The Power of Three
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Annual Report 2019 Contents
Annual Report 2019 Contents 4 Foreword 93 Report of the Supervisory Board 6 Executive Board 102 Consolidated Financial Statements 103 Consolidated Statement of 8 The Axel Springer share Financial Position 10 Combined Management Report 105 Consolidated Income Statement 106 Consolidated Statement of 13 Fundamentals of the Axel Springer Group Comprehensive Income 24 Economic Report 107 Consolidated Statement of 44 Economic Position of Axel Springer SE Cash Flows 48 Report on risks and opportunities 108 Consolidated Statement of Changes in Equity 60 Forecast Report 109 Consolidated Segment Report 71 Disclosures and explanatory report on the Executive Board pursuant to takeover law 110 Notes to the Consolidated Financial Statements 77 Corporate Governance Report 180 Responsibility Statement 181 Independent Auditor’s Report 187 Boards 2 Group Key Figures in € millions Change yoy 2019 2018 Group Revenues – 2.2 % 3,112.1 3,180.7 Digital revenue share1) 73.3 % 70.6 % 2) EBITDA, adjusted – 14.5 % 630.6 737.9 EBITDA margin, adjusted2) 20.3 % 23.2 % 2) EBIT, adjusted – 21.5 % 414.5 527.9 EBIT margin, adjusted 2) 13.3 % 16.6 % Net income – 35.4 % 134.6 208.4 2) Net income, adjusted – 21.5 % 263.7 335.7 Segments Revenues Classifieds Media 0.1 % 1,213.8 1,212.5 News Media – 4.4 % 1,430.9 1,496.2 Marketing Media 0.8 % 421.5 418.3 Services/Holding – 14.4 % 46.0 53.7 EBITDA, adjusted2) Classifieds Media – 3.8 % 468.4 487.2 News Media – 39.3 % 138.5 228.2 Marketing Media 20.3 % 107.8 89.6 Services/Holding − – 84.1 – 67.0 EBIT, adjusted2) Classifieds Media – 7.1 % 377.9 406.7 News Media – 54.4 % 72.1 158.2 Marketing Media 26.1 % 83.3 66.0 Services/Holding − – 118.6 – 103.0 Liquidity and financial position 2) Free cash flow (FCF) – 38.1 % 214.6 346.9 2) 3) FCF excl. -
14Annual Report Contents
14Annual Report Contents 4 Foreword 78 Report of the Supervisory Board 6 Executive Board 86 Consolidated Financial Statements 87 Responsibility Statement 8 The Axel Springer share 88 Auditor’s Report 89 Consolidated Statement of Financial Position 10 Combined Management Report 91 Consolidated Statement of 12 Fundamentals of the Axel Springer Group Comprehensive Income 22 Economic report 92 Consolidated Statement of Cash Flows 41 Economic position of Axel Springer SE 93 Consolidated Statement of Changes in Equity 44 Events after the reporting date 94 Consolidated Segment Report 45 Report on risks and opportunities 95 Notes to the Consolidated 56 Forecast report Financial Statements 61 Disclosures and explanatory report of the Executive Board pursuant to takeover law 158 Boards 65 Corporate Governance Report Group Key Figures Continuing operations in € millions Change yoy 2014 2013 2012 Group Total revenues 8.4 % 3,037.9 2,801.4 2,737.3 Digital media revenues share 53.2 % 47.5 % 42.4 % 1) EBITDA 11.6 % 507.1 454.3 498.8 1) EBITDA margin 16.7 % 16.2 % 18.2 % 2) Digital media EBITDA share 72.1 % 62.0 % 49.4 % 3) EBIT 9.7 % 394.6 359.7 413.6 Consolidated net income 31.9 % 235.7 178.6 190.7 3) Consolidated net income, adjusted 9.3 % 251.2 229.8 258.6 Segments Revenues Paid Models 2.6 % 1,561.4 1,521.5 1,582.9 Marketing Models 10.8 % 794.1 716.5 662.8 Classified Ad Models 27.2 % 512.0 402.6 330.2 Services/Holding 6.1 % 170.5 160.8 161.4 EBITDA1) Paid Models – 2.4 % 244.2 250.1 301.8 Marketing Models 6.0 % 109.7 103.4 98.1 Classified Ad Models -
Entscheidungen Im August 2020 Und Ergebnisse Der 252. Sitzung Der KEK Zulassungen • Supreme Master TV / Supreme Master Ching Hai Deutschland E
