The SPECTRUM, September 5, 2000
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Hurricane Katrina and New Orleans: Discursive Spaces of Safety and Resulting Environmental Injustice
HURRICANE KATRINA AND NEW ORLEANS: DISCURSIVE SPACES OF SAFETY AND RESULTING ENVIRONMENTAL INJUSTICE A dissertation submitted to Kent State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy by Andrew B. Shears August, 2011 Dissertation written by Andrew B. Shears B.S., Ball State University, 2003 M.S., Ball State University, 2005 Ph.D., Kent State University, 2011 Approved by ____________________________________, Chair, Doctoral Dissertation Committee Dr. James A. Tyner ____________________________________, Members, Doctoral Dissertation Committee Dr. Mandy Munro-Stasiuk ____________________________________ Dr. Robert M. SchwartZ ____________________________________ Dr. Scott C. Sheridan Accepted by ____________________________________, Chair, Department of Geography Dr. Mandy Munro-Stasiuk ____________________________________, Dean, College of Arts and Sciences Dr. Timothy Moerland ii TABLE OF CONTENTS LIST OF FIGURES……………………………………………..………………………………………………….iv ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS………………………………………………………………………………………vi DEDICATION……………………………………………………………………………………………………...vii CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION…………………………………………………………………………………..1 A. DEFINING ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE………………………………………….3 B. THE GAME PLAN………………………………………………………………………..19 C. METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK……………………………………………..20 II. ABOUT NEW ORLEANS……………………………………………………………………...29 A. THE HISTORY OF NEW ORLEANS……………………………………………….33 B. NEW ORLEANS IN 2005…………….……………………………………………….85 C. CONCLUSION…………………………………………………………………………...111 III. HURRICANE KATRINA……………………………………………………………………..113 -
FEMA and Disaster: a Look at What Worked and What Didn't from a FEMA Insider (1993 - 2000) Leo Bosner
The Federal Emergency Management Agency - FEMA - became an object of derision as it appeared to sit by helplessly as thousands suffered and died in the wake of Hurricane Katrina in 2005. But many have forgotten that FEMA responded quickly and effectively to countless emergencies and dis- asters during the 1990s. Earthquakes, hurricanes, floods, the Oklahoma City Bombing, all saw a swift response from FEMA, a sharp contrast to FEMA's performance after Hurricane Katrina. Leo Bosner worked at FEMA for nearly 30 years, from the time of the agency's establishment in 1979 until his retirement in 2008. I have known Leo for 21 years and really appreciated the work he did inside the bureaucracy, often at the risk of his own job, to make this vital agency work. We are lucky to have someone with so much experience let us in on how FEMA worked or didn't work through five presidents. In this four-part Solutions series, Bosner traces the development of FEMA during those years and offers his observations as to why a government agency like FEMA would perform so well one time and so poorly the next ... and his ideas on the key factors that can lead FEMA to success in the future. Leo Bosner was an employee of FEMA from 1979 until his retirement in 2008 and at the time of his re- tirement was president of the FEMA Headquarters employees' union, AFGE Local 4060. The views ex- pressed here are Mr. Bosner's personal views only. -Dina Rasor, Solutions editor On April 19, 1995, at a few minutes past nine in the morning local time, terrorists exploded a deadly bomb in front of the Alfred P. -
The Historical Context of Emergency Management
1 The Historical Context of Emergency Management What You Will Learn • The early roots of emergency management. • The modern history of emergency management in the United States. • How FEMA came to exist, and how it evolved during the 1980s, 1990s, and the early twenty-first century. • The sudden changes to modern emergency management that have resulted from the September 11 terrorist attacks and Hurricane Katrina. Introduction Emergency management has ancient roots. Early hieroglyphics depict cavemen trying to deal with disasters. The Bible speaks of the many disasters that befell civilizations. In fact, the account of Moses parting the Red Sea could be interpreted as the first attempt at flood control. As long as there have been disasters, individuals and communities have tried to do something about them; however, organized attempts at dealing with disasters did not occur until much later in modern history. The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the cultural, organizational, and leg- islative history of modern emergency management in the United States. Some of the significant events and people that shaped the emergency management discipline over the years are reviewed. Understanding the history and evolution of emergency man- agement is important because, at different times, the concepts of emergency manage- ment have been applied differently. The definition of emergency management can be extremely broad and all-encompassing. Unlike other more structured disciplines, it has expanded and contracted in response to events, congressional desires, and leadership styles. In the most recent history, events and leadership, more than anything else, have brought about dramatic changes to emergency management in the United States. -
The 2005 Hurricane Katrina Response Failure
The 2005 Hurricane Katrina response failure The 2005 Hurricane The 2005 Hurricane Katrina response failure Seeing preparedness for foreseeable complex problems Katrina response failure through a neo-institutional lens History is rife with cases where governments fail to manage complex foreseeable problems to the satisfaction of stakeholders. While it might be easy to understand why they struggle to deal with the novel or unforeseen, it is much more puzzling where governments fail to meet widely recognized and deeply understood threats. This study, Seeing preparedness for foreseeable complex which examines the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s, FEMA’s, capacity to manage the very foreseeable hurricane threat using an institutional perspective on problems through a neo-institutional lens preparedness, aims to explain why this is so often the case. This study shows that complex systems of government create deep interdependen- cies that pose major challenges to multi-level interagency coordination in dealing with problems, even those that are foreseeable. When viewed through a neo-institutional lens, the case reveals the role that norms, rules, routines, values, and individual interests played in determining how FEMA responded to major change in the institutional Christer Brown environment and what implications this had for the agency’s preparedness for hurri- canes. We also see that the apparent deterioration of FEMA’s preparedness ahead of Hurricane Katrina in 2005 was as much a result of elite over-attentiveness to terrorism as it was FEMA’s own resistance to change. This served to weaken the agency’s ability to garner political support and its readiness to partner with other stakeholders. -
