THE UNIVERSITY OF McGILL
THE PLACE OF PBS IN JAPAN' S MOVEMENT
TOWABP THE HIGHLY .\DVANCEP INFORMATION SOCIETY
by
JUNKO MITANI
A THESIS
SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRAPUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE
OF MASTER OF ARTS
GRADUATE PROGRAM IN COMMUNICATIONS
McGILL, MONTREAL
JUNE, 1989
C Abstract
This thesis focuses on the development of the Direct Broadcasting Satellite in Japan under its Kodo Joboka Sbakai (Highly Advanced Information Society) policy. The field of new media policies is relatively new but very important in communications studies. The development of new media technologies changes into existinq media systems, and profoundly influences economies which are increasinqly dependent upon information services. Japan's case is particularly interesting. Relatively little is known about its DBS policy compared to other industrialized countries, even though Japan has already begun to operate DBS under its own version of the "information society", the Kodo Johoka Shakai (Highly Advanced Information Society) • The formulation of DBS policy is related to many factors, including space development, research and development, broadcasting, international telecommunications requlations and economic competition both in international and domestic markets. In order to take these factors into consideration, an historical approach and institutional analysis are used in this thesis.
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Acknowledgement
l would like to express my appreciation to Professor G.J. RObinson, who kindly supervised this thesis and encouraged me to finish. l also thank Professor D. Crowley for his help, especially during my first year at McGill. l am grateful to have had Ms. Jane Henderson as my editor. Dr. Claude-Yves Charron, Franceise Beliveau, and Professer Hiroaki Oka da helped me to come to Canada. l was encouraged by my friends in Montreal. Finally, l am very thankful te my paronts. LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
BS BROADCASTING SATELLITE COPUOS COMMITTEE ON THE PEACEFUL USES OF OUTER SPACE CS COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE DBS DIRECT BROADCASTING VIA SATELLITE EDTV ENHANCED DEFINITION TELEVISION HOTV HIGH DEFINITION TELEVISION ITU INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATION UNION JSB JAPAN SATELLITE BROAOCASTING lOP THE LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY MI TI THE MINISTRY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INOUSTRY MPT THE MINISTRY OF POSTS AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS NASDA NATIONAL SPACE DEVELOPMENT AGENCY NIPPON HOSO KVOKAI (JAPAN PUBLIC 8ROADCASTING CO.) T5C TSUSHIN HOSO EISEI KIKO (TELECOMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE CO. )
WAHC WORLO AOti 1NI STRAT 1VE RAD 10 CO,~FE RENCE Table of Contents
1 Introduction 1 Chapter One: Japanls Changing Attitude Towards Development of Space Technology
Introduction 9 Section One: 10 The Japanese Concept of the Inform~tion Society: the Academie Tradition
Section Two: 13 Building the Highly Advanced Information society: A National Plan 1960's to the 1970's: Oependency on American Technology From the late 1970's: Changing Japan/US Relations Silice 1987: An Independent Japanese Spa ce Programme
section Three: 22 Japan's Space Policy: Key Players l Conclusion 26 Chapter TVo: Relationship of DBS to Japanls Broadcast Media Through the mid-IBOs
Introduction 28
Section One: The Japanese Broadcasting system 28 VCR's in Japan Cable Television
Section Two: Interests i~ DBS 36 Government's Interests NHKls Interests Consumer's Little Interests section Three: 48 A New Strateqy to promote OBS: Specialty Programming - Conclusion 53 Chapter Three: ·.. Japan's DBS Development in Relation to the Wo~ld Requlatory situation Introduction 55 section One: International Discussions 56 COPUOS Discussions UNESCO Discussions lTU Discussions
section Two: Japan's position 61 Japan's position in the Ideoloqical Debate Japan's Administration of DBS Channel Assiqnment to Japan Japan Deals with spillover
Conclusion 67 Chapter Four: Future Plans Concerninq DBS in Japan's Hiqhly Advanced Information Society
Introduction 69
section One: The Government Plans for DBS 70 DBS Plans for the Near Future Lonqterm Plans
section Two: 79 The National Interests of the Japanese Business sector
section Three: On the International level 81
Conclusion 93
Chapter Fiva: Conclusion 96
Biblioqraphy 102 l l Introduction A strange skyscape -- big owans (soup bowls) on the roofs of Japanese houses -- has emerged in Many remote islands in Japan since the Mid 1980's, and it ia slowly spreading to urban areas. The Japanese government estimates that this roof top scenery will become familiar throughout the country by the early twenty-first century. The soup bowl is actually a parabolic anntena for the reception of direct television broadcastinq via satellite. Oirect Broadcasting Satellite (OBS) ia one of the Most significant achievements in media technologies in that it has connected telecommunications and broadcasting. Future technological improvements are expected to allow for more elaborate functions. OBS has contributed to information distribution technologies and has changed existing media relationships. OBS is becoming available in industrial countries su ch as the US, Canada and several European countries, apart from Japan. AIl of these countries recognize the importance of the economlc trend towards the "information society", a shift from heavy industries to information activities in which satellites are very important hardware. This thesis, the Place of DBS in Japan's Movement toward the Highly Advanced Information Society, focuses on the case of Japanese development of DBS under Japan's information society policies. Japan has been one - of the Most aucceaaful countries in the current economic 2 ( transition by promoting its own version of "information society", the 1 In t.arms of the broader field of communication studies, this topic belongs to the field of new media regulation. With the rapid development of communication technologies, conventional frameworks for media regulations are now being reconsidered in many countries. Because media policies are highly influencad by various conditions such as culture, languange, economy, geography and technological levels which differ from one country to another, studies of new media (. regulations also have to ta~e into account these factors. This field is still new in communications studies and relatively little is known yet. There are several important works which this thesis has consulted, although they did not conelusively address the topie of this thesis. Denis McQuail and K. Siune (1986) present European cases on new media regulations and has helped to bui1t a framework for this thesis. Kazuhiko Goto reviews the historical development of Japan's DBS project and points out the different positions taken by major players in "Japanese project for Direct Broadcasting Service" (Mareh 1983, 9-47). Takashi Tachibana explained Japan's space plans in comparison ( with other countries in "Uchu e no Michi" (Feb. to Sep. in 3 ..' 1987). Japan's media system is studied by Masami Ito in Broldcasting in Japan (Ito et al. 1978). Tadao Umesao's "Joho Sangyo Ron" (Jan. 1963) and "lujiro Hayashi's Johoka Shakai (1969) provide examples ot early studies of information society in Japan. More recent studies on this theme by Japanese scholars are reviewed by Yoichi Ito in "Mass Communication Research in Jbpan: HistQry and Present State" (1987, 49-87) and compared with the American school's tradition by John E. Bowes in "Japan's Approach to an Information Society: A critical perspective" (1981, 699-710). Marika Natasha Taishoff discussed different positions adop~ed at international debates on DBS held by the world regulatory bodies in State Responsibility and the Direct Broadcasting $atellite (1987). '.' Soji Yamamoto exp1ains Japan's position in 1egal iSEues on DBS in Hoso Eisei 0 Meguru Jiyu to Kisei (1979) and in Hoso Eisei: Sono Hoseido Tek! Kenkyu (Yamamoto ed., 1981). H.N. Janisch explaines Japan's deregulated telecommunications law& in "Developments in Japanese Telecommunications" (1988) and Yoichi Ito analyzed the policy formulation process that accompaniod deregulation by pointing out different ideologies among Japanese ministries in "Telecommunications and Industrial POlicies in Japan: Recent Developments" (1986,201-230). Evidence to write this thesis was collected from a variety ~f documents, including government and industrial documents, newspapers and news magazines, communications journals, and books. A few of the MOSt important sources include the reports 4 written or edited by the Ministry ot Posts and Telecommunications such as Boso Seisatu no TeDbg (1987), ~ Media Hakusho (1988) and White Paper 1988: Communications in Japan (1988). statistical information ia also provided from the Keidanren's annual statistic book. Speaking of Japan publishes speeches made both by Japanese and foreigtlers mainly on industrial issues. Among newspapers and naws magazines, Asahi Shimbun (one of the biqqest daily newspapers in Japan), Economist and The Oriental Economist are often cited in this thesis. Studies of Broadcastinq (published by NHK) , InterMedia , Aviation Weet and Space technology, Space World, Communication Yearbook, and Telecommunicati~ns cover various ( issues of communications including world regulatory situations, telecommunications and broadcastinq policy in a country, and development of Dew media technologies like DBS and space development programmes. In terms of method, two perspectives are maintained in this thesis. The historical perspective is very important to understandinq the development of Japan's DBS project because particularly in economic and technoloqical situations which have been important factors of the project chanqed vastly in the past fifty years. When the DBS project started in the post-war period, Japan was still a poor country and had very little budget for space development. Japanese space projects depended heavily on US technoloqies. DBS was oriqinally r planned for use to solve the reception problems associated with 5 con,entional television broadcasting ir ~ountains and remote Islands. However, by the time DBS became available, these reception problems had been almost solved, and OBS is now being promoted to provide new media services which are unavailable through conventional broadcasting means. However, as Japan's economy ar.d its tracle surplus with other nat~ons grew, the US and other countries became reluctant to transfer technologies to Japan. The world regulatory situations related to DBS also pressured Japan to develop its own space technologies. Futhermore, the shifting of the focus of the Japanese economy from heavy industries to information industries has 1 become apparent as it has in other industrial countries. Today, Ja~an which posesses the world's highest GNP ia trying to promote the new economic tide towards the "information society." OBS is promoted as a part of Japan's Rodo Johoka §b~ (Highly Advanced Inf~rmation Society) policy. In future, development of technologies will promote the Integration of separate media like broadcasting, the press, printing, publishing, and even telematics. DBS will be integrated with Communications Satellites. Japan also has plans to expand these elaborate digital comm~nications networks to the Pacific area. The other method employed ln this thesis is an institutional perspective. It helps to identify important players involved in formulating DBS pOlicies. On the national u 6 level, the Miniatry of Posts and Telecommunications and the Mini.try of International Trad. and Industries ara the two important ministries dacidinq media and telecommunications policies. The Science and Technology Agency and NASDA are major public organizations charged with carrying out space developments. The Tsusbin Hiosi Eisei Kiko administers the hardware part of DBS operations. The Nippon Hoso Kyokai (NHK), Japan's public broadcasting corporation had been the sole broadcaster ~n1 one of ~he two financiers invloved in the DBS project, until the BS-2 project with the qovernment. The Japan Satellite Broadcasting (JSB) will join NHK as an user of BS-3, the next broadcasting satellite. other media, such as conventional commercial television broadcasting and the press are also represented on the many policy committees of the MPT and the MITI. Cable used to have little voice in formulating CBS policy in Japan because it was very underdeveloped, but its power will increase as spaco cable networks are now being planned. Business socie~ics, su ct as Kcidaoren, represent the opinions of Japanese industries which closely relate to the DBS projact, includinq home electronics manufacturers, satellite and rocket makers, commercial satellite companias, ~nd willinq invastors of new media businesses from other businesses such as trading, transportation and banklnq. Business socleties have influential power over policy formulatIon in Japan and enjoy a cooperative relationship with the Liberal Democratie Party which h3S governed Japan for most of the post-sacond World War 7 ~eriod. On the international level, international institutions such as the COPUOS, UNESCO and the lTU h~ve been important in terms of requlating DBS and allocating channels. Foreign qovernments, especially the US, have influenced Japan's DBS project on aspects su ch as transfer of technologies, joint international space development plans, deregulation of telecommunications laws, and standarization of new media. Apart from these public sector features, activities in the commercial sector -- both competitive and cooperative -- have also been takinq place between Japanese and foreign companies, especially American ones. This introduc~ion is followed by five chapters. Chapter One: Chanqing Attitude of Japan towards space development, examines the importance of the Kodo Johoka Shakal (Highly Oeveloped Inform~tion s~ciety) policy, the history of Japan's national space development plans of which DBS ia a part, and the ditferent interests among pUblic bodies involved in the space developments. Chapter Two: CBS in Japan's media situation, studies the relationship of DBS with conventional broadcasting media, and analyzes the interest or lack of interest in DBS from the positions of the government, NHK, and the audience. Chapter Three: Japan's DBS development in rela~lon to the world regulatory situation, explains Japan's position in the international discussions on DBS, including ideological d~bates, the operational system of DBS, the allocations of CBS channels and the Japanese treatment of 8 spill-over problems. Chapter Four: Future Plans concerninq DBS in Japan's Highly Advanced Information Society, outlines Japan's short and lonq-term plans for the future of DBS under the Kodo Johoka Shakai (Hiqhly Advanced Information Society) pOlicies. It then examines the concerns of the national and international business sectors in relation to these plans. Chapter Five: Conclusion, summarizes contributions made by this thesis. ( 1. 9 ... Chapter One Japan'a Chanqinq Attitude Towarda Development of Space technology Introduction Japan considers buildinq the Kodo Johoka Shakai (Highly Advanced Information Society) as extremely important to its future strategy for survival. Japan is experiencinq an international trend in which information plays an increasinqly important role in society. Its vital role in economy is already apparent. As Figure 1 shows, information industries contribute 4.4% of Japan's Gross National Product (GNP), making the highest contribution amonq all other Japanese industries, including automobile production which until 1984 was the top industry in Japan. The importance of information industries to the economy ia also apparent in terms of employment ratinq amonq the primary (eg. agriculture), secondary (eq.manufacture), and tertiary (eq. servic~) industries. In 1985, 56.9% of the Japanese employees belonqed to the third industry to which most employees of the information sector belonq. Ryozo Aoki (1985, 82-110) explains that Johoka will advance through a combinat ion of joho no sanqyoka (the industrialization of information), sanqyo no 10hoka(the informationalization of industry) and katei no 10hoka (informationalization at home). The first term implies the creation and development of various new information industries. 9a ( FIGURE ONE: Rate of Important Industries in GNP % Gt.JP 'i- 7- (,- :'-0'- --;-:::: --';"tex t i le s- : 1 -.,.,.' i" 1 '1 C .i; ,'. -~ tee 9 ,:A"-' ~:,.,: ~! .. t~":'automobi le '1 )(, ••• .. t :. 1. ., ... .,::.. -shi P bul1d 1 n9 c:; o.-.r #. ft.~ ," : --_..:~.::~.:.;:..- i l'I fo rma t ion 6 !- Q c o )C " . . x o· ' .. 0 {. ,- X ". )< )(,. ... x. 1 o " .• '--"--" yea r " 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1984 1991 Oenki Tsushin Shingikai t ed. Oenki T~ushin Kodoka Vision. Tokyo: MPT, June 1987: 117. ( 10 This thesis's topic, direct broadcastinq via satellite (OBS) is one of such new industries. The second term refers to the increasinqly important role of information in business activities, like satellite transmitted stock data. The last term indicates cha~ges occuring in the home as a result of an increased use of new media and information services. On a remote island, OBS has enabled people to watch the same television proqrams as those in Tokyo for the first time, in Japan. Under the kodo Johoka Shakai (Hiqhly Adva~ced information Society) policy, Japan plans to advance each of the three aspects of Johoka through building extensive cable and telecommunications networks, of which direct broadcastinq satellites constitutes a crucial element. Section One: 1h~ Japanese Concept of the Information Society; The Academie Tradition Accordinq to the Denki Tsushin Kodoka Vision (Vision on advancinq telecommunications) (my translation) (Denki Tsushin Shingikai 1987, 2-3), Japan will experience three major socioeconomic trends as it moves towards the next century. First, Japan's economy is shifting from manufacturing industries to service industries. Telecommunications is expected to play a leading role in promoting this economic shift toward what is called the "soft-ka" (flexible) and "service-ka" (service oriented) economy. Second, Tokyo is - becoming one of the biggest financial and information centres ., 11 ..l in a world economy that is becoming increasingly interdependent. The growth of information activities will create new business and advances in international telecommunications networks will accelerate trends towards globalization. Third, increasing incomes, decreased working hours, higher educational levels, an aginq population and more women in the work force have created a variety of life styles and different consumers' needs in the Japanese society. In order to answer these needs, more sophisticated information services and advanced information networks are in demand (Denki tsushin shingikai 1987, 2-3). Studies of this economic trend have become quite developed in Japan, forming a tradition which Y.lto (1987, 49) refers to as the Il information society school". Tadao Umesao was one of the first Japanese scholars to predict the increasing importance of information industries in the economy. Umesao (1963) called industries which provide Any kind of information Joho Sangyo (the information industries) and pointed out that Joho Sangyo are different from other industries in that the values, priees and amounts of information cannot be assessed as goods like nther industrial products. He predicted the "Joho Shakai"(the information society) would develop as a result of the rapid growth of technological development, based primarily on computers. Yujiro Hayashi, another early scholar in the information !. society school, called for a "soft-ka"(flexible setting) of the 12 economy. This proposal was inteqrated into the Government's policy f"rmulation. Hayashi states that the "Informatization of a society is characterized by a growing importance of information functions over practical functions in any kind of goods, services and systems which exist in a society" (1969,56) (My translation). For example, people often buy a thing not because it is cheaper or more efficient (practical functions) but because it looks nice or is trendy (information functions). Although Hayashi recognizes that these two functions are