ThirdWorld Quarterly, Vol 18, No 4, pp 631± 657, 1997

Threebuilding blocks of a theoryof LatinAmerican foreign policy

JEANNEAKHEY

Theliterature treating Latin American and Caribbean foreign policy is extensive and rich.1 Ithas beenheavily in¯ uenced both by dependencytheory and political realismand bene® ts fromnumerous empirical studies. Nonetheless, too few scholarshave incorporated empirical ® ndingsand theoretical re¯ ections into an integratedwhole. So while we havea bodyof knowledgeabout Latin American foreignpolicy, the ® eldstill lacks a ®rmparadigmto guide its students or make claimsabout causal relationships. Though numerous edited collections have madeattempts at developing theory in Latin American foreign policy, 2 few of theseattempts have been followed up with empirical scholarship. Furthermore, thevast amount of empiricalwork has notbeen thoroughly analysed with an eye towardsdeveloping theory. Scholarshipon Latin American foreign policyÐ particularly, though certainly notexclusively, that emanating from Latin AmericaÐ focuses heavilyon inter- nationallaw, foreign policy principles and traditions and the role of individual leaders.3 Increasingly,researchers haveexpanded the scope of their examination ofLatin American foreign policy, encountering in their analyses a broadrange offoreignpolicy goals and explanatory forces. 4 Areviewof theliterature reveals thatLatin American foreign policy makers includeamong their more important goalsautonomy, development and the management of theirrelationship with the USA.Otherkey goals include developing policy to treat regional relationships, ThirdWorldism, drug traf® cking, national security, arms control,border disputes andother local issues. Aliteraturereview also ® ndsthat the most frequently citedexplanatory factors of Latin American foreign policy are USin¯uence, pooreconomic resources, leader and regime ideology, and the global distribution ofpower and wealth. Researchers inthis area rarelyspend time pondering methodological issues. Overwhelmingly,the case studyapproach dominates the literature. Most exam- inationsare qualitativestudies of the foreign policy behavior of an individual state,regime or afewcountries in comparativeperspective. The research heavily focuses onthenation-state and often takes the form of story-telling,albeit in an analyticalway which sometimes includes some looselytested hypotheses. 5 A `kitchensink’ approach is alsopopular, in whichresearchers modeland examine allthe potential explanatory inputs into a particularcountry’ s (orcountries’ ) foreignpolicy. 6 Thistype of comprehensive modelling, reminiscent of (though rarely as JeanneA KHey is atthe Department of PoliticalScience, 218Harrison Hall, Miami University, Oxford,OH 45056, USA.

0143-6597/97/040631-27$7.00 Ó 1997Third World Quarterly 631 JEANNE AKHEY theoreticallysophisticated as) MichaelBrecher’ s input±process± output model, 7 iscertainlythorough and informative. Indeed, this paper draws heavily on works thatemploy this `kitchen sink’ approach. By including everything, however, they oftenfail to isolate those explanatory components of the foreign policy process whichare mostcrucial, and thereby do not contribute in and of themselves to theorybuilding. The qualitative, and sometimes comparative, approach dominant inLatin American foreign policy literature has putmany of its researchers at oddswith scholars in international relations who prefer a moretheoretically drivenand often quantitative approach to thestudy of foreignpolicy. 8 The `Latin Americanists’are frustratedwith the `international relations’ types, whom they accuse ofavoiding the richness of Latin American foreign policy and therefore inappropriatelyconcluding, for example, that international power variables explainLatin American foreign policy behaviour. 9 Inturn,international relations scholarsuse quantitativeanalyses of time-series and cross-sectional data to demonstrate,for example, that the Latin Americanists who dwell on the peculiaritiesof afewindividual cases ofLatinAmerican foreign policy may not see thewood for the trees. 10 Bothcritiques are toa certainextent appropriate. Latin American foreign policyresearchers havefailed to buildon eachother’ s workin awaythat would movethem towards a generaltheory. 11 Similarly,foreign policy researchers seekingto explain broad themes of Latin American foreign policy, frequently measuredwith the region’ s votingbehaviour in theUnited Nations, too often fail toexamine the internal dynamics of the process andthereby miss animportant partof the picture. The aim of this paper is togarner from the vast amount of informationand analysis currently available the foundations of a theoryof Latin Americanforeign policy. This presumes thatit isappropriateto developa theory ofLatin American foreign policy, ie that the foreign policies of Latin America andthe Caribbean have enough in common to merit the search fora single theoreticalapproach to capture them. One must, of course, recognise the multitudeof variations,across manydimensions, within the region. John Martz, forexample, in writing about the Caribbean Basin alone stated that the region’ s manydissimilarities `serve toillustratethe folly of undertakingbroad generaliza- tionsconcerning the Caribbean Basin’ . 12 Whilethis is perhapsoverstated for some socialscienti® c purposes,it serves as areminderof the pitfalls facing internationalrelations scholars and anyone else attemptingto makeclaims about theentire south-western quadrant of the globe. Thesearch fora commontheoretical grounding is nonethelessmerited for a numberof reasons. First, Latin America and the Caribbean share similar historiesof colonialism.While much of the Caribbean, particularly the English- speakingislands, gained independence in this century, most of the region has beenformally independent for over a century,although it has beenunable to eliminatethe constraints of neocolonialism. 13 Second,to varying degrees, Latin Americancountries retain economies heavily dependent on export, particularly ofprimaryproducts and other commodities that earn relatively little on theworld market.Indeed, many experiments with economic diversi® cation and import- substitutionthat began in the 1960s failed and were abandoned. Third, Latin Americancountries share culturalcharacteristics derived from a commonexperi- 632 THREE BUILDING BLOCKS OF ATHEORY OF LATIN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY encein which Europeans occupied and colonised indigenous communities, and inmanycases importedAfrican slaves. Their societies remain heavily bifurcated andcharacterised by aEuropean,wealthy elite in policy-making positions on one handand a non-European,poor, marginalised population on the other. Fourth, LatinAmerican foreign-policy makers workin a hemispheredominated by the USA,asuperpowerthat has madeclear its interests in the region and its willingnessto pursuethem. Finally, a reviewof thedisparate literature contribut- ingto Latin American foreign policy reveals a numberof behavioural patterns across theregion’ s manycountries, patterns discussed below and suggesting that thesearch fora commontheoretical approach to understanding the region’ s foreignpolicy is aworthwhileendeavour.

Three theoretical building blocks ofLatin American foreign policy Myapproach here is inductive.I reviewa largeliterature that speaks tothe foreignpolicy behaviour of Latin American states andfrom it extract the buildingblocks of theory. My approach is notmerely empirical, ie I havenot simplyobserved the empirical facts anddeveloped analytical assertions about them.Instead, I relyon the different scholars’ own explanations for the behaviourthey describe and with these seek toidentify patterns of Latin Americanforeign-policy behaviour and the explanations that account for them. Inreviewing the literature I havesearched for discernible patterns in behav- iour.If thereare behaviouralconsistencies, there may also be commonexplana- toryfactors to accountfor them which can become the building blocks of theory. Patternsthat emerge from a reviewof this vast literature re¯ ect at least three distinctdimensions on which to differentiate Latin American foreign policy behaviour:1) pro-core vs anti-core;2) autonomous vs dependent;and 3) economicvs political±diplomatic. Each of these `cuts’ is discussedin turn and holdsthe potential as afoundationfor Latin American foreign-policy theory.

Pro-corevs anti-core Themost immediately obvious axis by which to categorise Latin American foreignpolicy behaviour is thatseparating a pro-corefrom an anti-core foreign policy.The term `core’ here derives from the `core-periphery’ dichotomy and refers totheNorthern industrialised world and the institutions associated with its power.Key core actors include the USA, theWorld Bank, the International MonetaryFund ( IMF),US-orEuropean-based multinational corporations and privatecommercial banks based in theNorth. A pro-corepolicy is onethat does nottreat core powers as theinherent enemy of Latin America and that seeks to workwith the core actors to achieve foreign-policy goals. An anti-core policy emanatesfrom a beliefthat core actors dominate a globalsystem designedto augmentthe wealth of the core at the expense of the periphery. It is therefore hostileto core actors and seeks towork outside the dominant international system.Other terms thatcapture this same dichotomyinclude status quo vs revisionist,Western-orientated vs ThirdWorld-orientated ,right-wingvs left- wing,modernisation-theor y-orientatedvs dependency-theory-orientated,liberal 633 JEANNE AKHEY vs nationalistand compliant vs de®ant. All these characterisations point to the same wayof thinking about Latin American foreign policy: it is designedby policymakers whoare eitheragreeable or hostile to the current international orderand its dominant powers. Thebehaviours associated with a pro-coreforeign policy include cultivating andstrengthening relations with Western industrialised powers, especially the USA,attractingforeign investment and aid, implementing a neoliberaleconomic model,avoiding active participation in overtly Third World-orientated multilat- eralorganisations such as theNon-Aligned Movement, the Organization of PetroleumExporting Countries ( OPEC)andthe UN Conferenceon Trade and Development( UNCTAD),andpaying particular attention to foreign-policy ques- tionsimportant to the USA, suchas illicitdrug traf® cking and immigration. Examplesof pro-core regimes include those associated with Pinochet in Chile, Turbayin Colombia, Seaga in Jamaica, Fujimori in Peru, Febres Corderoin Ecuadorand Salinas de Gortari in Mexico. Incontrast,an anti-core policy is manifestin what Drekonja-Kornat a decade agocalled the `new’ Latin American foreign policy. 14 Itisorientatedtowards the ThirdWorld, promotes the New International Economic Order ( NIEO), and seeks autonomyfrom the USA. Anti-corepolicy typically celebrates the Non-Aligned Movement,economic and political relationships with non-traditional trading and diplomaticpartners, regional integration on political and economic matters, an Organizationof American States ( OAS)free fromUS hegemonyand Cuba’ s acceptanceinto that body. Frequently cited anti-core administrations include Velascoand Garcõ ÂainPeru, Lo ÂpezPortillo in Mexico, Betancur in Colombia, Bishopin Grenada,the ® rst governmentsof PeÂrez andCaldera in Venezuelaand RoldoÂsinEcuador. Whilethe distinctions in behaviourbetween these two foreign-policy orienta- tionsare oftenquite stark, it is importantto note that pro-core and anti-core policymakers frequentlyshare goalsand behaviours on issues thatare not ideologicallycharged, such as arms control,law of theseas, borderdisputes, and inter-regionalcontacts. Not all foreign-policy behaviours can be broken down intothe pro-core and anti-core dichotomy. Nevertheless, the manner in which a regimedecides to approach any of these issues maybe determined by its pro-coreand anti-core inclinations. Whatexplanatory factors emerge in the literature to account for these divergentforeign policy outcomes? An important point to make about the literatureis thatit pays more attention to explaining the behaviour of anti-core LatinAmerican governments than pro-core ones. Explanatory variables can nonethelessbe discerned to account for pro-core foreign policies as well.

