Document of The World Bank

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Public Disclosure Authorized

Report No.: 17994

Public Disclosure Authorized IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

FIFTH ROADS REHABILITATION AND MAINTENANCE PROJECT (LOAN 3350-DO) Public Disclosure Authorized

June 2, 1998

Finance, Private Sector and Infrastructure Sector Management Unit Country Management Department III Latin America and the Caribbean Region Public Disclosure Authorized

This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization. CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

1.00 US$ = RD 14.02 (Dominican Pesos) I RD = 0.0713

WEIGHTS AND MEASURES

Metric System

FISCAL YEAR OF BORROWER

January 1 - December 31

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

DAEP Department of Pavement Administration and Evaluation DGET General Directorate of Equipment and Transport DGMCCV General Directorate of Maintenance for Highways and Rural Roads DGPI General Directorate of Investment Planning GDP Gross Domestic Product GORD Government of the Dominican Republic HDM-Q Highway Design and Maintenance Model - Version Q ICR Implementation Completion Report IDB Inter American Development Bank LCSFP Finance, Private Sector and Infrastructure SAR Staff Appraisal Report SEOPC Secretariat of Public Works and Communications VPN Net Present Value

Vice President: Shahid Javed Burki Sector Management Unit Director: Danny Leipziger Country Management Unit Director: Orsalia Kalantzopoulos Task Manager: Jose Maria Alonso-Biarge FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

IMPLEMENTATIONCOMPLETION REPORT

DOMINICANREPUBLIC

FIFTH ROADSREHABILITATION AND MAINTENANCEPROJECT (LOAN3350-DO)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page PREFACE ...... i EVALUATION SUMMARY...... ii PART I. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION ASSESSMENT ...... 1 A. STATEMENT/EVALUATION OF OBJECTIVES ...... 1 B. ACHIEVEMENT OF OBJECTIVES ...... 3 C. MAJOR FACTORS AFFECTING THE PROJECT ...... 7 D. PROJECT SUSTAINABILITY ...... 9 E. BANK PERFORMANCE ...... 10 F. BORROWER PERFORMANCE ...... 12 G. ASSESSMENT OF OUTCOME ...... 13 H. FUTURE OPERATIONS ...... 14 I. KEYLESSONS LEARNED ...... 15 PART II. STATISTICAL ANNEXES ...... 19 Table 1: Summary of Assessments ...... 21 Table 2: Related Bank Loans/Credit ...... 22 Table 3: Project Timetable ...... 23 Table 4a: Loan Disbursement ...... 23 Table 4b: Retention Payments ...... 23 Table 5: Key Indicators for Project Implementation . .24 Table 6: Key Indicators for Project Operation .. 24 Table 7: Studies Included in Project .. 25 Table 8a: Project Costs .. 26 Table 8b: Project Financing .. 26 Table 9: Economic Cost and Benefits .. 27 Table 10: Status of Legal Covenants .. 28-30 Table 11: Compliance with Operational Statements . .31 Table 12: Bank Resources: Staff Inputs .. 31 Table 13: Bank Resources: Missions .. 32 Appendix A: Completion Mission's'Aide Memoire . .35 Appendix B: Borrower's Contribution to the ICR . . 55

This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization. IMPLEMENTATIONCOMPLETION REPORT

DOMINICANREPUBLIC

FIFTH ROADS MAINTENANCEAND REHABILITATIONPROJECT (LOAN 3350-DO)

PREFACE

This is the Implementation Completion Report (ICR) for the Fifth Rehabilitation and Maintenance Project in the Dominican Republic, for which Loan 3350-DO in the amount of US$79 million equivalent was approved on June 20, 1991 and made effective on December2, 1992.

The original closing date was December 31, 1996. The loan was extended for one year and closed on December 31, 1997. A grace period of four months for disbursementof eligible withdrawal applications expired on April 30, 1998. On that date only retention payments from civil works, used as additional performance security, remained undisbursed for a total of about US$1.2 million equivalent. The Borrower requested, and the Bank approved on April 16, 1998, based on OP 13.30 para. 4 (c), an extension exclusivelyfor retention payments of civil works to December31, 1998.

This ICR was prepared by Messrs. Jose Maria Alonso-Biarge (LCSFP) and Dorian Vitlalba (local consultant) and reviewed by Messrs. Max Pulgar-Vidal and Orville Grimes, and Ms. Maria Victoria Lister of the Latin Americaand the CaribbeanRegion.

Preparationof the ICR was begun during the Bank's final supervisionin December 1997. It is based on material in the project file and discussionswith the Borrower. The Borrower contributed to the preparation of the ICR by preparing an operational plan, and providingstatistical data and a retrospective assessment of the project. EVALUATION SUMMARY-

FIFTH ROADS REHABILITATIONAND MAINTENANCEPROJECT (LOAN 3350-DO)

DOMINICANREPUBLIC

Introduction i. The project followed four previous successfuloperations between 1976 and 1986 (Loans 1316-T-DO, 1783-DO,1784-DO, and 2609-DO)in the road sector of the DominicanRepublic.

Project Objectives ii. The followingwere the main objectives of the project: (a) to bring the highway network to acceptable operating standards through a program of road rehabilitation and periodic and routine maintenance;(b) to improve and strengthenthe institutionalcapability of the Secretariat of Public Works (SEOPC) to plan and maintain the road system; (c) to increase the availability of road operatingequipment; (d) to improve the quality of pavements and pavement construction techniques;(e) to strengthenthe domestic constructionindustry.

Achievementof Objectives iii. The objectives of the project were substantially achieved, as the evaluations and the indicator used to measure traffic developmentconfirm; the latter is also evidence of an increase in economic activity. As regards physical objectives, paved roads classified as being in good condition increasedfrom 43% to 81% of the total over the 1987-97period, while the increase for the completeroad system (including unpaved sections)was from 33.8% to 65.3%. This outcome has also a considerableimpact on transportationcosts, increases in traffic volume, and savings in travel time. iv. Another achievement of the project -- brought about by a legal covenant included in the Loan Agreement -- is that road maintenanceand rehabilitationis now financed by the users, this being a fundamental principle for the Bank. Currently, and in sharp contrast to the situation prevailing at the time of project preparation, the users' contribution is 47% larger than the maintenanceand rehabilitationcosts. v. The rehabilitation and periodic maintenance programs included in the project, with support in the form of a massive road rehabilitation program that the Government of the Dominican Republic (GODR) was simultaneously implementing, contributed toward bringing the road network up to a good operational standard, in keeping with local economic activities, and without being in any way overscale. UJnderthe project, 613 km of roads that had been in poor conditionwere upgraded to good condition,surface treatment was applied to 345 km, and a total of 958 km received periodic maintenance and rehabilitation. It should be noted that this iii was the first time all periodic maintenance work had been performedunder contract by private enterprises,and the first time that a Bank-financedrehabilitation and maintenanceprogram in the Dominican Republic did not include projects financed by previous loans and did not leave unfinishedworks to be financed by a subsequentloan. vi. The services of consultants were used to provide the SEOPC with a management system for planning and supervising road maintenance, and this was well assimilated by the local counterpart, which took the form of a specialized unit within SEOPC's Directorate General of Highwaysand Rural Road Maintenance(DGMCCV). The consultants' main task was to provide for a transition (over the medium term) from the existing maintenance system, under which programsare executeddirectly by the GODR, to one in which the SEOPC contracts works out to the private sector. The Secretariat's capacity for managing such contracts was also to be increased.

vii. Satisfactoryresults were also achieved with the equipment management system and the programsfor rehabilitatingdamaged equipment,upgrading workshops, and acquiring spare parts for the maintenancefleet.

viii. Over the last five years, the upgrading of pavement quality -- whether with financing from the project or from other sources -- has been made possibleoverall by the Program for the Transfer of Technologies using Surface Treatments and Thin Asphalt Overlays. Under this program, surface treatments and thin overlays were applied, using new technologies, to 536 km of roads throughoutthe country. All componentsof the programwere completed satisfactorily, and the results have been used in the preparationof a new programthat is itself a component of Loan 4127-DO.

ix. The project also strengthened the domestic road constructionindustry, not only in the fields of reconstructionitself and the manufactureand applicationof asphalt products, but also as regards organizationalcapacity and quality of execution. This was achieved under supervision from consultants who also performed better and showed more independence, vis-a-vis the SEOPC, than in previous projects.

x. There was also (compared with previous projects) a considerable increase in SEOPC's management capacity for executing such a complex capital investment program. The close cooperationbetween the staff of the SEOPC and the Bank was a key element in achieving great progress in all aspects of the project (i.e. technical, administrative,and financial), to such an extent that SEOPC has adoptedsome of the improved practices-- especially those relating to the contractingout of works and services -- for contracts other than those financed by the Bank.

xi. The evaluation of the internal rate of return shows that capital investmentcosts were 1.8 times larger than had been calculated when the cormponentswere redesigned in order to adapt them to road conditions when the works actually began. There were considerable omissions in the redesigned versions, especially as regards drainage and the improvementof black spots and sections where the geometrical designs were deficient, so that -- at the construction stage -- SEOPC had decided to improve these. The results show that the internal rate of return for all iv projectswas reduced by an average of 56% (from the 43.4% quoted in the revised version of the SAR to 19.2% upon completion of the projects). Nevertheless,the same table shows that net present value increasedfrom US$36.2 million to US$49.4 million, the reason being the increase in capital investmentfrom US$51 million to US$89.5 million, despite the reductionin the rate of return. xii. To summarize, the economic indicators are satisfactory, although not to the extent anticipatedin the SAR. This is to be expected,because rehabilitation(which has a very high rate of return) were replaced by reconstruction(which has a lower rate), and no allowance was made when these works were evaluated for such important factors as increased safety and savings in travel time.

Major Factors Affectingthe Project xiii. For the following reasons, there were discrepanciesbetween the SAR objectives and the final results. xiv. Initial delays in loan effectiveness and contractingfor works: The project began to be prepared in 1987, and was completedin 1990. Nevertheless,the Loan Agreementwas not signed until June 1992, and the loan did not become effectiveuntil Decemberof that year, so that all the roads that had been appraised had suffered an additional period of deterioration amounting to nearly two years. This initial delay, combinedwith a slow start, led to substantialchanges in the types of work necessary, and this was immediately reflected in costs, many of which were considerablyincreased. xv. Changes in engineering standards: When (for the reasons already stated) it was determined that certain roads should be reconstructedrather than rehabilitated (as had been the original plan), SEOPC decided to correct the curves and gradients, thus increasing the comfort and safety of users, becausemost of the existing alignmentswere obsolete. xvi. Cost increases resulting from the need to prepare the new designs rapidly so as to avoid further deterioration and excessive delays to works; this led to sizable omissions, especially in the areas of drainage and earth moving. xvii. Flows of counterpart funds, which were affected because operations coincided with periods of electoral activity and -- in the second part of the project -- with the construction of the Duarte highway: This was financed by the GODR, and absorbed a substantial amount of its resources. Except for these events, the flow of counterpartfunds was satisfactory. xviii. The capacity of contractors: In general, delays occurred in works that were being perforned by contractors who were simultaneouslyresponsible for a number of contracts. This shows that there are limits to available constructioncapacity, even among the largest companies, and this factor will be taken into accountwhen works are contractedout under the new loan. v xix. Project management: In comparison with earlier projects, which were smaller and less complex, overall managementwas much better and more informed,and showed a greater sense of ownership of the project, both as a whole and in its separate components. A contributing factor was that the General Coordinatorand his staff remained in their positions, even when there were changes in the Governmentor even when the ruling party changed.

Project Sustainability xx. Despite some uncertainties,the project shows good prospects for sustainability, at both institutional and operational levels. Nevertheless, project sustainability will depend to a considerable degree on the application, management, and implementation of a suitable maintenance program that allows for substantial private-sector involvement. The new loan (4127-DO) includes programs and conditions which, if properly fulfilled, will ensure the sustainabilityof the results achievedduring this and previous road-relatedloans. As a result, and by the time 4127-DO is completed,the Dominican Republic could possess one of the best road systems in Latin America. xxi. An additional factor favoring sustainability is that the SEOPC has once again accepted the policy of hiring qualified specialists, offering them considerablyimproved salaries, and that its managementproblems are being seriously addressed by the GODR.

Bank Performance xxii. Four other Bank operations preceded this project, between 1976 and 1986. The experience gained from these was applied at the preparationstage, the purpose being to avoid repeating the mistakes identified in previous projects. These efforts were strengthened by the fact that this project was preparedby the same team that had supervisedthe previous one. xxiii. The SAR clearly identifiedthe main risks facing the project when it was prepared: weak maintenance organization,institutional constraints that could retard project implementation, the high turnover of staff within the SEOPC (requiring repetition of training programs for newcomers), and doubts about the timely availability of governmentfunds. Although it cannot be claimed that these risks completely disappeared during project implementation, they were very much reduced, and producedno negative impact. xxiv. From July 15, 1992to December 10, 1997,there were 15 supervisionmissions occupying 58.10 weeks. Although implementationwas to some degree uneven, especially during electoral campaigns or changes of government (which, as previously indicated, affected the flow of counterpartfunds), the indicators for implementationand the achievementof objectives were at all times satisfactory. An importantcontribution to this successwas the continuityof the Bank's project task manager over the entire life of the project, which alloweda positive dialogue with the SEOPC, timely identificationof issues and valuable assessmentof project progress. Without the intensity of Bank supervision, level of staff conmnitment,and its dedication and flexibility in seeking solutions to keep the projectviable and adapting to unforeseencircumstances, the project would not have eventuallyachieved most of its objectives. vi

BorrowerPerformance xxv. The GODR, through the SEOPC and the Technical Secretariat to the Presidency, providedactive support for the project,beginning from the time it was prepared. This marked a departurefrom previous projects, and was helped by the good relationshipwith the Bank team, which led to enhanced cooperationbetween the two parties. As a result of this cooperation,the SEOPC made a considerable contribution to project preparation and implementation. This marked a change from previous projects,and much of the credit must go to the good relationship with the Bank'steam, which alloweda productivedialogue and enhancedcollaboration between the two sides during the entire life of the project. One contributingfactor was the continuity not only of the Bank's task manager but of the of the SEOPC's General Coordinator together with his associatesas well, as it was mentionedbefore. xxvi. As regards implementation,omissions and errors in the designs of the civil works slowed down both the launching of operations and progress in the various components. Nevertheless, the SEOPC solved the problems, and later assumed responsibility for the cost overruns of the projects that continued to achieve adequate rates of return. Finally, the SEOPC assumed responsibility(using local resources)for the total financingof those sections that were completed after the Closing Date (i.e. in the first quarter of 1998).

xxvii. The fact that a program designed to be implemented in four years was completed in five and a half years, despite an initial delay of two years and during a period that included two presidential elections, indicates that considerable progress had been made over all previous projects, and is clear evidence that the GODR now possesses a more thorough understanding of Bank-financed projects and will be better able to respond to future investment, and that its implementationperformance has improved.

xxviii. One problem that persisted (althoughto a lesser degree than in previous projects) was the failure to provide counterpart funds in a timely manner. At some stages of implementation,this made it possible for contractors to claim that payments had been delayed on many occasions when such delays were not directly relatedto time overruns in the completionof works. In order to solve this problem, the 4127-DO Loan Agreement includes the condition that a Project Account (with an initial deposit equivalent to US$1.5 million) must be opened in the Reserve Bank, enabling the SEOPC to manage the local-currencyfinancing.

Assessment of Outcome

xxix. In general, the overall outcome of the project is satisfactory. Some aspects are very satisfactory,and the pavement technology transfer component,because it was innovative and had other special features, had the greatest impact and was the most cost-effective element in the whole project. The road rehabilitation and reconstruction program also had a considerable impact because it integrated into the system a large number of roads that were originally in poor condition. In general, the performance of the contractors was satisfactory. The important vii

contributionthis program made to the overall improvementof the system should be noted, the result being that less than 150 km of the main network remainsto be reconstructed,and this work will be financed under Loan 4127-DO.

xxx. The institutionaland managementobjectives of the project were also achieved, since the SEOPC has substantially improved its road maintenance methods, and the basic idea has been acceptedof contracting out routine and periodic maintenanceof the highway network to qualified private firms. The project also enabled the SEOPC to increase its capacityfor preparing bidding documents and contracts. Similarly, project coordination was organized at the highest level, so that decision-makingon problemswas prompt and efficient.

xxxi. Except for the road rehabilitationcomponent, in which the costs of several operations were significantlydifferent from those calculated in the SAR (for reasons already explained),the costs of all other componentswere very much in line with those assumed at appraisal.