sometimes difficult to clearly separate, this tendency is increasing in all industries. Moreover, some information functions become practical functions or simply disappear as people gradually take the information function of - a thinq for qranted. In order to deal with such tendencies, Hayaltili points out i t is necessary to shift the social structure from "hard to soft", by implementing more flexible systems in companies, education and requlation, as well as increasinq flexibility in personal values and life styles. Soft-ka (softening) has become a key concept in the study of the Japanese information society. Bowes (1981, 699-710) examines the characteristics of these Japanese studies on the information society and points out that they emphasize the macro-economic aspects of information flows whereas American studies tend to emphasize their social psychological nature. He also notices "an impressively strong belief in Japanese studies that the 13 1... economic and social exploitation of informatiol1 is the J:lajor key tn their (Japan's] future" (708). Sectign IwO; Building the Highly Adyanced Information Society: A National In order to build the Kodo Johoka shakai (Highly Advanced Information Society) policy, the development of information technologies is considered especially important. The Economie Planning Aqency's report (Keizai Kikaku Cho 1983, 11) states: .' "Our country, which is particularly weak in terms of energy and 1... natura1 resources compared with other developed nations, needs to possess high-level technologies in order to establish the economic base for long term development. Moreover, having hiqh level technoloqy raises Japan's barqaininq power and contributes to our national security"(My translation). In Japan, the DBS project has been developed as part of a national space development plan. Currently, the second qeneration satellite, the Broadcasting Satellite-2b (BS-2b) that was launched in 1986 as a back-up satellite for BS-2a, is in use. The first broadcasting satellite, BS-E, which was launched in 1978 was only for experimental uses. The manufacture and launchinq of these satellites was , just like , other Japanese satellites, largely dependent on US space ,1 14 technoloqy. It is only recently that Japan has started to possess and develop on its own the space technoloqy that ls necessary to build the Rodo Johoks Shakoi (Highly Advanced Information Society). Japan's aggressive attitude towards the development of space technoloqy is a result of the increasing reluctance of the US to transfer technologies, and is also an outcome of Japan's growing need to become free from the US restrictions in order to develop its own spa ce plans. Japan's changing attitude on development of space technology is demonstrated historically as a three stage process in the following section. The first stage is marked by the beginning of technological transfer from the US to Japan. The next stage .. is defined as a period when two countries' attitudes began to change. The final and current stage started in 1987 with Japan's decision to develop its own space technology. 1960's ta the 1970's: Dependency on American Techoolog& Japan's economy and technology were too far behind to take part in the space competition between the US and the USSR until the late 1960's. The country was still too po or to engage in costly space projects. It was only in 1955 that the Japanese economy recovered to prewar levels. Hideo Itokawa, who ia regarded as "the father of Japanese rocketry" (Davis March 1983b, 14), remembered that the Federation of Economie Organizations had been "aloof and lacting enthusiasm" to his request to support his rocket research plans and that the - industriel circle's interest in rocket research in the 1950's 15 was only for the military application of rockets (Itokawa 1963). While US rocket technology had been progressing since the 1940's, Japanese engineers who engaged in aircraft and missile manufacture during the Second World War were prohibited from continuing their research until 1953 (Kobayashi 1986,42). For these reasons Japanese space technology was nearly twenty years behind that of the US when Japan entered space development. When the Japanese government estab1ished the National Space Deve10pment Agency of Japan (NASDA) in 1969, the American astronauts wa1ked on the moon. The astonishing growth of Japan's economy during the 1960's provided financial support for space development. Futhermore, Japan's desire to "learn from the west" and "catch up to the west" during this period, 1 .. supported the ide a of involvement of space development. Transfer of space technology from the US was first discussed in 1967 between the Japanese prime lninister Eisaku Sato and the US president, Lyndon B.Johnson, and the two governments reached an agreement in 1969. This was after the Apollo mission to the moon and American space projects were being reduced. The Americans wanted to sell th~ir advanced technology to make money (Tachibana May 1987 and July 1987). Japan's first five year space development plan was started in 1970 and was 1argely dependent on technologies transferred through this agreement. The agreement set three conditions as follows: that Japan must use transferred space technology only f for peaceful purposes; that transferred space technology as 16 well as products of the technoloqy must not be transferred or sold to other countries from Japan7 and that the US provide technoloqy up to the level of the Thor Delta Rocket system, excluding certain secret technoloqy and re-entering know-how (Takase 3 March 1972, and Tachibana July 1987). From the late 1970's; Changinq Japan/US Relations The cooporative relationship in terms of technological transfer between the two countries started to change in the late 1970's as the US became more and more reluctant to help Japan's space development. Three major factors lay behind the US's changinq attitude. First, the US started to see Japan as its competitor in space development. Craig Covault (14 July 1986) says that Japan is "challenginq western leadership in space". Japan gained knowledge from the US spa ce technology and improved its ~N.n very quickly.1 The US naturally wanted to maintain its dominance in space, so became more and more reluctant to qive its technologies to Japan. Second, the US did not want to contribute to Japan's trade ~urplus against the US by transferrinq technologies. Sinee 1977, the us has stronqly protested the trade imbalance between the two 1 By August 1985, the total number of Japan's launched satelli~es was thirty, which ranks it third in the world, although this number is far lesd than that of the top two eountries, the USSR and the us. There are 2,091 Russian satellites and 1,057 American satellites. After Japan are the European Spaee Agency (ESA), France, the People's Republic of China and the United Kingdom, Canada and several others (Tachibana Feb. 1987). Japan lately succeeded in refiring the LE-5 engine, an oxygen/hydrogen-powered liquid engine for a rocket. This technology was transfered to the us (Aviation week and Space Technology 7 July 1986, 20). 17 ( countries. Especially integrated circuits and te1ecommunications equipment have become targets of trade disputes between the two countries since 1978. Although it was the US who spent a great deal of money and time to gain initial knowledge of telecommunications, it was Japan who applied the US findings to produce commercial goods and make a huge trade surplus against the US. Japanese manufacturers are strong in consumer-related equipment while American manufacturers are dominant in switching equipment, in satellite production and in data processing. The US became aware that the transfer of technology to Japan would end up helping Japan's export to the detriment of the American economy. Although Japan's communication satellite industry is underdeveloped, Americans ( are afraid that Japan may quickly catch up in satellite research and that Japan may compete with the US over ~~ integrated system of high definition TV and consumer-related digitalized products. This economic consideration is closely related to the third factor behind the US reluctance to transfer technology to Japan. Space technology is especially applicable to other industries such as computers, electronics, energy and new materials (like, medicines, optonics and semi-conductors). These businesses are expected to play a major role in the future world economy. Thus, the US is careful about giving knowledge away to Japan. Between the two countries, the ( question of what kinds of technologies should be transferred 18 - has become a sensitive issue. 2 The US's increasinq reluctance to sell i ts space technoloqy to Japan has forced Japan to develop its own. The Japanese also started to want to become independent from US space technoloqy durinq this periode This chanqing attitude on the Japanese side was caused by two factors, one being the inconveniences created by conditions imposed by the US on transfer of technologies. Because of the US's restrictions on kinds of space technoloqy to transfer, some important parts of rockets and satellites were given to Japan as a "black box". Thus, Japan could not fix or improve them even when those parts were broken. The US's prohibition on the .. retransfer of space technoloqy and its products, has prevented .. Japan from starting space-related businesses. This restriction also prevented Japan from havi~q a manned space project because essential reenterinq technology (that allows astronouts to return from space) is given to Japan again only as a black box. The US did not want to let Japan master this technology because it contains crucial know-how on missile warheads (Tachibana July 1987). Another condition, prohibition on the retransfer of space technology and its products to a third country from Japan, also imposes inconveniences on Japan. It prevents Japan from launchinq other country's satellites and starting space 2 In the case of NASA's space station project, the US, Canada, Europe and Japan did not agree on technology transfer and have left the issue to informal negotiations (Aviation Week and Space Technology 15 Feb. 1988, 27) 19 l businessea. For example, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries had to reject tha Indian Spa ce Research Organization (ISRO)'. approach to tranafor tho LE-5 liquid propollant ongine. Japan regards these restrictions as obstacles to the future growth ot Japan's space and telocomMunicationo businoasos, tor example, using spa ce as an onorgy source, an'" btlilding spaco tactories tor new matorials. It has bocome cloar that Japan neoda to be independont trom restrictions imposed by the US to tully utilize opac. and suceed in thoso now businossos. In addition to Japan's roalization ot inconvenlancas cauaed by ~~e US restriction, it alao bocamo aware that ita research and dovolopment policies should bo changed to reapond to intornational critlctsc agalnst Japan. The US and other ( industrial nations criticized Japan's R&D policy which was basad on a atrateqy ot importing techno1ogical "know how" and applyinq it to the manutacture ot goods. This practice is thought untair by other nations bocause Japan con~ributes littla to tha invention ot science and technology but enjoys a hugo trada surplus by oxporting goods based on imported technology. As Figura Two illustrates, Japan's import ot technology trom the tlorth America was 210.3 billion yen while its export to North America was only 58.7 billion yen in 1986. In rosponse to international criticiam, the Japanesa govornmont has startod to promote technologies that roquJre a long time and high cost to develop. TeChnologies in spaca, ( tolacommunications and naw media broadcastlnq are among these t FIGURE !WO: JAPAN'S TECHNOLOGICAL TRAOE-1986 '!JW:~i,â~:I:r·J!·:m*5I;t!j·J#C$':N;j (~~ Europcand Sov;ct Union .., ... _~.--- ," Jonston, Bnb. "Rj~c of Tcchno· national ism." FAR EASTtRU ECOrlOlHe REVI E\J. 31 Harch 19bë: S~ - 19a FIGURE TWO: JAPAN'S TECHNOLOGICAL TRADE-1986 ,. Jons ton. Bob. "R i sc of Tcchno national ism." FAR EASTERN ECONOMie REVIEW. 31 Harch 1988:58 20 1 technologies (MPT 1986, 8-11). By the mid 1980's, both the Japanese government and the commercial sector, including Reidcoren (Japan Economie Federation) 3, a powerful economic society, came to agree on Japan's need to develop its own space technology (Keidanren Feb. 1985, 11-14). since 1987: An Independent Japanese Space program Changes promoting independent space technology and aggressive space development in Japan's space policy were finally made in May 1987 when The uchu Kaihatsu Iinkai (Space Development Committee) proposed a long term policy forecasting Japan's space development until the early 21st century. This new vision recommended that Japan play ~ greater role in space development because "space development is a 1eading factor in the development of science and the economy" (Asahi Shimbun 27 May 1987, 1). It plans to carry out independent space activities inc1uding manned flights, construction of Japan's space station and spaceplane4, a H-2 rocketS and various 3 Keidanren has the 5pace Activities Promotion Council. It represents the interests of over 800 major companies in Japan, and has significa~t influence on the government in policy formula 4 The space station integrates functions of various kinds of satellites and space factories. spaceplane is a shuttle to carry necessary equipments to the space station (Tachibana March 1987, 287-290; Aviation Week & 5pace Technology 13 July 1987, 20). 5 The H-2 Rocket is planned to be operative in 1991. Its launching capability will be 2,000 k.g. which is still a little less than the US rocket, 5pace Shuttle or the European 5pace Agency's rocket, Arian-4. However, it is a significant increase from the current rocket, H-1 which has only a 550 k.g. 21 satellite programmes6• In order to finance aIl these plans, the Space Activity Committee proposad a total budget of 6,000 billion yen (US$ 50 billion) for the 15 years starting from 1988. Although this is a significant increase compared ta Japanls previaus space budget7, it is still much smaller than the US and Francels space budgets8• Takashi Tachibana (Sep. 1987) urges an increase of the space budget as an i~portant investment for promoting high technologies for Japanls economy. In addition to the national space development plans, Japan is also participating in international joint space projects, such as NASAts Space station. 9 Since the US could not afford ( payload capability. Futhermore, H-2 is the first rocket entirely made by Japanese technology (Yoshino 1~81, 31-34; Davis March 1983a and December 1983; Kobayashi 1986; Aviation Week & Space technology 14 July 1986, 18-20). 6 There are many kinds of satellites, such as: the experimental Geodetic Payload, Engineering Test Satellite 5 & 6, Marine Observation Satellite, Communication Satellite 3-a and 3-b (mainly used for telephone traffic and data transmission), Broadcast Satellite 3-a and 3-b, Geosynchronous Meterological Satellite, and Earth Resources Satellite (Aviation Week and Spa ce Technology 14 July 1986, 20-21). 7 In 1984, Japanls space budget was about 110 billion yen (US4500 million-- 1 US dollar was 220 yen) which is 0.041% of Japanls GNP. B The US space budget for both NASA and the US military is about 0.6% of its GNP. It was US$17.2 million in 1984. France usas 0.09% of its GNP for its space budget, and West Germany allocates 0.047% of its GNP (this is about the same as Japanls) (Tachibana Sep. 1987). 9 Japan will have its own module for scientific expariments at this space station. Japan agreed to contributa more than uS$3 billion bafora operations begin in 1994 ( (Ayiation Week & Space Technology 30 June 1986, 24). 21a TABLE ONE: DISTRIBUTION OF JAPAN'S SPACE BUDGET (1987) SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGV 94,569 AGENCY NATIONAL POLICE AGENCV 1-48 MINISTRY OF EDUCATION 11 ,842 M1NISTRY OF INTERNATIONAL 8~297 TRADE AND INDUSTRY MINISTRY OF POSTS AND . 724 TELECOMMUNICATIONS MINISTRY OF TRANSPORT 6.239 MINISTRY OF CONSTRUCTION 2 • MI NI STRY OF HOME AFFAIRS 121 TOTAL 121,924 Figure is 1,000,000 yen. Tachibana, Tùkashi. "Uchu e no Michi" Chuokoron. May, 1987: 274. 22 1 the expense by itself, it requested Japan to join the project alonq with other western European countries and Canada. By joininq such projects, Japan qets access to the world's highest technologies which are otherwise unavailable. However, joining projects such as the strategie Defence Initiative Plan (SOI)10 and the Orient New Express11 is problematic in terms of the peaceful use of space which is Japan's principal aim in space development, as weIl as Article 9 of Japan's constitution which prohibits possession of military power. Section Three: Japan's space policv: Key Players Japan's spa ce plan has become increasingly independent from us technoloqy, partly due to the us reluctance to continue transfers of technology, and also due to Japan's increasing ( interests in various space businesses including telecommunications. Japan's present space plans include many kinds of activities ranging from broadcastinq to manned flights. These projects are managed under a complicated system which consists of many public bodies, as Figure 3 illustrates. Plans and studies of these various institutions are coordinated 10 This is a project to shoot missiles from satellites. Prime Minister Nakasone deceided to join SOI project in 1985, and emphasized that Japaneae SOI researchers and manufacturers particip(ate only in civilian and net mi1itary operations (Aviation Week & Space Technoloqy (27 oct.1986, 19). However, The Oriental economist (June 1985, 26-27) reports this move as "two side of the sarne coin", and similar views are expressed by Kobayashi (1986) and Tachibana (Feb. 1987). Il This project was started in 1986 ta develop a s[pace pJ.ane designed to fly between Washington and Tokyo in two hours. It is meant for general transport, but it can be also used as a pcwerful military space plane (Tachibana June 1987) FIGURE THREE: PUBLIC BODIES IN SPACE DEVELOPMENT \.au""JI :>p ...., ~. ~I.,l,m~nl Cornmtlll'lft l'ri"" \Imllh.or, ~~"c. 1"4 ~.I."".I ::,~,,~ T ~hMlory /l1[Pr\C~ .'"~ (').t, "ol"lmr"r A .... ,.r\ \Iullllry nI ArronlUIiCi and F'fOfP'm Allo.r' S:l_ TK~nololr" RrvlfCh Inlllllli. \I.nlUry 01 ~"aca :>c •• 1ICe E,I.,!""t u ," n"'''''M''h 'n.,.'''i'- ,~rr"r, nI In \(,,,.Uf' ,.1 : ".1."" tt"r\IC ,., f •• rW" Trl.'f"\rt H".",,"h In.htu'. ~!II.-urullllC c., ,A1I-"" \l .. t«",,,,,,,I,,,,'(11 t(f"W'lfch In"ltl1l("o) ( \l ... IMf"I,'",,,,, ~,,..Jlr,f C.. mcr \1,. "If' of l'y," on. - - r. ·.... '"'",""'r~u ... " .. ------_. --- - -._, 1( ,f,,. H"'\'~N"I 1 t""'~tr'rv ,. JI' Il''''(';&& ... " .. '"'''''''' Goto, Kazuhiko. /1 Japancsc Projcct for Direct Satellite Service. 11 Stud;,", of Broadcastinq. 1983:45 23 { by the Space Activities Commission which reports directly to the prime minister. However, the Space Activities Commission's coordinating power is not very strong as it does not have a sole right to determine the distribution ot the space budget12 (Yamamoto et al. 1981, 216). Conflicts have arisen as a resu1t of these many participants and their different interests. The determination ot the launching year and budget for the experimenta1 direct broadcasting satellite (BS-E) provides one examp1e of such conf1icts. Japan's public broadcasting corporation, Nippon Hoso Kyokai (NHK) as the user of BS-E, the MPT, a powerful section of the Li:Jera1 Democratie party13, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of International Trade and Industries and part of Keidanren, a big business society, were a11 in favor of launchinq BS-E in 1976. However, the Space Activities Commission, NASDA and the Science and Techno1ogy Agency were against the plan because NASDA's rocket could not be ready to 1aunch the satellite by 1976. Since the first group wanted to start operatinq BS-E as soon as pos~!ble, they did not want to wait for the deve10pment of NASDA's rocket and wanted to ask the US to 1aunch the BS-E. The budget for the BS-E and its 1aunchinq year was changed again and again as the two groups disputed. A ministeria1 meeting fina1ly sett1ed the matter in 12 The ministry of Finance has the right to decide. 13 The Liberal Democratic Party has been the ru1ing party in Japan for more than fort y years. 