Introduction

Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs

Qatar and the Arab Spring Support for Islamists and New Anti-Syrian Policy

Guido Steinberg Co m ments SWP

The small but wealthy Gulf State of is striving to adopt a leading role in the , and has readjusted its foreign policy in the wake of the Arab Spring. In doing so it has tried to stick to its former strategy of maintaining good relations with all coun- tries that could be important to Qatar’s survival – primarily the US and . At the same time (which until 2011 had mostly counted on the authoritarian status quo in the region) hopes to profit from the recent upheavals in the Arab world by support- ing the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist opposition groups. With regard to , this policy is threatening to bring Qatar into conflict with its powerful neigh- bour Iran. While Qatar publicly declared its support for the opposition early last sum- mer, Iran wants to save Bashar al-Assad’s regime and thereby ensure the survival of its main ally in the Middle East. The Syrian crisis could risk destabilising Qatar’s tra- ditional balancing act between the US and its allies on the one hand and Iran and its allies on the other.

Since the start of the Arab Spring, Qatar has had focused primarily on mediating been one of the leading supporters of the between conflicting parties and main- protest movements in North Africa and the taining good relations with all powers Middle East. It has played a major role in in the region. almost all the conflicts in the Arab world. Qatar’s strategy first became evident in March 2011, when Doha urged the Arab Basic principles of foreign policy League to support a Nato intervention in Since the mid-1990s Qatar has been trying Libya. With regard to Syria, Doha hesitated to increase its international profile and at first but then, in early summer, sided to raise interest among as many powerful with the protest movement and took the countries as possible in Qatar and in the lead among the Arab League states that stability of the regime of the ruling Thani were imposing sanctions against the Bashar family. This policy is largely defined by al-Assad regime. Qatar’s clear positions on Hamad bin Al Thani, who has been Libya and Syria signalled at least a partial since 1995, and his prime move away from its previous policy, which minister and foreign minister Hamad bin

Dr. Guido Steinberg is a Senior Associate in SWP’s Middle East and Africa Division SWP Comments 7 February 2012

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Jassim Al Thani. Up until the 1990s, Qatar exploitation of the field will bring the gas was considered to be under the patronage wells closer and closer together, making of its powerful neighbour, . border disputes more likely. The Iranian Since Emir Hamad came to power, how- government is already concerned about ever, he has consistently emphasised his Qatar’s energy policy. Thanks to its superior country’s independence. This attitude is technology, Qatar extracts far more gas reflected, for example, in the founding of from the shared field. While Iran’s chronic the satellite channel . The broad- financial woes mean it cannot find the caster succeeded in securing Qatar inter- money to cover the high initial investment national recognition. Overall, Qatar wanted costs for gas production, Qatar has become to maintain good ties to the US, Iran, and the world’s biggest exporter of liquefied its regional allies. It hoped that by mediat- natural gas (LNG). Doha is continually work- ing in conflicts in Sudan, , Yemen ing, with the help of the US, to improve and Palestine, it would be seen as a major the protection of its energy infrastructure. player in the region. At the same time, it is at pains to avoid un- necessarily provoking Tehran and to main- tain active dialogue with its neighbour. USA In view of its own military weakness, Qatar initially strove to develop close relations to Saudi Arabia the US in terms of security policy. In 1995 Qatar’s leaders also believe that they must it signed a defence agreement with the protect their country from Saudi Arabia. Clinton Administration and spent the sub- Riyadh has long considered Qatar as part of sequent years fostering its military links to its own sphere of influence, and Doha sus- Washington. In 2003 the US military began pects that the Saudis would not hesitate to operating the in Qatar, its annex Qatar if the opportunity presented most important air base in the Middle East. itself. As long as there is a US military pres- Doha believes that the US presence is cru- ence in Qatar, this is unlikely to happen. cial in protecting it from its neighbours. At That said, the mistrust is not unfounded, the same time, Qatar’s leaders are caught as Saudi Arabia has repeatedly attempted in a dilemma. On the one hand, they fear to influence Qatari domestic policy – for that Iran is developing nuclear weapons instance by supporting pro-Saudi members and plans to adopt a more aggressive hege- of the . monic policy within the Gulf region. On Tensions between the two countries the other, they worry that the US or Israel began increasing in 1995, when the new might attack Iran’s nuclear plants. Iran has emir tried to emancipate Qatar from its already openly threatened Qatar with un- overly powerful patron and neighbour. specified retaliation if either of those coun- Emir Hamad’s most influential instrument tries does target its atomic facilities. Qatar in this regard was the satellite channel Al is particularly afraid that Iran could attack Jazeera. Set up with government funding its gas infrastructure. and launched in 1996, it quickly became the most popular broadcaster in the Arab world. With its high level of journalistic Iran professionalism and its relatively relaxed Qatar and Iran share the world’s biggest reporting guidelines which provided a gas field, which the Qataris call North Field, forum for the whole spectrum of opposi- and the Iranians call South Pars. Both coun- tional voices, Al Jazeera transformed Doha tries must therefore collaborate over the from a little-known city to a prominent long term if they are to get the maximum political centre of the region. Almost every benefit from the gas reserves. Continuing regime in the Arab world has attempted

