Inséré le 01 juin 2010 Logbook News Enlevé le First Quarter Tankers Not Delivering
28 April 2010
Two months ago Tanker Outlook focused on tanker ‗non-delivery‘ rates in 2009, and this month we revisit the subject, looking at the first quarter of 2010. In 2009, the tanker non-delivery rate, defined as the share of tanker capacity scheduled for delivery in the year (at the start of the year) which was not actually delivered, is estimated to have been 25%, but over the first three months of 2010 this figure has risen to 33%.
Delivery Slide
In 2009, across the tanker sectors, Aframax tankers had the lowest non-delivery rate at 11%, and Product tankers below 30k dwt witnessed the highest non-delivery rate at 50%. When 2009 non-delivery rates were analysed according to builder country, Chinese levels were significantly higher at 36% than the Korean and Japanese ‗slippage‘ of 15% and 16% respectively.
The Graph of the Month analyses tanker deliveries scheduled for 2010 at the start of the year (excluding those with an unknown month of delivery) against actual deliveries in the first three months. It should be noted that the spike evident in the schedule for January is in a way a statistical artefact, boosted by tankers originally scheduled for 2009 but not actually delivered, initially pushed into the early year section of the 2010 schedule. In January actual tanker deliveries fell well short of the schedule with 43% non-delivery. However, the volume of actual deliveries in that month was higher than the average monthly level of deliveries scheduled for 2010. Since then, non-delivery rates have dropped, although scheduled deliveries have not been matched, and nor has the average scheduled delivery rate. The fall in non-delivery rates over the first three months means the current ytd non-delivery stands at 33%. Were one to compare the capacity delivered so far in 2010 with the scheduled deliveries adjusted to include a share of scheduled 2010 deliveries with an unknown month, ytd non- delivery would to 43%. Both of these figures are higher than 2009‘s 25%.
Slipping Up?
Clearly, the trend in tanker slippage rates has changed over the first quarter of 2010 as compared to 2009. Furthermore, non-delivery rates of the major building countries do not vary as much as in 2009; at 25% Japan has the lowest rate of ‗slippage‘, and China the highest at 35%. Across the sectors, Suezmaxes were the least affected, posting just 8% ‗non-delivery‘ (but were the only type with ytd delivery cancellations). Outside the smaller sectors (where 90% non- delivery of product tankers 10-30k dwt was recorded), products tankers 30-60k dwt had the highest non-delivery rate of 38%, and Panamaxes 37%. Great Expectations
So tanker non-delivery looks set to remain a key feature, and average monthly tanker deliveries in the first quarter of 2010 were below the average schedule for the year. Question marks regarding delivery performance, and high variability across sectors, mean that the orderbook schedule is today not such a helpful predictor of fleet changes. But at least tanker tonnage supply growth might not be as large as many had originally expected.
Inséré le 3 juin 2010 Open Forum – forum Ouvert Enlevé le Le gigantisme maritime : une nouvelle voie de réflexion… (suite et fin)
IV – MAIS LE GIGANTISME NE DOIT PAS ÊTRE DIABOLISÉ Non que l‘on doive considérer que les inquiétudes suscitées par la vraisemblance d‘une perte totale de TGN soient injustifiées (le syndrome du Titanic, celui de l‘invulnérabilité, n‘est pas de mise), mais parce que, en contrepartie des craintes qu‘il suscite légitimement, le gigantisme est un phénomène qui apporte aussi beaucoup à la collectivité, que ce soit sur les plans économique, commercial ou même environnemental. Sur les plans économique et commercial par l‘efficacité des économies d‘échelle qui n‘est plus à prouver. Par exemple le coût moyen de 20T de marchandises transportées en conteneurs de l'Asie sur l'Europe (au plus haut du marché !) était équivalent au prix du billet avion de classe éco d'un seul passager sur la même distance (le coût du transport maritime représentant donc quelques centimes pour des chaussures, quelques € pour un frigo). Sur le plan environnement le transport maritime est à la tonne transportée 7 fois moins polluant que le transport routier, et environ 20 fois moins que le Transport aérien. Qui plus est, et à tous niveaux, il est en voie d'améliorations et les armateurs et constructeurs de navires géants modernes sont à l‘avant-garde de ce « combat » (en particulier pour les réductions de consommation, émissions de gaz etc.) de ce fait l'augmentation du trafic maritime contribue à réduire fortement les pollutions (à titre d‘exemple, 4.000 EVP chargés ou déchargés représentent 2.000 camions ou 45 trains complets de 90 EVP ou 20 barges de 200 EVP). Enfin l‘évolution vers la qualité maritime en général, bien qu‘imparfaite, paraît irréversible. D‘autre part, à partir du moment où l‘homme et les biens se déplacent à la surface du globe, l‘accidentologie et l‘analyse de risques doivent évidemment être comparatives (comparaisons avec les modes de transport autres que maritimes ; comparaisons au sein du maritime lui-même). Même dans le pire des cas il est difficile d‘imaginer que la mortalité due au transport maritime atteigne jamais celle des accidents de la route (plusieurs dizaines de milliers par an rien qu‘en Europe), voire celle due aux accidents aériens, certes peu nombreux mais qui ne laissent en général que pas ou peu de survivants. D‘autant que, comme déjà signalé, la probabilité est très faible qu‘un grand navire – dont le compartimentage est maintenant très étudié - disparaisse corps et biens, ou coule en seulement quelques heures voire quelques jours, ce qui laisse une vraie capacité d‘intervention aux secours. De plus gros navires signifie aussi moins de navires et donc moins de risques d'accidents, d‘autant que la vraisemblance de vraie perte totale est heureusement très réduite (même si ce serait une grave erreur de ne pas la considérer très sérieusement). Certains assureurs préfèrent certes couvrir trois navires d‘une capacité de 5000 conteneurs plutôt qu‘un seul navire de 15000, mais c‘est du fait de leur analyse (qui peut être discutée) de la répartition du risque. De même le recours à un certain accroissement du feedering est une conséquence inévitable du gigantisme. Or non seulement le coût du « feedering » peut globalement diminuer les économies d‘échelles gagnées au maritime sur les « navires géants, mais l‘activité de feedering elle-même peut aussi contrebalancer, au moins en partie, les aspects positifs environnementaux des mégaships. Il n‘en reste pas moins que le coût de ré-acheminement classique des cargaisons par voie terrestre restera toujours supérieur en termes financiers comme de développement durable. Il est important d‘intégrer que le nombre d'accidents maritimes est à la baisse à peu près sur tous les segments du transport maritime, tant en valeur absolue (mais cela dépend des années) que bien sûr en valeur relative si on le rapporte à l'augmentation des trafics de l‘époque récente. Enfin c‘est un fait avéré que les armateurs de très grands navires sont en général des armateurs de qualité, ce qui peut s‘expliquer aussi bien éthiquement que par l‘intérêt évident qu‘ils ont à ne pas mettre en risque les énormes capitaux que représentent leurs grosses unités.
V – UN POINT PARTICULIER : LES CONTENEURS PERDUS EN MER
Cette question est devenue incontournable durant les travaux du groupe à la suite de trois constats, répétés à l‘envi. 1. À l‘heure actuelle, la situation juridique des conteneurs perdus en mer n‘est pas claire (conteneurs considérés en tant qu‘épave ou partie de navires ?), ce qui n‘aide pas à a résolution des problèmes de sécurité/responsabilité. 2. Même si finalement les pertes sont rares en valeur relatives (on parle d‘un conteneur perdu sur 12 000) elles sont parfois « difficilement compréhensibles » et surtout sont significatives en valeur absolue, ce qui pose des questions très importantes non seulement en matière de sécurité de la navigation et de protection de l‘environnement, mais aussi à l‘évidence de charge financière et sur le plan juridique. 3. L‘augmentation de la taille des navires ne peut qu‘augmenter le risque de perte de conteneurs, même si ces augmentations ne sont pas proportionnelles.
En fait quelques pistes ont paru essentielles : éclaircir et rationaliser (rendre plus réalistes) les règles de responsabilité (chaque métier ayant, sur ce plan là aussi et comme déjà évoqué, SA responsabilité et donc son risque propre et clair de sanction (transitaires, commissionnaires, déclarants, chargeurs, armateurs…) ; généraliser (OMI) l'harmonisation des systèmes et procédures entre les ports (allusion a été faite au code ISM armateurs). Mais le maillon faible actuel du dispositif semblant être les terminaux (non pris en compte dans le code ISM) l‘harmonisation des règlementations portuaires les concernant a aussi semblé très utile ; tracer les conteneurs tout au long de la chaîne de transport 7 (les nouvelles techniques RFID ont été mentionnées). Cette traçabilité doit comprendre la connaissance du poids, du contenu, - en fait de tout ce qui intéresse tous les acteurs de la chaîne (assureurs, chargeurs, auxiliaires de transport, transporteurs, douanes, réceptionnaires, autorités portuaires, services de sécurité … et naturellement les sauveteurs éventuels). Remarque : on ne peut ignorer tout à fait les questions qui se posent au plan du terrorisme (question de sûreté plus que de sécurité, mais pouvant mettre en cause cette dernière): il existe environ 30 millions de conteneurs dans le monde, dont chacun fait en moyenne 10 voyages, ce qui représente 300 millions de mouvements dans le monde répartis sur environ 4.000 ports. Les codes ISPS, Container Initiative, ne permettent de contrôler que 8% de ces mouvements. C‘est une piste de réflexion qu‘il faut approfondir
VI - QUELLES PISTES DE SOLUTIONS, ESSENTIELLEMENT SUR LE PLAN DE LA SÉCURITÉ MARITIME ? VI - 1 - À moyen et long terme Tout d‘abord la trop grande lenteur de l‘évolution de la réglementation internationale a été soulignée à de nombreuses reprises, ce qui a conduit les grands opérateurs à l‘autorégulation (ce qui est notoirement insuffisant quelle que soit la qualité de ces derniers !)
Une insistance particulière, très encouragée par l‘examen des mesures et travaux en vigueur aussi bien chez des armateurs que chez un constructeur de grands navires (STX), a donc porté sur l‘extrême importance de politiques de prévention vigoureuses et diversifiées (cf. insuffisance évidente des moyens « après-accidents »). En particulier, la probabilité d‘accidents importants étant plus forte dans certaines zones de navigation( comme la Manche/Mer du Nord par exemple - et les logiques « sécuritaires » des autorités étatiques en charge (préfets maritimes,…) et des opérateurs maritimes (armateurs,…) n‘étant ni ne pouvant souvent et automatiquement se référer au même ordre de priorités, il a été suggéré de commanditer une analyse probabiliste véritable et rigoureuse sur la sécurité du navire dans les environnements maritimes très particuliers, en l‗occurrence la zone « Manche – Pas de Calais 8» (analyse incluant naturellement - outre l‘effet dominant du facteur humain - les paramètres de densité des trafics longitudinaux montant / descendant et traversier, d‘hydrographie, de bathymétrie, de conditions météo, de visibilité, de courantologie, d‘activité de pêche…). Pour résumer, et même si les comportements des grands armateurs de grands navires sont fondés sur de véritables analyses de risque, il faudrait envisager que les dites analyses s'appuient sur une évaluation de la sécurité du navire dans son environnement spécifique de route et de manoeuvre (du type évaluation d‘un risque industriel – ex : le nucléaire), ce que ne font a priori pas (ou insuffisamment) les règles SOLAS que respectent par ailleurs les bons armateurs. A été aussi suggérée l‘utilité de faire partager et discuter les conclusions de telles analyses par/avec quelques grands armateurs de navires pratiquant cette zone de navigation, de manière à dégager des pistes d‗actions. Il a été en effet affirmé fortement et par tous que « c'est avec les armateurs qu‘il faut améliorer le présent et préparer l'avenir ! ». Enfin le principe de sécurité globale a été souvent invoqué (comment intégrer la sécurité de bout en bout? et la renforcer? Comment encourager le partage et la dissémination des « bonnes pratiques » ?). De même en a-t-il été pour le renforcement de la transparence (avec par exemple une connaissance des mesures particulières et innovantes que les armateurs adoptes pour faire face aux risques, ou encore dans un autre domaine le suivi particulièrement recommandé de la mise en place des opérateurs économiques agréés et de la question du « traçage » des conteneurs cf. ci-dessus). À noter que l‘idée de règlementer le temps de passage/manutention dans les ports (pour les PC) n‘a pas été retenue. Il s‘agissait qu‘un temps minimum soit éventuellement défini, pour tous de la même manière et par port, en fonction du nombre de conteneurs à manipuler au cours de l‘escale… et que ce temps s‘applique (une sorte de « minimum safety rate »en somme) en tenant compte d‘une manière ou d‘une autre des capacités des navires. VI - 2 - À plus court terme
Les pistes ci-dessus étant de longue haleine, le groupe a ouvert quelques pistes et fait les suggestions suivantes, touchant pour certaines à la prévention des accidents et pour d‘autres au traitement le plus efficace possible de leurs conséquences humaines et environnementales : A) Sur le plan de la prévention avant-accident : rendre le pilotage hauturier obligatoire dans certaines zones et selon des critères de dangerosité à déterminer (dont le gigantisme) ? instaurer des procédures de validation de compétences particulières (lesquelles ? comment ?) aux navigants associés directement ou indirectement à la conduite des megaships et n‘en n‘ayant pas l‘expérience ? étudier l‘adaptation de la vitesse des navires en transit dans certains passages ou détroits. Mais sans ignorer que la manoeuvrabilité est liée à la vitesse, ce qui signifierait éventuellement une application par type de navire et selon la capacité manoeuvrière 9 ? Tout en gardant en mémoire que la notion de vitesse adaptée aux circonstances est traitée dans le Règlement International pour Prévenir les Abordage en Mer (fonction du trafic, de la visibilité etc.). En fait il ne faudrait évidemment pas que les limitations de vitesse créent un nouveau risque, celui de situations trop rapprochées entre navires, sachant que la vitesse et le changement de cap sont les seuls moyens dont disposent les Officiers de quart pour éviter ces situations rapprochées. alternativement ou complémentairement réserver certains rails à certaines vitesses ? affiner la régulation du trafic (pas plus de x navires dans telle ou telle zone à tel ou tel moment) ? rendre obligatoire la redondance des systèmes vitaux obligation universelle de la présence de 2 veilleurs à la passerelle (toutes zones ou certaines zones) carrément interdire certains passages (le Pas de Calais par exemple. Quelles conséquences ?) généraliser les grues et portiques équipés de systèmes de pesée saisissage des boîtes (le saisissage (appellation maritime usuelle) sur les grands porte- conteneurs a une grande importance (slaming, roulis paramétrique, etc.). Peut-on mieux utiliser les matériels existants ? Peut on confirmer (et tirer les conséquences) que l‘utilisation des Twistlocks en mode semi automatique est la meilleure réponse en cas de traction verticale ? contrôler l‘application systématique d‘exercices de simulation de crises (paquebots en particulier).
Remarque : sur un autre plan il a été recommandé (pour la sécurité de la plaisance, voire de la pêche) que soient balisées les zones d‘évitage des megaships ancrés dans certaines rades. En effet leur fardage immense, ajouté à la longueur - plusieurs centaines de mètres – représente en soi un danger pour les activités maritimes dans la dite zone) B) Sur le plan de la prévention pour « l’après-accident » : améliorer la qualité et la rapidité de l‘information des sauveteurs en matière d‘existants soutes, de plan du navire et de ses soutes etc. Or l‘accès à ces informations s‘avère très difficile, et bien souvent elles sont approximatives voire totalement fausses (sans revenir sur le contenu des conteneurs, cf. supra) ; mettre en place des procédures pour que les commandants ne quittent pas leur navire sans avoir effectué les procédures de secours et sans avoir emporté les informations nécessaires à l‘organisation de l‘assistance. (Plan de chargement, détails sur la cargaison, emplacement du carburant etc.) ; généraliser (dans des conditions raisonnables) certains équipements comme des gréements de remorquage d‘urgence à l‘avant et à l‘arrière des grands navires ? améliorer toujours plus la coordination de tous les moyens de réponse existant le long des côtes (le renforcement de l‘autorité des Prémars a été salué) ; utiliser autant que possible tous les moyens d‘identification et de suivi mis en place actuellement, en particulier au niveau européen (Cleanseanet, Safeseanet, LRIT, etc.). VI - CONCLUSIONS
La question de savoir si limiter ou interdire l'utilisation des navires géants au nom du « tout sécuritaire » a été très rapidement balayée comme irréaliste, inappropriée et non souhaitable à bien des égards. De même n‘a pas été retenu le débat, finalement considéré comme intellectuel et de peu d‘importance concrète, sur la question de savoir si les TGN ont créé un nouveau risque ou simplement amplifié des risques déjà existants. L‘opinion générale étant que de toutes façons le niveau de taille atteint récemment - en particulier par les PC et les paquebots - requiert dans de nombreux cas des mesures nouvelles et parfois d‘une autre nature que celles existant auparavant ou actuellement. L‘affirmation a été très claire concernant la nécessité de dégager des solutions au niveau international universel (mêmes règle pour tous), et de les dégager en accompagnant et en se faisant accompagner par les acteurs concernés et de qualité du monde maritime.... L‘importance d‘avoir des océans plus sûrs a été acceptée par tous, autrement dit la nécessité d‘une vraie réponse durable à demande globale irréversible née de la mondialisation L‘exemple des dispositions prises pour améliorer considérablement la sécurité maritime en matière de bulk-carriers a été rappelé, avec toutes ses étapes et est perçu comme une preuve que « c‘est possible »10 Il a paru en définitive urgent qu‘à ces conditions (dont en particulier une vraie coopération avec les acteurs concernés) une démarche internationale soit rapidement mise en route (au niveau de l‘OMI) concernant le gigantisme des navires actuels et à venir.
Inséré le 05 juin 2010 Logbook News Enlevé le
World Shipbuilding - Is History Repeating Itself?
Karl Marx coined the phrase "history repeats itself, first as tragedy, second as farce". This insightful observation makes the point that it‘s not the repeated event which matters, but the new drama which accompanies it. In reality the repeated history is just a similar stage on which a new performance is acted out. Sounds familiar? Tragic Circumstances
Older members of the shipping community will recall the great shipbuilding tragedy in the 1970s. Shipyard production peaked in 1975 then fell 30% by 1979. But during the grim market of the early 1980s most of the yards were still there selling space, so the recession dragged on. That was a tragedy and recently there has been a sense of deja-vu as the 1970s was repeated. Shipyard output in CGT (compensated gross tons) trebled from 4m CGT/qtr in 2002 to 12m CGT/qtr in 2008 (see graph) and was heading for 16m CGT/qtr in 2011. Spot on for the "history repeats itself brigade".
Here We Go Again? But in the last year output has taken a new tack. Instead of growing, output slumped from 12m CGT in the first quarter of 2009 to 11m CGT in the second quarter of 2010. This was due to a mix of regional and product related factors. On the regional front China continued its great shipbuilding leap forward, expanding output by 32% in the last year. But the established yards have been cutting back. Japan, the least affected, cut output 8% in the last 12 months, whilst Korea's output is down 24% and Europe's 41%. Product Mix Problems Korea‘s cutback owes much to their product mix. Korea made a pitch for the containership market and this sector has been by far the hardest hit.
As the container surplus spiraled, deliveries halved from 2.6m CGT in the second quarter of 2008 to 1.4m CGT in the first quarter of 2010. Meanwhile, bulker earnings have been OK, despite their nasty shock in 2008, and deliveries surged from 1.4m CGT to 3.7m CGT. Japan and China dominate the bulker newbuilding market so they have had a much easier time so far.
No Tragedy – Must be a Farce
So there you have it. According to the history boys the shipyards will soon fall off a cliff. But that was the tragic ending of the 1970s. Now that history is repeating itself, if Karl Marx was right, today‘s cycle should end in farce (―a comedy which entertains with highly improbable situations‖). So we invite you to help us with suggestions for a suitably slapstick ending to this splendid shipbuilding shambles. Have a nice day.
Inséré le 7 juin 2010 Open Forum – forum Ouvert Enlevé le Objective of tank cleaning is the next cargo
The relationship between cargo tank coatings and tank cleaning is inextricably entwined. Failure to understand the impact of either, can lead to prolonged and inefficient tank cleaning or in the worst case, cargo contamination claims*.
What should also be considered that the primary role of the coating is to prevent corrosion of the steel structure of the vessels. The paint manufacturers strive to produce coatings with the best all-round corrosion protection and chemical resistance that are effective for the trading patterns in which the vessels are trading in.
When the vessels move out of these trading patterns, for whatever reason; operational or commercial, the largest impacts are felt. This is the time when the greatest understanding of the relationship between cargo tank coating and tank cleaning is required.
It should be noted at this time that this discussion does not look at stainless steel, Teflon, or rubber coatings. Cargo tank coatings
It is fair to say that all cargo tank coatings are to some extent, a compromise; the 'perfect' coating does not really exist.
Increasing the pigment volume concentration (PVC) in organic coatings can improve the apparent chemical resistance, but not for every cargo. Increasing PVC will also generally increase the permeability of the coating, which allows for a freer movement of cargoes 'in and out' of the coating. This reduction in residency time tends to reduce the contamination potential for volatile cargoes. However, the increase in permeability may also make the coating more sensitive to water, which could be quite disastrous.
One should also consider cross link density, which has a significant impact on both the chemical resistance and the flexibility of organic coatings. In general, the higher the cross link density, the better the chemical resistance, but the lower the flexibility.
There appears to be a trend emerging linking chemical resistance and flexibility and perhaps one characteristic will suffer - or be compromised - at the expense of the other?
When one considers that the chemical resistance may have to be compromised in order to produce a durable coating that does not crack as soon as the vessel starts to operate, the specific resistance of chemical and oil products to the coating becomes extremely important.
This is also the most logical reason why many coating manufacturers supply a range of different coatings that can be almost tailored to meet the exacting requirements of any specific trade pattern. Organic coatings
There are two types of organic coating in common use today, phenolic epoxy and straight (amine cured) epoxy, which are primarily different in their chemical resistance; with phenolic epoxies providing a much higher level of chemical resistance compared to straight epoxies. Phenolic epoxies are more expensive than straight epoxies because chemical resistance comes at a premium. As such, phenolic epoxies tend to be utilised far more widely in the chemical trade as opposed to straight epoxies which tend to be utilised in the vegetable oil, easy chemicals and CPP (Annex I) trades.
MarineLine is something of an enigma because while it is considered as an organic coating, this is not strictly correct, because of its make-up; however, for the sake of this discussion, it will be considered as an organic at this time.
MarineLine is neither a phenolic nor a straight epoxy and its chemical resistance is said to be derived from a very high cross link density, balanced with unique characteristics, which allow flexing of the product after it has been applied and post cured.
Inorganic coatings
In two words - zinc silicate. This coating type is quite different from organic coatings because the chemical resistance comes from the fact that the fully cured coating is inorganic and the vast majority of liquid cargoes shipped are organic. In other words, the coating and the cargo being carried are chemically opposite and this fact is extremely important.
Again one should also consider the permeability of the coating, because this property does change during the life of zinc silicate coatings. New zinc silicate is extremely porous, and there are some who say it would be a better coating if it stayed like this, based on the free movement of cargoes in and out of the coating and little or no retention of those cargo residues.
However this is not the case. Zinc silicate is quite reactive, which also restricts the type of products that can be carried and upon exposure to water, cargoes and the atmosphere, there is a steady build up of zinc salts, which reduces the permeability of the coating, at the same time increasing the resistance to organic cargoes.
Zinc salts can cause other problems and there is tendency to try and remove them by scrubbing or using cleaning materials that actually dissolve the salts, but as long as there is sufficient 'free' zinc available in the coating, the salts will return and it is perhaps better to deal with the coating including the salts than to try and change the characteristics of the coating. Looking briefly at MarineLine again, it should be noted that this coating is actually based on silicon chemistry, which arguably puts MarineLine into the inorganic coatings category. Bearing this in mind, it should be considered that the high level of chemical resistance that the manufacturers claim for their coating is based not only on the high level of cross linking, but also on the fact that the coating and the cargoes being carried, as noted for zinc silicate, are chemically opposite. Coatings and cargoes
The nature and chemical resistance of the different coating types determines which cargoes can or cannot be carried in those coatings.
As discussed the vast majority of bulk liquid cargoes are organic in composition and as such it is fair to assume that there is a natural affinity between these cargoes and the organic coatings. If one then looks at the permeability of organic coatings it can be quickly understood that aggressive and penetrating organic solvents are not ideally suited to organic coatings.
Many phenolic epoxies can actually be used to carry such cargoes, but there are restrictions, particularly after the cargoes are discharged and it is actually noted that some coating manufacturers are now prohibiting the carriage of such organic solvents even in the phenolic epoxies.
Straight epoxies can be almost immediately destroyed in such solvents and are thus considered unsuitable.
But apart from the carriage of aggressive organic solvents, most epoxy coatings are quite versatile and suitable for the carriage of a wide range of cargoes; non aggressive organic solvents and derivatives, clean and dirty petroleum products, acidic and alkaline based products, vegetable oils, waxes.
In terms of tank cleaning, most epoxy coatings are very smooth, which generally restricts the amount of clingage of previous cargoes and as such surface tank cleaning materials tend to very effective at removing previous cargo residues. It is also found that epoxy coatings are quite resistant to extremes of pH, so there are less risks using alkaline or acid based tank cleaning materials certainly compared with zinc silicate, which is also important to consider.
The absorption of certain previous cargo residues into organic coatings is of most concern when formulating tank cleaning plans, because removing these residues is not easy. Unsaturated and aromatic based cargoes are particularly challenging because once they have been absorbed into the coating, these residues can stay there for a long time, if the coating is not exposed to conditions that actively desorb these residues.
It is a popular misconception that if an organic coated vessel is loaded with intermediate or buffer cargoes after the carriage of an absorbing cargo, the residues of the absorbing cargo will be removed and will no longer pose a threat to a cargo that is particularly sensitive to these residues. This is not strictly correct, as it depends completely upon the chemical nature of the intermediate cargo and has resulted in cargo claims in the past. There are really only two ways of removing residues absorbed into an organic coating.
The first is to raise the temperature of the steel inside the cargo tank to a level where the residues are evaporated from the coating. This is feasible for low boiling residues, but not practical for residues with a boiling point in excess of around +75 deg C.
The second is to load the cargo tank with a cargo, usually solvent based, that will extract the residues without itself becoming contaminated with the residues.
The tendency is to over-clean organic coatings because of their noted resistance to most cleaning materials and this is another area where problems can occur, particularly if the vessel is cleaning to a wall wash standard. As the washing temperature increases, the coatings will start to open and absorbed residues will be liberated, however it has to be considered that the residues may have been accumulating for many voyages and while the most volatile residues will be liberated first, the heavier residues, azeotropes and/or reaction products of the previous cargoes, may stay behind in the coating, even after prolonged hot washing.
Solvents may also be used to clean the coating, because they can actively penetrate inside the coating and remove the most stubborn residues that remain after cleaning with water/detergents. It should always be considered that not all of the residues will be removed in one go and wall wash samples may fail, even after cleaning with a solvent.
What should also be noted after cleaning organic coatings at high temperature or with a solvent is that the coating will be softened for a period of time after the cleaning has been completed. During this time the coating will cool down and harden and it is very common to see wall wash results improve over a period of time, without any additional cleaning.
The most important consideration when cleaning an organic coating is the quality of the next nominated cargo and the understanding of the nature of the residues that may be absorbed in the coating from previous voyages. If the next nominated cargo is particularly sensitive to aromatic residues and the previous cargo was a medium boiling point aromatic solvent, it is unlikely that any amount of tank cleaning will remove sufficient of the previous cargo to prevent contamination of the next cargo.
This challenge has been made more difficult by the ever increasing demands on the quality specification of shipped cargoes - not just chemical but also fuel based - and also the analytical capabilities of the laboratories who analyse and certify the quality of these cargoes. In the past, parts per million levels of contamination were considered to be quite strict, but now many contaminants are measured in parts per billion levels and as such, it is now far more common for cargoes to be rejected, even though vessels are cleaning longer and harder than they ever did in the past.
In order to put this into perspective;
One part per million is equal to one second in 111/2 days.
One part per billion is equal to one second in 311/2 years.
This is not strictly a reflection on the quality of the crews on board the vessels, it is purely the fact that the receivers are able to analyse the cargoes to far more stringent levels and in fact, one of the most successful tank cleaning operations today prior to the carriage of the most sensitive cargoes, does not involve any tank cleaning at all, it is more preventative management and involves loading intermediate lower grade cargoes that remove residues known to be a threat to the higher grade cargoes. In complete contrast, zinc silicate is totally different.
First, the number of cargoes that are acceptable for loading in zinc silicate is considerably smaller, primarily because of the nature of the zinc, which reacts with products that have anything but an almost neutral pH.
A pH range of 5 - 9 is normal for most zinc silicates so this immediately rules out all alkaline and acid based products and also vegetable oils that have a significant fatty acid content.
It is found that most fuels are neutral pH, so clean and dirty petroleum products do not pose any problems, but where zinc silicate really comes into its own is in the carriage of aggressive organic solvents, because the zinc silicate is chemically opposite and thus completely unreactive to any neutral organic product, solvent or otherwise.
Tank cleaning zinc silicate is also completely different to cleaning organic coatings because while zinc silicate absorbs organic solvents, it does not retain them. Perhaps more significantly though, unlike the surface of organic coatings the surface of zinc silicate is far from smooth; in fact in many cases it is extremely rough to the touch.
The latter point creates very challenging tank cleaning issues because it is found that non volatile cargo residues are readily adsorbed on to the surface of the coating and also absorbed into the matrix of the coating.
So when cleaning from oils it is extremely is potentially very difficult to clean. This problem is made more challenging for two reasons:
Surface active cleaning materials (detergents) are exactly that; surface cleaners; and it is known that previous cargo residues are trapped within the coating matrix.
The most effective solutions for cleaning oil based residues usually employ ingredients containing caustic or metasilicate, which have a pH in the region of 12 or 13 and are thus prohibited for use on zinc silicate.
