In a country composed of multiple act in such a society, citizens will, even ethnicities, the state has to be impartial to win the though they may consider it morally trust of the people. This has not been the case in wrong, also begin to take part in Afghanistan. The Afghan state has functioned, in corruption. They will therefore conclude one form or another, as a patrimonial state where that since they cannot be trusted one clan, tribe or family rules over a themselves, other people cannot be heterogeneous society and the government’s trusted. resources are distributed as patronage to those The Afghan state has If a society is mired in social distrust, it does loyal to the ruling clan. functioned, in one not mean that dishonesty is in the genes of its To use Sudipta Kaviraj’s form or another, as a citizens, or that they are inherently and culturally metaphor, the state’s patrimonial state mendacious. Countries with very similar cultures, relation with the rest of where one clan, tribe such as Singapore, Hong Kong and China, society has been like a perform very differently with respect to social circle of circles. Each of or family rules over a trust and corruption. In the latest measurement these circles a distinct heterogeneous society published by Transparency International, cultural identity within and the government’s Singapore was rated to have an index of 9.3 on a Afghanistan. The ruling resources are scale of 0‐10, Hong Kong was placed fourteenth, clan or regime has come distributed as and China, with an index of 3.5, was in fifty‐ninth from one of the circles. place.12 As professor Rothstein says: “people who The ruling circle, whether patronage to those take bribes or evade taxes may hold values by it is a regime, a clan, or a loyal to the ruling clan. which they actually consider what they do to be family, has often either morally wrong. The reason why they continue to come from one of these circles, or from an elite act treacherously or opportunistically is not group that created a new circle. Either way, the necessarily that they suffer from some kind of state or ruling regime has never been like a thread moral defect, but rather that there is no point in running through all the circles. Instead, it has being the only honest player in a rotten game at either marginalized society or has been which everyone else cheats – or is perceived to marginalized by it. Due to many reasons, the cheat.”13 In order to build social trust, large relationship between the other circles has not groups of the population need to change their been harmonious. view of society. This will require strong and The Afghan state has always existed within a corruption‐free institutions (such as the police and deeply‐rooted tribal society. The equilibrium the judiciary) that govern by the rule of law and between tribes has more or less defined the punish corrupt civil servants. This way, the state relationship between state and society in plays an impartial role within society. However, Afghanistan throughout its history. There exists this brings us to a dilemma: “where do you find an entire canon which discusses the complexity of the uncorrupted judges, bureaucrats, and tribal societies in Afghanistan and their successful policeman in a society where corruption is resistance to authority. Thus, a profound rampant?” 14 Most judges and policemen may be discussion of the topic is beyond the scope of this willing to act honestly, but only if they trust that paper. Instead, I will briefly look at the creation of

4 al Nakhlah Afghanistan as a distinct political unit under the territories.”18 Even within the Pashtun leadership of Ahmad Shah Durani in 1747, the confederation the ruler’s clan was one of the reign of Amir Abdul Rahman Khan (1880‐1901), many clans.; and “Ahmad Shah was in the the rule of Amir Habibullah Khan and his son traditional tribal context only a chief among Amir Amanullah Khan (1901‐1929), the reign of equals.”19, “He led the Durani confederation and the Musahiban brothers (1929 – 1978), the ultimately the united Pashtun tribes in the Communist regimes in the1980s, and Afghanistan conquest of non‐Pashtun lands… the tribes, their under the Mujahedin in early 1990s. This group‐feeling cemented by a charismatic leader historical background will give context to a and the sharing of loot ruled over towns and discussion of social distrust in Afghanistan today, villages.”20 Thus, they created a circle with a goal and how it undermines efforts of state building that was alien, not to mention vicious, to the non‐ and development. Pashtun population. Ahmad Shah’s tribal However, before discussing the nature of confederation fitted Ibn Khaldun’s tribal model. state‐building in Afghanistan and the state’s Ibn Khaldun, (1332‐82) the North African relationship with ‘Afghan society,’ it is important historian, sociologist and philosopher, developed to define the notion of state, and a tribal model that “depicts tribes differentiate between a traditional Ahmad Shah failed to largely [as] self‐governing