Source Evans, Dylan. an Introductory Dictionary of Lacanian Psychoanalysis

ENG 400: Senior Seminar Literature, Media, Modernity Professor Craig Carey

Source Evans, Dylan. An Introductory Dictionary of Lacanian Psychoanalysis. Routledge: New York, 1996.

mirror stage

(stade du miroir) The mirror stage (also translated in English as ‘the looking-glass phase’) was the subject of Lacan’s first official contribution to psychoanalytic theory, when he propounded the concept to the Fourteenth International Psychoanalytical Congress at Marienbad in 1936 (the original 1936 paper was never published, but a rewritten version appeared in 1949). From this point on, the mirror stage forms a constant point of reference throughout Lacan’s entire work. While apparently quite simple, the concept of the mirror stage takes on an ever-increasing complexity during the course of Lacan’s work, as he takes it up and reworks it in various different contexts.

The ‘mirror test’ was first described by the French psychologist and friend of Lacan, Henri Wallon, in 1931, although Lacan attributes its discovery to Baldwin (E, 1). It refers to a particular experiment which can differentiate the human infant from his closest animal relative, the chimpanzee. The six-month-old child differs from the chimpanzee of the same age in that the former becomes fascinated with its reflection in the mirror and jubilantly assumes it as its own image, whereas the chimpanzee quickly realises that the image is illusory and loses interest in it.

Lacan’s concept of the mirror stage (as opposed to Wallon’s ‘mirror test’) is far more than a mere experiment: the mirror stage represents a fundamental aspect of the structure of subjectivity. Whereas in 1936–49, Lacan seems to see it is a stage which can be located at a specific time in the development of the child with a beginning (six months) and an end (eighteen months) (see E, 5), by the end of this period there are already signs that he is broadening the concept. By the early 1950s Lacan no longer regards it simply as a moment in the life of the infant, but sees it as also representing a permanent structure of subjectivity, the paradigm of the IMAGINARY order; it is a stadium (stade) in which the subject is permanently caught and captivated by his own image;

[the mirror stage is] a phenomenon to which I assign a twofold value. In the first place, it has historical value as it marks a decisive turning-point in the mental development of the child. In the second place, it typifies an essential libidinal relationship with the body- image. (Lacan, 1951b:14)

As Lacan further develops the concept of the mirror stage, the stress falls less on its ‘historical value’ and ever more on its structural value. Thus by 1956 Lacan can say: ‘The mirror stage is far from a mere phenomenon which occurs in the development of the child. It illustrates the conflictual nature of the dual relationship’ (S4, 17).

The mirror stage describes the formation of the EGO via the process of identification; the ego is the result of identifying with one’s own SPECULAR IMAGE. The key to this phenomenon lies in the prematurity of the human baby: at six months, the baby still lacks coordination. However, its visual system is relatively advanced, which means that it can recognise itself in the mirror before attaining control over its bodily movements. The baby sees its own image as whole (see GESTALT), and the synthesis of this image produces a sense of contrast with the uncoordination of the body, which is experienced as a FRAGMENTED BODY; this contrast is first felt by the infant as a rivalry with its own image, because the wholeness of the image threatens the subject with fragmentation, and the mirror stage thereby gives rise to an aggressive tension between the subject and the image (see AGGRESSIVITY). In order to resolve this aggressive tension, the subject identifies with the image; this primary identification with the counterpart is what forms the ego. The moment of identification, when the subject assumes its image as its own, is described by Lacan as a moment of jubilation (E, 1), since it leads to an imaginary sense of mastery; ‘[the child’s] joy is due to his imaginary triumph in anticipating a degree of muscular coordination which he has not yet actually achieved’ (Lacan, 1951b: 15; see S1, 79). However, this jubilation may also be accompanied by a depressive reaction, when the child compares his own precarious sense of mastery with the omnipotence of the mother (Ec, 345; S4, 186). This identification also involves the ideal ego which functions as a promise of future wholeness which sustains the ego in anticipation.

The mirror stage shows that the ego is the product of misunderstanding (méconnaissance) and the site where the subject becomes alienated from himself. It represents the introduction of the subject into the imaginary order. However, the mirror stage also has an important symbolic dimension. The symbolic order is present in the figure of the adult who is carrying or supporting the infant. The moment after the subject has jubilantly assumed his image as his own, he turns his head round towards this adult, who represents the big Other, as if to call on him to ratify this image (Lacan, 1962–3: seminar of 28 November 1962).