Explainingpro-core foreign policies. Economicdependence and weakness, frequentlyexacerbated during times of crisis,are oftencited as majorsources of pro-coreforeign policies. The logic behind this causal relationship is that economicallydependent states willdevelop policies that accord with their patrons’foreign-policy wishes. For example, Belau Ânde’s andFujimori’ s strong relationswith the USA are seen as afunctionof Peru’ s heavyindebtedness to 634 THREE BUILDING BLOCKS OF ATHEORY OF LATIN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY andeconomic dependence on the USA. 15 Similarly,when Ecuador’ s President Hurtadopromised that a regionalconference on debt (called the `Conferencia EconoÂmicaLatinoamericana’ or CEL)heorganised would not develop into a `debtors’cartel’ , hewas ensuringthat his creditors and trading partners would notfeel threatened or angry about the conference. 16 Asecondfactor contributing to pro-core foreign policies is internalpolitical turmoil.Related to thisis agovernment’s needto consolidateits position within apoliticallydivided policy. A pro-corereaction to domestic political instability is mademore likely, some argue,when a government’s opponentsare aligned withleftist and revolutionary forces. Bagley & TokatliaÂnexplainPresident Turbay’s strongrelationship with the USA as anattempt to bolster his own regimeat home during a periodwhen Cuban-supported guerrillas thrived in Colombia.17 InVenezuela, the Betancourt Doctrine aimed to isolateCuba within theWestern Hemisphere and also served to consolidate Betancourt’ s regimeby focusingregional attention on democracy. This also endeared Venezuela to the USA.18 Theseexamples conform with Steven David’ s notionof `omnibalanc- ing’,inwhich a ThirdWorld regime is expectedto develop alliances with the adversaryof those countries backing its strongest domestic opponents. 19 Leaderideology is anothercommonly cited variable explaining pro-core policies.When a leaderis predisposedto agreewith core positions, the country’ s foreignpolicy is morelikely to follow the core. This is thoughtto beparticularly truein LatinAmerica, where many executives remain powerful in foreign-policy decisionmaking. 20 Hence,leaders such as Ecuador’s Febres Cordero,Colom- bia’s Turbayand Jamaica’ sSeagamaintained world-views that celebrated free markets,anti-communism and democracy, which helps to explain their pro-core foreignpolicies. 21 Regimeand party ideology are similarlyused to explain pro-coreforeign policies. For example, Mun Äozarguesthat the `praetorian± ideo- logical’nature of the Chilean military government in¯ uenced its foreign-policy behaviour.22 Directand indirect pressure fromcore actors, especially from the USA, is creditedwith explaining pro-core policies in Latin America. It is arguedthat as theUSA’ sinterestin anissue increases,so doesthe likelihood that the affected LatinAmerican state will implement a pro-coreforeign policy. Examples of this includea numberof Colombian administrations’ compliance with US prefer- ences ondrug issues, Hurtado’s acquiescingto creditor preferences on the CEL heldin Ecuador, and Ecuadoran President Dura ÂnBalleÂn’schanginghis vote on the OAS SecretaryGeneral to the candidate preferred by Washington. 23 Arelatedexplanatory factor is nationalsecurity, particularly as itis de®ned withina hegemonichemispheric system. It is arguedthat Latin American leaders,strongly conditioned by a historyof extensive US in¯uence and interventionin the region, will view national security as independenceand freedomfrom US interference. 24 Ironically,that goal is bestachieved by developingpolicies in accordance with US intereststhat do not provoke anyanxieties in Washington. For example, in the Caribbean and Central America,the history of USin¯uence, the states’ smallstatus and the omnipres- enceof US securityconcerns combine to direct policy making in a pro-US direction.25 635 JEANNE AKHEY

Similarly,Drekonja-Kornat, a longtime observer of Latin American inter- nationalaffairs, argues that Latin America can develop foreign policy as it wishesbut only insofar as itdoes not threaten US interests. 26 Two® nalexplanatory factors emerge in analyses of pro-coreforeign policies. Oneis attemptsto achieve international prestige. For example, among Turbay’ s reasons fordeveloping a strongrelationship with the USA was toearn him and Colombiaa reputationwithin the hemisphere. As theUSA was thehemispheric leader,Turbay felt he could increase his own and Colombia’ s prestigeby associationwith the hegemon. 27 Anothervariable is publicopinion, speci® cally thatin favour of development. Here it is arguedthat voting publics understand thata positiverelationship with core actors will bring investment, economic growthand, hopefully, development. Seaga’ s reinsertingJamaica intoa strong relationshipwith the IMF,theUSA andother core actors is thusexplained as a responseto the public’ s wishesto distance Jamaica fromManley’ s anti-core programmes. 28

Explaininganti-core foreign policies. Theliterature also provides a richarray ofexplanations for anti-core foreign policy behaviour. Economic weakness and dependencecan be so severe as tonecessitate policies aimed at breaking dependentties, and therefore opposing the core. 29 Tovarying degrees, this type ofcounter-dependent behaviour is visiblein Peru under Garcõ Âa,Mexico under LoÂpezPortillo, Grenada under Bishop, and Jamaica underthe ® rst Manley administration. 30 Thesegovernments aimed to increase national autonomy over economicdecisions as partof an alternative development strategy. Interestingly,the reverse isalsoreported, ie economicprosperity is citedas a sourceof anti-core policies. Here the logic is thatincreases inrelativeeconomic strengthprovide Latin American states withleverage vis-aÁ -vis the core and manoeuveringroom within which de® ance is possible.Eschbach explains Lo Âpez Portillo’s activismin Central America as afunctionof Mexico’ s increased prosperity. 31 Otherexamples include the ® rst Calderagovernment’ s ThirdWorld orientatedforeign policy in Venezuela and Colombia’ s leadershipin Contadora duringthe Betancur years, both of which occurred during periods of domestic economicgrowth. 32 Domesticpolitical strife and the need to consolidatea regime’s powerare also citedas factorsleading to anti-coreforeign policies. In Colombia,Betancur used Contadora,an anti-core initiative, to earn political leverage at home that strengthenedhis position in thepeace negotiations with guerrillas. 33 Argentina’s GeneralGaltieri challenged Britain over the Malvinas in a desperateattempt to repairthe damage to his regime brought on by a sufferingeconomy and the politicaldevastation of theDirty War. 34 Ananti-core policy can also be usedto placatedomestic opposition critical of a regime’s economicdependence on and/orstrong political relations with core actors. This has longbeen an explanationfor anti-US Mexican foreign policy in the political realm, which is describedas compensationfor economic dependence on the USA. 35 St. John employsthis explanation to account for Garcõ Âa’s anti-coreforeign policies in Peruas doesMilenky in explainingPero Ân’sextensionof creditand trade to Cuba 636 THREE BUILDING BLOCKS OF ATHEORY OF LATIN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY in 1973.36 Ina similarvein, de® ant foreign policies can be used to delegitimise pro-USdomestic opposition to the regime. 37 Theleader, in advertising an anti-coreforeign policy, may, for example, publicise ® nancialand political ties domesticactors have with core actors such as investors,armies andpolitical leaders.In this way, the policy maker can use ananti-core policy to pursue nationalautonomy and to undermine domestic opposition’ s in¯uence. Rodrigo Borjain Ecuador (1988± 92), seeking to bolster the effects ofhis moderately anti-coreforeign policy, commonly advertised the ® nancialand ideological ties thathis political adversaries had with the USA. Leaderideology, when it advocates nationalism, a ThirdWorld orientation andother elements inconsistent with the ideological trends in the core, can also beastrongexplanatory variable in ananti-core policy. Presidential ideology has beencited as aninstigator in anti-core behaviour in Ecuador, Peru, Colombia andVenezuela, to name a few. 38 Relatedly,party and regime ideology can also tiltpolicy behaviour in an anti-core direction. In many Caribbean countries, Jamaica forexample, strong ideological traditions among parties may over- whelmthe power of individualpreferences in foreignpolicy. 39 Bothsupporters, 40 anddetractors 41 ofSandinista Nicaragua place high explanatory value on the party’s ideologicalroots in explaining its foreign policy behaviour. Party traditionswithin Venezuela’ s socialdemocratic party also dominate foreign policypositioning when its candidates are inpower. 42 Consistentwith political realists’ expectations, national security concerns can alsobe a motivationfor an anti-core foreign policy. 43 Sometimesthe perceived interestsof the Latin American state contradict and overwhelm the security interestsof core actors. Security considerations led Mexico to pursue Central Americanpeace plans that de® ed US interestsin Nicaragua and El Salvador. 44 Similarly,Costa Rican President Arias developed a peaceplan for Central Americathat directly contradicted US goalsof isolating Nicaragua and under- miningrebels in El Salvador and Guatemala. Arias did so because concerns aboutregional instability and refugee ¯ owswere stronger than fears ofUS reprisals.45 ArgentinePresident Alfonsõ Ân’s 1986visit to Cuba was notintended as asnubto the Reagan administration, as manybelieved. Instead, Alfonsõ Ân soughtto induce Castro `to call off the armed radical group in Chile that was attemptingto undermine the military regime of Augusto Pinochet’ because AlfonsõÂnconsideredthe group’ s activitiesa threatto Argentine national secur- ity.46 Aleader’s search forprestige may spur an anti-core foreign policy. In contrast tohis predecessor, Turbay, Colombia’ s Betancurused Contadora and other anti-coreinitiatives to gain regional prominence. 47 Ecuador’s sponsorshipof a debtors’conference was aimed,at least in part, at gaining President Hurtado diplomaticprestige throughout the hemisphere. 48 Anti-coreforeign policies may develop in response to national publics’ cries fordevelopment achieved independent of thecore. Biddle & Stephensargue that MichaelManley’ s establishmentof a democraticsocialist development strat- egy,49 whichincluded distancing Jamaica fromthe USA andstrengthening ties withCuba, was adirectanswer to the electorate’ s frustrationwith dependent development.Newly-elected President Alfonsõ Ântooka hostileposition towards 637 JEANNE AKHEY