groups state and a nation state. According create a sense of of people united by a “group to Charles Tilly, traditional states common identity for feeling” based on a belief in rarely “directly administered areas common kinship.”21 In this way, outside of cities and towns. They Afghans by stitching the tribal state ruled by Ahmad dealt with most rural or nomadic these different circles Shah was totally detached from population as corporate groups. together. Therefore, the major part of the society that it Control faded out toward ill oppressed identity “ruled,” which included: Tajiks, defined frontier rather than groups bore a sense of Uzbeks, Hazaras, Aymaks, shifting suddenly at monitored skepticism towards Farsiwans, Brahuis, Baluchis, borders.”15 Nation states are Turkomens, Nuristanis, different from traditional states in the tribal state from Kohistanis, Pamiris, Kirghiz, many ways. Tilly defines modern the very beginning of Gujar, Moghols, Arabs, states as those “governing Afghanistan’s history. Qizilbashis, Hindus, Sikhs and multiple contiguous regions and Jews. These non‐Pashtun societies their cities by means of centralized, differentiated, were never part of the united Pashtun circle. and autonomous structures.”16 The notion of Ahmad Shah failed to create a sense of common “governing” is important here. Nation states identity for Afghans by stitching these different govern their subjects, while traditional states circles together. Therefore, oppressed identity rarely do so. Afghanistan has struggled to become groups bore a sense of skepticism towards the a nation state. tribal state from the very beginning of The nature of Afghanistan’s foundation as a Afghanistan’s history. distinct political unit in 1747 had many Although the basic form of a modern state in implications for the state’s rapport with the Afghanistan emerged under Amir Abdul Rahman society and its subsequent political history. Khan, also known as the ‘Iron Amir,’ the lack of Ahmad Khan Abdali, the founder of Afghanistan, trust between state and society only increased. “came from a small clan, the Saddozai branch of Using resources provided by the British, Abdul the Popolzai Pashtuns, themselves a major sub‐ Rahman Khan created a state structure that tribe of the Abadalis.”17 The Abdali‐led endured until the fall of Najibullah in 1992; he confederation “was a loose alliance of tribes was “a Pashtun ruler using external resources to sharing a strong Pahstun cultural identity. Their reign over an ethnically heterogeneous society common aim was conquest, pillage, and the while manipulating that social segmentation to extraction of tribute from conquered peoples and weaken society’s resistance.”22 Iron Amir

Spring 2010 5 “described his task as putting in order all those Mohmmadzai clan, wanted to implement his idea hundreds of petty chiefs, plunderers, robbers and of a modern state over a heterogeneous cut‐throats.”23 In his twenty year reign, “rebellions population that did not share his vision for a were punished by mass executions or common future. deportations such as the forced resettlement of After Abdul Rahman Khan’s rule came to an thousands of Ghizali Pashtun tribesmen, chief end, his son Amir Habibulla Khan (1901‐ 19) and rivals of the dominant Abdalis in regions where his grandson Amir Amanullah Khan (1919 ‐ 29) they were neutralized in the midst of hostile both dramatically changed Afghanistan’s state Hazaras, Uzbeks, Turkmens and Tajiks.”24 Not policies. Haibbullah Khan opened the country to only did he foster intense resentment against his modern education for the first time, and allowed state by society in general, he also created the Mohammadzais exiled by his father to hostility among different ethnicities within return.30 Afghanistan. For instance, he mobilized the After Habibullah Khan’s assassination, his Ghizalis in a jihad against the Shi’ite Hazaras, son King Amanullah Khan took radical measures whom he considered heretical. The Ghizalis to reform Afghanistan. He targeted three areas to plundered, displaced and sold the Hazaras into reconstitute social control: taxes, land tenure, and slavery.25 This resentment and hostility that transportation.31 Amanullah Khan was the first resulted from this conflict would haunt Afghan king who penetrated deep into rural Afghanistan for decades to come. Afghan communities and linked the peasant‐ Although Abdul Rahman tried to create “one tribal system to both the state and the market; he grand community under one law and one rule,”26 attemped to create the crucial thread running equality before the rule of through different cultural circles within the “The feeling of law did not exist to country. One of Amanullah Khan’s radical patriotism, as known harness a sense of trust measures was that “he regularized the system of in Europe, cannot exist between state and society. taxation, abolishing tax farming and requiring 32 among Afghans, for For instance, he created that all taxes be paid in cash.” He ended indirect an “elite class of rule