Future Operations

xxxii. New Bank Loan: Loan 4127-DO,for the National Highway Project, became effective on November 10, 1997. It builds upon the experience gained with Loan 3350-DO,continuing and complementing its basic components,while at the same time introducing components that are totally new. These two categories of components together cover many of the activities that will be necessaryin the roads subsectorover the next five years.

xxxiii. Comprehensivecontracted maintenance: Over the next five years, the responsibilitiesfor maintenanceexercised since 1987 by the GODR and the Bank projects will be transferred to the pilotplan for comprehensivecontracted maintenance.

xxxiv. Local and rural roads: The Inter-AmericanDevelopment Bank is planning to finance an extensive program for contracting out the maintenance of the local roads system, covering 486 km of paved roads and about 5,000 km of all-weatherroads.

xxxv. Rehabilitation and maintenanceprograms for highways and local roads: The progress made so far has enabled the country to achieve high standards in its highway and local roads networks, and, to prevent this being jeopardized, it will be necessary to continue covering the system's maintenance and rehabilitationneeds, which are calculated to be about US$63 million at January 1998 prices. Of this amount, US$41 million is for highways and US$22 million for local and rural roads.

xxxvi. Extension of the road network: As regards new road construction, the GODR plans to improve the corridor crossing the capital (along Avenida 27 de Febrero and its continuation,the Avenida de las Americas), extend the coast road to San Pedro de Macoris as a "semiurban corridor", shorten the distance traveled from Santo Domingo to Samana (a tourist center in the far northeast of the country), and join the rities of Puerto Plata and Montecristi on the Atlantic coast, approachingthe frontier with Haiti. viii xxxvii. Toll roads: Finally, a loan-financedstudy of a possible freeway financed by the private sector and following the route running east through Santo Domingo-Airport-BocaChica-San Pedro de Macori and west through Santo Domingo-SanCrist6bal-Bani has shown such a project to be feasible technically, economically,and financially, and it has already been launched as a pilot project. This should make it possibleto prepare a general law on concessions,together with a programat national level.

Lessons Learned xxxviii. One notable lesson learned from this project is how much of its success was owed to the firm, open, and continuous cooperation between local staff and the Bank's supervision missions. Because of this sense of a common purpose, the parties were able to discuss each of the objectives, problems, and changes that arose, and final decisionscould be reached that were in keeping with the terms of the Loan Agreement,but which showedthe necessary flexibilityand took account of the range of options presented. Continuityof the Bank's task manager over the project period substantiallycontributed to that good understanding.

xxxix. On the other hand, the project demonstrated the undesirable effects of delaying implementation,whether this occurs because of problems relating to signatures, ratification by borrowers,or the failure to declare effectiveness in a timely manner. This can have particularly negative effects on projects that include sizable road rehabilitationand maintenance programs, because the deteriorationof the roads over time can change the type of works that are necessary, thus increasingtheir cost and affectingrates of return.

Xi. A further lesson is that the costs of civil works must be based on more conservative diagnosticstudies of the structuralcondition of the roads and on the implementationperiods for projects. In addition, designs for such works, which have conventionallybeen produced by the SEOPC, should be contracted out sufficientlyin advance to qualifiedconsulting firms, so as to avoid the types of problem that have occurred in this and previous projects.

xli. It has been clearly worthwhileto hire competentconsultants with the ability to carry out any studies necessitatedby departuresor changes from the SAR. Furthermore,such consultants will be able to train the local specialistswho act as their counterparts.

xlii. An steady flow of funds over the whole project implementationperiod to support the investment program and a minimal financial autonomy of the implementingagency are key elementsnot only to completethe work programnon time, but to avoid financialcosts claimed by the contractorsfor long delays in paymentsand subsequentcost overruns.

xliii. A road maintenance culture has been established as a result of the tremendous efforts made by the GODR and the Bank in the massive road rehabilitationand reconstructionprogram that has been in process of implementationsince 1987 and is due to be completed'in the year 2000. This culture, supported by the pilot 7rogram for contracted comprehensive maintenance will result in increased efficiency in the system and in the various agenciesresponsible for it, and this has already become evident in certain indicators. IMPLEMENTATIONCOMPLETION REPORT

DOMINICANREPUBLIC

FIFTH ROADSREHABILITATION AND MAINTENANCEPROJECT (LOAN3350-DO)

PARTI

PROJECTIMPLEMENTATION ASSESSMENT

A. Statement/Evaluationof Objectives

1. The key objectives of the project were to: (a) bring the highway network to acceptable operatingstandards througha programof rehabilitationand periodic and routine maintenance;(b) improve the institutional capability of the Secretariat of Public Works and Communications (SEOPC)to plan and maintain the road system; (c) increasethe availabilityof road maintenance equipment;(d) improve the quality of pavements and pavement constructiontechniques; and (e) strengthenthe domesticconstruction industry.

2. These objectiveswere a responseto the commitmentby the Governmentof the Dominican Republic (GODR)to help make certainthat the subprojectscomprising the projectand those being undertakendirectly by the GODR would have a notable impact on the primary roads system, in pursuitof the socioeconomicgoals and targets set for the country. This was to take the form of: (a) a more efficient highway system, thereby continuing the strategy begun with the previous loan (2609-DO)with the aim of rehabilitating1,813 km of roads (36% of the total network)that were in poor condition,through a reconstructionand rehabilitationprogram, with the loan fundingwork on 830 km and GODR providingfor the other 983 km; (b) institutionalstrengthening, particularly for planning and financialmanagement; and (c) contractingout more road work to the private sector, includingperiodic and routine maintenance.

3. The design of this project was essentially the same as that of its predecessor,with the exception of one innovative component,the Programfor the Transfer of Technologies using Surface Treatmentsand Thin Asphalt Overlays. This componentwas considerednecessary because of the antieconomicpractices and -- in some cases -- unsuitable technology being used in the country for periodic maintenanceof the road networkand asphaltpavement rehabilitation. Because the programwas complex, it proved difficultto shape and build it into the project, and to prepare documentationfor prequalificationof firms, bidding, and the Bank's and GODR's evaluation of bids.

4. From the Bank's standpoint, the component needed to be included for technical and economicreasons; here, the difficultieshad to do with the natureof the programitself, which called for the hiring of a single firm that had to be: (a) a state-of-theart manufacturerof improved 2 bitumens and asphalt binders; (b) able to apply those mixes in the field; and (c) able to supply expertsto provide technicalassistance for designs and laboratorystudies of asphalt mixes, and their on-siteapplication. The companywould have to subcontractor partner with a minimumnumber of local firms, to which it would transfer the new technology for them to use in the future. The contract was to include civil works, equipment procurement,and hiring of consultants,so as to increasethe program's chancesof success. However,this meant that different evaluation criteria would have to be appliedto each part of the bids, in order to comply with Bank proceduresand guidelines. The solutionultimately adopted was a very stringentprequalification process, which included the commitment to carry through a specified construction program using new technologies,a list of equipmentand laboratoryapparatus requirements,and a detailed technical assistance program, all of which was to be arranged through international bidding. Three companiesprequalified, and the contract was awardedto the firm submittingthe lowest evaluated bid conformingto the conditionsset out in the prequalification.

5. On the Borrower'sside, the difficulty laid in acknowledgingthat the country was not employinga suitabletechnology and that local contractorswould need to be trained by a foreign contractor. This was also the largest contractto be awardedunder the loan, costing US$16 million, a much larger amount than normal for contracts managed by the SEOPC. The agency would thereforehave preferredto reduce it in scale (but this would have made it ineffectual),or to increase the use of conventionaltechnology (hot-mix asphalt overlays) to a degree beyond what was necessaryfor improvingthe conditionsunder which such technology should be applied, thereby underminingthe spirit of the program.

6. Ultimately, after arduousnegotiations between the Bank's procurementadvisers and senior SEOPCofficials, the componentwas acceptedby both parties. As the SEOPCnow acknowledges, it has proved to be one of the most successful elements in the project, having contributed substantiallyto the achievementof objectives(b), (d) and (e). The other project objectiveswere, by and large,achieved.

Box 1. Summary of the project components

Accordingto the StaffAppraisal Report, the project was to comprise: (a) rehabilitationof 830 km of roads and supervisionof that work; (b) a programof periodicmaintenance to be executed by privatecontractors and SEOPC;(c) a workshopreconstruction program; (d) equipment rehabilitationincluding purchase of spareparts; (e) road signalingand marking and vehicle weight control;(f) technicalassistance for training equipmentoperators, pavement technology transfer,road maintenancemanagement, a rural roads inventory,an urban transportstudy for SantoDomingo, a constructionindustry study, generaltraining and study grants for SEOPC personnel;and (g) engineeringservices for road rehabilitationand reconstructiondesign. 3

B. Achievementof Objectives

7. Macroeconomic,social, and institutionaltargets achieved. One of the centralaims of the project was for it to have a strongimpact on transportationcosts, traffic generation,and travel times. These outcomes have been confirmedby ex post evaluations,the strongest indicatorsbeing for traffic generation,which impliesper se an increasein economicactivity whereverit is recorded. As for physicaltargets, between 1987 and 1997the percentageof asphalt roads in good condition rose from 43% to 81%,and the percentageof the total roadnetwork (paved and unpaved)in a good state of repair doubled,from 33.8%to 65.3%.

8. Road user charges. Another important achievementof the project, attained by way of a legal covenant in the Loan Agreement,is that road costs are being bome by users - this being a fundamentalprinciple for the Bank. The situation today is dramaticallydifferent from when the project was being prepared (in 1989 total user charges were insufficientto cover maintenance costs): today, levies paid by thoseusing public thoroughfaresare 47% higher than what it costs to maintainand rehabilitatethe roads. Virtually all (98%) of these funds come from fuel taxes, most of them from gasoline (i.e. for light vehicles). User charges brought in US$57.7 million in 1997, well above the US$39.2 million cost of road maintenance and rehabilitation. The total fuel differential,including city and other users, was US$264.4million, net of subsidies for energy, liquefiedgas, and others. Gasoline,at a price of US$1.71 per gallon (the average for leaded and unleadedfuel), pays for much of the pavement rehabilitationand reinforcementwork; the bulk of the damage sustained by roads -other than weather and age, which are responsiblefor 36% of deterioration- is causedby heavyvehicles powered by dieseloil, which costs US$0.93 a gallon.

9. Road rehabilitationand periodicmaintenance programs. These programs,which have received support simultaneouslyunder the government'smassive road rehabilitation campaign, have helped achieve the objective of bringing the highway network to acceptable operating standards, in keeping with local economic activities and without being in any way overscale. Thanks to the project, some 613 km of roads in poor conditionwere upgraded to good - 77% of them involving reconstructionand 23% needing periodic overlays using new asphalt pavement technologies. In addition, surfacetreatments were appliedto some 345 km of roads, giving a total of 958 km periodically maintained and rehabilitated. For the first time ever, all periodic maintenancework was contractedout to private firms, marking the start of a trend that will see routine maintenance likewise outsourced for the highway network during the period of Loan 4127-DO(for the National HighwayProject), which became effectiveon November 10, 1997. This is also the first time that a Bank-fundedrehabilitation and maintenanceprogram in the Dominican Republichas not includedprojects financed by previousloans, and the first time that no works were left unfinishedto be financedby a subsequentloan. 4

Box 2. Road improvements resulting from the project

The Dominican highway network is 4,950 km long, not counting sections that traverse large cities. In 1992, 3,885 km of the roads had asphalt pavement; 1,671 km of these (43%) were in good condition. None of the 1,065 km of dirt roads were in acceptable condition. Overall, then, in 1992 only 34% of the road system can be said to have been in good shape.

In 1997, the paving of 107 km of earth roads using project financing took the total asphalted network to 3,992 km and reduced the dirt-road total to 958 km. Rehabilitation and reconstruction work under the project and by the Government is improving (to "good" condition) 1,611 km, including the 107 km of dirt roads now paved (473 km rebuilt, 140 km of thin overlays, and 345 km of surface treatments under the program; and 653 km rebuilt by the Government).

10. Improving institutional capabilities for planning and maintaining the road system. The proposal in the SAR to equip SEOPC with a management system for road maintenance planning and control was accomplished by hiring consulting services, and was in large measure assimilated by the local counterpart, which was established in cooperation with the consultants and added as a specialized unit to the Road Maintenance Planning Department of SEOPC's Directorate General of Highways and Rural Road Maintenance. The consultants focused on devising a medium-range transition stage for the highway network, to move away from the current maintenance system with its SEOPC force-account programs toward one in which SEOPC would contract the work out to private firms, while at the same time they strengthened contract- management capacity in SEOPC. The program culminated with the consultants' proposal for a four-year comprehensive road maintenance plan (1998-2001) in which all highway maintenance will be carried out by contract, while SEOPC's labor and equipment would be assigned to maintenance by force account of rural roads. According to this, 25% of all maintenance other than emergency work (i.e., routine and periodic maintenance, short-range planning and management, and user assistance) would be contracted out in 1998, and a further 25% would be outsourced in each successive year until, by 2001, all such work would be performed externally. The contracts would be awarded to private firms through competitive bidding. Also to be in place by 2001 is a financial and administrative system, some elements of which will be: (a) a Road Fund and (b) a bureau of the Fund to manage maintenance contracts. On the basis of this proposal, the Bank decided to include the first outsourcing phase as a Pilot Plan for financing under loan 4127-DO, with technical assistance for instituting the system and supporting continued use of new technologies for periodic maintenance.

11. Increasing the availability of road maintenance equipment. Because it has traditionally done routine maintenance and some periodic maintenance itself, the SEOPC owned and operated a stock of maintenance equipment. Although the plan is to lay the groundwork for the SEOPC to contract out most maintenance, particularly in the highway network, it was considered preferable (in keeping with the phased-in approach adopted to reach the target) to bring in a system for the 5 management of SEOPC-owned equipment, and for the project to include a program for repairing damaged units, improving physical plant in shops, and buying the spare parts required for the maintenance fleet. Despite some minor difficulties, the program was carried through acceptably, although equipment availability (on which it was based) was altered when the SEOPC acquired 240 new machines in 1997, precluding any possibility of calculating fleet availability under the original conditions.

12. Improving pavement quality. Improvements in pavement quality in the past five years, whether funded by the project or from other sources, are the end result of the Program for the Transfer of Technologies using Surface Treatments and Thin Asphalt Overlays. The contract for this program, as noted earlier, was the largest in the project and the most complex, including as it did civil works, procurement of equipment and laboratory apparatus, training and technical assistance, and technology transfer. Once the program ended, the contractor also was to transfer the laboratories used during the contract to the SEOPC. All the components were completed satisfactorily; the findings and outcomes will be drawn upon for the component of Loan 4127-DO that involves treatments using the newly transferred technology.

13. Under the program, treatments and thin overlays were completed on 536 km of roads throughout the country. Some indirect effects on positive practices are: (i) more attention now is being paid to the quality of aggregates and quality control in all major SEOPC works projects; (ii) polymers are now being used as additives in bituminous binders; (iii) there is more competition for the manufacture and sale of emulsions, now that a new supplier (the contractor) has set up a plant other than the one in operation when the program began; (iv) emulsions and cold mixes are again being used, after many years, in SEOPC works projects; (v) surface improvements on pavements have clearly reduced user costs, relative to the cost of the improvements; and (vi) the role of SEOPC's Pavement Department has been strengthened, as a specialized unit in this area.

14. In short, the program has laid the foundations for these techniques to be developed and adopted by local contractors, and for more and more paving work to be done using those approaches. Pavement quality is superior to past works and, more importantly, these pavements cost less than traditional mixes and for the most part they perform better. The program also made it possible to acquire a laboratory designed for these technologies, and this now belongs to SEOPC. The pavement diagnostics unit set up on the Bank's advice (Pavement Management and Studies Department - DAEP) is equipped with falling weight deflectometers, roughometers, friction meters, traffic counters, portable scales to check axle loading, and other apparatus, and qualified staff have been selected for the unit. All of this has made for better pavement design parameters and better control of all road work.

