05_PANORAMA_Geographical_Anuari_2016_EN.indd 182

IEMed. Mediterranean Yearbook 2016 182 Geographical Overview | Western Balkans Panorama tween and . Serbia. Kosovo and tween be reconciliation of aprocess at starting ment, agree that through aimed, also which mediation, 2013, EU’s to April in the found thanks was North the of question to the solution Apossible Serbia. intransigently rejected Kosovo’s from secession who Serbs, by ethnic exclusively almost inhabited is and to Serbia contiguous is which corner, northern the was reach its beyond remained What Serbia. of aprovince as had it boundaries the with cides coin which claimed, it territory the over all control Kosovoupon its independence, to failed its extend The most conspicuous loose end is the fact that, that crisis. havehow these efforts unwittingly contributed to and have dealt with those loose and ends, Brussels, how on few considerations a offer Ishall But it. to support seem would writing of time Kosovo at the envelops that crisis litical 2015), (Capussela, po grave the book and recent a in to articulate Iseek argument the is this ment: institutions, are which failing to its sustain develop economic and political its in lie State new the of problems main the because my opinion, in mistake, a was This attention. their of most dedicated then have since alike commentators and diplomats that questions of territory and ethnicity; and it is to them again, are, These ends. loose some left 2008, ary The independence of Kosovo, declared in Febru Kosovo Crisis the of Ends Loose The The InternationalCivilianOffice-ICO International Supervisor Former HeadoftheEconomicsUnitKosovo’s Andrea Lorenzo Capussela and the Negotiations with Serbia Evolution Political Kosovo: |Western Balkans Overview Geographical ------February 2012, ahead of the talks that led to the 2012, led that talks the of ahead February in Indeed, Kosovo of soon. citizens loyal to become unlikely seemed North the of residents the because Reversing the status quo was complex, moreover, and monasteries. churches ancient its Kosovo and in minority Serb considerable – already the increasing perhaps except North, the for exchange in Serbia to offer little very Kosovo had grade had little incentive to compromise because Bel And too. to Serbia value limited of is North The gling and money laundering operations smug vast permits that quo astatus of continuation the preferred presumably and North, the with ably profit to trade known –are elite that of component a are leaders –whose ver, circles Kosovo’s criminal 2014, (Phillips Serbs’ the 142–3). of ‘get rid Moreo to order in North, the of separation formal the come to wel believed was it of part and there, jurisdiction its to extend strategy arealistic formulated never had Pristina in elite political the agreement cent ceed the material benefits. Indeed, before the re ex – probably activity economic of segment large unregulated land, where smuggling represents a lawless, almost an been years adozen for what on law of rule the re-establishing –and it sorbing ab of costs the and debatable, is value strategic Its Kosovo. for question existential an not is North The centives to compromise. in strong has side neither – and undesirable very – if stable is quo status the for one, urgent aless is Kosovo question the of avatar this But ovo question. sustainably might prove as hard as solving the Kos it Kosovo. Solving of territory over the Albanians and Serbs opposed that conflict political the of quarto, in image, mirror the Kosovo is North of question The Kosovo North of Question The – constitutional protection for the ------09/09/2016 12:23:49 05_PANORAMA_Geographical_Anuari_2016_EN.indd 183 ceptance of the deal. the of ceptance ac sufficient to signal seem not did it referendum, 2012 to the compared especially opinion, popular in ashift of beginning the have marked Kosovo – might – But althoughtime the independence. since turnout first the for North, the in held also meaningfully were 2013 both in notably, 2014 and Kosovo’s elections Most described. Ihave just context the in pected ex have been perhaps could than progress greater The implementation of the agreements has made negotiations. the in part taken not had who North, the of dents resi the among as well Kosovo, of as especially and Serbia of electorates the among unpopular er rath proved they But EU. the for success important an as described been have rightly agreements Both precise and implementable arrangements. into more earlier years two agreed principles broad second agreement, therefore, which translates the a made 2015 Pristina and August In so. Belgrade ment distinctly was vague, left deliberatelyprobably 2013 the of part this agree But minority. Serb to its granted protection the increase to further accepted has Pristina turn, In authority. to Pristina’s subject be North the that accepted has Kosovo, Belgrade nize to recog refusal Serbia’s safeguards formally ment are not negligible. Althoughconcessions the agree theers question Kosovo. of North The reciprocal governments to sign an agreement, which also cov 2013 in persuading succeeded the Brussels two 19 on April negotiations, of years two about After common foreign policy. reformed recently own its of credibility the firm nate and source af of a possible instability regional to elimi both desired which and Union, to the cede to ac desire their on leverage could which EU, the from pressure under North the of question the cuss to dis agreed only Pristina and Belgrade gotiate, even ne or to compromise, incentives real Lacking Crisis Current and the Kosovo North about Agreements The no. answered respondents the of 99% 75% was and turnout the reportedly, accepted: be referendum on whether Kosovo’s jurisdiction could informal an organized 2013 North the agreement, little above 20%, or 20 points less than in (south) in than less 20 points or 