through the tribal leaders and increased there is no common bureaucrats dependent on direct tax on land and livestock, which brought country.” him alone and detached him into conflict with the landowning khans. He from their tribal or ethnic encouraged trade by planning a new affiliation. The core of this elite was from the royal transportation network and expanded the family and from among the leading chiefs of the education system, opening it to foreign influence. Mohmmadzai clan.”27 He recruited “slave boys, Furthermore, he encouraged the participation of ghulam bache, from areas forcibly brought by the women. Amanullah gave Afghanistan its first Amir under his control and from leading non‐ constitution in 1921, according to which even the Pashtun families, who were trained like the king’s actions were, in principle, subordinated to Janissaires in the Ottoman Empire.”28 Thus, the law. Through the constitution, he introduced the line between master and slave was made boldly notion of universal citizenship and declared that clear during his reign. citizens had rights. This was the end of slavery for The Amir failed to give Afghans a sense of marginalized ethnicities like the Hazaras. common identity. As a British general Sir Henry Strengthening the army, however, was not his Rawlinson, observed: “The nation consists of a first priority. His radical modernization of the mere collection of tribes, of unequal power and country brought him in conflict with the tribal divergent habits, which are held together, more or leaders and the Islamic ulamas. Habibullah, also less loosely, according to the personal character of known as Bacha‐yi Saqao (son of water carrier), the chief who rules them. The feeling of toppled Amanullah’s regime. patriotism, as known in Europe, cannot exist Bacha‐yi Saqao was soon replaced by the among Afghans, for there is no common Musahiban brothers of the Mohmmadzai family, country.”29 The Amir, in association with his and the distribution of patronage remained in its

6 al Nakhlah place. Under the Musahiban the government under 10 percent.”37 The core leadership of both relied heavily on foreign aid. For instance, “from the future Mujahedin and the People’s Democratic 1958 to 1968 and again in the 1970s the state Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) were educated in financed over 40 percent of its expenditure from this period. Thus, during this time a new circle revenue accruing directly from abroad.”33 The was created from among the existing circles, and monarchy continued the patronage‐oriented the new one was very alien to the old ones. system of governing. In the words of Rubin: The newly‐educated elite “intellectuals” founded or joined social and ideological [Government] expenditures showed the organizations; For instance, “the principal domestic consequences of becoming an communist organization was the PDPA. The allocation state; they presented the Soviet Union provided the PDPA leaders some distribution of foreign aid as patronage protection from government repression.”38 The to favored groups. The beneficiaries of PDPA was divided into Khalq (people) and most of the irrigation projects were Parcham (Flag), who fought over the leadership of tribal Pashtuns. Eastern Pashtuns the Party. Meanwhile, a new Islamic movement dominated the trucking industry, was gaining influence among the Kabul especially because much of the profit University students under the name of Muslim derived from smuggling across the Youth Organization. nearby Pakistani border. Many of those In 1973, Sardar Mohmmad Daud Khan, the recruited into the new middle class were king’s cousin, carried out a coup, ended the also tribal Pashtuns; indeed, the monarchy, introduced the Republic, and declared Musahiban made a concerted though himself the president. He cracked down on the ultimately unsuccessful effort to Islamists, whose main activists and leadership Pashtunize the predominantly Persian‐ fled to Pakistan. Daud Khan also expelled the speaking civil service….the Musahiban Parchamis, who had assisted him with the coup. rulers used the resources obtained from Khalqis and Parchamis reunited, and the PDPA their international connections to create army officers began planning a coup and toppled a patronage network calculated to Daud’s regime. This change of regime was a battle strengthen Pashtun nationalism, which between the elites, while the majority of the they hoped would in turn prove an population, especially the rural people, watched ideological buttress for their rule.34 the scene unfold from the margins. Soon, conflict broke out again within the PDPA. Babrak Karmal Meanwhile, the foreign aid the government took and the rest of the leadership of the Parcham wing on certain “development” projects created new were sent into exile. The Khalqi government had types of constituencies. For instance, “after the its own internal conflicts; Hafizullah Amin mid‐1950s the school system expanded with wanted to carry out a revolutionary foreign, largely American, aid.”35 Some