One other point to note at this time is the effect of fuel generated inert gas in zinc silicate coated cargo tanks, prior to loading and during the discharge of flammable clean petroleum products. In short, inert gas is acidic and with prolonged contact to the coating it is quite common to observe yellow/brown dust on the surface of the cargo tanks, which is most likely a reaction product of the zinc silicate and the acidic inert gas.
This powder massively increases the surface area of the coating and significantly increases the potential of previous cargoes becoming adsorbed to the surface and trapped just underneath the surface layer. The only way to remove this problem is manual scrubbing, which is time consuming and limited in its effectiveness. The last coating type is MarineLine
Theoretically, this coating utilises the benefits of organic coatings and zinc silicate coatings in one system.
In the first case, the coating is very smooth and as a consequence the majority of cargoes will run off the surface without causing a retention problem. High melting or particularly viscous products will of course cling to the surface, but temperature alone is generally sufficient to tackle this issue.
The next consideration is the chemical composition of MarineLine. It is accepted that the product is treated as an organic coating, because during application, the product is mixed with various organic solvents in order to expedite application. However, as noted, once these solvents are removed during drying and post curing, the backbone of the MarineLine coating is silicon; not carbon.
If MarineLine is then considered to be an inorganic coating, it would be expected to be particularly resistant to organic solvents; and indeed this is found.
Without the pH limitations of zinc silicate, it would also be expected that the number of products suitable for carriage in MarineLine is much higher compared to zinc silicate and again this is true. The manufacturers state that the product is actually suitable for acid carriage, which is a bold statement, when one considers that acid transportation has been the almost exclusive domain of stainless steel for many years.
The potential of a smooth surfaced coating with good resistance to penetrating organic solvents and not restricted by pH is immediately obvious in several trade patterns and the author is currently investigating this potential further. In summary
Understanding how cargoes behave and/or react with the various coating types - always bearing in mind that any cargo absorbed into or adsorbed onto the surface of that coating will behave differently when it reacts with a different cargo - is essential if an efficient and economical tank cleaning procedure is to be carried out.
How the previous cargo residues are expected to be presented - absorbed, adsorbed, retained in a surface profile - is critical to the correct choice of tank cleaning chemical and the duration of each cleaning cycle. And of course the resistance of the cargo tank coating to the cleaning chemical is also extremely important, not only to effectively remove the previous cargo residues, but also to prevent short and long term damage to the coated surface.
Finally the quality of the next loaded cargo should never be overlooked, particularly if it is known that a coated surface is contaminated with a previous cargo residue. The objective of any tank cleaning procedure is to clean to a condition where the next cargo can be loaded without risk of contamination. By careful understanding and appropriate monitoring of each tank cleaning step, this objective is readily attainable.
Tanker Operator
*This article is the second in a series written by Guy Johnson, BSc (Hons) MRSC CChem CSci, director L&I Maritime (UK).
Inséré le 9 juin 2010 Open Forum – forum Ouvert Enlevé le
Bridge technology limitations and evidence preservation
What would an emergency situation reveal about your crew‘s understanding of bridge technology?
Although bridge technology has advanced in leaps and bounds in recent years, accidents are still happening and evidence that could be preserved is being lost. If properly understood, however, these technological advances ca n have a significant, and positive impact. Whilst, at sea, such understanding will inevitably improve safety and the efficacy of the bridge team, bridge technology also has a crucial role to play in the field of casualty investigation – should the worst ever happen. In a world where an in-depth familiarity with bridge equipment amongst mariners is becoming increasingly desirable, it is worthwhile exploring the scope of this technology. In addition to exploring the capabilities (and limitations) of some of the latest technology, this article will also address the evidence preservation facilities contained within such equipment. In the event of an incident, the importance of knowing how evidence can and should be preserved cannot be understated. Unfortunately, it is often when something goes wrong that a lack of in-depth knowledge of the equipment in question is exposed; but by then, of course, it is far too late and the damage is done. GPS
Although GPS is hardly a recent technological advance and will be familiar to most mariners it is as important as ever on the bridge and is a useful tool in evidence collection. NAVSTAR GPS For the purposes of navigation, visual fixing, where possible, is still the best method of navigation and is to be encouraged. When visual fixing is not possible, however, a system such as the NAVSTAR GPS provides a highly accurate means of positioning a ship (95 per cent accuracy in the order of 100 metres). GLONASS
Unlike the NAVSTAR GPS, the alternative GLONASS system is not deliberately degraded by selective availability (SA) and is, therefore, considered more accurate.
DGPS These days, however, many vessels are now equipped with differential GPS (DGPS), which is designed to provide positions accurate to within a few feet. It should be borne in mind, though, that the mere presence of a DGPS set is no guarantee of ‗pin point‘ positions as the system relies on the presence of a shore establishment in the area in question. The shore establishment must be able to transmit the correctional messages required to reduce the inherent errors found in normal GPS. To check whether such an establishment exists, mariners should refer to ALRS Vol 2. If there is no station in the area, then DGPS will only provide readings with the accuracy of normal GPS and the mariner should be warned accordingly. Even with DGPS fitted, position accuracy should not be taken for granted because, to work properly, GPS must be correctly set up in the first place. Datum
GPS positions are generally referenced to the global datum WGS 84 but can be tuned into other datums if necessary. The GPS datum in use should therefore be checked to ensure that it is consistent with the area and chart in use. On a recent casualty, for example, a ship built in the Far East was found using a Japanese datum in the Mediterranean (WGS 84), seven years after build. As a result, the GPS was providing navigational information with a near 5 cable inaccuracy, resulting in a half mile error on all the vessel‘s waypoints transposed from GPS onto the ship‘s ARPA radar. Had the ship been relying on GPS to navigate (rather than visual fixing) or had been using electronic charts, the inaccuracy of the positions shown on the screen would have been highly dangerous. It is also important that mariners be reminded that GPS has many other functions beyond its immediate role of providing a position to fix on a chart. For example, the input from GPS provides an essential input to other navigational systems on the bridge, such as electronic charts and automatic identification systems (AIS), discussed in further detail below. If GPS fails, or is incorrectly set up, then many other systems on the bridge will cease to function. Finally, in the event of a casualty, GPS plays an important role. GPS will not only provide all the waypoints in use for a particular transit but should provide, if set up correctly, a valuable track history of the ship. Such information can provide an investigator with extremely helpful data in determining a ship‘s movements and position prior to the casualty which may, in turn, dictate the direction of the investigation and any litigation. Even if the GPS does not have a print-out facility, photographs taken of a GPS track history screen can be superimposed onto a chart. This will then provide an accurate plot of a ship‘s movements in the event that VTIS, for example, is unavailable.
AIS The automatic identification system (AIS) is a shipboard broadcast transponder system from which ships continually transmit certain data to all nearby ships and shoreside authorities on a common VHF radio. Specifically, ships transmit their identification, type, position, course, speed, navigational status and other data. AIS also automatically receives similar information from other ships with AIS and has the ability to track and monitor such vessels. AIS may also exchange data with shore-based facilities.
Regulation 19 of SOLAS Chapter V requires AIS to be fitted on board all ships of 300 gross tonnage and upwards engaged on international voyages, cargo ships of 500 gross tonnage and upwards not engaged on international voyages and all passenger ships irrespective of size.
The requirement became effective for all ships by 31 December 2004. The obvious advantage of AIS is that it can help identify nearby vessels, even if not visual (say around a bend on a river or due to poor visibility), thus making the calling up of such vessels that much easier and accurate. That said, while the use of AIS and VHF may be justified for collision avoidance purposes on rare occasions, observance of the Collision Regulations should be paramount and the Courts take a very dim view of ships colliding as a result of misunderstood VHF conversations. Mariners may wish to refer to MGN 324 (M+F) in this respect. The information provided by AIS comes from two primary sources; GPS for information such as position, course and speed and manual data input for cargo details, drafts and ports of call. Therefore, if the GPS position data is inaccurate then the information provided by AIS will be wrong. Likewise, any error on the part of the crew inputting data will be transmitted on AIS and mariners should, therefore, be extremely wary of relying on the information provided. The AIS is often fitted with an anti-collision facility, either in isolation or as part of its integration with other systems such as ARPA. It should not be forgotten, however, that it is a matter of international practice that CPAs should be calculated using ‗speed-through- the-water‘ (as provided by a ship‘s log and used by ARPA) rather than ‗over-the-ground‘ (as given by G PS). It is for this reason (amongst others) that AIS, as an anti-collision device, has its limitations and should not be used in isolation. In a November 2006 Admiralty Court ruling, Mr Justice Steel considered the role of AIS and opined that; ―There are dangers associated with the use of this [AIS] equipment. First there may be a temptation for its use in preference to, or even in isolation from, other navigational aids. In fact, the primary instruments for safe navigation must remain an alert and systematic visual and radar lookout. Information derived from AIS may be erroneous‖. Mariners should refer to MGN 324 (M+F) and MSN 1781 (M+F) in this regard and be warned accordingly. As with GPS, if an incident occurs, AIS is again an extremely useful tool in terms of evidence collection. Some AIS systems have a recording facility and masters should be encouraged to check their sets and use the facility if fitted. If preserved, AIS data not only provides information about your own ship‘s movements but also about other vessels in the area, including those who may well have witnessed the incident, even if not directly involved.
Often, AIS data is transposed onto the ARPA radar or electronic chart systems which have their own recording facilities. In such cases, it is important that, where possible, AIS data (and any other electronic information) is saved as soon as possible after an incident has occurred as it is common for most recording facilities to only save data for a preset period, after which the information is overwritten. If an incident occurs within a port or in coastal waters, AIS data is often recorded by VTS stations, as well as an increasing number of independent providers who will provide quick access to the data for a fee. However, as indicated above, AIS data is only as good as the information given to it and should not be relied upon in isolation. Electronic charts
Electronic navigation, although still relatively new and unfamiliar to many, is becoming increasingly common and is likely to replace the paper chart in the not too distant future.
Official electronic charts come in two forms: ENCs (electronic navigational charts) or vector charts and RNCs (raster navigational charts). Unofficial commercial charts are also available and are becoming more widespread as an additional navigation tool. ENCs (electronic navigational charts) / Vector charts
ENC charts are digitally mapped and can be customised as required by the user. If, say, a ship‘s draft is 8 meters, then all depths over 15 meters can be removed from the screen as they are not relevant. Another option is to remove light characteristics on the display during daylight hours. Vector charts can also be interrogated to reveal further information, such as sailing directions and are therefore considered to be ‗intelligent‘. RNCs (raster navigational charts)
Raster charts are essentially a visual scan of the familiar paper chart. Positions can be continually updated with GPS or automatic position fixing by overlaying waypoints and bearing and distance lines. But, unlike ENCs, Raster charts are not considered ‗intelligent‘ as the chart features cannot be interrogated or customised. Replacement for paper charts?
Only ENCs, used in conjunction with an electronic chart display and information system (ECDIS), can be used in place of paper charts. Raster charts and commercial charts, even if used on an ECDIS system, cannot be considered a replacement for paper charts and mariners caught relying on them instead of the paper charts will find little sympathy with the Courts. Mariners should refer to MGN 285 (M+F) for further advice. A mariner using privately produced electronic chart data should be aware that these do not satisfy the international carriage requirements for charts; reference should be made to MGN 319 (M+F) to ensure that proper procedures for their use are being observed. The attraction of an electronic chart system, whether vector or raster, is that it provides a clear display that gives a real time picture of a vessel‘s positions and navigation track. If integrated with other systems, it may also show ARPA radar and AIS tracks, providing the watch keeper with a ‗one stop‘ screen for all the necessary information to keep the vessel safe. However, like any system that relies on human input, errors are inevitable and should be borne in mind whenever the technology is being used. There have already, for example, been cases where depths below a ship‘s draft, rather than over, have been removed from the ENC, resulting in the vessel grounding. A more common danger, however, occurs when the watch keeper becomes fixated with the screen and either forgets that he should be navigating using his paper chart (in breach of SOLAS) or fails to maintain ―an alert and systematic visual and radar lookout.
Like most other electronic navigation aids, electronic charts are likely to have a recording facility. In fact, it is a requirement for ships fitted with ECDIS. Clearly, any record showing a ship‘s movements in relation to the relevant chart will provide useful evidence, particularly if any ARPA and/or AIS data has also been captured. Masters should be reminded, however, that the records will be overwritten (at times within 12 hours) if the data is not saved. Masters would be well advised to familiarise themselves with the practicalities of data saving during quiet passage time and include the saving of data as part of their emergency response to a casualty; such knowledge will need to be second nature in the aftermath of a casualty. Often, however, the data will be saved in a format that is not readily accessible to a third party without the necessary software. Owners should check whether the information on their equipment can be readily downloaded or whether a manufacturer‘s technician will be needed. If a technician is required, he should be put on stand-by to attend a casualty as soon as possible after an incident to extract the necessary evidence. A common error in this area, is for the navigator to save the entire passage plan of a voyage which may last some days, when the relevant section consists only of the last hour before the incident. While the preservation of all evidence is to be encouraged, common sense must also prevail, and a huge data file consisting of many days of voyage is likely to crash the ECDIS during playback, or prove impossible to download without the aid of a technician when, really, it should be a task within the capability of those onboard.
Voyage data recorder (VDR)
Voyage data recorders are often referred to as ‗black boxes‘ (although they are often, in fact, bright orange) and have been a common feature on aircraft for many years. With the maritime community finally catching up, the relevant regulations are now contained in chapter V on Safety of Navigation of the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974 (SOLAS). VDRs are now a mandatory feature on all passenger and Ro-Ro ships and any ships of 3,000 GT and upwards constructed on or after 1 July 2002. For vessels of 20,000 GT and over, constructed before 1 July 2002, simplified or S-VDRs (less extensive and cheaper VDRs brought in to promote retro fitting) must be fitted during the first dry docking after 1 July 2006, but not later than 1 July 2009, and for vessels of 3,000 – 20,000 GT, during the first dry docking after 1 July 2007 but not later than 1 July 2010.
In line with aviation ‗black boxes‘, VDRs are designed to record all mechanical and operational data that might be used to reconstruct a casualty. The VDR recording should include a record of the vessel‘s course and speed through the water, radar data, transmitted and received voice communications, depth beneath the keel and rudder orders and responses. The more sophisticated versions may also record such data as the status of weather tight and fire doors and hull stress.
The data must be stored into a protective memory capsule that has been hardened to withstand extreme fire, shock and water pressure conditions. VDRs are required to maintain a record of all data for a minimumof 12 hours (Class often require 24 hours and many manufacturers provide a longer period), after which the information may be overwritten. To ensure a VDR continues to record events during and after an incident, it should be capable of operating from the ship‘s emergency source of electrical power.
In the event that this fails, a VDR should, as a minimum, continue to record bridge audio from a dedicated reserve source of power for a period of 2 hours. After 2 hours, all recording should cease automatically. During many incidents, however, power sources will not be completely lost and the VDR will therefore continue to record events in the normal fashion (i.e. for a minimum of 12 hours before being overwritten). For the purposes of evidence collection, therefore, it is important to identify early on if a vessel is fitted with a VDR and for the information it contains to be retained or downloaded as soon as possible. Should all power be lost (for example when a vessel sinks or is lost to fire) a VDR will retain the last 12 hours (or more if set up to do so) as a final recorded medium installed in a protective capsule (floating or fixed) that should retain the data for at least 2 years. The data supplied by VDRs need not be reserved for casualty evidence alone. The data can also be retrieved and downloaded at any time for training purposes (following a close quarters situation, for example). However, as with some electronic chart outfits, VDRs will often require a manufacturer‘s technician to attend and download the data. Following any casualty, therefore, it is important that the master preserves the data and a technician is brought on site to access the data as soon as possible.
With modern bridges bristling with navigational equipment it is important for crew to know which pieces of equipment feed into the VDR. For example, crew may be using the portside radar for collision avoidance on a small range, when in fact the starboard side radar is recording but it is set to a large range with no plotting data. The annual tests by technicians can be used to ensure equipment is identified and properly labelled if this has not already been done during installation of the VDR. Course recorders, telegraph printers etc
Crew should not disregard the significance of evidence obtained from course recorders, telegraph printers and other ‗mechanical‘ pieces of bridge equipment. Investigators and judges alike still place great significance upon the data retrieved from these sources, and should the electronic equipment have failed, as we sometimes see, it is likely this record will still be available. Good practice dictates that this equipment is regularly checked for correct operation and synchronised.
Conclusion
Clearly, the use of electronic equipment is only going to increase and become more sophisticated with each passing year. Whilst undoubtedly a benefit to the navigator, the aids are only as good as the user‘s training and the input and interpretation of the information received. The Courts in the UK have, time and again, advised that there is nothing as effective as the human look-out to avoid collisions and groundings. Despite the warning, there is a growing percentage of casualties that have resulted, in whole or in part, from the watch keeper relying too much on electronic aids and not enough on the traditional methods of keeping a good look-out. Mariners should also be encouraged to understand the additional uses of the electronic devices available to them, particularly in the event of a casualty. The quiet times can usefully be employed to ensure all electronic equipment is correctly set up and that the procedures for evidence preservation during more stressful times are well understood. Courtesy of: Faz Peermohamed & James Drummond of Ince & Co. Jan uary 2007. www.incelaw.com
Inséré le 11 juin 2010 Logbook News Enlevé le
GMDSS – time for an upgrade
The satellite-based GMDSS service has undoubtedly developed into an integral part of ensuring safety of life at sea, providing an efficient and dependable alerting service which can mean the difference between life and death when an accident occurs. However, with the latest IMO review of the system imminent, there is still room for improvement, writes Brian Mullan, BAMCOM International
The GMDSS has been with us for a little over 20 years, having taken some seven years to actually implement, 1992-1999.
The GMDSS amendments to the Safety of Life at Sea Convention (SOLAS) made it much more likely that a distress alert from a ship would be heard and acted upon. Indeed, the safety of seafarers now depends largely on alerting and communications via satellite, and this system has served the maritime community well. The IMO is about to embark on a comprehensive review of the GMDSS, which undoubtedly will lead to a number of revisions of the ways in which distress and safety services are delivered to ships at sea. Now is the time to ask ―what was missed last time round and what can we improve in the next revision?‖
One area that could have been addressed more effectively last time round is that of communications from survival craft. The GMDSS provides only for one-way alerting via EPIRB from survival craft and for only very short-range voice communications by walkie-talkie. Radar transponders complete the GMDSS fitting on a modern-day survival craft. The old, pre-GMDSS lifeboat radio, for all its shortcomings, provided a chance of 2-way communications between survivors and rescuers. Are we satisfied, therefore, that the current survival craft equipment addresses the actual needs of seafarers in distress?
Once a ship has been abandoned and survivors are in a lifeboat or inflatable raft, the need to communicate with the outside world is paramount. The practical experience of survivors with respect to rescue at sea has shown that this need is not addressed at all by the current GMDSS. The needs of seafarers in survival craft are universal – to be rescued and rescued without delay. In a typical, catastrophic distress situation, the crew have abandoned ship in a survival craft. Time permitting, Inmarsat and EPIRB alerts may have been sent out prior to actually abandoning ship and there may even have been time to receive an initial acknowledgement.
If not, the EPIRB will have been activated, either manually or by floating free. In a worst-case scenario, the vessel has been abandoned in a remote sea area and rescue may be several days away. The distressed crew has absolutely NO means of knowing when or if help will arrive. The morale of weakened and perhaps injured seafarers in such a situation could rapidly deteriorate to such a state that they lose the will to survive. The survival craft is almost impossibly small in a large ocean; is drifting and may be in bad weather. The EPIRB is indicating that it is sending out alerts but, without any form of acknowledgement, the distressed crew can only hope that it has been heard and will be acted upon. An EPIRB has to operate for 48 hours from the time it is first activated and rescues in mid-ocean may take longer. Absolute knowledge that rescuers are on their way can save lives. Why is long-range voice communications not possible from survival craft in a modern marine world where instant communication via satellite is the norm? To the non-marine world, this glaring lack of basic communications will seem unbelievable. Mandatory equipment
The current GMDSS has addressed the technical aspects of distress alerting and now needs to consider the psychological impact on the seafarer of not being able to communicate effectively in a critical distress situation. The provision of long-range voice communications between survival craft and maritime rescue coordination centres will speed rescue and allow for better management of all aspects of search and rescue. Not least, it will boost the morale of the persons in the survival craft. It will also allow the families and friends of distressed seafarers to know that their loved ones are alive and that a rescue operation is under way.
The technical answer is simple and has been available for a number of years: a satellite hand-held telephone. Such equipment has been proven under the worst-possible situations and in the remotest areas of the globe. Arctic and Antarctic explorers use them; serious mountaineers would not leave base camp without them. So, why are they not mandated for marine survival craft? A minimum of one portable satellite telephone, ruggedised for marine use and capable of transmitting automatically its GPS position, should be mandatory for every SOLAS ship. Two spare batteries and a charger should also be part of the requirement. The portable satellite phone can be used in a docking station for everyday, routine communications on board, thereby ensuring that its operational state remains known. The cost of such equipment is modest, yet the implications for safety of life at sea are huge. With the impending review and revision of the GMDSS, there has never been a better time to address the survival needs of seafarers. DS About the Author Brian Mullan now runs maritime safety and security consultancy, BAMCOM International Limited, having previously been Head of Maritime Safety Services at Inmarsat for twelve years. Prior to that, he was Assistant Secretary-General with Comité International Radio - Maritime (CIRM) and, for ten years before that, Electronics Superintendent with P&O Containers (now Maersk Line). Brian was also a Governor of the World Maritime University in Malmö, Sweden, 2000-2009. For more information on Mr Mullan’s role in maritime safety and security, visit www.bamcom.co.uk
Inséré le 13 juin 2010 Logbook News Enlevé le
Improving positional accuracy and reliability
GPS positioning is everywhere, and is used on a daily basis by shipping companies in all corners of the globe. While undoubtedly an excellent tool, what alternatives does a vessel have for fixing aposition if its GPS fails? Haydn Jones of Fugro Seastar, and Edgar Johansen, Kongsberg Seatex, told Digital Ship about new technologies in precise positioning. The American-run Global Positioning System, or GPS, has become the basic international standard for positioning, whether you are on a tanker delivering oil from one continent to another, or a motorbike messenger delivering pizza to the other side of town.
While GPS, in its most basic form, has proven to be an incredibly useful tool since it became fully operational in 1993, its success is potentially creating an overreliance on a system that is, to some degree, flawed and susceptible to disruption. Technology has moved forward to offer a number of helpful aids to complement and improve the use of standard GPS, to improve its accuracy and reliability. One of the first such improvements has been the advent of Differential GPS, explains Haydn Jones, business development manager at Norwegian positioning company Fugro Seastar. ―Differential GPS is a way of bringing higher accuracy to users of GPS, in our case ships,‖ he told us.
―Nowadays regular GPS is pretty accurate, certainly to a few metres, but with Differential GPS we can bring that accuracy to under 1 metre.‖ The adjustments required under a Differential GPS system are calculated by reference stations located on land. However, given the fact that the reference station and the ship applying its calculations are in different positions, there are limitations to its effectiveness. ―The way it works is that there are reference stations on the shore and we know what their actual position is, and we know what the GPS is saying their position is,‖ said Mr Jones. ―The difference between the two is the ‗error‘ or ‗sum of errors‘, and that information can then be made available and broadcast to vessels in the area, and they can apply that ‗error‘ to themselves.‖ ―However, the adjustment made for the ship doesn‘ t apply to everybody in the world, it‘s localised to that reference station. Typically it‘s considered to be valid out to 2,000km from where that station is located.‖ Orbit and Clock
This localised nature of accuracy with this type of Differential GPS has itself been improved through the introduction of the ‗Orbit and Clock‘ system for global navigation satellite systems (GNSS), which can extend positional correction information to be globally applicable. ―Orbit and Clock is not a localised correction, it is a calculation of errors at the satellite level,‖ explained Mr Jones. ―It‘s a form of inverse calculation – if you say ‗this is where I know I am, and this is where the GPS says I am‘, what corrections would I need to apply to the orbit information on the satellite and the timing clock on the satellite in order for the GPS to say I‘m in the correct location?‖ ―For Orbit and Clock the corrections are not land based, the corrections are space based, on the satellite. For that reason they are valid worldwide.‖ Calculating corrected satellite orbital positions and internal timings is a complicated business, backed up by a number of specialised reference stations around the world. Fugro itself operates a network of 35 such stations, and theré s also a network of Orbit and Clock corrections from the American government called JPL (Jet Propulsion Laboratory), a division of the California Institute of Technology which manages the Differential GPS laboratory for NASA.
These systems are also used to calculate correctional data for the Russian GNSS system, GLONASS, which works under the same principles as its American counterpart. Data for correction for all of these types of GNSS positioning systems must be transmitted via satellite.
―For the conventional differential data, wé ve got GPS and GLONASS receivers at 100 reference stations, and their information is valid locally to each reference station,‖ said Mr Jones. ―The data is broadcast over satellite, mostly Inmarsat, by us and picked up on board the vessel. Wé re operating a broadcast on both high and low power beams on both the (Inmarsat) I-3 and new I-4 satellites, which is available worldwide.‖ ―Orbit and Clock is a little bit different, as I said these calculations are relative to the satellite and not a ground station, but again those corrections are broadcast over the geostationary Inmarsat-type network.‖ Mr Jones also believes that, besides the improved accuracy that Orbit and Clock can offer, there are other widespread operational advantages for both the user and the system provider. ―It requires fewer reference stations than Differential GPS, so that means the operating costs are potentially lower,‖ he said. ―One set of correction data is also valid everywhere, so deep ocean accuracy is the same as coastal zone accuracy. You don‘ t need to look upon positional accuracy as being dependent on how close you are to the reference stations.‖
―On top of all that, Orbit and Clock gives better correction data than the basic Differential GPS during ionospheric disturbance periods.‖ Problems with GPS
Basic GPS does offer two or three metre accuracy, has a strong track record of avail- ability, and is well recognised by navigators around the world – so is there a real need to move to a more advanced system? The key to this question comes in the usage of the system depending on your own operations, and how essential accu-rate positioning is to your navigation, Mr Jones explains. ―One problem with GPS is that it might not work if yoû re close to an oil rig or production platform,‖ he told us. ―If you have only GPS and are close to a structure then some of the satellites can be obscured by those structures, therefore you wouldn‘ t have a position fix. Like any positioning system you need at least three lines of position, and in GPS terms it‘s really even four if you want three dimensional positioning.‖ ―If we could draw in the GLONASS network as well then we would have enough satellites to produce a fix, that would be a bit like mixing radar and visual range information, where yoû re using two different sources of information to find your position.‖ Another potential source of problems for the GPS system are atmospheric conditions that can affect the signals, with solar weather and sunspot interference in particular proven to be detrimental to accurate positioning.
―Sunspot activity is cyclical and previously peaked between 2000 and 2002,‖ said Mr Jones. ―It‘s now at a low, and the new cycle is due to start this year. It‘s a little uncertain as to when it‘s going to peak, but it looks like it might be sometime around 2011 or 2012, as it‘s generally considered to be an 11-year cycle.‖ As the peak in this cycle is reached there is likely to be a deterioration in the accuracy and reliability of GNSS systems like GPS and GLONASS, which will be experienced differently in different regions.
―The reason it‘s a problem is that sunspot activity generates more electron activity in the ionosphere, electron activity generates radio signal delay, and radio signal delay means navigational errors,‖ Mr Jones explained. ―GPS and GLONASS are effectively ranging devices, you are measuring the speed of light and movement of radio signals, which gives you a range. But if that is delayed there will be an error, and there will be delays in periods of high sunspot activity.‖ ―That disturbance is greatest near to the magnetic equator, which is pretty close to the regular equator, and in the polar regions. That‘s a problem for exploration operators around Brazil or off the west coast of Africa, because they are in the magnetic equator regions, and they will suffer from sunspot interference.‖ Mr Jones also notes that, as well as the general delay and errors introduced by ionospheric delays, solar activity also causes ‗scintillations‘ in GNSS signals, which makes it difficult to maintain an accurate position.
―These are regional effects and are in a particular area of the sky,‖ he said. ―So, rather like how an oil rig can block out signals from GPS, so can the scintillations block out, or at least adversely affect, GPS or GLONASS signals.‖ Combined systems
Fugro Seastar has recently released a combined GLONASS and GPS system which aims to work with the maximum level of accuracy and reliability available with these systems. This system, known as G2, became operational in February of 2009. ―It‘s an Orbit and Clock system, but unlike previous Orbit and Clock services it doesn‘ t use the American JPL model, it uses our own that was developed in conjunction with the European Space Agency, so it‘s completely independent,‖ said Mr Jones. ―Although basic GPS and GLONASS has been integrated for some while it hasn‘ t been done at the decimetre level with space based augmentation, so nobody else is operating a monitoring system to look at errors in the GLONASS system.‖
―In the past when yoû ve looked at combined GPS/GLONASS it has just been basic 3 metre, 5 metre, or 10 metre accuracy, not decimetre accuracy, like this system.‖ The G2 concept was conceived around year 2000, with a development contract signed in February 2003 with the ESA (European Space Agency). The decision to include GLONASS was made in October 2004, with the first G2 test signal on the air from February 2008. ―We now have an operational service, initially doing trials on cooperative vessels on the industry side,‖ said Mr Jones. ―We also did trials on one of the Bourbon vessels, the Bourbon Topaz.‖ The decision to bolster the robustness of the system by adding GLONASS signals to the GPS network has been closely linked to political developments in Russia over the last two decades. ―The GLONASS network peaked at 24 satellites in 1994, and then, with the dissolution of the Soviet Union, it declined,‖ said Mr Jones.