24 1 favor of early launehing by an Ameriean rocket. As this example shows, in addition to many public bodies, the Liberal Democratic Party, user organizations, and business societies also posess power in deciding Japan's space activities. Taehibana (May 1987) voiees a need to integrate various institutions into one, like the US's NASA, in order to strengthen Japan's space projects. However, such a move is unlikely to take place because of bureaucratie power struggle amonq the institutions.14 From the perspective of this study, the National Space Devolopment Agency of Japan (NASOA) is very important among those public institutions shown on Figure Three, becaus9 it is • responsibile for making and launching direct broadcasting satellites. NASOA is affiliated with the Science and Technology Agency which receives a large part of the nation's space budget. In 1987, it got 77% of the total mOüdy, as Table One indicates. The same table also shows that 9% of the budget was given to the Ministry of Education1S , and that the remaining 14% of the budget was shared by the National Police Aqency and 14 It is important to note that, in Japan, bureaucrats have significant roles in policy formulation. John Endicott and William Heaton (1978, 218) explained that: "bure~~crats are asked to write 80 to 90 percent of all bills introdueed in the Diet and they provide a large portion of the information requested by LOP [the Liberal Democratic Party) research committees and Diet standing and special committees." 15 The Ministry of Education is affiliated with the Institute of Space and Astronautical Science (ISA~) which is responsible for developing scientific satellites and solid engine rockets. 25 six ministries. Among them, the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications (MPT) is the one which is primarily in charge of broadcasting and telecommunications, including television broadcasting via satellites. However, the MPT cannot ignore other ministries' concerns to formulate a poliey on OBS through the process of concensus-building. concensus-building is a crucial charaeteristic of Japan's political system16• Thus, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) is also very important for this study because the MITI's interests in information industries often Interfere with those of the MPT's. There have been in fa ct power competitions between the two ministries. Yoichi Ito (1986, 201-230) points out that their competition means not only a bureaucratie battle over territory but also over ideological differences in policies. The MPT is eonsidered a 1igyo kancho or "business agency" in the Japanese political system, whose social and political influence, abilities in poliey-making and prestige are lower than that of the seisaku kancho or "policy agency" to which the MITI belongs. The MITI's ~litieal power is strong sinee it has sueeessfully led 16 poliey formulation starts at ore of the Policy Affairs Research Couneil's eommittees where oiet members discuss issues together with coneerned experts from the various business, academic and bureaucratie sectors. On1y after "practica11y all members are satisfied that their views ar9 heard and, most often, heeded" (Endicott 1978, 198), a proposal is sent to the next level the Deliberation Commission. The poliey is de1iberated at several levels of the Poliey Affairs Research Council, then at the Executive Council, and finally reaches the Cabinet. The Cabinet con~iRts of the Prime Minister and twelve r Ministers of State. 26 t Japan's economy in the past fourty years, and it wants to liberate telecommunications requlations trom the MPT's control to encouraqe growth of information industries. The MPT wants to become one of these "policy aqencies" by takinq advantaqe of new media business. The MPT's policy emphasizes social, cultural and political values while the MITI's policy emphasizes 'J::onomic values. Conclusion This chapter began by introducing Japan's current policy of the Rodo Johoka Shakai (Highly Advanced In!ormation Society). Transforminq Japan into such a society in the next century is considered as crucial to Japan's survival in a world where information industries lead the economy. Japan's DBS project is an important element of the Rodo Joboka Shakai (Hiqhly Advanced Information Society) and has been promoted as part of the national space development plan whicb used to depend larqely on US technology. The review of the chanqinq situation of the transfer of technology between the two countries revealed three distinct stages of the Japanese American relationship. Japan now has an aggressive space development proqram with projects which are carried out by Many institutions whose different interests are not easy to coordinate. The technical aspects of the OBS project are supervised by the National Space Development Aqency of Japan (NASDA), and broadcasting policy is the sphere of the Ministry 27 ( of Posts and Telecommunications. However, other participants in space development, especially the Ministry of International Trade and Ind~stries, also influence the DBS project. In order to understand the rivalry between the MPT and the MITI, the next chapter starts by discussing the qeneral broadcasting situation through the mid 80's. ( : .1 1 j 1 J 1 f 1 1 \ j ( 28 Chapter Two: Relationship of DBS to Japan's Broadcast Media Through the mid-80's Introduction An understandinq of the roles played by existing broadcast media in Japan is important for the study of the environment and issues that affected the introductionjdevelopment of OBS in Japan. After discussing the structure of Japan 1 s broadcasting system, and the roles of the public broadcaster, NHK, and of commercial broadcasters within this system, the strategies used to promote DBS within the system are examined. Direct television broadcasting via satellite is one of the newest media in Japan and its acceptance has been affected by 1. other well-established media. Especially important are television-related media, including conventional broadcasting and video cassette tape recordera (VCRs) which !lad high popularity before DBS started. Compared to these medid, cable television broadcasting was so underdeveloped that it did not much affect DBS. TV sets are highly available in Japan where 41% of the total Japanese househo1ds have two TV sets, 20% have three TV sets, and eight percent have more than 4 TV sets. considering the fact that the average Japanese household consists of 3.22 persons, each individual often has their own television set. People primarily use TV sets to receive conventional television broadcasting. section One: The Japanese Broadcasting system '. Japan's conventional television broadcasting operates 29 und.r a dual ayat.m conailtinq ot pUblic and commercial broadcaatinq. Accordinq to Ito (1986, 204), this system has boan quit. aucceaatul: "The major realon ia that Japancso broadcaoting has dcvolopod with a good balanco bctwoen the public notwork (Japan Broadcasting Corporation --NHK) and tho commercial notworks. Tho e~istence ot commercial networks otton preventod NHK trom boing doqmatic, ins~lticient, and bureaucratie. Howevor, the existence ot NHK holped mainta~n a certain lovel ot quality in Japanese radio and TV programmes." Tho Broadcaat LaW, which came into ettect in 1950, authorizol tho Nippon Hoao Kyokai (NHK), the public broadcaating corporation, to collect reception tees trom its audience and prohibits rlHK trom carryinq advertiscmentsl • This l~~ also sots NHKlu managomont by a Board ot Governors2, and or~ara NHK to submit its annual budgetary and ~perational plans to the Ministry ot Posts and Telecommunications (MPT), which are thon sont to the Cabinot and tho two hou ses ot the Diet where approvals are discu9sed. llHK broadcasta on two television channals (NHK-Genoral and NHK-Education) nation- 1 llHK'o 1985 groso revonuo waa 351.5 billion yon (Cdn.$3.5l billion), of which 96.4\ WAB trom rocoption toes whila tha rOBt was from various Bourcas including govarnmant qrants-in -aid for short-wava radio broadcasting service to overseas, salos of toxtbooks for NHKls educational programmas and copyright salas (MPT 1987, 25). 2 NHK's manage~ent il govorned by a Board of Govarnors; its twelvo mombors ara appointed by the Primo Hinistar with the conaont of both hOUDOS of the Diot. Tho Board of Govarnors makol docisions concerning NHK's annual budget, operation and programmlng plans, and appoints or diamis.os NHK's presidant, oxecutivas and auditorat 30 1 wide. commercial broadcaatinq ia diftarent trom NHK in several To be9in". with, commercial broadcastinq companie. derivo their revonues mostly from advertisinq3. Advertiaera tavour television Aboye othor media: about 35\ of the total advertisinq oxpenditure ia spent on television. Pay-TV in which broadcastors would collect reception tees tor specifie proqrammes has bean outlawed in commercial television broadeasting. 4 As Table TWo shows, commercial broadcastinq includinq talevision, radio, =ulti-sound television broadcasting5 and teletext broadcastinq6, made 1.3 trillion yen (Cdn.$130 billion) in 1985, which was about four times greater than NHK's revenue. Amonq these commercial broadcastinq .ntiti.s, talevision broadcastinq ia the moat important medium making 1.1 trillion yen (Cdn.$110 billion).7 Th~re are presently 151 commercial broadcastinq companies (MPT 1988,4) 3 According to UNESCO's 1987 statiatica, in Japan, 94\ of the revenue vas qained trom advertisaments. 4 Asahi Shimbun reported that MPT rejeeted "ihon Xuryo Teleyi's application for a licence as it planned to use the pay-TV system in 24 October 1987, 4. 5 It provides the viewer vith tho choiee ot watch~nq a toraiqn programma in its original language, or dubbod into Japanase. 6 A persan who is hearinq impaired can enjoy watchinq programmes by toletext broadcastinq. 7 Co~œQrcial radio cama second vith 144.2 billion yen (Cdn.$l.44 billion) from short- and modium-vave radio broadcasting. The rast vare 30.6 billion yen (Cdn.$306 million) from FM radio and 190 million yen (Cdn.$l.9 million) trom telotoxt broadcastinq. 30n TABLE NO: COMMERC 1AL BROADCASTI NG REVENUE 1 f !\~;Il: tota 1 1 medium wave FM dO te le :;I.ll '1 revenue 1 T.V. ra 10 1yeiJr ~a - .00 1. Z.;; ( Z.,2) 1 152 ( 7.6) 1 1. O~1 ( 3. 5) 1 • 1965 • , :l 1. l''·,,J j. !il 17 ~ :1 t CI) • 1. '?'J') (! ;j. 1) 1 1 t 1 1 ·. 1.7:,1 C:!l. 1/' 212i21.9) : 1. :-:1 !:!l. Il) ! 1 1 .'.., 1. : ..')1 'II. l' i .2i:?~18 Q) J 1. 725 (l~. 1) 1 i 1 · 2.j~(.2~.:;) 1 315(25. UJ 1 '1 Ill" (?- Il 1 ( -) 1 1970 _ ...·. •• J .ol. JI Ij 3. 1O~ (22. j) : 3b'.J ("?-_•• ?) 1, 2. ~O (21.7) 1 12 (:AU) 1 1 ". , .. ~ 7. J) '!. o·,~: 7 . .;) I\) ..... w •• ... , Il )' 19: .. ~.li. ?) 1 .;7 ~.67-Hl:i.8l , 4~'(1".b .J •• 1 3. 30;(1~. 7" 23 (25. 6) 1 , , :/\ ~. 711 \:':1. bll 5;j\2u.:;, 1 4. vitH:?!.:ij , ~':;!)I';i 1 1 1 Q -\1 ;,211 R.7) ! : !4 5. r:-" 1 .. ' 1 .; • .;..;2C 9.511 43(32. 6) ; - ..., 11 • I 1975 -ti, J.tJ __ \ fUll (lIJ."'1 !J• ••"l 1 ~. 7S:{ S.·U 49 Cl 3. Il) ; - 1 -Ii .... , 7::1: l(), .,: :-",;' ! :. ~~ ~ :. ~51 ~2·.\ 3), '32/2; O~ -., . '- 7... ,:-:-:-, 1:.::: 1 ~:5'L~ .!' . -. ,!.l.!II1. 11: 70 1l7.111 : '1 l" - ... 1· :,J ~:'1; 1 }j.v/! "',1_1 •• lI, 1 u\ ~'"I"c'_ \ ~,h , 1 1 1 'f ~::: ~. ~ 1 ", 1 W ••~~I 1" ... : 1.II,d·~," . b. .... 11_.0)" l"bOG.S: , 1· • 1980 - ":; ,1O.1lP / 1. 9: : 1.212( &9)! S.5:!Q( ~.S)I, 12H15. D ; 1 .... 1".I\.l~ / Il 141 1 1. 2r):! ( 6.6) , ~.1::0( 6.9) 1 13; ( 7. ~'I • ., ,\. . .. -, ", ,ll.tll.!: 7. l J 1 1. :>J';...... 1. ). ,..'\l, -'·""1 Hl': ;:.!~ s; ; ( • ". ... -, I.. ~, • It..·. ;:~t · -~ 1::. ::v,; ••• JI 1. ;)1<111 :-.v' ~~1 ·~~2. 4' . · -,:. 1:. :~w, 1 j. Iii 1• .;~! ( ... j) . 11.1,5\H ~.5, ,' .!.~tH 1). JI , )~ ''1L;., r \ 7 1 1 1. .;~2 ( Il 0'· 11. )(l:! 1 :!.~) 1 301j ::~. t» • .! 1985 '-:"-:::"-' . - ~ ..... _.. The Ministry of Posts ~nd Telecommunicatio ed. Hoso Seisaku no Tenbo: New Medj~ Jidai ni Okeru Hoso ni Kansuru Kcndan kai. 1987 Figure Is a hundred mlll ion yen. Figure inside of ( ) is il growth rate From the previou~ year. ( 31 Ownership of commercial broadcasting comparaies is restricted by Article 9 of the Radio Law which prohibits a broadcasting company from owninq more than two broadcastinq stations in a11 of Japan. Thus, unlike NHK which broadcasts nationwide, commercial broadcasting stations broadcast on a prefecture t'asis. The number of commercial television channels available in each prefecture is decided by the MPT. As Figure Four illustrates, the number is not even across the country. Amonq 47 prefectures, six prefectures with a large number of people are allocated six commercial television channels while the prefectures with small populations have only two commercial channels each. This regional imbalance is permitted because industrial cities provide a bigger market than rural areas do to commercial broadcasters, whose main source of revenue is advertising. The Radio Law also prohibits simultaneous management or control of radio, television and news paper businesses8 • In practice, however, television networks9 and affiliations between major broadcasting companies and major 8 The Radio Law prohibits broadcasting and newspaper from possessing more than 10% of the corporation votes of the other. MPT will not issue a new licence if a newspaper company owns mor9 than 7% of a television broadcasting company, or wishes to invest in FM radio. 9 There are four major reasons for the development of the networks in Japan (MPT 1987, 65-66). First, the network system is more cost effective in gathering national and regional news. Second, members of a network can share the cost of programme production. Third, local broadcasters can get programmes which are made in Tokyo or Osaka where better talent ls often located. Fourth, the network system answers sponsors' needs for nation-wide advertisements. 31a FiGURE FOUR: CHAlmEL PLAU FOR COilMERC 1AL BROADCASTI NG -1986 GJJ:3-2·' ~htT v t:: ~ <3 :"-ht*JfHlJ;~:~1;Ilit3 -r(1)1Jl~ '. I/\'II/lhl:, '0.111.,', 1 fJ/ :r'/I 6 channe 1 ",.1 Sim . , '~JJ!'lt '10 "," ·5 channel~"?Nm , I\.IJ!'/~ Il.m:,1j1Ifll,'1 channel 4 J·ml~ ...... ~: . , I\.h"/c f 'l Il,!) 1--1 3 channe 1s·" , , \1 , 'II~'/' f ') ".' , 2channels- I ... ~, '.1 • '1 l'" J ... i/l. It le",.', ~'I/I 1.1' .. ; l 'it '." , " 1 . ill "1'" "11' .:r " ,.11, {,'l' l(~',t'''il •.41', 1~,,"2f;l!: ! '. , ;-":.: 'l".: J ' •• 1.: ~.' ...., " Okinawa The Hinistry of Posts and Telecommunicatic cd. Hoso Scisaku no Tenbo: New Media Jidai ni Okeru Hoso ni Kansuru Kondan- '. k" i. To!,vo: :>enki Tsushin Sh in· shlf'llo..o KaT. 1987: ;2 32 t newspapers have been estab1ished. There are four commercial te1evision networks in Japan. 10 Each network is managed by four big broadcasting companies, all of which are 10cated in Tokyo. A1though the four companies are prohibited from owning other broadcasting companies in other prefectures, they distribute programmes to their network members, local te1evision broadcasting companies. It is important to note that, in Japan, network membership is not exclusive; a local broadcasting company can get programmes from more than two networks. Therefore, local te1evision broadcastinq stations can maintain a certain leve1 of independence from the big four. Affiliations between te1evision networks and major newspaper companies are made in news reporting. The two sides can bene fit from each other in terms of cost and labour since the collection of news materia1, especia11y international news, requires a large amount of money and experienced journa1ists. Newspaper companies are interested in extending their business into new media, such as facsimi1e broadcastinq, videotex and teletext. VCRs in Japan In addition to conventiona1 television broadcastinq, video cassette tape recorders (VeRs) are very popular in Japan. The present high avai1abi1ity of VCRs is a recent phenomenon. In 1980, on1y 6% of househo1ds had a VCR, now 60% do (NHK 10 Asahi Shimbun reports that the four companies made 580 billion yen in revenue in 1986, which consists 40% of the total revenue for commercial broadcasting (Yano 13 June 1987, 4). 33 1987,128). This dramatic growth in VCR ownership can be e~p1ained oy their use as time-switchers for conventiona1 broadcast programming. Two groups in particu1ar use veRs: busy people inc1uding businessmen who come home late from work, and students, inc1uding ehildren, who spend their ear1y evenings at preparatory schoo1s studying for entranee examinations. VCRs are also used to watch commereia11y produced video taped software. In the past, pornography made up the majority of VCR software sales, but the variety of VCR software is increasing to include movies, cartoons, music, sports games, "do-it yourse1f" and educational information programmes. There are about ~5,OOO video rentaI stores in the country, and the number is growing (Murayama 15 Jan. 1988,87). The rental priee is usually only a few hundred yen (a few Canadian dollars), and mueh cheaper than a priee of a movie ticket which costs about 1,800 yen (Cdn$ 18). An additional popular use of videos is to make "home videos" on special occasions, sueh as weddings, birthdays, or school graduations. 20% of households which have a VCR a1so own a video camera. These usage patterns suggest that part of the appeal of VCRs is that they a110w people to watch what they want, when they want. In other words, the VCR is used to make TV viewing more selective and more individual with!n the household. Futhermore, the low priee of VCRts has also eontributed to their popu1arity. Japanese electronics manufacturers produce inexpensive, high quality VCRs, and the 34 priee has kept falling as sales have increased. 11 Cable tqlevision Compared to conventional television broadcasting and VeRs, cable television broadcasting has not yet been fully deve10ped in Japan. In March 1986, only 14.6% of Japanese househo1ds subscribed to cable te1evision. Cab1e's underdeveloped situation in Japan is different from the US where it has greatly effected satellite projects. American cable operators became a strong moving force behind the introduction of satellite systems because they had grown to the point that they needed satellites for nationwide distribution of programmes. However, in Japan, the cable broadcasting business has not been much involved in the development of direct broadcasting satellites. The reason for this lies in the fact that cable in Japan ia used primarily to retransmit conventional broadcast programmes and is not operated for profit-making. Cable was developed as a public service to improve TV viewing in valleyu between mountains and remote Islands where people cannot receive conventional television broadcasting. Given an obligation to solve reception problems by the Broadcast Law, NHK has implemented cable systems in 10,746 districts (NHK 1986). Some cable systems in urban areas were laid by builders of high-rises wh'an those buildings caused reception problems in their areas. These cables are operated at both NHK and the 11 For example, Fareastern Economie Review (4 Feb. 1988, ,., 89) reports that, in 1988, VCRs were 20-25% cheaper than they were a year previously. 35 l local communities' expense, and users receive cable service tree of charqe or are required to pay a sma11 fee if their cable has an additional channel for local programminq. Since a large commercial cable industry did not exist in Japan unti1 recently, it was not an important player in terms of deve10pment of direct broadcastinq satellite projects. However, this situation is quick1y chanqinq. A new type of cable service that offers multi-channel services has started in Japanese urban areas. Some have two-way systems which enab1e cable operators to offer not only two-way broadcasting but a1so other services such as banking, shopping, ticket reservation, and data exchange to the audience at home. This new business oriented cable industry is very mu ch interested in the development of satellite systems for nationwide cable networking and Is involved in national projects for direct broadcastinq satellites and communication satellites, as weIl as commercial communications satellites (this will be explained in qreater detai1 in Chapter Four). This section has introduced Japan's broadcastinq media situation in which DBS has had to find a niche. There is a we11-established conventional television broadcastinq system which has pUblic and commercial channe1s, veRs which are very popular, and cable television which ls a1most as new as DBS in Japan. Based on this understanùinq of the competitive media situation in Japan, the fo110winq section focuses on DES po1icy to analyze what kind of niche DBS is meant and able t~ qain. 36 t Section TwQ; Interests in DBS Goyernment's Interest The Japanese government pa id a11 150 billion yen to 1aunch the e~~erimenta1 broadcasting satellite (BS-E) and 60 billion yen (US$265 Million) (that is 40%12 of the total expense) to have BS-2a and BS-2b. The rest was paid by NHK (NHK's invo1vement will be fu11y exp1ained in the next section). The government's financia1 invo1vement was regarded as "part of the science and technology promotion expenditure" (Goto 1983). The government's financia1 invo1vement in the DBS project ... is closely re1ated to its research and deve10pment po1icy and .. the Kodo Johoka Shakai (Highly Advanced Information society) p01icy. As explained in the previous chapter, the Japanese government's R&D po1icy current1y tries to encourage the development of technologies that do not provide immediate benefits to industries. Space technologies, inc1uding the DBS project, fa11 in this category of new technologies which are financially too risky for private investors to sustain. The Japanese business sector, like the home electronics industry, is also enthusiastic about the development of DBS because they expect that new media services via satellite will provide big business chances (Morimoto, 20 Feb. 1987, 4). 