BRIEFER: ROLE OF UN SPECIAL ENVOYS IN PEACE PROCESSES February 17, 2017

During political processes, UN Special Envoys often carry out a wide range of tasks. These tasks, in as well as other countries, typically involve activities related to security and stabilization, political settlement of the conflict, and humanitarian measures.

UN Special Envoys and the

Kofi Annan, the Six-Point Plan, and the Geneva Communiqué

In February 2012, the and the Arab League appointed former UN Secretary-General as the special envoy to Syria.1 In March 2012, Annan proposed a Six-Point Plan, which called on the parties to (1) commit to the Syrian peace process, (2) cease fighting, (3) allow humanitarian access, (4) release detainees, (5) allow free movement for journalists, and (6) allow free association and demonstrations.2 This plan was subsequently adopted in UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2042 (2012). In June 2012, Annan convened the Geneva I Conference, attended by foreign ministers of nine states and the Secretaries General of the UN and the Arab League.3 This Conference resulted in the Geneva Communiqué, which called for a transitional governing body, but led to little change inside Syria.4 Citing the lack of international will and the refusal of the regime to cooperate, Annan resigned in August 2012.5

1 Syria Unrest: Opposition seeks arms pledge, BBC (Feb. 28, 2012), available at http://www.bbc.com/news/world- middle-east-17144805. 2 Six-Point Proposal of the Joint Special Envoy of the United Nations and the Arab League States, UNITED NATIONS (Apr. 14, 2012), available at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/six_point_proposal.pdf. 3 UN envoy calls for transitional government in Syria, BBC (Jun. 30, 2012), available at http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-18650775. 4 UN envoy calls for transitional government in Syria, BBC (Jun. 30, 2012); Chris Doyle, Kofi Annan’s resignation is no surprise, his Syria peace plan undermined, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 2, 2012), available at https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/aug/02/kofi-annan-resignation-syria-peace-plan. 5 Rick Gladstone, Resigning as Envoy to Syria, Annan Casts Wide Blame, NEW YORK TIMES (Aug. 2, 2012), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/03/world/middleeast/annan-resigns-as-syria-peace-envoy.html.

1 and the Geneva II Peace Conference

In August 2012, veteran diplomat Lakhdar Brahimi was appointed as the new UN special envoy to Syria.6 Brahimi attempted to mediate a ceasefire in October 2012, but it quickly failed.7 Throughout 2013, Brahimi worked unsuccessfully with the U.S. and Russia to initiate a political process.8 Following the chemical attacks in Ghouta in August 2013, the Security Council passed UNSCR 2118 (2013) which condemned the use of chemical weapons and called for the destruction of Syria’s chemical weapons and the beginning of a political process.9 The UN-sponsored Geneva II Peace Conference began in January 2014, but two rounds of negotiations failed to produce results. In May 2014, Brahimi announced his resignation.10

Staffan de Mistura, the ISSG, and the 2016 Intra-Syrian Geneva Talks

In July 2014, Italian-Swedish diplomat Staffan de Mistura was appointed as special envoy.11 De Mistura initially focused on mediating controversial local ceasefires throughout Syria.12 In July 2015, following months of consultations with regime and opposition representatives, de Mistura announced an intra-Syrian working group process based on four thematic issues.13 However, the working group initiative ended without launching when Russia intervened in Syria in September 2015.14 In November 2015, the International Syria Support Group (ISSG) was formed and released a statement calling for the resumption of