15. Strengthening the domestic construction industry. Tied in directly to the advances discussed above is the strengthening, during the course of the project, of the domestic road construction industry and of the SEOPC, not only in the area of manufacture of asphalt mixes and their site application, but also in organizational capacity and implementation quality. Assistance here was provided by supervisory consultants, whose perforrnance and independence from SEOPC were an improvement over previous projects. The rehabilitation and technology-transfer projects directly -- and road rehabilitation and maintenance programs indirectly -- have helped nurture a 6

new technical and businessperspective in organizations,agencies, and companiesassociated with the road reconstructionand rehabilitationindustry. Other elementsthat have contributedhugely to these improvementsare the contractorprequalification requirement and better bidding documents, terms of reference, and specifications, which are now being used in all bidding processes. Nevertheless,although prequalificationrequirements were introduced, they can still stand to be fine-tunedand will be in the followingoperation.

16. Strengthening SEOPCproject managementcapabilities. One collateral objective that has proved to be far more productive than in previous Bank projects was the improvementin SEOPC's ability to manage an investment program as complex as the one under review here. Previous loans had revealed significant weaknesses in the local capacity for administering disbursementsor executingworks to the prescribedquality standards and within budget. Owing in large measure to the contractorprequalification methods adopted for all rehabilitationprojects and for the technology-transferprogram, and on the basis of documentsfurnished by the Bank for the program, contracts were awarded to the most qualified bidders. Close collaborationbetween SEOPCand Bank staff was key to the progressachieved in every facet of the project- technical, administrative,and financial; indeed, the SEOPC has adopted some of the improved practices, particularlythose pertainingto the contractingout of works and services,for contracts other than those financedby the Bank.

17. Economic evaluation. Consultantsassisting in the road maintenanceprogram evaluated internal rates of return for all the reconstructionand rehabilitationprojects. Because the scenario envisaged in the SAR no longer held (because the recommendedapproaches were no longer applicable,and all the projects had to be redesigned), it was not used for the comparisons;the appraisal of the revamped subprojects(redesigned before the work was done) was included as a reference. According to the evaluation,final investmentcosts were 1.8 times higher, on average, than the estimates in the revised designs, in which there were serious omissions, notably with regard to drainage and the improvement of black spots and sections where the geometrical designs were deficient, and which the SEOPC (advised by the supervisors) decided to upgrade during construction.

18. DAEP suppliedall the necessary data for evaluationsof traffic, final geometry,pavement and materials,deflection, and roughness. Usingthese data and the cost outturns,HDM-Q was used to performex post evaluationsthat were then comparedwith the evaluationsdone during the design revision(revised SAR in 1992). As Table 9 illustrates,the finding was a 56% drop, on average, in internal rate of return (from 43.4% in the revised SAR to 19.2%when the works were finished). Nevertheless,the table also shows a rise in net present value from US$36.2 million to US$49.4 million- the result of increasingthe total investmentfrom US$51million to US$89.5 million- even thoughthe returnwas lower.

19. To summarize: the economic indicators are satisfactory, although not as good as anticipatedin the SAR. This is to be expected, since rehabilitationworks promising very high returns were replaced by reconstructionprojects, which yield lower returns, and such important considerationsas increasedsafety and shortertravel times were not factoredinto the evaluation. 7

C. MajorFactors Affecting the Project

20. There were a number of reasons for the heavy overruns in the costs of works and the protractedcompletion times. Deviationsfrom the SARare outlinedbelow. a) Time elapsed before the loan became effectiveand the works were contractedout. Preparationsfor the project began in 1987 and werecompleted in 1990. Becausethe Loan Agreement was not signed until July 1992 and the Loan did not become effective until Decemberof that year, all the roads initiallyassessed had been deterioratingfor two more years. Compoundingthese delays at the outsetwas the slow start of the projectitself, all of which then requiredmajor changes in the work needed. This immediatelytranslated into higher costs - substantiallyhigher, in many instances. Actual costs differedfrom average SAR costs not becausethe unit prices of the work weremisgauged, but becauseof the more intensivework ultimatelyneeded. Becausework beganthree years laterthan envisagedand the roads had been poorly maintainedin the interim,roads that over the next 10 years would have simply required 40 mm of asphalt-mixoverlay needed instead -- when rehabilitation work finally began-- a completerebuilding of pavement. Damageto the base and subbase was in many cases irreversible,stemming from infiltratingwater, pollution,etc. The level of. work needed had to be changed for virtually every subproject, and what had been planned as rehabilitation instead became reconstructionwork, which was far more expensive.

b) Changesin engineeringstandards. When it becameobvious that heavierwork would be needed on all the major regional roads, most of them with old alignments, the SEOPC adopteda policy of curve and slope correction(the initialdesign had kept traveling speeds down), using new geometricdesigns that made drivingsafer and more comfortable. These measures,technically sound as they were, drove up the cost of the works and required a furthereconomic analysis, which again yieldedpositive findings.

c) Cost increasesand extra work needed on accountof contingenciesor additions. There were serious omissions in the designs that were reworkedto accommodatethe necessary changes, particularlyin items pertaining to drainage and earth moving. This was due in large measure to the haste with which the designs had to be produced, in an effort not to hold up the projectfurther and avert furtherdeterioration of some pavements. The net result was a US$17.1million increasein the cost of works (that is, 25.4% of the revisedbudget of US$67.4 million, taking the aggregate cost to US$84.6 million). The cost overrun was in evidence by the time US$39.6 million of the US$79 million total was disbursed. This prompteda series of decisionsinvolving: (a) changingthe pari-passuof the civil works for rehabilitationfunded by the Loan, whereupon the Bank's overall share of the project fundingdropped from 70% to an average of 62.3%;and (b) using GODR funds to pay the full cost of two road sectionsout of the original12 groups,since these could not be finished before loan closure(Navarrete-Altamnra Tunnel and El Seybo-ElPintado Intersection). 8

21. Counterpartfund availability. The flow of counterpart funds was affected by such factorsas election periodsand constructionfor wideningthe Duarte highway in the second half of the project, which was paid for with GODR funds and took a large amount of the Government's own resources. Other than these episodes,the counterpartfunds flow was satisfactory,notably in the first and last stages of the project.

22. Contractorcapacity. Only two road sections (coveredby two of the 12 contracts)were completedabout three monthsafter loan closure, and in the end these sectionswere 100% SEOPC- funded. For the most part, it transpired that any works that were completed late were the responsibility of contractors who had taken on several contracts at once - indeed, both the aforementionedcontracts were in the hands of one contractor,a firm that had been awardeda large share of the programcontracts overall. This points up some weaknessesin constructioncapacity, even among the largest companies, and this factor will be taken into account when works are contractedout under the new loan.

23. Project management. This project was more complex and on a larger scale than the previousones (over double the previousloan, which had itself been the largest at the time). In the first two years this caused serious managementproblems for SEOPC. The creation of a project coordinationteam within SEOPC, and very hard work on the part of the staff members involved, who were committed to the project's objectives, considerably improved every aspect of its implementation. Comparedto previous,simpler operations,the general managementperformance of this projectwas vastly superior,and evidenceda deeperknowledge of the project as a whole and of each of its components,and a strongersense of ownership. One contributingfactor is that even through a succession of five Public Works Secretariesin the course of the project, its General Coordinator,a senior official of a rank equivalentto Deputy Secretaryof State, together with his associates,were kept in their posts and interfaced(particularly the Coordinator)with each incoming Secretaryof State, even throughchanges of governmentand of the party in power. This, too, marks an improvementover previousprojects.

24. Investmentplanning. Althoughthis had little effect on the project's implementation,the comprehensive planning function that was to have been performed by SEOPC's Investment PlanningDirectorate (DGPI) was not really operational,and the sectorwas without any sound, up- to-date, multiyear program encompassingroads, ports, and airports. This was an impedimentto decision-making,and some projects of dubiouspriority were approved (not funded by the Loan). Traditionally,this problemhas been addressedduring the preparationof new loans by calling upon consultantsretained to help produce multiyear plans as a basis for preparing projects eligible for financing by the external financing agencies; however,this did not solve the problems of those subsectorsthat were not receivingsuch financing. To help improvethe situation,Loan 4127-DO includes technical assistance (financedby the Spanish ConsultantsTrust Fund) for drawing up a multiyearinvestment plan to cover all transportationsubsectors, and preparationof this has reached an advancedstage. 9

D. ProjectSustainability

25. Despite some uncertainties,the projectis provingto be sustainable,on the institutionaland operationalfronts alike. The greatestrisk is still the possibilityof a shift in attitudeof the current or future administrations regarding the transition from SEOPC force-account roadwork and maintenancetoward contracts with private firms. The decisionstaken by the administrationthat took office in early March 1998 -- a changeover that directly affected SEOPC -- are in line with the recommendedcourse of action, so for the momentthis risk appearsto have been allayed.

26. Work to strengthen every level of SEOPC's accounting and financial control systems should continue. The Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) is supporting a major improvementprogram in this area, and Loan 4127-DOwill fund technical assistancefor training staff from SEOPC'sExternal Resources Department in using the systems put into place under that program,and in modem financialmanagement practices.

27. The sustainabilityof the investmentsmade under the projectwill hinge in large measureon there being a sound, and soundly managed,maintenance program as proposed by the consultants financed by the project,and on that programhaving a fully operationalplanning and management unit. To lend support for this crucial element, and taking into account the current good level of service in the primaryroad network,Loan 4127-DOincludes the following: (a) a pilot programfor comprehensive contracted maintenance (encompassing routine and periodic maintenance, management,and user assistance),under a contract that will be funded by the Bank for four years, and which will take in 640 km of the road network;(b) the requirement that SEOPC bring in comprehensivecontracted maintenance at a rate of 25% of primary roads per year until, by 2001, the entire systemis being maintainedunder that arrangement;and (c) the requirementthat there be in place, by the year 2001, a financingfacility or road fund made up essentiallyof the proceedsof road user charges. If these programsand plans are carriedout, the achievementsof this and the previous highway loans will be sustainable,and by the closing date for Loan 41271DO the DominicanRepublic could have one of the best highwaysystems in Latin America.

28. Achievementof the aboveobjectives and their specifictargets is highly sensitiveto shifts in governmentpolicy. Since 1985, SEOPC's policy, with Bank support, had been to substantially reduce the equipmentfleet and its importanceto the agency,doing away with the Equipmentand Transport Directorate(DGET). This changedearly in 1997 when SEOPC,reversing its strategy of recent years, decided to create a comparable unit, the Equipment Directorate, and promptly purchased 240 new pieces of road constructionand repair equipment. Apart from these 240 units, SEOPC has 1,300 pieces of equipment,only 276 of which are operable. Most of the others are damaged, lack spare parts, or are write-offs,the result mainly of an inefficientfleet maintenance and repair policy. This shift in strategyalso runs counter to recommendationsput forward since 1974 by Bank-retainedconsultants (Lamarre-Valois, 1974; Roy Jorgensen, 1976, 1978, and 1982; Overseas, 1986; Auding-Transvialsa, 1996) as to the need for SEOPC to cut back on force-account work and keep only a core stock for emergenciesonly. The strategy changedonce again with the arrival of a new Secretaryof State in March 1998,whose approach appearsto be more in line with the current GODR general policy of granting a larger role to private businessin all transportation activities. Accordingly,the EquipmentDirectorate has once again been dismantled,and the new 10 equipment has been distributedto municipal governmentsto enable them to maintain secondary and tertiaryroads and to carry out emergencymaintenance work. In this respect,the outcome of the pilot maintenanceplan funded by Loan 4127-DO should clearly demonstrate the merits of outsourcedmaintenance, and confirm the swing back to a basic policy of privatizationin sector activities, including -- as a result -- reductions in SEOPC's stock of heavy equipment.

29. Another promising developmentin SEOPC is that it is again hiring qualified technical staffers,and paying substantiallyhigher salaries. This policy, and the Government'sserious efforts to improve management,suggest the likelihood of a better reception for the proposed ideas and changes. This will be put to the test by the introductionof the new loan as a whole,and the pilot road maintenance plan in particular.

E. Bank Performance

30. Project identificationand preparation. This project was preceded by four Bank-funded operations, the first being a small loan in 1976 (1316-T-DO) for staff training and road rehabilitationand maintenance. It was followedby loans 1784-DO(1978-82) and 2609-DO(1982- 86), both for road rehabilitationand maintenance, with sizable components consisting of the purchaseof machineryand transportationvehicles and a numberof technicalassistance operations, intendedmainly for establishinga road-maintenancemanagement group withinthe SEOPC. More or less concurrently with loan 1784-DO, and in the wake of two devastating hurricanes in September 1979, the Bank approved and began to provide -- in 1980 -- emergency financing (Loan 1783-DO)for rebuildingtwo major highways that had sustaineddamage. Funding shortfallsfor projects included under the emergencyloan were made up with resources from project 1784-DO; this in turn prompted a complementaryloan (2609-DO)to finish the work started with 1784-DO. The experience gained in these operations was built upon when the SAR for this project was prepared,in an attemptto avoid the errors encounteredin the previous projects. It also helped that the projectwas preparedby the same team that supervisedthe earlierloan.

31. Project appraisal. The appraisal report clearlyidentified the main risks facing the project, as envisaged at the preparationstage: weak maintenance organization, institutional constraints that could retard project implementation,the high turnover of staff within SEOPC (requiring repetition of training programs for newcomers), and doubts about the timely availability of government funds. As previous sections of this report attest, these risks did not completely disappearas the programunfolded, but they were forestalledsufficiently well to prevent the project outcome from beingjeopardized.

32. The above problems were taken into account in the project appraisal,as were a series of other problemscarried forward from past operations,and which can be summedup as follows.

(a) Institutional shortcomings and management weaknesses affecting SEOPC's capacity for administering projects of this type, with their different interrelated components,for which sound management and rigorous technical and financial controls are essential. II

(b) A lack of clear investment planning and programming; counterpart funds not allocated on time.

(c) Dominican contractors not equipped to take on and complete road reconstruction projects awarded through competitive bidding.

(d) Little dovetailing of Bank-financed projects and those funded from own' resources, in the absence of any common plan for guiding both types of operations, whether through complementary, cooperative, or supplementary projects.

(e) The use of inadequate road construction, design, and maintenance technologies and equipment.

33. Against this backdrop, the Program for the Transfer of Technologies using Surface Treatments and Thin Asphalt Overlays, details of which were given earlier in this report, was held out as a way of remedying technological deficiencies and also of setting guidelines that could solve, in time, some of the other problems noted. The program, a combination of training and production, yielded benefits for (a) manufacturers of bitumens and asphalt products; (b) construction firms; (c) supervision and consulting firms; and (d) government and private engineers and technicians generally.

34. The lack of a multiyear investment plan was remedied by hiring consultants -- using funds provided in the earlier loan (2609-DO) -- to produce such a plan for the transportation sector, on which the SEOPC drew for its future projects, including those financed by this loan. During the preparation of this program, several groups of technical staffers were trained, and the SEOPC was strengthened in its ability to produce better diagnostic reports and solutions for road problems and perform economic analyses of projects.

35. One persistent problem in the course of this project (and this had also been a serious weakness in the earlier loans) had to do with civil works and their cost. During the preparation of SARs, estimates are normally prepared for: (a) the types of works into which the planned subprojects are grouped, and (b) the unit costs of each component. In this instance, there was little difference between estimated and actual unit costs, but, as was noted earlier, in most of the subprojects the types of work were different, and their scale was more extensive than originally envisaged, because the state of repair of the roads was far worse than anticipated - largely because work originally slated for 1990 did not begin until December 1992, and it was started so slowly that the pavement kept deteriorating for yet another year.

36. Supervision. There were 15 Bank supervision missions spread over 58.10 weeks (between July 15, 1992 and December 10, 1997), and these visited the SEOPC (the executing agency for the project), the Technical Secretariat of the Presidency (the senior government bureau for economic policy and planning strategies), the Secretariat of Finance, and the Central Bank of the Dominican Republic (for matters relating to financial perfornance generally, exchange rates, and disbursement mechanisms), as well as the work sites themselves. The earliest supervision missions were 12 combinedwith the final missions for the Loan 2609-DO,and the final ones were combined with preparationmissions for Loan 4127-DO. The back-to-officereports provided for an easy follow-up on the progressof project implementationand compliancewith legal covenantsand action plans. Althoughthe project had its ups and downs, particularlyduring the lead-up to electoralcampaigns or changes in government,which in particular complicated the flow of counterpart funds, the project implementationindicators were in every casesatisfactory, and the objectiveswere fulfilled.

37. An important contribution to this success was the continuity of the Bank's project task manager over the entire life of the project, which allowed a positive dialogue with the SEOPC, timely identificationof issuesand valuableassessment of projectprogress. Withoutthe intensityof Bank supervision,level of staff commitment,and its dedicationand flexibilityin seeking solutions to keep the project viable and adapting to unforeseencircumstances, the project would not have eventuallyachieved all its objectives. Furthermore,the loan closing extension was also made on a detailedassessment of the time required to completethe physical execution of the project, which was practically completedaccording to the timetableestablished for completionof contracts.

