The Minds of Gods: a Comparative Study of Supernatural Agency
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Cognition 129 (2013) 163–179 Contents lists available at SciVerse ScienceDirect Cognition journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/COGNIT The minds of gods: A comparative study of supernatural agency Benjamin Grant Purzycki Centre for Human Evolution, Cognition, and Culture, University of British Columbia, 1871 West Mall, Vancouver, British Columbia V6T 1Z2, Canada article info abstract Article history: The present work is the first study to systematically compare the minds of gods by exam- Received 11 October 2012 ining some of the intuitive processes that guide how people reason about them. By exam- Revised 21 June 2013 ining the Christian god and the spirit-masters of the Tyva Republic, it first confirms that the Accepted 24 June 2013 consensus view of the Christian god’s mind is one of omniscience with acute concern for interpersonal social behavior (i.e., moral behaviors) and that Tyvan spirit-masters are not as readily attributed with knowledge or concern of moral information. Then, it reports Keywords: evidence of a moralization bias of gods’ minds; American Christians who believe that God Religion is omniscient rate God as more knowledgeable of moral behaviors than nonmoral informa- Minds of gods Supernatural Punishment Hypothesis tion. Additionally, Tyvans who do not readily report pro- or antisocial behavior among the Omniscience things that spirit-masters care about will nevertheless rate spirit-masters’ knowledge and Cultural consensus analysis concern of moral information higher than nonmoral information. However, this knowledge Theological correctness is distributed spatially; the farther away from spirits’ place of governance a moral behavior takes place, the less they know and care about it. Finally, the wider the breadth of knowl- edge Tyvans attribute to spirit-masters, the more they attribute moral concern for behav- iors that transpire beyond their jurisdiction. These results further demonstrate that there is a significant gulf between expressed beliefs and intuitive religious cognition and provides evidence for a moralization bias of gods’ minds. Ó 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. 1. Introduction the world are especially knowledgeable and concerned with human behavior (Boyer, 2001; Johnson, 2005; Pet- For a long time, researchers of religion have argued that tazzoni, 1955), but the specific domains of concern people religion functions to maintain and promote cooperation explicitly attribute to gods appear to vary from place to between individuals (Durkheim, 2001[1915]; Malinowski, place. As far as we know, these domains are limited to 1932; Rappaport, 1979, 1999). Contemporary experimen- interpersonal social behavior, ritual, environmental re- tal evidence suggests that religious priming can boost source management, and etiquette (Purzycki, 2012; Pur- cooperative behavior and can minimize defection on social zycki & Sosis, 2011). However, while religion appears to rules (Bering, McLeod, & Shackelford, 2005; Johnson, 2005; positively mediate interpersonal social behavior and curb Johnson & Bering, 2006; Piazza, Bering, & Ingram, 2011; antisocial behavior, we currently have very little in the Randolph-Seng & Nielsen, 2007; Shariff & Norenzayan, way of understanding the cognitive foundations for these 2007). Behavioral and cross-cultural studies also suggest effects. If religion heightens levels of prosociality, do gods that participation in religious rituals reliably conveys com- without explicit concern for interpersonal social behaviors mitment to the group and contributes to overcoming prob- (e.g., theft, generosity, murder, honesty, etc.) still prime lems inherent to human cooperation (Soler, 2012; Sosis & moral systems and domains? Bressler, 2003; Sosis & Ruffle, 2003, 2004; Sosis, Kress, & The cognitive science of religion literature regularly Boster, 2007). Many have also observed that gods around claims that the ability to mentalize is the essence of reli- gious cognition; our commitment to supernatural beings requires the ability to make sense of other minds (Atran, E-mail address: [email protected] 0010-0277/$ - see front matter Ó 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2013.06.010 164 B.G. Purzycki / Cognition 129 (2013) 163–179 2002, pp. 59–63; Barrett, 2004; Bering, 2011; Guthrie, focuses on the content (i.e., representational domains) of 1980, 1995). However, remarkably little has been done to gods’ minds. empirically investigate the cross-cultural similarities and Boyer (2001, p. 144) observes that people are far more variation in representations of gods’ minds and how this interested in the minds of their gods rather than other fea- relates to religious prosociality. As