―Subsequently President Putin decided that the Russians were going to rebuild the GLONASS network, and it is now being rebuilt. There are presently 18 GLONASS satellites operational, and you need 24 for a fully functioning global network.‖ ―We are still short of a full GLONASS constellation, but it‘s a lot more than it was and it‘s growing, so it‘s a useful supplement to the GPS network.‖ Benefits
The combined system is able to deliver, 95 per cent of the time, accuracy of within 5cm for longitude, 7cm for latitude, and within 17cm for height. However, in addition to this improved accuracy, Mr Jones believes a combination of GNSS sources offers a number of other advantages. ―The first thing is that it means independence,‖ he said.
―I think we‘ll find, as we move into a digital era with more reliance on ECDIS and electronic navigation, that the whole concept of integrity monitoring will grow in importance. If you have everything dependent on your electronic systems, it‘s obvious that you don‘ t want vulnerability in there, you want redundancy.‖ ―If you‘ re using more than one GNSS or navigation system, which at the present time would be GPS and GLONASS, then that gives you independence. There is also availability, if we can draw upon more satellites then that will give us the possibility of avoiding blockage from moorings or rigs or fjords, and so on.‖ The reliability of the information being presented is also easier to determine when there are multiple sources of data to compare. ―If you have three position lines, and they aren‘ t giving the same information, you don‘t really know which one is right and which one is wrong – you just know they don‘ t agree,‖ said Mr Jones.
―If you have six of them, and five of them cross in one point and the sixth is different, then the sixth is wrong and can be ignored. More satellites means more lines of position, and then more reliability – and more accuracy, better lines of satellite geometry and shorter convergence time.‖ This reliability could be further enhanced with the introduction of the European Union‘ s own GNSS system, Galileo – presuming that the multiple delays already met by the project are not repeated and that the system finally gets off the ground. This could mean that the next generation of these systems might arrive in the next five to ten years, said Mr Jones.
―Within the next few years we should see an operational GLONASS constellation, and have Galileo due to come in in 2013,‖ he told us. ―That is intended as another alternative to GPS, funded by the European Union to provide global coverage with high accuracy, and high reliability. The way we see it is that that will potentially be G3, we‘ve drawn in GLONASS, we‘ ve drawn in GPS, and there is every intention of working with Galileo as well.‖ Mr Jones believes that this integration of different systems, combined to create a single, reliable position, will become the standard for the next generation of mariners. ―IMO MSC Resolution 115 says that ‗A combined receiver, when compared to either the GPS or GLONASS receiver, offers improved availability, integrity, accuracy and resistance to interferencé ,‖ he said. ―I think we can be fairly confident that hybrid, combined systems are very much going to be the future of navigation.‖ Edgar Johansen, Kongsberg Seatex
Edgar Johansen, senior engineer at Kongsberg Seatex, is also a firm believer in the advantages of combining navigational technologies for improved accuracy and reliability. However, the research and development that Mr Johansen and his company has been working on involves the use of inertial navigation systems, which they aim to operate as a complement and a back-up to GNSS technology. The technology has been in use for some time, but recent developments have helped to make it a more suitable option for the wider shipping community. ―The traditional application of inertial navigation has been in long distance autonomic positioning, and it has been used for decades,‖ said Mr Johansen.
―Autonomous means that it starts off with a known position, and then the inertial navigation system measures the accelerations of the vessel at all times. By adding up all of these accelerations you can have both the velocity and the position of your vessel at the current time.‖
―In order to do this you have to know which directions the accelerations have been in, so in addition to accelerometers, an inertial navigation system includes gyros, so you can know the roll, pitch and angle at any time. An inertial navigation system consists of three accelerometers, and three gyros, so we're talking about six degrees of measurement.‖
Traditionally these types of systems have been used by high-end users that have been able to afford expensive systems, and those who have been unable to access GNSS positioning. ―These systems have state of the art accuracy, after a few hours of inertial navigation you can still be within one nautical mile of positional error,‖ said Mr Johansen. ―However, these are expensive systems, we're talking about €200,000 to €300,000 for one such inertial navigation system.‖ ―We know that people in the shipping industry want lower prices and higher accuracy – I don't think we're quite there totally but we might be able to meet one requirement at a time.‖ Integration
One way that Mr Johansen believes that this technology might be able to assist maritime navigators is through the integration of inertial navigation with GNSS to create a combined, complementary positioning aid. This type of system has been in use by Kongsberg Seatex in a number of other areas, for example in platform monitoring on a floating production platform, which has actually used two such systems since the 1990s incorporating carrier aided Differential GPS combined with a Honeywell ring laser gyro. A similar system was also delivered around the same time for use in five flight inspection and calibration systems. ―Those are used for calibration of the inertial landing systems,‖ said Mr Johansen. ―Antennas, placed on land as part of the instrument landing system at the airport, provide signals that are used as a positional aid for aircraft on landing.‖ ―These signals can be distorted by different things on the ground, so you have to calibrate the systems before they go into use. We delivered the instrumentation for five such aircraft, based on GPS and inertial navigation. They're used both for commissioning and regular checking of these instrument landing systems at airports in several countries.‖ ―These were the early projects we had on inertial navigation, but these types of systems are very expensive, so we have needed to look at reducing the cost.‖ One part of these cost reduction measures is the inclusion of a motion reference unit (MRU) in a combined system, an inertial measurement unit which also uses six degrees of measurement but is cheaper to produce. ―Here we are not using ring laser gyros but instead have solid state gyros, which use the principle of Coriolis Force to measure rotation in all angles,‖ said Mr Johansen. ―This reduces the price by about a factor of ten from the high-end systems.‖ ―These were initially used for roll, pitch and heel measurements, and we launched them in 1992. However, the accuracy has developed quite a lot over the years since then, improving from 0.3° to 0.02°. And it doesn't stop there because accuracy on these types of systems is consistently developing today.‖ ―We have delivered more than 5,000 of these MRUs, and the first one from 1992 is even still operating. You actually probably wouldn't be able to see that kind of lifetime for a ring laser gyro, so they're robust and come at a lower cost, though they don't have the same accuracy.‖ Kongsberg Seatex then combined the MRU and GNSS systems in 1997 with the release of its Seapath range of positioning systems.
―The reason for doing that is that, by combining the two technologies, we get a better motion sensor than with the MRU alone and a better positioning system than the GNSS alone,‖ said Mr Johansen. ―Those two types of sensors have complementary properties. The GNSS systems have good global accuracy, which doesn't deteriorate over time, but it can have variations because of background noise and other disturbances. The MRU alone has very low problems from noise, but will drift off over time. By combining the two we have a better system.‖ That system was used in applications such as subsea acoustic positioning, for ROV operation during an undersea pipeline inspection. ―With a pipeline inspection and other subsea work it's important to have accu-rate navigation of the ROV,‖ said Mr Johansen. ―The way we're doing that is using an acoustic system, with an acoustic transducer which is mounted on the underside of the vessel. It measures range and direction from the vessel to the ROV.‖ ―Of course, to know the position of the ROV you first need to know the position of the ship, because the acoustic position is a relative measurement, but you also need a rolling, pitch and heel measurement on the ship.‖ ―The offshore industry usually looks for 10cm accuracy on the seabed for this. I don't think we're quite there in terms of having that accuracy, but in shallow water and in good conditions we're getting quite close to it.‖ Continued development
As this system continues to develop, increasing in accuracy and decreasing in cost, Mr Johansen believes that a combined inertial navigation and GNSS positioning system is coming close to being a real option for modern shipping fleets. The company has conducted tests of its latest systems on a workboat, which had GNSS position errors of up to 100 metres in different directions as it passed under bridges but very close accuracy when using a combined system. Tests were also done with antennas mounted on a car driving around outside Trondheim, with the combined system able to maintain position accuracy in areas where GNSS was unavailable, such as when driving through tunnels. ―The inertial position at the exit of the tunnel matches quite well with the GNSS position when it is re-established,‖ said Mr Johansen. ―Of course, this is not like a submarine navigating for hours, for this wé re just talking about a few minutes, but our experience is that for dynamic positioning in most cases you don‘ t want to operate for a long time on inertial navigation, what you want is to avoid any surprises from the satellite navigation system, like a drop in power or background noise.‖ ―This can solve this problem when GNSS drops out.‖
With research and development of the systems continuing, Mr Johansen is confident that combined inertial navigation and GNSS will become a more common installation in the shipping industry. ―The performance of low and medium priced motion reference units is increasing rapidly, but it‘ s not consistent and not capable of running for hours at a time, wé re talking about minutes,‖ he said. ―However, the price has come down by a factor of ten for systems that are accurate for that time, and integrated GNSS/inertial navigation systems can improve reliability com- pared to stand-alone GNSS navigation.‖ DS
Inséré le 15 Juin 2010 Historique Historiek Enlevé le 15 Juillet 2010
Over Schoolschepen en Zeevaartonderwijs Visserijscholen
Reeds in 1881 brak de Handelskamer van Oostende een lans voor de beroepsvorming van de vissers en stelde ze dat de rekrutering van visserijpersoneel rechtstreeks in verband stond met een beroepsonderricht. De visserij vernieuwde inderdaad niet en ging zienderogen achteruit. Deze tanende situatie en de ontmoediging van nieuwelingen werd toegeschreven aan de niet alleen harde maar ook gevaarlijke aard van dit beroep. Velen gingen naar de staatsmarine die zich wel regelmatig vernieuwde. Met de snelle ontwikkeling van de techniek was het bovendien niet meer mogelijk de kennis van vader op zoon over te dragen. Scholing was een absolute noodzaak. De ingebruikstelling in de scheepvaart van stoom— en explosiemotoren verplichtte bovendien de overheid diploma's te eisen.
Oostende van 1886 tot 1995: de Stedelijke Visserijschool startte er met een aangehechte visserijklas in een lagere school; op 15 juni 1963 werd de eerste steen gelegd van een nieuwe moderne school die opengesteld werd op 19 maart 1966 onder de naam 'John Bauwens school'. Oostende van 1888 tot 1995: priester Hendrik Pype van de St-Petrus en Pauluskerk stichtte in 1887 een katholieke' visserijschool die openging in 1888; ze werd zeer bekend bij de vissers, vooral na 1937 toen het oude gebouw door een modern vervangen werd en de naam 'Paster Pypeschool' kreeg. Broeder Anobert leidde de school en was een uitstekend en zeer populair leraar.
Blankenberge van 1890 tot 1947: katholieke visserijschool. Nieuwpoort van 1893 tot 1990: idem als Blankenberge. De Panne van 1894 tot 1935: vissersschool te Adinkerke-De Panne. Koksijde van 1904 tot?: katholieke visserijschool.
Oostduinkerke van 1904 tot 1930: vissersschool. Heist van 1904 tot 1979: katholieke visserijschool. Bredene sedert 1906: Koninklijk Werk Ibis. Boekhoute van 1929 tot 1933: deze school had blijkbaar weinig bijval en ze verdween vlug. Zeebrugge van 1932 tot 1940:? Heist van 1947 tot 1995: rijksvisserij school. In 1950 waren er nog vijf visserijscholen, Ibis niet meegerekend. Het dalend leerlingenaantal lag aan de basis van de rationalisering van het visserijonderwijs. Bij besluit van de Vlaamse regering dd. 5 juni 1991 werd het beroepsonderwijs afgeschaft en vervangen door vier jaar technisch onderwijs. Dit leidde tot de sluiting van de vrije visserijschool te Nieuwpoort. Mede door de sluiting van de Zeevaartschool te Oostende werd het toekennen van brevettes voor de visserij niet langer gekoppeld aan examens voor de centrale examencommissie3 maar aan de behaalde schoolresultaten en het aantal maanden vaartijd in een bepaalde functie. Op 1 september 1995 fusioneerden de stedelijke visserijschool John Bauwens, de Paster Pypeschool en de visserijschool te Heist en vormden ze samen het Provinciaal Maritiem Instituut' (PMI) met vestigingen te Oostende (John Bauwens) en te Heist; in het technisch onderwijs behelsde de opleiding 4-6 jaar, in het beroepsonderwijs 4 jaar. Op 1 september 2005 sloot de vestiging Heist echter haar deuren en werden haar opleidingen overgeheveld naar Oostende. De school werd overgenomen door het gemeenschapsonderwijs en kreeg de benaming `Maritiem Instituut van het Gemeenschapsonderwijs' (MIGO). Er bestaan dus geen scholen meer met uitsluitend beroepsvorming voor vissers, want sedert 1995 vormt de PMI —het MIGO sedert 1.9.2005- ook dekofficieren en werktuigkundigen tot 3000 KW; zij kunnen een toekomst uitbouwen bij rederijen, sleep- en baggerbedrijven en ook op boortorens; men kan er tevens terecht voor een vorming tot yachtman en/of yachtnavigator. Momenteel doet de school ook een beroep op de vaarsimulator van de VDAB te Zeebrugge en schepen de leerlingen ter zeevisserij, zoals trouwens die van de Ibis sedert 1972, voor hun vorming in aan boord van de trawler 0.29 Broodwinner; naar verluidt zou er binnenkort een moderner vaartuig aangepast aan de huidige noden worden ingezet.
Directeurs van PMI/MIGO: - Marc Dewinter, gewezen directeur van de visserijschool John Bauwens van 1985 tot 1995, was ere-directeur van het PMI van 1995 tot 2002. - Marc De Jonghe, wnd. directeur van 1.9.2001 tot 2003. -Jan Denys, directeur van 1.9.2003 tot eind 2005. - Edwin Kyndt, wnd. directeur sedert 1.1.2006. Zeevaartscholen
Tijdens het Franse bewind werd een vorm van zeevaartonderricht opgestart te Antwerpen en Oostende in het jaar 1797-1798. Onder Willem I kreeg Vlaanderen een ware impuls op maritiem gebied; overal werden grote werken uitgevoerd: kanalen en dokken werden gegraven en sluizen gebouwd. Antwerpen en Oostende kregen een volwaardige zeevaartschool vanaf 1823 onder het beheer van de overheid. De proeven werden jaarlijks afgenomen, om de beurt te Antwerpen en te Oostende. Na de onafhankelijkheid bleef deze toestand nagenoeg ongewijzigd tot na de oorlog 1914-1918.
De visserij kende moeilijke tijden en vele vissers stapten over naar de Staatsmarine. Ook had na de WOI de Staatscheepsjongensschool4 opgehouden te bestaan wat de aanwerving van vissersvolk in de band werkte ten nadele van deze nijverheid. Verder was het zo dat de zeilschepen langzaamaan vervangen werden door stoom- en motorvaartuigen, wat het machinepersoneel verplichtte een brevet of diploma van machinist of motorist te halen. Van hun kant moesten de kapiteins van vissersboten vaan 1920 in het bezit zijn van het brevet van schipper ter visserij. De overheid trof dan ook maatregelen en op 15 november 1929 verscheen in het Staatsblad het KB waarbij de zeevaartscholen van Oostende en Antwerpen elk een afzonderlijke opdracht kregen. De Staatsmarineschool te Oostende
In uitvoering van het KB van 29 juni 1930 werd beslist een nieuwe zeevaartschool te bouwen op een prachtig gelegen locatie op een soort schiereiland in de haven; de eerste steen werd door de minister van Zeewezen gelegd op 23 mei 1931. In afwachting van de ingebruikneming werd de buiten dienst gestelde pakketboot Princesse Elisabeth' van de Oostende-Doverlijn ter plaatse gelegd waar hij een onderkomen bood aan leraars en leerlingen. De leerlingen machinisten-motoristen genoten meteen het voordeel van een leerzaam onderricht met het uiteennemen en terug ineenzetten van de hoofdmotor van de MLB nr 15 in de werkhuizen van het Zeewezen.De leerlingen van de nautische afdeling van hun kant kregen op 25 augustus 1931 een prachtige gelegenheid om hun kunnen en durf te tonen. Uitgedaagd door de cadettenschool van Scarborough meet de kotter Stroombank 6 zich met Engelse schoener Maisie Graham; de wedstrijd op een omloop van 26 mijl gedurende een N-O-storm eindigde op een schitterende Belgische overwinning.
Er waren drie afdelingen: een nautische en een werktuigkundige voor de kandidaat-officieren ter kustvaart, en een derde die de naam Zeeoorlogswetenschappen droeg en onderricht moest verschaffen inzake verdediging in oorlogstijd. Deze laatste afdeling, een primeur voor België (les getrokken uit ervaring opgedaan tijdens de voorbije oorlogsjaren), was bedoeld voor officieren en onderofficieren zowel van de koopvaardij als van de Staatsmarine; eenmaal geslaagd voor hun examen zouden ze op de rol der Marine ingeschreven worden en alzo een reserve vormen van uitgelezen elementen waarop de Staat ten aile tijde zou kunnen rekenen. De jongens van de Staatsscheepsjongensschool gingen na het slagen voor hun examen op koopvaardijschepen varen, maar na twee jaar werden ze op hun verzoek meestal aangeworven door het Zeewezen.
In de school werden eveneens matrozen en koks gevormd. Naast de Stroombank waren ook twee oude ex-torpedoboten aan de marineschool overgemaakt, onder de namen Wielingen en Westdiep. De commandant van de school, dhr. Coûteaux, was tevens hoofd operaties van de visserijwachtschepen met het gevolg dat de leerlingen regelmatig inscheepten aan boord van de Zinnia; dit laatste schip diende voor grote reizen voor de visserijwacht terwijl kortere reizen plaatsvonden met de Wielingen en de Westdiep'. Daarbuiten scheepten de leerlingen ook regelmatig in aan boord van het hydrografisch schip Victoire en uiteraard op de sleepboten en loodsboten van het Zeewezen. Na WO II kreeg de Staatsmarineschool een nieuw opleidingsschip nl. de Cdt Fourcault, de gewezen motorloodsboot nr 16 uit 1930. In 1961 werd het vervangen door de MLB nr 18 uit 1938 en in 1985 de LB nr 1 uit 1968, telkens varend onder dezelfde naam.
Wedden en lonen van het lesgevend personeel werden bepaald volgens het studieniveau van het onderwijs (ministerie van Nationale Opvoeding). Maar het zeevaartonderwijs ressorteerde onder het ministerie van Verkeerswezen met als gevolg dat het varend personeel niet mee evolueerde; m.a.w. "de mensen van de boten vielen uit de boot". Maar er was meer aan de hand: vrouwen wilden geen man die voor het grootste deel van de tijd uithuizig was; de Belgische reders waren volop bezig hun schepen uit te vlaggen en de RMT, die de Oostende-Doverlijn uitbaatte, stevende af op het faillissement. Kortom, de toekomstperspectieven voor zeeofficieren waren verre van rooskleurig en het leerlingenaantal bleef maar dalen. Na 25 jaar onderhandelen kwam het zeevaartonderwijs onder `Nationale Opvoeding' en op 15 juli 1985 werd de wet van kracht waarbij de school van Oostende voortaan werd opengesteld voor de eerstejaars ter lange omvaart; Oostende werd dus een onderdeel van de Hogere Zeevaartschool van Antwerpen. Beter laat dan nooit dacht men, maar het was te laat. Men had toch kunnen weten dat het voornamelijk de kustbewoners waren die zich door de eeuwen heen om den broode op zee waagden.
De Stroombank, de laatste zeilloodsboot in bewaring gebleven bij het Loodswezen, werd in 1931 aan de Staatsmarineschool afgestaan. Toen in de 19de eeuw het eerste Belgisch visserijwachtschip, de Mathilde, in de vaart kwam moest conform het KB van 3 september 1867 plaats voorzien worden voor 40 leerlingen van de scheepsjongensschool; sindsdien waren er bestendig scheepsjongens aanwezig op alle visserijwachtschepen.
Inséré le 17 juin 2010 Logbook News Enlevé le 17 juillet
BP to use tankers to contain Gulf oil spill
(June 14 2010)
BP is to deploy tankers and production vessels in an effort to beef up the process of collecting the leaking oil in the Gulf of Mexico. Currently, the oil major is using the drill ship ‗Discoverer Enterprise‘, which has the capacity to process up to 18,000 barrels per day.
Under a plan that BP has unveiled for next month, the 'Q4000' will add another 10,000 barrels of capacity each day. The ‗Q4000‘, which pumped drilling mud into the blowout preventer to try to shut down the well during the unsuccessful ‗top kill‘ procedure, will suck in oil and gas through the same lines in a ‗reverse top kill‘ operation. In late June, the ‗Q4000‘ will be joined by the ‗Clear Leader‘, which will siphon oil in the same way. ‗Clear Leader‘ will be able to capture another 10,000 barrels per day, bringing the total capture capacity to 38,000 barrels, or near the upper limit of the new estimates, by mid- July, BP said. While the three vessels are capturing most of the leaking oil, BP said that it will construct a new system along the seabed with floating risers thus enabling oil containment hoses to be disconnected during a hurricane and then easily reconnected. When this is completed, BP will bring in new vessels - two production vessels and two tankers - to replace the ‗Discoverer Enterprise‘, ‗Q4000‘ and ‗Clear Leader‘ while adding capacity.
The production vessel ‗Toisa Pisces‘ and the tanker ‗Loch Rannoch‘, which have the capacity to process 25,000 barrels of oil per day, will be hooked up to the first floating riser system at the end of June, according to BP‘s plan. In mid-July, a second string of vessels - the production vessel ‗Helix Producer‘ and the tanker ‗Evi Knutsen‘ - will be hooked up to the second floating riser system.
The four new vessels together will be able to process 50,000 barrels of oil per day, BP said. Another tanker- ‗Juanita‘ - will be on standby to take over as the full tankers sail to offload the oil.
The ‗Discoverer Enterprise‘, which can hold 125,000 barrels of oil, will remain on site. BP was told by the US government to achieve "complete collection rates" - in other words, to capture all the oil gushing from the well.
Inséré le 19 juin 2010 Open Forum Enlevé le 19 juillet
The Scheldt to be deep
Four Belgian dredgers are in the process of deepening the channel on the Dutch part of the Western Scheldt. By the end of this year, most of these works should be ready. Vessels with a draught of up to 13.1 metres will no longer need to take the tides into account. For vessels with a bigger draught, sailing windows are to be extended substantially.
STEFAN VERBERCKMOES
The Western Scheldt's deepening has thoroughly tried the relations between Flanders and the Netherlands. On 21st December 2005, both governments signed four Scheldt treaties, in which, besides a further deepening of the river, arrangements were made regarding safety and the river's nautical and ecological management. The four treaties were said to be carried out separately, and dredging activities should have been finalized at the end of 2009.
However, the Dutch government hesitated to flood part of a polder area, something that had in fact been agreed earlier. Environmental federations started protesting, so that in the end the treaties' execution got blocked by the State Council, even though depolderisation in Zeeland is unrelated to the deepening Works. The Flemish, patient by nature, lost their patience and frightened their northern neighbours by threatening declarations. On 13th January, the State Council gave green light after ail, and in less than a month later, the first dredgers were already operational on the river's Dutch part. This way, operations that had already started in 2007 on Flemish territory, were finally carried on. The deepening operations' planning was adapted, so that the project's execution could be speeded up. During the next few months, nine thresholds and three hurst edges will be dredged off. We are talking about a total of 7.7 million cubic metres of sand. Belgian dredgers Jan De Nul and lierne both mobilize two vessels. The works are being financed by the Flemish Region and will cost in the region of 100 million Euros. The Municipal Port Authority of Antwerp is particularly relieved by the present thorough dredging operations. The port management had indeed already informed domestic and foreign customers they would be able to sail with higher cargo capacity to and from Antwerp as of this year. The ongoing works are, according to port alderman Marc Van Peel, important to keep up Antwerp's commercial credibility. At the dredging operations' official start on Dutch territory, he declared that the port of Antwerp will now be given the chance to defend against Rotterdam and Hamburg its position as Europe's second port. "This lits into our Global plan in which, besides the deepening itself, we also aim at an optimized chain approach in order to guide the biggest container vessels more easily to Antwerp."
The increased draught will make a far higher number of vessels tide-independent. In practice, a number of thresholds are being dredged down to a draught of 14.7 metres at average low tille. Navigation will then be possible tide-independent for vessels of 13.1 metres draught. For safety reasons, a keel margin of 12.5% is taken into account. So over a metre and a half of water is left below the vessel in order to set off the effect of waves or an unexpected formation of sandbanks in-between two soundings. Seven out of ten vessels that still need to reckon with the tides, will no longer need to do so once the dredging operations have been finalized. Every step as important is that vessels having more draught will get larger tidal windows to sail up or downriver. A departing vessel with a draught of 14 metres now has for example only a tidal window of two hours and 37 minutes a day to sail the Western Scheldt. At the end of this year, that will be upgraded to a tidal window of over four hours. Traffic of bigger-sized container vessels will then be easier to spread in time, which benefits the safety of the river's navigation traffic as well as its capacity. At this moment, the maximum draught for sailing up to Antwerp is 15.56 metres. For departures, the Common Nautical Authority worked out in December 2009 a new arrangement allowing certain container vessels - depending on their speed and sailing characteristics - with a draught of maximum 14.80 metres to leave the port. Next year, it will be possible to increase this maximum departure draught to over 15 metres. For arrivals, an even higher draught is possible. Vessels with a draught of 15.9 metres would then get an access period of two hours and 21 minutes to reach Antwerp. The new maximum draughts will, after some testing in the hydraulic laboratory and trial trips, be fixed gradually and based on acquired experience. These procedures have already been completed to allow Swiss shipping line MSC to send 14,000 TEU vessels to Antwerp. For this size of vessels, attention should not only go to potential draught, but also to the length (366 metres). These ultra large container skips' (ulcs) first calls were subject to strict conditions, yet after a profound evaluation, the Permanent Commission of Supervision on Scheldt navigation concluded these record vessels could easily and safely get to Antwerp. One of the main changes of the new arrangement is the maximum draught increase from 13 to 14 metres for vessels longer than 340 metres. Not only for MSC is this important, but also for shipping lines such as Cosco and Mœrsk Line, because Antwerp is for them the last North-European loading port in a Far East service.
For container vessels of less than 340 metres length, under specific conditions a draught of up to 14.8 metres can be allowed upon departure. In that case, the shipping line must be able to guarantee a certain manoeuvring speed and a tidal window of at least one hour must be available.
The fact that MSC has been sending, since April 2009, 14,000 Teus vessels to Antwerp, proves that the port is henceforth accessible for ulcs. The deepening will also allow these mega vessels to be handled when full of cargo. The future will tell if the third Scheldt deepening operation is to be the last one. Although as yet, Flanders is not insisting on a fourth deepening, Flemish Prime Minister Kris Peeters has confirmed that Flanders' historical rights to deepening the Scheldt, continue to apply. Whether later dredging works will be necessary, depends most of ail on liner navigation's further scale-up. Time being, that process is on hold. Due to the economic crisis, no new (and thus no bigger-sized) container vessels are indeed being ordered.
Anyway, allowing more draft for big vessels may come without a new treaty, because of the present keel margin standard. On the Elbe in Hamburg, for instance, it is nota matter of percentage, but of a fixe d keel margin of one metre. The Antwerp Port Authority is of the opinion that, in the context of a better level playing field between the European container ports, this keel margin could also be applied to the Scheldt. This would mean navigation would again get an additional 0.6 m draught on top op the current standards. As a consequence tidal windows for bigger-size vessels - including the biggest container vessels - can continue to be enlarged as well. CHAIN APPROACH IS TO STREAMLINE RIVER NAVIGATION
Besides better access, it is also a matter of coordinating the activities of ail navigation- related services in such a way that movements on the river constitute a smooth whole, an optimal chain. The more smoothly navigating traffic is being served — piloting, tugging, priority arrangements, available lock capacity, lock timing, etc. — the more the river's capacity will increase. "By making sure the chain works well, capacity extends and the port is able to grow without any bottleneck being created", says Antoine Descamps of the Flemish authorities, who chairs the chain operations counselling group. In a first stage, his group has drawn up a statement of ail affairs and revealed the pressure points. In the second stage, recommendations on various domains are being worked out in order to eliminate these pressure points. For a legal scope, for example, it appears a regulation is missing for the tugging regimen on the river, and a liability regimen for waiting times should be worked out. On an organisational level, more deliberation is required between ail parties involved, hence the need of a common information system. The harbour master's office of the Port Authority is in favour of taking the lead in this matter. On a nautical level, measurements need to be streamlined, in that ETA (expected time of arrival) and RTA (real time of arrival) need better defining. The RTAs account for almost 40% of the waiting times. In conclusion, according to the counselling group, the methodology aiming at one smooth whole of chain operations (i.e. no delays in sailing up and clown the river) needs to be improved by means of better arrangements, the application of common parameters and optimising certain sub processes within the chain operations.
Inséré le 21 Juin 2010 News Logboek Enlevé le 21 juillet 2010
Don’t over-rely on GPS
The ubiquitous nature of GPS positioning makes it a heavily relied upon technology when it comes to vessel navigation. However, the system does suffer from a number of vulnerabilities, and signals could be lost in certain circumstances through the use of very simple technology onshore. Dr Andy Norris explores the dangers of over-reliance on GPS Delegates to the conference on GPS Jamming and Interference held in February at the UK National Physical Laboratories were reminded of the vulnerability of GPS and other Global Navigation Satellite Systems. The conference dramatically emphasised the strong advice that has always been given to professional mariners of not over over-relying on GPS because of the possibility of outright failure or grossly inaccurate position fixes.
In fact, the vulnerabilities of GPS to interference both from onboard as well as remote sources have been aired to mariners on numerous occasions and should be well instilled at training courses. For instance, poor positioning of Inmarsat and GPS antennas on some ships has led to sporadic instances of onboard GPS interference occurring during calls, depending on the specific orientation of the Inmarsat antenna at the time of the call. Certain TV and other high power broadcasting stations in specific areas inhibit some ships‘ GPS equipment from working effectively. These instances, for example, have been reported within the Golfo di Genova and Golfo di Napoli off Italy, and in the Golfe du Lion, off France. Also, IMO has been informed by the US Navy that GPS reception can be compromised by RF transmissions emanating from some naval vessels. Why is GNSS vulnerable?
The fundamental reason why GNSS transmissions are so susceptible is because of the small power of the received signal. GPS satellites, for instance, are 25,000 km from the surface of the Earth and only radiate about 45 watts of power.