6 Rick Gladstone, Veteran Algerian Statesman to Succeed Annan as Special Envoy, NEW YORK TIMES (Aug. 17, 2012), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/18/world/middleeast/lakhdar-brahimi-algerian-statesman-to- succeed-kofi-annan-as-special-syrian-envoy.html. 7 Syria, a civil, sectarian, and proxy war, THE ELDERS (Aug. 22, 2013), available at http://www.webcitation.org/6JJWHxDhU. 8 Syria, a civil, sectarian, and proxy war, THE ELDERS (Aug. 22, 2013). 9 S/RES/2118, UNITED NATIONS (Sep. 27, 2013), available at http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3- CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_res_2118.pdf. 10 Political Settlement becomes Obsolete after the Syrian Presidential Elections, ARAB CENTER FOR RESEARCH AND POLICY STUDIES (Jun. 18, 2014), available at http://english.dohainstitute.org/release/92316048-a000-4b3e-9057- 1c8323f8a8ca 11 Janine di Giovanni, The man with the toughest job in the world, THE GUARDIAN (Jul. 30, 2015), available at https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jul/30/staffan-de-mistura-man-with-toughest-job-in-world-syria. 12 De Mistura’s Plan for Syria: Small Steps Running up Against Big Obstacles, ARAB CENTER FOR RESEARCH AND POLICY STUDIES (Dec. 1, 2014), available at http://english.dohainstitute.org/release/12515805-ed65-48e1-bb57- 121f354bada1. 13 SC/12008, UNITED NATIONS (Aug. 17, 2015), available at http://www.un.org/press/en/2015/sc1200 8.doc.htm. 14 Why Syrian opposition rejected the UN's plan for Syria, AL-MONITOR (Oct. 2015), available at http://www.al- monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/10/syria-opposition-political-military-reject-de-mistura.html.

2 negotiations.15 The Security Council endorsed this statement in UNSCR 2254 (2015) and tasked the special envoy with convene the parties to engage in formal negotiations, determine the modalities of a ceasefire, and continue planning to support ceasefire implementation.16

A new UN-sponsored peace process began in February 2016, which de Mistura mediated. Following heavy airstrikes by Russian and regime forces during the first round of negotiations, the parties agreed to a cessation of hostilities and the ISSG formed two task forces to oversee the cessation of hostilities and humanitarian aid.17 Soon after the first round of negotiations, the Security Council requested the Special Envoy to resume, under UN auspices, formal negotiations between the parties “as soon as possible.”18 A second round of negotiations was held in March 2016, and the third round of negotiations ended in April 2016.19

In December 2016, De Mistura announced his intention to reconvene UN- facilitated negotiations in Geneva on February 8, 2017.20 He later pushed back this date to February 20,21 and again to February 23.22 De Mistura attended the first round of talks in Astana on January 23, 2017 as an observer and declined to personally attend the second round of the Astana talks on February 16, 2017.23

15 14 November 2015, Statement of the International Syria Support Group Vienna, UNITED NATIONS (Nov. 14, 2015), available at http://www.un.org/undpa/en/Speeches-statements/14112015/syria. 16 S/RES/2254, UNITED NATIONS (Dec. 18, 2015), available at http://www.un.org/press/en/2015/sc12171.doc.htm. 17 Joint Statement of the United States and the Russian Federation, as Co-Chairs of the ISSG, on Cessation of Hostilities in Syria, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE (Feb. 22, 2016), available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2016/02/253115.htm. 18 S/RES/2268, UNITED NATIONS (Feb. 26, 2016), available at 19 UN Syria envoy looks for talks to resume in July, AL MONITOR (Jun. 2016), available at http://www.al- monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/06/un-syria-envoy-mistura-russia-us-talks-resume.html. 20 Notes to Correspondents – by the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria, UNITED NATIONS (Dec. 19, 2016), available at https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/note-correspondents/2016-12-19/note-correspondents- special-envoy-secretary-general-syria. 21 Syria: UN-supported talks delayed until 20 February to give opposition time to unite, UNITED NATIONS (Jan. 31, 2017), available at https://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=56079#.WKbfihJ95E4. 22 Daily Press Briefing by the Office of the Spokesperson for the Secretary-General, UNITED NATIONS (Feb. 13, 2017), available at https://www.un.org/press/en/2017/db170213.doc.htm. 23 At talks in Astana, UN envoy on Syria urges mechanism to oversee ceasefire, UNITED NATIONS (Jan. 23, 2017), available at, https://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=56021#.WKbg5xJ95E5; U.N. envoy will not attend Syria talks in Astana – spokeswoman, UNITED NATIONS (Feb. 15, 2017), available at http://in.reuters.com/article/mideast-crisis-syria-astana-idINKBN15U1NH.

