The Rumsfeld Commission said rogue nations could pose Missile a threat to Controversies the US

within a few o rogue nations now pose a “no- D warning” ballistic missile threat to the United States? The question years. The shapes up as one of the critical se- curity issues of 1999 for the Clinton Joint Chiefs Administration, Congress, and the armed services. How it is answered could determine disagreed. whether the US gives a hard push to a multibillion-dollar homeland defense effort anytime soon. The controversy flared in July when a blue-ribbon commission led by former Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld warned that , , and are de- veloping long-range missiles faster However, the CIA’s missile specialist, than expected and in ways US in- Robert D. Walpole, said the agency is telligence might not detect. Panel preparing a new National Intelligence members said the rogues import Estimate on the matter. The classi- technology from Russia and China fied document is to be completed in and avoid long US–style develop- early 1999. ment and test cycles—factors that The intensified political debate on greatly compress acquisition times rogue missiles and missile defense and increase secrecy. will be shaped to a large extent by The panel’s bleak outlook clashed the positions staked out by various with that of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, officials and agencies in a recent whose Chairman, Army Gen. Hugh series of public hearings, reports, Shelton, expressed deep skepticism and speeches. of the report on nearly every key point. In addition, he indicated that Rumsfeld Commission Final the Chiefs saw no need to acceler- Report ate the current measured US missile defense program. (Released July 15, 1998) The Central Intelligence Agency, “Concerted efforts by a number for the moment, continued to maintain of overtly or potentially hostile na- that such a threat probably won’t tions to acquire ballistic missiles with emerge for a decade and that it would biological or nuclear payloads pose a be able to provide adequate warning. growing threat to the United States,

AIR FORCE Magazine / January 1999 49 its deployed forces, and its friends time and that the Intelligence Com- thetical threat. It is a reality that and allies. These newer, developing munity may not detect it. We regard has to be dealt with now.” threats in North Korea, Iran, and Iraq this as an unlikely development.” “Foreign assistance is funda- are in addition to those still posed by “These rogue nations currently mental to the growing theater missile the existing ballistic missile arsenals pose a threat to the United States, threat. ... Iran received important of Russia and China, nations with including a threat by weapons of foreign assistance in developing its which we are not now in conflict but mass destruction, [only] through Shahab 3 [Medium-Range Ballistic which remain in uncertain transitions. unconventional, terrorist-style de- Missile]. Moreover, countries are The newer ballistic missile–equipped livery means.” seeking the capability to build these nations’ capabilities will not match “The current [Clinton Admin- missiles independently of foreign those of US systems for accuracy or istration] National Missile Defense suppliers. The growth in the sharing reliability. However, they would be policy and development readiness of technology among the aspiring able to inflict major destruction on program ... is a prudent commit- missile powers is also of concern.” the US within about five years of a ment to provide absolutely the best “We judge that an unauthorized decision to acquire such a capability technology when a threat warrants or accidental launch of a Russian or (10 years in the case of Iraq). During deployment.” Chinese strategic missile is highly several of those years, the US might “Under current conditions, con- unlikely, as long as current security not be aware that such a decision had tinued adherence to [the 1972 Anti- procedures and systems are in place. been made.” Ballistic Missile Treaty] is still con- Russia employs an extensive array of “The threat to the US posed by sistent with our national interests. technical and procedural safeguards these emerging capabilities is broader, The treaty contributes to our strategic and China keeps its missiles unfueled more mature, and evolving more stability with Russia. ... For the im- and without warheads mated.” rapidly than has been reported in es- mediate future, [the ABM Treaty] “Among those countries seeking timates and reports by the [American] does not hinder our development longer-range missiles, we believe Intelligence Community.” program. We currently intend and North Korea is the most advanced. “The Intelligence Community’s project integrated system testing Its Taepo Dong 2, which we judged ability to provide timely and accurate that will be both fully effective and will have a range between 4,000 and estimates of ballistic missile threats treaty compliant.” 6,000 kilometers, could reach main- to the US is eroding. This erosion “The Chiefs and I believe all [the] land Alaska and the Hawaiian islands. has roots both within and beyond threats must be addressed consistent ... We judge it unlikely, despite the the intelligence process itself. The with a balanced judgment of risks extensive transfer of theater missile community’s capabilities in this area and resources.” technology, that other countries ... need to be strengthened.” will develop, produce, and deploy “The warning times the US can Robert D. Walpole, CIA an ICBM capable of reaching any expect of new, threatening ballistic part of the United States over the missile deployments are being re- (Sept. 17, 1998, speech in Washington, next decade.” duced. Under some plausible scenar- D.C.) “We identified several alterna- ios—including re-basing or transfer “We do not expect countries to tive scenarios for a country to ac- of operational missiles, sea- and follow any specific pattern for mis- quire an ICBM capable of reaching air-launch options, shortened devel- sile development. In fact, the United the United States sooner than 2010. opment programs that might include States, the former , and These include buying an ICBM or testing in a third country, or some China all took different approaches. ... SLV [Space Launch Vehicle] to combination of these—the US might Just because the United States, Rus- convert into an ICBM, or buying well have little or no warning before sia, or China was able to accomplish a complete production facility for operational deployment.” certain feats certain ways in a specific either. We judge that the current period of time—short or long—does policies of Russia and China make Army Gen. Hugh Shelton, not mean another country will.” these scenarios unlikely, given Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff “We recognize that foreign potential political repercussions, countries can hide many activi- the creation of a self-inflicted (Aug. 24, 1998, letter to Sen. James ties from us. These countries are threat, and China’s own military Inhofe, R–Okla.) generally increasing their security needs. Our report points out that “After carefully considering the measures and are learning from each we cannot be certain that this will [Rumsfeld] report, we [the Joint other and from open reporting of remain true over the long term. Chiefs of Staff] remain confident our capabilities.” Indeed, the further into the future that the Intelligence Community “Theater-range missiles already we project the politico–economic can provide the necessary warning in hostile hands pose an immedi- environment, the less certain we of the indigenous development and ate threat to US interests, military would be that the ‘value’ of the sale deployment by a of an forces, and allies. The threat is would not outweigh these factors ICBM threat to the United States.” increasing. More countries are in foreign thinking.” “The commission points out that, acquiring ballistic missiles with “A number of countries have the through unconventional, high-risk ranges up to 1,000 kilometers and, technological wherewithal to develop development programs and foreign more importantly, with ranges be- the capability to launch ... missiles assistance, rogue nations could ac- tween 1,000 kilometers and 3,000 from a forward-based platform, such quire an ICBM capability in a short kilometers. ... This is not a hypo- as a surface ship. Forward-basing