12 This percentage division of payments was determined in the minister-level budget meeting in 1979 (Yabushita 4 July 1986, 4). 37 l DBS is also being promoted as an important part of broadcasting in the Kodo Johoka Shakai (Highly Advanced Information Society). In order to introduce DBS to the existing broadcast media environment, the MPT has employed a policy which aims to develop a harmonious balance between old and new media by allowing only gradual changes in the broadcasting system (Hamada 1987, 55-56). This pOlicy was clearly set in a report by the Study Committee on the Diversification of Broadcasting for the chief of the Radio Requlatory Bureau of the MPT in 1980 (Goto 1983, 25-29). The MPT considered that a sudden introduction of many DBS broadcasting channels would create confusion that would be detrimental to the growth of DBS itself and damage existing media businesses as well. This assumption was derived from economic estimations. It was calculated that a revenue of 100 billion yen is necessary for a DBS commercial channel operation to become a profitable venture, but estimated that the Japanese advertising market will not become big enough to sustain the revenue requirements of several DBS channels in this century. Based on this policy, the MPT decided to restrict the uses of radio signals to only two DBS channels via BS-2a in the beginning of DBS broadcasting even though eight channels were allocated to Japan at the WARC-BS conference in 1977 (This will be explained in detail in Chapter Three). The MPT a1so 1icenced on1y NHK to broadcast via BS-2a because NHK's r financing source is audience fees, thus independent from the 38 t advertising market. To reduce competition with the conventiona1 broadcast networks, MPT a1so restricted the DBS ehanne1s from carrying original programs unti1 1987. These restrictions have been futher relaxed to make DBS more attractive to people. One of NHK's DBS channels earries original programmes, and a commercial channel is 1icenced for the next satellite (this will be fu11y exp1ained in Chapter Four). The MPT's earefu1 approach to the CBS project is not a1ways fo110wed by other institutions. For examp1e, a1thouqh this attempt eventua11y fai1ed, the Ministry of Education was interested in using DBS for the University of the Air which provides university and graduate-level education most1y by giving lectures via te1evision. The projeet did not take place because the expense of the equipment required for DBS was thouqht to undermine the university's very objective to provide wide educationa1 opportunities to people. The MPT has a1so had to dea1 with the Ministry of International Trade and Industries (MITI). A1though the MITI does not have a direct eontrol1ing power on DBS po1icy sinee broadcasting is the MPT's field, the MITI's requ1atory power over te1ecommunications industries gives it a close interest in the deve10pment of satellite uses. As exp1ained in the previous chapter, the two ministries' orientations differ in that the MITI tries to encourage competition in markets by re1axing regu1ations while the MPT is more conservative and protective of the status quo. The two ministries' disputes 39 ( over the recent derequlation of Japan's telecommunications laws between 1983 to '85 was even called "telecom wars" (Janisch 1988, 7-9). The MPT wanted to put strict conditions for licencing commercial satellite companies, but its original plan was qreatly moderated by the MITI which insisted on opening this market to foreign capital as well (the implications of telecommunications business for the DBS project will be fully discussed in Chapter Four). NHK's Interests NHK has had three major interests in DBS development. The most publicized of these is NHK's public service mandate to lay a network to reach all people by using OBS. The second one is NHK's mandate as the public broadcaster to improve broadcast technology in Japan. The third one is NHK's need to increase income from audiences by introducing new services like DBS. As the public broadcaster, NHK is required by the Broadcast Law to eliminate poor reception in order "to secure the maximum availability and benefits of broadcastinq to the people" (The Broadcast Law, Article One). Because 80% of the country consists of woodlands and because Japan has more than 3,000 islands, people living in such areas have difficulties receiving radio waves of conventional tele'lision broadcasting. In order to complete this task, NHK began to consider to have DBS in the 1960's, as the best solution to eliminating raception problems because DBS covers the entire nation regardless of its geographical characteristics. DBS was also ( 40 t estimated to be more cost-effective than buildinq land facilities in scattered areas. 13 In 1966, NHK president, Maeda tirst publicly expressed NHK's intention to introduce OSS at the H~~se of Representatives (Yabushita and Tsuji 4 July 1986, 4). At that time, there were mnre than 420,000 households with reception problems, and this poor reception was the only problem left for NHK.14 However, this situation chanqed as time went bye By the time direct broadcastinq by satellite became ~vailable in Japan in the 1980's, reception problems had decreased qreatly in rural areas and exist now mostly due to building barriers in urban areas. Shimizu (1987, 30) reports: " ••• through extensive installation of small relay transmitters throughout the country and improvement in reception technoloqy, the number of households with poor reception has decreased to around 100,000. Thus, there is no longer any need for a satellite merely to relay terrestrial signals." Recently, cost estimates also show it to be a less economical option than that of optic fibre cable. This situation is ironie considerinq that at the time full-scale OSS broadcastinq started, the conventional 13 NHK estimated that it would ccst 130 billion yen to provide the remaining households by shiftinq cable lines. This was three times the NHK's expenditure of 40 billion yen on BS-2 project (Sakamoto 24 Jan. 1984, 4). 14 The re~son for this i9 that, in the previous four years, colour television broadcastinq had commenced, and the number of TV reception contracts surpassed that of radio while the first experimental satellite relay by communication satellite between Japan and the US was succeeded in 1963. 41 l broadcasting mean. which NHK it.elf had implemented, had vlrtually oliminatod the broadcaat intorforenco problom. which DBS was auppoaed to Dolvo. Thi. waD aftor twonty yoars of publicizinq tho ollmlnation of rocoption probloms a. "tho basic ml •• ion ot aatollitoa" (NHK 1986), and aftor NHK had .pont billions of yon on the oas projoct. 8.caus. of thi. chanqinq situation, NHK boqan to placo more omphaaia on Its mandate to devolop modia tochnoloqy. Accordin; to tho B~oadca.t Law, NHK has th. taak ot 1mprovinq broadcaatinq tochnology a. Japan t • public broadcaotinq corporation. ThUM, NHK .ponds a cartain amount of 1ts annual budqot for DUrvOy. and re •• arch modia tochnoloqy dQvolopmont. For oxamplQ, in the fiscal yoar ot 1985, 9.9 million yon (Cdn.$99 million) which wa. 2.8' of the budget, va. allocatod for thi. purpo•• (HPT 1987, 23-27). ItHK has ovorsoon the dovolopment and implomentation ot technologie. ranginq from radio to teloviaion, trom black and whito to colour broadcaatinq, satellite rolay, multi-aound broadcasting, and tolotoxt broadcaatinq. Thoroforo, JlHK considora that D8S, too, chould bo dovolopod by NHK. NHK nov DtroDaoa thla mandata the moat to jUGtify lts inviovomont, oapocially emphaaizing tho future benofits and uaea of ODS. nov media aervlcea Duch as Hiqh Definition Tol.viaion and Pullo Codo Modulo Sound Broadcaatinq can bo provldod only via aateIIita in futuro bocauao of the 11mltod numbor of ulabl. froquoncloD for convontionai broadcaating (thoDo nov modia Dorvic.D will bo 42 t fu11y .xplai~.d in Chapt.r Four). In thi. context, promotion and diffu.lon of DBS technoloqy 1. regarded as a contribution to the Kodo Joboka Shako! (Hiqh1y Advancod Information Socioty), rathor tban mor.ly a. a panacoa to the recoption problom. Thor. 1. a third factor for NHK to ~e intereated in OBS broodcastinq. Collocting nov feos from aUdience. vho watch DBS i. a very attractive idea tor NHK. NHK has beon tacing financial probloma alnce the mid-1970'. vhen TV rocoiver ownorship roachod a saturation point with 99' of houaaholda owninq teloviaion sota. As the numbor of nrw rocoption contracta doclinod, NHK'. rovonuas, which oro largely depandant on roception fooa, baqan to atagnata. Hovover, at the samo timo th. oxponao of broadcaatinq hoa continuad to grov. NHK's revonue. havo also suttorad trom poor manaqamont and the rapid oxpansion ot ita orqani~ation (NHK 1982,90-108). In ordor to .olvo tholo tinancial probloma, NHK incroasad 1ts usor fool in 1976, 1980, and 1984. 15 Such froquont t.o incr.a ••s var. hiqhly criticizod. ThuI, the altornativo ot croatlnq a nov kind ot tao fcr subscription to OBS wos considorod 01 a solution to NHK'D tinancial problomB. Hcvovor, the nov too was not 1ntroducod et tho baqinninq of OBS broadca8tinq. This val tirltly bocau8o most ot tho DSS audionco had rocoption problom8, whom NHK, as the public 15 Tholo fOOD ara 1,040 yon (Cdn.SlO.40) a month tor a houlohold vith ft colour taloviaion sat and 680 yon (Cdn.S6.80) for tho,a vl~h a black ~nd white tol.vision Dot (HPT 1987, 23-27) 43 l broadcaater, ia mandated to reach at it. own expense. secondly, NHK is atraid that the introduction ot the tee may discourage people trom watchinq OBS. Thus, instead ot creatinq new tees tor the DBS audience, NHK tried to keep its programme production cost tor its DSS channels to a minimum. 16 However, in 1999, NHK and the MPT tinally decided to introduce the tee atter OBS audiences increased to 1,000,000 households (Asahi ShimbuD 23 Feb. 1998, 1).17 Consulers' Little lntlrast Despite the qovernment's and NHK's enthusiastic attitude towards introducinq OSS broadcastinq in Japan, DBS has not qained popularity amonq consumera. DBS audiences reached only 115,000 households which is leso than 1 , ot the potential ( audience ot 30,000,000 households with TV sets. Thare are a nuDher ot reasons tor this lack ot intereot in DBS amonq the majority ot pooplo in Japan. First, DSS's primary object to supplement conventional televiaion notwork reach was ot little relevance to most ot the 16 Tho total cost tor purchase and production of DBS p':ograoas waQ only 3.5 billion yon in 1997 (Sakamoto 2S June 1987, 4), and seven billion yen 1n 1998 (Kawamoto 16 June 1988, 4). These amounts are smal1 in comparison to NHK's programme expenditure on conventional television channels which was 95 billion yen in 1997. NHK described DBS proqrammes once as "tho•• which do not aat money and people' 8 hands" (~_Gllhi Shimbun 3 July 1987, evening 15). 17 Thore WAS another opinion that the t~e should be introduced atter the OSS audience reach 7.5' ot the total houaoholda in Japan. This rat. waa th. aam. or.~ at the time of introdJction ot the tee for col our television reception , (Ubukata 1988, 117). "' 44 l population and was appreciated only by the small number or people in rural areas who comprise most or the current oas audience. These people were delighted to have oas. For example, a villager in the Minami Daito island which is located 400 k.m. from the Okinawa islands, WaS quoted in Asahi Shimbun (24 Jan. 1984, 23): "How happy l will be when OBS starts. 1 can watch the NHK morning nobel programmes every day, as well as sumo wrestling and high school baseball games at the actual time." Until DBS started, people on this Island watched NHK's programmes on local CATV four weeks later than mainland Japan. Their broadcasting hours were cut short, and only a limited variety of programmes were available. The introduction of DSS enabled people in such isolated islands to be integrated into the main stream of the mass media for the first time. 18 However, the total number of people who were not reach by conventional broadcasting was only 10,000 before OSS broadcasting started; thus, their Appreciation contributed little to the wide acceptance of DBS broadcasting. Second, for most ot the Japanese population, oas did not greatly increase either the choico or variety of available channels. only one of the two oas channels, Channel-l, carries 18 However, this can bo also interpreted as a decrease of local character in media. For example, in the Ogasaw~~a islands, 1,000 k.m. south of Tokyo, people abandoned their small local CATV when DSS started. 366 households on the island decided so, because they did not want to paY f~es boch for cable and DSS, and would prefer NHK's DSS programmes to local programmes even though people no longer could .atch their local news such as ceremonies at schools and village conferences (Asahi Shimbun 27 April 1984, 122). 45 1 original programmes. The other channel, Channel-2, broadcasts digests ot programmes from the conventiona1 NHK-Genera1 and NHK-Education channels, in order to serve those with poor reception problems. Few people consider one more channel is worth the expense of subscribing, coupled with the high expense of investing in the equipment necessary to watch OBS. A parabo1ic a~tenna and tuner costs about 200,000 yen (Cdn.$ 2,000) which is far more than an average household's annual broadcasting budget of 7,900 yen (Cdn.$79). Futhermore, 69% of Japanese households already have VCRs which are cheaper than OBS and cater well to individual needs and programme choices. It is a1so important to remember that, in Japan, conventional television broadcasting carries programmes 18 hours and 45 ( minutes a day on average and provides eight channels in urban areas where most Japanese people live (MPT 1988, 161). Such variety of channel choice on conventional broadcasting is not the case for most other indus trial countries where the primary appeal of OBS broadcasting is the provision of more channels. According to a public opinion survey (NHK 1982, 148-149) in Japan, 70\ of people think that they a1ready have an Adequate number of television chan~4ls. 15\ of those who live in eight-channel areas even agree that they have too many channels. People believe that more channels will increase competition over viewing rates, and consequently programme content is likely to become more sensational and ( vUlgar (Arai 1985; Aida 1987). Sensationalism on commercial TV 46 1 programmes has been a target of stronq pUblic criticism19 • The survey also suqgested that more than 80' of people were doubtful or disagreed with the ide a ot extendinq broadcast hours. The averaqe Japanese person watches television about three hours a day, and an average household watches TV about eight hours a day. People are unlikely to devote more time to watchinq TV even with more channels or longer broadcasting hours, especially considering the fa ct that more women are enterinq the work force and people enjoy a qreater variety of leisure activities. Third, consumers do not seem very enthusiastic about the new media services which are only available by DBS broadcasting. High Definition Television (HDTV), one of the most publicised new media services by NHK, nas received little reaction in the domestic market because it is extremely expensive. It is estimated that those who want to enjoy pictures in better quality will likely buy the Enhanced Definition Television (EDTV) instead of HDTV20. EDTV was developed by the commercial Television Broadcaster's 19 Between 1985 and 1986 alone, commercial television broadcast involved several sensational incidents, su ch as: revorters recorded and photographed the killing of a chairman of a company which had deceived many people in gold-sellinq deals; a broadcaster prearranqed a violent attack by members of a girl gang on each ~ther; and the press corps converqed on families and friends of victims after disasters including a Japan Air lines crash, a hotel tire in Izu, and a criminal suspected ot wite killinq. 20 The MPT considers the EDTV provides a "transition service" during the period ot conversion trom conventional to HOTV transmission. 47 l Association and home electronics companies in Japan to provide clearer pictures in conventional broadcasting. However, its picture quality is less elaborate2l than that of HDTV. To watch EOTV transmission, one has to buy a new TV set which is based on the EDTV standard. An EDTV set costs about 400,000 yen (Cdn.$ 4,000) which is twice as much as the current non-sale priee of a TV set but is still affordable compared to an HOTV set. It is even doubtful whether the immensely clearer pictures provided by HOTV or EDTV are really enjoyed by audiences if broadcasters continue to use conventional broadcasting techniques that will for example, expose more sharply the lines of wigs on actors' heads in a samurai!s drama. In addition to the above three factors, NHK's argumant that OBS is useful in times of emergency and disater has been far from effective in convincing people to switch to OBS. NHK aims to develop a system to send emergency signals to households. However, for people who need to escape, radio or telephone is a more effective medium than DBS. DBS is useful for broadcasters in times of a disaster, because they can easily send pictures from a site of a disaster via satellite to audiences in other parts of a nation. 21 Technologically, EDTV is merely an improved version of the current television system and cannot provide pictures as clear as HDTV. In order to smooth the transition, the M~'s Committee for EDTV divided the implementation of the new technology into two stages. It admits that the first stage of EDTV does not improve picture quality subs~antially (Kawamoto Asahi Shimbun Nov.3 1988,18). 