3 Roles of Special Envoys During Other Peace Processes

Security and Stabilization

UN Special Envoys may be authorized to contribute to ceasefire efforts over the course of a political process. For instance, in the Democratic Republic Congo, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to the Congo had a mandate to manage UN efforts relating to the peace process, including by assisting in the implementation of a ceasefire.24 This authority included leading the UN mission in the country to liaise with the Joint Military Commission to provide it with technical assistance to implement such functions as investigations of ceasefire violations.25 The Special Representative was also authorized to plan for ceasefire observation and the disengagement of forces. 26 Similarly, the UN Secretary- General’s Special Representative and head of the UN Mission in Colombia had authority to monitor and verify the implementation of a ceasefire and of disarmament in the country.27

Additionally, UN Special Envoys are often tasked with overseeing general security and stabilization efforts during political processes. This authorization is often in the form of leading the operations of a UN Mission tasked with security and stabilization activities. For instance, a UN mission in the Congo under the leadership of a UN Special Representative had authority to support civilian protection and to supervise the reform of security institutions in the Congo.28 A different mission in the Congo, also led by the UN Special Representative to the country, was mandated to ensure the protection of humanitarian personnel and human rights defenders.29 Similarly, a UN mission in the Central African Republic is mandated with protecting civilians and contributing to security sector reform, demilitarization, and disarmament programs.30

24 Security Council Resolution 1279, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1279 (Nov. 30, 1999), available at http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3- CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/DRC%20SRES1279.pdf. 25 Security Council Resolution 1279, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1279 (Nov. 30, 1999). 26 Security Council Resolution 1279, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1279 (Nov. 30, 1999). 27 UN Mission in Colombia, Mandate (2017), available at http://colombia.unmissions.org/en/mandate. 28 United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo – Background, UNITED NATIONS, available at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/monuc/mandate.shtml. 29 Security Council Resolution 1925, U.N. Doc S/RES/1925 (May 28, 2010). 30 Security Council Resolution 2149, U.N. Doc S/RES/2149 (Apr. 10, 2014).

4 Mediation and Negotiation Support

UN Special Envoys often have authority to provide mediation and negotiation support. For instance, the Special Envoy to the Secretary-General of Yemen has made significant efforts to convene and facilitate negotiations between the various parties in Yemen.31 These efforts have led to consultations among the parties and the onset of peace talks.32 The Special Adviser of the UN Secretary- General on has similarly convened discussions and mediated talks between the parties to the conflict.33

During political processes, UN Special Envoys may also be authorized to generally support efforts to bring parties towards a transition period. For instance, in Yemen, the Special Envoy is specifically tasked with working to establish agreements to return Yemen towards a political transition.34 This is in conjunction with the Special Political Mission for Yemen, which is authorized to engage with all parties in Yemen to move towards “an inclusive Yemen-led transition.”35

Facilitation of Humanitarian Aid and Return of Refugees

During political processes, UN Special Envoys may have the responsibility to support the facilitation of humanitarian aid initiatives and the return of refugees. This authority is often vested in the Special Envoy through leadership of a UN mission. For instance, in the Central African Republic, the Special Representative led a UN mission, which had the authority to “facilitate the immediate, full, safe and unhindered delivery of humanitarian assistance.”36 Moreover, in the Congo, a different UN mission under the leadership of the Special Representative had a mandate to support the Congolese Government, as well as international and regional partners, in supporting the safe return of internally displaced persons and refugees.37

31 United Nations: Department of Political Affairs, Yemen, available at http://www.un.org/undpa/en/middleeast- westasia/yemen. 32 Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen, Mandate (2017), available at http://www.un.org/undpa/en/middleeast-westasia/yemen. 33 UN Cyprus Talks, News: A Watershed moment for the Cyprus negotiations – press conference by Espen Barth Eide, Special Adviser of the UN Secretary=General on Cyprus (Jan.13, 2017), available at http://www.uncyprustalks.org/a-watershed-moment-for-the-cyprus-negotiations-espen-barth-eide-special-adviser-of- the-un-secretary-general-on-cyprus/. 34 Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen, Mandate (2017). 35 Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen, Mandate (2017). 36 Security Council Resolution 2149, U.N. Doc S/RES/2149 (Apr. 10, 2014), available at http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2149%20%282014%29. 37 Security Council Resolution 1565, U.N. Doc. S/RES1565 (Oct. 1, 2004).

5 Conclusion

UN Special Envoys often carry out a wide range of tasks to facilitate peace processes. In Syria and other countries, these tasks have typically involved activities related to security and stabilization, political settlement of the conflict, and humanitarian measures.

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