of the transformation of Afghan society by decree and secondary boarding schools, such as Rahman terror, while Noor Mohmmad Taraki, the General Baba and Khushhal Khan Schools, enrolled only Secretary of the Party, wanted more moderation. Pashtun students from eastern tribes.36 Under this When Amin felt that the Soviet Union planned to period, as the government took a non‐ replace him with a Taraki‐Karmal coalition, he confrontational approach with the rural khans, it had Taraki killed and he took over.39 created constituencies in the cities that were Amin’s rule marked one of the most brutal newly educated and loosely considered periods between the Afghan state and society. intellectuals: “the state educational process led to Amin’s goal was to use the state apparatus to weakened traditional social control over those destroy all competition for social control in all who went through it. Schooling separated village sectors of Afghan society. He wanted to neutralize youth from their kin groups and from most of the both tribal aristocracy and rival intelligensia. He population, in which the literacy rate remained wished that “the masses liberated from

Spring 2010 7 domination would then be enlightened through a that “largely followed ethnic patterns in mass literacy program and would gratefully composition if not in ideology.”43 In this battle, support the Khalqis; the regime was dominated hundreds of years of resentment and hostility by Ghilzai and Paktia Pahstuns of tribal origins.”40 among ethnicities came to the surface. The Amin’s regime used mass arrests, torture and majority of Pashtun fighters gathered around secret executions on a scale Afghanistan had Hekmatyar, and one of the bloodiest wars was never seen before even under Abdul Rahman fought between Hekmatyar’s Hizb‐e Islami and Khan. He targeted any social groups that could the Hazara faction of Hizb‐e Wahdat. The have threatened his regime: students and international community, however, tried to bring teachers, army officers, religious leaders, the Mujahedin together, which resulted in the The Islamists, Parchamis, Maoists, bureaucrats, and Peshawar Agreement of 24 April 1992, which was members of ethnic groups who have revolted brokered by Pakistan. When the accord failed, against the government such as Nuristanis and Kabul turned into a battleground for warring Hazaras.41 The Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan ethnicities. Hekmatyar launched a barrage of in 1979, assassinated Amin, and put Babrak rockets against Kabul that destroyed half of the Karmal in power. By then the Islamist factions city, and took some 25,000 civilian lives.44 based in Pakistan were actively organizing an With the collapse of the pro‐communist opposition to the regime in Kabul with the help of regime in Kabul, there was no legitimate state in the US, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. Afghanistan. Thus, it is difficult to see a Afghanistan experienced relationship between the state and more social fragmentation After the fall of the society at all—additionally, the following the withdrawal of the Taliban in 2001, shaky relationship between Soviet Union from Afghanistan, as Karzai’s regime different circles was destroyed both the United States and the inherited a society that too. Since even individual circles USSR suspended military aid to were divided into subsections, their clients in Afghanistan. Rubin was not only skeptical Afghani people became skeptical observes that “the fragmentation of the state, but also of those who were not in their of the political and military fragmented into immediate family or circle of close structures of the resistance pieces—with each friends. prevented the mujahidin from piece loyal to a The state of brutality and turning local victories into a chaos in the country led to the rise national one. For many different khan, a of one of the most religiously commanders, the personal warlord, or a religious conservative regimes that obligation of jihad ended with the leader and suspicious Afghanistan has ever experienced Soviet withdrawal.”42 With of all others. ‐‐ the Taliban. Although the weapons at the disposal of the Taliban brought security by Mujahedin, they engaged in a struggle for power driving the warring factions out of major Afghan at the local level, with each faction backed by its cities, they failed to create strong, impartial and own foreign supporter. For instance, the Islamic efficient institutions. Pashtuns and religious Party, led by Gulbudin Hikmatyar, was extremists dominated the Taliban regime. supported by Saudi Arabia and Pakistan because Therefore, anyone who did not share the regime’s both countries feared that the domination of dogma was marginalized and terrorized. This is Afghanistan by a Persian‐speaking regime would again a familiar pattern in the Afghan relationship lead to the rise of an Iranian influence in the between state and society: a regime with a country. Since ethnic identity was much stronger particular ideology trying to rule over a than national identity, and some factions of heterogeneous population that does not share the Afghan society had deep‐rooted resentment ideology of the regime. After the fall of the against others (such as Hazaras against Pashtuns), Taliban in 2001, Karzai’s regime inherited a the battle for Kabul was waged between alliances society that was not only skeptical of the state, but