48 1 section Three; A New strategy to Promote PBS; Specialty programming Clearly the efforts by the government and by NHK to promote Japan's PBS project have failed to interest consumers. In response to this lack of interest, both the government and NHK currently are trying to increase the popularity of DBS. The government ls encouraging the establishment of space cable networks which will enable audiences to subscribe to DBS with much less cost (this will be fu1ly explained in Chapter Four). NHK is tryinq to provide attractive programmes on PBS broadcastinq by making them different from those on conventional broadcastinq and VCRs. NHK calls programmes on Channel-l proqramming "specialised" and hopes this proqramming "1 • will attract "a tarqeted audience" in the upper-middle class who can afford expensive PBS equipment (Shimizu Nov. 1987, 31). There are two characteristics of NHK's Channel-1 programming which started to broadcast oriqinal programs 24 hours a day since 4 July 1987. One is more news programs. News programs are broadcast fourteen hours a day includinq two slots in prime time between 6 p.m. to 7 p.m. and 10 p.m. to Il p.m., lunch time between Il and 13 o'clock, and morning hours from 1 a.m. until9 a.m. (Asahi Shimbun 28 Oct. 1987, eveninq 11-13). These news programmes emphasize more international content than national content. This increase of foreign content is the other • characteristic of Channel-l proqramming. Apart from NHK's own 49 news reports trom abroad, Channel-l carries the news programmes of foreign networks, such as ABC, CNN and BBC. These news broadcasts are introduced by Japanese anchor pers ons who compare the varied commenta of theae foreign newseasts when big international events oceur. Apart from hard news, foreign made news also features many aspects of foreign people's lives and life styles, that have gained some popularity among the Japanese audience. This tendeney to air more foreign content ls also apparent in other Channel-l programmelJ. There is more foreign music in the daily five hours of musil:: programmes. American baseball games, international soceer and tennis competitions are seen in the sports programmes that are broadeast two hours a day. There are also more foreign dramas, movies, theatre plays and other entertainment on Channel-le Emphasizinq news reporting ia a good strategy for DBS to eompete with VCRs because realtime news reports create a distinct programme category whieh sets DBS programming apart from VCRs. Under the current Kodo Johoka Sha}~ (Highly Advaneed Information Society) policy, information is valued highly, and consequently news proqrammes are emphasized over other types of programmes. This move also reinforces NHK's historical dominance over commercial broadcasters' news reporting. 22 By using foreign made news for international news 22 NHK has a good reputation in news reporting. According to a survey (Arai and Fujikawa 1987, 140), ~mK was listed as the most reliable medium by 62\ of people aEI op:oosed to 31\ for , the newspaper. NHk plays an important role in distributing information, considering that television trêlnsmits 81' of the 50 1 reporting, NHK saves on the high costs for the collection and producti~n of foreign news, and can compensate for its own correspondents' weak coverage of features and human interest stories compared to political and economic reports. This strategy to orient DBS towards more foreign content has been successful in gaining a positive reaction from the people. An important reason for this lies in the relative unavai1ability of foreign programmes on conventiona1 broadcasting. According to one survey (Sugiyama ~982, 225- 234), Japan's conventiona1 broadcasting has one of the lowest rates of imported programmes in the wor1d. Imported programmes constitute only 2.8% of all TV programmes and 5% of the total television broadcasting hours in 1980. 23 However, the Japanese people's interest in foreign programmes has become stronger than ever as their contacts with western culture have increased. This orientation towards more foreign content a1so relates to the government's policy for the tlinternationalization" of Japan. This po1icy aims to open the country more to foreign perspectives. It was developed partia11y in response to foreign countries' criticism of Japan's trade surplus, c10sed markets, and Japanese government and society's lack of concern total information in Japan (Arai and Fujikawa 1987, 126). 23 This little presence of foreign programmes is not set by a p01itical force but merely a commercial one. Television viewing rates have suggested that Japanese people, especia1ly -. those above middle age, pre fer domestic programmes to imported ones. 51 for international issues compared to their strong invo1vement with domestic matters. Under such circumstances, increasing foreign content on the Channe1-1 was largely perceived as an adequate way to promote the "internationa1ization" of Japan. It is interesting to note that Japan's use of DBS to increase foreign content in broadcasting is rather an opposite move compared to other industria1 countries' uses of DBS. For examp1e, Canada is trying to use new media techno10gy to deve10p Canadian identity by increasing Canadian content in broadcasting over and against American programmes which fill 80~ of Eng1ish channe1s in prime time. The U.K., Italy, France, and Many other countries a1so broadcast Many American programmes and fee1 cu1tura11y threatened to some degree as a resu1t of this exposure to American programmes. By contrast, the Japanese people show very 1itt1e resist~nce to increased foreign content, and especiajly American programmes in broadcasting. This May be attributed to not on1y the very 10w avai1abi1ity of foreign programmes, but a1so differences between the US and Japan in language, geography, demographic characteristics, religion, culture and history that are so vast that the fear of total cultural assimilation does not app1y. Because national pride and identity are re1atively strong among Japanese peop1e24 , there 24 According to a study by Akiyama and Muramatsu (1985,144-146), a statement "Japan is a first-c1ass country" was 8greed by 57% of people, and the other statement "Japanese have c1ear1y superior qua1ities" was 8greed by 71% of people in f 1983. Both statements were supported more by midd1e aged 52 t is little need to intentionally develop it by increasing the domestic content in broadcastinq as the Canadian government does. In Japan, popular culture that is reproduced by the mass media has not been accorded as strong a role as it has in Canada in the promotion of cultural identity. More regard is qiven to high culture when Japanese identity is politically discussed. 25 Television broadcasting has had a relatively neqative status, and been cast in "the villain's role" (NHK 1977, 240) which has perhaps just the potential ot television to contribute to hurt Japanese culture. 26 It is difficult to determine distinctly the effectiveness people than young people, and agreed by more people this time than previous years. The study points out that "this growing sense of national pride largely corresponds with Japan's economic progress ••• with this newly r~stored self-confidence, Ja~anese are often accuserl of arrogance in their dealings with other peoples" (146). 25 The 10w status of popular culture in Japanese media in terms of nationalism was observed after the Showa Emperor became seriously ill in September 1988. Commercial broadcasters presentad their self-restraint by stopping entertainment programmes if they included violence, non-sense humour and explicit sexual content. These criteria were applied to both domestic and foreign programmes; thus, for example, western classic music was considered uppropriate but not pop music. Excluded programmes suggest that respect for the emperor tend to be expressed in broadcasting by obliterating popular culture contbnt regardless of whether it was foreign or domestically produced. 26 Soichi Oya commented on the start of television broadcasting in 1957, "ichioku so hakuchika" (complete national fatuity or aIl the population becomes silly), which became very famous. He said: "In particular, TV airs programmes everyday which are similar to or even worse than comic books. It might be said that radio and television astringe complains for the 'complete national fatuity' of the Japanese people" (NHK 1977, - 240). 53 l of the characteristic programme content offered on Channel-l in terms of gaininq wide acceptance for DBS broadcastinq. The oriqinality of Channel-1 programmes was eroded to some degree when commercial broadcasters quickly put more international content and more news programmes on their schedules. 27 Conclusion The stronq presence of conventional media in Japan has hurt the establishment of OBS. The national association of commercial broadcasters in Japan has criticized the NHK's expansion into new media businesses (Yano 12 May 1987, 4) and has pressured the MPT to admit the necessity to limit this expansion (MPT 1987, 62-63). Consumers' interest in DBS broadcasting has also been weak, causing a shift in the f . strateqy of promoting DBS as a me ans to meet the public broadcaster's obligation to provide broadcast service to every part of the country, to a strategy of promotinq DBS as a means to provide distinctly different broadcast services than those offered on conventional television. Nevertheless, NHK and the qovernment have continu~d to promote the DBS project. In order to operate DBS, Japan ne~ds a series of frequencies and positions on satelll~'e orbits over which the government has no controllinq power. ~hese are assigned to each country at international agencies accordinq to international agreements. 27 For example, the TV Asahi, one of the biqqest commercial station, announced, ten days before startinq of DBS, that it would broadcast the CNN news (rom the US in the early morninq and mid-niqht, and that it would increase the number of r news reports via satellite relay from the US. 54 The next chapter, therefore, considers the introduction of DBS in Japan in tarms of the world requlatory situation. 55 1 Chaptor Throo: Japon'. DDS OGYolopaont in Relation to tho World Roqulatory situation Introduction ~or noarly thirty yoara, hoatod dobatoa ovor the roqulation ot dlro~~ broadcaDtinq yia .atollitol hayo bo.n carriod out amon; intornational i~Dtitution., .uch aD the Unltod Nations' com=itto. on th. Poac.tul US.I ot Outor Spaco (COPUOS), tho UN'. Educational, Sciontitic and Cultural Orqanization (UNESCO), and tho Intornational Tolocommunication. Union (ITU). But agrooDontl have boon diftieuit to roach. Loqal illuOD rolatod to DDS arc balod on concorn. that DBS proqram=inq mlght hurt tho polltical, cultural, locial and ( comaorcial intorolts of a rocolvin; country whoDo dODoDtic lavs cannot control program contont or radio vayes via satolilto troD a broadcaltinq stato. Ono rOCUI of ~iscullion iD national sovoroignty voraUD froodom or information. Prior conaont tor proqram=inq (aqroomonto on proqramD botvoon rocolving and broadcaotlng Itatoo boforo DDS broadcaatlng starto) Day protcct national Govorelgnty but Day undormlno frccdoD ot information. Anothor point ot clabato i. Dtato rosporaibility voraUD troodo~ of tho Dedia. Admittinq that a otate haa ft cortain ro.ponaibility tor progra=ming Day alao provido for a Dtate to claim controiling pover ovar the media. Thia chaptor diacUDDea the koy i •• UOD and policy propoDala that Dhapod the doyolopmont or international OSS and other ! .pace policle.. Japan'I polition in rolation to theDo 56 t intctrnlt!onal debatoa i. then diacu ••ed. ~ion Onoz IntOrDAtiono1 Di,cUllion. CQpu2S Pi'çUl,iono In 1961 intornational cooporation on 'paco communication. va. J~ir.t callod for at tho Conoral A'DOmbly at the UN. Sovon y.ar. latar, the COPUOS oatabli.hod a Working Croup tor the Study ot Communication, by PSS. From tho boginning. apparontly diftoront ideologio. oxiatod bol~4on tho two group., oach ot vhich vaD ropro.ontod by tho USSR and tho us. A Soviot propooal modo in 1972 claimod throo pointa. Firs~, OBS broadc!atin9 ia only 10901 vith tho rocoiving stato', prior eonsont. Socond, tho broadcaDting .tato ha. an obl1;~tlon to .' oxcludo contant thot promoto. othicol hatrod or Inmorality and vhich lntorforo. in anoth_r country" domoDtic problo •• or foroi;n polieio.. Third, tho rocoivin9 .tato ha. tho riqht to provont tho rocaption of unvantod OSS proqrom.. This USSR propoD~l vas radical, and ovon includod tho dOltruction of aatollitoa OG a pOlaiblo moaluro tho rocolvin9 .tato could teko. Althouqh thig point VOD modl!lod in tho 1974 Soviot propoaal, it. ba.lc idoo10qy was m"intainod. lt' s bac~ bf,~o is th. notion of information aovoroIgnty ~hieh holdl that ovory stato haa " ri9ht to provido tho mODt approprioto intornotlon to itl own pooplo accordlng to It. ovn doeiDlona and judqomonta. ~uch rlghta oro eon.idorod oDaontiol for ft Dtoto • to bo ablo to chooao and koop ita ovn 80ciol, économie, 57 t po11tical and cultural value.. Thus, trom the Soviet atandpoint, control ovor broadcastinq proqrama i. part ot a r.a.rvod domain vith which othor states ahould not intortere (Yamamoto 1979, 38-68). Contrary to tho Soviot proposal, the US proposal mada in 1974, 1. aqainat prior conaent. The US position holds that problems cauaed by DSS proqrams ahould bo noqotiated by the two atat.s involvod one. they aris., and that otherwis., D8S ahould b. oporatod undor tochnical roqulation. by tho Intornational Tolocommunication Union and oxistinq international lawa. The US'. atandpoint stros.os the prot.ction ot human riqhta whlch Includoa tho freodom ot information. Tho principle ot human ( riqht. has boen intornationally rocoqnized .ince the Universal Declaration ot Human Riqht. at tho UN in 1948. It. Articlo 19 stat.s "Evoryono has tho riqht to troodom ot opinion and oxpr••• ion: thi. right include. troodom to hold opinions vithout intorforence and to .ook and rocoive and impart inforaation and idoa. through any modo and regardloa. of frontiors." Tho US boliovoa that human riqht. can bo quarantood in the world by competition and the trao exchango of thouqht, information and culturo in a country and botvoon countrio., and that DSS ia ono of tha moat offactive and important meana availabla to promot. the froodom of information (Yamamoto 1979,70). In ordor to nogotiate between thoso two difforent viowa, Canada and Swodon dovalopod a propoaal. This propoaal (, 58 1 recognized the .tata'. rasponsibility for state and private DBS broadcastinq, but at the same time supported the principlo ot freedom ot intormation on DSS, providad that other media be excluded trom discussiona on DBS (Tai.hott 1987, 141-157; Hatto 1982, 187-1891 Hirobe 1981, 102-109; Yamamoto 1979, 99-102). COPUOS could not reach a consensus among the member statos after years of discussion8. Thu8, the UN Ceneral Assembly hold a vote on the Principloa Covorninq the Ua. by States ot Artiticial Earth Satellites tor International Direct Television Broadcaating. The vote adopted the principles of states' r.sponsibility and prior consent which were cl oser to the Soviet proposal than to thoae ot either the Canada-Swedon or th. US proposals. In other words, theso principlos givo more consideration to the receiving country'. position than to that of countrloa orlglnatlng broadcasting. Although it la not 18qally binding, this rosolutlon waa adopted by 107 v~tos with thirtoen atatos votinq aqainat and thirteen statos abstaining. Moat of the dovoloping countrioa votod for tho reoolution and tho primarily industria1 countrios, includinq Japan, votod aqalnst it. Soji Yamamoto who attendod COPUOS describos the change of atmosphoro at COPUOS as a change "trom 1egal diacuaaion to political arqumonts" (1979, 105). UNESCO Discussions unESCO ia anothor place whoro dobatoa on DBS proqrams have takon place. As W8S thé casa in cOPUOS, discussions botween tho aast VA west and south VA north at Ul~ESCO becamo hiqhly 59 l political and staqnant. DBS was diacussed in the context ot a new world information and communication order that aims at creatinq a wider and better balanced dissemination ot information. Developinq and socialist countriea have claimed that world information flows have been heavily one-way trom the western industrial countries to the developinq vorld. The domination and control of news reporting and flow by a tew vestern nows aqoncios have been criticized. In 1972, UNESCO adopted the Declaration of Guidinq principles on the Use ot Satellite Broadcasting for the Free Flow ot Information, the Spread of Education and General CUltural Exchanqe. Thi. declaration approves the principle. of atate sovereiqnty and prior consent althouqh it ia not logally bindinq. Tho US and six others did not agree to give states the riqht to consor toroiqn broadcasts recoived by it. ovn people, based on Adherence to the principle ot treedom of information. Fitty fivo states voted tor the declaration. Most of thom arc afraid that DBS might brinq too strong an influenco trom the VOGt and wanted to protect themaelves aqainst cultural i=porialiom. COPOOS criticized the doc1aration c1aimin9 that UNESCO has no leo!s1atlve power enablinq it to deal adequately with auch prob1ema, eapecially when COPOOS wau working on the iusue (Hatte 1982, 40-49). Tho US W3D truGtrated by UNESCO, where tho vast majority of membors aro deve10pinq countrioD who disagree with the American standpoint on troedom ot information, whilft at the 60 1 .ame time the US made the greatGst contribution to UNESCO tunds. In addition, UNESCO's inetticient management under the Director General Hahtar K'bow was criticized. Several years atter UNESCO adapted the Declaration on Fundamental Principlos Concerning the Mass Hodia in 1978, the US, the UK and several other countries withdrew trom UNESCO. lTV Piscussiong Ideological dittoronces surrounding DBS policy at COPUOS and UNESC~ were not diroctly resolved, but eventually were settled by technological regulation at the lTU. The lTU ia an international organization doaling with technological mattors, including the use ot the radio spectrum and geostationary orbit, trequency assignmonts, notitications and r~gistratlon, and coordination between various aystems (Hatte 1982). The ITU'a World Adminiatrative Radio Conterence (WARC) ot 1977 provided radio trequencies and positions on geostationary orbit to countriep only for domeBtic use. International broadcaoting via DBS van thUG prohibitod unlosD thora was a prior consent trom roceiving countries. consequently, argumonts ovor the international regulations of oas bocama unneceoBary bacauBo domestic broadcasting via OBS remainod o~ the national level. Past arguments have created difficulties in coming to international 10gal agroemonts on OBS becauso each country has differont notions and lavs concerninq freedom of expression and the disturbance of social values and orders. Tho next section 61 tocuses on how this world requlatory situation has attected Japan's DBS project. Section THO: Japan's Position Japan's Position in the Ideological pebate Japan has tried to tind practical compromises by avoiding involvement in the ideological debates occuring at the international organizations. Japan supported the US position on the treodom ot intormatlon rathor than the soviet position on national soveroiqnty, but it did not tota11y commit itselt to the US position. This attitude became apparent when Japan decided not to tollow tho US withdrawal trom UNESCO. This deciaion lott Japan as the biggest financier ot the organization and gave the Japanese governmont an opportunity to play a more important rolo et the international lovol. Even it the governmont wantod to tollow the US, it would have been ditticult to qot pUblic support. Sinc& Japan's withdrawal trom the Leaguo of Nations io romomborod as an historic turning point that lod to the Pacific War, withdrawing trom intornational organizations io gonorally rogardod as taboo. It is intorootlng to note that until the us docision to withdraw from UNESCO, Japancse nowspaporo and magazines had roportod very littlo about tho intotnational dobatos on tho DBS, and ovon articlos about tho US docioion that appoared in major Japanooo nowopapero placod little omphasio on ideologioo compared to the American preos. The JapanoBo media's lack of intorast in ideoloqical conflicts can be oxplainod from an 62 1 historical viewpoint as weIl as by the present situation. In Japan, thara is no tradition ot struqgle tor treedom ot speech or ot the press. These riqhts were qiven to Japan under the US occupation atter World War TVo. In spite ot their origin, these rights are presently weIl guaranteed in Japan, thus the prass and other media tend to be less concerned with these issuas than with the pursuit ot commercial benafit. In addition, Japan's unenthusiastic attitude can be explained by its recent experiences on both sides ot the international information tlow debate. Japan ia a dominant sender ot information in Asia. For elcample, neighboring countries' newspapers report on Japan much more than Japanese papers do on them (Nihon Shimbun Kyokai 1979, 133-136). Very littla is known in Japan about other Asian countries' popular culture, wh!lo Japan's pop music, movies, and magazines are ottan regarded as fashionablo among young people, espccially in Hong Kong, Taiwan and Sinqapore. On the other hand, like other dovoloping countries, Japan has becn at the reccivinq end of information flowinq trom othor industrial countries, and thUG sharas their frustrations to some dogree. For cxample, with the exception of economic information, s011ing Japanese news to the US io otill difticu1t (Isagatana 1983, 135-139), as ia a190 the caao with the salo of Japanose TV programmes, exccpt for cartoona for childron (Taukagoohi 1983, 154-156). Host Amorican newspapers report littlo about Japan, while Japanesc nawspapars carry many kinda of articles on tho US ~_cording to 63 1 a study conducted by the Japan Newspaper an,1 Publishers Association (Hihon Shimbun Kyokai 1979, 125-141). While other countries are increasingly intereated in Japan's economy, this doea not instantly create masa interests in other aspects of the Japanese nation. Having experienced ~ot:h sides of the information flow debate, Japan prefers to SElek a compromise in practice, rather than committinq itself to either side of the ideological spectrum. Japan's Administration of PBS Japan's approach to seekinq a practical solution has resulted in the development of a unique system for the administration of DBS. Japan's administrative organization, the Tsushin Hisi Eisei Kik2- (Telecommunications Satellite Corporation) (TSC)1, is not responsible for broadcasting satellites' software, or the business of brondcasting itself. The TSC ia only responsible for satellite hardware includinq the design, maintenance and technical operatJon of broadcasting satollites. 