Northerncreditors in 1983, a policyin part explained by its popularity with the Argentinepublic. 50 Nicaragua’s foreignpolicy can be explained as partof a revolutionarymandate from the people to break neocolonial ties with core actors.51 A®nalset ofvariables the literature identi® es as importantin understanding anti-coreforeign policies concerns the role of theUSA. Numerousauthors point tothe end of the Cold War and the decline of US hegemonyas factorsthat provideLatin America with more leeway to develop anti-core policies. 52 This perspectiveassumes adependency-basedrelationship between the core and peripheryin which Latin American interests and preferences are expectedto divergefrom those of the USA. 53 Otherwise,a declinein US hegemonywould notnecessarily lead to anti-core policies in Latin America. Arelatedvariable concerns US decisionsnot to pressure aLatinAmerican neighbouron aparticularforeign-policy issue. In other words, it isargued,when theUSA decidesto ignore an issue, Latin American states canand will take advantageof that freedom and develop anti-core foreign policies. Mares, for example,argues that Mexico is moreactive (ie de® ant) when the USA payslittle attentionto Mexican policy. 54 Oneof the reasons theEcuadoran government joinedthe Contadora Support Group in 1987 was becausethe USA didnot opposeit. It is unlikelythat Ecuador would have acted as itdidif facedwith US pressure.55 A®nalexplanatory relationship that concerns the US rolein theregion is that Washington’s recentemphasis on democracy has givenLatin America some policy-makinglatitude. For example, Ecuador’ s ®rst post-militarypresident, Jaime RoldoÂs, developeda staunchlypro-Sandinista foreign policy. The USA was unwillingto intervene in this and other policies because it was lauding Ecuadorfor returning to the democratic fold. Overt interference in the policies ofdemocraticstates blemishesthe US reputationfor support of democracyin the region.56 TheChilean case alsodemonstrates this. Pinochet’ s dictatorshipwas suf® cientlyprolonged and brutal to isolateChile from international politics, and eveneventually from US favour.Mun Äozargues that Chile’ s lackof democracy gaveit virtually no room to manoeuver in international politics. 57

Discussion. The® rst analyticaldetail that emerges fromthis discussion of explanatoryfactors of pro-coreand anti-core foreign policies is thatmany of the attributesare saidto explain both typesof behaviours. The explanatory factors discussedcan be roughlydivided into two categories: those that remain ® xedand thosethat vary. In other words, there are some factorsthat, even though their statusdoes not change, are associatedwith both pro-core and anti-core foreign policies.Economic weakness and dependence, for example, are associatedwith LatinAmerican compliance with and de® ance of coreactors. On the other hand, thereare otherindicators which truly vary, and their variation can help explain whethera pro-coreor anti-core policy will emerge. Leader ideology, which co-varieswith changes in foreignpolicy, is anexample of this type of variable. Four`® xed’factors emerge from this review of the literature: 1) economic dependenceand weakness; 2)domestic political turmoil and the desire 638 THREE BUILDING BLOCKS OF ATHEORY OF LATIN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY toconsolidate a regime;3) a leader’s desirefor personal and national prestige; and4) public opinion favouring development. That these weighty factors in the policyprocess leadto both pro-core and anti-core policies is notdif® cult to explain.Each is subjectto a regime’s interpretation,which may vary with leadershipand situational conditions. In other words, it is notsurprising that ideologicallydistinct leaders would use completelydifferent strategies to deal with,for example, economic dependence. Similarly, the regional power distri- butionor political± economic situation may guide the degree to which a regime seeks toacquiesce to or defy economic dependence. Milenky notes how Argentinatakes an opportunistic approach, leading it toimplementboth pro- and anti-corepolicies: Argentinawants to challengethe international political and economic status quo and tobene®t from it.It seeks trade and investment from theindustrial powers and then joinsthe underdeveloped nations to force changes in the rules. It seeksto be alternatelyor simultaneously Western and Third World ¼ 58 Inmanaging domestic political opposition, some leaderswill pursue a band- wagoningapproach, which aims tocoopt the opposition by developing good relationswith its patron. So, for example, Colombian President Betancur developeda positiverelationship with the Sandinistas in the 1980s in part to coopthis leftist opposition. Other leaders will attempt to balance the opposition byallying strongly with the opponent of its patron. Betancur’ s predecessor, Turbay,pursued this strategy when allying Colombia with the USA. 59 Similarly, some leaderswill ® ndmore prestige in a strongrelationship with the regional hegemonwhile others prefer to maketheir mark among the region’ s champions ofa ThirdWorld view. Alone, these `® xed’variables are oflittle general explanatorysigni® cance, but as isdiscussedbelow, they may interact with other factorsin important ways. Morepotentially powerful as explanatoryfactors then are the`true’ variables, whichindeed change with variations in foreign policy behaviour. These include 1)the ideology of the leader/ party/regime;2) US pressure andin¯ uence; 3) the internationaldistribution of power;and 4) nationalsecurity. Of these,which are themost powerful in explaining variations in Latin American foreign-policy behaviour?The international distribution of power, which encompasses issues aboutthe Cold War and its aftermath, is notvery strong. While the end of the ColdWar is oft-citedas creatingan opening within which some LatinAmerican countrieswill successfully develop anti-core policies, no-one argues that such a changein theinternational structure will necessarily generate this foreign policy outcomein Latin America. Indeed, many countries have not developed such policies.Recent events indicate that, even with the end of the Cold War, many LatinAmerican countries are intensifyingthe pro-US components of their foreignpolicies. In thewake of thedebt crisis andwithin the context of aglobal trendtowards free markets,Latin American countries are scramblingto gain favourableaccess toUSinvestmentand markets. 60 Thisis atrendwith which the LatinAmerican foreign-policy literature has yetto catch up. Hence, while the endof theCold War and other changes in theglobal power structure may create anenvironment for certain types of policies, no causal relationship is visible. 639 JEANNE AKHEY