8 al Nakhlah also fragmented into pieces—with each piece technical assistance contracts running into loyal to a different khan, a warlord, or a religious hundreds of millions, more foreigners came to fill leader and suspicious of all others. Could Karzai these open vacancies jobs that Afghans could create a sense of trust among these people? easily be trained for.”46 The system not only failed to train new PRESIDENT KARZAI’S GOVERNMENT: 2001- people for the government, it also had the PRESENT unintended effect of attracting top Afghan For President Karzai to win over the people professionals to the NGO world, rather than and create a sense of social trust among them, he leaving them in positions where they could needed to build strong, efficient and corruption‐ strengthen the government. Mr. Ghani, the former free institutions that could offer people an finance minister, recalled in an interview with the alternative to the warlords’ protection. This way, BBC News: “Within six months of starting my job he could signal to different circles that a new era as finance minister, my best people had been of politics was at hand. However, Karzai’s stolen by international aid organizations who administration started poorly because could offer them forty to a hundred times the international donors operating in Afghanistan– salary we could.ʺ47 As the “NGOs sucked away chiefly among them the United States – were not most of those who had been working as ready for state building. As Ahmed Rashid puts professors, engineers, it, “United States policymakers had concentrated doctors and teachers to “Within six months of on waging war but had not considered how to highly paid positions starting my job as wage the peace.”45 The consequences of this half‐ supporting the donor finance minister, my hearted nation‐building had many critical circus,” a handicapped best people had been implications for Afghans and their future government stolen by international government. bureaucracy became The Bush administration tried to fix even less functional.48 aid organizations who Afghanistan on the cheap as the United States “To rebuild, states need could offer them forty diverted its effort and interest from 2002 onwards to establish government to a hundred times the to Iraq. After the fall of the Taliban regime in institutions that do salary we could." 2001, the United States turned to the warlords, broadly what they are such as Gul Agha Shirzai to “stabilize” the supposed to do, and that invest heavily in higher country. Ironically, by supporting these warlords education and skills to create a competitive work the United States was undermining the authority force.”49 For instance, South Korea and Japan of the very government that it was meant to owed their success in post‐war state building to a protect. Warlords such as Gul Agha Shirzai are large extent to their efficient bureaucracy. The known for dolling out government contracts to Afghan bureaucracy, on the other hand, became family and friends. In Afghan politics this was a so weak and ineffective that it could hardly spend familiar business – a system run on patronage. its budget. In 2005 and 2006 the government spent Therefore, the task of building trust between state only 44 per cent of the money it received for and society was hard to achieve from the very development projects. Meanwhile, according to beginning. the Ministry of Finance, donor countries spent Running Afghanistan cheaply also meant about $500 million on poorly designed and that the international community did not invest uncoordinated technical assistance.”50 In the resources to create a strong Afghan Afghanistan, the NGOs have repeatedly bureaucracy. Nevertheless, this bureaucracy was competed with the government over the resources essential, so instead, the international community necessary for building an effective civil service relied on non‐governmental organizations system. (NGOs) to carry out quick impact projects. This A weak central government was not in a way, “Afghanistan was stripped of the capacity to position to hold these NGOs accountable because help itself, the donors rushed to fill the gap with the NGOs were only accountable to their donor