F. BorrowerPerformance

38. Preparationand Implementation. The GODR, by way of the SEOPC (its executing agency)and the TechnicalSecretariat of the Presidency,lent its firm support to the projectfrom the preparationstage onward. Very highly placed officialswere closely involved in every facet of the preparations,particularly in the case of the road reconstructionand rehabilitationprogram, the pavement technology transfer program, and some of the studies funded by the project, notably those on road maintenanceand the developmentof a toll-highwayprogram. This marked a change from previous projects, and much of the credit must go to the good relationshipwith the Bank's team, which allowed a productive dialogue and enhanced collaboration between the two sides during the entire life of the project. One contributingfactor was the continuity not only of the Bank's task manager but of the of the SEOPC's GeneralCoordinator, together, with his associates as well, as it was mentionedbefore.

39. One feature of this collaborationwas SEOPC's considerableinput into the preparationof documentation for contractor prequalification,competitive bidding, and contracts, this being prepared in accordancewith Bank requirementsand with the Bank's assistance. Because project coordinationwas exercisedat the highest level, the views of the Secretaryof State could be elicited quickly on every matterthat needed a senior-leveldecision.

40. Initialprogress on implementationof the various componentswas slow, the result of major errors and omissionsin the civil works designs. However, SEOPC did resolve the problems, and took responsibilityfor cost overruns in the projects which still yielded positive rates of retun. Whenever final costs were 25% or more over the original SAR figures, new economic analysis were performed;these showed that the investmentsin question still yielded acceptablereturns. In addition, SEOPC took on the entire financingof the two sections that had not been completed by the Closing Date (December31, 1997), and these were finished in the first quarter of 1998, using the agency'sown funds. 13

41. The funding of studies has not traditionallybeen a SEOPC priority, but in this case the Santo Domingo Urban TransportationStudy, the Study of the San Crist6bal-SantoDomingo and Santo Domingo-BocaChica Highways, and much of the DiagnosticReport and the Final Reporton the Highway MaintenanceManagement System were used extensivelyby -- or were of particular interestto -- senior GODR and SEOPCofficials and (in the case of the first of the above)the Santo Domingo municipal government. Likewise, on the strength of the preliminary results of the HighwayMaintenance Management System, financing for a pilot plan for contractedmaintenance was includedin Loan 4127-DO,with a plan for a new Road Fund and a bureauto manageit.

42. That a program designed to take four years could be completed in five and a half years, including in that period a two-year delay in getting started, and coinciding with two presidential elections, represents a vast improvementover all the previous loans. Consequently,it can be affirmed that GODR has deepened its understandingof Bank-financedprojects, and is better equippedto respondto upcominginvestments and carry them throughmore effectively.

A43. One problemfor which a satisfactorysolution has yet to be found is the timely provisionof counterpart funds. Because repeated hold-ups in furnishing these funds at some stages of the project, contractorswere able to cite delaysthat were often not directly related to slow progresson the works but rather to late payments. Budgetexecution and allocationof budget funds by item and state agency is a continuingproblem, and one to which greaterinstitutional efforts will have to be devoted. To that end, one covenant in the 4127-DOLoan Agreement requires the opening of a Project Account in the Reserve Bank, enablingSEOPC to directly manage loan proceeds in local currency. A first deposit,in an amount equivalentto US$1.5million, has alreadybeen made.

G. Assessmentof Outcome

44. Overall, the outcome of the project is satisfactory, and some elements are highly satisfactory. The Pavement TechnologyTransfer component had the greatest impact and was the most cost-effectiveelement in the program,by virtue of its innovativenature and unique features. The project's institutionalobjectives were achieved: SEOPC's road maintenance methods were considerably improved, with assistance from the project's maintenance program, and the fundamentalprinciple of contractingout routineand periodicmaintenance to qualifiedprivate firms has been adopted,as embodiedin the Pilot Planfor ComprehensiveContracted Maintenance that has been incorporated into the new loan. The road rehabilitationand reconstructionprogram brought a good percentageof roads formerlyin poor repair definitivelyinto the road system,and in 80% of cases the performanceof the local and internationalcontractors who receivedtraining was broadly satisfactory. The reconstructionprogram likewise did a great deal to upgrade the road system overall. By the end of that program,only 150 km of primaryroads were left to be rebuilt, and that work will be fundedunder Loan 4127-DO.

45. SEOPC gained on the institutional and internal management front, being now better equipped to produce prequalificationdocuments, terms of reference, bidding documents, and contracts. It is utilizingthese new capabilitiesalso in those of its major works projectsthat are not 14 funded by the Bank. Moreover,since the project was coordinatedat the highest level, decisions could be takenquickly and efficientlywhenever problems arose.

46. The costs of all the projectcomponents were close to the SAR estimates,except for the final cost of the Road Rehabilitation Civil Works component. In this case, costs climbed as more extensive operations became necessary when work began later than originallyenvisaged in the SAR.

47. One final importantoutcome of the projectis that, thanks in part to the technical assistance received in maintenancemanagement, 80% of the Dominican Republic'sroad system is in good condition. This leaves the country very well positionedto begin institutinga truly effective system of comprehensivecontracted maintenance and a workable Road Fund, which are especially A propos in a situation, like this one, in which the road network needs preventive and periodic maintenancerather than massive maintenanceor completereconstruction.

H. Future Operations

48. The New Bank Loan. Loan 4127-DO for the National Highway Project was declared effectiveon November 10, 1997. As a continuationof Loan 3350-DO,it draws on the experience gained in that operation and complementsits core components (a road reconstructionprogram, periodicmaintenance using new technologies,works supervisionby consultants),and also brings in new components(a pilot program of comprehensivecontracted maintenance, bridge construction, relief roads and wideningto avert bottleneckson primaryroadways, technical audits, and assistance with concessions). These two types of componentsencompass most of the actions planned for the highway subsectorin the coming five years, and on which work has alreadystarted.

49. Contractingout comprehensivemaintenance. One result of the road rehabilitationand reconstructionefforts since 1987 by the GODR and through Bank projectsis an awareness of the need to preservethe country'sroad system by strengtheningits maintenance,an area for which the Pilot Plan for Contracted Maintenance will be providingsupport over the next five years. SEOPC, for its part, has pledged to strengthenits administrativestructure and institutionalizeprocesses, in order to resolve problems resulting from its poor performance in these areas in the past, as evidencedin every externally-fundedproject prior to 3350-DO.

50. Local and rural roads. A future operation on the agenda of the Inter-American DevelopmentBank (IDB) is the funding of an extensivemaintenance by contract program for the local road system, involving approximately486 km of existing asphalt roads and nearly 5,000 km of all-weather roads, which need regravelingto bring them up to a serviceablestandard. This program would begin on roads for which IDB funds rehabilitation work, and roads being rehabilitatedwith GODR's own funds. A third network, taking in very lightly traveled rural or seasonal roads (about 7,500 km in all) would be left to the respective communitiesto maintain, with support from the SEOPC and communityorganizations in each area. 15

51. Highway and local road rehabilitationand maintenanceprograms. Since 1987, the GODR has been spending between 2% and 3.5%of GDP on the roads sector. This represents an extraordinaryeffort that has taken the country'shighway and local road systemto a high standard. So that noneof this effort will have been wasted,funds will haveto be forthcomingto maintainand rehabilitatethe system (of both highways and local roads). That would take an estimated US$63 million annually,at January 1998 prices- US$41 million for highways and US$22 million for local and ruralroads.

52. Expansionof the highway network. The GODR is planning to build new highways to shortenthe travelingdistance from Santo Domingoto Samana,a tourism center in the far northeast, by about 100 km, routing it (to the extent possible) around a large national park to lessen the environmentalimpact. With this project, plus the proposedlink between the city of Puerto Plata and Montecristion the Atlantic coast and towardthe Haitianborder, about 217 km will be addedto the networkover the next five years.

53. Toll highways. Accordingto a referencestudy funded by the Bank under Loan 3350-DO and relating to the Santo Domingo-Airport-BocaChica-San Pedro de Macorisroute to the east and Santo Domingo-SanCrist6bal-Bani to the west, the idea being to convert these to expressways financedby the privatesector through toll concessions,the Santo Domingo-Airport-BocaChica and Santo Domingo-SanCrist6bal stretchesare technically,economically, and financiallyfeasible. The central governmentand city govermnentare also embarkedon major works projectsfor improving the roads and accesseslinking these two sections,such as: (a) wideningto eight lanes the Duarte bridge (i.e. the main bridge; bidding has already been completed);this provides a connectionto the airport road; (b) a 1-kilometerviaduct (overpass) to reach the western access of that bridge on the airport road (under construction); (c) constructionof major overpasses at various levels, and making Avenida27 de Febrero the main city corridor; it joins the Santo Domingo-SanCrist6bal segment to the viaduct now under construction,the Duarte bridge, and the road to Las Americas InternationalAirport. Loan 4127-DOwill contributeto this plan by financingthe section between the Duarte and Juan Carlos bridges on Avenidade las Americason the airport route and providing technical assistancefor a pilot project taking in the Santo Domingo-Airportand Santo Domingo- San Crist6balsections, and it will also lay the groundworkfor devisinga solid legal frameworkand a future highwayconcession program.

1. LessonsLearned

54. The projecthas affordedimportant lessons fromthe Bank and the GODR standpointsalike. Perhaps the most salient of these is how instrumentalthe steadfastand open cooperationbetween local officials and the Bank's supervisionmission members was, at every step, in achieving the success of the project. Pursuing their shared objectives,the parties discussed every goal, every problem, and every change; at all times, decisions were arrived at with due regard for the Loan Agreement,but with the requisite flexibilityand willingnessto examineworkable alternatives. One contributing factor was the continuity not only of the Bank's task manager but of the of the SEOPC's GeneralCoordinator, the former over the entire life of the project,the latter over most of it. 16

55. One negative element this operation has pointed up is what happens when projects start later than planned, for whatever reason (loan signature, borrower ratification, or declaration of effectiveness). Such delaystake a particulartoll in projectsthat entail major road rehabilitationand maintenanceprograms, because, as time passes, the roads continue to deteriorate,and the work originally slated is no longer adequate. The action ultimatelytaken costs more, and the return on investmentsuffers.

56. As for the solutionsput forwardin the originalSAR for each roadworkelement, one lesson is that the cost of civil works must be based on more conservative diagnostic studies of the structuralconditions of the roadsand on the implementationperiod for projects.

57. Designs for roadworks, which SEOPC has traditionally produced itself, should be commissioned,in good time, from consultingfirms retained following Bank procedures, which have proved to be efficientin this project. Problemsin SEOPC designs (the result of changes that had to be made too quickly)accounted for nearly60% of the cost overruns,which resulted fromthe need to remedy omissionsand pay for the additionalwork necessary.

58. Another approach that has shown itself to be useful is the use of qualified consultants (retainedby the Secretariator the Bank or jointly) for producingthe analysesnecessary whenever a proposed works projectdeviates from the specificationsset out in the SAR. Such consultantsalso can train local technicians(their counterparts), and are acceptedand respectedat that level.

59. A road maintenanceculture has now been established,thanks to the tremendousefforts of GODRand the Bank and throughthe huge road rehabilitationand reconstructionprogram that has been under way since 1987 and is expectedto be completedin 2000. With some 356 km rebuilt and 217 km in new highway construction,the surfaceof virtuallyevery road in the country will be in good or acceptablecondition. The fruit of the new maintenanceculture, supportedby the Pilot Program for Comprehensive Contracted Maintenance, will be greater efficiency, which is already in evidenceto judge by a number of indicators.

60. An steady flow of funds over the whole project implementationperiod to support the investment program and a minimal financial autonomy of the implementing agency are key elements not only to completethe work programnon time, but to avoid financialcosts claimed by the contractorsfor long delaysin paymentsand subsequentcost overruns.

Final Comments

61. Some of the proposedprocesses may not be completely in place institutionallyby the year 2000, owing to local politicalactivity (electionsin May 1998 and again in May 2000). The GODR is ranking its priorities to tackle the most important processes first, meaning that these will probably be set permanently in place. In this connection, SEOPC has espoused the concept of a Road Fund, but not the possibility of setting up a decentralized bureau to manage it. This is an item to be negotiated and settled in the future. The same holds true for the idea of a Government Toll Highway Delegation, and possibly an Autonomous Highway Agency, which would shoulder much 17 of SEOPC'scurrent responsibilities.Nevertheless, the central governmentdoes support the idea of decentralizingactivities that need to be more efficient,as witness its creation of the Metropolitan TransitAuthority to handle urban transportationin the city of Santo Domingo,an initiative that came out of recommendationsin the Santo Domingo Urban TransportStudy funded by the Bank under Loan 3350-DO.

19

PART II

STATISTICAL ANNEXES I 21

PART II. STATISTICAL ANNEXES

Table 1. Summary of Assessments A. Achievementof Objectives Substantial Partial Negligible Not Applicable

Macroeconomic policies x Sector policies x Financial objectives X Institutional development X Physical objectives X Poverty reduction X Gender concerns X Other social objectives X Environmental objectives X Public sector management X Private sector development X

B. Project Sustainability Likely Unlikely Uncertain l

Technical components X Institutional strengthening component X

Highly C. Bank Performance Satisfactory Satisfactory Deficient

Identification X Preparation Assistance X Appraisal X Supervision X

Highly D. Borrower Performance Satisfactory Satisfactory Deficient

Preparation Assistance X Implementation X Covenant compliance X Operation (if applicable)

Highly E. Assessment of Outcome Satisfactory Satisfactory Deficient x 22

-. Tabic 2. RclatedLoans/Credits

mn..,::b,n4,.-,,!,*::Bt ' ' s______Preceding operations_

1. FirstHighway Project Loan 1316-T-DO Rehabilitationof 19 km of highwaysand some bridges,and a technicalassistance to 1976 Completed implementa maintenancemanagement system

2. SecondHighway Project Rehabilitationof about286 km of highways, 1784-DO acquisitionof maintenanceand rehabilitation Completedafter equipment,spare parts and workshoptools, subsequent supportto the maintenancemanagement 1980 complementary system,creation of a trainingdepartment and loan strengtheningthe SEOPC.

3. Third HighwayProject Emergencyhighway reconstruction loan, after l Loan 1783-DO two hurricanesin September1979. The loan Completedwithf l comprisedthe reconstructionof about300 km 1980 additionalfunds in two importantnational highways, providedby thel completelydestroyed by the hurricanes. 1784-DOloan

4. FourthHighway Project Loan 2609-DO Complementaryloan to completethe rehabilitationprojects under the 1784-DO Loan. It also included:rehabilitation of other July, 1985 Completed high prioritydeteriorated roads, improvement of workshopsorganization, equipment managementand technicalassistance in road maintenance.

Followingoperations

1. First NationalHighway Highwaywidenings of about28 km, Project(Loan 4127-DO) constructionof 564 m of newbridges and 18 km of highwaysections to by-passimportant December, I cities, reconstructionof 169km of the road 1997 In progress network,resurfacing of 628 km of paved roads,a pilotprogram of comprehensive maintenanceby contract,institutional strengtheningof SEOPC'senvironmental and financialmanagement units and consultingservices. 23

Table 3. Project Timetable . l.' Stepsan project cYcie Dat iapj di F=' a1I Identification(1EPS) _ January 1988 Preparation(pre-appraisal) December1989 December 1989 Appraisal March 1990 March 1990 Negotiations April 1991 April 1991 Letter of developmentpolicy (if applicable) N/A N/A Board presentation June 1991 June 1991 Signing June 2, 1992 Effectiveness -December2, 1992 First tranche release (if applicable) N/A N/A Midterm review (if applicable) N/A N/A Second (and third) tranche release (if applicable) N/A N/A Project completion June 30, 1996 June 30, 1997 Loan closing December31, 1996 December31, 1997

Table 4a. Loan Disbursement1 F. ,.92.. >~937.... 95.96l97.9. AnnualAppraisal Estimate 5.70 21.30 25.70 26.30 CumulativeAppr. Estimate 5.70 27.00 52.70 79.00 AnnualActual ---- 9.01 5.27 17.72 23.44 14.62 4.44 CumulativeActual ---- 9.01 14.28 32.00 55.44 70.06 77.80 Cum. Actual as % of Estimate ---- 33.37 27.10 40.51 70.18 88.68 98.48 '-The closing date has been extended to December31, 1998 to disburse the balance of the Loan of US $1,135,950 that was committedto repay retention from paymentsmade to the contractorsof civil works in the past by the SEOPC,as additionalperformance security.The last repaymentis due December31, 1998,one year after the final acceptanceof the works.