20%, above little ------Serbs view it as a constitutional organ, whereas whereas organ, aconstitutional as it view Serbs Kosovo the and Belgrade interpretations: different versions use different words to describe it, reflecting Serbian and Albanian the that fact to the due name adouble ‘association/community,’ the as known is it body suggests the of absence realagreement on it: this of name the Already government. central the of interlocutor an as serve thus could and latter the whichties, would be delegated extensive powers by municipali coordination body among Serb-majority a of establishment the is part controversial and tant impor most Their to astandstill. ground has ments agree the of implementation the context, this In churches and monasteries Kosovo in minority its ancient and constitutional protection for theSerb except the increasing perhaps to little in exchange, Serbia very offer to compromiseKosovo because had too. had Belgrade incentive And little isof limited North The value to Serbia – may break out. break – may system political the for distrust and spread poverty, economic pessimism, joblessness, by wide – fuelled unrest social that risk the creasing in unruly, and acute became and walls, its of outside percolated 2015: of conflict summer the political the since business little transacted thus has Parliament demonstrations. violent, ing and large, occasionally prompt MPs, opposition the of third one than more – probably most – illegally, by arresting responded in six or seven consecutive sessions). The authorities cans inside the chamber (remarkably, this happened gas tear even opened opposition the meeting, from and proved largely effective. To prevent Parliament months several lasted which Parliament, of boycott a began turn, in opposition, The arguments. tional offication the upon agreement, constitu spurious rati parliamentary the to bypass sought government street, against its implementation. In response, the the on and Parliament in battle, asustained ened threat opposition the 2015 made, was agreement August the after Soon crisis. political aserious ed ignit that however, spark the were agreements, The ------09/09/2016 12:23:49

IEMed. Mediterranean Yearbook 2016 183 Geographical Overview | Western Balkans Panorama 05_PANORAMA_Geographical_Anuari_2016_EN.indd 184

IEMed. Mediterranean Yearbook 2016 184 Geographical Overview | Western Balkans Panorama ments about North Kosovo. This ulterior motive can can motive ulterior Kosovo. This North about ments and misguided suggest, perhaps arrange support, to score a foreign to led policy Brussels success 2015), (Surroi aim its that analyst sovar argues who aKo of criticism the of atarget is motive ulterior This strengthen their in credibility the global arena. would that a result to achieve order in – also began programme energy Iran’s nuclear on negotiations the 2013 agreement was reached and, almost in parallel, the until priority highest their to be seemed – which issue this in capital political and energy erable consid to invest have chosen Service, Action ternal Ex 2015). established newly its and fact, in EU, The Cooper (e.g., mediator the of asuccess as nificance sig its on as conflict, underlying the of solution the for agreements the of importance the on much as is 2015). emphasis the conversely, former, the Among and the prospects of its implementation (e.g., Surroi agreement the of merits the discuss mainly latter The eign commentators and analysts from the Balkans. by for perspectives, different markedly from viewed generally Kosovo are North on agreements The Kosovo North on Agreements the of Interpretations Diverging region. the Kosovo and both to stabilize was precisely by EU-mediated agreements, whose aim triggered was crisis this that is course, of paradox, The remain). authorities central the and minority an Albani the between differences where instance, for Macedonia, (including Balkans the of parts unstable degenerate, with potential repercussions in other to even threatens and acute remains Pristina in sis cri political the because writing, of time at the soon, relaxed to be likely seems obstacles these of None about the of constitutionality the agreement. ment sought – has voiced some (prudent) concerns govern that assistance –whose Court stitutional tocredibility overcome; and Kosovo’s because - Con the lacks government current the which it, against signalled intense, and rather widespread, opposition that body; large because demonstrations in Pristina to shape giving legislation of adoption the and ment 2015 the of agree ratification the both blocked ment Parlia of boycott the because established yet be not could say). body (an ‘NGO,’ often This they ciation asso asimple as it view electorate its and Pristina ------case of Kosovo, which was allowed (controversially) (controversially) allowed was Kosovo, of which case the in impossible solution this judged West had The self-determination rights. internal for exchange in State mother the of ereignty sov the to accept refused territory minority-held the cases both in And jurisdiction. its of imposition the resisting of capable was and more or adecade for it from autonomously lived had State, mother putative) separationethnic from desired its minority (titular or a homogeneous and concentrated geographically cases both In Isaid. other, as each of images mirror are North the of that Kosovo of and question The Kosovo North on Policy Western of Foundations Unclear The Kosovo’s North. to the claim to support decision Western the namely agreements, these of rationale underlying to the briefly to turn useful be might it So sions’ granted to the minority. Serb ‘conces further the to accept electorate its suade to per credibility political the lack evidently Pristina in elite the because partly premature, were tempts rent crisis would seem to suggest that these at pave the way for more