IAI COMMENTARIES 18 | 38 - JULY 2018 ISSN 22532-6570 © 2018 IAI 1 Political Science at theCatholic University of Milan. Giorgia Perletta isPh.D. Candidate in Institutions and Policies within theDepartment of class-labor-economy/551690 archive/2018/01/-protest-mashaad-green- https://www.theatlantic.com/international/ in Protests”, 1 towns. spread to over 85 cities and provincial of ,from where theyquickly Khorasan province, in the holy city Protests erupted inthenorth-eastern impeding popular revolution inIran. in theWest that seemedtopoint toan somewhat exaggerated mediacoverage in various Iranian cities, resulting in In late 2017,localized protests erupted between Iran andits adversaries. ground inthedecades-long struggle country areemergingasthenewbattle economic andpolitical trendsinthe pressure against , internal socio- its allies seektoramp-up economic nuclear deal andasWashington and to prevent thecollapse of theIranian With the European Union struggling by Giorgia Perletta The Caseof Khuzestan Province Socio-Economic Challenges inIran: Street Protests and

Asef Bayat, “The Fire That Fueled the Iran Iran the Fueled That Fire “The Bayat, Asef 1 The Atlantic The , 27 January 2018, 2018, , 27January . 2018, Discrimination”, in State-Sanctioned to Protest Khuzestan in 3 fortunes-in-iran recent-protests-could-revive-ahmadinejad-s- atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/iransource/how- Iran”, in in Fortunes Ahmadinejad’s Revive Could 2 the authorities. Iran, leading to severe crackdowns by Khuzestan province insouth-western in , theregional capital of the several cities and regions, including demonstrations have continued in but sincetheprotests ended,sporadic Ahmadinejad andhisallies were former Iranian president Mahmoud Many observers concluded that the involvement of Ahmadinejad, support base.Othershave questioned Ahmadinejad’s political rhetoric and between theprotesters demandsand not least due tothesimilarity somehow involved intheseprotests,

Ahmad Majidyar, “ Stage Rallies Rallies Stage Arabs “Iranian Majidyar, Ahmad Giorgia Perletta, “How Recent Protests Protests Recent “How Perletta, Giorgia https://www.mei.edu/node/57545 IranSource . 3 , 18 June 2018, June 2018, , 18 Iran Observed http://www. , 30 March March , 30 . 2

Street Protests and Socio-Economic Challenges in Iran: The Case of Khuzestan Province

Protests against the central Figure 1 | Geographical location of government have been a reoccurring Khuzestan province in Iran trend in Khuzestan. For decades, the province represented a significant source of instability in the country, even when it enjoyed the status of a semi-autonomous “emirate” named “Arabistan” until 1925. © 2018 IAI Dynamics in the province are different compared to other regions. Distinguishing factors include the mixed Arab and Persian population, energy and natural resource concentration and a complex history of relations with the central authorities in Source: Mostafa Salehi-Vaziri et al., “An Outbreak Tehran. of Crimean-Congo Hemorrhagic Fever in the ISSN 2532-6570 South West of Iran”, in Jundishapur Journal Other regions are also witnessing of Microbiology, Vol. 10, No. 1 (January 2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.5812/jjm.41735. protests. One example is the south- eastern province of Sistan and often explained through the prism of Baluchestan, another area with a high- religion, ethnicity and, in the former concentration of ethic minorities and a case, Arab-Persian tensions. province that has long been a hotbed of activism against the central authorities. Such perspectives offer a somewhat Bordering Pakistan and Afghanistan, simplistic analysis, however. Rather, this province suffers a lack of services socio-economic inequality, poverty and a severe drug trafficking problem. and pollution (i.e. the infamous Further tensions stem from the example of the river crossing resentment of the predominantly the Khuzestan province) and a Sunni Balochi minority that inhabit shortage of health facilities, roads the province. Baloch armed groups and infrastructure stand at the origin have engaged in a long insurgency of popular grievances.5 For example, campaign against the central recent protests in , authorities in both Iran and Pakistan, another city in Khuzestan province, leading to a significant Iranian military were due to sever water contamination.6 presence in the province.4