This equates to the equivalent transmission of just 45 millionths of a watt from a hypothetical satellite 25 km above the ship, so it is not surprising that small amounts of interference could have a significant impact on GPS receivers. For comparison, a mobile phone transmits at about 2 watts. Its operation 25 km from a ship creates a signal around 44,000 times stronger than the GPS signal, albeit at significantly different frequencies that do not pose an interference threat. In 2003 measures for reducing the susceptibility of ships‘ GPS receivers to interference were addressed in a revision to IEC 61108-1, the international standard for shipborne GPS receiver equipment. This reflected the changes brought about by IMO adopting GPS as part of the carriage requirements of SOLAS. The standard also mandates the need for receivers to have RAIM – Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring – which alerts the user when there are satellite problems that may be creating inaccuracies.
The changes have significantly improved the integrity of SOLAS-compliant GPS receivers over earlier equipment, but vulnerabilities still exist. Jamming
In particular, receivers remain highly susceptible to being jammed over a wide sea area by dedicated jamming equipment operating at similar power levels to a mobile phone. Trials conducted by the Research and Radionavigation Group of the General Lighthouse Authorities of the UK and Ireland recently demonstrated a 1.6 watt land-based jammer that would give problems to shipborne GPS receivers out to a distance of about 30 km.
Other details of the jammer used in the trials have not been released. It is possible that it was a very sophisticated military jammer. However, simple GPS jammers of similar power to that used in the trials are relatively easy and affordable to buy and are likely to have a comparable effect on shipborne receivers. The trials showed that deployment of such jammers creates the potential of a very dangerous situation at sea, possibly resulting in loss of life and considerable environmental damage. It is stressed, however, that if caught using jamming equipment in the UK, unlimited fines can be imposed on the perpetrators, together with a prison sentence of up to two years. The supply of such equipment is also illegal. It is generally true that there are severe penalties for illegal use in all countries. However, despite such penalties it is likely that the jamming of GNSS signals will become more likely as we head into the future. Unfortunately, basic jammers are relatively easy to design and there will always be a contingent of individuals wanting to utilise their possibilities for criminal intent or just for misguided ‗fun‘, even if not primarily directed at shipping.
A more sophisticated form of jamming is known as spoofing. This involves transmitting fake satellite signals that intentionally make the receiver give erroneous position. This requires much more sophisticated jamming equipment and at least, for now, is probably confined to military operations. Advice to mariners
In the marine world all items of navigation equipment are traditionally referred to as navigation aids. This underlines the fact that no single device should be given total reliance. The problem with GPS on ships is that it is normally accurate and reliable and so it can easily provoke over-reliance. In recognition of this The Nautical Institute provides the following invaluable advice:
Mariners should be kept aware of the vulnerabilities of GPS and other GNSS
Mariners should be reminded not to rely on a single source of position fixing
Effective use should be made of other navigation techniques primarily radar, visual and the use of Dead Reckoning
Skills in these techniques must be maintained, through training and practice, if they are being relied upon
Mariners should familiarise themselves with existing alarms and warnings that could indicate failure of GNSS systems specific to the vessels they are sailing on
Should GNSS fail or degrade, risks should be assessed in accordance with the ISM Code, and the best practice of good seamanship should dictate ‗safe speed‘ The GLA jamming trials showed that, at least on the trials‘ vessel, the jamming created numerous GPS-related alarms throughout the bridge system that sounded for about five minutes during entry and exit of the jamming region. Although these were most disconcerting they did provide an extreme warning that all was not well. A number of systems rely entirely on, or at least expect, a GNSS position, including AIS, track-keeping autopilots and ECDIS. These will all alarm if there is a problem with the GNSS input.
This is a specific requirement arising out of the inquiry of the Royal Majesty grounding in 1995 that was provoked by a GPS equipment failure and the inadequate ability of equipment to relay alarms. When such alarms sound a ship should immediately take precautionary measures, such as reducing speed, increasing the number of officers on watch and immediately relying on other means of position fix. What is more insidious is the possibility of no warnings at all being given – just that the accuracy of the position fix is perhaps steadily degrading to dangerous levels.
This is perhaps more unlikely on a modern system, unless being spoofed, but constant precautions need always to be in place to check for GNSS errors, such as regular visual and radar fixes in coastal areas and estimated position techniques in ocean regions. The value of using these other techniques is that in normal circumstances they add considerably to improving the situational awareness of the OOW and, very importantly, they maintain the necessary skills to navigate safely when electronic position fixing becomes unavailable. The future
It is imperative that GNSS technology reacts to the growing threat of jamming. It is relatively straightforward for designs to include specific alarms when convention-al jamming or interference is being encountered and these should be investigated by manufacturers and legislators.
Also, with the efforts being made to improve bridge alarm systems by IMO, the effect of GNSS unavailability should be particularly considered, so at least to allow easy acknowledgement of all such alarms from a central position. Technology will inevitably be improved in a way that makes it ever more likely that positioning issues will be automatically detected, the OOW appropriately informed, and the system automatically reverting to whatever positional backup is available and most suitable at the ship‘s current location. However, once an automatic system provides a better positioning alert and backup than the present day OOW is able to achieve, then the detailed role of the OOW will inevitably change. This needs proper investigation and probably lies within the remit of IMO‘s eNavigation progra m m e . DS Dr Andy Norris has been well-known in the maritime navigation industry for a number of years. He has spent much of his time managing high-tech navigation companies but now he is working on broader issues within the navigational world, providing both technical and business consultancy to the industry, governmental bodies and maritime organizations. Email: [email protected]
Inséré le 23 Juin 2010 News Logboek Enlevé le 23 juillet 2010
ICS slams US proposal to abolish limited liability
(June 17 2010)
The International Chamber of Shipping (ICS) has expressed concern about a US proposal to remove the present limitation of liability system for vessels. This is one of the various proposals put forward to amend OPA 90 in the wake of the ‗Deepwater Horizon‘ oil pollution incident in the Gulf of Mexico in April 2010. According to this proposal, the limitation of liability system would be replaced by a system which would be similar to that being applied to the oil offshore/extraction industry. The ICS said that the OPA 90 regime has functioned well for two decades and the limits have been reviewed and updated as recently as 2006. They were also increased further in 2009. These limits have proved to be adequate and workable. Every incident of pollution from a vessel has fallen within the limits of liability of OPA 90 and the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund (OSLTF). More particularly, in the few cases where vessel limits have been exceeded, additional resources have come from oil industry funding via the OSLTF, which ensures sharing of responsibility for the costs of compensation between the shipping and oil industries, the ICS said. There are significant factual differences between the risk assessment of a drilling operation and of maritime transportation and OPA 90 very rightly differentiates between the two sectors when determining the respective limits of liability.
ICS said that changes to the liability and insurance related aspects of OPA 90 for vessels are unwarranted. The vessel liability provisions in OPA 90 strike a careful balance (taking into account both vessel type and size) to provide appropriate levels of responsibility for the broad range of vessels to which OPA 90 applies. The levels of liability and financial security for pollution are reasonable and insurable. Unlimited or disproportionate liability for vessels would undermine the operation of OPA 90, because the system relies on the immediate availability of insurance resources to support clean up and response operations and compensate third party claimants with minimal delay or litigation. This would also be inconsistent with congress‘s aim of having a comprehensive and vibrant transportation system that enjoys an effective, predictable liability and response regime.
Unlimited liability is uninsurable and the providers of the Certificates of Financial Responsibility (COFR) would not be able to provide certificates for such liability. This would lead to an inability on the part of the majority of vessel operators trading to the US to continue to do so, ICS warned.
In seeking to align the OPA 90 provisions on financial consequences of an oil spill from a vessel with that from an offshore oil facility, the reason for the original point of distinction is disregarded. In ICS‘s view, such a proposal is unwarranted and, if effected, would disrupt the mechanism by which vessels fund their liability under the statute, and would make it impossible for shipowners to trade to the US, the chamber said.
Inséré le 25 Juin 2010 News Logboek Enlevé le 25 juillet 2010
The iceberg threat in the North Atlantic
By the staff of the International Ice Patrol
Of all the peacetime hazards at sea, none is more fearsome, unyielding, and potentially deadly to an unwary seaman than an iceberg. Despite ingenuity, resourcefulness, and almost a century of technical advances, these natural wonders have resisted human efforts to control or destroy them. Calving from Greenland‘s glaciers – frequently as long as a city block and towering hundreds of feet above the sea surface – these majestic ancient bergs are driven and steered by ocean currents into the shipping lanes of the North Atlantic. The United States Coast Guard‘s In ternational Ice Patrol (IIP) has been responsible for monitoring these lanes for iceberg danger since 1913. The IIP receives iceberg information from a variety of sources, enters those data into drift and deterioration computer models, then distributes the Limit of All Known Ice (LAKI) to the maritime community. The Ice Patrol has amassed an enviable safety record, with not a single reported loss of life or property due to collision with an iceberg outside their advertised LAKI.
The principal origins of the icebergs that reach the North Atlantic are the 100 tidewater glaciers of West Greenland. Between 10,000 and 15,000 icebergs are calved each year and carried north along the Greenland coast, around the western side of Baffin Bay, and then south along the east coasts of Baffin Island, Labrador, and Newfoundland to the Grand Banks. With drafts of 300-600 feet, the progress of larger icebergs is frequently slowed due to grounding. Smaller icebergs often become sidetracked, banging along the fringes of an Arctic island or caught in a cove along the Labrador coast. The total drift for an iceberg is about 1,800 nautical miles and will take from 11 months to three years to reach the North Atlantic shipping lanes. The icy cold Labrador Current, running southeastward along the northeast coast of Canada, carries icebergs south to the vicinity of the Grand Banks and into the great circle shipping lanes between Europe and the major ports of the northeast United States and Canada. In this area, the Labrador Current clashes with the warm northeastward-flowing Gulf Stream. The temperature difference between the two currents can exceed 20 degrees Celsius. The mixing of air atop these two different water masses causes the dense fog for which this area is well known. This thick shroud of fog and the high concentration of transatlantic shipping vessels, oil platforms, and fishing boats in the area compound the danger represented by icebergs. The combination of these factors exists nowhere else on earth and so makes the waters of the Grand Banks one of the most dangerous marine areas in the world.
The enormous mass and the tremendous environmental forces acting on icebergs render efforts to restrain, destroy, or significantly alter their course largely ineffective. Therefore, tracking these icebergs and publishing the LAKI has proved the most effective means of promoting safe navigation. The United States Coast Guard formally commences its service of ice observation whenever the presence of icebergs threatens the primary shipping routes between Europe and North America. Officially, according to the SOLAS convention, the iceberg season runs from 15 February to 1 July each year, but the IIP commences operations when iceberg conditions dictate and continues the effort until the threat no longer exists. Except during unusually heavy ice years, the Grand
Banks is normally iceberg free from August through January.
It took one of the greatest marine disasters of all times - the sinking of the Titanic on April 15, 1912 - to arouse public demand for international cooperation to deal with iceberg danger. This disaster was the prime impetus for the establishment of the International Ice Patrol and the United States Coast Guard has been carrying out this duty since 1913. Throughout IIP‘s history the individuals responsible for carrying out this mission have been focused on continuous improvement. Iceberg scouting began with ships patrolling the foggy waters of the North Atlantic in search of the southernmost iceberg. The focus shifted from shipboard reconnaissance to aerial reconnaissance in 1946; however, visibility was still the limiting factor in iceberg detection. With the advent and operational implementation of airborne radars, the primary sensor for iceberg detection changed from the human eye to radars. Still, despite the numerous technological advances in iceberg scouting, the task today is the same as it was in 1914, and finding a relatively small chunk of ice in the 500,000 square nautical miles of ocean for which the IIP is responsible remains extremely challenging. Today, in a manner very similar to the early cutters, aircraft and ice observers rotate every two weeks during the ice season to maintain regular ice patrols in the vicinity of the Grand Banks. The Ice Patrol relies heavily on the support of merchant traffic transiting through the operational area, both for reports of icebergs and sea surface temperatures (SST), to aid in iceberg melt and deterioration predictions. Merchant vessels typically account for around 25% of all iceberg reports received. The Ice Patrol has a strong customer relations programme targeted at developing relationships with transatlantic mariners to provide the most timely and accurate ice information possible. In 2005, the Ice Patrol initiated a programme to recognize the ship that made the most contributions through SST or iceberg reports. Named after the British steamer Carpathia,which came to the aid of the victims of the Titanic, the Carpathia award is presented annually to the ship that makes the most information reports. In 2006, the M/V Mattea, home ported in Arnold‘s Cove Station, Newfoundland was the recipient for the second time, with 131 reports of SST and ice. All ships are encouraged to immediately report sightings of ice to COMINTICEPAT GROTON CT, CT through INMARSAT, United States Coast Guard Communication Stations, or Canadian Coast Guard Marine Communications and Traffic Services.
Ships are encouraged to make reports even if ―no ice‖ is sighted, as knowledge of ice- free regions is important to assessing the threat to shipping. When reporting ice, ships are requested to include the following information: SHIP NAME AND CALL SIGN
ICEBERG POSITION TIME OF SIGHTING (in UTC) METHOD OF DETECTION (Visual, Radar, or Both)
SIZE AND SHAPE OF ICEBERG SEA ICE CONCENTRATION Ice sightings, weather, and sea-surface temperature should be reported to COMINTICEPAT GROTON CT. If using INMARSAT A or C, use Service Code 42. This will ensure the ice information reaches COMINTICEPAT GROTON, CT. There is no charge for ice reports made using Service Code 42.
The International Ice Patrol in Groton, CT can be reached by phone at +1 860-441-2626 and +1 860-441-2773 (fax), the Customer Service hotline at +1 877-423-7287, or by e-mail at [email protected]. Website: http://www.uscg.mil/lantarea/iip/
Inséré le 27 juin 2010 Historique - Historiek Enlevé le 27 juillet 2010
Belgische kolonisatieprojecten in de 19de eeuw Het Pinos Eiland
Cuba, het langwerpige en grootste eiland der Antillen werd op 28 oktober 1492 door Colombus ontdekt en achtereenvolgens Juana, Fernandina en Cuba (huana) genoemd. In 1511 werd het bezet en georganiseerd "op z'n Spaans" door uitroeiing der Indianen, om uiteindelijk in 1764 een Generaal Kapitanaat te worden. Pinos, het "Pijnenboom"- eiland, een 2198 km2 groot eiland in de Golf van Batabano aan de zuidkust van Cuba, werd ook door Colombus ontdekt maar dan op zijn tweede reis in 1494; in 1518 kreeg het het bezoek van de veroveraar van Mexico, Hernân Cortés. Het heeft een vlakke en moerassige kust en wordt ter hoogte van de Siguaneabaai door moerassen in twee gesneden. Het binnenland is eerder heuvelachtig met de 310m hoge La Canadatop als hoogste punt. Zoals Cuba kent het een keerkringsklimaat met passaatwinden, hoge temperaturen en veel regenval. Aansluitend aan het hoofdeiland liggen westelijk de San Felipe riffen (cayos) en oostelijk de Canarreos archipel, een schapulier van eilandjes en rotsen. Thans telt het eiland 20.000 inwoners -komende van 3.200 in 1900- maar in 1838, in de periode kort na de Belgische onafhankelijkheid, waren het er precies geteld nauwelijks 427, die in hoofdzaak leefden van visvangst, houtwinning en wat landbouw. In 1980 kreeg het de naam Isla de la Juventud (Eiland van de Jeugd) toebedeeld. Cuba blijft een Spaanse bezitting
Tussen 1810 en 1825 waren de Spaanse kolonieën op het vaste-land in opstand gekomen. De ene na de andere proclameerde haar onafhankelijkheid en Landen als Colombië en Argentinië gingen een federatie vormen. In 1838 viel de Verenigde Republiek van Colombië echter uiteen in de onafhankelijke staten Nieuw Granada, Venezuela en Ecuador. Peru en Bolivië waren verenigd in een confederatie (18351839) en Brazilië was sedert 1822 een keizerrijk. Mexico reikte in het noorden nog tot aan het Oregongebied, terwijl de vijf staten van Midden-Amerika een federatie vormden (1823- 1839) en Haïti samen met Santo Domingo een Verenigde Republiek (1822-1844). Slechts twee bolwerken waren in Spaanse handen gebleven: Cuba en Puerto Rico. Vooral Cuba nam een sleutelpositie in wegens haar ligging aan de toegang van de Golf van Mexico. Spanje was dan ook vastbesloten er te blijven, spijts de belangstelling van de Verenigde Staten voor het eiland.
Tussen 1808 en 1820 arriveerden in Cuba talloze van het vasteland verdreven koninklijke functionnarissen en politieke vluchtelingen. De Spanjaarden leken evenwel uit de opstanden de nodige lessen geleerd te hebben want hun houding tegenover de Cubanen werd heel wat liberaler: de vrijhandel werd aangemoedigd en niet-spaanse immigranten kregen de toelating zich op het eiland te vestigen. Belangrijk was tevens dat het eiland niet langer als een kolonie werd bejegend, maar dat het een deelgebied werd van Spanje met vertegenwoordiging in het parlement, de Cortes, in Madrid. Maar de druk van de onafhankelijke "Americas" op de eilandbewoners was zo groot dat zij zelfbestuur, algemeen stemrecht en afschaffing van de slavernij eisten, met het gevolg dat Spanje noodgedwongen diende terug te grijpen naar een hardere koers en maatregelen uitvaar- digde die dan weer opstanden ten gevolge hadden (1824), waardoor het voordelig statuut van Spaanse provincie in 1827 werd opgeheven.
Belgische belangstelling
Zo was de toestand toen in januari 1838 de Belgische rondreizende gezant voor Latijns- Amerika, baron de Norman, bij het Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken een verslag indiende omtrent de wenselijkheid op het Cubaanse eiland Pinos nederzettingen en handelsfactorijen op te richten. Belgen zouden zich aldaar kunnen vestigen en zich toe- leggen op kustvaart met de Cubaanse havens en de continentale havens van Mexico en Midden-Amerika. Zij zouden zorgen voor de verhandeling en verscheping van de op Pinos gewonnen producten en tevens instaan voor de aanvoer van levensnoodzakelijke goederen. Baron de Norman hoopte aldus mettertijd een druk handelsverkeer te scheppen "dat uiteraard zowel nuttig als onmisbaar zou zijn voor zovele Landen, die aan België hun geluk en welvaart zouden verschuldigd zijn". De toenmalige voorzitter van de Belgische ministerraad, tevens Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken, baron de Theux, wees het voorstel zomaar niet af en legde het voor aan "onze doorluchtige vorst, die zijn verslag zou lezen met dezelfde voldoening als hij zelf'. Aanvankelijk had de Norman alleen maar de aankoop van gronden of van het eiland zelf op het oog, geenszins de overdracht aan België van de Spaanse soevereiniteit. Dat was nochtans niet helemaal de richting die de Belgische regering uit wou. Baron de Theux verzocht nl. in mei 1838 graaf de Lalaing, onze ambassadeur in Madrid, beide mogelijkheden te onderzoeken en bijzonderheden over het eiland te verzamelen. Meer bepaald betreffende de bodemgesteldheid, de eventuele delfstoffenrijkdom en het klimaat. De rapporten van zowel de Norman als de Lalaing belandden uiteindelijk bij Smits, de directeur van de Handelsafdeling van het Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, die er op zijn beurt een beoordeling over gaf die dan de secretaris-generaal van het ministerie ter hand werd gesteld. Dit werkstuk van Smits is Lang de basis gebleven van de koloniale politiek ten tijde van Leopold I. Smits zag in een overzees rijk heel wat obstakels van allerlei aard, zoals de verdediging waarvoor een oorlogsvloot diende uitgerust, en voorts twijfelde hij dermate aan het rendement zelf van de kolonie, dat o.m. het overbrengen van talloze Belgen genoodzaakte, dat hij oordeelde dat het maar beter was er niet aan te beginnen. Toch kwam zijn chef, de secretaris-generaal, tot de vaststelling dat de nadelen niet tegen de voordelen opwogen en dat de risico's eerder denkbeeldig waren. Hij adviseerde de minister dan ook het eiland Pinos te kopen en de Norman de nodige onderrichtingen en machtsdelegatie te bezorgen "om deze zaak tot een goed einde te brengen". Maar blijkbaar had de Theux meer oog voor de argumentatie van Smits want in februari 1839 besloot hij de Norman terug naar Cuba te zenden, niet om over de overname van Pinos besprekingen te voeren, maar om nadere informatie over het eiland te verzamelen. Dat was de zaak op de lange baan schuiven.
Zo de Belgische regering plots geen interesse meer had was dat ook te wijten aan de start van een ander groots opgezet kolonisatieplan in Santo Tomas in Guatemala. Ze kon de aandacht -en de financiee middelen- niet tegelijk over verschillende projecten verdelen. Amerikaanse interventie
Het einde van het liedje zou zijn dat de Amerikanen met de kluif aan de haal gingen. Reeds in 1823 had John Quincy Adams, die het daaropvolgend jaar Amerikaans president zou worden, geschreven dat "Cuba losgemaakt van zijn onnatuurlijke (sic) binding met Spanje, zich alleen tot de Verenigde Staten kon wenden". In hetzelfde jaar dat de Norman zijn laatste verslag schreef, hadden de VS aan Spanje in het geheim 100 miljoen dollar aangeboden in ruil voor de soevereiniteit over Cuba. Madrid wees dat aanbod echter af. Vijf jaar later kwam een dergelijke aankoop in het Amerikaans congres ter sprake en in 1846 deed een genootschap zelfs een bod van 200 miljoen dollar op Cuba. Na deze periode van geldelijke aanbiedingen volgde een tijd van hardere taal en zelfs van daden. Er werden in de VS paramilitaire groepen opgericht die in samenwerking met de Cubaanse creolen een omwenteling moesten veroorzaken. Een voormalig Spaans functionaris, Narciso Lopez, was leider van een dergelijke groep. Op 10 mei 1850 landde hij met 600 man op Cuba maar werd verdreven. Hij deed het in 1851 nog eens over, werd gevangen genomen en terechtgesteld. In 1854 was er enige spanning in de lucht toen in Havana een Amerikaans schip in beslag werd genomen. Het parlement van Louisiana stemde toen zelfs een resolutie om Cuba bij de Verenigde Staten in te lijven. De Amerikaanse burgeroorlog bracht een lange pauze in die aanspraken. Tenslotte zorgden de VS in 1898 voor een enscenering die hen het argument bezorgde om militair in te grijpen. Hun slagschip Maine deden ze op 15.2.1898 zelf in de lucht vliegen in de haven van Havana en schoven dan de schuld op de Spanjaarden. Cuba, Puerto Rico en de Filippijnen werden op de Spanjaarden veroverd. Met de vrede van 10.12.1898 deed Spanje noodgedwongen afstand van Cuba en kwam het eiland aan de Verenigde Staten. Voor nog zeer lange tij d. R. Thys
Bronnen - Lynch, J. Spanish colonial administration. Univ. of London, 1958. - Monheim, Chr. Belgische kolonisatieplannen. Zaire uitgaven, 1943. Versini, A. Quatre siècles de l'histoire des Antilles. Cahiers Hist. 5, 1963.
Cuba/Pinos Winkler Prins, 3de druk, 1908. Grosser Historischer Weltatlas. Bayerischen Schulbuch Verlag, 1962.
Inséré le 29 Juin 2010 News Logboek Enlevé le 29 juillet 2010
MARPOL Introduction
The MARPOL Convention is the main international convention covering prevention of pollution of the marine environment by ships from operational or accidental causes. It is a combination of two treaties adopted in 1973 and 1978 respectively and updated by amendments through the years. The International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL) was adopted on 2 November 1973 at IMO and covered pollution by oil, chemicals, harmful substances in packaged form, sewage and garbage. The Protocol of 1978 relating to the 1973 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (1978 MARPOL Protocol) was adopted at a Conference on Tanker Safety and Pollution Prevention in February 1978 held in response to a spate of tanker accidents in 1976-1977. (Measures relating to tanker design and operation were also incorporated into a Protocol of 1978 relating to the 1974 Convention on the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974) As the 1973 MARPOL Convention had not yet entered into force, the 1978 MARPOL Protocol absorbed the parent Convention. The combined instrument is referred to as the International Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution from Ships, 1973, as modified by the Protocol of 1978 relating thereto (MARPOL 73/78), and it entered into force on 2 October 1983 (Annexes I and II). The Convention includes regulations aimed at preventing and minimizing pollution from ships - both accidental pollution and that from routine operations - and currently includes six technical Annexes:
Annex I : Regulations for the Prevention of Pollution by Oil Annex II : Regulations for the Control of Pollution by Noxious Liquid Substances in Bulk Annex III : Prevention of Pollution by Harmful Substances Carried by Sea in Packaged Form
Annex IV : Prevention of Pollution by Sewage from Ships Annex V : Prevention of Pollution by Garbage from Ships Annex VI : Prevention of Air Pollution from Ships (entry into force 19 May 2005) States Parties must accept Annexes I and II, but the other Annexes are voluntary. History of MARPOL 73/78
Oil pollution of the seas was recognized as a problem in the first half of the 20th century and various countries introduced national regulations to control discharges of oil within their territorial waters. In 1954, the United Kingdom organized a conference on oil pollution which resulted in the adoption of the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil (OILPOL), 1954. Following entry into force of the IMO Convention in 1958, the depository and Secretariat functions in relation to the Convention were transferred from the United Kingdom Government to IMO. OILPOL Convention
The 1954 Convention, which was amended in 1962, 1969 and 1971, primarily addressed pollution resulting from routine tanker operations and from the discharge of oily wastes from machinery spaces - regarded as the major causes of oil pollution from ships.
The 1954 OILPOL Convention, which entered into force on 26 July 1958, attempted to tackle the problem of pollution of the seas by oil - defined as crude oil, fuel oil, heavy diesel oil and lubricating oil in two main ways:
-it established "prohibited zones" extending at least 50 miles from the nearest land in which the discharge of oil or of mixtures containing more than 100 parts of oil per million was forbidden; and
-it required Contracting Parties to take all appropriate steps to promote the provision of facilities for the reception of oily water and residues. In 1962, IMO adopted amendments to the Convention which extended its application to ships of a lower tonnage and also extended the "prohibited zones". Amendments adopted in 1969 contained regulations to further restrict operational discharge of oil from oil tankers and from machinery spaces of all ships. Although the 1954 OILPOL Convention went some way in dealing with oil pollution, growth in oil trade and developments in industrial practices were beginning to make it clear that further action, was required. Nonetheless, pollution control was at the time still a minor concern for IMO, and indeed the world was only beginning to wake up to the environmental consequences of an increasingly industrialised society. Torrey Canyon
In 1967, the tanker Torrey Canyon ran aground while entering the English Channel and spilled her entire cargo of 120,000 tons of crude oil into the sea. This resulted in the biggest oil pollution incident ever recorded up to that time. The incident raised questions about measures then in place to prevent oil pollution from ships and also exposed deficiencies in the existing system for providing compensation following accidents at sea. First, IMO called an Extraordinary session of its Council, which drew up a plan of action on technical and legal aspects of the Torrey Canyon incident. Then, the IMO Assembly decided in 1969 to convene an international conference in 1973 to prepare a suitable international agreement for placing restraints on the contamination of the sea, land and air by ships. In the meantime, in 1971, IMO adopted further amendments to OILPOL 1954 to afford additional protection to the Great Barrier Reef of Australia and also to limit the size of tanks on oil tankers, thereby minimizing the amount of oil which could escape in the event of a collision or stranding. 1973 Convention
Finally, an international Conference in 1973 adopted the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships. While it was recognized that accidental pollution was spectacular, the Conference considered that operational pollution was still the bigger threat. As a result, the 1973 Convention incorporated much of OILPOL 1954 and its amendments into Annex I, covering oil.
But the Convention was also intended to address other forms of pollution from ships and therefore other annexes covered chemicals, harmful substances carried in packaged form, sewage and garbage. The 1973 Convention also included two Protocols dealing with Reports on Incidents involving Harmful Substances and Arbitration.
The 1973 Convention required ratification by 15 States, with a combined merchant fleet of not less than 50 percent of world shipping by gross tonnage, to enter into force. By 1976, it had only received three ratifications - Jordan, Kenya and Tunisia - representing less than one percent of the world's merchant shipping fleet. This was despite the fact that States could become Party to the Convention by only ratifying Annexes I (oil) and II (chemicals). Annexes III to V, covering harmful goods in packaged form, sewage and garbage, were optional.
It began to look as though the 1973 Convention might never enter into force, despite its importance. 1978 Conference
In 1978, in response to a spate of tanker accidents in 1976-1977, IMO held a Conference on Tanker Safety and Pollution Prevention in February 1978. The conference adopted measures affecting tanker design and operation, which were incorporated into both the Protocol of 1978 relating to the 1974 Convention on the Safety of Life at Sea (1978 SOLAS Protocol) and the Protocol of 1978 relating to the 1973 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (1978 MARPOL Protocol) - adopted on 17 February 1978. More importantly in terms of achieving the entry into force of MARPOL, the 1978 MARPOL Protocol allowed States to become Party to the Convention by first implementing Annex I (oil), as it was decided that Annex II (chemicals) would not become binding until three years after the Protocol entered into force. This gave States time to overcome technical problems in Annex II, which for some had been a major obstacle in ratifying the Convention.
As the 1973 Convention had not yet entered into force, the 1978 MARPOL Protocol absorbed the parent Convention. The combined instrument - the International Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution from Ships, 1973 as modified by the Protocol of 1978 relating thereto (MARPOL 73/78) - finally entered into force on 2 October 1983 (for Annexes I and II).