KEK-Pressemitteilung 04/2020 • Berlin, 8. September 2020 Entscheidungen im August 2020 und Ergebnisse der 252. Sitzung der KEK Zulassungen • Supreme Master TV / Supreme Master Ching Hai Deutschland e. V. • TVR (Arbeitstitel) / Deutsches Musik Fernsehen GmbH & Co. KG Beteiligungsveränderungen • TM-TV GmbH • ProSiebenSat.1 Media SE • RTL Group S.A. • German Car TV Programm GmbH und MV Sendebetriebs- gesellschaft UG (haftungsbeschränkt) • sporttotal.tv GmbH • WeltN24 GmbH und Bild GmbH Die Kommission zur Ermittlung der Konzentration im Medienbereich (KEK) hat entschieden, dass den folgenden Zulassungen und Beteiligungsveränderungen keine Gründe der Sicherung der Meinungsvielfalt entgegenstehen: Zulassung Supreme Master TV / Supreme Master Ching Hai Deutschland e. V. Der Supreme Master Ching Hai Deutschland e.V. hat bei der Medienanstalt Berlin-Brandenburg (mabb) eine Zulassung für das bundesweite Fernsehspartenprogramm Supreme Master TV beantragt. Das Programm Supreme Master TV ist geprägt vom Leben und Wirken der Ching Hai, einer vietnamesischen Schriftstellerin, Unternehmerin und Meditationslehrerin, die in ihrem Umfeld als spirituelle Meisterin gilt. Themenschwerpunkte sind unter anderem Veganismus, Frieden, Kultur, Spiritualität, Umwelt und Gesundheit. Supreme Master TV wird bereits international über verschiedene Ausspielwege verbreitet. In Deutschland ist der Empfang über die sendereigene Website www.suprememastertv.com und über YouTube, Apple TV, Amazon Fire TV sowie Android-Smart-TV-Systeme und TikTok möglich. 1/8 Zulassung TVR (Arbeitstitel) / Deutsches Musik Fernsehen GmbH & Co. KG Die Deutsches Musik Fernsehen GmbH & Co. KG plant ein Unterhaltungsspartenprogramm unter dem Arbeitstitel TVR. Das Programm soll frei empfangbar über Satellit (Astra) und Kabel (PŸUR/Tele Columbus) erfolgen. Ein entsprechender Zulassungsantrag wurde bei der Bremischen Landesmedienanstalt (brema) gestellt. Die Deutsches Musik Fernsehen GmbH & Co. -
Silicon Alley Media, Inc
Beta How To Write A GREAT Business Plan Henry Blodget Co-founder, CEO & Editor-in-Chief, Business Insider Beta What We Know About Business Plans • We’ve seen a lot of business plans – 10 years on Wall Street working with growth companies – We run a business plan competition with hundreds of entrants – Startups pitch us ideas every day • We’ve been through it ourselves – Business Insider has raised several rounds of investment Beta What Makes A Business Plan GREAT? • The GREAT ones are concise and and crystal clear. They explain: – WHAT your value-proposition is – WHY you will win – HOW you will execute your plan 3 Beta Overview of Today’s Presentation • Why do you need a business plan? • What goes into a great business plan? (Step by step) • Quick guide to the elevator pitch Beta How Important Are Business Plans? 5 Beta Why Bother With A Business Plan At All? • Forces you to analyze key questions: – Market size – Existing competition – Your value-proposition – Realistic assessment of obstacles and challenges • Helps you refine idea • Helps you raise money Beta Type Of Plan Depends On Type Of Business • Capital intensive businesses: – Require abundant planning and risk management – Ex.: mining, manufacturing, food services, data centers • => Create detailed business plan Beta Type Of Plan Depends On Type Of Business • Less capital intensive – Need to be nimble and adapt strategy – Excessive planning an impediment to agility – Ex.: internet start-ups, service businesses • => Create less-detailed business plan Beta Key Elements Of Your Business -
What Do News Aggregators Do? Evidence from Google News in Spain and Germany*
What Do News Aggregators Do? Evidence from Google News in Spain and Germany* Joan Calzada† Ricard Gil‡ December 2018 Abstract The impact of aggregators on news outlets is ambiguous. In particular, the existing theoretical literature highlights that although aggregators create a market expansion effect when they bring visitors to news outlets, they also generate a substitution effect if some visitors switch from the news outlets to the aggregators. Using the shutdown of the Spanish edition of Google News in December of 2014 and difference-in-differences methodology, this paper empirically examines the relevance of these two effects. We show the shutdown of Google News in Spain decreased the number of daily visits to Spanish news outlets between 8% and 14%, and that this effect was larger in outlets with less overall daily visits and a lower share of international visitors. We also find evidence suggesting that the shutdown decreased online advertisement revenues and advertising intensity at news outlets. We then analyze the effect of the opt-in policy adopted by the German edition of Google News in October of 2014. Although such policy did not significantly affect the daily visits of all outlets that opted out, it reduced by 8% the number of visits of the outlets controlled by the publisher Axel Springer. Our results demonstrate the existence of a net market-expansion effect through which news aggregators increase consumers' awareness of news outlets' contents, thereby increasing their number of visits. * We thank Shane Greenstein, Avi -