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(at least temporarily) to prevent Al Jazeera suing a balancing policy from the mid- from reporting – either in the form of 1990s onwards and increasingly served as a diplomatic protests, by closing local chan- mediator in regional conflicts from around nel offices or harassing journalists working 2005. It seems that Qatar’s main goal was on the ground. Saudi Arabia in particular to convince the West that it could be a valu- has often been extremely displeased about able player in solving the region’s numer- Al Jazeera broadcasting the views of Saudi- ous conflicts. It also probably wanted to Arabian dissidents. defuse conflicts so as to protect stability In response to the frequent protests, in the region. In its efforts to mediate in Qatar’s leaders always stressed that Al Sudan, Lebanon and Yemen (all in 2008), Jazeera was independent of the govern- Qatar proved itself as a mediator capable ment. However, this was not strictly true – of making progress but unable to solve the as the channel’s reporting on Saudi Arabia, conflicts or bring about lasting peace. for example, revealed. When Doha realised Qatar’s most successful effort at media- that the expected escalation of its conflict tion to date was in Lebanon in 2008. Saudi with Iran would make a rapprochement Arabia and Syria could not mediate because with Saudi Arabia necessary, Qatar’s rela- they were too clearly aligned with their tionship with its neighbour began improv- respective Lebanese allies. This cleared the ing in 2008/2009. Suddenly, critics of the way for Qatari involvement. The result of Saudi regime began finding it much harder Qatar’s efforts (which was achieved in close to get any airtime on Al Jazeera. With the consultation with Saudi Arabia, Syria and dawn of the Arab Spring, state control of Iran, and with the help of generous finan- the channel became increasingly evident. cial aid to the parties involved in the con- In its coverage of and Syria, Al flict) was the Doha agreement of May 2008, Jazeera toed the government line and in which the Lebanese factions agreed to reacted immediately to any change of form a national unity government. policy. It appears that there was resistance To be able to intervene as a mediator to this within the channel, which led the (and also as a result of its efforts), Qatar government to increase its control during developed good relations with all political 2011. One of the measures it implemented camps in the region – at times even with was to replace Al Jazeera’s long-serving Israel. In particular it was Qatar’s close ties (Palestinian) director with a member of to Iran, Syria, Hamas and that the Qatari royal family. provided good reason to intensify relations The move in 2008/2009 to improve ties with Doha (cf. SWP-Aktuell 18/2009). The with Saudi Arabia is the biggest change country has now become extremely im- that Qatar has made to its foreign policy portant as a mediator in the region – even in recent years. These ties provided the the announced plans to open an foundation for Qatar’s active approach to office in Qatar. the Arab Spring – its line was often, but not always, in harmony with Saudi Arabia. Due to the advanced age of the Saudi decision- Supporter of Islamists makers, a slow decision-making process and When the Arab Spring began, Qatar started problems in domestic policy, the Saudi gov- supporting protest movements (with the ex- ernment generally appeared less dynamic ception of those happening in Gulf States), than Emir Hamad and his prime minister. in particular Islamist forces connected to the Muslim Brotherhood. The Qatari gov- ernment already showed remarkable fore- Qatar the mediator sight in this respect back in the 1990s, With such powerful and aggressive neigh- when it began offering refuge to Islamists bours, the Qatari government began pur- from all over the world and gave them an