2 Therefore, the programme content of satellite 1 The TSC was established under the provisions of the Telecommunications Satellite Corporation Act in 1979. It is responsible for broadcasting satellites and communication satellites. 2 The TSC has four tasks over broadcastirlg satellites. First, it makes plans for the design and launching schedule of broadcast satellites according to requests from user organizations. It is thus clear that the Japanese system is not based entirely on free competition among users. The organization negotiates benefits among users in order to make bast use of the l imi ted number of frequencies I,nd available broadcasting equipment. Second, it requests other institutions to design, produce and launch a broadcastinq slltellite. Third, once the satellite i9 settled in an orbit, the TSC controls and 64 1 broadcasting is beyond the TSC's sphere of responsibility while satellites falling out of orbit are its responsibility. In other countries, such as Canada, Australia and the US, administrative orqanizations are responsible for both aspects of DBS. By separatinq the two, Japan avoided getting involved in arquments at WARC about the treatment of foreign information flow across national borders (Yamamoto 1979, 168-173). The TSC was established through equal private and government fundinq. private fundinq came from NHK, Nippon Telegraph and Telephone and Kokusai Denshin Denwa. Their participation was justified on the qrounds that they are the major users of broadcastinq or communication satellites. The TSC has leqal status as a Ninka Ho1in (a juridical pers on with • a character) which provides the necessary mandate over business administration, financinq and accountinq from the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications. But, it is neither astate orqanization nor a Tokushu Hojin (a juridical pers on havinq special status) which is under total qovernment control. This incorporated status is advantaqeous since it places the corporation into the private sector and enables it to answer the demands of private users. At the same time as beinq the maintains technical aspects of satellite broadcasting, such as: satellite positioninq, placement, inside temperature and electric power. Fourth, it provides transponders to user broadcasters for payment (Yamamoto 1979, 150-168; Uemura 1991,81-93). 65 single administrative body,3 it has a public responsibility to plan and develop broadcast satellite businesses in Japan. Channel Assignment to Japan Japan was much concerned about the number ot channels that would be allocated to Japan by WARC. In the 1970's, Japan worried that it might not be able to get as Many channels as other industrial countries because Japan's space technology lagged far behind. This fear was derived from lTU's A posteriori arrangements which allocated channels on a "first come, first served" basis. Because the number of usable frequencies and orbit positions for satellites4 are limited, many developing countries protested this way of allocating channels. 5 They claimed that aIl nations, including those which have not had immediate plans to launch satellites, should have the right to get frequencies and positions. After heated 3 The US, however, allows several private organizations of broadcasting satellite management which compete against each other (Yamamoto 1979, 168-173). 4 The geostationary orbit, which is about 35,800 k.m. above the equator is especially important because only this orbit guarantees a ~atellite coverage of the same area without interferenee by the earth's movement. Equatorial countries even declared this orbit their territory at Bogota in 1976 (Kuribayashi 1981, 41-44). 5 Sinee frequencies and stationary orbit positions were admitted as limited natural resources in the International Telecommunications Law in 1973, its fair allocation has beeome a major concerna Disputes on the New International Economie Order (which was adopted in 1974) affected these discussions between developing and developed countries at the united Nations. Developing countries claimed that the lTU should consider benefits for developing countries and should be 1 responsible for dividing those communications resources among 4 aIl countries (Yamamoto 1981, 11-12). 66 t disputes, these nations agreed to make a priori plans tor the uses ot broadcasting satellites at 1977'8 WARC-BS conference. Japan worried that it might not able to get many channels because, like developing countries, it did not possess signiticant spa ce technologies to launch satellites at that time. Thus, Japan thought it should present some accomplishment in space activities at the 1977 WARC-BS in order to get as many channels as possible. This was one of the reasons that Japan eventually asked the US to launch Japan's tirst broadcastinq satellite and communication satellite, instead ot waitinq for Japan's rocket to be ready. At the WARC-BS conference, the world was divided into three areas, the first (Europe, Africa the USSR) , the second (north and south America), and the third (Asia, Oceania). Japan belonqs to the third area and was allocated eight channels on the geostationary orbite Japan Deols with Silloyer Japanese satellites need to send radio waves to cover the entire nation which spreads from the north near the USSR to the South near Taiwan. These stronq radio waves can be also received in part of South Korea, the People's Republic ot China and Hong Kong. Although Japan'D satellites are meant only tor domestic uses6 , today's technology is still unable to totally 6 At the very beginning of discussions on DBS in Japan, the MPT mentioneà uses ot DBS for international broadcasting (Asahi Journal 27 Harch 1966, 52). But, this idea was abandoned soon attending international debates on regulations ovar DBS. 67 prevent such unintended transponder radiation across n~tional bordera. 7 Japan has dealt with this spillover problem accord~nq to the technical standards set by lTU. Because a definition of intended or unintended radiation was too difficult to be aqreed upon by all nations, technical standards which reduce spillover to a minimum are considered the best practical solution (Hirobe 1981). The agreement made at the lTU, however, was followed by another political discussion as to whether or not a negotiation betwe~n oriqinating and receiving nations should take place in case of spillover that occured even under the lTU standard. Japan decided, at the House of Representatives in 1979, that such negotiation is ( unnecessary as long as the lTU standard is satisfied (Yamamoto 1979, 128-146). On these qrounds, the Japanese government refused to address the South Korean protest that spillover from Japan's broadcastinq satellite was a "cultural aggression" (Taishoff 1987, 88). Such a reaction from a neighboring country suggests that there will be great difficulties introducing international broadcasting via satellite in the far east in the near future. (Japan's ambition for a pacifie telecommunity will be discussed in Chapter Four.) Conclusion This chapter studied issues of international requlations regarding direct broadcasting via satellites and their 7 Technology for "spot boams" is however progressing, and it can focus on smaller areas by controlling an antenna on a satellite (Ubukata 1988, 42). 68 t influence ~n the Japan's DBS project. As far as Japan ia concerned, it would prefer to avoid becoming involved in the ~jeological dcbates which have become highly political issues between the west and the east, and the north and the south. Instead, Japan has supported the search tor practical solutions by setting technical standards at ITt'. Japan has a1so established a domeotic satellite administrative system which permits it to negotiate policies that avoid heated international debates on software issues in direct broadcasting via satellites. Japan's major concern in the 70's was, in fact, not to focns on ideological issues but on the number of channels which would be allocated at WARC. Japan was worried that its comparatively underdcveloped space technologies would • hinder its efforts to reserve satellite channels at WARC • After starting to broadcast via satellites, Japanese spillover was protested by South Koraa. But, Japan dismissed this claim on the grounds that its satellites satisfied the technical standards which were set by lTU. Other countries' reactions to Japan's broadcasting via satellites will be turther examined in terms of Japan's future plans concerning DDS in the Kodo Johoka Shakai (Highly Advanced Information Society). 1 \ Cbaptor Four: FUture Plana concornlng DSS ln Japant. H19hly Advaneod Inforaation socioty Introduction Thi. chaptor ia divldod into throo ooction.. Tho firDt .ection diacuanoa Japanoao plan. tor tha future dovolopmont of DBS and rolatod aatollito aorvicoa. Tho aocond soction oxamino. buainoDa intoroata ln the dovolopmont ot lIatol1ito BorvicoD on the national lovol. Finally, the third aoction focuooa on i~tornational iaDuoa includlng the potontia1 croation ot a "Pacifie Toloco==unity~. Tho vorld rêqulatory aituation vhich vag atudlod in the proviou. chaptor influftncoa Japan'a futuro plana for diroct broadcaGting via aatollito. ~ocau.o Japan vanta to aocuro all oi9ht channola vhich voro allocatod at tho WARC-BS by uDin; thom. Tho HPT plana to incroaao the numbor of ODS channola gradually. 8S-2b nov ua.a tvo channol.. Throo channolc voro liconcod for aS-la which will bo launchod ln the Dummar of 1990 by an "-1 rockot, aa woll ag for ita back-up catollite as-3b vhich vill bo ~nticlpatod for 1991. Tho HPT dociaion in 1983 gavo tvo channol. to NHX and ono to Japan Satellito Broadcaating (JS8), tho commorcial gatollite broadcaating company. Eight channola may becomo Bvailablo via a broad~aAting and communicationa tochnolcgy aatollito (BCTS) oarly in tho next cQntury. Dy thon, Japan' s H-2 rockot will also bo roady to launch a tvo-ton aatollite capablo of producing onough oloctric powor with ita Dolar coll. tor the 70 1 oi9ht. channo1 •• rvico. 1bro~ vayu Ar. boinq cendidorod to uso and tinanco the addlt!~nal fiva channols. Ono mothod ia te uao nov lat.llito channo1a tor apocialilod information whlch 1. not otfor.d by convontional telovl.ion broadc4~tlnq. Anothor ia te 10a.o ch~nnolD to ethor ceuntrl0.' broadcaatinq companioa. A third id.a 10 to aboliah .xlatinq convontional broadcaatinq oporatione and lot thom boeODO satollito broadcaating eo~panio.. Movovor, o~ch ct thooo idoao haa cor~atn probloma. With tho tirat ono, It ia doubttul if advortiainq markot ~omanda ara largA onouqh to auatain apociallzod information aorvicoa. Wlth tho Gocond ono, thora aro many intornational 10qa1 probloma which =UGt bo aortod out in ordur to loaaa channolo to othor countrioa. With tho third ono, information vill bo too contralizod it all oxiatinq local broade!atinq atationa aro aboliahod. ThODO probloma could bo allovlatod to a cortain doqroo by ovor advancinq t4chnoloqloa ln tho tuturo. 1 Sactlon One: ThQ Goyernmont's Mans tor....DBS Tho HPT la earofully eoordlnatlnq DOS plana baaod on lto "harmoniouli dovolopmont pollcy". Futuro plans aro laid down in tvo ataqoa: noar futuro and long tor:na plana. lloar future plana ineludo ons devolopmont (rom the 1990'0 to the carly 1 For Qxamplo, the utilization of the 22 GHz froquoncioo which ara diffargnt from tho proa~nt ono, for broadeaatinq aatollitoa io boinq studied. Through the uaa of "apot bQams", it can fOCUD on a limitod aroa to provo nt apillover. 71 tventy t1rat century vhon BS-3 aat.l1ite. vi1l bo prevalent. Pl.n~ for tho n.ar future inc1ud. tho introduction ot nov aodia o.rvicoa 8uch a. pu1.e cod. modulation sound broadcaotin; (PCM), hi;h dofinition tol.viaion (HDTV), and the eonDtruction ot SplCO cablo notworkD. Lonq tOrD plana havo boon aado for th. 2020'0 whon a broadclatinq and communicationD tochnoloqy oato11it. (BCTS) vill intograto tho tunctlona of broadcaot DatollltQD ~nd communicationa Dat.llttoo, and ortor f3CD181lo broadcaDtin~ aorvicoD, and whon an Intoqratod Sarvieo. Oi9ital lIotvork (ISOU) vill intoqrato all dittoront =odia includinq oss. DDS Plans for th, IlI!Ar Future Nov modia corvicoo Auch aD PCH and HDTV will bo introducod via BS-) in tha oarly 1990'.. 8o=auDo theDa aorvic•• aro not availablo through conventional broadcagtlnq (duo to a limltad numbar of uDablo troquenclos2), tholr availabllity by OBS has bocomo an important ju~tlfleation for Japan's aatollito planning, aD vaa oxplalnod in Chaptor Two. PCH iD a tochniquo vhich changes analog pulsos into digital pulses or vico varaa, and it providoD hlgh quality sound vith tar 1099 noiG. and 2 ln Japan, PCM cannot ba providod through convontional broadcaDting bocauDo of a limited aval1ability of troquoncioDI PCM rIJquiro9 600 kHz whilo FM broadcaDting n"oris 200 kHz and ~lddlo-vavo radio nGoda only fltteon kHz. (Nlkkol SanC)'yo Shimbun Sha ot al. 1993, 179-181). HOTV ia olGa unaval1ablo through the convontional maan8, baeause HOTV broadcagtinq roquiroD "an much bandvidth aD do four or riva convontional TV aJ.gnals" (lntermedia Nov. 1993, 3). .,. 72 • di.tortlon than curront .ound .y.t•••• l Tho hlqh quallty sound ot PCK via DBS 1. oxp~ctod to attract young pooplo vho ara partlcular1y intoroatod in Duaic proqramaoD. 4 HDTV 1. conaidorod to bo "th. cornor Gtono" ln th. tranaition trom analoq to digital tochnoloqy (Port 1989, 64). IamonDoly cloaror plcturo Imagoa duo to a dongo runnlnq acan diDtinquinh HOTV troD convontional TV.5 Bocauco ot dlttoront tochnical Dtandarda, contomporary tolovision Dota aro unuaablo for HOTV roc.ption, which moanD that a nov world-vido =arkot tor TV cotg will bo croatod tor homo oloctronico manuracturora. (Tho international l=pllcatlono of thls vill bo rully Qxn=ln~d ln the noxt coction). Futhor=oro, HOTV tochnology croatod =any bUDineaD opportunitioD in that it iD alDo applicable to vidoo, 3 Analoq pulaoA (tho tora ot natural Round), ara changod into digital pulaoa at 4 broadcaltinq atation and the digital pulaoa thon aont t~ a roception machina which changea tham bac~ into analOCJ pulae!; whl,=h the human boinq can hoar. Bocauao a dlqltally coded tranc:miaaion ia 10Da a!foctod by 019na1 diatortion than an analoq tranDDIDDion, PCH providoD hlghor quality Dound than convontional broadcnDtinq. 4 Accordinq to ft rocent Atudy (Kojlma, 1986), young JapanoDe pooplo con91dor musIc as a =~jor ~oan9 of communication vith othorg aD woll ag a form of solf oxprosDlon. At prosent, convontionnl TV i9 tho lonDt i=portant modium tor the enjoymont of ~uaic aCtor COUGotte tapoa (94\), recorda (66\> and FM radio (62\). PCH uound Aceo=panied by videos la expacted to establi~h a younq OSS audience. S "ccordlng to mn<' a IfDTV ntandard which ia baGad on MUst (Multiplo sub-nyquiat Samplinq Encoding), tho numbar of runnln~ Dcana on an MDTV scroon iD 1,025 -- more than doublQ the 525 of a eonvontional aeroon (Kawamoto 3 Nov.1909, 10). 13 film, milltary mapplnq, Dodlcal practlco and printinq.6 Thua, HDTV 1. bolnq .tronqly proDotod in Japan. For .~a=plo, KHK dODonatratod HOTV at T.u~uba EXPO ln 1985, and had b19 HOTV .ot. in.tallod in many citl0. to dODon.trato tholr quality. Novombor 2S \la. namod "Kl Viaion day", and )~;:K and the "PT pr()Cf~Jcod aovoral ohovo and ovonta ln dopartlDont Dtoroa to lntroduco the nov tochnoloqy to th. public. Tho "PT prOpOGOD to aot up a :codoi city, callod "HiVl.1on Ci ty" f vhoro "OTV ID providod to hou~ohoida and othor institutionG (Wa~ui ot al. 1989, 40·41 and 53). Tho HITI haD êstabl19h~d th. H1Vlalon tukyu Shlen Centre, HOT\! Promotion and Support Contra (=y tranalatien), te offor f1nanclal holp to corporationa that want to invoDt ln thl0 nov buolnocc. HDTV aorvlcoG wl11 bo orrorod not on1y dlroctly to ho=oc via aatollito, but 41eo throuqh cablo tolovlDlon broadcaotlnq. Tho MPT bollavos that buildinq Dpaca cable notworkG will bono!lt cable and diroct brondcasting satollitoD, aG woll aa commercial co~munlcatlon satollltoD which vill start to oporate in boqlnninq of the 1990'9 duo ta th. rocont deregulatlon of tolocommunicatlons laws. 7 BocauQo cable subscr1ption rees are 6 Tho HPT êQtlJnntcu~ that tho HDTV-rolntod mar)cot \Jill bocomo 14,500 billion yon (Cdn.$145 billion) by thê yonr 2000 (MPT 1989, 64). 7 CommQrci~l communications satollito compnniüG bGlon~ t~ Typo l carriers nccordinq to the TQlocommunication~ Dug!nass Law. lt d~vidaG JapanasQ telQcommunicatlons businassos into two typ09: Typo l carriors ovn thoir f~cl11tios to provido tholr sorvices, and 'r': '0 2 carriers uses others' (< noad to torm notwork. to facilit4to pro9ra~~o dictrlbutlon. 8 Thi. neod will bo woll aorvod by commercial co:munication aatolliteg whlch nro importnnt nevcomora ln Japan'. aatellita dovolopmont. Thua far, thera hava boon only natIonal aatcllit.a: Communication gat.llfto9 that have boon uDod :a1nly for tolophono and tolomatlc DorvicoD and Oirect Brondcaatlnq eat.llites whlch arc uaod for broadcaatlng. Japan'g DUSe havê boon dovolopod for individual recoptlon at ho~o?, and nono or lt. channela have been nllocntod for tho oxcluglv~ use of LabIe façl1lti~Q e~ployQd"(1998, 17) and that it ia "the cornoratono of the new tolacom~unlcationa lnduatry structura, and con.titutog a conccioug breakinq awny from the North American 'ba9ic'l'onhancod' 90rvlco approach"(1999, Il). 9 Cable iG êXPQct~d to achiovo major grow~h ln Japan. According to tho Uomura Ingtituto'9 oatimate, cable'. markot will bo moro than 1000 billion yen (Cdn.$10 billion) in the yoar of 2001 (HPT 1999, 52). The MPT rovisûù or cr@oted tw~lv~ roqulationg for tho convoni@nce of cobl@ businesn, in accordance with the Hinigtry of financ@ and the rninistry of Conatruction. for axampla, tho HPT gimplifiod regulatlong of cablo construction and gava privjladgcd !inancial aGniDtnnc~9 (HPT 1909, 53-54). 9 Radio wavos !rom CSo arc too waak to bo recolvod at hom~ in the ontiro nation throuqh the parobollc antonnao u90d for tho rocêption of ons. 75 , oporatora. (Thl. wa. bocauao, a. oxplalnod ln chaptor tvo, whon tho Das projoct DtArtod, cablo va ••0 undordovolopod ln Japan that the diotribution of progrADDoD to cablo oporAtora via aatollitoa vaG not Includod ln th. oriqinal pUrpODOD ot OSS.) Althouqh cs. varo uGed tor pllot cablo Qxporl:cnta10 by the HP! and MITI, eo==orclal cs. viII diDtrlbuta proqra==og to cable ayatomo on ft co~ercial basis. AD the spaco-cablo network ineludoD codlu:D liko DS, commercial CS and c4bloo, thia plan nooda to conDidor tho dl!toront lawA vhlch qovorn oach modium 11ko tho Têlêco~unication~ nualnoG~ LDw, tho Cable Tolovision Broadc3Dt Law, tho Droadcagt Law, and tho Radio Law. Shlono (1985, 46) roconmon1d that h~atollito broadcastinq pollcloa ought to hava clODO connoctions vith tolaeo~~unicationD Detalllto polic!a. and CATV (cablo] polie!aD." Longtera Plana In addition to th. nov codia .arvlcoa offorad by 8S-3, facalmilo broadcaatinq will boqin operation via tho BCTS satollite in tho noxt contury. Faeaimilo broadcastinq onabloD the vievor to mako printoutA ot imagoo on the seroon 4A tho 10 Tho HP! and HITI ara ln compotition over logiolativo powor ot nov media InduDtriQG, and hava conductod many similar rosoarch studios including pilot cablo oxp~rlmênts ln Tama and Higaahi-Iko~a ln tho 1970'0 (Xobayaahi 1982, 34-36). Theoe tiva yoar oxporimonto, however, could not Qvaluato cabIo's social and oconomic !OQSibl1itios (Kornatouznkl 1901, 32). Sinco 1964, tho HPT haB doclarod 63 towns or arens ao Htalotopia" (tolccomrnunicationo plus utopin) and han offorod financial nsslntnnco for the implom~ntatlon of and Qxporlmentation with tvo-wùy and mUltl-chnnnel cablo tolevioion, CAPTAI» system (vidootex) via CS-2a nnd CS-2b. The MITI alao has carriod out similor exporlmonts. 