The 2005 Hurricane Katrina Response Failure
PDF hosted at the Radboud Repository of the Radboud University Nijmegen The following full text is a publisher's version. For additional information about this publication click this link. http://hdl.handle.net/2066/147444 Please be advised that this information was generated on 2021-09-30 and may be subject to change. The 2005 Hurricane Katrina response failure The 2005 Hurricane The 2005 Hurricane Katrina response failure Seeing preparedness for foreseeable complex problems Katrina response failure through a neo-institutional lens History is rife with cases where governments fail to manage complex foreseeable problems to the satisfaction of stakeholders. While it might be easy to understand why they struggle to deal with the novel or unforeseen, it is much more puzzling where governments fail to meet widely recognized and deeply understood threats. This study, Seeing preparedness for foreseeable complex which examines the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s, FEMA’s, capacity to manage the very foreseeable hurricane threat using an institutional perspective on problems through a neo-institutional lens preparedness, aims to explain why this is so often the case. This study shows that complex systems of government create deep interdependen- cies that pose major challenges to multi-level interagency coordination in dealing with problems, even those that are foreseeable. When viewed through a neo-institutional lens, the case reveals the role that norms, rules, routines, values, and individual interests played in determining how FEMA responded to major change in the institutional Christer Brown environment and what implications this had for the agency’s preparedness for hurri- canes. We also see that the apparent deterioration of FEMA’s preparedness ahead of Hurricane Katrina in 2005 was as much a result of elite over-attentiveness to terrorism as it was FEMA’s own resistance to change. -
Introduction to Emergency Management, Third Edition (Homeland Security Series)
Introduction to Emergency Management BUTTERWORTH-HEINEMANN HOMELAND SECURITY SERIES Other titles in the Series: ● Maritime Security (2008) ISBN: 978-0-12-370859-5 Michael McNicholas ● Terrorism and Homeland Security: An Introduction with Applications (2007) ISBN: 978-0-7506-7843-8 Philip P. Purpura ● Introduction to Homeland Security, Second Edition (2006) ISBN: 0-7506-7992-1 Jane Bullock et al. ● Emergency Response Planning for Corporate and Municipal Managers, Second Edition (2006) ISBN: 0-12-370503-7 Paul Erickson Other related titles of interest: ● The Corporate Security Professional's Handbook on Terrorism (2008) ISBN: 0-7506-8257-4 Edward P. Halibozek et al. ● The Design and Evaluation of Physical Protection Systems, Second Edition (2008) ISBN: 0-7506-8352-X Mary Lynn Garcia ● Vulnerability Assessment of Physical Protection Systems (2006) ISBN: 0-7506-7788-0 Mary Lynn Garcia ● Introduction to International Disaster Management (2006) ISBN: 0-7506-7982-4 Damon Coppola ● Risk Analysis and the Security Survey, Third Edition (2006) ISBN: 0-7506-7922-0 James Broder ● Introduction to Security, Seventh Edition (2003) ISBN: 0-7506-7600-0 Robert J. Fischer and Gion Green ● High-Rise Security and Fire Life Safety (2003) ISBN: 0-7506-7455-5 Geoff Craighead ● Investigative Data Mining for Security and Criminal Detection (2002) ISBN: 0-7506-7613-2 Jesús Mena Visit http://books.elsevier.com/security for more information on these titles and other resources. Introduction to Emergency Management Third Edition George D. Haddow Jane A. Bullock Damon P. Coppola AMSTERDAM • BOSTON • HEIDELBERG • LONDON NEW YORK • OXFORD • PARIS • SAN DIEGO SAN FRANCISCO • SINGAPORE • SYDNEY • TOKYO Butterworth-Heinemann is an imprint of Elsevier Acquisitions Editor: Pamela Chester Marketing Manager: Marissa Hederson Project Manager: Jeff Freeland Designer: Joanne Blank Compositor: SPI Technologies India Pvt. -
Fema and Management of the Consequences of Terrorism
FEMA AND MANAGEMENT OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF TERRORISM Historical Chronology of FEMA’s Terrorism Consequences Management Role As Assigned by Section 2-103 of E.O. 121481 Prepared by: Dr. Thomas E. Baldwin, PhD Argonne National Laboratory Argonne, IL June 1972-Tropical Storm Agnes devastates the Northeast. Summer 1972-Munich Olympics- Several U.S. Governors and mayors are interested in preparing hosting agreements for 1984 Olympics and attend Olympics. 1984 Summer Olympics hosted in Los Angeles, CA. July 1, 1973, FDAA (Federal Disaster Assistance Administration) created in the Department of Housing and Urban Development. This agency managed programs, functions and activities previously housed in the Office of Emergency Preparedness, Executive Office of the White House. The Federal Preparedness Agency established in General Services Administration to administer Executive Branch COG and COOP functions among other purposes. Both actions taken pursuant to President Nixon Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1973. May 1, 1974 –President signs into law Federal Disaster Relief Act of 1974, P.L. 93-288. No use of the word “terrorism” appears in the statute. June 1976-The Working Group of the Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism assigned FPA the responsibility for coordination of Federal and Federal/State responses to the effects of terrorism. Robert Kupperman (later head of Carter/Reagan Presidential Transition Team for FEMA) is Staff Director. 1977 – Congress conducts numerous hearings about the coordination of federal emergency assistance programs. Congress later suspends the efforts when President Carter begins to review the issue. 1977-Hannafi Muslim Sect takes over District Building holding hostages in downtown Washington, D.C.