Reference Code: 2016/52/9

Creation Dates: 17 January 1986

Extent and medium: 11 pages

Creator(s): Department of the Taoiseach

Accession Conditions: Open

Copyright: National Archives, Ireland. May only be reproduced with the written permission of the Director of the National Archives. .,- •I -- .. '1..l'L~'t ,::,,, -ONFIDENTIAL ' . ·;·-. ,1" •• •. :.

MEETING BETWEEN THE TAOISEACH AND THE ! 17 JANUARY 1986 .... .-

. - C • ,a:• •( a delegation from the 1. The Taoiseach received on 17 January Church of Ireland which comprised the following:

Most Rev. Dr. John Armstrong, Primate and Dromore Most Rev. Dr. Robert Eames, and and Most Rev. Dr.», Bishop of Raphoe Most Rev. , Most Rev. Dr. Samuel Poyntz, Most Rev. Dr. Empey, and Kildare Mr. Bristow Stevenson, Lay Secretary (Derry) Mr. Deane, Lay Secretary (Dublin)

the undersigned Mr. W. Kirwan, Department of the Taoiseach, and wer-e also present.

2. The Taoiseach welcomed the delegation. Archbishop were Armstrong began by saying that the Northern bishops and encountering widespread opposition to the Agreement to were quite perturbed. There was no rational approach - the Agreement or readiness to consider it objectively with King, only destructive opposition. At their meeting British and they had noted a slight dichotomy between the would be Irish interpretations of the Agreement; they on this score. TheY. would also grateful fo~ c1arification ~ . SDLP and like to see a more positive approach from the this wondered whether the Taoiseach could assist in that the respect . . Eames followed with the observation with Taoiseach would probably have been disappointed or Northern reaction so far, as conveyed by the media

©NAI/TSCH/2016/52/9 ., - i - r ·· ••• has. been a blind through his own advisori. There groundswell of opposition which is being manipulated for . . .. . ,,. 0 .... ·. poi.'i i i'cal purposes·•. . ·;.··oa"ndwa'gon· Ts ·.:g'a'theririg .. momeiniuin: 'No' ;~asonable discussion of the Agreement is possible. H ' Moderate opinion has been totally squeezed out by ·extremists and by recent events such as the murder of a young UDR member. Eames was concerned about the political leadership being given in the North and by the prospect of a yawning vacuum after the by-elections.

3. Mehaffey was disappointed at the widespread emotional people have even rejection of the ,,Agreement. Very few read the text. In many rpral areas, furthermore, the scurrilous "Newsletter" is the only source of information. Some individuals have been dismayed by the element of violence in the protest to date and fear that their politicians are going down the road to UDI or over do""~ the top, which the Protestant peopleLwant. Opposition to the Agreement, however, is very solid. People who have been brought up to see the Republic as a foreign state regard Dublin as interfering in the affairs of Northern .. Ireland. Any insensitive statement by Dublin on, say, the security forces sends temperatures soaring. There has been some irresponsible criticism of the UDR; while some members have certainly brought shame on themselves, the force as a whole is very fine. Selection procedures and training are now good. Both the RUC and the UDR have performed their jobs well under difficult circumstances. Those who call for the disbandment of the UDR or for a major change in its role are touching a raw nerve. In (where Mehaffey was due to . places such as , Castlederg . preside at the funeral service for the murderea UDR member) people will judge the Agreement in terms of whether or not it helps to reduce violence. Stevenson agreed with his Bishop that the reaction to the Agreement had been been very µnreasoning. Some people, albeit reluctantly, are prepared to give it a chance but their

©NAI/TSCH/2016/52/9 . .­ l , . - 3 - • voices are not being heard. A mechanic in Eglinton, Co. Derry, to whom Stevenson spoke on th~ previous day before for DublinJcommented, "Let's have power-sharing". leaving.. . Sbch. reactions are encouraging but the vast majority give~'- the Agreement no chance at all. The Irish Government must try to sell it to Unionists, even if they meet initially with "No, No, No". This must be tried if there is to be any hope of progress or of postponing rather awful events that may happen. One is worried about what may happen . after the elections. In this connection Stevenson asked for a very careful choice of words by the Irish Government.