Fiduciary Duties and the Analyst Scandals
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law 2007 Fiduciary Duties and the Analyst Scandals Jill E. Fisch University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship Part of the Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons, Business Law, Public Responsibility, and Ethics Commons, Business Organizations Law Commons, Economic Policy Commons, Economics Commons, Law and Economics Commons, Legal Biography Commons, Legal Studies Commons, and the Work, Economy and Organizations Commons Repository Citation Fisch, Jill E., "Fiduciary Duties and the Analyst Scandals" (2007). Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law. 1058. https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/1058 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law by an authorized administrator of Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. File: Fisch Macro Updated Created on: 5/22/2007 2:10 PM Last Printed: 5/22/2007 2:15 PM FIDUCIARY DUTIES AND THE ANALYST SCANDALS Jill E. Fisch* I. INTRODUCTION I am delighted to be here and to deliver a lecture as part of the series honoring Daniel Meador. I am also honored to be part of the group of dis- tinguished scholars who have delivered lectures in this series. I was invited to speak about fiduciaries and, in particular, whether research analysts should be regulated as fiduciaries. Regulators, legislators, and the self regu- latory organizations—the New York Stock Exchange and the NASD—have been paying a lot of attention to analyst regulation. -
How Much Are Your Eyeballs Worth? Placing a Value on a Website's Customers May Be the Best Way to Judge a Net Stock
How Much Are Your Eyeballs Worth? Placing a value on a Website's customers may be the best way to judge a Net stock. It's not perfect, but on the Net, what is? By Erick Schonfeld February 21, 2000 (FORTUNE Magazine) – Internet CEOs crave many things: world domination, instant service in bistros, fawning media attention. But what they crave above all else is eyeballs. That's less ghoulish than it sounds. In Webspeak, you see, eyeballs mean customers. Since the typical dot- com lacks the one metric that Wall Street has traditionally used to evaluate companies (you remember--earnings) analysts and investors have contrived other ways to size up Net stocks. One now stands out: market capitalization per pair of eyeballs. It's a useful first step in explaining why a company garners a certain kind of valuation. For instance, a pair of eyeballs at Web portal Lycos, with a $7.4 billion market cap, has a value of just $244; at Schwab, which has a $30 billion market cap, a pair is worth $4,562 (ironically, this also happens to be around the price a pair of real human corneas reportedly commands on the black market). If the Internet market were rational, the market cap per eyeball would represent the total profit that you could reasonably expect a company to get from its average customer, adjusted for risk and the length of time before those profits are realized. Internet analysts are the first to admit that today's is not a rational market. So correlating the lifetime value of eyeballs to a fast-growing dot-com's stock price is not perfect science. -
Literaturverzeichnis