Spring 2010 9 countries. Ironically, a poor and devastated Cases such as Bamyan tell a story that is country like Afghanistan became a place for familiar to the Afghan people: ordinary Afghan people to get rich. With billions of dollars of society is marginalized, while elite groups who humanitarian aid flowing into the country, sub‐ are supposed to be helping the people are helping contractual layers turned into a common business: themselves by filling their own pockets. This “by one estimate, international contractors are feeds pre‐established social distrust among responsible for almost three quarters of the U.S. people. This case also highlights the fact that development assistance in Afghanistan.”51 And under Karzai’s regime, resources are distributed while corruption is an endemic part of the unequally. Those with connections and Afghani government, the “layers upon layers of “contracts” get rich on behalf of those who need subcontracting appear to Afghans as a case of help. There should be no doubt that such an many hands legally taking a cut before funds approach to state building and reconstruction has reach the target program.”52 This means that by a devastating effect, not only on the relationship the time the money gets to the last contractor, between state and society, but also on the pillars who really does the physical work on the ground, of social trust among people. there is not much money left to finish the project. Equal distribution of resources and The case of a small village in a remote part of opportunities reflect roots of generalized trust in a Bamiyan province, in Afghanistan’s central society. Bo Rothstein and Eric Uslaner argue that highlands, serves as a good example: “the distribution of resources and opportunities plays a key role in establishing the belief that In 2002, $150 million could have people share a common destiny and have similar transformed the lives of the inhabitants fundamental values. When resources and of villages like this one. The money was opportunities are distributed equally, people are received by an agency in Geneva, who more likely to perceive a common stake with took 20 percent and subcontracted the others and to see themselves as part of a larger job to another agency in Washington social order. If there is a strong skew in wealth or DC, who also took 20 per cent. Again, it in the possibilities for improving one’s stake in was subcontracted and another 20 per life, people at each end may feel that they have cent was taken; and this happened again little in common with others.”54 This is one way of when the money arrived in Kabul. By explaining the pervasive corruption in this time, there was very little money government institutions. If a civil servant feels left; but enough for someone to buy that he or she makes one hundred times less than wood in Western Iran and have it his or her neighbor who works for an NGO, the shipped by a shipping cartel owned by a individual might feel great resentment against the provincial governor at five times the system. And if he or she feels that most fellow cost of regular transportation. civil servants are taking bribes – due to a low‐ Eventually some wooden beams paying salary – that person will most likely take reached to the villages. A young man bribes because there is no reason to be the only explained: ‘the beams were too large honest one in a rotten game. The massive and heavy for the mud walls that we inequality of opportunity and distribution of can build. So all we could do was chop resources, along with non‐cooperative game them up and use them for firewood.’53 theory, goes a long way to explain why government bodies suffer from pervasive Unfortunately, this example is certainly not an corruption. isolated case, but rather a common practice; too often, money for development projects is THE POLICE AND THE JUDICIARY “burned” by the time it gets to the site of A corrupt police force is the gateway for the construction. loss of a society’s trust and faith in the government. After all, “a trusted law enforcement

10 al Nakhlah institution would assist nearly everything that investigations has concluded that people at the needs to be achieved in the country from security, highest levels of the Karzai administration, through gender rights and minority rights, to including President Karzai’s own brother, Ahmed building investor confidence and development Wali Karzai, are cooperating in the country’s goals.”55 It is the police force that is responsible for opium trade, now the world’s largest. In the bringing corrupt officials to the judiciary, thus streets and government offices, hardly a public giving people a reason to trust in the government. transaction seems to unfold here that does not Afghanistan lacks this law enforcement carry with it the requirement of a bribe, a gift, or, institution. According to an article in the New York in case you are a beggar, “harchee” — whatever Times, at all levels Afghan officials misuse their you have in your pocket.”58 President Karzai positions in the civil administration and the police publicly acknowledged that corruption “is force for quick profits.56 The article notes that “the contributing to the collapse of public confidence lack of trust, coupled with the absence of security in his government...”59 It is widely acknowledged forces in almost all villages, further strengthens that “the two fatal weak points in Afghanistanʹs the hand of the Taliban as the only real power government