76 1 image. are boing broadcaat. ll A digital tacaimi1e system WhODC pictura qua1ity ia bottar than that ot ana109 systoms la boing dovaloped ln Japan. 12 Sovora1 changea are expected te reQuIt trom the introduction ot facsimllo broadcaating bocauao it combinoD tho conventional media tunctions ot broadcastlng and tho praDs. Tho HPT and tho MITI havo mado DevoraI oxpori=onta for tho tranomiosion of tacoimilo nowopaper via BS and CS diroctly into the homo. Although tho rOGultQ of thoao oxporimontr wcro not favorablo tor homo une in torms or coat and quality, thls tochno1ogy io proocntly in uso to transmit picturoD and articles among nowspapor branchon and thoir printing planta (Komatsubara 1981, 44-45). Tho HPT i8 considoring liborolizing modia concentration foroclosuros to lot tho prenD invest in !acsimilo broadcasting companioo which ncod large amounta or capital. BecaUDa the prenD i8 not governod by tho Samo 1aws as broadcasting, the logal pooition of facsimilo broadcasting, a combination of the two media, Il A !acoimilo broadcasting printout can carry more thon thirty timon the amount of information a TV scrcon i8 able to provide (Uikkoi Sangyo Shimbun ot al. 1983, 18l-185). 12 An ona10g !acoimilo systom hod baan otudiod by »HK, commorcial broadcosting companios (oopccially the Tokyo Broadcosting Station), tho prass and homo oloctronics manura~turora oinco the 1960'0. Howovor, thoso onalog oignals somotimos oxporienco Interference trom signals for multi sound broadcasting. ThUG, digital systoms ar~ boing studiod. In spito of tho long transrnlosion time, which ntill noods shortoning (Tnkahashi 1987, 70-71), fncsimilo haB gainod popularlty (or businoss uses. According to otatiotics (Denk! Tsuohln Shingi ka! 1987, 59), thora woro 1,400,000 fncsimilo mnchinos in Japon which nmountod to an nvorago of 45.5 machinos por company with more than 100 employoos. 77 l n.eds to be sorted out. A primary characteristic ot the long term plans tor satellite hardware io Integration. BCTS will integrate broadcasting and communications satellites and tha :ntegrated Services Digital Network will inteqrate various forms of information media. According to a long term space development policy proposcd by the Uchu Kaihatsu Iinkai eSpace Development Committee) in Hay 1987, the functions ot direct broadcasting and communications oatelliteG, as weIl as a apacc t'actory will oventually bo intcgratod into Japan's space station which will ba availablo by the middlo of the next contury. CBy then, thr~~ dimensional television (3-0TV) may also bccome oper.ltional13 ). Bocauoo a largo oatollite can tulfill a variety of J)urposes, lt ia gonerally ~ore cast effective. In addition, the limited numbor of uoable gooGtationary positions and froquoncios can be more efficiently used by a largo satellito than by several omall satollitos. This integration of the hardware of difterent typos cf satellites also requiros coordination among aIl financiors and usors, as woll as among rogulatory bodies. Thin tondoncy to integrato communication hardwaro will take place not only in the spaco components, but also in land facilitios in tho form ot Intogratod sorvices Digital Network 13 Hatsushita Eloctronic Industrial Co., Ltd. has dovoloped a 3-DTV which docs not roquiro the uso of special qlassos to gain tho "JO" offoct. It was displayod nt Tsukuba EXPO in Japan in 1985 (Japan Report March 1985, 5). For practical mass use, however, it needs more technoloqical dovelopment as well as reducing its high cost. 78 1 (ISDN) • ISDN, which is usually called Information Network System (ISN) in Japan, has been studied by Nippon Telephone and Telegraph (NTT) since 1977. ISDN carries sound, data and picture information via optic fibre cable and satellite using a high speed digital system. The main services provided by ISDN at the present include: digital telephone service, voice storage service, digital sketch-phone service, digital high speed facsimile service, digital character and pattern tolephono access information service (CAPTAIN, Japan's videotex), message exchange service, TV conference and TV telephone service, and a video response system (VRS) (Kobayashi 1985,19). These are largely telematic services and their users are mostly companies bocause of their high costs. But, in the long run, NTT aimD ~o reach individual households by integrating cable networks into INS (The MPT 1988, 68-73). When it is introduced, DBS broadcasting, cable broadcasting, convantional broadcasting, talephone, and telematic services will aIl be offered to usera through INS which will also connact to satellites, or spa ce stations, as weIl as to trans pacifie cablo linos. This plan, however, may make NTT, the owner or oporator of INS, a superior power over aIl kinds of media, and su ch an ide a will be cortain~y objected to on the grounds of too much concentration of media. Shiono (1985, 46) points out: "There also remains a question as to whether or not it ls 79 possible for ISDN which has been planned by the NTT (NTT calls it INS) to provide broadcastinq service rather than VRS[video response system]. If it is, this implies that two networks under different principles can provide competitive service and thus the present legal system is certain to be confronted with the need for recoqnition. In this case, the raison d'etre of the public broadcasting corporation, NHK, should also he reexamined. ti section TwOi The National interests of the Japanese Business Sector In order to finance all of the developments outlined above, the govornment is seekinq private tinancinq. Those who are interestod in participatinq can be dovidod into three ... groups: media industries, conglomerates and foreign companiea. Media industries, which include the press, cable and conventional broadcastinq, are concorned with new media distribution notworks for thoir own survival and expansion. However, their investments are rostricted by the media concentration foreclosure.14 Thus, other industries, especially conglomerates which include manufacturoring, banking and trading, see their chance to invest in new media 14 For oxample, conventional commercial broadcastinq could invest only 19\ of the costs to establish the Japan Satellite Broadcasting company (JSB), the commercial channel on BS-3, although they wantod ta contribute 51' (Kobayashi 1985, 14). Conventional commercial broadcasting companies, the press, news agencies, movie-companies, publishers and advertising agencies were allowed together to invest 39.6\ of the total financing of the JSB. 80 1 bu.in...... In the ca•• ot the Japan Satellite Broadcaatinq Co. (JSB), th. busin•••• ector' ••trong inter•• t in satellite broadcastinq wa. domonstrated whon the MPT r.ceivod so many applications for a single licence that it asked the chairman of the Keidanren to form a consortium ot 190 companies. Financial institutions and equipment manufacturora invostod 30.8\ of tho total cost, and other businesses and groups such as trading companios, big retailors, universitios and nowly omorqing cablo companies (which are partly hold by trading companies and railroad companies) contributod 33'. A1though conglomeratos aro eager to invent in now media businassos, they ara more interested in tolomatic and business communications notworking, which are closoly related with thoir own businosses and which are tho major profit-making businosGcn in the tolocommunications industry. foroign companloG which were only racontly allowed to entor tho Japaneso telecommunications markets under the new telecommunications laws, ara eager to expond their markot sharo. Those aro of ton allied with major Japaneso trading companios in order to invent in tolocommunicationr. businesses. In the case ot Hihon t~~s~1n Eise! (Japan Toloco~munications Satellite) (JCSAT), one of the two commercial cs companies, 70\ of its capital waB tinancod by the Itochu and ~~ conglomerates, and the romaining 30\ w~u providod by Hughos Communications Corporation, an Amorican company (Miyagawa 1987, 34-39). Tho other CS company, Vehu Tsushln (Space cc·mmunicationn Corporation) (sec) had 85\ of 81 capital provided by the Mitpubi.hi conglomorat. (Hashimoto 1987, 40-45). Both companie. plan to purcha.e American communication satollites15 becaus. they are more cost effective than Japaneso onos16 • The purchasa of toreign satellites usad to ba prohibita~ in Japan but was allowed under Japan's naw telacommunications laws atter the restriction was criticizad by toroiqn govornmants, aspecially by the US. Japan'. future plans at tho intornational laval will bo di.cussod in the following section. Section Threej On the International l,vol Aa the twanty-tirst cantury has been given aymb01ic names like the "Into~ation Age" in the world, other nations ( have also stressed the development of various information industries as eSGontial to thoir oconomic survival. Japan has rapidly devolopod its tolecommunications industry, makinq a $2.5 billion surplus in telecommunications trade with the US in 1985. 17 As a result ot this imbalance, the US has 15 JCSAT plans to buy satellites from Hughes Communications corporation, and SCC from Ford Aarospace and Communications Corporation. 16 Tho total cost of a transponder on a Japaneso satellite ia 5.8 times highor than the cost of one on an American satellite (Fujimani 1985, 65). 17 Tho trado imbalance in telecommunications between Japon and the US used to favor the US: the American surplus was $516 million in 1980 (Salvaggio 1986, 136). Japan has bccn successful in the American market in telephono equipmont, te1evision sots, satellite oarth stations and satellite dishes and semiconductors, and has a lead in the newest telecommunicatioras products including HOTV, cellular f telephone, and video phone. Although the US ls still ~ dominant in rocket and satellite systems, Japan ia catching 82 t criticized Japan for cloaing ita markets to the American telecommunications industry and thera haa been a series ot negotiations between the two qovernments. 1B Recently, practical efforts have been made based on the realization that Japan now has a greater rosponsibility for the international economy than ever before. The Reagan Administration supported freo competition, and put pressure on the Japanese government to liberalize telecommunicationa laws and almplify the complicated standards system to allow up in this field as wall. 18 According to the two countries' trade pact made at the and of tho Carter administration, the US government telecommunications contract, which was $17.5 billion a year, was opened to Japanese manufacturers' bidding, whilo only $1.5 billion ot the Japanese market, which was then monopolizod by NTT and ROD, was oponed to foroign manufacturers' participation (pearce 1981, 16). NTT relied on "family" manufacturera, like NEC, Fujitau, Hitachi and Oki, which supplied 60 to 10' ot its tel~communications equipment (White 1983,76). Compared to American firms, Japanase compar.ies of tan "form business groups in which manufacturera, subsidiaries, subcontractors, material auppliers, trading farma, and banks cooporate with each other" (White 1983,70). And, as Miyoshi (Sep 1984, 20) from the ~e1âanren (Japan Federation of Economie Organizations) points out "communications between the government and private aectors ara closer in Japan than in the Unitod States, enabling the two Bectora to share the some long .. term goals". The Japanese government's protectionist attitude in telecommunications industries as weIl as other forms of manufacturing and agriculture, was fiercely criticized as "unfolru by the Amoricans. Senator John C.Danforth and some others wont so far as to show thomsolvos destroying Japanose home electronico products on TV, and presentod some protectionist trade bills to the Congross. According to the Japanose press, tho US side blamed different business customs as boing a m~jor part of the problem. The spread of such protectioniom and the sensationalist presentation of anger on the part of the US was often interprated as the result of a patronizing and - racist attitude bl the Japanese. 83 1 American firms to participate in the Japanese mark~t. Keidanren (Japan Federation of Economic Organizations), one of the strongest business associations in Japan, demanded the deregalation of telecommunications Iaws, and its proposaI was agreed to by the MITI which is now in charge of opening markets in Japan. Salvaggio (1986) points out that today the "Japanese telecommunication market is the most open in the world after that of the USA. In comparison to France, Italy, and West Germany, the Japanese telecommunication market is wide open" (142). She believes that the trade imbalance is partially a result of poo~ US strategy. A lack of aggressiveness in terms of penetrat1ng the Japanese market, disorganized efforts among the American firms also compete against each other, and the American government's inconsistent telecommunications policy aIl contribute to the problem (Salvaggio 1986, 144). with competitive international telecommunications markets, Japan is interested in being competitive especially in such areas as HDTV and extending ISDN to the Pacific areas. HDTV High Definition Television (HDTV) has become a focus of international competition, especially between Japan, the US, and European countries in the telecommunications market. The Japanese, including NHK and the MPT, hoped that Japan's HDTV 84 standard19 would become the international standard. However, despi te Japan' s initial optimism, this is unlikely to take place because other industrialized countries want to protect their home electronics markets against Japan. In addition, many European countries do not want t.o encourage an American presence in their broadcasting by having the same stanaard as the US. Japan suggested to other countries that a single international standard would help to reduce production costs and \>'ou1d eliminate the need to transform the broadcasting standards of foreign programs. 20 The cost, as weIl as the degradation of picture qua1ity which occurs as the result of changing standards are viewed as inconveniences by countries like Japan which want to import more foreign programs and export more domestic programs (Tanaka 1986, 47). On the other hand, many countries, including parts of Europe, are reluctant to have more American presence in their broadcasting, and prefer a standard that differs from the Amer i can one. other countries' obj ections to the adaptation of Japan' s 19 NHK has studied HDTV systems since the 1970' s, and has developed i ts own system. It has two technica1 characteristics; i t is designed for the use of direct satellite broadcasting and it is incompatible with conventional television broadcasting (NHK recently developed another HDTV system which is compatible.) 20 programs produced in a different broadcasting standard cal~not be broadcast without undergoing a relatively expensive conversion process. Presently, there are three major conventional television broadcasting standards in the world: NTSC in the North America and Japan, PAL in western Europe and SECAM in France and eastern Europe. l . 85 1 standard are mainly derived from economic considerations. In terms of penetrating the world market, the adoption of Japan 1 s standard as the international standard will give a great advantage to Japanese home electrorlics manufacturers who devElloped the new media technology wi th NHK. 21 Naturally, other countries are reluctant to give Japan such an advantage in a promising market whjch, according to the FCC's estimate, 'Jli 11 be worth $400 million a year. This is largely why the US changed its initial support of Japan" s proposaI of "Hi-Vision" as the HDTV standard at the Comité Consul tatif International de Radiodiffusion (CCIR) in 1986 (Yano 10 March 1988, 4). will iam F. Schreiber criticized the Japanese HDTV system saying: For aIl the remarkable progress made in cameras, displays, and recorders, the systems' (the NHK production system and the MUSE system) concepts are fatally out of date. NHK is simply a scaled-up version of the existing ana log systems with aIl their shortcommings, except composite video. It does not take advantage of the enormouse progress in cheap and powerful integrated circuits. Worst of aIl, it makes insufficient use of excessive bandwidth. As a resul t 1 it is very expensive for the broadcaster 1 and 21 For example, Sony has already made plans te sell HDTV VCRs and pre-recorded video cassets in the US and Europe, even before HDTV hroadcasting starts (Watson-Brown and McLintock Jan. 1988, 22). 86 presents nearly insuperable problems in transmission. While it could be used as a stu~io standard, it has no special advantages for this purpose over any other possible high-definition system, except that it is available. Its use of interlace is probably a disadvantage (Schreiber Nov. 1987, 38). As he admits, however, the alternative American HDTV technology is not yet available, although studies have been undertaken at several institutions. 22 Despite the American governmnent's and business' des ire to develop its own HDTV technology, there is a problem on the American industrial side. American consumer electronics companies, which had fled the TV market in the 70's, are reluctant to get back to the TV market where profit r.\argins are slim and where they have to compete with established Japanese competitors. Thus, the Arnerican Electronics Association has proposed the establishment of an HDTV consortium jointly funded by the US government and 17 companies provided changes are made in antitrust laws (Hall 1989, 63). European countries are promoting "MAC", an HDTV standard which has 1,250 running scans on a screen. They plan to 22 For instance, at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (Schreiber 1987, 40), Del Rey Group, Faroudja Laboratories, New York Institute of Technology, Philips Laboratories, David Sarnoff Research Centre and Zenith Electronics (Marbach 1989, 59). The Center for Advanced Television Studies was established by ten American companies including the broadcasting networks for the cooperative development of HDTV (Intermedia Nov. 1983, 4) • . 87 utilize it via satelli~e in the early 1990's as part of the EC Eureka project, Europe's new technology development plan. "MAC" is largely compatible with conventional television transmission system in Europe and provides stereo sound although "the picture improvements will hardly be evident to consumers '\dth the current generation of television sets" (Watson-Brown and McLintock Jan. 1988, 21). The Japanese are disappointed by other countries' rejection of Japanese HDTV technology. The Japanese news media reported this rejection as an aspect of "Japan Bashing", a tarm often used to ~xplain the US reacticn to its trade imbalance with Japan. 23 Japanese firms have said they are prepared to adapt to any standard which the US develops in order to gain access to the US market (Marbach 1989, 58). HDTV will possibly become another target oÏ trade disputes between the two countries. Pacifie Telecommunity Despite intense international competition, international interdependence in the field of telecommunications is also increasing. Cooperation occurs even between competltors such as Japan and the US, because the development of new 23 For example, Aera, the Asahi Shimbun's weekly news magazine's article (Morimoto 8 Nov.1988,19) and Asahi Shimbun (Yano 9 March 1988, 11) which said: "Although standard unification is ideal, cou.1tries do not aIl have the same stepping speed. It is because they do not want ta lose their face; they are jealous of Japan's initiative on unification of HDTV standards and frustrated at their technological backwardness" (My translation). 88 technologies needs large amounts of capital, extensive technological studies and large markets, aIl of which are difficult to obtain within single states. Building telecommunications networks in the Pacific area is one of the mo~t ambitious future plans and requires a great deal of international cooperation. 