Annex V, covering garbage, achieved sufficient ratifications to enter into force on 31 December 1988, while Annex III, covering harmful substances carried in packaged form, entered into force on 1 July 1992. Annex IV, covering sewage, enters into force on 27 September 2003. Annex VI, covering air pollution, was adopted in September 1997 and enters into force on 19 May 2005. Annex I: Prevention of pollution by oil
Entry into force: 2 October 1983 (Revised Annex I enters into force 1 January 2007) The 1973 Convention maintained the oil discharge criteria prescribed in the 1969 amendments to the 1954 Oil Pollution Convention, without substantial changes, namely, that operational discharges of oil from tankers are allowed only when all of the following conditions are met:
- the total quantity of oil which a tanker may discharge in any ballast voyage whilst under way must not exceed 1/15,000 of the total cargo carrying capacity of the vessel;
- the rate at which oil may be discharged must not exceed 60 litres per mile travelled by the ship; and
- no discharge of any oil whatsoever must be made from the cargo spaces of a tanker within 50 miles of the nearest land.
An oil record book is required, in which is recorded the movement of cargo oil and its residues from loading to discharging on a tank-to-tank basis.
In addition, in the 1973 Convention, the maximum quantity of oil permitted to be discharged on a ballast voyage of new oil tankers was reduced from 1/15,000 of the cargo capacity to 1/30,000 of the amount of cargo carried. These criteria applied equally both to persistent (black) and non-persistent (white) oils. As with the 1969 OILPOL amendments, the 1973 Convention recognized the "load on top" (LOT) system which had been developed by the oil industry in the 1960s. On a ballast voyage the tanker takes on ballast water (departure ballast) in dirty cargo tanks. Other tanks are washed to take on clean ballast. The tank washings are pumped into a special slop tank. After a few days, the departure ballast settles and oil flows to the top. Clean water beneath is then decanted while new arrival ballast water is taken on. The upper layer of the departure ballast is transferred to the slop tanks. After further settling and decanting, the next cargo is loaded on top of the remaining oil in the slop tank, hence the term load on top. A new and important feature of the 1973 Convention was the concept of "special areas" which are considered to be so vulnerable to pollution by oil that oil discharges within them have been completely prohibited, with minor and well-defined exceptions. The 1973 Convention identified the Mediterranean Sea, the Black Sea, and the Baltic Sea, the Red Sea and the Gulfs area as special areas. All oil-carrying ships are required to be capable of operating the method of retaining oily wastes on board through the "load on top" system or for discharge to shore reception facilities. This involves the fitting of appropriate equipment, including an oil-discharge monitoring and control system, oily-water separating equipment and a filtering system, slop tanks, sludge tanks, piping and pumping arrangements.
New oil tankers (i.e. those for which the building contract was placed after 31 December 1975) of 70,000 tons deadweight and above, must be fitted with segregated ballast tanks large enough to provide adequate operating draught without the need to carry ballast water in cargo oil tanks.
Secondly, new oil tankers are required to meet certain subdivision and damage stability requirements so that, in any loading conditions, they can survive after damage by collision or stranding. The Protocol of 1978 made a number of changes to Annex I of the parent convention. Segregated ballast tanks (SBT) are required on all new tankers of 20,000 dwt and above (in the parent convention SBTs were only required on new tankers of 70,000 dwt and above). The Protocol also required SBTs to be protectively located - that is, they must be positioned in such a way that they will help protect the cargo tanks in the event of a collision or grounding.
Another important innovation concerned crude oil washing (COW), which had been developed by the oil industry in the 1970s and offered major benefits. Under COW, tanks are washed not with water but with crude oil - the cargo itself. COW was accepted as an alternative to SBTs on existing tankers and is an additional requirement on new tankers. For existing crude oil tankers (built before entry into force of the Protocol) a third alternative was permissible for a period of two to four years after entry into force of MARPOL 73/78. The dedicated clean ballast tanks (CBT) system meant that certain tanks are dedicated solely to the carriage of ballast water. This was cheaper than a full SBT system since it utilized existing pumping and piping, but when the period of grace has expired other systems must be used.
Drainage and discharge arrangements were also altered in the Protocol, regulations for improved stripping systems were introduced. Some oil tankers operate solely in specific trades between ports which are provided with adequate reception facilities. Some others do not use water as ballast. The TSPP Conference recognized that such ships should not be subject to all MARPOL requirements and they were consequently exempted from the SBT, COW and CBT requirements. It is generally recognized that the effectiveness of international conventions depends upon the degree to which they are obeyed and this in turn depends largely upon the extent to which they are enforced. The 1978 Protocol to MARPOL therefore introduced stricter regulations for the survey and certification of ships. The 1992 amendments to Annex I made it mandatory for new oil tankers to have double hulls – and it brought in a phase-in schedule for existing tankers to fit double hulls, which was subsequently revised in 2001 and 2003. Annex II: Control of pollution by noxious liquid substances
Entry into force: 6 April 1987 (Revised Annex II enters into force 1 January 2007) Annex II details the discharge criteria and measures for the control of pollution by noxious liquid substances carried in bulk
Some 250 substances were evaluated and included in the list appended to the Convention. The discharge of their residues is allowed only to reception facilities until certain concentrations and conditions (which vary with the category of substances) are complied with.
In any case, no discharge of residues containing noxious substances is permitted within 12 miles of the nearest land. More stringent restrictions applied to the Baltic and Black Sea areas. Annex III: Prevention of pollution by harmful substances in packaged form
Entry into force: 1 July 1992 The first of the convention's optional annexes. States ratifying the Convention must accept Annexes I and II but can choose not to accept the other three - hence they have taken much longer to enter into force. Annex III contains general requirements for the issuing of detailed standards on packing, marking, labelling, documentation, stowage, quantity limitations, exceptions and notifications for preventing pollution by harmful substances. The International Maritime Dangerous Goods (IMDG) Code has, since 1991, included marine pollutants.
Annex IV: Prevention of pollution by sewage from ships Entry into force: 27 September 2003 The second of the optional Annexes, Annex IV contains requirements to control pollution of the sea by sewage. A revised Annex was adopted in 2004.
Annex V: Prevention of pollution by garbage from ships
Entry into force: 31 December 1988 This deals with different types of garbage and specifies the distances from land and the manner in which they may be disposed of. The requirements are much stricter in a number of "special areas" but perhaps the most important feature of the Annex is the complete ban imposed on the dumping into the sea of all forms of plastic. Annex VI: Prevention of Air Pollution from Ships
Adoption: September 1997 Entry into force: 19 May 2005
The regulations in this annex set limits on sulphur oxide and nitrogen oxide emissions from ship exhausts and prohibit deliberate emissions of ozone depleting substances. Enforcement
Any violation of the MARPOL 73/78 Convention within the jurisdiction of any Party to the Convention is punishable either under the law of that Party or under the law of the flag State. In this respect, the term "jurisdiction" in the Convention should be construed in the light of international law in force at the time the Convention is applied or interpreted. With the exception of very small vessels, ships engaged on international voyages must carry on board valid international certificates which may be accepted at foreign ports as prima facie evidence that the ship complies with the requirements of the Convention. If, however, there are clear grounds for believing that the condition of the ship or its equipment does not correspond substantially with the particulars of the certificate, or if the ship does not carry a valid certificate, the authority carrying out the inspection may detain the ship until it is satisfied that the ship can proceed to sea without presenting unreasonable threat of harm to the marine environment. Under Article 17, the Parties to the Convention accept the obligation to promote, in consultation with other international bodies and with the assistance of UNEP, support for those Parties which request technical assistance for various purposes, such as training, the supply of equipment, research, and combating pollution. Amendment Procedure
Amendments to the technical Annexes of MARPOL 73/78 can be adopted using the "tacit acceptance" procedure, whereby the amendments enter into force on a specified date unless an agreed number of States Parties object by an agreed date.
In practice, amendments are usually adopted either by IMO's Marine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC) or by a Conference of Parties to MARPOL. The 1984 amendments
Adoption: 7 September 1984 Entry into force: 7 January 1986 The amendments to Annex I were designed to make implementation easier and more effective. New requirements were designed to prevent oily water being discharged in special areas, and other requirements were strengthened. But in some cases they were eased, provided that various conditions were met: some discharges were now permitted below the waterline, for example, which helps to cut costs by reducing the need for extra piping. The 1985 (Annex II) amendments
Adoption: 5 December 1985 Entry into force: 6 April 1987 The amendments to Annex II, which deals with liquid noxious substances (such as chemicals), were intended to take into account technological developments since the Annex was drafted in 1973 and to simplify its implementation. In particular, the aim was to reduce the need for reception facilities for chemical wastes and to improve cargo tank stripping efficiencies.
The amendments also made the International Code for the Construction and Equipment of Ships Carrying Dangerous Chemicals in Bulk (IBC Code) mandatory for ships built on or after 1 July 1986. This is important because the Annex itself is concerned only with discharge procedures: the Code contains carriage requirements. The Code itself was revised to take into account anti-pollution requirements and therefore make the amended Annex more effective in reducing accidental pollution The 1985 (Protocol I) amendments
Adoption: 5 December 1985 Entry into force: 6 April 1987 The amendments made it an explicit requirement to report incidents involving discharge into the sea of harmful substances in packaged form. The 1987 Amendments
Adoption: December 1987 Entry into force: 1 April 1989
The amendments extended Annex I Special Area status to the Gulf of Aden The 1989 (March) amendments
Adoption: March 1989 Entry into force: 13 October 1990 The amendments affected the International Code for the Construction and Equipment of Ships Carrying Dangerous Chemicals in Bulk (IBC Code), mandatory under both MARPOL 73/78 and SOLAS and applies to ships built on or after 1 July 1986 and the Code for the Construction and Equipment of Ships Carrying Dangerous Chemicals in Bulk (BCH). In both cases, the amendments included a revised list of chemicals. The BCH Code is mandatory under MARPOL 73/78 but voluntary under SOLAS 1974. Further amendments affected Annex II of MARPOL - updating and replacing the lists of chemicals in appendices II and III. The October 1989 amendments
Adoption: 17 October 1989 Entry into force: 18 February 1991 The amendments make the North Sea a "special area" under Annex V of the convention. This greatly increases the protection of the sea against the dumping of garbage from ships The 1990 (HSSC) amendments
Adoption: March 1990 Entry into force: 3 February 2000 (coinciding with the entry into force of the 1988 SOLAS and Load Lines Protocols). The amendments are designed to introduce the harmonized system of survey and certificates (HSSC) into MARPOL 73/78 at the same time as it enters into force for the SOLAS and Load Lines Conventions. All three instruments require the issuing of certificates to show that requirements have been met and this has to be done by means of a survey which can involve the ship being out of service for several days.
The harmonized system alleviates the problems caused by survey dates and intervals between surveys which do not coincide, so that a ship should no longer have to go into port or repair yard for a survey required by one convention shortly after doing the same thing in connection with another instrument. The 1990 (IBC Code) amendments
Adoption: March 1990 Entry into force: On the same date as the March 1990 HSSC amendments i.e. 3 February 2000. The amendments introduced the HSSC into the IBC Code The 1990 (BCH) amendments
Adoption: March 1990
Entry into force: On the same date as the March 1990 HSSC amendments i.e. 3 February 2000. The amendments introduced the HSSC into the BCH Code. The 1990 (Annexes I and V) amendments
Adoption: November 1990 Entry into force: 17 March 1992
The amendments extended Special Area Status under Annexes I and V to the Antarctic. The 1991 amendments
Adoption: 4 July 1991 Entry into force: 4 April 1993 The amendments made the Wider Caribbean a Special Area under Annex V.
Other amendments added a new chapter IV to Annex I, requiring ships to carry an oil pollution emergency plan. The 1992 amendments
Adoption: 6 March 1992 Entry into force: 6 July 1993 The amendments to Annex I of the convention which deals with pollution by oil brought in the "double hull" requirements for tankers, applicable to new ships (tankers ordered after 6 July 1993, whose keels were laid on or after 6 January 1994 or which are delivered on or after 6 July 1996) as well as existing ships built before that date, with a phase-in period.
New-build tankers are covered by Regulation 13F, while regulation 13G applies to existing crude oil tankers of 20,000 dwt and product carriers of 30,000 dwt and above. Regulation 13G came into effect on 6 July 1995.
Inséré le 01 juillet 2010 News Logboek Enlevé le 01 aout 2010 MARPOL (2nd part)
Regulation 13F requires all new tankers of 5,000 dwt and above to be fitted with double hulls separated by a space of up to 2 metres (on tankers below 5,000 dwt the space must be at least 0.76m).
As an alternative, tankers may incorporate the "mid-deck" concept under which the pressure within the cargo tank does not exceed the external hydrostatic water pressure. Tankers built to this design have double sides but not a double bottom. Instead, another deck is installed inside the cargo tank with the venting arranged in such a way that there is an upward pressure on the bottom of the hull. Other methods of design and construction may be accepted as alternatives "provided that such methods ensure at least the same level of protection against oil pollution in the event of a collision or stranding and are approved in principle by the Marine Environment Protection Committee based on guidelines developed by the Organization. For oil tankers of 20,000 dwt and above new requirements were introduced concerning subdivision and stability. The amendments also considerably reduced the amount of oil which can be discharged into the sea from ships (for example, following the cleaning of cargo tanks or from engine room bilges). Originally oil tankers were permitted to discharge oil or oily mixtures at the rate of 60 litres per nautical mile. The amendments reduced this to 30 litres. For non-tankers of 400 grt and above the permitted oil content of the effluent which may be discharged into the sea is cut from 100 parts per million to 15 parts per million. Regulation 24(4), which deals with the limitation of size and arrangement of cargo tanks, was also modified. Regulation 13G applies to existing crude oil tankers of 20,000 dwt and product carriers of 30,000 dwt and above. Tankers that are 25 years old and which were not constructed according to the requirements of the 1978 Protocol to MARPOL 73/78 have to be fitted with double sides and double bottoms. The Protocol applies to tankers ordered after 1 June 1979, which were begun after 1 January 1980 or completed after 1 June 1982. Tankers built according to the standards of the Protocol are exempt until they reach the age of 30. Existing tankers are subject to an enhanced programme of inspections during their periodical, intermediate and annual surveys. Tankers that are five years old or more must carry on board a completed file of survey reports together with a conditional evaluation report endorsed by the flag Administration. Tankers built in the 1970s which are at or past their 25th must comply with Regulation 13F. If not, their owners must decide whether to convert them to the standards set out in regulation 13F, or to scrap them.
Another set of tankers built according to the standards of the 1978 protocol will soon be approaching their 30th birthday - and the same decisions must be taken. The 1994 amendments
Adoption: 13 November 1994
Entry into force: 3 March 1996 The amendments affect four of the Convention's five technical annexes (II III, V, and I) and are all designed to improve the way it is implemented. They make it possible for ships to be inspected when in the ports of other Parties to the Convention to ensure that crews are able to carry out essential shipboard procedures relating to marine pollution prevention. These are contained in resolution A.742 (18), which was adopted by the IMO Assembly in November 1993. The amendments are similar to those made to SOLAS in May 1994. Extending port State control to operational requirements is seen as an important way of improving the efficiency with which international safety and anti-pollution treaties are implemented. The 1995 amendments
Adoption: 14 September 1995 Entry into force: 1 July 1997 The amendments concern Annex V. They are designed to improve the way the Convention is implemented. Regulation 2 was clarified and a new regulation 9 added dealing with placards, garbage management plans and garbage record keeping. The 1996 amendments
Adoption: 10 July 1996 Entry into force: 1 January 1998 One set of amendments concerned Protocol I to the Convention which contains provisions for reporting incidents involving harmful substances. The amendments included more precise requirements for the sending of such reports.
Other amendments brought requirements in MARPOL concerning the IBC and BCH Codes into line with amendments adopted to SOLAS. The 1997 amendments
Adoption: 23 September 1997 Entry into force: 1 February 1999 Regulation 25A to Annex 1 specifies intact stability criteria for double hull tankers. Another amendment made the North West European waters a "special area" under Regulation 10 of Annex 1. The waters cover the North Sea and its approaches, the Irish Sea and its approaches, the Celtic Sea, the English Channel and its approaches and part of the North East Atlantic immediately to the West of Ireland.
In special areas, discharge into the sea of oil or oily mixture from any oil tanker and ship over 400 gt is prohibited. Other special areas already designated under Annex I of MARPOL include: the Mediterranean Sea area, the Baltic Sea area, the Red Sea area, the Gulf of Aden area and the Antarctic area. The Protocol of 1997 (Annex VI - Regulations for the Prevention of Air Pollution from Ships)
Adoption: 26 September 1997 Entry into force: 19 May 2005 The Protocol was adopted at a Conference held from 15 to 26 September 1997 and adds a new Annex VI on Regulations for the Prevention of Air Pollution from Ships to the Convention. The rules set limits on sulphur oxide (SOx) and nitrogen oxide (NOx) emissions from ship exhausts and prohibit deliberate emissions of ozone depleting substances. The new Annex VI includes a global cap of 4.5% m/m on the sulphur content of fuel oil and calls on IMO to monitor the worldwide average sulphur content of fuel once the Protocol comes into force.
Annex VI contains provisions allowing for special "SOx Emission Control Areas" to be established with more stringent control on sulphur emissions. In these areas, the sulphur content of fuel oil used on board ships must not exceed 1.5% m/m. Alternatively, ships must fit an exhaust gas cleaning system or use any other technological method to limit SOx emissions. The Baltic Sea is designated as a SOx Emission Control area in the Protocol. Annex VI prohibits deliberate emissions of ozone depleting substances, which include halons and chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs). New installations containing ozone-depleting substances are prohibited on all ships. But new installations containing hydro- chlorofluorocarbons (HCFCs) are permitted until 1 January 2020. The requirements of the IMO Protocol are in accordance with the Montreal Protocol of 1987, as amended in London in 1990. The Montreal Protocol is an international environmental treaty, drawn up under the auspices of the United Nations, under which nations agreed to cut CFC consumption and production in order to protect the ozone layer. Annex VI sets limits on emissions of nitrogen oxides (NOx) from diesel engines. A mandatory NOx Technical Code, developed by IMO, defines how this is to be done . The Annex also prohibits the incineration on board ship of certain products, such as contaminated packaging materials and polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs). Format of Annex VI
Annex VI consists of three Chapters and a number of Appendices:
• Chapter 1 - General
• Chapter II - Survey, Certification and Means of Control
• Chapter III - Requirements for Control of Emissions from Ships
• Appendices, including the form of the International Air Pollution Prevention Certificate; criteria and procedures for designation of SOx emission control areas; information for inclusion in the bunker delivery note; approval and operating limits for shipboard incinerators; test cycles and weighting factors for verification of compliance of marine diesel engines with the NOx limits; and details of surveys and inspections to be carried out.
The 1999 amendments
Adoption: 1 July 1999
Entry into force: 1 January 2001 (under tacit acceptance)
Amendments to Regulation 13G of Annex I (Regulations for the Prevention of Pollution by Oil) make existing oil tankers between 20,000 and 30,000 tons deadweight carrying persistent product oil, including heavy diesel oil and fuel oil, subject to the same construction requirements as crude oil tankers. Regulation 13G requires, in principle, existing tankers to comply with requirements for new tankers in Regulation 13F, including double hull requirements for new tankers or alternative arrangements, not later than 25 years after date of delivery. The amendments extend the application from applying to crude oil tankers of 20,000 tons deadweight and above and product carriers of 30,000 tons deadweight and above, to also apply to tankers between 20,000 and 30,000 tons deadweight which carry heavy diesel oil or fuel oil.
The aim of the amendments is to address concerns that oil pollution incidents involving persistent oils are as severe as those involving crude oil, so regulations applicable to crude oil tankers should also apply to tankers carrying persistent oils. Related amendments to the Supplement of the IOPP (International Oil Pollution Prevention) Certificate, covering in particular oil separating/filtering equipment and retention and disposal of oil residues were also adopted. A third MARPOL 73/78 amendment adopted relates to Annex II of MARPOL Regulations for the Control of Pollution by Noxious Liquid Substances in Bulk. The amendment adds a new regulation 16 requiring a Shipboard marine pollution emergency plan for noxious liquid substances. Amendments were also made to the International Code for the Construction and Equipment of Ships carrying Dangerous Chemicals in Bulk (IBC Code) and the Code for the Construction and Equipment of Ships carrying Dangerous Chemicals in Bulk (BCH Code). The amendments address the maintenance of venting systems, The 2000 amendments
Adoption: 13 March 2000 Entry into force: 1 January 2002 (under tacit acceptance)
The amendment to Annex III (Prevention of Pollution by Harmful Substances Carried by Sea in Packaged Form) deletes tainting as a criterion for marine pollutants from the Guidelines for the identification of harmful substances in packaged form. Tainting refers to the ability of a product to be taken up by an organism and thereby affect the taste or smell of seafood making it unpalatable. A substance is defined as tainting when it has been found to taint seafood. The amendment means that products identified as being marine pollutants solely on the basis of their tainting properties will no longer be classified as marine pollutants. The 2001 amendments
Adoption: 27 April 2001 Entry into force: 1 September 2002
The amendment to Annex I brought in a new new global timetable for accelerating the phase-out of single-hull oil tankers which was subsequently revised again by the 2003 amendments. The flag state administration may allow for some newer single hull ships registered in its country that conform to certain technical specifications to continue trading until the 25th anniversary of their delivery. However, under the provisions of paragraph 8(b), any Port State can deny entry of those single hull tankers which are allowed to operate until their 25th anniversary to ports or offshore terminals. They must communicate their intention to do this to IMO. As an additional precautionary measure, a Condition Assessment Scheme (CAS) will have to be applied to all Category 1 vessels continuing to trade after 2005 and all Category 2 vessels after 2010. Although the CAS does not specify structural standards in excess of the provisions of other IMO conventions, codes and recommendations, its requirements stipulate more stringent and transparent verification of the reported structural condition of the ship and that documentary and survey procedures have been properly carried out and completed.
The requirements of the CAS include enhanced and transparent verification of the reported structural condition and of the ship and verification that the documentary and survey procedures have been properly carried out and completed. The Scheme requires that compliance with the CAS is assessed during the Enhanced Survey Programme of Inspections concurrent with intermediate or renewal surveys currently required by resolution A.744(18), as amended. The 2003 Amendments
Adoption: 4 December 2003 Entry into force: April 2005 Under a revised regulation 13G of Annex I of MARPOL, the final phasing-out date for Category 1 tankers (pre-MARPOL tankers) is brought forward to 2005, from 2007. The final phasing-out date for category 2 and 3 tankers (MARPOL tankers and smaller tankers) is brought forward to 2010, from 2015. The full timetable for the phasing out of single-hull tankers is as follows: Category of oil Date or year tanker
Category 1 5 April 2005 for ships delivered on 5 April 1982 or earlier 2005 for ships delivered after 5 April 1982
Category 2 and 5 April 2005 for ships delivered on 5 April 1977 or earlier Category 3 2005 for ships delivered after 5 April 1977 but before 1 January 1978 2006 for ships delivered in 1978 and 1979 2007 for ships delivered in 1980 and 1981 2008 for ships delivered in 1982 2009 for ships delivered in 1983 2010 for ships delivered in 1984 or later
Under the revised regulation, the Condition Assessment Scheme (CAS) is to be made applicable to all single-hull tankers of 15 years, or older. Previously it was applicable to all Category 1 vessels continuing to trade after 2005 and all Category 2 vessels after 2010. Consequential enhancements to the CAS scheme were also adopted. The revised regulation allows the Administration (flag State) to permit continued operation of category 2 or 3 tankers beyond 2010 subject to satisfactory results from the CAS, but the continued operation must not go beyond the anniversary of the date of delivery of the ship in 2015 or the date on which the ship reaches 25 years of age after the date of its delivery, whichever is earlier. In the case of certain Category 2 or 3 oil tankers fitted with only double bottoms or double sides not used for the carriage of oil and extending to the entire cargo tank length or double hull spaces, not meeting the minimum distance protection requirements, which are not used for the carriage of oil and extend to the entire cargo tank length, the Administration may allow continued operation beyond 2010, provided that the ship was in service on 1 July 2001, the Administration is satisfied by verification of the official records that the ship complied with the conditions specified and that those conditions remain unchanged. Again, such continued operation must not go beyond the date on which the ship reaches 25 years of age after the date of its delivery. Carriage of heavy grade oil A new MARPOL regulation 13H on the prevention of oil pollution from oil tankers when carrying heavy grade oil (HGO) bans the carriage of HGO in single-hull tankers of 5,000 tons dwt and above after the date of entry into force of the regulation (5 April 2005), and in single-hull oil tankers of 600 tons dwt and above but less than 5,000 tons dwt, not later than the anniversary of their delivery date in 2008. Under the new regulation, HGO means any of the following:
- crude oils having a density at 15ºC higher than 900 kg/m3;
- fuel oils having either a density at 15ºC higher than 900 kg/ m3 or a kinematic viscosity
at 50ºC higher than 180 mm2/s; and
- bitumen, tar and their emulsions.
In the case of certain Category 2 or 3 tankers carrying heavy grade oil as cargo, fitted only with double bottoms or double sides, not used for the carriage of oil and extending to the entire cargo tank length, or double hull spaces not meeting the minimum distance protection requirements which are not used for the carriage of oil and extend to the entire cargo tank length, the Administration may allow continued operation of such ships beyond 5 April 2005 until the date on which the ship reaches 25 years of age after the date of its delivery.
Regulation 13(H) also allows for continued operation of oil tankers of 5,000 tons dwt and above, carrying crude oil with a density at 15ºC higher than 900 kg/ m3 but lower than 945 kg/ m3, if satisfactory results of the Condition Assessment Scheme warrant that, in the opinion of the Administration, the ship is fit to continue such operation, having regard to the size, age, operational area and structural conditions of the ship and provided that the continued operation shall not go beyond the date on which the ship reaches 25 years after the date of its delivery. The Administration may allow continued operation of a single hull oil tanker of 600 tons deadweight and above but less than 5,000 tons deadweight, carrying heavy grade oil as cargo, if, in the opinion of the Administration, the ship is fit to continue such operation, having regard to the size, age, operational area and structural conditions of the ship, provided that the operation shall not go beyond the date on which the ship reaches 25 years after the date of its delivery.
The Administration of a Party to the present Convention may exempt an oil tanker of 600 tons deadweight and above carrying heavy grade oil as cargo if the ship is either engaged in voyages exclusively within an area under the Party's jurisdiction, or is engaged in voyages exclusively within an area under the jurisdiction of another Party, provided the Party within whose jurisdiction the ship will be operating agrees. The same applies to vessels operating as floating storage units of heavy grade oil. A Party to MARPOL 73/78 shall be entitled to deny entry of single hull tankers carrying heavy grade oil which have been allowed to continue operation under the exemptions mentioned above, into the ports or offshore terminals under its jurisdiction, or deny ship- to-ship transfer of heavy grade oil in areas under its jurisdiction except when this is necessary for the purpose of securing the safety of a ship or saving life at sea. Resolutions adopted The amendments to MARPOL regulation 13G, the addition of a new regulation 13H, consequential amendments to the IOPP Certificate and the amendments to the Condition Assessment Scheme were adopted by the Committee as MEPC Resolutions
Among other resolutions adopted by the Committee, another on early implementation urged Parties to MARPOL 73/78 seriously to consider the application of the amendments as soon as possible to ships entitled to fly their flag, without waiting for the amendments to enter into force and to communicate this action to the Organization. It also invited the maritime industry to implement the aforesaid amendments to Annex I of MARPOL 73/78 effectively as soon as possible. The 2004 (April) Amendments
Adoption: 1 April 2004 Entry into force: 1 August 2005
The revised Annex will apply to new ships engaged in international voyages, of 400 gross tonnage and above or which are certified to carry more than 15 persons. Existing ships will be required to comply with the provisions of the revised Annex IV five years after the date of its entry into force. The Annex requires ships to be equipped with either a sewage treatment plant or a sewage comminuting and disinfecting system or a sewage holding tank. The discharge of sewage into the sea will be prohibited, except when the ship has in operation an approved sewage treatment plant or is discharging comminuted and disinfected sewage using an approved system at a distance of more than three nautical miles from the nearest land; or is discharging sewage which is not comminuted or disinfected at a distance of more than 12 nautical miles from the nearest land. Also, amendments to the Appendix to MARPOL Annex V on Prevention of pollution by garbage from ships which relate to the recording of the disposal of cargo residues in the Garbage Record Book. The 2004 (October) Amendments
Adoption: 15 October 2004 Entry into force: 1 January 2007
Revised MARPOL Annex I (oil)
The revised MARPOL Annex I Regulations for the prevention of pollution by oil incorporates the various amendments adopted since MARPOL entered into force in 1983, including the amended regulation 13G (regulation 20 in the revised annex) and regulation 13H (regulation 21 in the revised annex) on the phasing-in of double hull requirements for oil tankers. It also separates, in different chapters, the construction and equipment provisions from the operational requirements and makes clear the distinctions between the requirements for new ships and those for existing ships. The revision provides a more user-friendly, simplified Annex I. New requirements in the revised Annex I include the following:
• Regulation 22 Pump-room bottom protection: on oil tankers of 5,000 tonnes deadweight and above constructed on or after 1 January 2007, the pump-room shall be provided with a double bottom.
• Regulation 23 Accidental oil outflow performance - applicable to oil tankers delivered on or after [date of entry into force of revised Annex I plus 36 months] 1 January 2010; construction requirements to provide adequate protection against oil pollution in the event of stranding or collision.
Oman Sea - new special area under MARPOL Annex I
The Oman Sea area of the Arabian Seas is designated as a special area in the revised Annex I.The other special areas in Annex I are: Mediterranean Sea area; Baltic Sea area; Black Sea area; Red Sea area; "Gulfs" area; Gulf of Aden area; Antarctic area; and North West European Waters. In the special areas, there are stricter controls on discharge of oily wastes. Revised MARPOL Annex II (noxious liquid substances carried in bulk)
The revised Annex II Regulations for the control of pollution by noxious liquid substances in bulk includes a new four-category categorization system for noxious and liquid substances. The revised annex is expected to enter into force on 1 January 2007.