such, many questions tures and posits that people are more likely to endow remain unanswered. For example, do people have a predis- supernatural agents with access to domains of ‘‘socially position towards associating interpersonal social behaviors strategic information’’ (Boyer, 2000, 2002). He defines this such as theft and generosity, deceit and honesty, cruelty as ‘‘the subset of all the information...that activates the and kindness with supernatural agents? If present, does mental systems that regulate social interaction’’ (2001, p. this predisposition operate even in contexts where super- 152). Bering (2011) defines ‘‘strategic social information’’ natural agents are not explicitly concerned about human as ‘‘any information that, once exposed, could influence morality? Do people around the world draw upon different one’s reproductive success’’ (p. 174). Having access to this cognitive systems to think about the knowledge and con- reputational information is often held to be the primary cerns of their gods? The present study initiates the formal distinction between gods and other counterintuitive examination of these questions by systematically investi- agents (Atran, 2002; Barrett, 2008; Boyer, 2001, 2002); gating how people from two different cultures—American gods who care about such information are more salient Christian students and Buddhist-animist Tyvans from to our minds than other agents without such abilities southern Siberia—make sense of their gods’ minds. (e.g., cartoons, mythological creatures). These theorists of- The following sections review current thinking and evi- ten explain retention of and commitment to supernatural dence on how and why it is that humans commit to gods. agent concepts by appealing to their cognitive salience, Following this is a discussion of the important distinction but very little work has been done to get a reliable account between ‘‘theologically correct’’ beliefs and how intuitive of the variation in attributed domains of concern to gods. cognitive processes often betray culturally specific postu- However, one thread of research suggests that the links be- lates. I then review some of the theological discussions of tween supernatural agents, their minds, and socially stra- the Abrahamic god’s mind followed by a brief description tegic knowledge function to mediate social behavior and of religion in the Tyva Republic. Drawing from this frame- thus contribute to the evolution of cooperation. work, I present hypotheses and their tests regarding how people ought to reason about their supernatural agents 1.2. Gods’ minds and conclude by illustrating future directions in the study of gods’ minds. 1.2.1. Supernatural punishment and cooperation Some evolutionary theories culminate into what is known as the Supernatural Punishment Hypothesis (Sch- 1.1. Representing supernatural minds loss & Murray, 2011). One strand of this hypothesis (Ber- ing & Johnson, 2005; Johnson, 2005) suggests that a Recently, the question of why humans are religious has psychological commitment to punishing deities is a part become reinvigorated by the cognitive and evolutionary of our evolved repertoire of cognitive systems. Another sciences of religion. While cognitive approaches attempt (Norenzayan & Shariff, 2008; Shariff & Norenzayan, to unravel the proximate mechanisms at work in religious 2007) posits that because of the prosocial effects of pun- cognition, evolutionary approaches seek to determine ishing supernatural agents, such concepts are more preva- whether or not religion promotes survival and lent in large populations. Together, this research shows reproduction. that supernatural agents often function to inhibit self- Many argue that the essence of religious cognition is the interested behavior or free-riding, and this strengthens representation of supernatural minds, an ability stemming cooperation which significantly contributes to individual from our normal, everyday theory of mind systems (see well-being. Baron-Cohen, 1995; Premack & Woodruff, 1978). In his People are more likely to engage in prosocial behavior foundational work, Guthrie (1980, 1995) argues that or suppress antisocial behavior when primed with super- anthropomorphism—granting human-like characteristics natural agent concepts (Bering & Johnson, 2005; Bering to non-human entities—is a central feature of religion. et al., 2005; Johnson, 2005; Johnson & Bering, 2006; Piazza, Anthropomorphism includes human-like forms, and attrib- Bering, & Ingram, 2011; Randolph-Seng & Nielsen, 2007; uting comprehension of symbolic thought and human Rossano, 2007; Shariff & Norenzayan, 2007). We also see motivations to non-humans. Barrett (2004) and Keil (Bar- similar effects with the priming of secular justice concepts rett & Keil, 1996) suggest that humans are equipped with (Shariff & Norenzayan,