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international forum through Al Jazeera. and no security. That is what turns people The lynchpin of this policy was and con- into extremists. However, if the people tinues to be the Egyptian scholar Yusuf can participate in the political process, I al-Qaradawi. His roots are in the Muslim am certain that you will see this extrem- Brotherhood, and during his exile in Doha ism transform into a civil/civilised (hayat in the 1990s he became the world’s most madaniya) life and a civilised society.” What famous and influential Muslim scholar. His was interesting here was that Emir Hamad success was greatly facilitated by Al Jazeera, was not just talking about the Muslim where up until recently he had his own Brotherhood, which even many Western ob- weekly programme called Sharia and Life. servers consider to be “moderate” – he also A community of exiled Muslim Brothers expressly included Salafists and al-Qaeda. gradually formed around al-Qaradawi. There are also solid political motives for During the Arab Spring, some of these in- Emir Hamad’s optimistic views on dividuals took on roles as leaders, financial extremists’ capacity for transformation. The backers, religious authorities and politi- Qatari has little in common with cians. This, along with the financial and the fallen republican regimes in the Arab other support for Islamists, is likely to world. Doha appears to believe that the further boost Qatar’s influence in , Muslim Brotherhood and many Salafists Libya, Egypt, the Palestinian territories, represent an interpretation of that is Syria and Yemen. During the Arab Spring, compatible with the that most al-Qaradawi expressed his support for Qatari citizens follow. It also gives Doha Doha’s policies in Libya, Syria and Bahrain the opportunity to distance itself from on a number of occasions. Saudi Arabia, whose relationship with the Qatar’s policy is driven by strong prag- Muslim Brotherhood deteriorated sharply matism and by Emir Hamad’s sympathies in the wake of 9/11. Qatar has every reason for the Islamists. On the one hand, the basic to hope that its relationship to countries principles of Qatar’s foreign policy played a under Islamist rule will be better than they major role in its policies towards the coun- were under the previous regimes, given the tries mentioned; this was particularly clear support that it is affording these upcoming in the case of Libya. There, Doha strove to powers. position itself as an essential ally of the West in the Arab world by supporting and participating in the Nato-led intervention. Libya On the other hand, Qatar’s leaders provided Shortly after the uprising in Libya began, targeted support to Islamists and Salafists. Doha made it clear that it wanted to take a Libya again provides a good example of leading role by urging the Arab League to this, though the intention is clear in other impose a no-fly zone and to call for military countries too. Doha recognised that the intervention. This was subsequently autho- Islamists would become the next big power rised by UN Security Resolution 1973. In in North African and Middle East politics, late March 2011, Qatar also became the first and so increased its efforts to close ranks Arab country (and second overall, after with them. Speaking in an interview with ) to recognise Libya’s National Tran- Al Jazeera in September 2011, Emir Hamad sitional Council based in Benghazi. expressed his convictions using Libya as Qatar sent six fighter jets to support the an example: “What is it that turns people ensuing military action, making it one of into extremists? Extremism is the result only two Arab countries – the other was the of tyrannical, dictatorial governments or United Arab – to actively partici- leaders [descriptions that according to the pate in the Nato intervention. It also helped emir clearly do not apply to Qatar’s leader- Libyan rebels by transporting oil out of the ship, G.S.] who give their people no justice territories they controlled, and selling it on