Table 4b. Retention Payments Retention Contractor Road Rcconstruction Payment (USS) Date Due Consorcio Ocisa-Asfaltos Santiago-Navarrete-Puerto Plata S 270,750.67 12/17/9

Federici-Mera Munoz & F. Navarrete-Guayacanes-La Isabela 95,226.96 12/23/97

Consorcio Ocisa Asfaltos San Pedro de Macoris-Hato Mayor 120,273.59 12/30/97

Consorcio Ocisa Asfaltos Hato Mayor-El Seybo-C. El Pintao 113,405.48 12/30/97

Federici-Mera Munoz & F. Imbert-El Estrecho-Luperon 100,079.22 11/28/97

Consorcio Agroman-Conde Cotui-Cevicos y La Bomba-Monte Plata 294,776.54 12/31/9

Consorcio Ocisa Asfaltos San Pedro de Marcoris-La Romana 141,436.39 12/18/97

TOTAL S 1,135,948.85 24

Table 5. Key Indicators for Project Implementation

Loan 3350-DO Physical Targets [Keyimplementation indicators in SARPresident's Report Estimated(SAR) | Actual

1. Road reconstruction and rehabilitation (km)" 690 473

2. Pavement Technology Transfer (km) 704 536 Thin overlaysand cold mix with modifiedasphalts 142 143 Macro seals, slurry seals and other seals and asphalt treatmentsv 562 393

3. Bridge and workshop rehabilitation 12 11 Bridgesrehabilitation (units) 8 7 Workshopsrehabilitation (units) 4 4

4. Equipment rehabilitation (units) 3' n.a 23

I/ Mostly reconstructionwork. Additional653 km. were rehabilitatedunder the projectwith only local financing. 2/ Most of the seals required previousrepair work. 3/ Only 23 dumptrucks were rehabilitated.Only 20% of the original amount availablefor the component was spent, followingthe recommendationsof the consultants.

Table 6. Key Indicators of Project Operation (Not Applicable) 25

Table 7: Studies Induded in Project

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-i......

Assistance managementsystems (SAMC maintenanccprograms and . andSAE) ~~~~~~~~annualmnaintenance budgets. Alsosettled the principles for a PilotProgram of routine -___-_----_-----_-maintenance _ __ __ b contract Studiesunder UrbanTransport Study for the Completed Kelpedth cntral govertmt DGPPITechnical Cityof Sanan m nd the municipalauthorities to Assistance addressedto identifyimmediate, take actionson the main shortterm and mediumterm corridorsof the cit. The study projects,prperly quantifiedand estimateof totalnecessary analyzedfrom the economnic investmonts isover USS97 pointof view.The projects million,of USS22uhich wouldbe includedin the millionhavc already been investmrentprograms of the committdc. centraland municipal

______governm ents______Eigh volume Studyaddressed to deveop a Complese A pilotprognm compasing the roadsfinancing nationaltoll road systerm The SantoDomingo international alternatives studyanalyzed the feasibilityof Airport,Boca Chica, and the conversionof somehigh volumc SantoDomingo-San Cristobal traffichighways into motorways highwaysis beingstarted undera iOTscheme. followingthe study to convert thosehigh vays into motorwas undera BOTscheme. The total lengthis about32 km and e governmentis enthusiasticin consideringthis as a first stage of the nationaltoll road systemT Theexpectations are that the pilotprogram will allow the establishmentof a legal frameworkto extendto other traffic_highways_into_motorways______highwavs androads. Construction Studyrelated to: a) the Completed In additionto the industuy organizationof theconstrction recommendationsof the study. capabilitiesin indusuysub-sector, b) the real the constructionindustry sub- Dominican capacityalready installed; c) the.~~~~~~~~io sector,pr.anespecially wrl the lo parth Rcpublic identificationof technical relatedto roadconstruction, weaknessesand financial receivedfrom the pomject drawbacks;and d) the importantinputs and assoia ed competitivenessof the sector, benefits,through wvell prepared biddingdocuments and Theadequate supervision. 26

Table 8A. Proect Costs

...... xz33Mi$33~~~~~~~~"~ .:ii* oa orinectCos .'~~ oa

1. Road Rehabilitationand Supervision 15.6 36.3 51.9 40.9 56.8 97.

2. PavementTechnology Transfer 4.5 11.0 15.5 6.0 11.0 17.

3. Bridge and WorkshopRehabilitation 0.9 2.1 3.0 0.3 0.7 1.

4.Acquisition of Goods 0.0 11.1 11.1 0.5 4.5 5.

5. EquipmentRehabilitation 0.5 1.5 2.0 0.1 0.3 0.

. ConsultingServices 0.0 5.2 5.2 0.0 5.7 5.

7. Unallocated 5.1 11.8 16.9 0.0 0.0 0.

TOTAL [ 26.51 79.01 105.51 47.81 79.01 126.l

Table 8B. Project Financing ...... ppraisaleumLA Actual/laites't"

.. ,j::.::...... ,...... I. 3 3._...... -..... i.5..3iiiii S 3ii," .~~~~~~~~~~Local i i H § ts ii :ioreignI F:~: o s - li IiiST .. t I " L1.ocalC st ' Frinii 0 t i ...... * ... *.. . Costs ~~~~~~~~~~...Cost...... ota .Tta Cots..t _BRD 0.0 79.0 79.0 0.0 79.0 79.

Local Contribution 26.5 0.0 26.5 47.8 0.0 47.

TOTAL 26.5 79.0 105.5 47.8 79.0 126. Tabl 9. Ecomod Cost andBemils ICR 1a. - 3350-DO

ioralecost (US R of Resun Net l|r|sml Value( SS ammIlUo i.: t:v11CoB ,*Ra.l, |:w=1^l , .;, il n,_si,|iili,iisI.. : ;Ht ,,, ...... Y,Ij% J6.56', 5.SU0 ;8.490 1_ 4.693 4.691 5 C/DualS.P. talacd 23.3 Rll - 1. 2.3 1. S 32.9 33.1 55.83%C 8.330 11.270 L.5 2.ISS 1.902 9.J7 Seal. DomiaoSaaCds6ai-a 45.6 RC0 t 1.1 13.6 I .9 47.6 23.0 4.100 6J39 | .7 2.271 2.209 9. 97 Sanl'.3dro-laStoaa 32.9 RC 3.2 5.1 I5.1 52.5 24.6 46.64%C I0.470 1.6 1.902 1.818 9.9S6 CiNavauulc-PaacdoPlala 67.S RC 7.1 152.3 1.8I. 47.8 20.S JJ.76% 6.400 1 7 2.032 1.772 9.55 Navaawctc.C/Uayt'an 21.S Rll I5.3 3.2 2.4 56.0 20.3 3(AtS% 1.450 2.470 5J.S3% .1370 2.060 1.2 1.494 1.438 9.96V Sta Pcdo-IIBo Maycr 37.0 RIl 3.6 4.7 I.3 29.4 17.3 21.1IS% 0.570 0.S30 1.1 1.967 1.441 9.7?J CiAngc,la.C/La Gu,s 3.5 Rll 0.9 2.5 2.3 31I.S 17.3 6.35% 0.990 1.140 1.2 4.692 4.180 .2 CliUayancis-L. Seboo 25.5 RIB 1.4 3.0 2.1 26.9 36.8 2.82% 0.980 1.460 1.S 2.395 I.l0O (A9J CiCSaav6o.C/ayahibc-S.R.dei Yun- 29.1 RC 2.5 4.8 5.9 47.5 IS.2 30.4 54.8 4.654 0.900 0.S90 L 1.1331 I.209 a9 PC4Ooa-SmnJohdeOcOa 26.6 RC 2.2 5.0 5 9 (dS 1.768 1.168 96 Cucvas-Coulu 21.0 RC 2.0 5.0 2.5 60.4 14.4 4.156% 1560 0.840 Ccvico-Las 9. 7 .204 1.065 9.55 30.2 P 5.4 *.S1.8 5.6 21.4 53.1 61. 22% 1.100 0.470 L anba honcPlala 9.55 O.SJ'% 0.740 0.3S0 9. 1.206 1.056 SolPoMky"rClPhib4ao 34.0 RC 3.6 6.24.7 25.3 52.8l 0.620 0.170 LO 1.202 1.04s 0.57 Imbcri-LupeAAGs 25.0 RC 3.9 5.5 1.3 43.4 12.3 2I.52% I.152 1.050 9.91 RC 5.6 6.8 5.2 40.6 15.7 JI.38% 0.850 01340 .4 La llcnadura.MAo 40.4 49 4 2: .S4-I 13.11 612.7% ::i36.0| il1 . 7 ii li;2S iii |-- Sa a ai Pta ' I 30.2 P ii5.41 .b9.S 1i I

(5) RBSRcehabUdibaBcnRC"RoconsauclBon P-Pavigg BAR (2) RevIsed 70 A11deck (3) lacbau a34 (160. a(span0 OmR3Lw621D253Ddd4o widila) hIIGHWAY MANAGEMENT V PROJECT (LOAN 3350-DO) IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT

Table 10: Status of Legal Covenants

-ireement Se;tion Covenant Present- Onaia -Revised Fullilbnentf D, sript'l4 of Covenant i C ments ii, i i T ~ ~ ~~~~Tal: s H Loan 3.01 (cXi) Financial CD Tlle Borrower slall provide in its .uuIual budget, in N/A pesosequivalent, as countcrpart fundsfor the Projecl, tite following niiminiuni amounts: (a) for fiscal year 1992, USS10,500,000; (b) for fiscal year 1993, US510,700.000;and (c) for fiscal year 1994. usS I0,800,000.

Loan 3.01 (cXi) Financial CP The Borrowershall provide dheGeneral Direction of N/A Road Maintenance(DGM) within the Secretariat of Public Works and Communications(SEOPC), the funudsrequired to carry out the Iiighway MaintenanceI Program. '

Loan 3.04 (a) Management C The Borrowershall furnish to theBank: (i) any N/A additionsor modificationsto its tighway Investment Prograin;and (ii) by not later thanSeptember 30 of each year, theupdating of the investmentsof its

______H-lighwayInvestment Program.

Loan 3.04 (b) Management C The Borrowermay oily modifythe existinglist of N/A Eligible lIvestments, as approved by the Bank. afler obtainiig the Dank'sconsent to any such . modification.

Loan 3.05 (b) Mauagement C TheBorrower shall, through SI!OPC,by Sepnember The maintenanceprogram for 30 of each year, furnish to the Bank a budget 1998 is included in Annex 3 of the proposal for maintcnancefor the followingyear. SAR of Loan 4127-DO, National

______Highway Project. .iiCorn! Agreement Secion Covetii. Present Qjjgjiai iji.niiRevisedFulfiment J)escriptionofCov!!arits was due on March Management CD The Borrower shall, through SEOPC,by March31 Of The last report Loan 3.05(c) lo the . . ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~eachyear infiormthe Bank dheactual budget, by 31, 1998,and was submitted category oftexpenditures,spend for maintenance in Bank on April 4, 1998. the precedingliscal year. ______and gasoline N/A Loan 3.06(a) Other C ._The Borrower shallmaintain diesel prices sold in its territory at a level suff.cientto cover at______leastthe ______c.i.L Santo Domingo.______...______.. _.. shalt be NiA Loani 3.06 (b) Other C .*llie B3orrowershall take all actionsas required to ensure that costs of road maintenance are _ _ by_ road_ usern. .__bomne ______omns

N/A Loan 3.07 Other C The Borrowershall furnish to the Bank tor its capprovalall bidding documents for works in respect Loan 3.06 (a) Other Tofwhich the final engineeringdesi,ns related to such contract result in a cost estimaled to exceed by 25% tindollar tens Ihe cosl in dollar termgs of lhe

______rc~~nssl)e ive l;ligible Investmnc t_

N/A Loan 3.08 Management C The Borrowershall, not laler than December 31, 1992, furnish to the Bank a plan on organization and .administration ot personnel for DGM detailing the positions assigned to road maintenance activities and the total costs thereof.

as Last oNaudit reports were received Loan 4.01 (b) Financial CD The Borrower shall furnish to the Bankas soon available, but in any case not later than five months on September 30, 1997 .awer the end of each such year, the audit report by ______~~~saidauditors.

N/A Loan Schedule5, Otiler C SOinC shall subarit a report tole Dalnkshowing at and Of Action 9 (a) updated list otproposed Eligible Investmenelts of the Proiect. ______civil afe work;sth n renuiredfec underuhyar Part Bh ui eolb

showing N/A Loan Schedule 5, Other C SEOPC shall submit a report tohe Bank Action 9 (b) progress in implementationof all civil works contractsincluding latest cost estimates.r _uu_fiv_mo___n_Set__ber30_199 Ainrcanent*~~~~~~..Present Scctiwt~~~~~~... OriainalCovenant Revised FtatfihIanent.:... .: ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~Dcscn..p...... C...... ______- .. _ .::Rvised F:n: - -- : : *

Loan Schedule S, Other C SeOPC shall submit a report to thc Bank showing N/A Action 9 (c) the status of actual Loan disbursementsagain-st those If. orecasted.

Loan Schedule S. Other C SEOPCshall submit a report to theBank showing N/A Action 9 (d) the amount of counterpart fundsallocated to the Project in the fiscal year and the amount actually

Loan Schedule S, Other Co SEOPC shall submit a report to the Bank showing N/A Action 9 (c) the actualroad maintenancebudget for the preceding year, the budgetallocated for thecurrent year and physical progress of the maintenanceplan for thc

year. ______.______,__y a._

0 Table 11: Compliance with Operational Statements (Not Applicable)

Table 12: Bank Resources: Staff Inputs

, . .. . _ . .. ..__.~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~. . . .. Stageof Project:Cclea - - Planned- Revised D' ActualKiL4 . I______WeeksWe i SS Weeki USS. Weeks. . ,- ...... -USS...... i.;: Throughappraisal _ _ 46.1 92,267 A;)praisal-Board 17.4 44,051 Board-effectiveness Supervision 67.8 208,691 Completion 5.0 14 900

:0.' :::;i--:;i ii -*- Tio ta l :-_ -:-_-__-____-_:____i:__-______j______.. _ ,.______32 FITH ROADSMAINTENANCE AND RmA=AN PROJECT (LOAN 3350-DO) -iPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT

Table 13: Bank Resources: Missions

Tprouih A Jr l97isal

Pre-appraisal Marc 1990 315 Highway Engineer Financial Analyst Consultant

Appraisal July L990 3 7 Division, Chief Financial Arnalyst

Pre- September1990 3 6 Highway Enginee negotiations Financial Analyst Consultant '-______- . , , .. - - .. , -, . Preparadon/ October 1990 2 5 Hghway Engineer combined Financial Analyst with spa. for 2609-DO ~.- .. _=i4=-'- tr. 2 a - - .- 2 n ......

Nesoriations throuefh Board Awnaal

Preparation/ July 1991 1 7 Highway Engineer

::_ _ ...... __ I i r rj.r2.i= ; ...... n 1 - ...... -..-......

Sunervision

June 1992 1 9 Highway Engineer eieciie waiting approvalby

r i:r iiiYi , i^i.: ' jul...... iiiiiiri-=iiii^.ii;iiii.iiiiii-:-rsiir.....i--- ...... 2. November 1992 2 7 Highway Engineer I I Lan eCfetiene1ss5 Procurement Assistant pending lcgl opinion

4:Z. ig i=:n Z =*r =.:. m .Z...... 3 April 1993 2 11 Highway Engineer ges in the Consultant e m

4 __ SSSiiii-issii1993 i'October1 7 _ Highway Engineer-

S.... .nEsjErDEi...... i 2ISrl2Fi3ii...... r33rsiii3 5. January 1994 3 II FFighway Engineer 2 I Wgher cos th Transpozt Economist estuzated due to Economist adtional road deteiortion 33 6.June 1994 2 10 HighwayEngineer 2 I Dlaysinpro;ec TmnsPoz Economist

7. November 1994 3 13 HIighwayEngin S S Dlays in th Tnspoart Economist mhabilitation Transport Specialist Pmgms for bAdge . ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~wo*shopar4

S. February 1995 1 11 Highway Engineer S S Delays in t rehabilitation programsfor btdges, Workshopsand

",:t0ijg i3~~~~~~ *-**-- . .--. iF_ L Z., - -li 9. Maly 1995 I 5 Sr. HgwyEngiaee S S Prjc inplementation progressmingslowly due to insufficient counterpartfunds. Delays in disbursements.