' 4. Archbishop Caird said th~t on the whole the Agreement is regarded in the Republic as a justified and in some cases welcome initiative. With at least two-thirds of the Church of Ireland's membership living in the North and taking a Unionist view, however, Northern bishops are obviously concerned. Southern Bishops would advise Northerners to give the Agreement a chance, at least for the initial three years of its operation. They would appeal to the British and Irish Governments nonetheless to make amendments or additions which might give Unionists a sense of -being involved. The inference could be taken from this Agreement that the SDLP does not feel under any pressure to reach agreement with the Unionists. ( The Taoiseach intervened to challenge this inference, saying that it is in the interest of the SDLP and of the Irish Government to achieve devolved government). Archbishop Caird went on to ask whethe~ if devolved government could be established immediately or very quickly, the Agreement would run its 3 year course and secondly, what the C of I , . Bishops could do to promote the peace and welfare of the community in relation to the Agreement. He commented also that Unionists would prefer to see the Conference taking early action on the security front rather than in relation to issues such as the Irish language or the Flags and Emblems Act. Deane felt that there is enthusiasm in the

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problem. It is South for any solution io this intr~ctable • opposition here to the hard to find any substantive will develop in coming Agreement. Hopefully a situation . . . will be feasible. ,, ~onths·~ in which devolved government the SDLP would make· ~eane hoped that, after the elections, to support for the · some gesture, whether in regard of readiness to security forces or a general indication if the next day's engage in talks. He observed that, to take place in the funeral of the murdered UDR man were politicians would be · Republic, the Taoiseach and other it is likely that attending it. In Castlederg, however, politicians will not be present. cert~in \

for reaching an accommodation 5. Poyntz praised the Agreement of parity. The vast between two aspirations on the basis the Agreement. He majority of his parishioners favour "blatant, greenish ·~made three requests: first, that be avoided; second, that {)rhetori~" from the South should SDLP to show greater the Government should lean on the and third, that the support for the security forces; be less propagandistic media here should be persuaded to the Agreement and and more constructive in covering said that he had made Northern affairs. Finally,~ not found anybody who did inquiries in his diocese and had be given a fair try. not think the Agreement should not should take account of The Church of Ireland, furthermore, to the UDR. He nationalist attitudes, e.g., in relation had an extremely mentioned that he had personally some time ago unpleasant experience at a UDR roadblock a Catholic priest and (when the UDR had mistaken him for to continue for a few he had allowed , this misunderstanding behaved). Tltere was some minutes in order to see how they same thing as happened concern among his people that the again. Referring to after Sunningdale should not happen Agreement for review the provision in Article 11 of the if it would be after 3 years "or earlier", he asked to see if Unionists could possible for the 'Government here they were to say "no" . be invited to be involved, even if

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(._ "\, I In response to these various interventions, the Taoiseach 6. ' . • explained th~t he has been concerned for years to create conifrtlorts · in which ·the.. tens·ioris· whi'ch·""exist 'in ·1r·enuid ~o~ld be dissipated. The defects of Unionist rule and the! British Parliament's total abdication of responsibility over fifty years have contributed to these tensions as . - have the Unionist sense of living in a perpetual state of siege and certain irridentist attitudes in the South. the reality - a reality which he has spent most of his life trying to get people down here to accept - is that there is no way in which Ireland can be united without the consent of the majority in Northern Ireland. Over the

past seventeen yei~s, there,, has, in fact, been a revolution in Irish; na.tionalist thinking which is perhaps not sufficiently realized . . · An Agreement which formally recognizes the legitimacy of the Unionist position represents such a sweeping reversal of attitudes which characterized the South in the forties and fifties that it has changed the basic Irish equation. It will take time for people in Northern Ireland to recognize the significance of this development - with which we in the

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on our side. South are removing an obstacle to ~e~~e - not the principal one - is the way the ., Another .factor ·-· • • ••JO . aiid ' laws·:·-· thfs ..also · .,. "...·· - --~ ····· .. ·sta"t'e here ·tias "run .. its' c·onstftiltion .• Another obstacle,, lfas.. to be worked out and will take time. that successive in the way of peace has been the fact in Northern British Governments have allowed people not only to remain Ireland to believe that they can decide precise method by a part- of the UK but also determine the the UK . The decision which they are to be governed within time this century by a British Government for the first to decide this that it was up to the sovereign Parliament We have had no had a shattering effect on Unionists. . we may have illusions about the likely reaction, although underestimated it a little.

the Agreement is how to 7. The fundamental issue underlying allegiance to get the Northern minority to give sufficient remove the the institutions of Northern Ireland to This is the conditions in which IRA violence thrives. that we remove whole point of the Agreement; it is vital might weaken this these conditions and do nothing which completely wrong to a~pect of the Agreement. It would be this would be to pull back from the Agreement in any way: attitudes, while lose the benefits, as regards nationalist from Unionists. being left with all the adverse reactions that there is There is no doubt, on the other hand, the majority. We substantial alienation on the part of so that they have to change the attitude of nationalists accept judicial consent to structures of government and the IRA; this is and security structures and thus isolate North and to the securi ty of this vital to peace , in the th.~ir trust in State. The Unionists' reluctance to place Their British politicians, furthermore, is striking. than their Britishness is deeper and more cultural The Conference, allegiance ~o political institutions. will allow both however, now offers a structure which communities to play their role.