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their behalf. Al Jazeera dedicated hours Members of the Transitional Council who of airtime every day to reports on the opposed the Islamists feared being forced uprising. Yusuf al-Qaradawi repeatedly out of power by Qatar’s friends. The fact called for the Gaddafi regime to be over- that Islamist militias have been armed by thrown and actively encouraged support Qatar is making it more difficult for the for the rebels. Qatar also sent military aid – Council to establish a state monopoly on it collaborated with the US, the UK and violence. France to supply the rebels with weapons and used its own military to train Libyan fighters. Moreover, Qatar is thought to Syria have sent in special forces that were in- When protests broke out in Syria, Qatar volved in the fighting. It is likely these adopted an altogether more cautious policy forces were made up of (Pakistani) merce- than it had with Libya. However, its initial naries in Qatari uniform. In any case, the hesitation was soon replaced by efforts to Qatari armed forces, including members of overthrow the Assad regime and to help the the military leadership, were involved in Muslim-Brotherhood-dominated opposition every phase of the armed conflict in Libya. take power. Qatar directed most of the weapons and During the first few months of the up- money to Islamist rebels, with just a small rising in Syria, there was no clear reaction portion going to the National Transitional from Qatar. Up until then, Doha had main- Council. In Benghazi the majority of the tained good relations to Damascus. The arms and funding went to militias con- Qatari government had played a crucial nected to the Muslim Brotherhood, and in role in helping Syria overcome its isolation the western mountains to units of Abdel- in the Arab world after being accused of Belhadj, a former jihadist who later murdering the Lebanese prime minister became military commander of Tripoli. Rafiq al-Hariri in February 2005. The Doha Sallabi, a Libyan member of the Agreement on Lebanon of May 2008 con- Brotherhood born in 1963, became the key firmed this development. At the same time, go-between for the rebels and Doha. He had Qatar had invested billions in the Syrian been living in exile in the Qatari capital economy, particularly in the property sec- since 1999 and had studied under al-Qara- tor. Doha felt that good relations with Syria dawi. In 2007, Sallabi began acting as a were a top priority because they could be mediator between the Gaddafi regime and beneficial to Qatar’s ties to Iran, Syria’s the leaders of the jihadist Libyan Islamic most important ally. Fighting Group (LIFG), who at the time were This was why it hesitated to take a being held in jail in Tripoli. The outcome stand against Syria’s leaders when the pro- was that the LIFG renounced armed con- tests began in March 2011. Even Al Jazeera flict. During this time Sallabi developed paid little attention to the early days of close ties to Belhadj, the commander of the uprising. It was only al-Qaradawi who the LIFG, and used this relationship during repeatedly criticised the way the Assad the 2011 uprising. Among the Islamists regime responded to protestors. When Emir receiving Qatari aid, Belhadj and Sallabi’s Hamad refused Syria’s demand that Qatar brother Ismail (the commander of a strong should call on al-Qaradawi to rein in his rebel group from Benghazi) became par- opinions, the public dispute between the ticularly powerful. During the conflict, countries intensified. The Syrian state representatives of the Transitional Council media began criticising the Qatari govern- complained that Qatari support was skewed ment, and Al Jazeera’s reporting on the too much in favour of the Islamists. protests became increasingly detailed Once the armed conflict ended, Doha and aggressive. In July 2011 Qatar became increasingly became the target of criticism. the first Gulf State to close its embassy in