Nationalsecurity is a`true’variable in the sense thatits de® nition varies and canhelp to determine the foreign-policy path a regimechooses to manage a nationalsecurity problem. Critics of realist theory have long identi® ed the pitfallsof using national security and national interest as explanatoryvariables ininternational behaviour. These terms’ de®nitions depend so heavilyon the contextsÐhistorical, contemporary, political, ideologicalÐ within which they are formulatedthat they lose their analytical power. 61 Thebrief review here of the use ofnational interest reveals this same problem.Some regimes de® ne it as ensuringthe USA doesnot become concerned with events in Latin America, therebyinviting intervention, while others de® ne it as opposingthe USA on regionalissues crucialto both the USA andLatin America. National security, then,appears not to be a veryuseful source of explanation for Latin American foreign-policybehaviour. Theremaining variables are USpressure andleader/ party/regimeideology. Howpowerful is thepresence or absence of US pressure indetermining Latin Americanforeign policy? It can be arguedthat this variable necessarily interacts withthe degree of economicvulnerability a statehas tothe USA thehigher the degreeof dependence, the more likely US pressure willsucceed. Indeed, this appearsto be the case. Whilethere are some examplesof states’ defyingcore interestseven during economic crisis, 62 theliterature clearly shows this to be morethe exception than the rule. It is evenless likelyto occur when economic conditionsare exceptionallybad, as theywere when Fujimori took power in Peru andquickly developed a pro-coreforeign policy. Thus Heine argues that a key distinctionto bemade between continental and Caribbean foreign policies is that thelatter are moresubject to core pressure speci®cally because of theirrelatively highstate of dependence. 63 Theliterature suggests that, when the USA is committedto pressuring for its objectives, Latin America will usually comply. Andeancooperation with US drugprogrammes is indicativeof this trend. It is thereforeappropriate to notethat economic dependence acts as aconditioningor interveningvariable for the effects ofUS pressure,and not simply as a`® xed’ andtherefore weak explanatory factor. Theideological orientation of the policy maker or policy-making group emerges as thestrongest predictor of policy, largely because it helps to determinethe weight and direction of thecausal relationship between policy and manyof the other variables mentioned here. For example, a policymaker’ s ideologicalorientation may govern the state’ s willingnessto defy core actors, its de®nition of thenational interest, the development model to be pursuedto meet publicdemands, 64 whetherit seeks prestigethrough status-quo or revisionist policies,and whether it will take a bandwagoningor balancing strategy over domesticcon¯ ict. The ideological distinctions between Betancur and Turbay in Colombia,for example, had a strongimpact on Colombia’ s alignmentand prestigestrategies. 65 Similarly,ideological differences distinguishing the Ja- maicanLabor Party and the People’ s NationalParty, differences which have intensi®ed since independence, account for the different foreign-policy orienta- tionsof the Seaga and Manley regimes respectively. 66 Insum, the literature on Latin American foreign policy reveals numerous variablesthat contribute to explaining the development of pro-core or anti-core 640 THREE BUILDING BLOCKS OF ATHEORY OF LATIN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY foreignpolicies. Observation and comparison of these factors suggests that leader/regime/partyideology is thestrongest explanatory variable. It is followed inexplanatory weight by pressure fromthe core, speci® cally from the USA, the effectof which is conditionedby the degree of a state’s economicdependence andweakness. Other variables, such as thenational interest, the search for prestigeand domestic political con¯ ict also in¯ uence foreign-policy behaviour. Butthe direction in which they will lead foreign policy is not® xedand is often afunctionof the policy maker’ s ideologicalorientation.

Autonomousvs dependent Asecondcut discernible in the literature is thedistinction between foreign policiesthat are developedautonomously and those that are dependent.The distinguishingfeatures here are theextent to which a governmentis ableto developand implement policy without interference from international, usually core,actors. An autonomous regime makes decisionsaccording to perceived national,political or personal interests while a dependentone acts inaccordance withthe wishes of foreign interests. Like the pro-core vs anti-coredistinction, thiscut is groundedin notions central to both political realism and dependency theory. Animmediate question that arises indiscerning autonomous from dependent policymakers ishowto determineif aregimethat implements pro-core policies is doingso out of coercion or conviction. Some leaders and regimes are predisposedto develop pro-core policies and may do so `autonomously’. This matteris atthe heart of the `compliance vs consensus’debate in the ® eldof dependentforeign policy. 67 Manystudies of ThirdWorld foreign policy, partic- ularlythose that employ UN votingdata, assume thata pro-corevote by aLatin Americanstate is anexample of compliance, ie that the Latin American policy makers are subvertingtheir own national interests to concede to core wishes. 68 BruceMoon argued that, more often than not, agreement between periphery and corein foreign policy was theresult of consensus, not coercion. Ideological alignmentbetween leaders in Latin America and the USA is commonand a functionof the fact that many Latin American leaders are educatedin core countriesand often pro® t frombusiness ventures there. It is understandable, then,that they develop policy in accordance with core interests. 69 Giventhat a pro-corepolicy can result from both compliance and consensus, itisnecessary toevaluateany policy within the full context of apolicymaker’ s historyand the conditions under which the policy is developed.This type of informationis oftendif® cult to attain and accounts for the literature’ s too frequentfailure to makemeaningful or reliable distinctions between compliance andconsensus. What has emergedis amindsetthat equates pro-core policies witha `dependent’policy process. This is aproblemwith the current literature thatmust be corrected if the distinction between autonomous and dependent is tobecome analytically useful. Similarly,those regimes that successfully implement anti-core policies are thoughtto beautonomous,often with too little consideration of howde® ant they mighthave become if ithadnot been for core pressure. A quotefrom Valenta’ s 641 JEANNE AKHEY studyof Nicaraguan foreign policy under the Sandinistas is instructivehere: `Thoughnot a pawnof the USSR andCuba, the FSLN leadershiphas not maintaineda scrupulousequidistance from East and West as havesome other non-alignednations’ . 70 Valenta’s pointis thatwhile Nicaragua may not be a proxystate of the Communists per se,itcannot be categorised as fully autonomousbecause it has leanedtowards the Communist camp. Such a claim has neverbeen made about Colombia or Ecuador, also members ofthe non-alignedmovement and certainly not countries that have kept a `scrupulous equidistance’between the USA andthe USSR. Likenearly all their neighbours, Colombiaand Ecuador clearly lean towards the USA ineconomic and political relations.Nonetheless, when they develop policies that challenge the core, such as Contadoraor the CEL,theyare saidto be acting autonomously. This demonstratesthat states thatdefy the USA, evenslightly, are likelyto belabelled autonomouseven though their policies may indeed be highlyconstrained. It also revealsthat such generous considerations are unlikelyto beextendedto Cubaor revolutionaryNicaragua. Keepingthese weighty caveats in mind, whom does the literature identify as autonomousforeign policy makers? Theyinclude the Sandinistas in Nicaragua, 71 Ecuador’s Hurtado,especially in diplomatic policy, 72 Brazilianregimes in general,Argentine and Brazilian leaders on nuclearweapons policy, 73, Mexico’ s LoÂpezPortillo and De la Madrid,especially on Central American issues, 74 Peru’ s GarcõÂa,75 andCosta Rican President Arias. 76.Thedependent foreign policy makers,in contrast, include Seaga in Jamaica, 77 Salinasin Mexico, Fujimori in Peru,78 andEcuador’ s DuraÂnBalleÂn. 79 Thatthese lists overlap so heavilywith the anti-core and pro-core lists again pointsto the troubling feature of a literaturethat equates autonomous as anti-core.This does not necessarily mean, however, that the autonomy/ depen- dentdichotomy will not yield useful analytical insights. As thefollowing discussionreveals, the literature identi® es anumberof variables that appear to accountreliably for autonomous and dependent foreign policies.

Explaining`autonomous’ foreign policies. Increasedrelative power capabilities are citedas animportant component of an autonomous foreign policy in Latin America.80 Selcher,for example, explains Brazil’ s autonomousforeign policy as afunctionof Brazil’ s relativestrength within the hemisphere. 81 A number of factorsthat comprise power capabilitiesÐ geographic proximity to the USA, economicdependence and performance, physical size andlevel of develop- mentÐhave particular relevance for Latin America. Hence, Brazil’ s large physicalsize andColombia’ s relativelysound economy have contributed to their autonomyin foreign policy. 82 Thedegree of core control over and interest in the foreign-policy issues ofa particularstate also contribute to autonomy. Mares explainsthat, throughout history,Mexican foreign policy has gainedautonomy speci® cally when US interestin the region is low. 83 Similarly,numerous authors explain that the weakeningof bipolarityhas decreasedUS interestand power in Latin America, givingthe region more room for autonomous action. 84 Interestingly,many such 642 THREE BUILDING BLOCKS OF ATHEORY OF LATIN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY claimswere made years beforethe collapse of the USSR, in recognition of a presumedloosening of the bipolar system. Leader/regime/partyideology can also affect the degree of autonomy a foreign-policymaker seeks, andhence achieves. Braveboy-Wagner explains that, whilein general Caribbean foreign policy is highlydependent, and therefore circumspect,some governments,such as thoseled by Manley in Jamaica and Bishopin Grenada, believe they can achieve greater autonomy.

Socialiststates have perceived themselves as capable of overcomingthe constraints andmodifying some of the effects of history, geography, society, economic need andthe in¯ uence of the international system in non-traditional directions. Thus thereis centrality to the role of ideology in foreign policy. 85 Theact of trying increases thelikelihood of success. Thehistory of core in¯ uence, especially that of the USA overthe region is citedas asourceof autonomousforeign policies. It isarguedthat decades of US hegemonyand intervention has generateda backlashamong Latin American foreign-policymakers whoseek autonomyto counteract the effects ofhistory. Thisis especiallytrue in Mexico,where the relationship with the USA isperhaps mostimmediate and certainly most overtly associated with foreign policy. 86 Someautonomous foreign policies are explainedas afunctionof the failures ofdependent development. When strong economic and political ties with the corefail to bring development, states mayseek greaterautonomy as apathto greaterprosperity. Manley’ s drasticbreak with Jamaica’ spastforeign-policy traditionsis anexample of this pattern, 87 as is Betancur’s attemptinga new approachin Colombia. 88 Finally,the literature cites some culturaland historical reasons, unique to the differentcountries, for Latin America’ s pursuitof autonomous foreign policies. Forinstance, Brazilians’ sense ofculturaland historical uniqueness from the rest ofLatin America encourages their policy makers topursue a foreignpolicy autonomousnot only from the core, but from the rest ofthe region as well. 89 Mexicohas astrongtradition of foreign policy principles, grounded in the pursuitof self-determination, that guides its foreign policy.