The new categories are:
• Category X: Noxious Liquid Substances which, if discharged into the sea from tank cleaning or deballasting operations, are deemed to present a major hazard to either
marine resources or human health and, therefore, justify the prohibition of the discharge into the marine environment;
• Category Y: Noxious Liquid Substances which, if discharged into the sea from tank cleaning or deballasting operations, are deemed to present a hazard to either marine resources or human health or cause harm to amenities or other legitimate uses of the sea and therefore justify a limitation on the quality and quantity of the discharge into the marine environment;
• Category Z: Noxious Liquid Substances which, if discharged into the sea from tank cleaning or deballasting operations, are deemed to present a minor hazard to either
marine resources or human health and therefore justify less stringent restrictions on the quality and quantity of the discharge into the marine environment; and
• Other Substances: substances which have been evaluated and found to fall outside Category X, Y or Z because they are considered to present no harm to marine resources, human health, amenities or other legitimate uses of the sea when discharged into the sea from tank cleaning of deballasting operations. The discharge of bilge or ballast water or other residues or mixtures containing these substances are not subject to any requirements of MARPOL Annex II.
The revised annex includes a number of other significant changes. Improvements in ship technology, such as efficient stripping techniques, has made possible significantly lower permitted discharge levels of certain products which have been incorporated into Annex II. For ships constructed on or after 1 January 2007 the maximum permitted residue in the tank and its associated piping left after discharge will be set at a maximum of 75 litres for products in categories X, Y and Z - compared with previous limits which set a maximum of 100 or 300 litres, depending on the product category. Alongside the revision of Annex II, the marine pollution hazards of thousands of chemicals have been evaluated by the Evaluation of Hazardous Substances Working Group, giving a resultant GESAMP2 Hazard Profile which indexes the substance according to its bio-accumulation; bio-degradation; acute toxicity; chronic toxicity; long-term health effects; and effects on marine wildlife and on benthic habitats.
As a result of the hazard evaluation process and the new categorization system, vegetable oils which were previously categorized as being unrestricted will now be required to be carried in chemical tankers. The revised Annex includes, under regulation 4 Exemptions, provision for the Administration to exempt ships certified to carry individually identified vegetable oils, subject to certain provisions relating to the location of the cargo tanks carrying the identified vegetable oil. Transport of vegetable oils
An MEPC resolution on Guidelines for the transport of vegetable oils in deep tanks or in independent tanks specially designed for the carriage of such vegetable oils on board dry cargo ships allows general dry cargo ships that are currently certified to carry vegetable oil in bulk to continue to carry these vegetable oils on specific trades. The guidelines also take effect on 1 January 2007. Consequential amendments to the IBC Code
Consequential amendments to the International Bulk Chemical Code (IBC Code) were also adopted at the session, reflecting the changes to MARPOL Annex II. The amendments incorporate revisions to the categorization of certain products relating to their properties as potential marine pollutants as well as revisions to ship type and carriage requirements following their evaluation by the Evaluation of Hazardous Substances Working Group.
Ships constructed after 1986 carrying substances identified in chapter 17 of the IBC Code must follow the requirements for design, construction, equipment and operation of ships contained in the Code. The 2005 Amendments
Adoption: 22 July 2005
Entry into force: 21 November 2006
The amendments to the Regulations for the Prevention of Air Pollution from Ships in Annex VI include the establishment of the North Sea SOx Emission Control Area (SECA). The NOx Technical Code was also updated. The 2006 Amendments
Adoption: March 2006 Entry into force: 1 August 2007
MARPOL regulation on oil fuel tank protection The amendment to the revised MARPOL Annex I (which was adopted in October 2004 with entry into force set for 1 January 2007) includes a new regulation 12A on oil fuel tank protection. The regulation is intended to apply to all ships delivered on or after 1 August 2010 with an aggregate oil fuel capacity of 600m3 and above. It includes requirements for the protected location of the fuel tanks and performance standards for accidental oil fuel outflow. A maximum capacity limit of 2,500m3 per oil fuel tank is included in the regulation, which also requires Administrations to consider general safety aspects, including the need for maintenance and inspection of wing and double-bottom tanks or spaces, when approving the design and construction of ships in accordance with the regulation. Consequential amendments to the IOPP Certificate were also adopted. The MEPC also agreed to include appropriate text referring to the new regulation in the amendments to the Guidelines for the application of the revised MARPOL Annex I requirements to FPSOs and FSUs and approved a Unified Interpretation on the application of the regulation to column-stabilized MODUs. Definition of heavy grade oil A further amendment to the revised MARPOL Annex I relates to the definition of "heavy grade oil" in regulation 21 on Prevention of oil pollution from oil tankers carrying heavy grade oil as cargo, replacing the words "fuel oils" with "oils, other than crude oils", thereby broadening the scope of the regulation. MARPOL Annex IV amendments
The amendment to MARPOL Annex IV Prevention of pollution by sewage from ships adds a new regulation 13 on Port State control on operational requirements. The regulation states that a ship, when in a port or an offshore terminal of another Party, is subject to inspection by officers duly authorized by such Party concerning operational requirements under the Annex, where there are clear grounds for believing that the master or crew are not familiar with essential shipboard procedures relating to the prevention of pollution by sewage. Amendments to BCH Code Amendments to the Code for the Construction and Equipment of Ships Carrying Dangerous Chemicals in Bulk (BCH Code) were adopted as a consequence of the revised Annex II of MARPOL 73/78 and the amended International Code for the Construction and Equipment of Ships carrying Dangerous Chemicals in Bulk (IBC Code), which are expected to enter into force on 1 January 2007. The MEPC also adopted a resolution on Early and Effective Application of the 2006 amendments to the BCH Code to invite MARPOL Parties to consider the application of the amendments to the BCH Code, as soon as practically possible, to ships entitled to fly their flag. Also adopted were the revised Guidelines for the provisional assessment of liquids transported in bulk. In this context the Committee urged industry, in particular the chemical industry, to provide information on the revision of List 2 of the MEPC circular which contains pollutant-only mixtures based on section 5 of the revised Guidelines. The 2006 Amendments
Adoption: October 2006 Entry into force: 1 March 2008/1 January 2010 Entry into force: 1 March 2008
The designation of the Southern South Africa waters as a Special Area under Annex I (Regulations for the prevention of pollution by oil from ships) , will provide measures to protect wildlife and the marine environment in an ecologically important region used intensively by shipping.
Entry into force: 1 January 2010 The revised MARPOL Annex III Regulations for the prevention of pollution by harmful substances carried by sea in packaged form. The Annex has been revised to harmonize the regulations with the criteria for defining marine pollutants which have been adopted by the UN Transport of Dangerous Goods (TDG) Sub-Committee, based on the United Nations Globally Harmonized System of Classification and Labelling of Chemicals (GHS).
Inséré le 3 juillet 2010 Open Forum enlevé le 3 aout 2010 P a v i l l o n s de complaisance, l e shipping d é l o c a l i s é
Le naufrage de l'Erika, qui battait pavillon maltais, a projeté le transport maritime à la une de la presse grand public, fin décembre 1999. Ce naufrage, aux conséquences si dramatiques pour les côtes bretonnes et vendéennes, aurait eu pour cause son pavillon de complaisance et certains journalistes de titrer : « en finir avec les pavillons de complaisance... »Le recul, par rapport à cet événement, permet de jeter un regard moins passionné et il apparaît surtout nécessaire de se baser sur les faits et les chiffres. Comment définir les pavillons de complaisance ? On peut utiliser les caractéristiques fournies par la commission Rochdale, qui a enquêté, en mai 1971, pour le gouvernement britannique sur les conditions d'exploitation des armements dans le monde. Ces caractéristiques sont les suivantes : les non résidents peuvent immatriculer leur navire de commerce sans être soumis à une législation contraignante ; l'immatriculation est facile, rapide et peu coûteuse ; la fiscalité est très limitée ; l'armement des navires par des équipages étrangers est autorisé et les contraintes sociales sont inexistantes. Le pavillon est le symbole et le signe de rattachement d'un navire à un État. A ce titre, le bâtiment de guerre à l'étranger est considéré comme une partie du territoire national. Mais l'époque où le navire des Messageries Maritimes apportait une certaine image de la France dans les ports d'Extrême-Orient, ou celui de la Compagnie Générale Transatlantique en Amérique, est bien révolue. Les navires sont, à l'évidence, devenus des outils économiques qui se doivent d'être performants et d'avoir des coûts optimisés. Les compagnies maritimes, qui sont probablement les premiers acteurs économiques à avoir eu à lutter dans un milieu ouvert à la concurrence mondiale, ont eu l'obligation de réduire leurs coûts. Pavillon de complaisance, en anglais, se dit flag of convenience. "Convenience", qui se traduit littéralement par "commodité", a une connotation beaucoup plus neutre que complaisance en français. Les milieux professionnels parlent d'open registry, de pavillon économique ou de pavillon de libre immatriculation. Pavillon de complaisance est une expression utilisée couramment par la presse grand public, mais les professionnels l'utilisent de manière plus restrictive et seulement lorsqu'ils souhaitent souligner la "complaisance" c'est-à-dire le "laxisme" de l'État du pavillon dans l'application des réglementations internationales de sécurité et de niveau de formation des équipages. Panama aurait été le premier pavillon de complaisance lorsque, dans les années 1920, des armateurs américains, soucieux de s'affranchir de la prohibition de l'alcool, y ont enregistré leurs navires. Mais le réel développement de ces immatriculations à l'étranger date de l'après-guerre. De grandes nations maritimes, comme le Royaume Uni et la France, étaient aussi des nations coloniales qui entretenaient une flotte importante pour assurer, au travers de compagnies privées subventionnées ou étatiques, les flux de marchandises entre la métropole et les territoires d'outre-mer, et ce, dans les deux sens. Ces trafics étaient, dans une très large mesure, captifs, exclusifs du pavillon national, et de ce fait, les taux de fret non soumis à la concurrence. Vers la fin des années 50, alors que la décolonisation était en route, les jeunes états devenus indépendants, cherchèrent à créer leur propre flotte pour acheminer vers les anciennes métropoles, leurs productions (matières premières et produits agricoles) et reprendre, au retour, les marchandises qui leur étaient nécessaires. Concurrençant directement les flottes des anciennes métropoles, des accords devinrent vite indispensables pour réguler ces trafics et maintenir des taux de fret acceptables. Mais les choses devaient se compliquer par l'arrivée massive des navires de l'ancien bloc de l'Est (U.R.S.S., République démocratique d'Allemagne, Pologne...) dont l'importante flotte était devenue largement excédentaire pour couvrir leurs besoins de transports maritimes. A cet afflux, s'ajoutait aussi celui des jeunes marines des pays devenus indépendants qui ne pouvaient pas entretenir des flottes sous employées. Puis des pays d'Extrême Orient (Taïwan, Corée) entrent en compétition. On assiste donc, dans les années 60, à un «boom» de la capacité internationale de transport. Les taux de fret s'écroulent, l'U.R.S.S., par exemple, proposant des rabais de l'ordre de 30 à 40 0/0. Les grands armements nationaux de l'Europe et des États-Unis ne peuvent suivre cette concurrence. On désinvestit. C'est ainsi, pour le transport pétrolier, que les grandes compagnies pétrolières vendent leurs navires-citernes et sous-traitent leurs approvisionnements à des armateurs étrangers. L'abandon des grandes flottes des nations maritimes d'autrefois va conduire aux deux phénomènes suivants : vieillissement de la flotte mondiale et à une mondialisation du transport maritime. En effet, cet afflux de navires d'occasion sur le marché va conduire à une diminution des commandes de navires neufs et l'âge des navires en exploitation va croître : de quinze ans en moyenne, on atteindra vingt ans, voire plus, car ces navires appartiennent à des armateurs étrangers, abrités par des sociétés écran, qui immatriculent leur flotte auprès de registres moins exigeants, sachant qu'il est plus rentable d'exploiter un navire jusqu'à la corde que d'en faire construire un neuf. Les pavillons de ces États, qui abritent ces registres complaisants, aux conditions fiscales attrayantes, sont vite appelés pavillon de complaisance, ou mieux, pavillons de libre immatriculation (P.L.I.) ! Il y a vingt ans, les pavillons de libre immatriculation représentaient 30 % de la flotte mondiale, en 1999, plus de 50 % (en tonnes de port en lourd). Les deux premières flottes mondiales, le Panama et le Liberia, sont des P.L.I. et constituent ensemble le tiers de la flotte mondiale. La puissance des P.L.I. est donc incontestable. Mais assimiler P.L.I. et navires-poubelles est une erreur car, sous les pavillons panaméen ou libérien par exemple, il existe un pourcentage très élevé de navires de moins de quatre ans. Les navires âgés ou mal entretenus peuvent se trouver aussi bien sous certains pavillons nationaux que sous des P.L.I. En outre, ils ne représentent qu'un pourcentage assez faible de la flotte mondiale.
Le shipping évolue dans un monde ouvert et la mondialisation est pour lui une réalité ancienne. Avant même les industriels et les entreprises de service, le transport maritime s'est vu contraint de se délocaliser pour lutter à armes égales. Des pays européens à la fibre maritime, conscients de l'enjeu, ont cherché à réintégrer des navires sous leur pavillon national en accordant des conditions d'exploitation concurrentielles, ce sont les pavillons bis ou le second registre. En 1987, la France créait son pavillon bis, permettant à certains navires français de s'immatriculer sur le registre des Kerguelen. La moitié de la flotte mondiale
Quels sont les Pavillons de Libre Immatriculation (P.L.I.) et que représentent-ils par rapport aux pavillons nationaux ? Le double tableau ci-dessous, établi d'après les statistiques de l'I.S.L. de Brême, donne le classement des quinze premières flottes de commerce et le pourcentage de chacune par rapport au tonnage total mondial qui était de 760 millions de tonnes de port en lourd (tpl) au premier juillet 1999. Le tableau 1 classe les flottes en fonction de leur pavillon, colonne de gauche, les pavillons nationaux et celle de droite, les P.L.I. Les quinze premières flottes représentent les trois quarts (75,7 0/o) de la flotte mondiale et les P.L.I., la moitié (49,2 %). En ajoutant Saint-Vincent, les Bermudes et Antigua et Barbade, les P.L.I. représentent 52 % en tpl de la flotte mondiale.
Le tableau de droite (en orangé) classe les flottes d'après le pays où l'armateur exerce ses activités. Les quinze premiers pays représentent 78 % de la flotte mondiale se répartissant ainsi : Europe occidentale 38 0/o, Asie 32 0/o, États-Unis 6 % et Russie 2 0/o. La France se situe au 24e rang avec 0,8 %, alors qu'il y a moins de vingt ans, elle était au 9e rang mondial. Quels sont les pays ayant plus des deux tiers de leur flotte sous pavillon étranger ? Dans un ordre décroissant, ce sont la Belgique 100 %, l'Arabie Saoudite 92 0/o, la Suède 910/o, la Suisse 89 0/o, Hong-Kong 83 0/o, le Japon 80 0/o, les États-Unis 76 0/o, la Corée et le Royaume Uni 72 0/o, l'Allemagne 70 % et la Grèce 67 0/o.
Il est possible aussi de connaître, pour chaque pavillon de libre immatriculation (P.L.I.), la nationalité des compagnies maritimes ayant mis principalement leurs navires sous ce registre. Panama est le pavillon préféré des compagnies maritimes asiatiques : les compagnies de Corée (88 % en tpl des intérêts coréens enregistrés à l'étranger sont sous pavillon panaméen), du Japon et de Taïwan (plus des trois quarts), de Hong-Kong (à 59 %), de la Chine (la moitié). Le Liberia est le premier pavillon pour les armateurs d'Arabie Saoudite (aux trois quarts), du Brésil et de Russie (59 %), d'Allemagne (43 %).
Malte est le pavillon choisi prioritairement par des opérateurs des pays méditerranéens, de Turquie (plus de la moitié), d'Italie (38 %), de Grèce (le quart). Le pavillon des Bahamas a été choisi par la Norvège (à 27 %), les États-Unis (à 23 %), tandis que le pavillon chypriote a été retenu par la Grèce (à 27 0/o) et la Russie (à 21 %), celui des Iles Marshall par les États-Unis (à 23 %). Quant à celui des Bermudes, le Royaume-Uni l'a sélectionné pour près d'un tiers en tpl. Cette longue énumération peut paraître austère, mais elle monte que chaque P.L.I. a acquis une certaine spécialisation et que les intérêts maritimes d'un même pays ont tendance à se regrouper à l'étranger sous un même pavillon. Dans le même ordre d'idée, on constate que certains pavillons ont un pourcentage supérieur à la moyenne pour un type de navire. Ainsi, les pétroliers sont plutôt enregistrés au Liberia, à Malte ou aux Bahamas, alors que les vraquiers le sont dans un plus grand pourcentage à Panama ou à Chypre. Le meilleur et le pire
L'âge de la flotte mondiale se répartit ainsi, au ler janvier 1999 (tableau 2).
Ainsi, près d'un quart de la flotte mondiale a moins de quatre ans, ce qui est très jeune pour un navire de commerce. Quant à l'âge moyen de la flotte de chaque pavillon, le tableau 3 montre de grandes disparités. Il est possible de corroborer ces données en examinant la pyramide des âges des navires de certains pavillons. Ils ont des tranches d'âge très élevées, correspondant aux années de construction 1965 à 1980 pour le Belize, 1970 à 1980 pour Saint- Vincent et Grenadine ou 1975 à 1980 pour Malte. Tranches d'âge ne reposant pratiquement sur aucun socle pour le Belize, car il n'y a sous ce pavillon, qu'un nombre tout à fait réduit de navires construits entre ces années et 1998. L'Association Internationale d'Assurance Maritime fournit des statistiques sur les pertes totales de navires en fonction de l'âge du navire ou du pavillon. Les pertes totales, en fonction de l'âge du navire, sont calculées en pourcentage de la flotte dans chaque tranche d'âge. Il s'agit d'une moyenne sur la période de dix ans, 1988-1998, comme le montre le tableau 4. Si les pertes de navires deviennent significatives à partir de quinze ans d'âge, à partir de vingt ans, la progression n'est plus aussi importante qu'on pourrait l'imaginer. Quant aux pertes totales de navires en fonction du pavillon, elles sont calculées en tenant compte de la flotte de chaque pavillon sur une période de cinq ans (1994-1998). La moyenne mondiale étant de 0,23 %, quels sont les pavillons se situant au-dessus de cette moyenne ? Dans un ordre décroissant, on trouve la Géorgie (2,08 %), le Nigeria (1,15 %), le Belize (1,14 0/o), le Honduras (1,05 0/o), la Turquie (0,98 %), le Liban (0,95 %), Saint- Vincent (0,89 %), Chypre (0,88 %), etc.
Puis, en ne relevant que les pavillons de libre immatriculation, on note les Bermudes (0,61 0/o), Malte (0,51 0/o), Les Bahamas (0,27%). Panama et le Liberia se situent en dessous de la moyenne mondiale. Le pavillon du Liberia est d'ailleurs géré par une entreprise privée qui a un intérêt économique à ce que ce registre présente une image de qualité satisfaisante, alors que le pavillon de Chypre ou de Malte est géré par un organisme public. Examinons, enfin, le résultat des inspections effectuées dans le cadre du Mémorandum d'Entente de Paris, de 1982, qui prévoit de vérifier l'application des normes internationales relatives à la sécurité maritime, à la prévention de la pollution et aux conditions de travail et de vie à bord des navires en escale. Tous les pays maritimes de l'Union européenne sont signataires de ce mémorandum. En 1998, 11 168 navires de 106 pavillons différents ont été inspectés. Une liste est établie indiquant les pavillons dont le pourcentage d'immobilisation, du fait des déficiences constatées, est supérieur à la moyenne. Sept pavillons ont été, durant trois années consécutives (1996 à 1998), parmi ceux ayant eu le plus fort pour- centage d'immobilisation : Belize, Honduras, Liban, Maroc, Roumanie, Syrie et Turquie. Puis, dans la liste, on trouve dans un ordre décroissant, la Libye, le Cambodge, la Thaïlande, Saint- Vincent et Grenadine, l'Égypte, etc.
Il apparaît donc que ces navires âgés, mal entretenus et, de ce fait, susceptibles d'avaries importantes, voire de naufrages, que l'on appelle des navires sous normes, ou de manière imagée, des navires-poubelles, sont sous couleurs, pour certains, de pavillons de libre immatriculation, mais beaucoup d'autres arborent leur pavillon national.
Les pavillons ne sont pas seuls complaisants
Un navire est dit sous normes lorsque son niveau d'entretien et la formation de son équipage ne sont pas conformes aux règles et normes internationales agrées. L'inobservation de ces réglementations internationales en vigueur, représente un avantage concurrentiel pour les compagnies maritimes. D'après un rapport de l'O.C.D.E. de 1996, cet avantage financier est de l'ordre de 25 % à 30 % en coût d'exploitation par rapport à la pratique courante, alors que les risques encourus sont assez faibles et les sanctions appliquées aux navires sous normes relativement légères. Si ces navires sous normes continuent à naviguer, c'est qu'ils profitent de toute une chaîne de permissivités, voire de compromissions. Il s'agit d'abord de propriétaires sans scrupules qui exploitent leurs navires au mépris des règles de sécurité, mais qui, le plus souvent, exploitent aussi leurs équipages en payant des salaires particulièrement bas. Les administrations des États du pavillon (qu'il s'agisse d'un pavillon national ou d'un P.L.I.), quand elles ne peuvent assurer leurs responsabilités et mettre en oeuvre ces règles et normes internationales, les sous- traitent à des sociétés de classification. Or certaines inspections et visites techniques sont complaisantes dans la mesure où, compte tenu de l'état très dégradé du navire, le document remis n'est qu'un faux certificat. Cependant, l'International Association of Classification Societies, qui regroupe les sociétés de classification les plus représentatives, cherche à assainir la profession en proscrivant les certificats de complaisance. Les autres intervenants peuvent être le skip management pour la qualification des personnels à bord, comme les compagnies d'assurance. Enfin, la qualité des contrôles par l'État du port est fonction du nombre d'inspecteurs et de la latitude qu'ils ont d'aller au-delà d'une vérification purement documentaire. Certains ports sont plus laxistes que d'autres. Les information statistiques émanant des membres de l'Association Internationale d'Assurance Maritime ou des membres européens du Mémorandum de Paris, permettent de jeter un éclairage sur l'état des flottes de commerce et de faire apparaître l'importance réelle des navires sous normes. En complément, il serait sans doute souhaitable de les utiliser pour mettre en oeuvre un classement (rating) des différents pays en fonction de la qualité des contrôles effectués. Un classement des sociétés de classification, comme des compagnies d'assurance et des sociétés de gestion de navires serait aussi source de transparence et générerait à terme une amélioration de la qualité des navires. Il faut espérer que des mesures efficaces seront prises par les Pouvoirs publics avant que, une fois les plages nettoyées, on oublie l'Erika. Des mesures telles que ces armateurs n'aient plus intérêt à faire naviguer leurs navires sous normes.
On peut espérer aussi que les européens réussiront à reconstituer des flottes sous leur propre pavillon, dont la taille correspondra mieux à leur puissance économique. Les pavillons européens amorcent cette reprise avec plus ou moins de succès suivant les pays et les mesures incitatives qui y sont mises en oeuvre. Le second registre est le cadre administratif le plus utilisé : les Canaries pour l'Espagne, Madère pour le Portugal, les Kerguelen (TAAF) pour la France... Le régime d'imposition des revenus basé sur le tonnage, et non pas sur les résultats, est aussi un élément important de décision pour les armateurs envisageant d'enregistrer leurs navires sous leur pavillon national. Les exemples les plus remarquables sont l'Allemagne, depuis le milieu de l'année 1999, et les Pays-Bas, qui est connu pour avoir le registre le plus compétitif de l'Union européenne. Le nombre de navires sous ce pavillon a crû de plus d'un tiers entre 1996 et 1998. En ce début d'année 2000, le Royaume-Uni prend des mesures en matière fiscale qui devraient avoir pour effet une forte croissance du pavillon britannique. ❑croissance du pavillon britannique. ❑
" Hervé Lionel-Marie est expert près la Cour d'Appel de Versailles et conseil en transport international.
Inséré le 05 juillet 2010 News Logboek Enlevé le 05 aout 2010
Norway slammed over "criminalisation" case
Unions and managers condemn 'legally and morally indefensible treatnent of officers
Seafaring unions and ship managers have jointly condemned what they have described as the worst case of criminalisation since the `Hebei Two' controversy in Korea. In a hard-hitting statement, the International Transport Workers' Federation, Norwegian maritime unions and the international ship managers' association InterManager accused the Norwegian authorities of legally and morally indefensible' treatment of two officers who have been detained since their ship ran aground after dragging its anchor in a storm in July. There was a small spillage of oil as a result, and prosecutors have filed charges of gross negligence against the Chinese master and third officer of the bulk carrier Full City. Hopes that the two men would be allowed to return home last month were dashed when an appeal court overturned a district court decision to give the men their passports. It also altered their bail conditions to keep them in the country pending a trial for negligence that is unlikely to be held until next year. `This is looking all too much like another Hebei Spirit, where seafarers doing their job are hauled in front of a court to satisfy an illusory public requirement that someone gets punished when oil leaks onto water,' said Intermanager president Roberto Giorgi. `This automatic reaching for the handcuffs is emphatically not the way to solve the fact that sometimes ships get into trouble, and actively undermines all the efforts everyone in shipping puts into making sure that safety is made paramount.
`Norway, a nation that understands safe shipping more than most, has shot itself in the foot by pandering to ignorance of the realities and a desire to blame someone, anyone, when things go wrong,' he warned. ITF general secretary David Cockroft added: 'The criminalisation of seafarers — the vilification of workers for accidents that may be beyond their control – is one of the ugliest developments in shipping. Sadly, it appears that once again we are looking at a knee-jerk response to an incident, which, more sadly still, is happening in the country where you'd least expect it.' Captain Hans Sande, director of the Norwegian Maritime Officers' Association added: 'There is a wealth of maritime experience in Norway and we hope that some of it will find its way into the judicial process. `If that happens, the court case will be dropped and the normal maritime investigation processes will be free to take action unfettered by political considerations or nods to public opinion.
`If common sense prevails then the lessons of the grounding will be identified and learned and the cargoes that we all rely or to sustain our way of life in every country in the world will trave that little bit more safely,' Capt Sande added.
`If not, we will once again see not just the criminalisation of these two men, but a new genera tion of potential ship's officers; deciding that the job isn't worth the risk of being unfairly pillo ried that increasingly seems to come with it'
Shipmaster jailed by US court
A Greek shipmaster has been jailed for six months and banned from US waters after admitting obstructing justice and breaking maritime safety and pollution laws. Capt Panagiotis Lekkas, master of the 71,242dwt bulk carrier Theotokos, will also have to serve a further four months in a community confinement facility and pay a $4,000 fine. He was sentenced in federal court in New Orleans last month after pleading guilty to one count of obstruction of justice, one count of violating the Act to Prevent Pollution from Ships, and two counts of violating the Ports and Waterways Safety Act.
`This sentence, including the three-year ban from US territorial water, sends the message to ship crew members and captains that violating environmental and ship safety laws will have consequences,' said acting assistant attorney-general John Crudden. We are serious and we will continue to prosecute these cases and seek sentences that appropriately punish the crime.' The charges were brought after a US Coast Guard inspection on the Liberian flagged Theotokos discovered fuel leaking into the forepeak ballast tank. In addition, the ship's oily water separator was not working property and bilge waste had been discharged directly overboard.
Inspectors also found that crew members had failed to notify the USCG about a crack on the ship's rudder stem, even though they had informed shore management about the problem some three months earlier. The investigation led to the first criminal prosecutions under US laws designed to control the spread of invasive species through ballast water, and also saw the ship's chief officer and chief engineer being brought before the courts. The ship's manager, Greek operator Polembros Shipping, has been fined US$2.7m and banned from operating any of its 20 owned or managed vessels in US waters for three years after admitting a series of related charges, including making false statements during the USCG investigation. The company will also pay $100,000 towards research into ballast water issues.
Inséré le 7 juillet 2010 Open Forum enlevé le 7 aout 2010 De internationale gemeenschap in de strijd tegen het maritieme terrorisme
Sedert 11 september 2001 heeft het maritieme terrorisme, met inbegrip van de piraterij, angstwekkende proporties aangenomen. Op de oceanen neemt de illegale trafiek van nucleaire componenten uitbreiding, koopvaardijschepen worden er in groot aantal geënterd en miljoenen dollars losgeld worden gevraagd voor de in beslag genomen vracht en de gegijzelde bemanning. Voor de aanslag op het World Trade Center hadden de terroristen al van zich laten horen. Zo werd de pakketboot Achille Lauro door hen in 1985 gekaapt, terwijl de USS Gole in oktober 2000 in Aden gewapenderhand aangevallen werd met 17 doden tot gevolg.
Omvang van het maritieme terrorisme
De strategische en gevoelige doorgangen van de grote zeevaartroutes zijn gekend: het Suez— en het Panamakanaal, de Bosporus en de Dardanellen, de Straat van Malakka en voornamelijk de zeeengtes van Ormuz en Bab-el-Mandeb. Langs deze routes transiteert vandaag ruim 80% van de wereldhandel. Dat komt neer op bijna 7 miljard ton vracht die er jaarlijks door meer dan 50.000 grote schepen wordt vervoerd met daarbij nog duizenden kustvaarders, die samen zo'n 4.000 zeehavens bedienen. De beveiliging van deze grote scheepvaartroutes is bijgevolg van primordiaal belang voor de welvaart van de wereldhandel. Voor het ogenblik is het gevaar vooral geconcentreerd rond de zeengte van Bab-el-Mandeb en in de Indische oceaan langsheen de Somalische kust. ledere dag transiteren er ca. 50 schepen, waaronder grote olietankers die het equivalent van 3,3 miljoen barrels vervoeren. Van de 293 schepen die in 2008 in aanvaring kwamen met piraten, bevonden er zich 111 (38%) in die zone. Tijdens de eerste negen maanden van 2009 werden er in totaal al 157 incidentes gemeld.
