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Numbers AES-GCM Efficiency, 154 0-RITT Data, 245 Internals, 152–153 2G Mobile Communications, 89 Security, 154 3DES (Triple DES), 59, 72–74

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Numbers AES-GCM Efficiency, 154 0-RITT Data, 245 Internals, 152–153 2G Mobile Communications, 89 Security, 154 3DES (Triple DES), 59, 72–74 INDEX Numbers AES-GCM efficiency, 154 0-RITT data, 245 internals, 152–153 2G mobile communications, 89 security, 154 3DES (triple DES), 59, 72–74. See also and small tags, 161 DES (Data Encryption and weak hash keys, 159–161 Standard) AES native instructions (AES-NI), 3G mobile communications, 91, 128 63–64 4G mobile communications, 78, 91, AEZ, 161–162 128, 129 AKA (authenticated key agreement), 205–207 A algebraic attacks, 85 Alvisi, Lorenzo, 125 A5/1, 18, 88–91 amplitude, 252–253 Aaronson, Scott, 171, 178, 259, 269 Apple, 218, 231 Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), application-specific integrated circuit 53, 59 (ASIC), 79 AddRoundKey, 60 associated data, 149 block size, 54 asymmetric encryption, 1, 15. vs. DES, 59, 80 See also RSA and GCM, 152–154, 159, 161 (Rivest–Shamir–Adleman) implementations, 62–64 attack costs, 43–44 internals, 59–62 attack models, 10 KeyExpansion, 60 black-box, 11–12 MixColumns, 60 for key agreement protocols, 207 with Poly1305, 138 gray-box, 12 and provable security, 48 authenticated ciphers, 148 security of, 65 with associated data, 149 ShiftRows, 60 functional criteria, 151–152 SubBytes, 60 nonces, 149–150 and TLS 1.3, 243–244 online, 151 Advanced Vector Extensions (AVX), 55 performance, 150–151 AE. See authenticated encryption (AE) permutation-based, 157–158 AEAD (authenticated encryption with security, 150 associated data), 16, 149, streamability, 151 157–158 authenticated decryption, 148 AES. See Advanced Encryption authenticated Diffie–Hellman, 210–213 Standard (AES) authenticated encryption (AE), 16, 145 AES-CBC, 69 AES-GCM, 152–154, 159–161 AESENC instruction, 64 autheticated ciphers, 148–152 AESENCLAST instruction, 64 OCB, 155–156 authenticated encryption (AE), padding oracle attacks, 74–75 continued rounds, 56 permutation-based AEAD, 157–158 round keys, 56–57 SIV, 156–157 security goals, 54 using MACs, 146 –148 slide attacks, 56–57 authenticated encryption with substitution–permutation networks, associated data (AEAD), 16, 57–58 149, 157–158 Bluetooth, 78 authenticated key agreement Boneh, Dan, 199 (AKA), 205–207 Bos, Joppe W., 233 authentication tag, 16. See also broadcast attack model, 95 authenticated encryption Brumley, David, 199 (AE); MACs (message brute-force attacks, 41, 90 authentication codes) AVX (Advanced Vector Extensions), 55 C CA (certificate authority), 238–240, B 247–248 backtracking resistance, 26 cache-timing attacks, 63 backward secrecy, 26 Caesar cipher, 2–3 BcryptGenRandom() function, 33–34 CAESAR competition, 161 Bellare, Mihir, 143 Canetti, Ran, 143 Bellaso, Giovan Battista, 3 carry-less multiplication (CLMUL), 153 Bellcore attack, 196–197 CBC. See cipher block chaining (CBC) Bernstein, Daniel J., 52, 95, 100, 136, CBC-MAC, 134 139, 230, 231, 261 CCA (chosen-ciphertext attackers), 11 big-number libraries, 192 CCM (counter with CBC-MAC), binary exponentiation, 192 162, 243 birthday attacks, 109 CDH (computational birthday paradox, 