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Damascus, after it was attacked by Assad Although there are some reports of arms supporters. being supplied to the Free Syrian Army, In the months that followed, Qatar these have currently not been confirmed. In became the driving force behind the anti- light of Emir Hamad’s call for Arab military Syrian movement. Just as it had with Libya, intervention, however, it is probably only a Doha used the Arab League, whose rotating matter of time before Qatar begins arming presidency lies with Qatar until March the rebel forces – if it hasn’t already started 2012, as its main instrument in implement- doing so in secret. ing its policy on Syria. The Qatari prime minister Hamad bin Jassim was head of the Arab League’s committee on Syria, Stability in the Gulf which also included the foreign ministers While Qatar supports the opposition move- of , Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Algeria. ments in North Africa, Syria and Yemen, it In a startling move, the League suspended is committed to ensuring stability at home Syria’s membership in November 2011 and and in the neighbouring Gulf countries. announced shortly afterwards that it would Since the spring of 2011 it has been moving be imposing economic sanctions. closer to Saudi Arabia and its allies in the However, Qatar and its allies – mainly (GCC), in an Saudi Arabia and Egypt – were still holding effort to protect itself from the fallout of back on putting an end to Assad’s regime the Arab Spring. Qatar, like many coun- once and for all. This was probably the tries, is extremely concerned about the result of concerns about Iran’s reaction and unrest in neighbouring Bahrain. Although how that might aggravate existing Sunni- Qatar has no opposition groups of its own Shiite tensions in the region. Another to speak of, the leaders in Doha believe reason for Doha’s hesitancy is likely to have that Iran is helping to fan the flames of the been the fear of civil war breaking out in protests there. Doha fears that if power Syria and of the impact that would have on changes hands in Bahrain, it will have in- neighbouring countries. This became all calculable consequences for the stability of too clear when the Arab League presented a the surrounding region. Qatar has recently peace plan in November 2011. The proposal announced domestic-policy reforms, but called for an end to the violence, for the these are likely to be mostly cosmetic and army to withdraw from the cities, for the designed to quickly curb potential criticism government and the opposition to enter of the blatant contradiction between its into dialogue, and for an observer mission support for opposition movements abroad to be deployed to verify the measures. In and its authoritarian policies at home. mid-December the Syrian government agreed to allow observers into the country but ignored the other terms of the agree- Bahrain and the Gulf Cooperation Council ment. Although the violence in Syria The events in Bahrain came as a shock to increased during the first two months the Qatari government, as they did to many of the mission’s presence, the Arab League other countries. Although Doha let Saudi could not bring itself to remove the ob- Arabia take the lead on the issue, it did servers. But the Gulf States, under the support the Gulf Cooperation Council’s leadership of Saudi Arabia, did order their decision to intervene and reflected this by observers to leave. Qatar even went a step sending in a symbolic military contingent. further in mid-January 2012, when it However, like the Saudis and , called on Arab states to take military action who made up the majority of the deployed and for the Syria issue to be referred to troops, Qatari soldiers played no role in the UN Security Council – initially without suppressing the protests. This job was left success. to Bahrain’s security forces. The GCC forces