Over de wereldzeeën heen stegen de gewapende conflicten in 2008 met liefst 11,4% t.o.v. het jaar voordien; enkel in de Straat van Malakka, waar 28 aanvallen plaatsgrepen, stelde men een daling van het geweld vast. In totaal werden er ongeveer 900 bemanningsleden gegijzeld, met 11 doden en 21 vermisten tot gevolg. De maritieme industrie betaalde in 2008 een slordige 40 miljoen dollars aan losgeld, terwijl de risicoverzekeringspremies voor een doortocht door een gevarenregio tot 20.000 dollars opliepen. Deze cijfers, vrijgegeven door het International Maritime Bureau (IMO) duiden voldoende op de ernst van de situatie.
Ook ons land ontsnapte niet aan de piraterij. Zo werd in april 2009 het baggerschip Pompeï van de rederij Jan de Nul Group geënterd langs de Somalische kust en de 10 bemanningsleden gegijzeld. Onze reders hebben nogal wat belangen te behartigen in het Midden-Oosten en in Azië, met het transport van olie en derivaten en het uitvoeren van baggeropdrachten. Vandaar dat tal van Belgische vracht— en baggerschepen deze zones doorkruisen. Strategische maatregelen tegen het terrorisme
De uitbreiding van het maritieme terrorisme, inclusief de piraterij, heeft de internationale gemeenschap ertoe aangezet de nodige maatregelen te treffen om het zeegoederenverkeer op aile maritieme wegen veilig te stellen. Eerst werden een reeks conventies gesloten en codes opgesteld waarvan de belangrijkste op internationaal vlak de ISPS-code is (International Ship and Port Facility Security). Hierbij werden de regeringen, de reders, de bemanningen en aile actoren van het zeegoederentransport betrokken van de landen, waaronder België, die lid zijn van het IMO. Zij besloten gezamenlijk op te treden om ieder terroristisch gevaar te detecteren en ongedaan te maken. Op Europees niveau heeft de Commissie in november 2008 een globale strategie uitgestippeld inzake een geïntegreerd maritiem beleid tegen het terrorisme. De Amerikanen, van hun kant, hebben reeds in november 2002 de Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA) in het leven geroepen.
Ten einde het terroristisch gevaar uitgaande van de containertrafiek te counteren, hebben zij ook het Container Security Initiative (C SI) in werking gesteld; niet minder dan 61 Europese en Aziatische landenwaren eind 2007 erbij betrokken. Om de strijd aan te binden tegen terroristische organisaties die mas- savernietigingswapens naar de VS zouden willen smokkelen, hebben zij in mei 2003 het Proliferation
Security Initiative voorgesteld, dat door 90 landen geratificeerd werd. Door het toepassen van deze codes en conventies zouden volgens de VS minstens een dertigtal netwerken opgedoekt zijn tussen 2004 en 2007. Men vermoedt evenwel dat er op wereldschaal jaarlijks ca. 65 trafieken van nucleaire componenten plaatsgrijpen. Ook de piraterij blijft welig tieren en daarom werd men genoodzaakt "task" forces' in te zetten om de druk op te voeren. Het inzetten van task forces
Daarom werd, ter implementering van de VN resoluties 1701 en 1773, de illegale wapentrafieken langs de Libanese kust bestreden door het inzetten van de internationale Maritime Task Force MTF-448. Fregatten, patrouilleschepen en helikopters uit acht verschillende landen nemen deel aan de operaties Unifil die zich uitstrekken over zo'n 5.000 vierkante zeemijlen. Ons fregat F930 Leopold I nam er al tweemaal aan deel en voerde zelfs het commando over de MTF-448 van maart tot juni 2009. Voor het bestrijden van de piraterij in de Golf van Aden en langs de Somalische kust opereren twee task forces. Zo is er de Combined Task Force 151 (CTF-151) onder leiding van de VS die er sinds 2002 operationeel zijn in het kader van de multinationale operatie End- uring Freedom. Omtrent 15 schepen nemen eraan deel waaronder die van de Vde vloot van de US Navy met Bahrein als uitvalsbasis. Dertien landen hebben al hun medewerking verleend aan deze operatie. In april 2009 nam Frankrijk het commando van de CTF-151 over. Voorts is er in deze zone de Europese task force Atalanta van Euromarfor die er sinds december 2008 actief is. Franse, Britse, Griekse, Spaanse, Zweedse, Noorse en Nederlandse schepen worden naar die zone gestuurd voor minstens één jaar; sinds september jl. maakt ook onze Marine deel uit van die task force. Het is Frankrijk dat die operatie opstartte met het doel de handelsschepen van het World Food Program te beschermen door ze in begeleide konvooien te laten varen. De staf van de operatie is te Northwood (UK) gevestigd en geïntegreerd in het Allied Maritime Component Command van de Navo. De eerste zes maanden van de operatie trad een Britse admiraal als bevelhebber op, bijgestaan door een Franse admiraal. Privéondernemingen ingezet
Zondag 26 april 2009. De MSC Melody, een Italiaans cruiseschip, vaart onder Panamese vlag langs de Somalische kust. Er bevinden zich 1.500 passagiers aan boord. Een groep van zes piraten valt het schip aan, maar het loopt voor hen faliekant af. Ze worden beschoten en teruggeslagen door gewapende agenten van de Israëlische maatschappij Mano International Security (MIS) die aan boord van de Melody ingescheept zijn. MIS heeft ruim 20 jaar ervaring op het vlak van de maritieme veiligheid. Haar agenten worden voornamelijk gerekruteerd onder de oudgedienden van het Israëlische leger. Nu worden ze geregeld ingescheept aan boord van cruise- en vrachtschepen die gevaarlijke zones moeten doorkruisen. Voor hun interventie betalen de reders uiteraard de gevraagde vergoeding. MIS is niet de enige op de markt. Israël telt inderdaad en tiental ondernemingen gespecialiseerd in de strijd tegen de piraterij; citeren we o.m. Spike Security Experts, Top Secure en HR Marsec. Ook de VS zijn sinds 2004 operationeel met de joint venture Global Maritime Security onder leiding van twee gewezen officieren van de US Navy; het Amerikaanse Blackwater heeft zich ook gespecialiseerd in antipiraterij opdrachten. De Fransen, van hun kant, hebben een Société Militaire Privée (SMP) die gewapende agenten ter beschikking stelt van de reders; conform de Franse wetgeving mogen zij echter niet zelfstandig optreden en daarom werkt SMP samen met een Engelse maatschappij. Spanje heeft op 23 april 2009 de schepen die onder haar vlag varen de toelating verleend gewapende veiligheidsagenten aan boord te nemen teneinde de Somalische piraten efficient te kunnen bestrijden. Militaire vloten onvoldoende efficient
Dat privémaatschappijen agenten opleiden om het maritiem terrorisme te bestrijden, vloeit voort uit het feit dat de militaire marines van de Westerse landen niet bij machte zijn om dit fenomeen te elimineren. Hun vloten werden inderdaad sinds het einde van de Koude Oorlog fors gereduceerd, terwijl de bouw van scheepstypes specifiek bestemd om de piraterij te counteren nog in de kinderschoenen staat. Zo hebben de Fransen korvetten van het type Gowind ontworpen die elk twee snelboten aan boord hebben, die kunnen bemand worden door negen commando's.
Ook de VS bouwen nu dergelijke interventieschepen. Er zijn ook landen die, naast pri- vémilities, gewapend militair personeel aan boord van hun schepen inschepen. Onder meer België kan een Vessel Protection Detachment (VSP) van speciaal getrainde militairen inzetten; ze zijn voor het eerst eind juni 2009 opgetreden om de eerder gekaapte Pompeï naar een veilige haven te loodsen. Ook ons fregat F931 Louise-Marie dat sinds september jl. aan de operatie Atalanta deelneemt, heeft zulk detachement aan boord. Zolang militaire vloten en gewapende militaire interventieteams onvoldoende bescherming kunnen bieden, zullen privéondernemingen ter bestrijding van de piraterij en het maritiem terrorisme bijzonder actief blijven en wellicht aan belang winnen. De financiële opbrengst van deze tussenkomsten is immers niet te verwaarlozen, terwijl de reders, van hun kant, ook zware investeringen te beveiligen hebben. De verzeke- ringspremies die zij betalen en het losgeld dat zij aan piraten moeten betalen om hun schip, zijn lading en zijn bemanning vrij te krijgen, liggen thans bijzonder hoog. Zo betaalde bv. Jan de Nul 2 miljoen euro voor het loskrijgen van de kleine Pompeï. Het is dan ook begrijpelijk dat reders een beroep doen op privémilities waarvan de interventiekosten doorgaans het verlies kunnen compenseren dat zij door een eventuele kaping kunnen lij den. 'Business' speelt hier immers een voorname rol. Rules of Engagement
Na een intensieve NOST (Naval Operational Sea Training) ging ons fregat F931 Louise- Marie Begin september 2009 bij de operatie Atalanta aansluiten om er de konvooibegeleiding te versterken. Sinds augustus voert Nederland het commando over deze operatie. Een probleem voor onze deelneming was de toepassing van de Rules of Engagement. De bestaande codes en conventies die wij hierboven hebben uiteengezet, vergden inderdaad nog bepaalde aanpassingen, o.a. wat betreft de arrestatie van piraten. Ook de Conventie van Montego Bay diende nauwlettend nageleefd worden; deze laat nl. een Staat alleen toe zijn eigen schepen te inspecteren, tenzij het om piraterij of illegale trafieken gaat. Van 27 mei tot 5 juni 2009 heeft het Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) van de IMO in Londen vergaderd om deze Rules of Engagement bij te werken. Zo werd, onder meer, de Staten afgeraden aan boord van hun vrachtschepen vuurwapens te gebruiken om zich tegen piraten te verdedigen. Wél mag, met akkoord met de reders, gewapend militair personeel ingescheept worden, wat België zinnens was te doen.
Dat de internationale gemeenschap hardhandig tegen de piraterij moet optreden, zal niemand betwisten. Het fenomeen kan zich immers uitbreiden en nog andere belangrijke scheepvaartroutes bedreigen. Dit gevaar moet tot elke prijs vermeden worden. En er is meer: er bestaat een sterk vermoeden dat de piraterij langs de Somalische kusten kadert in de terroristische netwerken die de Westerse wereld onveilig maken. De interventie van deze piraten is immers bijzonder goed gestructureerd. Niet alleen vanuit de kust, maar ook vanuit commandoschepen ondernemen zij hun kapingtochten met snelle en goed bewapende boten. De miljoenen dollars die zij aan losgelden krijgen, zullen beslist niet alleen in de zakken van deze piraten belanden. Daarom ook moet de internationale gemeenschap bijzonder attent blijven en desnoods met nog grotere middelen dit gevaar bestrijden, want uiteindelijk is het onze Westerse beschaving die op het spel staat. Henri Rogie
Inséré le 9 juillet 2010 Open Forum enlevé le 9 aout 2010
Building dangers for the future?
Market pressures are undermining quality control in shipbuilding — at a time when ships are becoming ever more complex, a classification society expert has warned.
Det Norske Veritas global quality manager Medhat Bahgat told a London conference on marine failures that problems such as hull structure, machinery and stern tube damage are being experienced at an increasing rate. `This damage has a high frequency and has severe consequences for all of us,' he warned. `It's a nightmare for the operator, for the shipyards, for the owners — for everybody.' Mr Bahgat said the industry needs to look at the picture affecting build standards, and said owners need to ask many more questions about the way in which their new tonnage is constructed. He expressed concern at the emergence of new countries with maritime aspirations and new shipyards at a time when building projects have become more complex. At the same time, commercial pressures have become even more intense, with cost- cutting measures affecting quality. `Everybody's squeezing the next level down, squeezed by price and time. You have to deliver cheaper, and quicker,' he added. 'All these are causing a higher potential risk exposure. The split between design and production is very serious, Mr Bahgat added. `Traditionally, shipyards in Europe or the Far East, in the 6os, 70s and 8os, were large shipyards. They had their own design people, an engineering department — some of them even had their own foundries, they could cast their own propellers, and some could even build their own engines,' he said. But recent years had seen the rise of so-called `greenfield' shipyards. `Many have never built ships before. Several have con-tracts and are building a ship, and building a shipyard around them. Some, there is no shipyard, no people around, everybody is got from outside and they are putting together a team as they go along, solving problems as they go along. And that situation has increased.' Such yards are now undertaking even the most complex projects, Mr Bahgat found. `They are building LPG carriers, container vessels, quite sophisticated offshore supply vessels, anything.' He questioned the experience and qualifications of many of the workers in these yards, and said owners should beware of the consequences. takes time to get an understanding of how to weld, how to put a ship together, what is good quality, what should be rejected, what should be rewelded,' he added. 'The understanding of what is safety and quality is completely different. One shouldn't be surprised that we start having problems in the hull structure, in the machinery, everywhere.' Mr Bahgat also alerted the conference to the implications of the widening split between vessel designers and builders. New yards may buy a ship or equipment design from another yard — and may often be sold 'the problem designs that they have suffered with in the 70s and 8os'. There may sometimes be as many as six levels of sub-contracting a project — raising the risks of Jack of understanding or common approaches to quality, he warned.
All this has been happening at a time when newbuilding projects have become increasingly complex — not only technically, but also to manage. Mr Bahgat said the Aker yards' Genesis project to build two of the world's biggest cruiseships involved building work in eight different yards, with the involvement of 32 design offices and the technical complexity of integrating multiple hitech systems and equipment. Nowadays, even much smaller chips — such as offshore support vessels with DP systems and redundant propulsion — are stacked with complex onboard systems, he pointed out. But Mr Bahgat warned problems in integrating all this equipment could lead to a 'digital big bang' as a result of poor interlinking and overall control of software and components. As for the impact on crews, he warned: lots of signais, lots of alarms. What are we expecting —a superman or superwoman here to really be able to analyse and assess what to do in different situations?' DNV, he reported, had been analysing some of the groundings it had dealt with. 'And we've seen that many of the problems that we have noted are happening just after delivery of the vessel. The crew are not able to really have control and manoeuvre and to steer the vessel properly, and what happens is they run aground. Lots of collisions happen just after delivery, because the people are not well trained to cope with ail the alarms and buzzers.' On the production side, smaller revenues and shorter delivery times are all affecting quality control, Mr Bahgat warned. `They start to take short cuts in production, they accept defects that they pretend are not there, they don't dare to stop it because they have to deliver. So, the tendency is to more sub-contracting, everybody squeezed by time and money. They have to deliver cheaper and quicker, so if they're going to do it with high quality, and the right quality, and repair what should be repaired, it will cost them more — so they just send things that shouldn't have been sent out. `You must ask questions,' Mr Bahgat urged shipping companies. 'Who is building forme? Who is doing what, who is controlling quality? Is it the shipyard, is it class, is it the one who sub-contracted, is it the sub-sub? You must ask — it's your responsibility.' And, he concluded: `You have to understand, if you're getting it cheap, you're getting nothing for nothing. So it's important to be aware that you have to put things under control.'
Inséré le 11 juillet 2010 Logboek News Enlevé le 11 aout 2010
Pirate pleads guilty
Abduwali Abdukha- dir Muse, the Somali pirate who led the hijacking of the containership Maersk Alabama in the Indian Ocean, pleaded guilty on May 18 in Manhattan federal court to two felony counts of hijacking maritime vessels, two felony counts of kidnapping, and two felony counts of hostage taking. Muse faces sentencing by U.S. District Court Judge Loretta Preska on Oct. 19. He faces a minimum of 27 years in prison.
Muse plead guilty to his participation in the April 8, 2009, hijacking of the Maersk Ala- bama, subsequent hostage-taking of Captain Richard Phillips, and two other ship hijack- ings in Tate March and early April and related hostage-taking, according to Preet Bharara, the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York.
Bharara said that Muse "admitted his leadership role in the armed hijacking of an Amer- ican-flagged vessel and two international ships in the Indian Ocean. The five-day Maersk hijacking and the events leading up to it make clear that modernday piracy is a crime against the international community and a form of terrorism on the high seas. Pirates who attack U.S. ships overseas and take American hostages should know that they will face stiff justice in an American courtroom." Armed with guns, Muse and three other pirates boarded and hijacked the Maersk Alabama on April 8, 2009, while it was en route to Mombasa, Kenya, with cargo, including relief supplies for Somalia. Overpowering and capturing Muse, the crew of the Maersk Alabama was able to retake control of the ship. With their own skiff sunk in the attack, the three remaining pirates took a life boat from the ship and held Phillips as a hostage in hopes of exchanging him for Muse.
Muse was freed by the crew, but Phillips remained a hostage and was held by the pirates on the life boat from April 8 to April 12. During this period, in radio communications between the pirates and the U.S. Navy, the pirates threatened to kill the captain if they were not provided with safe passage away from the scene. On April 12, Muse requested and was permitted tu board the Navy missile destroyer USS Bainbridge, which had responded to the incident. On the USS Bainbridge, Muse continue to demand safe passage for himself and the other pirates in exchange for the captain's release. Clearing for Captin Phillips' life, Navy SEALS on board the Bainbridge spot the three pirates on the lifeboat. Muse surrendered and was taken into custodv by the U.S.Navy.
Late last month, a trial of five alleged Somali pirates was scheduled to begin in the Netherlands . The men were arrested in January 2, 2009 by Danish marines after their skiff was intercepted by a Danish frigate as they were preparing to board the Netherlands Antilles-flagged cargo ship Samanyolu. If convicted, the men could receive prison terms between 9 and 12 years. Meanwhile, Saba, Yemen's official news agency reported earlier last month chat six Somali pirates were sentenced to death and six others to 10 years of prison, stemming from the hijacking of a Yemeni oil tanker Qana in April 2009 in the Gulf of Aden.
Inséré le 13 juillet 2010 Logboek News Enlevé le 13 aout 2010 Reliable shipboard systems
Most shipping accidents can be attributed to failure of shipboard control systems. Not surprising considering that no-one checks how well different systems work together in advance
FAILURE of shipboard computer systems and software, including operating systems, control systems and alarms, are most likely the root cause of a fair proportion of shipping accidents. Class society Bureau Veritas has calculated that 32 per cent of major oil spills / near misses are caused by machinery failure, 34 per cent by navigation error and 15 per cent by fire and explosion. Ships are fitted with various electronic devices and control systems to make sure the engine keeps running, the steering works, there is enough water under the vessel, the ship is a safe distance from other vessels, there are no explosive vapour mixtures or sparks, no flooding in the engine room, and the water cooling and fuel oil systems are working properly. So why are there so many failures?
The answer is probably that very little research has been done into how well different systems from different manufacturers integrate with each other - the result often being summarised times as "plug and pray" rather than "plug and play".
Shipyards source systems from separate manufacturers, without assessing the risks associated with integration of those systems. Engineers are given the task of designing products which solve specific problems, but often do not make sure their products work with other suppliers' products.
Many equipment "type approval" procedures do not consider whether the equipment integrates with other equipment - it just tests if the equipment works well running by itself. Meanwhile individual software-based systems are becoming more complex and more automated - bugs can occur when they are interfaced with other systems which would never show up when they are tested on their own. When problems do occur, the expertise required to identify the specific problem and fix it is considerable - often involving an engineer from each of the companies which might be involved in the problem, together with the ship superintendent to force them to sit down together and stop blaming each other. Some of the problems can be attributed to seafarers expecting the equipment to work better together than it actually does, not appreciating that it has all been put together by engineers not talking to each other in different parts of the world.
For example, a seafarer might expect different equipment to have similar interfaces, or similar shut down procedures, or expect the ship alarm system to notify them adequately of any problem - as all readers of this magazine are too well aware, this is rarely the case.
Another cause of problems is the ship using software or systems which are unlikely to be supported in 20 years time when problems arise. Examples of problems
One example of a failure of systems to work well together is the grounding of cruise ship Royal Majesty near Massachusetts in 1997 - the antenna connection into the GPS failed, sending the GPS into "estimation" (dead reckoning) mode - the DGPS set off an alarm because the data from the GPS was not right, but the alarm was not noticed by the bridge team.
The ship carried on what it thought was the right course, but which was actually 17 miles off it, eventually running aground several hours after the initial fault occurred.
Inséré le 15 juillet 2010 Historique - Historiek Enlevé le 15 aout 2010 TRADITIONS ANGLO-BELGES
Après avoir écorné et démystifié au cours de notre précédente contribution* à l'histoire des uniformes portés par nos Jantjes dans la Royal Navy, les légendes tenacement accrochées au 'Nelson das', à la 'boucle de Nelson' des galons des officiers, aux trois victoires de l'amiral Nelson rappelées par les trois raies blanches des cols marins, aux sept plis du pantalon pattes d'éléphant représentant symboliquement les sept océans sur lesquels flotte le White Ensign (le sait-on encore: North Atlantic, South Atlantic, North Pacific, South Pacific, Indian Ocean, Arctic Ocean et Southern Ocean, que nous appelons l'Antarctique), avec malice mais sans médire, ni même nier l'évidence de l'utilité de ces traditions chargées d'un symbolisme générateur de fierté nationale et d'esprit de corps auxquels je reste très sensible, je vais aujourd'hui vous parler de ces traditions britanniques que nous avons ramenées en 1945, dans nos kitbags, au retour d'Angleterre. Il y a tout d'abord tout le vocabulaire anglo-belge dont nos officiers formés à la Marine française n'ont pu se débarrasser, malgré leurs efforts constants pour remplacer le réveil par 'Branle-bas' et la fin du travail par le 'Dégagé' —et autres expressions du parler de la Royale—; il y a des mots qui collent à notre sabir à nous. Ah oui, 'sabir' est le mot qui désigne en français le mélange des langues méditerranéennes qui fait là-bas le parler des marins; chez nous on devrait plutôt dire: le 'neder-fran-glais'. Exemple: `Stand by, Kurkezakken à l'arrière', ce qui veut dire: 'Paré à mettre des défenses à l'arrière', ordre de précaution lancé par le 'Number One' voyant que le commandant va manœuvrer! 'Number One', voilà le mot qui désigne chez nous le commandant en second; dans la Marchande c'est 'Den Eerste', qui vient de 'Eerste Stuurman'.Le `wardroom' —qui vient de `wardrobe room' (wardrobe = garde-robe), le magasin où les officiers rangeaient leurs vêtements et autres possessions personnelles— c'est le carré des officiers; aujourd'hui, vu l'influence grandissante du parler `kaki', on a tendance à dire 'le mess'. Bien que mess soit anglais, ce mot désigne à la Royal Navy les postes d'équipage: ainsi y a-t-il à bord des navires anglais le `stokers' mess' (mess des chauffeurs) et on y `pipe' Messman to the galley' (Messman, à la cuisine).
Le 'pipe' c'est le sifflet de manoeuvres, ce bel instrument si propre à la Marine et qu'on ne voit utiliser nulle part ailleurs; en anglais on l'appelle le 'Bosun's pipe' ou 'Bosun's whistle', le bosun (prononcez boz'n) ou boatswain étant le sous-officier, chargé à l'origine d'un canot, qu'on appelle chez nous, indifféremment en français et en néerlandais, le 'bootsman', 'bosco' étant le terme propre. Tout comme d'ailleurs le 'coxswain' (prononcez cox'n) qui était le maître chargé de prendre la barre du navire ou d'un canot; l'usage veut que ce soit le coxswain qui prend la barre dès que la manœuvre devient un peu `tricky' —donc lorsqu'on sort d'un port ou y rentre—, qu'on va exécuter des manœuvres de flotte —un peu genre carrousel de cavalerie— et que le commandant veut prendre toutes les précautions utiles à la bonne marche de la manoeuvre et à sa réputation.
Il y a bien sûr les noms des vêtements que l'on portait dans la Navy: le 'cap' pour le béret, le 'jersey', 'le jumper', le 'pilot jacket' qui est caban en français et 1"oilskin'. Et évidemment le `duffel coat', qui en ce temps-là était porté par tous les marins; nous en tirions gloire parce que, revenu en 1945 dans les bagages de la Navy, ce vêtement nous rappelait que depuis le moyen-âge il était confectionné dans un lainage tissé et foulé dans le village de Duffel près d'Anvers.
Outre les termes d'habillement est restée chez nous la manière à l'anglaise de passer au rapport. Pour toute faute de discipline le coupable est déféré au jugement du Number One, qui se tient debout, casquette sur la tête et en uniforme n°1, derrière un haut pupitre sur lequel est ouvert le registre des punitions. A gauche de l'officier, perpendiculairement à lui, se tient le coxswain qui donne l'ordre au coupable de saluer le ler Lieutenant, puis d'enlever son béret —`Kap af' ou `Béret bas'— qui s'enlève du bras gauche passé par-dessus la tête et se coince par le bras gauche contre la hanche gauche. Puis le coxswain énonce l'objet de la délinquance, par exemple: «Matelot Untel, étant de permission de minuit est rentré à 01h15 du matin, soit un retard de 1 heure et 15 minutes». Le 1 er Lieutenant demande alors au coupable ce qu'il a à dire pour sa défense et après l'avoir entendu, il prononce la sentence, par exemple: «Deux heures trente de travail supplémentaire!». Après quoi le coxswain donne l'ordre au coupable de remettre son béret, de saluer le 1 er Lieutenant, et ensuite «Demi-tour à droite, marche....». Aucune punition n'est infligée sans cérémonial. Celui-ci a pour raison profonde d'empêcher qu'on ne punisse sur un mouvement de colère et il permet en toute justice qu'on puisse s'expliquer, devant témoins, car, outre le coxswain, le chef de département (pont-machine- service-passerelle) peut également être présent et peut défendre l'intéressé. -
Moi, je me souviens que, lorsque j'étais cadet à l'école de navigation, je me suis fait punir par le capitaine qui, lors d'un rassemblement dans la cour de l'école, se mit à gueuler: «Ils bougent là dans les rangs; derrière vous ils bougent; vous me ferez deux jours et parce que vous êtes chef d'équipe vous m'en ferez quatre!» C'était une sale boîte, comme me le disait l'amiral Brasseur-Kermadec qui, Belge de Verviers, s'était, brevet au long cours en mains, engagé dans les Forces Françaises Libres du général de Gaulle à Londres, après avoir été éconduit par les services de l'ambassade belge. Dans le carré (le wardroom), selon la tradition anglaise, c'est le Number One qui préside la table et règne en maître sur le personnel, les convives et les conversations. Non, ici ce n'est pas le commandant (colonel chez les kakis) qui préside; celui-ci, quand il est invité, s'assoira à la droite du Number One, la place de l'invité d'honneur — le reste du temps il est servi seul dans sa cabine. De la conversation sera bannie toute référence à la politique ou à la religion et aux femmes, mais surtout on ne peut y parler ‗shop', c'est-à dire du boulot. Le wardroom est un lieu sacré où, bien habillé comme il se doit, on prend un verre entre gentlemen et on se comporte à table comme dans un restaurant quatre étoiles. Psychologie marine appliquée comme panacée qu'on respecte parce que la sagesse des anciens, ayant sans doute dû pâtir de disputes, de désordres et de coteries, en a établi l'étiquette! Cela me mène à vous parler d'une autre tradition scrupuleusement respectée dans les carrés ainsi que dans les mess des établissements à terre de la Royal Navy, à savoir le `Pass the port ceremonial' . C'est le cérémonial que l'on observe à table lorsqu'on sert le vin de porto (port, port wine, porto). En Angleterre on boit le porto au dessert. En souvenir donc de l'amiral Nelson, qui comme chacun le sait perdit le bras droit à la bataille de Ténériffe, on ne sert le porto que de la main gauche; le verre de porto doit donc se trouver à gauche des couverts des convives et la carafe (de cristal) doit faire le tour de la table de gauche à droite, passant de convive en convive, chacun d'eux se servant à tour de rôle. Le porto est évidemment de grande qualité et on le déguste religieusement. Certains l'appellent même le 'Nelson blood'. Quoique cultivé, vendangé et vieilli en fûts au Portugal, le vin de porto est une invention anglaise vieille de deux siècles, une de ces très bonnes choses que l'on trouve sur les tables anglaises.
La carafe de porto donne aussi lieu à un jeu de mots plaisant. Cette carafe est à très large base afin de ne pas se renverser au roulis, mais aussi pour que les impuretés du vin puissent s'y déposer, d'où son nom de `decanter'. Ce dépôt ne se boit pas et il restera donc toujours un peu de porto au fond de la bouteille: 'There is still a bit of red port left in the bottle': jolie façon de se rappeler ou d'apprendre aux terriens et aux novices que rouge (red) c'est bâbord et que bâbord (port) c'est la gauche (left). Les feux de navigation d'un navire sont en effet blanc en tête de mât, rouge à gauche et vert à droite lorsqu'on regarde vers l'avant du navire...CQFD. Les marins français usent également d'une image à l'usage des apprentis marins. Imaginez que la batterie de canons soit fermée à l'arrière par une grande double porte où l'on aurait inscrit 'Batterie% ouvrez maintenant la porte à deux battants: celle de gauche portera les lettres `Bat' (pour bâbord) et celle de droite 'Trie' (pour tribord). Les couleurs se retiennent par le matelot fantaisiste qui aura enfilé 'son Tricot vert et ses Bas rouges'! Le 'Pass the port ceremonial' n'a pas été repris par les officiers de la marine belge, pourtant issus de la Royal Navy, d'une part parce que le porto n'est pas une boisson par- ticulièrement nationale mais aussi parce qu'en Belgique, tout comme en France, on ne le boit pas à table au cours du repas, mais on le consomme comme apéritif ou comme petit verre offert au visiteur chez Monsieur le Curé.... Par contre ce qui reste chez nous de ces traditions gustatives britanniques c'est le `Up Spirit', du moins en guise de cérémonial de réminescence, si pas de nostalgie, au cours d'un bal ou d'une soirée dansante comme en organisent les anciens de la Navy. `Up Spirit' est le nom donné à la distribution de rhum à l'équipage d'un navire à la mer de la Marine de Sa Majesté Britannique, usage qui remonte à l'époque de la découverte de cette boisson des îles et qui fut aboli en 1970. En 1740, dans le but de réduire l'incidence de l'ivresse dans la flotte, ce 'tot' de rhum fut coupé de moitié d'eau sur l'ordre de l'amiral Vernon ; d'où le nom de 'grog' d'après le surnom 'Old Grogram' donné à l'amiral (grogram étant une espèce de tissu dans lequel était confectionné sa cape). Le cérémonial s'effectuait de la façon suivante. A midi —et jusqu'en 1824 également à 6 h p.m.— le bosun's pipe, précédé de quelques trilles enthousiastes, annonce l'Up Spirit' et les matelots (valides) venaient faire la queue (manie très british!) devant une table garnie d'une cruche et d'une mesure, toutes deux en cuivre. Derrière la table trônaient le `tankie' (magasinier), le coxswain, le purser (officier-payeur) et l'officier en charge de l'opération. Les matelots, après avoir énoncé leur nom et matricule, recevaient dans leur gobelet d'émail la ration de spiritueux qu'ils devaient ingurgiter séance tenante... Après que tout le monde y eut passé, le reste du liquide contenu dans la cruche devait être jeté dans les 'bilges' (les bouchins), car jeté par-dessus bord au travers d'un hublot il aurait pu être recueilli par quelques petits malins depuis un hublot d'un pont inférieur! Comme quoi le règlement avait tout prévu! Pourquoi en restait-t-il au fond de la cruche, me demanderez-vous; eh bien, parce qu'il y avait à bord des malades du mal de mer que le rhum ne guérissait pas et des matelots punis qui en étaient privés. A toutes fins utiles le nom des bénéficiaires figurait dans un registre. Les chief petty officers, quant à eux, recevaient dans une cruche à part, leur ration non coupée d'eau, qu'ils pouvaient boire en toute tranquillité dans leur mess. Le 'tot' des officiers fut supprimé en 1881 en raison de la popularité du gin qu'ils devaient néanmoins, étant réputés riches, payer de leur poche.