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that the persis\ent suggestion The Taoiseach challengea •8. · SDLP becoming is a substitute for the the Agreement ~o-·i>oh ti'ca:i."'par·ty' .. ~ourd · .- .... ··~· 1rivc:iive<1· in· a·e·voi ved ·gove'rniiie111:·: ··:;:·· approaches to· the : .. a role limited to making ~e content with on the latter take up matters Irish Government and having a powerful interest in its behalf. The SDLP has the Commons and he Hume made this clear in devolution. out of when the elections are will return to this theme in trying to get There is no point, however, the way. The SDLP· across when nobody is listening. this message after the moment (perhaps shortly must careful~ choose the put its proposals on devolution elections) when it can ,, and is not laying effect. It wants a role with greatest ,' new forms, There may be new moulds, down any precise way. open, fresh minds. The and the SDLP must have on which we staying part, has no interest in Irish Government, for its could be transferred necessary in areas which longer than in a There are risks for it to a devolved government. responsibility. role of involvement without consultative it as soon as possible. Indeed, It wants out as much and proposed to transfer Government which first was the Irish (a matte~which could be devolved from the Conference any side initially resisted). proposal which the British matters, however, judicial and human rights Security, the on the first of these, would not be devolved; Heath's opposition at Sunningdale Taoiseach recalled Ted responsibility for security. to the restoration of local that were devolved, the Otherwise, the more functions concerned. better so far as we were from an views on the UDR. Statistics 9. There are different , Britain ~u~gest that non-government source in impeccable of times for the UDR is a number the serious crime rate population the average for the civilian greater than members The conduct of some UDR (which includes the IRA). been borne out by senior real problem. This has is a very ~~it1cj regiment's more hostile SDLP figures. Even the

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than •• involved i& . ~ot more would say the proportio~ was was not security, it but the bad behaviour "ar·, . n ...... ,· ., .,. one-third, ·fo'' go on •'"yea\:. 'iilte·r ye • .. .. ·ci;;'mi'n"a t'i"on···an-,f ~ihe'it'aflo,iet· .. . ·;. : ...,. . .. did the Irish ,, ' .. At no stage, howe·ver, had to be put right. · ' which we realised . seek the force's disbandment Government Rather, it and could be dangerous. would be provocative for a on patrol by the RUC, looked for its accompaniment A for other improvements. ' level of training and higher the Taoiseach in the security field, crucial problem be : of the RUC. It will is the acceptability continued, minority to the point where the very hard to get things and the murder of when one has intimidation will join, . Any who ~o work for the RUC. building contractors a high risk of being who join the RUC run Catholics about a way forward is to bring killed. The ·~nly and intimidate· is reduced where the IRA power to situation RUC. Other could begin to join the some Catholics places like community policing in possibilities such as but the British and the been considered by us Derry have sure enough to them and we were not RUC were. opposed RUC's to f ush the idea. The of the possible benefits other hand, are very and discipline, on the •• loyalty of those intimidation of some impressive: despite been no defections to Maryfield, there have guarding at the cooperation, always good date. RUC/Garda since the been greatly intensified operational level, has Concrete results in the Agreement was signed. is only come where there very important but can area are Amsterdam as in the case of the evidence - and luck, arrests. , be and calm nerves would Taoiseach said patience 10. The reaction to the in dealing with the Unionist required their people politicians are leading Agreement. Unionist Government must be sensitive cul-de-sac. The Irish down a as to - but not in such a way to Unionist concerns When the support for the Agreement. diminish nationalist