The mirror stage is also closely related to narcissism, as the story of Narcissus clearly shows (in the Greek myth, Narcissus falls in love with his own reflection).

imaginary

(imaginaire) Lacan’s use of the term ‘imaginary’ as a substantive dates back to 1936 (Ec, 81). From the beginning, the term has connotations of illusion, fascination and seduction, and relates specifically to the DUAL RELATION between the EGO and the SPECULAR IMAGE. It is important to note, however, that while the imaginary always retains connotations of illusion and lure, it is not simply synonymous with ‘the illusory’ insofar as the latter term implies something unnecessary and inconsequential (Ec, 723). The imaginary is far from inconsequential; it has powerful effects in the real, and is not simply something that can be dispensed with or ‘overcome’.

From 1953 on, the imaginary becomes one of the three ORDERS which constitute the tripartite scheme at the centre of Lacanian thought, being opposed to the symbolic and the real. The basis of the imaginary order continues to be the formation of the ego in the MIRROR STAGE. Since the ego is formed by identifying with the counterpart or specular image, IDENTIFICATION is an important aspect of the imaginary order. The ego and the counterpart form the prototypical dual relationship, and are interchangeable. This relationship whereby the ego is constituted by identification with the little other means that the ego, and the imaginary order itself, are both sites of a radical ALIENATION; ‘alienation is constitutive of the imaginary order’ (S3, 146). The dual relationship between the ego and the counterpart is fundamentally narcissistic, and NARCISSISM is another characteristic of the imaginary order. Narcissism is always accompanied by a certain AGGRESSIVITY. The imaginary is the realm of image and imagination, deception and lure. The principal illusions of the imaginary are those of wholeness, synthesis, autonomy, duality and, above all, similarity. The imaginary is thus the order of surface appearances which are deceptive, observable phenomena which hide underlying structure; the affects are such phenomena.

However, the opposition between the imaginary and the symbolic does not mean that the imaginary is lacking in structure. On the contrary, the imaginary is always already structured by the symbolic order. For example in his discussion of the mirror stage in 1949, Lacan speaks of the relations in imaginary space, which imply a symbolic structuring of that space (E, 1). The expression ‘imaginary matrix’ also implies an imaginary which is structured by the symbolic (Ec, 221), and in 1964 Lacan discusses how the visual field is structured by symbolic laws (S11, 91–2).

The imaginary also involves a linguistic dimension. Whereas the signifier is the foundation of the symbolic order, the SIGNIFIED and SIGNIFICATION are part of the imaginary order. Thus language has both symbolic and imaginary aspects; in its imaginary aspect, language is the ‘wall of language’ which inverts and distorts the discourse of the Other (see SCHEMA L).

The imaginary exerts a captivating power over the subject, founded in the almost hypnotic effect of the specular image. The imaginary is thus rooted in the subject’s relationship to his own body (or rather to the image of his body). This captivating/capturing power is both seductive (the imaginary is manifested above all on the sexual plane, in such forms as sexual display and courtship rituals; Lacan, 1956b:272) and disabling: it imprisons the subject in a series of static fixations (see CAPTATION).

The imaginary is the dimension of the human subject which is most closely linked to ethology and animal psychology (S3, 253). All attempts to explain human subjectivity in terms of animal psychology are thus limited to the imaginary (see NATURE). Although the imaginary represents the closest point of contact between human subjectivity and animal ethology (S2, 166), it is not simply identical; the imaginary order in human beings is structured by the symbolic, and this means that ‘in man, the imaginary relation has deviated [from the realm of nature]’ (S2, 210).

Lacan has a Cartesian mistrust of the imagination as a cognitive tool. He insists, like Descartes, on the supremacy of pure intellection, without dependence on images, as the only way of arriving at certain knowledge. It is this that lies behind Lacan’s use of topological figures, which cannot be represented in the imagination, to explore the structure of the unconscious (see TOPOLOGY). This mistrust of the imagination and the senses puts Lacan firmly on the side of rationalism rather than empiricism (see SCIENCE).

Lacan accused the major psychoanalytic schools of his day of reducing psychoanalysis to the imaginary order; these psychoanalysts made identification with the analyst into the goal of analysis, and reduced analysis to a dual relationship (E, 246–7). Lacan sees this as a complete betrayal of psychoanalysis, a deviation which can only ever succeed in increasing the alienation of the subject. Against such imaginary reductionism, Lacan argues that the essence of psychoanalysis consists in its use of the symbolic. This use of the symbolic is the only way to dislodge the disabling fixations of the imaginary. Thus the only way for the analyst to gain any purchase on the imaginary is by transforming the images into words, just as Freud treats the dream as a rebus: ‘The imaginary is decipherable only if it is rendered into symbols’ (Lacan, 1956b:269). This use of the symbolic is the only way for the analytic process ‘to cross the plane of identification’ (S11, 273).