10. November 1995 2 12 Sr. Highway Engineer S S Procuereent Consultant rehabilitationstill unsolved. Routine maintenanceprogram and progressreport delayed. ,r M -. rm-M r...... - ...... _ ii. April1996 1 10 Sr. HighwayErgumer S S Scarcedcounterpart funds.SEOPC's debt to contractorsand consultants accumulated.

- =* =, : S = * = ,, ,.-. X-,=:.:=---=_=:.:-...-=,s__...... _ ...... _...... _.. = ...... 12. December 1996 1 10 Sr. Highway Engineer S Equipment rehabilitation programreduced. Progress report delayed.

13. April 1997 1 5 Sr. Highway Engineer S S Slow progressin project implementationdue to accumnulateddebt to contractorsand

~~F~EI~~L~ ~~ 4'~~"~~~~iiI~~ .~~7~7I77 ZZ~~~~. - - - ~consultants. 14. August 1997 1 5 Sr. Highway Engine16er S S -9 c agWa--- ~---: -i -@i iii dL.ii @r;:. N i .. -i. IS. December 1997 2 10 Sr. HlighwayEngineer S S Somecomplimentary Procurement Assistant works will be completedentirely financeby the SEOPCin a few

.______.______._ _ _ _closing date.

35

Appendix A: Completion Mission's Aide Memoire

37

REPPiBLICADOMrNICANA

QUINTO PROYECTO DE REHABILITACI6N Y MLANTENIvUIENTODE CARRETERAS (PRESTAMIO3350-DO) Y

PROYECTODE CARRETERASNACIONALES (PRESTAMO 4127-DO)

MISIONDEL BANCO MUNDIAL

AYUDAMEMORIA

1. Una misi6n del Banco Mundialintegrada por el Dr. Ing. Jose M. Alonso-Biargey la Asistente en ContratacionesSra. MiriamAllen, visit6 la Republica Dorninicanadel 2 al 11 de diciembrede 1997 para cerrar el Quinto Proyectode Rehabilitaci6ny Mantenimientode Carreteras(Prestamo 3350-DO) e iniciar la preparaci6n del Informe de Terminaci6n y tambien para iniciar el lanzamientodel Proyecto de CarreterasNacionales (Prestamo 4127-DO), que fue declaradoefectivo el pasado 10 de noviembre.

2. La rnisi6n agradecela colaboraci6nprestada por el Sr. SecretarioTecnico de la Presidencia,Sr. Secretario de Estado de Obras Piblicas y Comunicaciones, Sr. SubsecretarioTecnico de la Presidencia, el Ing. Asesor del Secretario de Estado de Obras Puiblicas(Coordinador General del Proyecto) y funcionarios y consultoresde la SEOPC, en particular a los miembrosde DAREy del equipo de coordinaci6ndel proyecto.

Ouinto Provecto de Carreteras(OPC)

3. Durante la misi6n se hizo una revisi6n final (principalmente con el Coordinador General del Proyecto y funcionarios de DARE)del prestamo 3350-DO. Los resultadosde la revisi6nse comentan en los parrafos siguientes.

4. La implementacion del Proyecto continuia avanzando hacia su final, notindose un avance sigrificativo en la implementaciondel proyecto durante los tres uiltimosmeses, aunque sin que se haya conmpletado todavia, particularmente en lo que concierme a detemiinadas obras de carreteras Y edificacion (talleres y campamentos). El nivel de desembolso puede considerarse satisfactorio, de acuerdo a la revision del calendario de desembolsos realizada tras la extensi6n de la fecha de cierre hasta el 31 de diciembre de 1997, aprobacla el 4 de noviembre de 1996. It 38

5. La cantidad desembolsadahasta la fecha es de 74.9 millonesde d6lares(94.5% del total del prestamo), de los cuales 3.4 millonesfueron desembolsados desde la misi6nanterior (septiembre de 1997) lo que supone urkresultado aceptable para el periodo, pero que no pernitira desembolsarla totalidad del prestamo dentro del plazo determinado por la fecha de cierre,aunque si se estima que todos los recursos habran sidoagotados en dicha fecha. Para completarlos desembolsosnecesarios para el abono de las obras y trabajosde consultoria realizados pero pendientesde pago, se concedeni un periodo de gracia de cuatromeses, como mkirmo, previa solicitudde la SEOPC. El programade desembolsos revisado tras la extensi6nde la fecha de cierre se incluyecomo Anexo 1. El estado actualizado de los recursos del prestamo, teniendo en cuenta las cantidadesdesembolsadas y comprometidas, se incluyeen el Anexo2.

A. Componentes del Proyecto

6. Proerama de Reconstrucci6n v Rehabilitaci6n de Carreteras. Este programna esta substancialmente finalizadoa falta de completar algunas obras accesoriasen algunoscasos. La lista final de las obras de rehabilitaci6nde carreteras financiadas por el prestamocomprende un total de 473 km. y se incluye como Anexo 3. El costo total de este componenteasciende a 1,598.36millones de pesos equivalentes a 114.1 millonesde d6lares de los que 50.8 milloneshan sido financiadospor el prestamo. Ninguna de las obrasde este componente se transferiranal prestamosiguiente. Aquellas carreteras incluidas en el Informe de Evaluaci6n del Proyecto cuya rehabilitaci6nno ha podido financiarse por el pr6stamo,debido a que el alcance de las obras financiadasfue sensiblementemayor que ei proyectado,ya que las carreteraspracticamente se reconstruyeronen lugarde rehabilitarlas,han sido financiadas totalmentepor la SEOPC. Por la misma raz6n, fue necesarioreducir el pari-passude este componente a partir de desembolsode USS39.6 rnillones.-

7. Obras del Primer Aio del Programa. Las obras del primer afhodel prograrnaestan termninadas, con excepci6n de la carreteraLa Bomba-Guanurna-M\onteplata,visitada por la misionque comprob6 que continuia el ritno satisfactoriode ejecuci6n ya observado durante la misi6n anterior que, de continuar, permitirAla terminaci6nde las obras a finales de febrero de 1998,a financiarcon fondos locales a partir de la fecha de cierredel prestamo. El progreso medio alcanzadoen el conjunto de los cuatro lotes del primer afno,en trmiinbsde costo, supera el 97%.

8. Obras del SeLundoAfio del Proerama. Ha continuado tambien el progresode las obras de los ocho lotes en que se dividi6el programadel segundo afno. Las obras en las carreterasde Navarrete - Puerto Plata, Cruce de Guayacanes-LaIsabela, Imbert-Luper6n y el itinerarioHato Nlayor-ElSeybo- Cruce El Pintado, tambien visitadas por la mision entre otras, son las uinicas que no estaft completamente terminadas.pero se trabaja en ellas a buen ritrno, suficientepara terminarlasantes del cierre del prestamo, salvo en loscasos de los trarnos Navarrete-TCinelde Altamiray El Seybo-CruceEl Pintado, cuvas obras se preve terminara finales de febrero de 1998 con financiaciontotalmente local. El progreso medio alcanzadoen el conjunto de los ocho lotes del segundoanio, en terrninosde costo, supera el 90%.

,/ ;:..' 39

9. Estudios de IneenieriaFinal para las Obras del Tercer Ana del Provecto. Se trata de los estudios de ingenieria y analisisecon6mico correspondientes a las obras civiles incluidas en el nuevo prestamno(4127-DO) que ya se termiinarony fiueronexaminados por rnisionesanteriores conr resultado satisfactorio. Continuapendiente el disefto de la variantepor el sur de la poblacionde Ba que incluye.un nuevo puente y que la SEOPC piensa proponer en sustituci6nde otras obras del prograrna del nuevo proyecto,que seran o estaLnsiendo realizadas con financiaci6ntotal de Ia SEOPC. (El diseohode la variantede Bani y el correspondiente analisisecon6mico se han encargado a un consultor local y seran financiados totalmente por la SEOPC, con fondos locales de contrapartida). Los serviciosde consultoria financiados por el prestarnose han extendidotambien a la preparaci6n de los documentosde licitaci6n de los componentes financiadospor el nuevo prestamo. Estos docurnentosfueron revisados por la misi6n y sus comentariosse incluyen en un parrafo aparte mas adelante.El costototal de este subcomponentese elevaa 0.6 millonesde d6lares equivalentes, totalmentefmnanciados por el prestamo.

10. Contrato do Transferenciade Tecnologia de Pavimentos. Este contrato,el mayordel proyecto, era al mismo tiempo el mas complejo,puesto que incluia obra civil, adquisicionde equipoy material de laboratorio, capacitaciony asistencia tecnica y transferencia tecnol6gica. El contratista debia tambidn transferir los laboratoriosutilizados durante el desarrollo del contratoa la SEOPCal final del programa. Todos los componentesse han terminado satisfactoriamentey los resultadosobtenidos se aplicaran a un componentecon las tecnologias transferidas financiado por el nuevoprestamo. Se completaron tratamientosy capasdelgadas con nuevas tecnologiasen 485 km de carreterasrepartidas por todo el pais. Como resultadospositivos indirectos que el desarrollodel contratoha producidoen la practica mencionamos: (i) la mayoratenci6n que ahora se presta a la calidadde los agregadosy su control; (ii) la introducciondel uso de polimeros como aditivos de los ligantesbiturninosos; (iii) la mayor competitividad en la fabricaci6ny venta de emulsiones, al haberse instaladopor un nuevo proveedor (el contratista) una planta adicional a la existente al comienzodel programa. (iv) la reintroducci6n del uso de eonulsionesy mezclas en aio en las obras de la SEOPC,que habian estado postergadas por muchos antos;(v) la comprobaci6n del notable efecto posiuvo que la mejora superficial del pavimento tieneen la reducci6n de los costos de los usuarioscomparado con el costo de la mejora; y (vi) el refuerzodel papel del Departamento de Pavimentosde la SEOPCcomo unidad especializada en la materia. El Departamento de Pavimentos de la SEOPCpreparard un informne especifico de este componenteque remitira al Banco antes de que se concluyael Informe de Terminaci6n. El costo total de este componente se eleva a 19.5 millonesde d6laresequivalentes, incluida la asistencia tecnica,de losque 13.5 millones han sido financiadospor el prestamo.

11. Programa de Rehabilitaci6nde Puentes. Las obras de este componenteestin tambidn casi concluidas. Se han rehabilitadopuentes por un costo total de aproximadarnente500,000 d6lares equivalentes, de los que 350.000 han sido financiados por el prestarno.

'L 40

12. Proerama de Rehabilitaci6nde Talleres. Este programa no podri concluirseen su totalidad antes de la fecha de cierre,por lo que los fondos no gastadosantes del 30 de octubrese han transferido a la partida de servicios de consultoria. Las instalaciones rehabilitadas correspondena los campamentos y talleres de las ayudantiasde Moca, Mao, San Juan e Higuey. El costo final de este componente asciendea 425,000d6lares de los que 290,000 han sidofinanciados por el prestamo.

13. Licitaci6n del Proerama de Rehabilitaci6n de Egui2a. El programa se redujo a la rehabilitaci6nde un total de 23 camniones,siguiendo la recomendaci6nde los consuttoresde asistencia. tecnica de mantenimientoen la especialidadde gesti6n de equipo. La reducci6nse debi6 al hechode haber recomendadocomo 6ptimala soluci6n de contraEartodo el mantenimientode la red pavimentada de carreteras. De los 23 camionesrehabilitados, 12 lo han sido en talleres de SantoDomingo que fueron visitados por la misiony 11 en talleres de Santiago. El costofinal de este componenteasciende a 5,605,848 pesos dominicanos(alrededor de 400,000 d6laresde los que 300,000han sido financiados por el prestamo). Esto supone aproximnadamenteel 40% del costo de reposici6nde los camiones,lo que puede considerarse aceptable. Los recursos sobrantes se repartieronentre las categoriasde obra civil, adquisicionesy asistenciatecnica, cuando se reasignaronlos recursosdel prestamo.

14. Proerarna de Adauisiciones. Se han completado todas las adquisicionesbajo el prestamo comprendiendo:24 vehfculostodo terreno, 36 camionetas para supervisi6nde obras, 11 motocicletas, 2 camiones, 4 reroexcavadoras,10 segadoras de vegetaci6n con sus correspondientestractores, 2 franjeadoras de pavimnentos,49 contadores de trafico, 3 balanzasfijas y 22 balanzasm6viles para el control de cargas, 1 deflect6mesode impacto, I mendidorde fricci6n,ademas de equipode laboratorio y topografia,herramientas diversas, equipo de oficina y computaci6n,repuestos de reposici6ny parala reparaci6n de equipo, y matenalespara sefializaci6n de carreteras,tanto vertical comohorizontal. El costo fimalde este componenteasciende a aproximadamente5.5 millonesde d6lares equivalentes,de los que 4.5 millones han sidofinanciados por el prestamo.

15. Asistencias Tecnicas. I as firmas consultoras que supervisanlas obras no terrninadasen su totalidad continuan su trabajo,aunque con equipos y medios reducidos. Los trabajosque realicena partir del 31 de diciembrede 1997no seran financiados por el prestamo,debiendo hacerse cargo de su abono la SEOPC, asi como del aumento de los costos de supervisi6nque excedanlos recursosdel prestamo. El costo final de este subcomponente de supervisi6n asciende a aproximadarnente9.5 millones de d6lares equivalentes,de los que 5.7 millones han sidofinanciados por el pr6starno.

16. El contrato de asistencia tdcnica para la Gesti6n de Mantenimiento de Carreteras finaliz6 el pasado 31 de enero de 1997, pero se concedi6 una extensi6n que finaliz6 31 de octubre para dar continuidad a esa asistencia en la capacitaci6n del nuevo personal de los distritos y avudantias en el manejo de los sistemas y programasestablecidos bajo la asistenciatecnica, hasta que se dispongade recursos del nuevo prestamo. El costo final de este subcomponente asciende a 860,000 d6lares equivalentes, totalmente financiados por el pr6starno. 41

17. Se han terrminadoel Estudio del Transporte Urbano en Santo Domingoy el Estudio de la Industria de la Construcci6nasi como el Estudio de Prefactibilidaddel Puerto de Manzanillo. Las conclusiones y recomendacionesdel estudio de Transporte Urbanoestan siendo utilizadosya por el Ayuntamientode SantoDomingo para preparar y ejecutar su programade inversionesy adquisiciones. El costo final de este conjuntode estudios asciende a 950,000d6lares equivalentes,totalnete financiados por el pr6stamo.

18. Entrenamiento de Personal de la Direcci6n de Mantenimiento. Se han concluido este entrenamiento, al que se di6 continuidadcon la extensifn del contratomencionada en el parrafo 16. El costo final de este subcomponentejunto con el de becas y viajes de estudio asciende a aproximadarnente100,000 d6lares equivalentes, totalmente financiadospor el prstammo.

19. Estudio de las CarreterasSanto Domineo-San Pedro de Macoris v San Crist6bal-Santo Domingo. La misi6n revis6con la SEOPC y los consultores el gradode avancede este estudioy sus diversas alternativas y aspectostecnicos, de los que se deduce la factibilidadtanto tecn.icacomo econ6mica-financierade llevar a cabo la mejora v posterior mantenimientode los tramos Santo Donningo-Boca Chica (y su posible extensi6n hasmaSan Pedro de Macoris)y Santo Domingo-San Crist6bal mediante una concesi6npor peaje, ya que son los tramos en que se curnplentodos los requisitos para el exitode un esquemade esa naturaleza. Hay trifico elevadoen ambostramos, existen alternativas de paso por otras vias en ambos casos y, dadas las relativamentemoderadas inversiones necesarias,los peajes que resultande un primer anMisis econ6mico-finacieroson moderados(entre 0.6 y 0.8 pesos por kxn)y posiblementeaceptables para los usuarios. Los consultores,conjuntamente con la misi6n, presentaron la prirnerafase del estudio en sus aspectostecnicos, financieros y legales, al Secretario de Estado y autoridadesde la SEOPC y al Secretarioy SubsecretarioTdcnicos de la Presidencia,encargados por el Presidentede coordinar todas las accionesdel Gobiernoy, en particular los temas relacionados con concesiones. A la vista de la informaci6ndisponible, se acord6 que los consultores continuaran los estudios completando la documentaci6ntecnica y econ6mica y prepararandolos documentosde licitaci6n, comenzando por el de precaiificaci6n,para la concesionde ambos tramos en el plazo de rres meses. El costo total de estos estudiosasciende a aproximadamente 635.000 d6lares equivalentes,totalmente financiados por el prestarnovigente.