Literaturverzeichnis Jürgen Peter Schmied Sebastian Haffner Eine Biographie 683 Seiten, Gebunden ISBN: 978-3-406-60585-7 © Verlag C.H.Beck oHG, München Quellen- und Literaturverzeichnis I. Quellen A Ungedruckte Quellen 1. Akten Archiv der Humboldt Universität zu Berlin. Matrikelbuch, Rektorat, 600/116. Jur. Fak., Bd. 309. BBC Written Archive Centre, Reading. RCont 1, Sebastian Haffner File 1. Bundesarchiv. Personalakte Raimund Pretzel, R 3001, 71184. Personalakte Raimund Pretzel, ehemals BDC, RKK 2101, Box 0963, File 09. Bundesbehörde für die Unterlagen des Staatssicherheitsdienstes der ehemaligen Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, Berlin. ZA, MfS – HA IX/11. AF Pressemappe. ZA, MfS – HA IX/11. AF Z I, Bd. 3. ZA, MfS – HA IX/11. AF N-II, Bd. 1, Bd. 2. ZA, MfS – F 16/HVA. ZA, MfS – F 22/HVA. National Archives, Kew. FO 371/24424 FO 371/26554 FO 371/106085 HO 334/219 INF 1/119 KV 2/1129 KV 2/1130 PREM 11/3357 Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes, Berlin. B 8, Bd. 1498. B 11, Bd. 1019. 2 2. Nachlässe NL Konrad Adenauer Stiftung Bundeskanzler-Adenauer-Haus, Rhöndorf. NL Raymond Aron École des hautes études en sciences sociales, Paris. Centre de recherches politiques Raymond Aron. NL David Astor Privatbesitz. NL Margret Boveri Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin, Handschriftenabteilung. NL Willy Brandt Archiv der sozialen Demokratie. Friedrich-Ebert- Stiftung, Bonn. NL Eugen Brehm Institut für Zeitgeschichte, München. NL William Clark Bodleian Library, Oxford. Department of Special Col- lections and Western Manuscripts. NL Arthur Creech Jones Rhodes House Library, Oxford. NL Isaac Deutscher International Institute of Social History, Amsterdam. NL Sebastian Haffner Bundesarchiv. -
Jury Trial Demanded .41M' Defendants
105). ttne 194' s4 UNITED STATES DI p, co vi 4/1 SOUTHERN DISTRIC i W YORK - _ —1 SANDRA and RONALD BLAIR, on behalf of Civil Action No. themselves and all others similarly siWfttbci, Plaintiffs, FEDERAL SECURITIES -against- CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT MERRILL LYNCH & CO., INC. and HENRY M. BLODGET, 1=1 Jury Trial Demanded .41M' Defendants. - • • , Plaintiffs, individually and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated, by4iteir'l undersigned attorneys, for their complaint, allege upon person& knowledge as to themselves and their own acts and upon infortnation and belief as to all other matters, based upon the investigation made by and through their attorneys, which investigation included, among other things, a review of analyst reports published and disseminated to the investing public by defendant MertillLynch & Co., Inc. ("Merrill Lynch"), internal communications of Merrill Lynch employees and recent court filings by the New York State Attorney General obtaining an order requiring immediate reforms by Merrill Lynch: NATURE OF ACTION 1. This is a securities class action on behalf of public investors who purchased the common stock of At Home Corporation, doing business as Exeite@Home ("Excite" or the "Company"), during the period from August 18, 1999 through June 20, 2001, both dates inclusive (the "Class Period"). Named as defendants are Merrill Lynch and its former star interne research analyst Henry M. Blodget ("Blodget"). These defendants are charged with violations of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5. 2. During the Class Period, defendants issued to the investing public false and misleading analyst reports and ratings about the business operations and prospects of the Company. -
Google to Stop Publishing German Newspaper Extracts - WSJ
Google to Stop Publishing German Newspaper Extracts - WSJ http://online.wsj.com/articles/google-to-stop-publishing-german-newspap... Dow Jones Reprints: This copy is for your personal, non-commercial use only. To order presentation-ready copies for distribution to your colleagues, clients or customers, use the Order Reprints tool at the bottom of any article or visit www.djreprints.com See a sample reprint in PDF Order a reprint of this article now format. TECHNOLOGY Search Giant to Avoid Paying Publishing Rights Following Change in Law By SAM SCHECHNER Oct. 2, 2014 10:27 a.m. ET Google has been in a long-running legal battle over a new German law that obliges the company to secure permission to display publishers’ content.. Associated Press Google Inc. will stop posting snippets from several large German newspapers beginning next week, rather than