solid solutions. But the cur might agreements into piecemeal question political sensitive that to deconstruct EU’s attempts the that argued be course of may It sustainable. to be likely very –is north the of residents the –including ers play relevant all of incentives and interests the from implementable, and no agreement that abstracts and fact, in sustainable, be must they a success be to order In agreements. the of weakness structural the unveiling success, the undermine could fects The current political crisis suggests that such de territory. own their govern shall meaningfully in included the about who discussion never Kosovo was North of population the cause be Kosovo, partly North surrounding conflict political these agreements do not to seem sufficient solve the on account of their contents and circumstances, governancebased (Surroi, 2015). importantly, More ethnic- of elements introduce they as problematic, highly seem indeed, Kosovo do, North about ments agree the of Parts untimeliness. possible its and agreement the of defects some both for planation idealistic perspective, but it does offer a plausible ex hardly be criticized se per , except from a markedly amarkedly from , except ------09/09/2016 12:23:49 05_PANORAMA_Geographical_Anuari_2016_EN.indd 185 really desired, considered urgent or was capable neither that agreement to an sides two the to bring premature, at least or imprudent, just not was it So Remarks Concluding Some tional such autonomy may be – is – is be may autonomy such tional – however no Serbia of borders the Kosovo within without provoking violent opposition. Autonomy of authority its regain not could Kosovo. Belgrade of people the of majority overwhelming to the ceptable ac be not over Kosovo would rule Serbian of return irreversible is it deny; cannot one areality is This separation complete in governed have been Serbia Kosovo and years, eight past the For Serbs… and nized the relationship between mistrust and enmity of [a] history North: the of question the describe well equally could that words in couched is which added), sis Kosovo’s 2007, independence (Ahtisaari 2; empha for blueprint the in argument central the from clearly very emerges this eclipse; hardly can vo’s authority Koso under North the of subjection ter, the which charac ethnic bia’s). essentially have an did it And change (unilaterally) an established border (Ser did Kosovo’s But secession borders. established of redrawing ethnic-based the for aprecedent as Kosovo’s of independence dangerousness the limit –to course of –laudable, to adesire responded Retaining Kosovo’s mightprovincial haveborders its autonomy. banian minority), subject to adequate guarantees for Al asmall retains (which Serbia of sovereignty the Kosovo under to invoked maintain be could ments argu same the But suffering. great caused had latter the where aregion in one, ethno-nationalist over the prevail citizenship of notion civic the to see desire by the or protection, its to strengthen order in force, political and numerical minority’s Serb the ing increas of intention by the dictated have been could Kosovo within North the keeping for preference The 2008. in away, did facto de they as breaking of tion op the Kosovo, of had rest the in dispersed claves en Serb the unlike North, the that fact the glected community Serb to Kosovo’s protection minority of degree a high offered they because North, the for it embraced itly to secede But from Western Serbia. powers implic taken as awhole as taken simply not tenable not simply has long antago long has . This choice ne choice . This . A . A … ------. References References Serbia uncertain. ofprospects reconciliation Kosovo between and the and unclear therefore North the on agreements fate the of the dense, remain Kosovo’s future near solve the question of The clouds over the North. to attempt Western premature arguably by the of course, is that this crisis was triggered precisely exacerbate the country’s The paradox, problems. to only likely is crisis the term short the in deed, in imminent: nor certain neither is this But system. in changes its elitemuch-needed and governance force might it Kosovo, for for perspectives ing It is true that the current crisis could open promis- Europe. Western in kets lie ganized criminal groups, whose main mar export or for basis a safe and polity unstable an mains re fact, Kosovo, in reach. territorial country’s the which involve far greater European interests than traction from Kosovo’s governance problems, dis a serious was dispute territorial this for tive, was mistaken especially from a European perspec decided to its It support from secession Serbia. West the when 2008, in vo’s North to the claim Koso –to support tenable’ not ‘simply –or taken of implementing, but it might also have been mis - S P C C A hillip hti urroi apu ooper Balkans EU the the and in sovo: Corruption Democracy, na-dialogue/ cooper-the-philosophy-of-the-belgrade-pristi westernbalkans.com/2015/07/16/sir-robert- 16 2015 July Balkans, (at http://european dialogue.’grade–Pristina European Western Koha, 2015. Koha, MIT Press, 2012. Press, MIT Intervention US and macy March 2007. March sovo’s status future Ko on - Envoy Secretary-General the of Special the of Report Add.1, Secretary-General, UN in S/2007/168/ Doc. Settlement,” Kosovo Status s ss aari s In the Name of Autonomy of , Veton. Name the In ela Liberating Kosovo: Diplo Liberating Coercive , David. , Robert. ‘The philosophy ‘The , of Robert. the Bel , Martti. “Comprehensive Proposal for the the for Proposal “Comprehensive , Martti. State-Building in Ko in - State-Building Lorenzo. , Andrea . London: I.B. Tauris, 2015. I.B. . London: ). , Doc. S/2007/168,, Doc. 26 . Cambridge, MA: MA: . Cambridge, . Pristina: . Pristina: ------09/09/2016 12:23:49

IEMed. Mediterranean Yearbook 2016 185 Geographical Overview | Western Balkans Panorama