The reoccurrence of protests in Iran, 5 and particularly in the Khuzestan and “How Iran’s Khuzestan Went from Wetland to Wasteland”, in The Guardian Iran blog, 16 April Sistan and Baluchestan provinces, is 2015, https://gu.com/p/47fap. 6 “Protest Over Water Scarcity Turns Violent In Southwestern Iran”, in RFE/RL’s Radio Farda, 1 4 Nicholas Cappuccino, “Baluch Insurgents in July 2018, https://www.rferl.org/a/protest-over- Iran”, in The Iran Primer, 5 April 2017, http:// water-scarcity-turns-violent-in-southwestern- iranprimer.usip.org/node/3931. iran/29330155.html. IAI COMMENTARIES 18 | 38 - JULY 2018 18 | 38 - JULY IAI COMMENTARIES

2 Street Protests and Socio-Economic Challenges in Iran: The Case of Khuzestan Province

Khuzestan province enjoys the highest According to a 2011 census, concentration of energy resources unemployment reached 53 per cent in Iran, with an estimated 85 per in many towns of the area, making cent of oil reserves and 60 per cent Khuzestan the province with the of gas reserves.7 Nonetheless, its highest unemployment rate in Iran, residents, particularly the Iranian-Arab followed by Sistan and Baluchestan.12 community, accounting for less than While the unemployment rate has 2 per cent of the Iranian population diminished recently according to 8

© 2018 IAI (estimated at 80 million in 2016), government figures, Khuzestan is still have long been subject to political, among the five regions with the highest economic and social marginalization. inactivity levels in the whole country. Last April, Ahvaz witnessed further demonstrations, this time sparked by In a very delicate phase for the Islamic a controversial television programme Republic of Iran, considering the efforts described as discriminatory towards of the US and its allies to weaken Iran’s the ethnically Arab population of Iran.9 economy, the reoccurrence of protests in Khuzestan and other regions could ISSN 2532-6570 In 2016, Hassan Rouhani, President of represent a significant risk for the the Islamic Republic of Iran, launched system’s stability. three oil development projects in collaboration with Chinese firms with Provocative statements by and the aim of improving oil production , some of which are no in the province.10 Today, 350 thousand doubt aimed at increasing tensions barrels of oil per day are being produced within Iran, have today married in the joint fields of West Karun and with the anti-Tehran obsessions of Azar.11 Despite the promise of more US neoconservatives in the Trump equal development projects, living administration. The US’s unilateral conditions have not improved and withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal remain a source of popular discontent. was followed by calls by Mike Pompeo, the US’s new Secretary of State, to impose the “strongest sanctions in 13 7 US Energy Information Administration (EIA), history” on Iran. Country Analysis Brief: Iran, last updated 9 April 2018, https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/ Pompeo’s speech included twelve analysis.php?iso=IRN. demands that sound more like an 8 Statistical Center of Iran, Census 2016 - General Results, https://www.amar.org.ir/ “ultimatum” than a serious attempt english/Population-and-Housing-Censuses/ at diplomacy. Iran has categorically Census-2016-General-Results. 9 Saeid Jafari, “Iran’s TV Censors Draw Ridicule, Protests”, in Al-Monitor, 26 April 2018, http:// 12 “Which provinces in Iran, the 60% of their almon.co/31fa. people are unemployed?” (in Farsi), in Tabnak, 10 “3 Oil Projects Launched in Khuzestan http://www.tabnak.ir/fa/news/735251. Province”, in Financial Tribune, 14 November 13 US Department of State, After the Deal: A 2016, https://financialtribune.com/node/53546. New Iran Strategy, Remarks by Secretary of 11 “West Karoon, Azar Oilfields Yielding 350,000 State Mike Pompeo at The Heritage Foundation, b/d: PEDEC”, in Shana, 5 February 2018, https:// Washington, 21 May 2018, https://www.state. www.shana.ir/en/newsagency/281253. gov/secretary/remarks/2018/05/282301.htm. IAI COMMENTARIES 18 | 38 - JULY 2018 18 | 38 - JULY IAI COMMENTARIES