B. Plan de Acci6n.

20. La misi6n revisocon el CoordinadorGeneral del Proyectoel Plan de Acci6nacordado durante las negociaciones e incluidoen el Convenio de Pr6szarno. En general,el cumplirnientocon el Plan de Acci6n es satisfactorio, aunque quedan todavia algunos aspectos incumplidos. Entre ellos, esta pendiente de recepci6nen el Bancoel informe de progreso correspondienteal terceritrmestre de 1997 y no se ha completadohasta la fecha la puesta en operaci6n de las balanzasm6viles para el control de cargas por eje. Los informespendientes deberan enviarse al Bancono mas tarde del 31 de dicieinbre, fecha que tarnbien se establececomao limite para la puesta en operacionde las tres balanzasfijas. El Departamento de Pavimentosesti llevando a cabo un infortne con los resultadosobtenidos de los datos obtenidos con las balanzascue es;anya operables y que reritiri al Bancouna vez concluido.

. ..~~~~~~~4 42

Provecto de Carreteras Nacionales (PCM

21. El Directoriodel Bancoaprob6 este-proyecto y el prestaro para financiarlo(USS75 millones) en su reuni6n del 19 de diciembrede 1996. Tras su aprobaci6n,el correspondienteConvenio de Prestamo fue fumado el 17 de enero de 1997. Posteriomnente,se han concedidopr6rrogas para el curnplimiento de las condicionesde efectividad, que se cumplimentaronel pasado dia 10 de noviernbre, fecha en que, finalnente,el prdstarnofue declaradoefectivo por el Banco.

22. Con la no objeci6nde la Secretaria Tecnica de la Presidencia,se esta procediendoahora a la apertura de una cuentaen el Bancode Reservas, a nombre de la SEOPC,para el manejode los fondos del proyecto en pesos domninicanos.En ella se depositara el equivalentea 1,500,000dolares en pesos dominicanos como dep6sitoinicial, en cumplimiento de lo acordadoen el Conveniode Prestarnoy, al mismo tiempo se ha solicitadoal Banco el dep6sito inicial de US$3 rmillonesen la Cuenta Especial abierta en el Banco Central.

23;. La misi6n se reuni6con los miembrosdel Equipo de Coordinaci6nque apoyaranla gesti6ndel Coordinador General, que han sido recientemente contratados o designadoscon dedicaci6ncompleta por la SEOPC. Durantelas reunionesse trato de familiarizarlescon los componentesdel proyecto,los requisitos del Conveniode Prestamo,las guias, normas y procedimientosdel Banco y las funciones que deberan desempefiar.Se acord6que, para acelerar ese proceso de familiarizaci6ncon el proceso de implemetaci6ny, al mismotiempo, contribuir a la terminacionde las actividadespendientes del prestamo vigente, el equipode coordinaci6nse incorporara al desarrollode las actividadespendientes del prestamo actual.

24. Con fecha 16 de noviembre se publicaron en el peri6dico de las Naciones Unidas, Development Business,sendos ar_uncios para la licitaci6n de las obras incluidasen la primerafase de implementaci6n del proyectoy su supervisi6n. Posteriormente,el 30 de noviembre,se public6 el anuncio para que los consultorespuedan mostrar su interes en la asistenciatecnica a la SEOPC tambien incluida en la primerafase de implementaci6n del proyecto. Esta primerafase de asistencia tecnica incluye la auditoriatecnica, la asistencia ala SEOPC en materia de gesti6nfinanciera y medio ambiente y el estudio del plan director de drenaje de la ciudad de Santo Domningo.La asistencia tecnica en manteniniento, que es prioritariapero no se ha anunciado,se ha divididoen dos partes. La primera, sera desarrolladapor los consultoresque vienen prestandoel rnismotipo de asistenciabajo el prestamo 3350-DO y se dedicara a la preparaci6n y puesta en marcha del programa integral de mantenimientopor contratofinanciado por el prestamo 4127-DO. La segunda,que se licitaraentre los consultores que demuestreninteres en respuesta a un futuro anuncio, se dedicaraa la supervisi6 n Y coordinaci6n de la ejecuci6nde dicho prograrna. A tal efecto, la SEOPCpropuso al Banco,y este no objet6, la contrataci6ndirecta de la primera parte con los consultoresde la asistenciatecnica anterior (dado que se dan las condicionesprevistas para este tipo de contrataci6nen lasNorrnas del Banco para la Selecci6n de Consultoresde enero de 1997) y, al rnismo tiempo, la preparaci6nde los tirminos de referencia para la invitaci6n a concursarN los consultores para la segunda fase.

H bSt~~62 43

25. La misi6n record6a la SEOPCque el Desdoblamientode la Carreterade Santiagoa Navarrete requiere precalificacion de contratistas y expropiaci6n o adquisici6nde terrenos, por lo que los procesos correspondientesdeben comenzar a la mayor brevedadposible, para no comprometerel fun de las obras mds alla de la fecha prevista para completar todas las obras del prestamo. La disponibilidad de terrenos afectatambien a las obras del Puentey Variantede San Pedro de Macoris. Entre las obras seleccionadaspara licitar en la primera fase figuran,ademas de las mencionadas,todas las obras de reconstrucci6nde carreterasa excepcion de los tramosEsperanza-Mao y S. Franciscode Macoris-Tenares,que han sido ya reconstruidos con recursos nacionales. Los fondos asignadosen el prestamo a estos tramos se asignaran,junto con los del puente de Bani, a la VarianteSur y Puentede Bani, ahora en proceso de estudio de factibilidad por la SEOPC. Previamentea la licitaciondel proyecto y obra de esta variante,deberan enviarse al Banco los anAlisisecon6micos y de impacto ambiental correspondientes,para su revisi6n e inclusi6n de la obra, si procede, en la lista de obrs financiables por el prestamo.

26. La misi6n reviso con los ninembros del equipo y consultor a cargo de su preparaci6nlos documentos de licitaci6nde los componentesdel proyecto incluidosen la primerafase. Las listasde las obras y servicios de consultoriacuyo proceso de licitaci6nse incluyeen la primerafase son las que figuran en el Anexo 4.

27. Tras la revisi6n se lleg6 a las siguientes conclusionesy acuerdos:

a) Documentos de precalificaci6ny licitaci6n para obras mayores aplicables a las obras de arnpliaci6n de la carretera Santiago-Navarretey el diseAoy construccci6ndel Puente BenitoMonci6n en Montecristi (Grupo I). Estosdocumentos fueron revisadosy finalizadosa manerade incluirlos comentariosdel Banco. Una versi6nfinal de estos docurnentossera entregadainmediatarnente por la niisi6n a su regreso, al DepartarnentoRegional de Adquisicionesdel Banco en Washingtonpara su aprobaci6ndefinitiva ya que el valoraproximnado de estas obrasse estimaen USS16 millones.

b) Docurnentos de licitaci6n para obras menores (Grupos II, III y IV). Se revisaron los documentos a ser utilizadosen las licitaciones para estos gruposde carreteras,los aiismos que fueron preparados en conforntidadcon la uiltimaversion de los docurnentosestandar del Banco aplicablesa contratos de obras menores. Tras incorporar algunos comentariosa los docurnentos,el Banco di6 su no objecion para su utilizaci6nen las licitaciones de obras que correspondena estos grupos de carreteras.

c) Documento de licitaci6npara las obras correspondientesal grupo V de carreteras,se acord6 que, por ser esta una obra que incluye disefio y construccion,se require la inclusi6nde clajasulasY disposiciones especiales y, al no contar con un documentoestandar para su elaboracion.se acord6que este documento seria preparadopor la SEOPC con la ayuda del Banco. Para este efecto,se preparara un borradorinicial basado en un documentoelaborado anteriormentepor la SEOPCpara otra licitaci6 a de caracteristicassimilares. del quese entreg6 una copia a la misi6n. 44

d) Contrataci6nde serviciosde consultoria par Supervisi6ode Obrasy AsistenciaTecnica programadosbajo el proyecto.La docurnentaci6ncorrespondiente no estacompleta, aunque se avanz6 notablementeen su preparaci6ndurante la rnisi6n. Se disponedel bonradorfinal de las cartas de invitaci6ny de los terminosde refererencia(que fieon incluidoscomo anexos del Informede Evaluaci6ndel Proyecto,quedando pendiente de incorporarla informaci6nespecifica sobre la fase de evaluaci6n de las propuestasque fue finalmente acordadacon la misi6n para su posterior incorporaci6nal documentode invitaci6npam cada una de las consultorias.

SantoDomingo, 10 de diciembrede 1997

Por la SEOPC Porcl B co Mundial

e l WdnezG6mez l~~~~ng.Jos M.- oBiargc Asesordel Secretaro Estadode Obras e los Proyectos P(blicasy Comucacidps y Coordinador Generalde los Proyectos. 45

ANEXOI

Prestamo 3350-DO. CalendarioRevisado de Desembolso

ir +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~1L/ 46

REPJBLICADOMDIICANA

QUINTOPROYECTO DE REHABIIAIN Y NTENMO DE CARRETERAS(PRSTAMO 3350-DO)Y PROYECTODE CARRETERAS NACIONALES

MISIONDEL BANCO MUNDIAL

X AYUDAMEMORIA. ANEXO1

Pristamo 3350-DO. Calendario Revisadode Desembolsos

| ~~Dese3boL mMnon Desv a o!= Acumlado wadoent el de M mMoncs % Tnimes USS de USSI

Ejerciao Dic. 31,96. *4.8 7.2 62.6 79.3 1996 (FY 97)

Ejercicio Mar. 31, 4.2 11.4 66.8 84.6 1997 97 (FY 97)

3um.30, 97 4.2 15.6 71.0 89.9

Ejercicio Sep. 30, 97 4.2 4.2 75.2 95.2 1997 (FY 98)

Dic. 31, 97 3.8 8.0 79.0 100.0

Total 21.2 79.0

* Real 47

ANEXO 11

Resumen de Ejecuci6n Presupuestaria al 3112197

e? 9 L. / ~~~~~~~~~~~~~48,

SECREtARIADEESTAB BE OBPas PUBLICAS Y COtUiCACIOHES 33swiRE DEP/TAITOAR1iNISTRATIVO DERECUSOS EXTERIIOS (DARE) * SI~~PROYECTO IIERECONSTRICICNII DECARRETERAS Pig. Il d 3 - .PRESTAII0BIRf3350-DO RESUKENDEEZESUSION PRESUPUESTARIA AL14104/99 tANEID21 (EnUSS Corrientes) .__.------_ __- -_ -_------_------(1) {(2) (3) (4) M (6) Presupuesto (2 - 3) 12 - 5) COPOKENTES PresupuestoDefinitivo Par Aprobado (31112/97) EjecutadoPor Ejucutar Deseebolsado Desesbolsar

1.Obras Civiles Parte A y F

(1)Rehabilitacift de Carreturas: --D-- - --0-- --a-- -- o

a) Sto.Dgo.-paJ0s dehaina- S.Crist6bal-San; 7,308,790 7,309,780 7,309,7SO 0-- 7,300,780 --O--

b) CIC.Chavbn-C. Sayihibe- S. Rafaeldel Yuea 3,364,516 3,364,516 3,364,516 -O-- 3,364,16

C) C/CDuarte-Controba-C1Rinc6n- CiCenw;-San Fco. Naceris- C/Anqelina-LasSuiranas 3,035,960 3,035,960 3,035,960 --O-- 3,035,960 -*

d)Cevicos-Las Cuevas-Cotui y LaBoaba-goanuka-La Luisa El Dosque-Bororn.a-te.Plata 9,004,450 9,004,450 9,004,450 0-- 8,707,917 296,533

a) Lafferradvra-hatey 2-Piedra serda-Suataaanal-BateyAsina Entridade Ka: 3,231,610 3,231,610 3,231,610 --O-- 3,231,610

f)C/1msrt-Si Estra:ho-Luper6n 3,084,685 3,084,685 3,0s4,685 --C-- 2,9K3,962 IOG,717

gi Cf43n8Pd M t,:^r.; -?uante RiD 3o:o-iafmranS 3,076,904 3,076,904 3,076,504 --5-- 2,327,444 107,450

ht Sa Fe.crz i:oaris-Sat) COlsweit-.-4at:Pa;:r 2,397,701 2,357,70!2,3i7,701 -0 2,207,74!

*s4ji;me 2,001, .25 2,00!, It5 2.00!,125 -_ I.1S.,%7O 15! -

j; Disegoy Const.Puente Lucas Diaz 1,241,673 1,843,673 1,84,b73 --O-- 1,a4;,6773

k)Crycs Gsa.-San Jost de Occa 2,585,927 2,5SE,217 2,535,527 -_ - 2,595,927

1)Sntimag-N?alarete-Pto. Plata 6,37,346 6,537,346 6,537,346 --Q 5,132,791 1,38t.55s

i .,- r.:a-i:;aY:.a t---i-5,2Hid31q--

n) Sup Ccwntrucci6nfi;.b. ',725,'78 5,725,57Z 5,75,57 --S-- .,;25.5,7'

- -,4-,5- - . ------. S-,---- ,5------5-;,- - ;------:- 49,

SECRETARIADEESTADO DEDIMRS PUELICAS YCOHUNICACIONES 330E DEPARTAEWOADMIISTRATIVO DERECURSOS [ITERNOS (DARE) V pRtyCTOBE RECONSTRMCCIDN BECARRETERAS P4.2 de3 PRESTAtOBIRF 3350-D0 REsuWN£BEEJEClCION PRESUPUESTIRA ALI414198 (ANEIO21 (EnUS5 Corrientes)

11) (2) l3) (4) 5( Presupuesto (2 - 3) 12- 51 CONPOliENTES Presupuesto Definitivo Por Aprobado (31112/97) Ejecutado PorEjecutar DeseebolsadoDeseabolsar ------

2. ObrasCiviles ParteB 10,772,505 10,772,50510,172,505 -O- 10,672,496 100,001

3.Obras CivilesPartes C y D 553,435 553,435 553,435 --O-- 422,908 70,527

4.Adquisici6nt de Eientes 4,470,938 4,470,938 4,470,938 --O-- 4,470,93 -Q-

5. Rehabilitaci6nde Equipo Parte E 300,000 300,000 300,000 --G-- 30,000 -0--

6. Serviics de Consultoriay Elntreonaven1to

a; Servi:ios de C^nsultor;a y Entreuai:nt. 6,464,599 6,464,599 6,464,599 - 5,504,6SH 959,931

7.No ---A;i;nada _---_-

SaldoCuenta Especial 68.00

TOTAL 75,000,000 79,000,00075,000,000 --O-- 75,214,7603,785,24: =:======:======:=:======-=5w:== 50.