Explaining`dependent’ foreign policies. Lowlevels of relativepower capabil- itiescontribute to dependence in foreign policy. In the Caribbean, for example, states’ closeproximity to theUSA, strongeconomic dependence, small size and relativelylow levels of development combine to give the region few power capabilitiesand therefore a heavilydependent foreign policy process. 90 Another factorthat has hada signi®cant impact on LatinAmerica’ s relativepower is the debtcrisis. Not only did most of the region’ s countriesexperience enormous increases intheir debt burdens in the 1980s and 1990s, the vast majority of the borrowedmoney was owedto core countries, especially the USA. Thiscon- tributesto apowerdifferential between periphery and core that in turnin¯ uences LatinAmerican foreign-policy behaviour. 91 USactivityand interest in the region is alsocited as acontributingfactor to dependentforeign policy. As is mentionedabove, numerous authors cite a 643 JEANNE AKHEY weakeningin bipolarityas asourceof foreignpolicy freedom for Latin America. Theyalso argue that the reverse is true;when US globalpower and in¯ uence are strengthened,Latin American foreign policy becomes more dependent. 92 This impliesthat a concentrationof power in US hands,which, arguably, is happen- ingnow within the economic system ofthe Western hemisphere, 93 will make LatinAmerican foreign policies more constrained despite theeasing of the Cold War. Theideology of thepolicy maker also contributes to thedegree of dependence inforeignpolicy. 94 Libbyargues that Seaga’ s pro-coreideology led him to marry Jamaicanforeign policy to thatof the USA. 95 Asimilarargument is madeabout Ecuador’s Febres Cordero.His strong personal, political and business ties to the USAmayhave in¯ uenced his decision to developa foreignpolicy that coincided ideallywith US interestsin Latin America. 96 Finally,Milenky argues that Latin American states lackall the features of sovereignnations. 97 Theyare permeableto outside intervention and in¯ uence, havepenetrable decision making and rely too heavily on foreign markets and investmentfor their development. As such,he argues,they are unableto develop foreignpolicy in an autonomous manner. While Milenky’ s viewwas developed some 20years ago,the features to which he points still aptly describe Latin America.

Discussion. Anintriguingpoint about the `autonomous’ foreign policies is that, accordingto scholars, many of them apparently failed. Eschbach and Bagley & TokatliaÂnconcludethat, respectively, Mexico’ s andColombia’ s attemptsat increasedindependence via foreign policy ended in reducing those countries’ autonomy vis-aÁ -vis the USA.98 TheUSA succeededin undermining the Conta- doraeffort and the Arias peace plan, 99 andNicaragua’ s attemptat an auton- omousforeign policy was short-lived.Manley’ s experimentwith democratic socialismand a non-alignedforeign policy is widelyconsidered a failure,not onlybecause his policies were reversed by Seaga, but also because Manley himselfdid not continue on those paths once he returned to of® ce in1990. 100 Grenada’s experimentwith an independent foreign policy certainly failed. Braveboy-Wagnertries to explain why Caribbean governments’ attempts at autonomyoften do not succeed. She argues that left-orientated governments succeedat getting international support for economic and social policies, but `thissupport has notproved suf® cientto minimize external pressures, simply becausefor small states economicsecurity rests heavilyon bilateral political relations’. 101 Shegoes on toarguethat Caribbean governments have simply been unableto institute truly independent foreign policies and that `the primary reason forthis failure has beenthe Caribbean socialists’ neglect of geopolitical realitiesÐthese governments have gone too far beyondthe implied limits of politicalacceptability’ . 102 Braveboy-Wagnerappears to place the responsibility forfailed autonomy on the shoulders of the Caribbean leaders who are naive enoughto attemptautonomy within a hemisphereclearly dominated by the USA. Otherswould argue that US lackof respectfor Caribbean autonomy is thebetter explanation. 103 644 THREE BUILDING BLOCKS OF ATHEORY OF LATIN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

Inevaluatingthe dependence/ autonomyaxis of foreignpolicy, it isimportant toseparatepolicy development from policy success. Itisnonethelessinteresting tonote the apparent low level of accomplishment these policy efforts have had. Thissuggests a potentialproblem in the literature. Above it was suggestedthat discussionsof `autonomy’ and `dependence’ were heavily conditioned by considerationsof anti-coreand pro-core policies respectively. The fact that most ofthe `autonomous’ foreign policies failed points to a seconddif® culty in the literature:many studies seeking to explain autonomy in foreign policy focus moreheavily on policy attempts atautonomy, rather than on achievedautonomy itself.Indeed, many of the presumably `autonomous’ foreign policies outlined in thisreview appear to have been rather dependent, as demonstratedby their failurerate. Havingobserved these dif® culties with the autonomy/ dependencedichotomy, itis worthwhileto evaluate whether the variables described in the literature revealany valuable underpinnings of theory. They do provide some promise. Recallthat the pro-core/ anti-corecut at Latin American foreign policy uncovered anumberof variables which, even when their status remained unchanged, correlatedwith both pro-coreand anti-core policies. The factors described in the autonomy/dependencesection do not share thatquality. In other words, this literaturereveals more `true’ variables which co-vary with changes in the degree ofautonomy in foreign policy. None of these factors explains both autonomy anddependence. For example, relative power capabilities and US interestand poweremerge as independentvariables for predicting autonomy or dependence. Thisis incontrast with economic dependence, for example, which predicted both pro-coreand anti-core foreign policies. Policymaker ideology also emerges hereas a`true’variable. The literature suggeststhat ideology in¯ uences the degree of autonomy a foreign-policy makingbody seeks, andsometimes achieves. This variable nonetheless remains troublesomefor reasons outlinedabove. Because theliterature too heavily equates`autonomous’ with `anti-core’ , itis dif®cult to discern the effect of a pro-coreideology on foreign policy. As noneof the regimes listed in the `autonomous’group clearly advance a pro-coreideology, it is likelythat the degreeto which they seek autonomymay be undervalued. This is notthe place todelve into the question of how to measure autonomyand dependence in foreignpolicy. 104 Thatthe question has goneunder-treated in the literature limits theimpact of ® ndingsrelating policy maker ideology with autonomy and dependence. Cognisantof these caveats, I ®ndit possible to develop some tentative statementsabout which variables lead to autonomy and dependence in Latin Americanforeign policy. Keeping in mindthe potential impact of leader/ regime/ partyideology, which may in¯ uence the degree of autonomy a government seeks, theautonomy of a policy-makingbody is afunctionof variables rooted inrealist theory, such as relativepower capabilities, the global concentration of power,and the behaviour of thehegemon. Additionally, states maystrive for an autonomouspolicy because of historical circumstances, failures with dependent developmentand other place-speci® c factorsthat in¯ uence the details of individ- ualcountries’ foreign policies. When they do strivefor autonomy, they often fail 645 JEANNE AKHEY becausethey are unableto overcome the in¯ uence of powerful international actorsand because they lack the basic power-tools of independentnation-states.

Economicvs political Issue areas presenta thirdcut at Latin American foreign policy that emerges fromthe literature. An issue area perspectivedivides Latin American foreign- policybehaviour roughly into two areas: economicand political-diplo matic (hereafterreferred to simply as `political’). Thisdichotomy avoids a thirdissue area,military-security policy, which some foreignpolicy analysts have also deemedimportant. 105 Thatthe military/ securityarea appearsinfrequently in examinationsof Latin American foreign policy appears to be explained by two factors.First, Latin America is typicallynot considered an actor in the high politicsof internationalwarfare and security policy. With the obvious exception oftheFalklands/ Malvinaswar, Latin Americans’ participation in inter-statewars has beenmostly limited to small-scale incursions usually related to border disputes.106 Therelative peacefulness of the region, at least among states ifnot withinthem, has diminishedthe attention paid to the military/ securityarea. Second,because the Latin American foreign policy literature has paidso much attentionto the relationship between core and periphery, it has tendedto underemphasisethe role of military/ securityconcerns in Latin American policy circles.In other words, the main foreign policy issues betweenLatin America andthe USA are usuallynot security-related per se,atleast not from the perspectiveof theLatin Americans. The issues relateto development,diplomatic policy,aid, debt and other issues. Withthe recent exceptions of Nicaragua, Grenadaand Panama, few Latin American states see theirrelationship with core countriesas oneprimarily turning on securityinterests. It should nonetheless be emphasisedthat military players remain powerful in thesecurity realm of foreign policy.107 Theyhave generally retreated, however, from overt intervention into otherpolicy matters, including non-security-related foreign policy. Latin Amer- ica’s democratisationis suf® cientlyconsolidated to curtail the possibility of a militarycoup signi® cantly. That the generals did not move to ® llthe power vacuumin Ecuador in early 1997 is evidenceof this trend. In their retreat (or expulsionfrom) the halls of political power, military players have moved on to newand more circumscribed activities, limiting their in¯ uence in foreign policy. Anumberof scholarshas suggestedthat an issue-area approachwill be useful fordeveloping theory in Latin American foreign policy. 108 Areviewof the literaturedemonstrates that highlighting the distinction between economic and politicalpolicy does yield some kernelsof theory.