3 Street Protests and Socio-Economic Challenges in Iran: The Case of Khuzestan Province

refused the US diktat and is looking to Most importantly, during periods Europe and other states to preserve the of isolation and closure, it was the Iran nuclear deal and keep investments conservative hardliners in Iran – flowing. the Islamic Revolutionary Guards in particular – that benefitted, as these The current political, military and actors control the black market and economic pressure on Iran is indeed important elements of the economy in aimed at exploiting socio-economic the country.14

© 2018 IAI challenges to exacerbate internal tensions. The reintroduction of Against this backdrop of heightening sanctions could provoke a further tensions and efforts to weaken the crisis in Iran’s banking and commercial Iranian government from within, it system, exacerbating the situation of will fall to Europe, and in particular unemployed youth, low-wage workers the EU3+1 (Germany, France and the and subaltern classes. Washington UK, plus the EU High Representative and its allies are essentially engaged in Federica Mogherini) to find creative economic warfare against Iran, seeking means to keep the deal alive. ISSN 2532-6570 to prevent international actors from investing in the country or buying its Important in this regard will be to oil as a means to collapse the regime devise a mechanism that will allow from within. Iran to strengthen its economy, through investments and oil exports. In this scenario, popular protests Economic growth and opportunities could become more frequent to the in Iran represent the main avenue point of undermining Rouhani’s to guarantee political stability and government. Government efforts to avoid a return of more radical forces promote economic development are (such as the followers of the previous dependent on the removal of sanctions president, Ahmadinejad) that have and Iran’s gradual re-integration in the traditionally gained the most from international economy. In this context, Iran’s international isolation. Iran must seek to better integrate outlaying regions and peripheries, Ultimately, sanctions and containment limiting the existence of elements that cannot be described as a recipe for can be exploited by external actors and regional stability. Rather, these will regional adversaries. likely result in further chaos and instability, both in the unlikely event Sanctions have proven ineffective in of a collapse of the Iranian regime, or the past to change the posture of the in the eventuality that more hard-line Iranian government (and that of other forces return to power in Teheran. countries). Instead, they have generally exacerbated internal tensions while worsening the daily lives of ordinary citizens. 14 Nader Habibi, “Can Rouhani Revitalize Iran’s Oil and Gas Industry?”, in Middle East Briefs, No. 80 (June 2014), http://www.brandeis.edu/ crown/publications/meb/meb80.html. IAI COMMENTARIES 18 | 38 - JULY 2018 18 | 38 - JULY IAI COMMENTARIES

4 Street Protests and Socio-Economic Challenges in Iran: The Case of Khuzestan Province

Now is time to learn from history and devise a means to responsibly engage with Iran without falling prey to the errors of the past, particularly when it comes to the avoidance of abrupt – and often foreign imposed – changes to the political systems of Middle Eastern states. © 2018 IAI 10 July 2018 ISSN 2532-6570 IAI COMMENTARIES 18 | 38 - JULY 2018 18 | 38 - JULY IAI COMMENTARIES

5 Street Protests and Socio-Economic Challenges in Iran: The Case of Khuzestan Province

Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) Founded by Altiero Spinelli in 1965, IAI does research in the fields of foreign policy, political economy and international security. A non-profit organisation, IAI aims to further and disseminate knowledge through research studies, conferences and publications. To that end, it cooperates with other research institutes, universities and foundations in Italy and abroad and is a member of various international networks. More specifically, the main research sectors are: European institutions and policies; Italian foreign policy; trends in the global economy and internationalisation processes in Italy; the Mediterranean and the Middle © 2018 IAI East; defence economy and policy; and transatlantic relations. IAI publishes an English- language quarterly (The International Spectator), an online webzine (Affarinternazionali), two book series (Quaderni IAI and IAI Research Studies) and some papers’ series related to IAI research projects (Documenti IAI, IAI Papers, etc.).

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