today are the Ministry of the Interior here [Ghazni province of Afghanistan]. The list of and the judiciary. Both are deeply corrupt and schemes that undermine law enforcement is long plagued by a lack of basic skills, equipment, and and bewildering, according to resources. Without effective and American and Afghan officers “The lack of trust, honest administrators, police, and who cite some examples: police coupled with the judges, the state can do little to officials who steal truckloads of absence of security provide internal security ‐‐ and if gasoline; judges and prosecutors forces in almost all the government does not provide who make decisions based on security, people will not recognize bribes; high‐ranking government villages, further it as a government.”60 officials who reap payoffs from strengthens the hand “Community leaders complain hashish and chromites smuggling; of the Taliban as the forcefully about judicial and midlevel security and only real power here." corruption, which has led many to political jobs that are sold, demand the implementation of sometimes for more than $50,000, money the Islamic law, or sharia ‐‐ which they contrast not to buyers then recoup through still more bribes and secular law but to corruption. One elder from the theft.”57 Investigations show that the Afghan province of Paktia said, ʺIslam says that if you police force is ill‐trained and low‐paid. While find a thief, he has to be punished. If a murderer these factors do much to explain widespread is arrested, he has to be tried and executed. In our corruption within the police force, this corruption country, if a murderer is put in prison, after six has also created a situation in which the police months he bribes the judge and escapes. If a force does not trust Afghanistan’s political member of parliament is killed ... his murderer is leadership. released after three to four months in prison The leadership’s character and outlook because of bribery.ʺ61 affects every level of the administration. When civil servants feel that their bosses are cheating, CONCLUSION this enables them to find a reason to take bribes If Afghani civil servants such as police and too ‐‐ especially if their salaries hardly pay for judges, whose job it is to hold others accountable, their families’ expenses. This ultimately makes are corrupt themselves, then how can people trust common citizens feel suspicious of others in normal citizens? On the other hand, if law society because their civil servants are cheating. enforcement agencies were deemed to be Thus, Afghan society is caught in a social trap, corruption‐free by society, the general population where everyone feels that everyone else is would actually rely on these agencies, and Afghan cheating. This hierarchy of corruption is very citizens would obey the rule of law. common in Afghanistan. For instance, “a raft of Unfortunately, bringing about such a change

Spring 2010 11 would be no simple task: social distrust in this will be a difficult task. The warlords, Afghanistan has historical roots, and the majority although not strong enough to topple the of the Afghan population has always been government, are still very influential. They marginalized. Afghanistan’s resources and command loyalty based on ethnic lines. The opportunities have historically been in the hands presence of the foreign troops and their airstrikes of a few and the rest of society has felt that it is causes hundreds of civilian casualties and gives not part of a larger social order. Therefore, people the feeling that either their government Afghan citizens have always remained within does not care about them or is not in a position of their own circles, and trusted people within that authority; this makes the task of creating social circle. The ruling circle has repeatedly failed to trust even harder. In order to break out of encompass all of society, especially the rural Afghanistan’s social trap, it will be necessary to areas, and give them the feeling that they share a change the way the majority of Afghan people common destiny. The ‘state’ either did not bother view their society. This task will require a strong, to engage with rural populations, such as the corruption‐free and impartial government that Musahiban brothers, or it took an elitist approach punishes dishonest officials and creates a sense of when it confronted them. The latter approach was national identity that is stronger than regional or evident under Abdul Rahman Khan, Amanullah ethnic circles. Khan and later under the communist regime: the discourse that they tried to introduce into Afghan The views and opinions expressed in articles are society was alien to the people. strictly the author’s own, and do not necessarily Today, Karzai’s government faces the represent those of Al Nakhlah, its Advisory and challenge of stitching these circles together with a Editorial Boards, or the Program for Southwest Asia single thread. With a weak central government, and Islamic Civilization (SWAIC) at The Fletcher School.