109 Diffie–Hellman), 204 Bitcoin, 106 certificate authority (CA), 238–240, bit security, 42–43 247–248 BLAKE, 120 certificate chain, 239, 247 BLAKE2, 215, 226 ChaCha20, 95, 120, 138, 243–244 BLAKE2b, 123 chaining values, 112 BLAKE2s, 123 Chinese remainder theorem (CRT), compression function, 124 195–196 design rationale, 123 chosen-ciphertext attackers (CCA), 11 blinding attacks, 189 chosen-message attacks, 129 block ciphers, 53. See also Advanced chosen-plaintext attackers (CPA), 11 Encryption Standard (AES) Chrome browser, 118, 231 block size, 54–55 Chuang, Isaac, 269 CBC mode, 67–70 ciphers, 1 codebook attacks, 55 cipher-based MAC (CMAC), 134–135 CTR mode, 71–72 cipher block chaining (CBC), 67–69. decryption algorithm, 54 ciphertext stealing, 70 ECB mode, 65–67 padding, 69–70 encryption algorithm, 54 padding oracle attacks, 74 Feistel schemes, 58–59 ciphertext, 2 key schedule, 56 ciphertext-only attackers (COA), 11 meet-in-the-middle attacks, 72–74 ciphertext stealing, 70 modes of operation, 65 C language, 63 272 Index Clay Mathematics Institute, 46, 171 CRT (Chinese remainder theorem), client certificate, 246 195–196 clique problem, 169 CryptAcquireContext() function, 34 CLMUL (carry-less multiplication), 153 CryptGenRandom() function, 33–34 closest vector problem (CVP), 264–265 Crypto++, 199 CMAC (cipher-based MAC), 134–135 Cryptocat, 37 CMAC-AES, 157 cryptographic security, 39. See also ciphertext-only attackers (COA), 11 security code-based cryptography, 263–264 CTR (counter mode), 71–72, 91, 152 codebook attacks, 55, 90–91 cube attacks, 85 Codenomicon, 248 Curve448, 244 coding problems, 179 Curve25519, 230–231, 244 Cohen, Henri, 233 Curve41417, 231 Cold War, 53 CVP (closest vector problem), 264–265 collision resistance, 109, 113 cyclic redundancy checks (CRCs), 106 complexity. See computational complexity D complexity class, 168 complex numbers, 253 Dahlin, Mike, 125 compression functions, 111 Damgård, Ivan, 111, 126 in BLAKE2, 124 Data Encryption Standard. See DES Davies–Meyer construction, 114 (Data Encryption Standard) in Merkle–Damgård construction, Datagram Transport Layer Security 112–113 (DTLS), 237 in SHA-1, 117 Davies–Meyer construction, 114, computational complexity, 164 117, 124 bounds, 167 decisional Diffie–Hellman (DDH) classes, 168 assumption, 205 comparison, 166 problem, 204–205 constant factors, 165 decryption, 2 constant time, 166 dedicated hardware, 79 exponential, 165, 167 DeMillo, Richard A., 199 exponential factorial, 167 DES (Data Encryption Standard), 53, 80 linear, 165 3DES, 59, 72–74 linearithmic, 165 vs. AES, 59, 80 polynomial, 166–168 block size, 54 quadratic, 165 double DES, 73 superpolynomial, 166–168 Feistel schemes in, 58–59 computational complexity theory, 163 deterministic random bit generator computational Diffie–Hellman (DRBG), 14, 25, 78 (CDH), 204 /dev/random, 32–33 computational hardness, 164 /dev/urandom, 30–32 computational security, 40–41 Diehard, 29 confidentiality, 1, 106 differential cryptanalysis, 98–99 confusion, 57 Diffie, Whitfield, 201 constant-time implementations, 142 Diffie–Hellman problem, 178 Coppersmith, Don, 199 Diffie–Hellman (DH) protocol, 201 counter mode (CTR), 71–72, 91, 152 anonymous, 209–210 counter with CBC-MAC (CCM), authenticated, 210–213 162, 243 CDH problem, 204 CPA (chosen-plaintext attackers), 11 DDH problem, 204–205 