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must be faced, many over and ~ealities elections are not go down . decide that they will Unionists will hopefully fdd'eri',·~··· ...... -: . -~po·;;~Tsiiecf, ··v·i"of ~iice-r . . .. , - ~ ·~: i~. ~n···i ... ,. . . the "i:-oa"ci -t~··uni' BBC, the previous day's # ,. Taoiseach noted that ~nclave. · The . favour of · majority of 2 : 1 in revealed a Unionist 12 poll evident over the past (confirming a trend power-sharing will not act on this. Unionist politicians years) - yet in which the criticism of the secrecy Regarding Unionist said the Irish Government was negotiated, he Agreement tat ions between th·e had been fuller consul believed there in fact, Unionists than had, Government and the British time that this was Had they known at the been the case. .. it. If ~8ne something about so, they might have not then, singly and violence _could be avoided, serious the SDLP, the t'wo .the involvement of together and with this, attention to devolution: Governments could give including the proposed by security action, of helped o_n the Suppression European Convention accession to the note of the tide. He took should help to turn Terrorism, of certain politicians made about the absence the remarks rhetoric" unhelpful "greenish funerals and about had from the Government TD ' s from one instance, •, (though, apart claims to avoid making excessive abided by instructions for the Agreement).

said he had been referring latter point, Poyntz 11. On the on the RUC and UDR to occasional statements more generally Referring to outside the Oireachtas. made by people Mehaffey said the UDR roadblock, Empey's anecdote about of roadblocks, the his extensive experience that, in of courtesy in be graded in terms forces could then security , Army, th~·RUC and ascending order: the the following nationalists commented that many the UDR. The Taoiseach Questioned by Stevenson in the reverse order. list these in the UDR, he the serious crime rate about his figure for that had been covered and a twelve-year period said that in favour of was possibly weighted the statistic quoted

©NAI/TSCH/2016/52/9 - 10- r divergences Asked by Eames ·about • earlier period. •... • the ...... - t .iP.flS .9.J _tlJ..~.-- ...... -d.. In.. s~. io ~_e:i;:pr e.H · J>.E:.~'!e!;I}• .. 1?.r.i t ,i _s)1 .~~ joint .. , .... -·· _ the very careful Ag>eement, he emphasized should be presented; · of how the Agreement preparation presentation occasional errors in notwithstanding this, seen the Agreement is being possible but basically for remain same way. The role way and worked in the in the same is neither under the Agreement the Irish Government must the British Government consultative nor executive; to but it obliges itself take the decisions, ultimately with the Irish efforts to reach agreement make determined system which a complex and delicate Government. This,is side put forward reasonable only work if th_e Iri!h will reasonably. In a if the British respond proposals and (given the are condemned to success sense, both sides Armstrong of failure). Archbishop appalling consequences other were being ~ought on that the by-elections said Agreement provided was saying that the issues. Paisley Northern in the government of for direct interference from putting forward something very different Ireland, that a Unionist may The Taoiseach responded proposals. concerns is to meet nationalist feel that any action well of the rejection of especially when, because unacceptable, making proposals to we had to get involved, powe.r-sharing, and, in some cases, the latter reacting the British with be Unionists, this may He could see how, to agreeing. way. The difficulty but there was no other distasteful trust in the the lack of Unionist was, in large measure, also be reason, thought must Government. For that British an input. In recent of giving the Unionists given to ways has evidently Cushnahan, Mrs. Thatcher contacts with John The desire to be involved~. to meet Alliance's tried the best moment for will have to choose British Government role in parties a consultative offering the Unionist favour of We would be all in to the Conference. Yfl\relation unhappy at the mentioned that he is , ~his. The Taoiseach to offering limits the Irish side fact that the Agreement

©NAI/TSCH/2016/52/9 .. - 11- (~:· .• views and proposals on matters affecting the minority community. Stevenson felt the British were wrong to have . • . . • • , · • •• , . . • .. " .•• · - ····-· • • • ••• ;,._. ,. •. • •, ••• •• ~,.a.- • • • · , . ,• ••• - •• - · .:~, ... . ~ . iQ~isted on this. Finally, Eames expressed appreciation £or visits paid to him and other Northern Bishops by Irish~ civil servants. He said he has personally found these visits very valuable and is very grateful for them.

Archbishop Caird and Bishop Poyntz raised concerns of the 12. Church of Ireland about the regionalisation proposals in the Green Paper on Education, for which the deadline f;r reactions was 28 January. The Taoiseach suggested they make their worri~~ known to the Minister for Education but said the Government woul~~e very ready to have consultations on their concerns in this area.

13. In conclusion, the Taoiseach mentioned proposals currently under discussion for legislation on problems arising from marital breakdown and said he would be in touch with the individual Churches shortly with a view to arranging joint or separate discussions of these matters, as appropriate .

.{)-.~~~~- David Donoghue '11 January 1986.

c.c. Taoiseach Minister . . , .. Se.:retary Mr. Nally Mr. Lillis A-I Section Ambassadors London and Washington Box

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