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Addressing Anthropocentrism in Nonhuman Ethics: Evolution, Morality, and Nonhuman Moral Beings

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Addressing Anthropocentrism in Nonhuman Ethics: Evolution, Morality, and Nonhuman Moral Beings ADDRESSING ANTHROPOCENTRISM IN NONHUMAN ETHICS: EVOLUTION, MORALITY, AND NONHUMAN MORAL BEINGS By Andrew Woodhall A thesis submitted to the University of Birmingham for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Department of Philosophy College of Arts and Law University of Birmingham September 2016 University of Birmingham Research Archive e-theses repository This unpublished thesis/dissertation is copyright of the author and/or third parties. The intellectual property rights of the author or third parties in respect of this work are as defined by The Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988 or as modified by any successor legislation. Any use made of information contained in this thesis/dissertation must be in accordance with that legislation and must be properly acknowledged. Further distribution or reproduction in any format is prohibited without the permission of the copyright holder. ABSTRACT In this thesis I put forward a new definition of anthropocentrism based on a thorough overview of use in the literature and via analogy with other centrisms, such as androcentrism. I argue that thus clarified anthropocentrism is unjustified and results in problems for nonhuman animals and that any nonhuman ethic should wish to avoid. I then demonstrate how important nonhuman ethics theories are anthropocentric on this definition, and do not address anthropocentrism, in a way that results in these problems for nonhumans. I therefore propose a nonhuman ethic that aims to be less anthropocentric. I do this by first considering morality in light of evolution and second by looking at nonhuman moral codes. I draw upon both of these to set out a less anthropocentric nonhuman ethic and show why this account is at least as viable as, and less problematic than, the current theories as well as outlining its beneficial implications for nonhuman animals and the field. I conclude that anthropocentrism and approaching nonhuman ethics in the manner I have is therefore important for considering nonhuman issues, and that the theory I have put forward is advantageous. For my mother and father, who have given so much for me. You are, and have always been, the wind beneath my wings. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I would like to acknowledge and thank the following people and groups, without whom this work – and myself – would be but a shadow of what they have become: My deepest and most eternal gratitude to my lead supervisor Professor Lisa Bortolotti – whose confidence, interest, support, immense knowledge, and positivity have guided and enlightened me throughout the last four years. I cannot express the enormity of the impact you have had on myself, my work, and the development of this thesis. You are my inspiration. Professor Heather Widdows, my co-supervisor, who believed in me from day one, taught me more of how to be an academic than anyone, and whose patience, insight, knowledge, guidance, and instruction have been more than invaluable – they have been the foundation without which this thesis would have been impossible. All that I have achieved begins with you. The Arts and Humanities Research Council for funding support, without which I would never have been able to undertake a PhD. Gabriel Garmendia da Trindade, for all of the arguments we had that helped me refine my position and for being a Samwise Gamgee to my Frodo as I walked through this anthropocentric Mordor. All members of the Global Ethics reading group over the last four years, those at Minding Animals Conference 3, and all of those over the last three years of MANCEPT, your comments and feedback have been invaluable. Professor Gary Steiner and Dr Tony Milligan, for their continued support, advice, enthusiastic encouragement, and belief in me. Dr Herjeet Marway and Dr Lauren Traczykowski whose love, support, and encouragement has been a light, comfort, and perpetual strength. My family, for their never- ending love, support, and understanding. And most importantly, all of the nonhuman animals who lived around me, shared their lives and love with me, and reminded me of why I was working on this thesis: it was you who gave me the endurance and desire to fight through the hardest moments and do the best I could. Finally, anyone else my tequila-addled brain has embarrassingly forgotten - you know who you are, and with all of my heart I thank you. CONTENTS Introduction ............................................................................................................... p. 1 1. Clarifying Anthropocentrism .................................................................................. p. 8 1.1 Value Assumptions ....................................................................................... p. 8 1.2 Speciesism .................................................................................................... p. 12 1.3 Human Chauvinism....................................................................................... p. 17 1.4 Anthropocentrism ......................................................................................... p. 22 1.4.1 The Uses of Anthropocentrism ............................................................ p. 24 1.4.1.1 Use (a): Distinctions of Value ....................................................... p. 24 1.4.1.2 Use (b): Human Modus Operandi or Understanding ..................... p. 26 1.4.1.3 Anomalous Uses ........................................................................... p. 29 1.4.1.4 Use (c): Both Understanding and Value ........................................ p. 32 1.4.2 Anthropocentrism as a Centrism ......................................................... p. 33 1.4.2.1 The Relation of A(i) and A(ii) ...................................................... p. 38 1.4.3 Anthroparchy ...................................................................................... p. 40 1.5 Conclusion .................................................................................................... p. 42 2. Is Anthropocentrism Justified? ............................................................................... p. 44 2.1 The Origin of Anthropocentrism ................................................................... p. 45 2.2 Species Membership ..................................................................................... p. 52 2.3 Morally Relevant Characteristics................................................................... p. 57 2.4 The Necessity of Anthropocentrism for Ethics .............................................. p. 70 2.5 One Property Among Many .......................................................................... p. 77 2.6 Rejecting Anthropocentrism is Unnecessary.................................................. p. 80 2.7 Conclusion .................................................................................................... p. 83 3. The Problems of Anthropocentrism ........................................................................ p. 84 3.1 Problems of Anthropocentrism ...................................................................... p. 84 3.1.1 A Counterintuitive Problem ................................................................ p. 85 3.1.2 Anthropocentrism as a Centrism ......................................................... p. 87 3.1.3 The Relation of A(i) and A(ii) ............................................................. p. 93 3.1.4 Problems Caused by A(i) .................................................................... p. 94 3.1.5 The Aim of Nonhuman Ethics ............................................................. p. 102 3.1.6 Anthropocentrism in Nonhuman Ethic Debates ................................... p. 105 3.2 Conclusion .................................................................................................... p. 113 4. Nonhuman Ethics Theories: Singer & Regan .......................................................... p. 114 4.1 ‘Can They Suffer?’ ....................................................................................... p. 115 4.2 Nonhuman Animal Rights ............................................................................. p. 119 4.3 Anthropocentrism ......................................................................................... p. 124 4.3.1 Arguing From Humans ....................................................................... p. 125 4.3.1.1 Regan ........................................................................................... p. 128 4.3.1.2 Singer ........................................................................................... p. 133 4.3.2 The Hierarchy of Value ....................................................................... p. 136 4.3.2.1 Singer ........................................................................................... p. 136 4.3.2.2 Regan ........................................................................................... p. 142 4.4 Addressing Anthropocentrism ....................................................................... p. 145 4.5 Conclusion .................................................................................................... p. 147 5. Nonhuman Ethics Theories: ‘Non-Anthropocentric’ Positions ................................ p. 149 5.1 Environmental Ethics .................................................................................... p. 150 5.1.1 Deep Ecology ..................................................................................... p. 152 5.1.1.1 Anthropocentrism ........................................................................
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