50 AIR FORCE Magazine / January 1999 from dedicated vessels or from hand, if they purchased an ICBM ICBM threat to the United States.’ freighters could pose a new threat to from North Korea or elsewhere, it We don’t disagree with that—that is the United States in the near term— would be quicker.” to say, if there were such a thing as well before 2010.” an indigenous development program, “We could provide five years’ we probably would be able to track warning before deployment that it and provide adequate warning. a potentially hostile country was (Sept. 24, 1998, Senate Armed Services The problem with it is an indigenous trying to develop and deploy an Committee) development program doesn’t exist. ICBM capable of hitting the United “He [JCS Chairman Shelton] What is stated here is an illogical States, unless that country pur- says we have had some different premise. It can proceed perfectly chased an ICBM or SLV; ... had perspectives on likely development logically to an illogical conclusion. an indigenous SLV; or purchased [of rogue nations’ missiles] and as- That’s where that would take you.” a turnkey production facility. We sociated warning times. ... We do. “Next section ... says, ... ‘The could not count on providing much We differ from his assessment, which commission points out that, through warning of either the sale of an I understand from this letter is the unconventional, high-risk develop- ICBM or the sale and conversion of [Joint] Chiefs’ assessment.” ment programs and foreign assis- [an] SLV. (Conversion could occur “It says, ‘After carefully consid- tance, rogue nations could acquire in as little as two years.)” ering the report, we remain confident an ICBM capability in a short time “The threat is real and growing. that the Intelligence Community and that the Intelligence Community The MRBM threat to US interests in can provide the necessary warning may not detect it. We feel this is an the world is already upon us. Missile of the indigenous development and unlikely development.’ We do not forces of Russia and China pose a deployment by a rogue state of an view it as unlikely. We view it as a significant threat to the United States fact. It’s all happened.” and this threat will continue to ex- “First of all, an ‘unconventional ist for the foreseeable future. Our development program’ is what all reports also agree on North Korea’s “ They ARE those countries are doing. It’s all capabilities.” unconventional. No country is going “There are plausible scenarios to do what we [the United States] that could result in an increased acquiring an did. We have totally different inter- missile threat to the United States ests in accuracies and survivability. for which there would be little or ... Second, ‘high-risk development no warning.” ICBM capability. programs.’ They couldn’t care less “We are in basic agreement with about safety. Naturally, it’s high the commission on North Korea. ... risk. To characterize it as high The commission considers Iraq to be risk and imply that, therefore, it behind North Korea and Iran relative In our view, doesn’t exist or isn’t a threat, ... to ballistic missile technology. We well, they’re wrong. Next, it says view Iraq as further along in some ‘and foreign assistance.’ Of course ways. Iraq was ahead of Iran before we do not view it there is foreign assistance. It’s go- the Gulf War. They have not lost ing on. It’s happening every day. the technological expertise and cre- It’s happening as we sit here.” ativity. If sanctions were lifted and “[Shelton says] ‘rogue nations they tried to develop indigenously as unlikely. could acquire an ICBM capability.’ a 9,000-kilometer-range ICBM to They ARE acquiring an ICBM capa- be able to reach the United States, bility. In our view, we do not view it would take them several years. We view it as it as unlikely. We view it as a fact If they purchased an ICBM from of life that’s happening all across North Korea or elsewhere, it would the globe.” be quicker.” a fact of life “Our report assessed North Ko- “The commission considers Iran rea as being capable of developing an to be as far along in its technological ICBM to threaten the United States development efforts as North Korea. within five years of a decision to do In our view, that is not the case. The that’s happening so and that we might very well not recently tested Iranian Shahab 3 is know when that decision was made. based on the No Dong and followed It could have been made four years North Korea’s test, even with foreign all across ago. ... They [Joint Chiefs] point out assistance, by several years. Iran will that these rogue nations currently likely continue to seek longer range pose a threat by using weapons of missiles and would need to develop the globe.” mass destruction through unconven- a 10,000-kilometer-range ICBM to tional terrorist-style delivery means. be able to reach the United States. And of course, that’s true. But the If they follow a pattern similar to fact that there are other threats ... the Shahab 3 time frame, it would doesn’t diminish the ballistic mis- take them many years. On the other sile threat.” ■

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