Explainingeconomic policy. Thedominant theme in studies that look at Latin America’s economicpolicy over time is thatit has changedsubstantially. The 1970sand early 1980s saw statismin economic policy, which included restric- tionson foreigninvestment, some nationalisationof foreigninterests, orientation towards the NIEO andother Third World-orientated organisations, and high trade barriers.109 Forexample, the military government in Ecuador joined and soon 646 THREE BUILDING BLOCKS OF ATHEORY OF LATIN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY becamea leaderof OPEC.110 Jamaica underManley established economic ties withCuba and sought to weaken them with the USA. Chile’s Allendein the early1970s was ousted,at least in part, because of his nationalist economic policies.111 GarcõÂainPerubegan his presidency by promising to makepayments onlyon Peru’ s publicdebt and only in amounts that would not exceed 10% of thetotal value of exports. Furthermore, he shunned the IMF.112 Similarly, BrazilianPresident Sarney declared a moratoriumon debt service. 113 In the 1970sVenezuela, particularly under Pe Ârez,became a globalspokesman for the NIEO andnationalised foreign oil companies working in the country. 114 Until its reactivationin the1990s, the Andean Pact, a subregionalfree tradeorganisation, mostlyacted as aprotectionistbody to keep out Northern powers. 115 There were, ofcourse, exceptions to the general trend of nationalism in foreign economic policy.Some leaders, such as Pinochetin Chile, who eventually withdrew from theAndean Pact, and Turbay in Colombia, eschewed the notion of economic nationalismand pursued free marketpolicies and strong relations with core actors. Inthe 1980s and into the 1990s the trend shifted. Latin America abandoned muchof itsnationalist economic policies in favourof astrongerintegration into thehemispheric and global economies. Seaga returned Jamaica tothe embrace ofthe USA andthe IMF.116 Fujimoridid the same inPeru. 117 AlthoughBrazil’ s economicrelations vis-aÁ -vis theUSA werestrained during the 1980s, Collor de Mello,inaugurated in 1990, quickly put Brazil on a pathtowards free markets andinsertion into the global economy. 118 Thispolicy was continuedunder his successor, ItamarFranco, and even under Fernando Cardoso, the former aca- demic,famous dependency theorist and exile during Brazil’ s militarydictator- ship.Since the early 1980s Ecuador has seen arelativelyconsistent movement towardsneoliberal policies. 119 InMexico the transition began under de la Madrid,who gave into austerity demands as ameans ofsolvingthe debt crisis. 120 Itintensi® ed during the Salinas years, during which the North American Free TradeAgreement ( NAFTA)was signed,and continues into the Zedillo sexenio.121 Regionaltrade organisations such as theAndean Pact and MERCOSUR that had actedas protectionistalliances in the 1970s are nowbeing revitalised as free tradeagreements. Whataccounts for these disparate economic behaviours? There is ascholarly consensusthat Latin America became weaker during the 1980s, particularly becauseof thedebt crisis. The resulting economic vulnerability made it imposs- iblefor Latin American countries to resist thepressure forneoliberal policies emanatingfrom the core. 122 Inmanycases thispressure tookthe form of explicit conditionsdemanding austerity packages in exchange for debt restructuring agreements.In other cases theincentives came inthe form of carrots, such as Reagan’s CaribbeanBasin Initiative and Bush’ s Enterprisefor the Americas Initiative.These offered trade preferences and debt reduction, respectively, in exchangefor cooperative countries’ developing neoliberal economic policies. Additionally,there is aconsensusamong some policymakers inLatin America thatalternatives to the neoliberal model have been exhausted and have proven ineffective.The neoliberal approach, while ¯ awed,is seen as theonly remaining alternative. 123 647 JEANNE AKHEY

Itisimportantto notethat in aminorityof cases, economicvulnerability leads policyin theopposite direction, ie towardsthe development of amorenational- isticeconomic policy. For example, Ala ÂnGarcõÂa’s andMichael Manley’ s economicpolicies are explainedas afunctionof Peru’s andJamaica’ seconomic weaknessrespectively. 124 Itis equallyimportant to point out that, by the end of hisregime, Garcõ Âahadlargely given in to coredemands on economic policy, 125 as didManley towards the end of his ® rst termand during his second term in power.De® ance of thehegemon on economicmatters is morethe exception than therule, and is rarelymaintained for a longperiod of time. Twoadditional explanatory factors in Latin America’ s economicforeign policyare leader/regime/partyideology and the notion that global leaders are experiencingthe `end of history’ . Coleman& Quiros-Varelaand Snarr argue that developmentpolicy, intricately linked to the ideology of the policy makers, stronglydetermines the economic component of foreign policy. 126 Hey argues thatwhat variation was evidentin Ecuadoran economic policy since the early 1980sis afunctionof ideological differences among leaders. 127 The `end of history’explanation, popularised by Francis Fukuyama, 128 arguesthat Latin America’s shifttowards economic neoliberalism is partof a globaltrend in whichpolicy makers embracefree marketeconomic policies as themost effectivemeans ofdevelopment.Accordingly, Latin American policy makers are simplytaking part in a world-widetransition.

Explainingpolitical policy. Unlikeeconomic policy, political policy shows few,if any, patterns across timein Latin America. Domõ Ânguezargues that the 1970swas atimeof foreign policy `activism’ , de®ned mostly as multilateral, anti-coreinitiatives such as supportfor the NIEO.129 Healso argues that this subsidedin the1980s, even in usuallyactivist countries like Cuba, Mexico, Peru andVenezuela. 130 However,there have always been numerous pockets of non-conformity.Colombia’s Turbayand Jamaica’ sSeaga,for example, broke diplomaticrelations with Cuba just when many other states werere-establishing them.131 Chile’s Pinochetcertainly did not participate in `activist’ foreign policiesand even withdrew from the Andean Pact because he thought it had becometoo political. 132 Similarly,the 1980s, which Domõ Ânguezargues was a timeof `passivism’ in Latin American foreign policy, saw theContadora and Ariasefforts opposing US policyin Central America and Cuban intervention in Africa.Types of political policy appear to be much more randomly distributed thantypes of economic policy. Arethere any patterns in political policy? There is evidenceto suggest that Andeanpolicy makers haveagreed to cooperate with the USA onillicit drug operations.These include Peru’ s GarcõÂaandColombia’ s Betancur,both leaders whoin otherareas opposedmuch US policy. 133 Thissuggests that a corecountry maysuccessfully pressure LatinAmerican states onpolicy matters it considers salient.However, the fact that many Latin American foreign-policy makers opposedUS policyin Central America, clearly an issue ofhigh salience to the USAinthe1980s, appears to undermine this hypothesis. The critical difference betweendrug and Central America policy may be money.When Colombia, Peru 648 THREE BUILDING BLOCKS OF ATHEORY OF LATIN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY andEcuador agree to cooperatewith US drugpolicy in the Andes, they receive aid.This indicates that core pressure maybe mosteffective in changingpolitical policyin Latin America when it is accompaniedby ® nancialcarrots. Indeed, althoughColombia ® rst reactedto its1997 decerti® cation by the USA byhalting cocaeradication, this act of de® ance was shortlived.Colombian drug squads quicklyresumed spraying coca ® eldsin accordance with US wishesand in part becausedrug-® ghting funds from Washington depended on it. Asecond,more long-term, pattern in politicalpolicy concerns regional foreign policytowards Cuba. With the exception of Mexico, Latin America joined with (and/orwas coercedby) the USA toostracise revolutionary Cuba from hemi- sphericpolitical circles. 134 Thisincluded countries’ breaking diplomatic relations withCuba and denying it participation in the Organization of American States. Thistrend shifted in the1970s and 1980s when, one by one,Latin American and Caribbeanleaders re-established formal diplomatic relations with Cuba and beganto lobby for its inclusion in the OAS.(Despitethe fact that the vast majority of OAS members favourCuba’ s participation,the US-backed ban continues.)A thirdshift is seen inthe 1990s. While Latin American foreign- policymakers continueto maintain that Cuba should be welcomed as a formalparticipant in hemispheric affairs, they also appear more willing to criticiseFidel Castro’ s policiesas anachronisticin a globalpolitical economy dominatedby democracy and free markets.Cuba was theonly Latin American countryexcluded from the 1994 `Summit of the Americas’ held in Miami. The event’s host,President Clinton, took advantage of the opportunity to vilify Castroas theonly socialist dictator in the region and therefore undeserving of takinga seat ator sharingin thespoils of theSummit table. The region’ s heads ofstate did not make an issue ofCuba’ s exclusionand instead celebrated the plansfor a futureregion-wide free tradeagreement. 135 Thesepatterns are morethe exception than the rule in political policy. Most evidentis awidevariation in substance and process inpolitical policy across timeand space. Different countries and regimes pursue different types of politicalpolicies, with little evidence that a commontheme guides their foreign policybehaviour in this area. What explanations does the literature provide to accountfor this diversity? A myriadof factors is mentioned.One strong one is theuse offoreign policy for political purposes. Numerous authors indicate that foreignpolicy becomes a politicaltool for Latin American leaders to appeaseor underminepolitical opponents. 136 InMexico,for example, foreign policy is used toappease domestic critics of the PRI whoclaim the party has weddedMexico tooclosely to theUSA. 137 Similarly,President Febres Cordero’s tripto Cuba,the ®rst byanEcuadoran president since the Cuban revolution, placated leftist critics whoargued Febres Corderowas apawnof Washington. 138 Otherexplanatory factors include leader/ regime/partyideology, a country’s foreignpolicy traditions, its political culture, and its policy-making institu- tions.139 Allof these vary throughout the region and can be used to explain differencesin political policy. Ecuador’ s traditionaladherence to non-interven- tionistprinciples, for example, in part explains the country’ s failureto become moreinvolved in the Central American con¯ icts of the 1980s. 140 Ebel,Taras & Cochraneargue that Costa Rica and Venezuela share apoliticalculture that is 649 JEANNE AKHEY characterisedby Western democratic values. 141 Theyaccordingly explain these countries’foreign policy behaviour in the same terms.Myers explainsBrazil’ s politicalrelations with Latin America partly as afunctionof Brazilians’sense of futuregreatness and uniqueness within the region. 142 Explanationsfor political behaviour vary widely, and often take the kitchen sinkapproach discussed above. As thedependent variable (behaviour) is so heavilydifferentiated, so are thepossible independent variables explaining it. Everythingbecomes a potentialexplanatory factor. The fact that relatively little theoreticalwork underpins much of this research limitsthe degree to which scholarsrank variables in a theoreticallymeaningful way.