12 al Nakhlah

Works Cited

1 Synovitz, Ron, “Afghanistan: Karzai’s Corruption Comments Could Lead to Cabinet Shakeup,” Radio Free Europe: Radio Liberty, Nov 16, 2007. 2 “Fighting Corruption in Afghanistan: A Roadmap for Strategy and Action,” 15 February 2007. 3 Ghani, Ashraf, “The Second Chance,” Prospect Magazine March 2009: 159. 4 Ibid. 5 Rothstein, 12. 6 Ibid. 7 Ibid, 7. 8 Fukuyama, Francis, “Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity,” New York: Free Press Paperbacks (1995) P. 26. 9 Eek, Daniel and Rothstein, Bo, “Political Corruption and Social Trust- an Experimental Approach,” QOG Working Paper Series 2006: 1, P. 5. 10 Eek and Rothstein, P. 11. 11 Rothstein, P 12 – 16. 12 Rothstein, 130. 13 Ibid, 3. 14 Ibid, 22. 15 Ibid. 16 Ibid. 17 Rasanayagam, Angelo, “Afghanistan a Modern History,” New York: I.B.Tauris (2003), P. xv. 18 Ibid. 19 Ibid. 20 Rubin, 46. 21 Ibid, 10. 22 Ibid, 19. 23 Rasanayagam, 11. 24 Rasanayagam, 11. 25 Ibid. 26 Ibid. 27 Ibid, 12. 28 Ibid. 29 Ibid, xvi. 30 Rubin, 53. 31 Ibid, 55. 32 Ibid. 33 Ibid, 65. 34 Rubin, 66. 35 Ibid, 69. 36 Ibid. 37 Ibid, 76. 38 Ibid, 82. 39 Rubin, 111. 40 Ibid, 115. 41 Ibid. 42 Ibid, 247. 43 Ibid, 265. 44 Rasanayagam, 142. 45 Rashid, Ahmed, “Afghanistan: Progress Since the Taliban,” Asian Affairs, March 2006: 33. 46 Rashid, 33. 47 Poston, Toby, “The Battle to Rebuild Afghanistan,” BBC News, January 26, 2006. 48 Lockhart, Clare, “The Failed State We’re In,” EFE Prospect, May 29, 2008. 49 Ibid. 50 Rubin, Barnett R., “Saving Afghanistan,” Foreign Affairs 86:1 (2007) P. 57.

Spring 2010 13

51 Rubin. 52 “Afghanitan: New U.S. Administration, New Directions” International Crisis Group, March, 2009, P. 12. 53 Ibid., 54 Rothstein, Bo and Uslaner, Eric. “All for All: Equality, Corruption, and Social Trust.” World Politics 58 (2005), 52. 55 “Reforming Afghanistan’s Police,” International Crisis Group, August, 2007. 56 Oppel, Richard A, Jr., “US Hope for Afghan Police is Undercut by Corruption,” The New York Times, April 9, 2009. 57 Oppel. 58 Ibid. 59 Ibid. 60 Rubin, 11. 61 Ibid, 12.