pay for the right to post them, escalating a fight with the country’s publishers amid broader pressure on the company in Europe. On Wednesday Google said it would stop displaying both text summaries and thumbnail images from newspapers including Axel Springer SE ’s Bild—the country’s most widely sold—because of a continuing legal fight over a new German law that obliges the company to secure permission to display publishers’ content. “Given this litigation, we’ll no longer be showing snippets and thumbnails for some well-known sites (in Germany),” Philipp Justus, managing director of Google Germany, said in a blog post, adding Google 1 of 2 10/3/2014 11:39 AM Google to Stop Publishing German Newspaper Extracts - WSJ http://online.wsj.com/articles/google-to-stop-publishing-german-newspap.. -
The Inevitability of a Strong SEC, 91 Cornell L
Cornell Law Review Volume 91 Article 1 Issue 4 May 2006 The nevI itability of a Strong SEC Robert A. Prentice Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Robert A. Prentice, The Inevitability of a Strong SEC, 91 Cornell L. Rev. 775 (2006) Available at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr/vol91/iss4/1 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Cornell Law Review by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. THE INEVITABILITY OF A STRONG SEC Robert A. Prenticet There are many visions for the future of securities regulation. One prominent view fratures significant private contractingfor disclosure and fraud protection. Another envisions regulatory competition, enabling compa- nies to choosefrom among a menu of regulatory regimes provided by different states, nations, or securities exchanges competing for incorporations or list- ings. This article demonstrates that these two regulatory regimes rely too heavily upon the reputationalconstraint, which is insufficient for the signifi- cant task of securities regulation. Tenets of behavioral psychology suggest that self-serving bias and other factors will too often cause managers to choose regulatory regimes that serve their own best interests rather than those of shareholders. Around the globe, most developed economies have rejected private con- tracting and regulatory competition in favor of emulating the United States' current strong-SEC model. An impressive body of transnationalempirical evidence supports the viewpoint that the strong-SEC regulatory model is sig- nificantly more effective than alternatives at promoting capital markets. -
Enron Slime Mold Hit with RICO Suit
Click here for Full Issue of EIR Volume 29, Number 15, April 19, 2002 officials; the law firms of Vinson and Elkins, and Kirkland and Ellis, based in Andersen’s hometown of Chicago; and Enron Slime Mold nine commercial and investment banks: J.P. Morgan Chase, Citigroup, Bank of America, Merrill Lynch, Cre´dit Suisse First Boston, Lehman Brothers, Barclays, Canadian Imperial Hit With RICO Suit Bank of Commerce, and Deutsche Bank. by John Hoefle “Enron was a hall of mirrors inside a house of cards— reporting hundreds of millions of dollars of phony profits each year, while concealing billions of dollars of debt that should Enron, its accountant, two law firms, and a number of big have been on its balance sheet....Enron has turned into an international banks have been named in two class-action law- enormous Ponzi scheme—the largest in history,” the Lerach suits, as current and former Enron employees and holders suit charged. of Enron securities seek compensation for losses suffered in connection with Enron’s collapse. In part, this is a common The Right Track legal maneuver of going after the “deep pockets”of associated These lawsuits have exposed a thread which, if pulled companies, since Enron itself is bankrupt. However, the suits with courage and determination, will reveal much about the also touch upon a fundamental truth in the Enron affair, which inner workings of a much larger Ponzi scheme, that of the is that Enron did not act alone, but was one part of an organized global speculative bubble. EIR’s investigation into these mat- criminal network designed to loot the public.