Discussion. Is theeconomic/ politicaldistinction useful for developing theory inLatinAmerican foreign policy? The above discussion reveals that many more factorshelp to explainpolitical policy than economic policy. This indicates that LatinAmerican policy makers are moreconstrained in theeconomic realm than inthe political± diplomatic realm. An alternative way to conceptualise this point isthateconomic policy behaviour is less sensitiveto changesin theindependent variablesthat have a strongimpact on political behaviour, such as leader/regime/ partyideology, domestic political circumstances and a country’s politicalhistory. Instead,economic policy is developedwithin a hemisphericdistribution of powerthat is usuallystacked against Latin America. More often than not, Latin Americanstoe the economic line of the USA whenthey have weak relative economicpower capabilities, making these a potentvariable in explaining foreignpolicy in the economic realm. Thepolitical± economic axis thus reveals the following tentative conclusion: in general,political policy is subjectto amyriadof explanationswhereas economic policyis explainedby the differential in relative economic power capabilities betweencore and peripheral actors within the hemisphere. Pressure fromthe core,particularly when tied to ®nancialresources (as indrugpolicy) or totrends withinthe region (as inCuba policy), also appears to be important in determin- ingboth political and economic policy. This analysis points to the potency of conceptualvariables fundamental to both political realist and dependency theo- ries,variables such as theregional distribution of power,relative power capabil- itiesand hegemonic pressure. That these variables hold most true for the economicrealm is alsoconsistent with realism and dependency, which would holdthat the hegemon would succeed in the areas mostimportant to it. Increasingly,the USA appearsto value Latin American economic behaviour overpolitical activities, making it more likely to `tolerate’de® ance in diplomacy inexchange for compliance in ® nancialmatters.

Conclusions Aliteraturereview focusing on the causal factors scholars point to in explaining LatinAmerican foreign policy reveals a numberof elements that will be importantin developing theory in this area. A ®rst conclusionis thatLatin Americanforeign policy remains in essence aboutdependence. All three of the 650 THREE BUILDING BLOCKS OF ATHEORY OF LATIN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY cutsexplored here tap into the region’ s weakeconomic and political status on ahemisphericand global scale. The pro-core vs anti-coreand autonomous vs dependentaxes categoriseLatin American foreign policy according to its relationship vis-aÁ -vis thecore. Similarly, analysis of the economic± political dichotomyreveals that Latin America experiences decreasing foreign policy latitudeas itseconomic vulnerability to core actors increases. This enduring constraint,(dependence) continues to operate even in a post-coldwar world in whichthe USA arguablyhas less interestin keeping its dependencies in line. Myanalysis of the many factors contributing to Latin American foreign policy suggeststhat leader/ party/regimeideology and pressure fromthe core are the strongestvariables in determining foreign policy. Pressure fromthe core most oftenoccurs in the economic arena, which is alsothe realm of LatinAmerica’ s greatestvulnerability. This means thateconomic policy is moresubject than politicalpolicy to core pressure. Realist variables, those that are featuredin traditionalpower-politics discussions of foreign policy and international rela- tions,also play an important role. These include a country’s powercapabilities andthe global or hemisphericdistribution of power.In addition,researchers also pointto countries’ idiosyncratic features, such as history,geography and diplo- matictraditions, in explaining foreign policy. These idiosyncracies, however, shouldnot play more than a smallpart in the development of a generaltheory, as theyare byde® nition place-speci® c characteristics. Anotableobservation here is thatbureaucratic features, an important set of variablesin studies of Western industrialised foreign policies, are mostlymissing inanalyses of Latin American foreign policy. Except in the larger, more developedstates suchas Braziland Chile, 143 mostLatin American foreign policy bureaucraciesare deemedtoo unprofessional, underskilled and subject to ca- priciousacts ofthe leadership to merit their own entry in a modelof foreign policybehaviour. As diplomaticacademies continue to grow and professionalise, andwhere personalism loses outto institutional norms, bureaucratic variables maygain greater standing in the Latin American foreign policy literature. Identi®cation of thepotent explanatory factors is butthe ® rst stepin develop- inga theoryof LatinAmerican foreign policy. The next step is torecognisethat thevariables indicated here are notautonomous of oneanother. Indeed, many of thereadings cited in this article point to the interrelated nature of the many determinantsof policy.Certainly, leader/ party/regimeideology does not develop inapoliticalor economicvacuum. Leaders and the parties and governments they headdevelop ideology at least in part in responseto domesticpolitical demands andinternational power relationships. To thatextent, the `leader ideology’ notion inthe extant Latin American foreign policy literature is sorelyunderdeveloped. Tobe sure, many Latin leaders have charismatic and strong personalities, and frequentlyseem toscornthe effects ofdomestic and international pressures. But thedevelopment of `ideology’cannot escape externalpressures. Oneindicator of thisin Latin America is theso-called `Washington Consensus’ , inwhich the region’s leadersare saidto have abandoned protectionist and state-orientated modelsand instead now agree on a neoliberalapproach to economic develop- ment.144 Similarly,if Domõ Ânguezis correctthat the region’ s leadershave togetherundergone a transitionfrom statism to free-markets in economic 651 JEANNE AKHEY policy,145 thenthere is somethingother than simple `leader ideology’ at work in determiningleaders’ approaches to policy.There seem tobetrends,independent ofindividual proclivities, that in¯ uence leaders’ preferences. Inthe same vein,`pressure fromthe core’ is partlya functionof the `internationaldistribution of power’ . Thepower of the USA inLatin America, forexample, is notindependent of itsrelationship with other core countries, even thoughthe USA has remainedthe regional hegemon throughout this century. Therelationship between the global system andthe in¯ uence of core countries requiresmore attention. Numerous authors have pointed out that the end of the ColdWar is expectedto bring a reductionin the in¯ uence of the USA overthe WesternHemisphere. Recent literature, however, indicates that the reverse may actuallybe true. In combinationwith economic crisis inthe region, the absence ofasecondsuperpower has actuallyincreased the power of the USA overLatin America,particularly in economic policy. 146 Theexternal in¯ uence on a Latin Americancountry’ s foreignpolicy is afunctionof domestic and international variables,as wellas ofthe interplay between them. Theseobservations suggest that the next step is todevelop an integrated theorywhich not only includes the many explanatory factors, but considers their relativeweights and their effect on one another. The review of scholarship on LatinAmerican foreign policy undertaken here points to a numberof elements thatsuch a theoryshould include. The disjointed nature of the current literature tooeasily allows us tomiss theinterrelated nature of the elements of foreign policy. Whatmight such an integrated theory assert? Ifthisstudy is togobeyond the `kitchensink’ approach it criticises, then it should speculate on which of the variablesare primary.The preceding analysis allows for the suggestion that some ofthe variables identi® ed may be more important than others. Although leader/party/regimeideology appears strong, there is suf® cientevidence to indicatethat it is indeedconditioned by domestic and international pressures. Thequestion then becomes, which is primary,the domestic or theinternational? Theevidence presented here strongly favours the international. While domestic politicalpressures frequentlyplayed a rolein in¯ uencing foreign policy, the strengthand, more importantly, the direction of that in¯ uence varied widely. Thiswas less truein thecase ofcorepressure onLatinAmerican policy makers. Recallthat, since the 1980s, international variables had an important effect on channellingthe region’ s economicpolicy towards neoliberalism, suggesting that corepressures overwhelmedor modi® ed the effects ofleader preferences and domesticpolitics. When the core deems apolicyarea salient,it islikelythat core pressure willaffect Latin American foreign policy in thedesired direction. This isnotto say thata myriaddomestic and other variables do notin¯ uence policy. Instead,it suggests that on certain crucial issues LatinAmerica is likelyto behavein a pro-coredirection. Indeed, an integrated theory would expect that corepressure wouldachieve its policy results through manipulating other factors suchas leader/party/regimepreferences or the domestic political climate. It is alsoimportant to remember that these salient issue areas mayconstitute only a smallpart of a country’s totalforeign policy. Thisarticle provides a theoreticalcontext on which future empirical analyses 652 THREE BUILDING BLOCKS OF ATHEORY OF LATIN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY ofLatinAmerican foreign policy may be based.Theoretically grounded empiri- calanalyses are requiredif progressin this ® eldis tobe made. Future research shouldask, for example, whether or not international variables do have more in¯uence than domestic and personal factors. If so,under what conditions does thissituation occur? What is thelevel and direction of the interaction among variables?This article has provideda startat developing theory in Latin Americanforeign policy upon which future theoretically informed empirical research canbuild.