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were tasked with protecting buildings and terms it is one of the biggest. The family infrastructure. Doha’s decision to publicly has been plagued by fierce infighting – not side with the Bahraini regime is in flagrant one of the five royal successions in the 20th contradiction of the support it offers rebels century (1913, 1949, 1960, 1972 and 1995) and protest movements in countries not passed off without heated conflict. The cur- on its doorstep. The different approach is rent emir came to power in 1995, when he primarily motivated by Qatar’s fears for the overthrew his father Khalifa in a bloodless future of its own regime. coup. Few things scare the Qatari government The Saudi government has tried on sev- more than the idea of the Shiite majority eral occasions to influence the line of royal seizing power in Bahrain. Within this succession in Qatar. It is even rumoured to crisis, it has become very clear that Qatar’s have been behind a 1996 attempt to over- leaders, just like their counterparts in throw the new emir and put his father back Riyadh, , Manama and Abu Dhabi, on the throne. There are still numerous view the Arab Shiites as a potential fifth supporters of Riyadh in the Qatari ruling column for Iran. family today, who are strongly critical of the emir’s policy of distancing the country from Saudi Arabia. Hamad’s son, former Domestic stability crown Jassim (born in 1978), is said Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani is an authori- to be among those supporters. His stance tarian ruler. Although the prime minister meant that he was forced to renounce his and foreign minister Hamad bin Jassim claim to the throne in 2003, in favour of Al Thani plays a major role in decisions his younger brother Tamim (born in 1980). concerning foreign policy, the Emir always The conservative Wahhabi members of the has the last word. Emir Hamad is highly family are also critical of the emir’s pro- respected in his home country as he is seen West policies and the rapid modernisation as the initiator of the gas sector’s expansion of the country. and modernisation since the 1990s, and for These differences of opinion are particu- the extraordinary prosperity that the coun- larly important in light of speculation try enjoys as a result. The $77,000 per about the emir’s health – there are ru- capita income in Qatar is the highest in mours in Qatar that he is seriously ill. The the world. The some 250,000 citizens of the Saudi government is said to already be also enjoy numerous state benefits. considering how it could support a pro- Ever since the merchant sector lost its Saudi candidate (i.e. not the current crown last vestiges of power in the 1950s, there prince) if conflict breaks out over who will have been no potential contenders to the succeed to the throne. power of Qatar’s ruling family. Unlike in Meanwhile, Emir Hamad has initiated a Saudi Arabia, religious scholars have little series of political reforms. In October 2011 political influence in Qatar – this is also he announced the country would hold true of its small Shiite minority. This is elections to the Consultative Council. Cur- why there was no uprising in Qatar in 2011. rently, all 45 members of this body are ap- A few activists did protest online in the pointed by the emir. The reform means that spring, though, voicing criticism of 30 of them will be elected starting in 2013. the Emir and his pro-West foreign policy. The move has widely been seen as a further The only real potential threat to Emir attempt by the emir to boost the credibility Hamad exists among his own relatives. of Qatar’s policy on the Arab Spring. How- There are several thousand members of ever, the elections will not bring about any the Al Thani family. Measured against the significant change to Qatar’s authoritarian population, this makes it the Arab world’s political system, let alone a democratisa- largest ruling family; even in absolute tion.

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Still an important partner Qatar can only assert its limited claim to leadership because Egypt is greatly weakened and Saudi Arabia tolerates Qatar’s activities. That said, Qatar will continue to play a major role in the coming years because the domestic problems in Egypt and Saudi Arabia will persist for the time being. This makes Qatar a key partner for anyone wanting to shape Middle East policy – and that includes German and European leaders. However, the events of the Arab Spring have also highlighted the limits of Qatar’s

© Stiftung Wissenschaft und potential. The most noticeable issue is the Politik, 2012 obvious contradiction between the desire All rights reserved to ensure stability among its immediate

These Comments reflect neighbours and its commitment to sup- solely the author’s views. porting protest movements that are hap-

SWP pening at a safe distance. Over the next Stiftung Wissenschaft und few years, this is likely to have a tangible Politik German Institute for impact on Qatar’s soft power. This applies International and particularly to Al Jazeera, which has Security Affairs revealed itself to the whole world as a Ludwigkirchplatz 3­4 political instrument of the Qatari leader- 10719 Berlin Telephone +49 30 880 07-0 ship. Fax +49 30 880 07-100 The country’s decision to openly take www.swp-berlin.org sides in numerous conflicts and to support [email protected] Salafists and the Muslim Brotherhood will ISSN 1861-1761 also affect Qatar’s position. On the one

Translation by hand, Qatar stands to benefit from Islamist English Express e.K. organisations seizing power in Arab coun-

(English version of tries. On the other, this means that Qatar SWP-Aktuell 7/2012) cannot possibly present itself as a non- partisan mediator in the future. In recent months many opponents of Islamists in Libya, Tunisia and Egypt have also become opponents of Qatar. Even more problematic, however, is the fact that Qatar is calling for a military solu- tion to Syria. This is exacerbating the con- flicting interests that Qatar and Iran have in Syria. If the Syrian situation escalates, it seems likely that Iran will step up its already forceful efforts to support Bashar al-Assad, which would increase disputes between Iran and Qatar. Given the relative strength of the two countries, this is an extremely risky policy.

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