CRCs (cyclic redundancy checks), 106 function, 202 Index 273 Diffie–Hellman (DH) protocol, with integers, 219–220 continued NIST curves, 230 generating parameters, 202–203 order, 224 and key agreement, 205–208, point at infinity, 222, 224 225–229 point doubling, 222–223 MQV protocol, 213–214 point multiplying, 223 and shared secrets, 202, 214–215 prime curves, 230 in TLS, 215, 242–243 Weierstrass form, 218 twin problem, 205 elliptic-curve cryptography (ECC), 217 unsafe group parameters, 215–216 elliptic-curve Diffie-Hellman(ECDH), diffusion, 57 226, 232–233 digest, 106 elliptic curve digital signature DigiNotar, 248 algorithm (ECDSA), 226 digital signatures, 106, 182, 188–189 and bad randomness, 232 discrete logarithm problem (DLP), vs. RSA signatures, 227–228 174 –176 signature generation, 226 and CDH problem, 204 signature verification, 226–227 ECDLP, 224–225 elliptic curve discrete logarithm and Shor’s algorithm, 259, 260 problem (ECDLP), 224–225 distribution. See probability elliptic curve integrated encryption distribution scheme (ECIES), 229 drand48, 28 embarassingly parallel, 43, 90 DRBG (deterministic random bit Encapsulating Security Payload generator), 14, 25, 78 (ESP), 241 DTLS (Datagram Transport Layer encrypt-and-MAC, 146 –147 Security), 237 encryption, 1 Durumeric, Zakir, 36 asymmetric, 15 at-rest, 15 in-transit, 15 E randomized, 13 ECB (electronic codebook), 65–67 security, 9 ECC (elliptic-curve cryptography), 217 encrypt-then-MAC, 147–148, 152 ECDH (elliptic-curve Diffie-Hellman), entanglement, 252, 255 226, 232–233 entropy, 23–24, 35–36 ECDSA. See elliptic curve digital entropy pool, 25 signature algorithm EPR (Einstein–Podolsky–Rosen) (ECDSA) paradox, 252 ECDLP (elliptic curve discrete error-correcting codes, 263 logarithm problem), ESP (Encapsulating Security 224–225 Payload), 241 ECIES (elliptic curve integrated eSTREAM competition, 86, 103 encryption scheme), 229 eth roots, 185 Ed448-Goldilocks, 231 Euler’s theorem, 198 Einstein–Podolsky–Rosen (EPR) Euler’s totient function, 183 paradox, 252 exponentiation, 192, 194 elliptic curves, 217–218, 244 extended Euclidean algorithm, 184 addition law, 221 Curve448, 244 Curve25519, 230–231 F Curve41417, 231 factorials, 6 Edwards curves, 219 factoring methods, 172 groups, 224 274 Index factoring problem, 46, 171 general number field sieve (GNFS), and NP-completeness, 173–174 173, 204 solving with Shor’s algorithm, getrandom() system call, 33 259–260 GHASH, 152–154, 159–160 factorization, 172–173, 176 –177 Gilbert, E.N., 136 fast correlation attacks, 85 Git, 105 fault injection, 196–197 GitHub, 51 FDH (Full Domain Hash), 190–191 Gmail, 248 feedback shift registers (FSRs), 80–82 GMR-1, 103 cycle, 82 GMR-2, 103 feedback function, 80 GNFS (general number field sieve), linear, 83–85 173, 204 nonlinear, 86 GNU Multiple Precision (GMP), 192 period, 82 GnuPG, 52 Feistel schemes, 58–59 Go, 140, 191, 193 Ferguson, Niels, 26, 161 Goldberg, Ian, 35 FHE (fully homomorphic Goldwasser, Shafi, 19 encryption), 17 Google, 118, 248 field-programmable gate array Chrome, 231 (FPGA), 79 Internet Authority, 239 filtered LFSR, 85 GOST, 53, 59 first-preimage resistance, 108 Govaerts, René, 126 fixed points, 114 Government Communications Flame, 126 Headquarters (GCHQ), 202 forgery attacks, 128 Grain-128a,
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