Le rhum était autrefois considéré comme un médicament, un antidote contre toutes sortes de maux de marins, mais également comme une récompense, après p.ex. une nuit de tempête, un exercice particulièrement épuisant ou une bataille victorieuse. Splice the main brace' était le terme consacré, autorisant une distribution extraordinaire d'une ration de rhum. Cette expression, qui se traduit par 'Epissure du grand étai', date du temps de la marine de voile où, un boulet râmé venant à rompre l'étai principal de grand mât —cordage qui pouvait être aussi gros que la cuisse—, sa réparation ou son remplacement exigeaient un effort considérable de la part de l'équipage. On a pu entendre il n'y a pas si longtemps la Reine mère, exprimant sa satisfaction pour la parade faite à l'occasion de son 100ème anniversaire, remercier le général en charge et octroyer à tous le `Splice the main brace'.
Les routines de bord chez nous sont également celles de la Royal Navy, avec ses rondes de propreté, les annonces au 'pipe' qui sont identiques, même si au réveil on ne beugle plus dans l'intercom l'innénarable et menteur Wakey, Wakey! Rise and shine! Show a leg! Show a leg' (Debout! Le soleil est levé et brille! Montrez une jambe!); eh oui! les bonnes moeurs ne permettent plus en effet de laisser monter des prostituées à bord des navires à l'ancre en rade, qui seules pouvaient rester dans les hamacs, reconnaissables à la jambe féminine qu'elles devaient en laisser pendre. Tout cela donc —sauf le 'show a leg' bien entendu— la marine militaire belge l'a connu, adopté, appliqué sans complexes, comme un exemple venant d'en haut, et elle s'en est bien sentie.
Illustrations: collection J-C. Vanbostal Texte et dessin: CPV (lire) J.-C. Liénart JS SEPTEMBER - SEPTEMBRE 2005 133
Inséré le 17 juillet 2010 Logboek News Enlevé le 17 aout 2010
Giant obo arrives to help US oil cleanup
(July 2 2010) The 320,000 dwt Taiwanese converted combination carrier – ‗A Whale‘ - has anchored off Lousiana to await the go-ahead to join the oil clean-up efforts in the Gulf of Mexico. The TMT Shipping- owned vessel is to be tested and evaluated by military and National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) officials to determine whether it could be used for skimming operations, said Bryan Ferguson of the joint information centre operated by the US government and BP, talking to local news agencies.
The US Navy and NOAA are overseeing the testing. ―They'll be looking at the amount of oil to water collected, its ability to skim oil and how it holds up under environmental conditions,‖ Ferguson told the German press agency dpa. ‗A Whale‘ was modified into a skimmer in Portugal on 15th June to allow it to be considered for the clean-up operations, Ferguson said. The ship can hold 2 mill barrels of oil and water. "The government is eager to get on board the vessel in the region and see if (it) is effective in skimming oil,‖ the US Coast Guard said in a statement quoted by CNN.
The tanker has 12 openings on either side to suck up oil and water and is equipped to eject the water and store the oil. In a statement issued on Thursday, TMT spokesman Bob Grantham said: "The ‗A Whale‘ will shortly sail to a designated site to begin a test protocol near the spill location. "As it has been since the beginning of this project, TMT Offshore group is committed to aggressive action to combat and contain the oil spill. We have had constructive dialogue with the (US) Coast Guard and BP. "We look forward to working in close co-operation with all parties to establish an effective global response capability for oil spills," he said. The rough seas stirred up by tropical storm ‗Alex‘, which was downgraded from the season's first Atlantic hurricane as it moves across the western Gulf, have caused a suspension of skimming and burning at the oil disaster site. More than 500 ships deployed in the cleanup had to seek shelter. "We've been held hostage here for the last two days by the prevailing weather," said USCG Rear Admiral Paul Zukunft on Wednesday. ‗A Whale‘ was built last year and was converted from an ore/oil carrier last month in Portugal.
Inséré le 19juillet 2010 Open Forum Enlevé le 19 aout 2010
Ransom payments - Will Washington muddy the waters?
By Stephen Askins
According to a number of reports in trade press and recent comments from the US State Department, the US administration seems to be flying a kite to test national and industry reaction to an initiative which may use existing UN Resolutions and the US OFAC (Office of Foreign Assets Control) Regulations (―Regulations‖) to allow them to take action, including the banning of ships involved from US ports, against ship owners who pay ransoms to Somali pirates. It is difficult to comment in detail because the full scope of the US proposals has not been aired. Indeed, if the reaction is strong enough no formal proposal may be forthcoming. However, our understanding from industry and other sources is that the US is considering having certain pirate leaders named as ‗designated‘ people. These may be named at a UN level, using UN Resolution 1844. Given this approach to ransom payments, it is interesting to note that the High Court in London recently issued a judgment in a case (Masefield v Amlin Corporate Member Limited 2010 EWHC 280 (Comm)) which involved the hijacking of the Bunga Melati Dua in 2008. One of the issues was whether the payment of a ransom was contrary to public policy as a matter of English law. It is worth highlighting the words of Mr Justice Steele (at paragraph 60 (iii) in his judgment), where he made it clear that he did not think it right to categorise the payment as contrary to public policy: ―So far as harm is concerned it is truth that payments of ransom encourage a repetition, the more so if there is insurance cover: the history of Somali piracy is an eloquent demonstration of that. But if the crews of the vessels are to be taken out of harms way, the only option is to pay the ransom. Diplomatic or military intervention cannot usually be relied upon and failure to pay may put in jeopardy other crews.‖ Resolution 1844, adopted by the Security Council in November 2008, is one of a series of UN Resolutions which deal with the deteriorating situation in Somalia (beginning with 751) and in general terms implores member states to impose travel bans and to freeze the assets of named individuals and entities who: 1. import weapons into Somalia
2. through their actions, undermine the security and stability of Somalia
3. prevent humanitarian aid from reaching those who it is targeted at in Somalia.
One key element of the Resolution is that member states are able to nominate such individuals or entities to the relevant Committee established by the UN. In their most recent report in January 2010, the Committee referred to the citing of the Eritrean government by the US, who, it is believed, have previously named three Al Shebab commanders, although it is not clear whether those nominations have been accepted by the UN. It is understood that the US will also be looking to name either individual war lords or groups (perhaps by clan or sub-clan) involved in piracy, on the basis that their actions are undermining and/or threatening the stability and security of Somalia. It is believed that the OFAC Regulations could then be used to impose sanctions on any entity paying ransoms to those designated people. The sanctions could be: (i) the banning from the US of vessels freed from pirates following the payment of ransom; (ii) the freezing of assets of the ship owners if they have a registered presence in the US. The difficulties these sanctions could cause for ship owners are compounded by the fact that during the recent collapse of the freight market, many shipowning companies registered a presence to avoid Rule B Attachments in New York. These attachments are a freezing type injunction employed by companies seeking security for claims for litigation in other jurisdictions. The threat of action against companies with offices registered in the US may therefore have some teeth.
It is difficult to understand the rationale behind this move. It appears the motives may be to persuade the pirates that there is no economic benefit in piracy or to force the industry to take greater steps to prevent piracy. US legislation would not seek to make the payment of a ransom illegal in other countries. Instead it would aim to impose sanctions after the event. There are precedents where the US has imposed sanctions which can interrupt what would otherwise be regarded as normal trade. Cuba is a good example and the shipping sanctions being imposed on shipping companies involved in the delivery of refined petroleum products to Iran show how wide ranging these sanctions can be. US proposals appear to assume that the pirates approach a hijacking in a rational way. They clearly do not. Even if they became aware of such new law, they would simply assume that if the ship owners could not pay, the fact that they have captured cargo and have shown themselves perfectly happy to wait for months for ransoms to be paid demonstrates a belief that money will eventually be paid from somewhere. Perhaps a better approach would be to increase the risk to pirates by ensuring that national laws are robust enough to prosecute pirates and would be pirates. Reports often appear in the press of pirates being captured by naval forces only to be released at a later date without prosecution. It would be better to address this ‗catch and release‘ policy before we criminalise the ship owners. Having said that, at the time of writing there have been encouraging reports of the French handing 22 recently captured pirates to the Puntland authorities and Kenya sentencing eight others to 20 years in prison. It remains to be seen if this will continue. One rationale for this initiative could simply be that it is a way to change the ship owners‘ approach to self-protection. There has been criticism voiced by US Admirals to the effect that ship owners are in the main not adopting Best Management Practice Guidelines and a plaintive cry that ship owners should ‗do more‘ to help themselves.
These steps may include having armed guards on board and it appears to be US policy to move towards the arming of US-flagged vessels. Raising the stakes for other ship owners, particularly those with US registered offices or whose vessels regularly call at US ports, through new regulations may pressurise them into taking more robust steps to protect their vessels from hij ackings, and thus negate the negate the need to pay a ransom. This may clash with the flag state policy or indeed give rise to the other issues, not least the fear that the violence could escalate. Recent events in the Indian Ocean, with reported fire fights between pirates and Spanish fishing trawlers, highlight this fear.
Fundamentally it cannot be in anyone‘s interest to criminalise the victims of a hijacking. The effects of a US move to introduce these regulations could have serious consequences for those that are affected by piracy, while doing little to address the issue of preventing piracy and dealing with those responsible. The reality is that ship owners are driven by a commercial imperative to free their ships, and, as long as the ransoms remain a minor percentage of the values involved, that will remain the case. Introducing additional hurdles could see the practice of paying ransoms driven underground or elaborate structures being put in place to avoid falling foul of new regulations. It is interesting that the US is focussing on Somalia alone, notwithstanding the fact that piracy can and does happen elsewhere. Furthermore, this legislation would be specific to shipping and does not address extortion in the wider sense. The issue is further complicated by the fact that in the US the act of ‗hostage taking‘ of a US national overseas is regarded as terrorism under the Patriot Act and knowingly paying money to those involved in terrorism is a criminal act. Laws attempting to ban ransom payments and indeed freezing assets of families involved have been introduced elsewhere, notably Colombia and Italy, although these too have generated debate. In Colombia these laws were subsequently subject to a Court ruling that allows ransoms where humanitarian factors demand them. Furthermore, these bans were accompanied by the outlawing of kidnap and ransom insurance, which is now a well-established insurance product in the Lloyds market. It is therefore difficult to see how the US could take unilateral action against a ship owner without also condemning various insurance companies specialising in this area. Even if such a move was possible it is, of course, made more complicated in shipping in the sense that losses incurred by piracy are a legitimate insured peril and payable under ordinary hull and/or war policies (depending where the risk falls). This then is the real crux of this problem – who pays the ransom and how will the Regulations affect them?
But who pays the ransom? The ship owner may take the lead in any negotiations but ultimately would look to his usual insurer (in the absence of a dedicated kidnap and ransom policy) to pay ship‘s proportion of the ransom, either as a sue and labour expense or in General Average. If the latter (i.e. when the vessel is laden) then cargo interests (and more likely their insurers) will pay cargo‘s proportion. Crew, of course, do not contribute to the ransom despite the fact that the threats are essentially made against them. There are also circumstances (although rare) where the time charterer agrees to bear the cost of a ransom and takes out applicable insurance on the basis that they are bearing the risk of time. Where Time Charters were entered into before the global economic downturn, some of the exposures to losses over a three to four month hijacking are considerable. They can be in excess not only of the final ransom payment, but also of the original, higher demand.
Even if the legislation singles out the ship owner, questions remain as to exactly who the regulations would cover. Would they cover the shipowning company, the managers and other ships under management in the same group? What about those companies where the technical management is done by a different third party company? The key issue appears to be the payment of a ransom, in which case what consideration will be given to the cargo interests who may in fact pay a greater proportion of the ransom in certain circumstances? Further how would the Regulations apply to the insurers themselves?
It is difficult to see how the Regulations could be formulated (save that the US has a reputation of making them as wide-ranging as possible). Putting that aside there is also the very real difficulty of a ship owner knowing exactly to whom he is paying a ransom and whether this person is a nominated individual as per UN guidelines. A ship owner will have done well if during the course of a negotiation he is able to determine which Somalian clan and sub-clan he is dealing with, letting alone identify the individual with whom he is dealing. Penalising the ship owner, who is but one stakeholder in a maritime venture, would appear not to be the most sensible way to deal with the continued burden of piracy and ransom demands. The reward side of the equation for pirates continues to rise and although the coalition naval forces appear to have adopted a more aggressive approach to the issue, there appears no commensurate increase in risk to a pirate of being arrested and taken for prosecution.
If national governments want to introduce new policy perhaps that is a better place to start. Some 50 pirates have been captured in the past week, 35 by the French navy. It will be interesting to see what happens to them. ■ Stephen Askins is a Partner in the London office of Ince & Co.
Inséré le 21 juillet 2010 Logboek News Enlevé le 21 aout 2010 exactEarth Nowhere to Hide
For ship owner and operators seeking to maximize the power of the 24/7 exact whereabouts of its ships – and others – at sea, meet exactEarth Ltd. ExactEarth – a subsidiary of ComDev – is reportedly the first and only data services company aiming to leverage advanced microsatellite technology to deliver monitoring solutions. A $40 million investment, its initial service, exactAIS, aims to provide a global vessel tracking and monitoring system based on a space-based AIS detection technology. Approximately $6m of the investment was used to crack the signal processing dilemma posed by AIS. As currently configured, AIS is only used to a range of about 50 miles from the shore. exactEarth – once fully operational – extends its reach to full global coverage via satellite. According to Peter Mabson, VP Corporate Development, the new technology has a myriad of applications – search and rescue operations, environ-mental protection, traffic monitoring and maritime security – and also the ability to ―slow steam‖ meaning the optimal speed to effectively and cost-efficiently travel from port to port based on weather and traffic conditions. ―We probably haven‘t even dreamed up half of the applications for this system,‖ said Mabson, who said that the service could be used to enforce offshore navigation channels, ensuring that ship carrying potentially hazardous cargoes maintain a proper distance from a particular country‘s shoreline. A key enabler for this technology is the actual satellite technology itself, in that the use of microwave satellite technology makes the satellites much smaller and lighter, meaning that they are far more economical to launch. One spacecraft is schedule to go into orbit in December 2009, and the current plan is for six more, to be completed in mid 2011. Early 2010 service will be commercially available via a fixed fee system – with the fee dependent on the amount of information and its frequency of delivery — charged annually. www.exactEarth.com
Inséré le 23 juillet 2010 Logboek News Enlevé le 23 aout 2010 Oil and Tankers, a Volatile Cost Mix
30 April 2010 Getting the goods to market is what all product businesses are about and key to that is transport. In the international sphere that means shipping. For as long as oil has been around the role of tankers has been indispensa-ble. But for the oil industry and oil consumers just what does it cost to get the oil to market and are tankers doing a good job? Our Graph of the Week highlights the key components in this business chain.
Inflating Oil….
The cost of oil is represented by the average price of Saudi Arabian Light (the bars). And it‘s been on a pretty sharp upward trend in recent years. During the 1990s it was consistently below $20/bbl - as low as $10.94/bbl in 1998. During the first half of this decade the price eased its way up to over $40/bbl and since then has been in excess of $60/bbl, peaking at over $95/bbl in 2008. In the first quarter of this year it has averaged $77.30/bbl. That means oil this year is 4½ times the price it was in the 1990s and is 2½ times the price of the early 2000s. A Spiky Mixture The lines in the graph show the share of transport cost in getting the oil to market by VLCC. The upper one is for delivering oil to the West and the lower one to the East.
In the period up to 2004, average transport costs were around $1.50/bbl to the West and $1.03/bbl to the East, but their share of delivered cost was particularly volatile. There was rarely more than one year‘s movement in either direction.
The spikes in 1991 and particularly in 1998, when transport costs peaked at 12% of the delivered cost, were more the result of falling oil prices. Only the spike in 2004 to 8+% of delivered cost could be levelled at sharply rising freight. Rising Costs, Falling Shares Since 2004 the share of freight in delivered cost has declined; that‘s somewhat perverse given that in these years tanker owners experienced some of their best ever earnings. Transport costs to the West fell from over 8% of delivered cost to about 3% and to the East from almost 7% to 2½% of delivered cost. They now stand at around $2.44/bbl to the West and $2.08/bbl to the East.
Moreover, apart from 2009 when freight rates slumped, transport costs are now lower than at any time since 2004, while the price of oil has more than doubled. Nevertheless, they are now double what they were in the 1990s; but as we have seen the comparative increase in oil prices was more than fourfold. Consumer’s Friend? So, getting oil to the market has become pretty costly and consumers are the ones having to pay. For the oil producers and the oil companies it‘s the price of oil that matters most as they would most likely happily attest. But transport matters and shipping markets can at least take some credit for keeping the relative cost of freight in check.
Inséré le 25 juillet 2010 Logboek News Enlevé le 25 aout 2010
Navies ‘release’ 400 Somali pirates
There is a complete lack of political will to prosecute pirates caught in the Gulf of Aden with naval forces in the region estimated to have released as many as 400 without charge, SMI can reveal. Up to time of writing, it was understood that of this total, the British Royal Navy had released 66 pirates, the Dutch had sent pirates packing with food and water and there were unconfirmed reports that Kenyan authorities had not detained any pirates since September last year. Nairobi is known to want to renegotiate the agreements it has with the European Union, UK and US navies and as such was believed to be refusing to take any more pirates until the situation had been sorted out. Stephen Askins, a partner at Ince & Co in London, said the trend showed that while the rewards for hijacking ships continued to grow ―almost unchecked – and many of the pirates can‘t believe the sums of money they are receiving‖, the risks involved in attacking a ship are getting smaller. Mr Askins said there was a steady rate of attrition in the area with statistics pointing to a 50% drop in attacks on ships in the Gulf of Aden. Owners had to remember that if an attack on a ship was unsuccessful there was every chance the pirates would remain in the region. Ransoms being paid were also increasing, he said, with one vessel reported to have been recently released for $7.4 million and another for between $5.5m and $7m.
―There is a problem at the heart of this with the responders and negotiators - some are good and some are not but none have an innate understanding of shipping. You have an example of a responder sitting across the table from an owner who doesn‘t know the difference between a voyage charter and a time charter and doesn‘t think it matter,‖ Mr Askins said.
Inséré le 25 juillet 2010 Logboek News Enlevé le 25 aout 2010 New Somali pirate security force launched
A ‗non-profit‘ organisation that promises to solve the problem of inadequate naval protection of ships transiting the pirate-infested Gulf of Aden by offering all vessels armed escorts has been set up by a Russian ex-Master in Cyprus.
Known as the International Law Enforcement Agency, it said its plan is to be funded by IMO member states while allowing individual ship owners and managers the opportunity to ‗purchase‘ custom-made security solutions for their individual vessels. Nikolay Khovrin, a director of the agency, said that while 157 flag states had pledged to work to fight piracy on the high seas, ―the majority of flag states do not have naval assets and qualified manpower to meet their counter-piracy obligations under UNCLOS. ―That is why it is our aim to offer such capacity to ship owners on behalf of his flag state and without undue cost. Our primary task is to provide sea marshals and ship security details onboard armed RHIBs.‖ He added: ―As we forecasted last year the piracy in Somali basin has proved to be a long-term problem. Failing nations of the region are steadily becoming criminal states with piracy as their major revenue. There is no any sign from the developed countries that they can seriously tackle the problem. Regional politics signal more violent conflicts and therefore threats to navigation in the area for years to come. This points to a full scale war at sea that ship owners, operators and flag states can hardly imagine.‖ Mr Khovrin said the use of RHIBs meant that no weapons would be carried onboard any of the ships being escorted and that any use of force at sea would be limited to the self- defence of the members of the vessel protection detachment (VPD) or visit, board, search and seizure (VBSS) teams. ―Generally the use of force is restricted to the time when the VPD/VBSS team is on patrol at sea and not onboard the target vessel. It can be expressly agreed with the flag State and the ship owner that no firearms are used or carried or loaded for use onboard the target vessel and within less than 500 m from the target vessel,‖ he said.
Inséré le 25 juillet 2010 Logboek News Enlevé le 25 aout 2010
ITIC reimburses cash stolen by Somali pirates
THE International Transport Intermediaries Club (ITIC) has paid out a claim in respect of a sum of money stolen from the safe on board a ship managed by one of its members after the ship had been boarded by Somali pirates.
In the latest issue of its Claims Review, ITIC reports that, after the pirates had boarded the ship, they opened fire on the accommodation block and entered the bridge. Once under the control of the pirates, the ship was forced to alter course for Somalia, where it was detained by the pirates for some months before being released. Before releasing the ship, the pirates stole a number of items from it, including a cash box located in a safe kept in the master‘s cabin. The cash box included the sum of $15,000 which had been placed on board by the ship manager. Because the manager had taken out ‗cash on board‘ insurance, the stolen money was duly reimbursed in full to the ship manager by ITIC.
Under the terms of ITIC‘s cash on board insurance, money can be covered when kept in a locked safe on the ship. ITIC also provides a range of cover for managers and agents in respect of money carried temporarily in their care while in transit to a ship. The cover can be extended to money, including petty cash, kept in the manager‘s office or at his home overnight.
Inséré le 27 juillet 2010 Logboek News Enlevé le 27 aout 2010
Tall Ships’ Race 2010 - Le parrainage de la LMB : une réalité !
Pas moins de 15 jeunes ont pu, grâce au parrainage de la LMB, embarquer à Anvers le 13 juillet 2010 à bord d‘un des grands voiliers qui participent actuellement à la Tall Ships‘ Race 2010. Cette régate, unique en son genre, est organisée annuellement par la Sail Training International (STI) La STI est représentée en Belgique par la Sail Training Association Belgium vzw. (STAB). La LMB a réuni 15 jeunes trainees, âgés entre 15 et 25 ans, originaires des quatre coins de la Belgique. 14 trainees dont 3 jeunes filles ont embarqué à bord du navire école norvégien « SV Christian Radich », un splendide trois- mâts barque de 62 m de longueur et construit en 1937, réputé être un des plus rapide parmi les grands voiliers actuellement à flot. Un trainee a embarqué à bord du yacht belge « Antwerp Flyer ».
La première étape de la régate a mené pas moins de 75 voiliers, comptant plus de 3.000 membres d‘équipage, d‘Anvers à Aalborg au Danemark où les navires sont attendus le 21 juillet 2010. Les voiliers se rendront ensuite à Kristiansand d‘ou le départ de la deuxième étape vers Hartlepool en Angleterre sera donné le 29 juillet 2010. L‘embarquement des trainees de la LMB s‘est effectué le 13 juillet tôt matin dans la bonne humeur. Le temps était radieux. Le « SV Christian Radich » et le « Antwerp Flyer » ont participé dans l‘après-midi à la grande parade de la voile qui s‘est déroulée sur la rade d‘Anvers. Le départ officiel de la régate a été donné le lendemain 14 juillet 2010 à 11 heures au large de Zeebrugge.
Le vent, bien établi au SSO - force 5 avec une mer modérée, a permis à de nombreux voiliers de réaliser des temps records de traversée (840 miles) entre Zeebrugge et la ligne d‘arrivée au large du Jutland. L‘on parle déjà de l‘une des étapes la plus rapide qu‘a connu la Tall Ships‘ Race. Le « SV. Christian Radich » a parcouru la distance à une vitesse moyenne de pas moins de 10 nœuds ce qui, pour un voilier de cette taille, est une excellente performance. Aussi le « SV Christian Radich » s‘est classé deuxième des navires de la classe A (plus de 50m de longueur) juste derrière le navire « Sorlandet » battant également pavillon norvégien.
Les trainees de la LMB sont attendus à Anvers le 23 juillet 2010 à l‘issue de la première étape de la Tall Ships‘ Race 2010. Dès leur retour vous pourrez partager avec nous sur ce site les expériences vécues par les trainees et vivre avec nous les moments forts de cette régate. ‗A travers cette initiative la LMB cherche à mettre des jeunes belges en contact avec le milieu maritime et de sensibiliser ceux-ci aux diverses possibilités de construire une carrière intéressante et active à l‘intérieur du secteur maritime de notre pays. La Ligue Maritime Belge asbl a pu mettre cette initiative sur pied grâce à l‘appui de ses sponsors. Parmi ceux-ci il convient de citer l‘Union Royale des Armateurs Belges asbl, le Collège Royal Maritime Belge asbl, la Mercatorkring et les vzw. Jachthaven Willemdok-Antwerpen et Linkeroever.
Pour de plus amples informations sur la Tall Ships‘ Race 2010 visitez le site de la STI : www.sailtraininginternational.org
Tall Ships’ Race 2010 – Sponsoring door de BZB : een werkelijkheid !
Dankzij het sponsoring initiatief van de BZB zijn niet minder dan 15 jongeren op 13 juli 2010 in Antwerpen ingescheept op een van de grote zeilschepen die thans aan de Tall Ships‘ Race 2010 deelnemen. Deze zeilwedstrijd, enig in zijn soort, wordt jaarlijks door Sail Training International (STI) georganiseerd. De STI wordt in België door de Sail Training Association Belgium vzw. (STAB) vertegenwoordigd. De BZB heeft voor dit sponsoring project niet minder dan 15 jongeren geselecteerd die, allen tussen 15 en 25 jaar oud, afkomstig zijn uit de vier hoeken van België. 14 trainees, waaronder 3 meisjes zijn ingescheept op het Noorse opleidingsschip ―SV. Christian Radich‖, een prachtig driemast bark, lengte 62 m. en in 1937 gebouwd. Dit schip staat bekend als een van de snelste van de grote zeilschepen die thans nog in de vaart zijn. Een trainee is aangemonsterd aan boord van het zeiljacht ―Antwerp Flyer‖.
Niet minder dan 75 zeilschepen, met meer dan 3.000 bemanningsleden aan boord, zijn voor de eerste etappe vanuit Antwerpen vertrokken naar het Deense Aalborg waar de schepen op 21 juli 2010 worden verwacht. Van daaruit zal deze armada naar Kristiansand varen waar de start van het tweede deel van de race naar het Britse Hartlepool op 29 juli 2010 wordt gegeven.
De inscheping van de BZB trainees vond plaats vroeg in de morgen op 13 juli 2010. De geestdrift was alom te lezen op de gezichten van de jonge trainees. Het was een prachtig zomerse dag. De ―SV. Christian Radich‖ en de ―Antwerp Flyer‖ hebben in de namiddag deelgenomen aan de grootste en feestelijke zeilparade op de rede van Antwerpen. De volgende dag op 14 juli 2010 had om 11 uur de officiële start van de regatta plaats buiten-gaats Zeebrugge.
Er stond een ZZW wind – windkracht 5 met een matige zee. Deze wind zou heel wat van de deelnemende zeilschepen toelaten de 840 zeemijlen tussen de start in Zeebrugge en de aankomstlijn ter hoogte van Jutland in een recordtijd af te leggen. Het zou een van de snelste etappes worden ooit gevaren tijdens een van de Tall Ships‘ Races. De ―SV Christian Radich‖ haalde over deze etappe een gemiddelde snelheid van iets over 10 knopen. Voor een schip van deze grote was het heel zeker een mooi resultaat. De ―SV. Christian Radich‖ klasseerde zich dan ook als tweede in de rangschikking van de A klas schepen net achter het Noorse zeilschip ―Sorlandet‖
De trainees van de BZB worden bij het einde van de eerste etappe vanuit Aalborg terug in Antwerpen verwacht op 23 juli 2010. Eens terug zal U op deze site kunnen delen in hun reiservaringen en met hen de spannende momenten van deze unieke zeilervaring mogen beleven. Met dit initiatief poogt de BZB Belgische jongeren in voeling te brengen met het maritiem milieu en hen te wijzen op de talrijke boeiende loopbaanmogelijkheden die zich in het maritiem milieu van ons land aanbieden. Dit initiatief werd mogelijk gemaakt door de steun die de Belgische Zeevaartbond vzw ontvangen heeft vanwege tal van sponsors waaronder de Koninklijke Belgische Reders Vereniging vzw., het Koninklijk Belgisch Zeemanscollege vzw. en de vzw‘s Jachthaven Willemdok-Antwerpen en Linkeroever. Wenst U meer te vernemen over de Tall Ships‘ Race 2010, bezoek dan de STI website: www.sailtraininginternational.org