24 Chang (1983, 220) points out the "rapid improvement in communication and transportation making the construction of a large community possible and desireab1e", and conjurs the image of an e1ectronic bridge to encourage an information exchange to foster a trading "Pacific Telecommunity". Apart from Australia, only Japan posesses the high technology and capital required for private satellite businesses in the Pacific area. 25 The Japanese government and business sector are very interested in the idea of a Pacific Telecommunity. They have economic ambitions in the enormous pacific area with its almost untouched market for 24 INTELSAT provides sorne telecommunications service, but only two of its fifteen satellites are available to the region. Even these two satellites are mostly used for communications between the US and Japan, leaving little transponder space for other Pacifie nations. 25 The People's Republic of China has its own space programme but has not yet reached the level of Japan in telecommunications businesses (FarEastern Economic Review 12 May 1988, 70-71). Their satellites are limited either to scientific research or military use at present, but broadcasting satellites are under consideration. Indonesia has the Palapa system which provides voice, video and data to Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, the Phillipines and Singapore. But its operation largely depends on American technology. 89 telecommunications businesses. 26 Japanese telecommunications industry needs a large market in order to continue its growth. Thus, Japan's satellite uses are shifting from initial public and welfare purposes to business uses, but it is already feared that the supply of transponders on commercial communication satellites may outstrip the demand within the country. The Japanese governme~1t also expects that participation in such an internationùl project will bring positive effects in dealing with other countries' complaints about Japan's protective poJicies for domestic industries. In addition, building a Paeific network may give Japan a chance to become the centre '.)f the information flow in the area" 27 .. Several plans have been made in order to build teleeommunications networY.s in t:ne region. Japan and New Zealand have propo~ed a regional telecommunications network, called the Pacific Information Network System (PINS) which 26 The Pacific area presently accounts for Ij6th of the world's trading and its economic growth rate is faster than that of any other part of the world, but mûkes up only lj9th of the world's informatio~-traffic via satellites. Telecommunications systems in the area are still underdeveloped with a few exceptions like, Japan, New Zealand and Australia. In most Asian~oacific nations, even basic telephone services reach less than five percent of the population. But the fast growing economy is expected to change this situation soon. The number of telephones in the Asian area is estimated to exceed that of Europe by the year 2000 (White Oct.1983, 129). 27 Presently, Singapore and Hong Kong also play as important a role as Tokyo in terms of information flow in the South Pacifie. 90 1 includes m,ore than thirty nations in the pacifie area. PINS will use satellites28 and Trans-Pacific optical fibre cables and providE~ information on economic development and trade to databases i n {~ach country (Malik 1985, 7). Papua New Guin~a and an American company, TRT, plan to establish the Pacster system using two satellites. 29 Australia plans to lease three transponders on its next satellite for use by thirteen nations in the south Pacific. These satellites will be used mostly for tslematics. International direct broadcasting in the Pacific is technologically possible, but i5 too problematic to be agreed upon among countries where languages, religions, cultures, politic~l systems and econo'mic levels greatly differ. 30 International cooperation in the field of broadcasting is being ~ttempted in a limited 28 A technological advantage of satellites: the ability to cover a wide area at the same time regardless of geographical terrain, is considered to be very suitable for communications among the Pacific rim nations, because they are m0stly small island nations separated from each other by the sea. 29 One of its two satellites will cover Papua New Guinea, Japan, South East Asia, the Solomon Islands and Fiji. The ether ene will reach Hawai, California and French Polinesia. Papua New Guinea will use the system's capacity free of ~harge in exchange for offering the US company uses of i ts orbital slot which was allocated at WARC (Jussawal).a 1987, 34-37). 30 The recent Thails protest against a TV commercial of Sony radio cassette tape recorders is a good example of how delicate sorne problems are. Thai people who are Buddists felt offended when they saw Budda awaking to the music played on a Sony stereo, and protested. The Japanese company eventually wi thdrew the conlmercial (Usanami, 7 April 1988 evening, 19). . 91 1 form, like exchanging news programmes through Asiavision among memb€rs of the Asia-Pacific Broadcasting union (ABU).31 There are obstacles preventing the construction of an extensive telecommunicatlons network in the Pacific. Such a network might increase the centralization of information in a few industrial states, reducing developin~ countries' to the status of mere markets for industrial states. This fear of becoming "a potential tool of domination by the big powers" (Chang 1983, 221) has been repeatedly expressed by other Asian countries in several failed attempts to built an economic and political community like the European Community in the Pacific area. 32 31 Greater cooporation of AsiaVision, such as the co production of entertainment programmes for the world's market, and the pooling of television talents and resou~ces in the region is called for by simeon Bonzon, Director of the Phillipine Federation of Rural Broadcasters (Intermedia July/Sep. 1985, 8-9) 32 The idea of economic cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region can be traced back ta the early 1960's. One of these early proposals was made by Kiyoshi Kojima (1971) who wanted to establish a Pacific free trade area. For the Japanese economy, the area has been considered very important aa a supplier of raw material and energy,as weIl as a market for industrial products made in Japan. The Japanese governrnent had initiated several meetings on regional development issues among Asian Finance or Development Ministers in 1966, but this effort was discontinued after ASEAN was established amongst Southeast Asian countries in 1967. These countries resented Japan's efforts, considering them to be an interference in their affairs (Gordon 1981, 276). Japan's former ideology of establishing a Great East Asia Co Prosperity Sphere was also still fresh in their memory. Japan's political positlon in Asia has been very sensitive because "even th(mgh geographically speakiug Japan belongs to the Asian region, historically speaking its status as 'a member of the Western camp' and a party in the East-West confrontation characterizes it as a 'victimizer,' in contrast a aM as 92 However, the desire for the cordination of eeonomie aetivities in the region is growing. The idea of telecommunications networks in the area ls an especially attractive idea to developing eountries who believe that the laek of ael' ~ss to the updated information provided by telecommunications puts their eeonomic development at a disadvantage. Although they do not have the budget or technology to establish their own telecommunicatiûns systems, they want to partieipate in the new international eeonomic ta other eountries of Asia which share the identity of 'vietim'" (Shibagaki 1985,17). ASEAN's reaction to Japan's initiative in the Pacific Corr~unity has been skeptieal. They claim that Japan contributes little te ASEAN but undermines its independent political voiee (Gordon 1981, 286-287). Nevertheless, the Japane~e government has continüed to \ express its desire for establishing the Pacific community. t In 1968, Japanese Foreign Minister MI~I Takeo said that "Japan will serve as the bridge" between the developed Pacific nations (Australia, the US and Canada) and Southeast Asian countr.ies (Gordon 1981, 272). This effort was again not very successful because of other countries' disinterest l and because of vague plans. The idea of the Pacific Community was again boosted by Japanese Prime Minister Masayoshi Ohira at the end of the 1970's. He called it the "Pacifie LdBin", and added the NIes to its geographical scope. Japan recommended the establishment of a governrnental level committee for trade and developrnent, similar to the OECD. However, this was rejected by ASEAN countries which were afraid of loosing their vitality against advanced nations once they were integrated into such an organization (Chang 1983, 221). The plan was considered to be vague even by the Japane~e side(Gordon 1981, 285-286), and dirninished with his sudden d~ath. Behind the promotion of a Pacifie Community at that time, there was the Japanese government's recognition of changing world po1itics; the US was no longer protective of Japan, especially in trade, as Japan's econorny had grown. Futhermore, the restriction of oil supplies from the Middle East in the mid 1970's made Japan not only reinforce its "omnidireetional peaceful diplomacy" (Kennedy 1988, 591) but a1::;0 "turn to Asia, especia11y to China and the ASEAN group" (Gordon 1981, 277) • ft 93 t tide toward the iilformation society, and also want to use the new technology to improve communications in rural areas where mountains and jungles often prevent the building of land based communications networks. Building the Pacific Telecommunity while taking into consideration the complicated economic and political situations of each country requires large efforts of international coperation. Kennedy (1988, 566) says: "there exists a dynamic for change, driven chiefly by economic and technological developmûnts, which theh impact upon social structures, political system~, military power, and the position of individual states and empires." New technologies such as telecoDL~unications are bringing sorne changes toward the next century in the Pacific area. If Japan succeeds in overcoming the skepticism of neighbouring countries and manages te take the initiative jn the Pacific Telecommunity project, it will have achieved both huge economic profits and see the successful formation of the Kodo Johoka Shakai (Highly Advanced Information Society), as weIl as establish a stronger political position for itself internationally in the next century. Conclusion These future plans suggest that various conventional distinctions between broadcasting and telecommunication~ media will he blurred. In terms of hardware, direct broadcasting satellites and communications satellites will be 94 integrated into one, and their radio waves will be distrih"Jted to people, not only by individual parabolic antermas but also through cable linefl'.. By means of hardware, broadcasting and telematic services will be offered to audiences on one line. Broadcasting and talematic services used tn be distinguished by the fa ct that broadcasting serves a mass audience while talematic services are targetteù to a limited audience of subscribers. However. this criterion cannot he applied to separate for example, videotex and pay TV. Both offer services to their subscribers. Both of their services are also comp~sed of picture images accompanied by sounds displayed on a screen. Conventional distinctions between broadcasting, the press and publishing will also become ambiguous as new media services like HDTV and facsimile broadcasting become available. There is a need to redefine what constitutes broadcasting an environment in which the development of transmission technologies is blurring traditional media boundaries. Japan has not yet taken a clear s,tand as to how future regulations are to be developed. There are two important considerations to keep in mind in des:lgning the new regulatory situation. One is considering the audience benefits in promoting Kodo Johoka Shakai (Highly Advanced Information Society). Although this future society is supposed to provide a ri cher information environment to l • 95 l audiences, it is unelear what kinds of benefits people can actually derive from various new media services sueh a~ ORS and from the integration of dlfferent media services. Also, economic efficiency may contradict diversification of media flows. The other is cooperation with other countries. On top of alloeatirns of frequencies and positions on the geostationar7 orbit, standardization of new media technologies, tel~eommunications laws, participation in international spaee development programmes, and building teleeommunieations netwo~ks in the Pacifie area aIl require extensive international cooperation. As interdependency in the world eeonomy increases, the regulations governing Japan's broadcasting and telecommunications ~ystem cannot help but reflect the international situation. '.> .. 96 1 Chapter Five: Conclusion This thesls has made four contributions. First, it has brought together a great deal of information from a variety of separate sources which are written in both English and Japanese -- government documents, industrial documents, news papers, journals, and scholarly books. Secondly, this thesis has interpreted such technical information in a historical context, using a three stage model to explain the evolution of Japan's Rodo Johoka Shakai (Highly Developed Information Society) plan along with develop~ent of space and telecommunications technologies. Thirdly, this thes1s has helped to explain the interrelationship between media and telematics development in Japan. Finally, key player~ in the Japanese po1icy development debate were identified. The historical analysis described the deve10pment of Japanese space and technology policies as a three stage process. In the first stage, Japan'~ space development plans were heavily dependent on US technology. In this early stage, DBS was planned as an ideal solution to the reception problems of those who live in Japan's many islands and mountains. Studies on the "information society" also began during this periode The second statge started in the 1970'S when the US became re1uctant to contribute to transfer technologies to Japan, whose economic growth had greatly benefitted from the US technologies. International debates on how to allocate channels and positions on the geostationary orbit also ~.... ------~--~------97 pressured Japan to improve its own space technologies. During this second stage, Japan's DBS project suffered from severa1 techno1ogica1 fai1ures and was sUbjected to criticisms. However, by then, economic changes from heavy industries to information industries became wide1y recognized, and the Johoka (informationalization) of Japanese society was accepted as a basic notion of formu1ating DBS po1icies. In the third stage, which began in the late 1980's, Japan is enthusiastic about the development of its own technologies in order to promote the Kodo Johoka Shakai (Highly Advanced Information Society) which figures as a key element of the country's strategy for economic survival in the next century. While the original purpose of DBS was to bring broadcasti~g to the whole population, inc1uding those in remote or mountainous areas, the policy goals for DBS have shifted. Now DBS is promoted for its ability to provide new media services such as HDTV and facsimile broadcasting which are unavailable through conventional television broadcasting. DBS has started ta broadcast on two channels in accordance with the MPT's carefully planned policy for the harmonious development of conventional and new media. However, DBS has not gained popularity amang the people because of the high cost of DBS, the limited choices of programmes, and a highly competitive media situation in Japan. Thus, a commercial channel will be added to the two public channels when the next DBS satellite, BS-3 becomes operational. 98 ( These new services are expected to have significant economie impacts on both domestic and international markets. It will also bring media blur into the Japanese media situation. Japan's strong intention to expand its information businesses in world markets is shown through its promotion of HDTV and its Pacifie telecommunity plans. For the future, three trends ean be observed in the development of DBS, including increasing participation of the private secter, greater need for international cooperation in technology and regulations, and the integration of media hardware and concentration of media industries. In the past, media and telematics were developed separately, for example, DBS was originally meant for direct television broadcasting to ( individual heuseholds while Communication Satellites were used for telephone and other telematic services. However, these distinctions have been blurred by the introduction of commercial communications satellite businesses and by the integration of hardware. Commercial CS will distribute programmes to cable operators as weIl as provide telematic services to users. The funetions of DBS and CS are planned eventually to be integrated into a new satellite, the signaIs of which will be transmitted tbrough digital cable networks that can be used both for broadcasting and telematic services. As a result of the cbanging situation brought about by new technologies, the redefinition of broadcasting in relation to telematie services and other conventional mass media is ft 99 1 necessary. This third point about the need to redefine media is closely related to the last contribution of this thesis which identified the different players in the policy drama and showed government, industry, as weIl as foreign interests to be involved. As media and telematic services became intertwined, competition between the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications ar,d the Ministry of International Trade and Industries over jurisdictional power has also intensified. While the MPT pre fers graduaI changes in the existing system, the MITI is promoting changes which are based on economic competitiveness. Apart from Nippon Hoso Kyokai (NHK) , which cooperated with the MPT to develop the DBS project and other new media services, Japanese industry can be largely divided into two groups. There are the conventional media industries, including commercial television broadcasting and the press, which are prevented from investing in new media industries by media concentration foreclosures. The se~ond group consists of those who wish to invest in cable and telecommunications businesses, which have only recently begun to grow in Japan. These investors whose money has largely come from Japan's huge trade benefits, are seeking new investments in information industries becêuse they represent the most promising economic future. Foreign interests too have had an influence on Japan's DBS and telecommunications policies. The US's attitude has been 100 ( especially important on matters such as the transfer of technology, the opening Japan's telecommunications markets to foreign capital and international space development projects. Ideological confrontations between West and East, and between North and South at international conferences have raised important issues over sovereignity of states and freedom of information which must be taken into account if international projects such as the pacifie telecommunity are to succeed. Some types of research were not addressed in detail in this thesis. Amonq the issues not fully explained are three which rêquire more sustained work: audience reactions to new media services; economic analysis including cost estimates of these new services; and the impact of informaI industry- (, qovernment relationships in the formulation of the highly advanced information society policy. The first two iS'.;ilf\S are being followed by NHK, the MPT and the MITI as new broadcast services become availab1e. The impact of informaI government industry relationships in developing information policy is much more difficult ta assess and will require numeraus case studies. That these relationships are very important is evidenced by the "Recruit scandaI" which involved the bribing of high ranking bureaucrats, politicians, NTT officiaIs and media owners by Recruit, a newly developed information conglomerate. 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