SECRETARIA.DEESTADO DEODRAS PU8LICAS Y COIUNICAC IDES (SEOPC) 335oPRE DEPARTANENTOADrnNISTRATIvO DERECWRSOS EXTERHO; (DARE) V PROYECTOcE RECONSTRUCCION DECARRETERAS Pig.3.de 3 PRESTANO8IRF3350-90 RESUNENDEEJECUCION PRESUPUESTARIA AL 14104139 - (ANEID21 (EnUSS Corrientes)

------11) (2) (31 (4) (5) (61 Presupuesto (2- 3) (2- 5S CONPONENTES PresupuestoDefinitivo Por Aprobado (31/12/37)Ejecutado Por Eiecutar Deseabolsado Desesablsar ------

1.Obras Civiles Parte A y F 56,43,8523 56,438,52356,439,523 --0-- 53,763,682 2,654,941

2.Obras Civiles Parte 8 10,772,505 10,772,50510,772,505 --O-- 10,672,496 100,009

3.Obras Civiles Partes C y D 553,435 553,435 553,435 --D- 482,908 70,527

4.Adquisici6n deBienes 4,470,938 4,470,939 4,470,931 --D-- 4,470,938 -D--

5. Rehabilitaci6ndeEquipo Parte E 300,000 300.000 300,000 --o-- 300,000-- fi_

6. ServiciosdoeConsultoria ' Ertrenasientc 6,464,59 6,464,5i9 6,464,5591 -- ;

7.No Asignada --G --0 -- --5i-- SaldoCuenta Especial 68 W5

oTAL 79,000,000 79,000,0007$,000,000 --0-- 75,214,70 3,705,24

100.003.bOO 4.97 P0R~~~~~~~~E)i!AJ~~~~~~~~~~~~,=… ==, == , = , , 51

ANEXO III

Prestamo BIRF No. 3350-DO. Relaci6n de Obras Civiles

. p...~~~~u~~~~~~~~~~~~~. SECRETARIADE ESTADODE OIAS PUBLICASY COMUNICACIONES DEPARTAMENTOADMINISTRATIVO DE RECURSOSEXTERNOS, (DARE)

PRESTAMO BIRF No.3350-DO

RELACION DE OBRASCIWLES

OBRA LONGITUD MONTO SITUACION ______(KMS.) (RDS) 1.- CIDUARTE-SANFRACISCO DE MACORIS 28.30 33,211.005.37 TERMINADA

2.- CIANGELINA-LASGUARANAS-GUIZA 8.50 31.310.716.14 TERMINADA 3.- COTUI-LASCUEVAS-CEVtCOS 21.00 105.964.595.06 TERMINADA I 4.- LABOMBA-GUANUMA-MONTE PLATA 30.20 227,929,395.34ETAPA DE TERMINACION I 5.- NAVARRETE-LOSHIDALGOS-LA ISABELA 46.60 83.955.475.571 TERMINADA

6.- NAVARRETE-PUERTOPLATA 67.50 198,970,337.131ETAPA DE TERMINACION 7.- IMBERT-ELESTRECHO-LUPERON 25.00 108.183.236.56 TERMINADA 1 8.- CILAHERRADURA-AMINA-MAO 40.43 107,272,354.72 TERMINADA

9.- SANTODOMINGO-SAN CRISTOBAL-BANI 45.60 163,809,849.30 TERMINADA

10.. CICHAVON-CJBAYAHIBE-CISANRAFAEL DEL YUMA 29.80 64,400.060.51 TERMINADA

11.-CIOCOA-SAN JOSE DE OCOA 26.00 61,967,109.23 TERMINADA

12.-PUENTE LUCAS DIAZ SOBRE EL RIONIZAO 269.60M.L. 34.371,556.46 TERMINADA

113.-SAN PEDRO DE MACORISALAROMANA 32.90 73,195,833.99 TERMINADA

1'4. SANsPEDRO DE MACORIS-HATOMAYOR 36.96 65,549.281.871 TERMINADA

15.-HATO MAYOR-EL SEYBO-C/EL PINTAO 3400 83.331.533.19ETAPA DE TERMINACION t6.- OBRASCIVILES PROGRAMA TRANSFERENCIA DE TECNOLOGIA I 536.07 215.736.684.03: TERMINADA

17. RECONSTRUCCIONINSTALACIONES AYUDANTIA DE MOCA * 5.861.641.46ETAPA DE TERMINACION 18. REPARACIONDE UN CONJUNTODE PUENTES METALICOS i 7,000.000.00. TERMINADA

19.-CONSTRUCCION DE VARIOSEDIFICIOS PARA ING. AYUDANTES . _ 1.2-.000.00 ETAPADE TERMINACION TOTALES.- > 19OBRAS = 1,673 220,665.93:

L .. 53 4

ANEXO IV

PROYECTONACIONAL DE CARRETERAS. Liamado a Licitaci6n Piublica Internacional. Licitacion SEOPCIBIRF N°. 01197

(This "Anexo" relates to the National Highway Project, and, therefore, it is not included)

44>.

55

Appendix B: Borrower's Contributionto the ICR

SEOPC prepared a comprehensivereport of the project, which was furnished to the Bank in May 1998. This appendix only includes the main text of such report. Information provided by the Annexes of the report is similarto that provided in Appendix A of this ICR.

xt j

57

V PROYECTO DE REHABILITACION Y MANTENIMIENTO DE CARRETERAS PRESTAMO BIRF. 3350-DO

INFORME FINAL

INDICE

1.- Antecedentes

2.- Ojetivos del Proyecto

3.- Programaci6nInicial del Prestamo (Ver Anexo 1-A)

4.- Programaci6nFinal del Prestamo (Ver Anexo 1-B) al 14/04/98

5.- Analisis de la Reprogramaci6n Final

6.- Metodologiaempleada para la Reprogramaci6nFinal

7.- Evaluaci6nde Objetivos

7.1 Programas de Rehabilitaci6n y Mantenimientode Carreteras

7.2 Mejoramientode la Calidad de los pavimentos Asfalticos

7.3 Fortalecimientode la Industria Nacional de la Construccion

7.4 Mejoras en la Gerencia Administrativade Proyectospor la SEOPC

7.5 Evaluaci6n Econ6mica

7.6 Cambios en los Estandares de Ingenieria

7.7 Capacidad de los Contratistas. 58

1.- Antecedentes

En fecha 2 de junio de 1992, efectivo el 2 de Diciembre de 1992,se firm6 el Acuerdo de

Prestamo BIRF. 3350-DO correspondiente al v proyecto de Rehabilitaci6n y

Mantenimientode Carreteras, entre la Secretaria de Estado de Obras Publicas y el Banco

Intemacionalde Reconstrucci6n y Fomento.

El proyecto, el cual debia financiar los tres primeros afhosdel Programa de Inversi6n en

Carreteras, consistia en las siguientes componentes, sujetas a modificacionestanto por parte del Prestatario, como del Banco, por mutuo acuerdo, con tal de lograr los objetivos propuestos.

Parte A: Repavimentaci6n y Rehabilitaci6nde unos 425 Kms. De Carreterasy el Recapeo

de unos 408 Kms.

Parte B: Mantenimiento, tanto Preventivo como Rutinario, asi como el resellado de cerca

de 805 Kil6metrosde Carreteras.

Parte C: Rehabilitaci6n y Reparacion de 8 Estructuras de Puentes, incluyendo daihos de

erosion por efecto de la arena, reparaci6n y Pintura de las Estructuras Metalicas,y limpieza

de los sujetadores, asi como reparacionesmenores en los empalmes.

Parte D: Reconstrucci6n de Talleres y Construcci6n de otros para trabajar con la

reparaci6n de Equipos y MantenimientoPreventivo.

Parte E: Previa la adquisici6n, la utilizaci6n de los equipos y repuestos seleccionados,

para la reparaci6n de los equipos de Mantenimiento existentes, incluyendo las

Sefializadorasde Carreteras. 59

Parte G: AsitenciaTcnica, consistenteen

1.- Entrenamientoa los operadores de Equipo requeridos para la ejecuci6nde las Partes A y B del Proyecto.

2.- Programa dirijido a la Direccion General de Mantenimiento(DGM) de la SEOPC y la Industriade la Construcci6n, en Tecnologia de Pavimentos.

3.- Disehioe Implementacion del Sistema de mantenimiento de Carreteras y Manejo de Equipos, para la Direcci6n Generalde Mantenimientode la SEOPC.

4.- Inventarioy Reclasificaci6n de la Red de Caminos Vecinalesdel Prestatario.

5.- Ejecuci6n de de los Disefios de Ingenieriapara las Carreteras incluidas en el Proyecto.

6.- Ejecuci6n de un Estudio de TransporteUrbano.

7.- La ejecuci6n de un estudio de la Capacidad y Estructura de Industria de la Construcci6n operando en Territorio del Prestatario.

Posteriormentese dicidi6 ejecutar solamentelas obras del Ier y 2do ahiodel Proyecto, las correspondientes al 3er ano fuer6n solo estudiadas y preparados sus planos ejecutivos para ser incluidas como componentes del prestamo "carreterasNacionales", en ejecuci6n actualmente.

2.- Ojetivos del Proyecto

En cuanto a los objetivos del proyecto de:

(a)- Dotar a la Red Nacional de Carreteras de Caracteristicasde operaci6n aceptables a trav6s de est" Programa de Rehabilitaci6ny Mantenimiento.

(b) Mejorar y reforzar la capacidad Institucional de la Secretaria de Estado de Obras Publicas y Comunicaciones (SEOPC)para planificar y dar mantenimientoa la red vial del Pais. (c) Incrementar la disponibilidad del Equipo y Maquinaria utilizado para el Mantenimiento Vial. (d) Majorar la calidad de los Pavimentos y de las Tecnicas utilizadas en la Construccionde los mismos. (e) Reforzar la Industria Domestica de la Construcci6n. (f) Efectos positivos en los Costos del Transporte y Is tiempos de viaje. 60

3.-) Programaci6n Inicial del Pr6stamo: En el anexo la podemos observar la programacioninicial concebida para cada una de las componentesdel Prestamo en funci6nde los alcances concebidospara cada componente.

4.-) Programaci6n final del Pr6stamo: En el anexo 1B podemos observar la ultima reprogramaci6n del Pr6stamo, donde constan las ultimas asignaciones realizadas a cada componente de acuerdo a reprogramacionesanteriores y en consonanciacon la metodologiaaplicada en las reprogramacionesanteriores.

5.-) Anilisis de la Reprogramaci6n Final : Al irse ejecutando los diversos componentes del Prestamo Birf. 3350-Do , los costos de construcci6n de Obras Civiles , incluidos en la parte A del programa de Prestamo, se elevar6n considerablemente con relaci6n a lo originalmente contratado, debido a que los proyectos que se han ido ejecutando, por cambios en los disefios,para mejorar la calidad de los trabajos a realizar, asi como por omisiones en los planos originales del mismo, obligar6n a rediseniarpracticamente todas las obras y se paso de un simple recapeo, o de una rehabilitacionen muchas de ellas, a una reconstrucci6n de las mismas.

Los escalamientos de precios consignadospara el Banco Mundial alcanza un valor tope de un 8%, los excedentes a este valor fuer6n asumidos por esta Secretaria.

A lo largo del proyecto se realizar6n varias reprogramacionesde los recursos consignados a cada componente , utilizando para ello el analisis econ6mico de lugar.

En la reprogramaci6n final se utilizar6n al maximo los recursos disponibles por el Banco Mundial, utilizando estos en las partidas que tienen verdaderaincidencia en la ejecuci6n de los proyectos, dejando a esta SEOPC los excedentesy los elementos que por sus caracteristicas caen dentro de ambitos que deben ser financiados con recursos locales.

En el cuadro del anexo 2 presentamos una relaci6n de las obras Civiles ejecutadas con el prestamo 3350-Do , su longitud, el monto final consignadoy su estado de situaci6n.

6.-) Metodologia Empleada para la Reprogramacion Final : Debido a los trabajos de rehabilitaci6n y reconstruccion de carreteras, que superar6n los estimados iniciales, se realiz6 un analisis econ6mico de los mismos para todas las carreteras incluidas en la parte A del Prestamo, donde se verific6 los niveles de importanciade los proyestos en funci6n de la tasa interna de retorno.

El analisis econ6mico realizado nos muestra que todas las carreteras estudiadas, auin con los aumentos previstos arrojan tasas internas de retomo (TIR) superiores al 12%, aceptables por el Birf. Para ser financiadas, mientras que el analisis de sensibilidad nos dice que el % que podian aumentar los costos de las mismas sin 61 alterar su rentabilidad ; debido a que los presupuestos de las carreteras han sufrido aumentos o disminuciones despues de haberse realizado el analisis econ6mico, hemos procedido a comprobar, con los valores reales finales, si estos montos alterarian la TIR de cada proyecto, en base al aumento o disminucion del % de sensibilidad.

7.-) Evaluaci6n de Objetivos

7.2 Programas de Rehabilitacion y Mantenimiento de Carreteras:

El proyecto de rehabilitaci6n aporto una recuperaci6nde de cerca de 613 krns de carreteras que estaban en mal estado y que pasar6n a estadobueno y ademas agreg6 unos 345 kms en tratamientos superficiales para un total de mantenimiento pri6dico y rehabilitaci6nde 958 kms.

Uno de los objetivos que tienen una gran importanciapara el futuro inmediato es la intensificaci6n de la contratacion con el sector privado de las obras demandadas por el sector vial, incluyendo el mantenimiento peri6dico y rutinario de las carreteras.

En este programa por primera vez se introduce un componetenuevo, que es la aplicaci6n transferencia de tecnologia en Capas Delgadas para el mantenimiento de pavimentos Asfalticos, donde se utilizar6n los servicios de una empresa lider en el ramo, que sirvio de base para una transferencia real de la tecnologia y la metodologia necesaria para realizar las aplicaciones que tengan a bien implementarseen programas posteriores.

7.2 Mejoramiento de la Calidad de los Pavimentos Asfalticos : Con la aplicaci6n de un programa de transferencia de tecnologia en pavimentos asfalticos, se lograr6n en gran medida los objetivos planteados,como son:

a.-) La ejecuci6n de las Obras Civiles con una extenci6n de 536.07 kms

b.-) Adquisici6n de equipo y material de laboratorio.

c.-) Asistencia Tecnica.

d.-) Transferencia de Tcnologia.

e.-) Se realiz6 la transferenciade los laboratoriosutilizados durante la ejecuci6n del proyecto la SEOPC, una vez finalizado las distintas aplicaciones. 62

Ademas de estos logros se puden mencionar algunos resultados indirectos de este proyecto como son:

* Mejores controles de calidad de los agregados utilizadosen las obras.

* La introducci6n del uso de polimeros como aditivos de los ligantes bituminosos.

* Mayor competitividad en la fabricaci6n y venta de emulsiones.

* La reintroducci6n del uso de emulsiones y mezclas en frio en las obras de la SEOPC que habian estado en deshuso por varios anios.

* Reducci6n de costo en la mejora de la superficiedel pavimento.

3 Refuerzo del departamentode Administraci6n y evaluacionde Pavimentos

7.3 Reforzamiento de la Industria de la Construcci6n:

El fortalecimiento de la Industria Nacional de la Construcci6n Vial en aspectos como la fabricaci6n de mezclas asfalticasy su aplicaci6n en obra, la capacidad organizativa de la SEOPC y los controles de calidad en la ejecuci6n.

7.4 Mejoras en la Gerencia Administrativa de Proyectos:

Dentro de los objetivos que se han ido logrando a lo largo de varios proyectos, es incrementar la capacidad de gerencia administrativa de proyectos por parte de la SEOPC, asi como ejecutar las obras con calidad y acorde con los costos preestablecidos, mejores controles para la selecci6n de los contratistas.

7.5 Cambios en los Estandares de Ingenieria:

En este proyecto se logr6 un cambio en los estandares de ingenieria utilizados originalmente, en la construccion de estas obras fueron corregidos, dandole a estas un mayor confort, con un analisis econ6mico adicional que les dio soporte. 63

7.6 La Capacidadde los Contratistas:

Se puso de manifiesto en este proyecto, como un elementoa tener en cuenta para los siguientes programas, que los contratistas que tenian a su cargo varias obras, confrontarondificultades en su terminaci6n a tiempo, lo que demuestra que deben tenerse un mayor cuidado en evaluar la capacidad real de ejecucion de varias obras simuitanearmente.

Ptepakado pot: Viato BuLeno

ml UL0v1K ItEtZ1NG. DANIEL G MARTINEZ Ing. de Ceo u one A4e6o4det S. ecteta4o 64

REPUULICADOMINICANA SECRETRRIRDEESTRDO DEOBRRS PUBLICRS YCOMUNICRCIONES

Na. 203-9k Santa Domaingo, D. N. 14 de Ab6d 199t.

Ac cor No9 t ---

8NCo iZrERNACTONALDE RECOHSTRUCCio Y FOMENiTO(BIRF)) L plwfcti4pnmaeorirGPFEs"VCXaa A m Proc Wa4hington, D.C., U.S.A. ______

Ate6n DR. JOSE hA. ALONSO-'3ARGE rngen9euod TxaJupo4te.

D.,ati tdo.6 SeAoteao .

CotS4mente, ijt6o4mamo4t que hemos tev4 4ado ea botnadour det IndoAmede TeMncoin, copia deL cuat et Banco no4 entLeQo ana duante.tZ a tma. mi,Zi6YLdet 20 at 29 de mawzode 1998.-

A taZ qevto, ex0p aemo,6teque no tetemoa unflg1a06j 6n atL mi7Mo, COkexcepcain det XII p>tu 11 y III que debeAca ag4tegavcean tLtimo paaao pque 'teconozea wta mayot dukabZUdad de tc' .tO4 0 econ6tXuwdoAaunquLe ron mfpfnolt lLentbiti&da

Atentmentz,

MG. DANIELGO MA h, Ak wo%det SecAe04aad2 _ ; 0b4aA P(ibabi y Cornu.

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