Indian Army Training for the Italian Campaign and Lessons Learnt

Indian Army Training For The Italian Campaign 103

chapter 6 Indian Army Training for the Italian Campaign and Lessons Learnt

Alan Jeffreys

Training for war is that most fundamental component of military effectiveness, yet the subject continues to elicit little excitement in academic circles. This is perhaps a result of its rather pedestrian nature in comparison to combat operations; as Brigadier E.D. “Birdie” Smith, who had served as a junior subaltern with the 2/7th Gurkha Rifles in the Italian campaign, commented: “Life in this camp is not what may be termed as over exciting – training never is …”.1 None- theless, such training played an essential role in the successful Allied conduct of the war in Italy. With a primary focus on the transfer of techniques from frontier warfare in India to mountain warfare in the Mediterranean, this chapter examines the development of training in the Indian Army during the Italian campaign, the ensuing effectiveness of Indian formations in combat and the lessons learned from that experience. During the invasion of Sicily a few Indian battalions, such as the Indian State battalion, the Jodhpur Sardur Light Infantry and the 3/10th Baluchis, which had each undergone combined operations training, were tasked with carrying out beachhead duties.2 Aside from such commitments, no larger Indian Army formations were involved in the major operations undertaken on the island. In the subsequent campaigns on the Italian mainland, however, three Indian divisions, the 4th, 8th and 10th would each play an active role. The 4th Indian Divi- sion had fought throughout the North African campaign mainly under the command of Major General Francis “Gertie” Tuker, an inveterate trainer who held a low opinion of the standard of training of some British Army formations. The division arrived in Italy in December 1943. The 8th and 10th Indian Divi- sions had previously been involved in operations in Persia and Iraq and the 10th had briefly seen action in North Africa. In 1943 the 8th Division was command- ed by Major General Dudley “Pasha” Russell and landed at Taranto in September 1943. The 10th Division, meanwhile, had had a succession of commanders,

1 Smith, E.D. (1978), Even the brave falter (London: Robert Hale), p. 2. 2 Ahmed, Major General Rafiuddib (nd.) History of the Baloch Regiment, 1939–1956 (Uckfield, East Sussex: Naval & Military Press), pp. 90–91.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2014 | doi 10.1163/9789004255708_008 104 Jeffreys including “Bill” Slim and “Pete” Rees who both subsequently played pivotal roles during the Burma campaign, and arrived in Italy in March 1944 under the command of Major General Denys Reid. Apart from the Indian Armed Forces Official History’s volume on the Italian campaign and some pocket divisional histories, produced by the Director of Public Relations of the War Department in Delhi, there has been little research on the Indian Army formations that fought in Italy.3 This neglect was also true of the other theaters of war, before recently having been remedied by the works of Daniel Marston and Tim Moreman.4 For the Allied formations fighting in Sicily there had been little time follow- ing the end of the Tunisian campaign to train for operations in mountainous terrain, and the challenges it posed surprised even the most battle-hardened formations.5 In large part the importance of training for mountain warfare seems to have been underestimated by the British High Command in Italy during the campaign itself, and for this crucial form of fighting no official doctrine ensued.6 The German army, in contrast, was well aware of the need for mountain warfare training; Field Marshal Kesselring insisting that it was at the unit level, “where mountain warfare was won or lost” and noted that “Allied junior leadership continued to lack initiative” in this type of warfare.7 British official historians would in fact lament the lack of the use of Indian divisions for mountain warfare in Italy, a task for which they were thought particularly well suit- ed.8 Prior to the Second World War, the Indian Army was well versed in mountain warfare due to the experience of fighting on the North West Frontier. Indian

3 Pal, D. (1960), The campaign in Italy, 1943–1945 (Delhi: Combined Inter-Services Historical Section). The exception to this truism is a recent thesis. See: Rose, Patrick, ‘British Army Command Culture 1939–1945: A Comparative Study of British Eighth and Fourteenth Armies’ (PhD Thesis, University of London, 2009). 4 Marston, Daniel (2003), Phoenix from the ashes: The Indian Army in the Burma Campaign (Westport: Praeger); Moreman, Tim (2005), The jungle, the Japanese and the British Com- monwealth Armies at War, 1941–1945: Fighting methods, doctrine and training for jungle warfare (London: Frank Cass). 5 See: Gooderson, Ian (2008), A hard way to make a war: The Allied campaign in Italy in the Second World War (London: Conway), pp. 102–4. 6 Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke (edited by Alex Danchev and Daniel Todman) (2001), War Diaries 1939–1945 (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson), p. 510. 7 Porch, Douglas (2004), Hitler’s Mediterranean gamble: The North African and the Mediter- ranean Campaigns in World War II (Weidenfeld & Nicolson), p. 628. 8 Jackson, W.G.F. (1984), The Mediterranean and Middle East Vol. VI: Victory in the Mediter- ranean Part 1, 1 April to 4 June 1944 (London: HMSO), pp. 13–14; Porch (2004), p. 658.