Notes Theauthor wishes tothank Thomas Klak, Walter Vanderbush,Lynn Kuzma, Tricia Gray andan anonymous reviewer forhelpful comments onearlier draftsof this manuscript. 1 Inthis paper, the term `LatinAmerica’ refers tothe entirety of the Western Hemisphere southof North America. Ittherefore includes Mexico, Central America, theCaribbean Islands and South America. 2 ElizabethG Ferris &JennieK Lincoln(eds), LatinAmerican Foreign Policies: Global and Regional Dimensions,Boulder,CO: Westview Press, 1981;Jennie K Lincoln& ElizabethG Ferris (eds), The Dynamics ofLatin American Foreign Policies: Challenges for the 1980s ,Boulder,CO: Westview Press, 1984;Heraldo Mun Äoz& JosephS Tulchin(eds), LatinAmerican Nations in WorldPolitics ,Boulder,CO: Westview Press, 1984,1996, and Jorge Heine &Leslie Manigat, TheCaribbean and World Politics , New York:Holmes andMeier, 1987. 3 ModestoSeara VaÂsquez, La PolõÂticaExterior deMe Âxico: LaPra Âcticade Me Âxico enel Derecho Internacional ,MexicoCity: Editorial Es® nge;Harold Eugene Davis &Larman CWilson(eds), Latin AmericanForeign Policies: An Analysis ,Baltimore,MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975;Edward S Milenky, Argentina’sForeignPolicies ,Boulder,CO: Westview Press, 1978;Arturo Lecaro Bustamante, PolõÂticaInternacional del Ecuador 1809± 1984 ,Quito:Universidad Central, Escuela deCiencias Interna- cionales,1988; and Fernando Bustamante, `Ecuador:putting an end to ghosts of the past?’ Journal of InterAmerican Studies and World Affairs ,34(4),1993, pp 195± 225. 4 DavidR Mares, `Mexico’s foreignpolicy as amiddlepower: the Nicaragua connection,1884± 1986’ , Latin AmericanResearch Review ,23(3),1988, pp 81±107. 5 Jorge I DomõÂnguez,`The foreign policies of Latin American states inthe 1980s: retreat orrefocus?’ ,in Samuel Huntington,Joseph Nye &RichardCooper (eds), GlobalDilemmas ,pp161± 98 Cambridge, MA: Center forInternational Affairs, HarvardUniversity, 1985; and Mares, `Mexico’s foreignpolicy as a middlepower. 6 Milenky, Argentina’sForeignPolicies ,HeraldoMun Äoz, LasRelaciones Exteriores delGobierno Militar Chileno, Santiago: PROSPEL-CERC ,1986;Wayne A Selcher,`Current dynamics and future prospects of Brazil’ srelationswith Latin America: towardsa patternof bilateralcooperation’ , Journalof Interamerican Studiesand World Affairs ,28(2),1986, pp 67±99; Alfredo Toro Hardy, Venezuela: Democraciay PolõÂtica Exterior,Caracas: Proimagen,1986; Mary B Vanderlaan, Revolutionand Foreign Policy in Nicaragua , Boulder,CO: Westview Press, 1986;and Jacqueline Anne and Braveboy-Wagner, TheCaribbean in World Affairs,Boulder,CO: Westview Press, 1986. 7 MichaelBrecher, TheForeign Policy System ofIsrael: Settings,Images, Process ,New Haven,CT: Yale UniversityPress, 1972. 8 JacquelineAnne Braveboy-Wagner, `The state andstatus of research onCaribbeaninternational relations’ , paperdelivered to theXIX InternationalCongress of theLatin American StudiesAssociation, Washington, DC, 1995. 9 Jeanne AKHey, Theoriesof Dependent Foreign Policy and the Case ofEcuador in the 1980s , Athens, OH: OhioUniversity Press, 1995. 10 James LRay,`Dependence, political compliance, and economic performance: LatinAmerica andEastern Europe’, inCharles WKegley& PatrickJ McGowan(eds), ThePolitical Economy of Foreign Policy Behavior,pp111± 36, Beverly Hills, CA: Sage;Neil RRichardson& Charles WKegley,`Trade dependenceand foreign policy compliance: a longitudinalanalysis’ , InternationalStudies Quarterly , 24, 1980,pp 191±222; and Bruce Moon,`The foreign policy of the dependent state’ , InternationalStudies Quarterly,27,1983, pp 315±340. 11 Somecomparative studiesdo relate empirical ®ndingsto theory. See, forexample, Lincoln& Ferris, The Dynamics ofLatin American Foreign Policies ;ToroHarely, Venezuela;JuanGabriel Tokatlian,`The politicaleconomy of Colombian± US narcodiplomacy:a case studyof Colombianforeign policy decision- making,1978± 90’ ,unpublishedPhD dissertation, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, 1990; and Hey, Theoriesof Dependent Foreign Policy and the Case of Ecuador in the 1980s . 653 JEANNE AKHEY

12 JohnD Martz,`Counterpoint and concatenation in the Caribbean: the substance and style of foreign policy’, LatinAmerican Research Review ,21(1),1986, pp 162.See alsoJorge Heine, `Postplantation societies andworld order: some re¯ections on the Caribbean predicament’ ,inMun Äoz& Tulchin, Latin AmericanNations in World Politics ,1996,pp 225±236. 13 EdwardS Milenky,`Problems, perspectives, and modes of analysis: understanding Latin American approachesto worldaffairs’ ,inRonald G Hellman &HJohnRosenbaum (eds), LatinAmerica: TheSearch fora New InternationalRole ,pp93± 113 New York:Sage, 1975; and Cheryl L Eschbach,`Dilemmas of sovereignty:Mexican policy toward Central America underPresidents Lo Âpez Portilloand De la Madrid’, unpublishedPhD dissertation, Princeton University, Princeton, 1989. 14 GerhardDrekonja-Kornat, `The rise ofLatinAmerica’ sforeignpolicy: between hegemonyand autonomy’ , LatinAmerican Research Review ,21(1),1986, p 240. 15 EduardoFerrero Costa, `Peruvian foreign policy: current trends, constraints and opportunities’ , Journal of InteramericanStudies and World Affairs ,29(2),1987, p 59;and Ronald B StJohn, TheForeign Policy of Peru,Boulder,CO: LynneRienner, 1990, p 214. 16 Jeanne AKHey,`Compliance, consensus and counterdependence: foreign policy in Ecuador’ , Internati- onalInteractions ,19(3),1994, pp 250±251. 17 Bruce MichaelBagley & JuanGabriel TokatliaÂn,`Colombian foreign policy in the 1980s: the search for leverage’ , Journalof Interamerican Studies and World Affairs ,27(3),1985, p 28. 18 ElizabethG Acosta, `Consideracionessobre la polõÂtica exteriorde Venezuela hacia el Caribe’ , EconomõÂa yCienciasSociales ,26(1),1987, p 6. 19 StevenR David, ChoosingSides: Alignment and Realignment in the Third World ,Baltimore,MD: Johns HopkinsUniversity Press, 1991. 20 JennieK Lincoln,`Introduction to Latin American foreignpolicy: global and regional dimensions’ , in Ferris &Lincoln, LatinAmerican Foreign Policies: Global and Regional Dimensions ,pp3± 18; Alberto Van Klaveren,`The analysis of Latin American foreignpolicies: theoretical perspectives’ ,inMun Äoz& Tulchin, LatinAmerican Nations in WorldPolitics ,1984,pp 1± 21; and Jeanne AKHey,`Foreign policy optionsunder dependence: a theoreticalevaluation with evidence from Ecuador’ , Journalof Latin AmericanStudies ,25,1993, pp 543±574. 21 JohnD Martz,`The fate ofa small state: Ecuadorin foreignaffairs’ ,inMun Äoz&Tulchin, LatinAmerican Nationsin World Politics ,1996,pp 129±47; Bagley & TokatliaÂn,`Colombian foreign policy in the 1980s’ ; andRonald T Libby,`The United States andJamaica: playingthe American card’ , LatinAmerican Perspectives ,17(1),1990, pp 86± 109. 22 MunÄ oz, LasRelaciones Exteriores delMilitar Chilero , p 303. 23 TokatliaÂn,`The political economy of Colombian-US narcodiplomacy’ ; Hey,`Compliance, consensus and counterdependence’; andHey, Theoriesof Dependent Foreign Policy . 24 Peter Calvert, TheInternational Politics of LatinAmerica ,Manchester:Manchester UniversityPress, 1994, pp 00±51. 25 RonSanders, `The relevance andfunction of diplomacy in internationalpolitics for small Caribbeanstates’ , TheRound Table ,312,1989, pp 413±424; and Francisco Rojas Aravena, &LuisGuillermo Solõ Âs Rivera, `CentralAmerica andthe United States’ ,inMun Äoz& Tulchin, LatinAmerican Nations in World Politics , 1996,pp 105± 128. 26 Drekonja-Kornat,`The rise ofLatin America’ sforeignpolicy’ , p241. 27 Bagley& TokatliaÂn,`Colombian foreign policy in the 1980s’ , p28. 28 PaulAshley, `Jamaican foreignpolicy in transition: from Manley to Seaga’ ,inJorge Heine &Leslie Manigat(eds), TheCaribbean in World Politics: Cross Currents and Cleavages ,p157,New York:Holmes andMeier; andLibby, `The United States andJamaica’ . 29 FerreroCosta, `Peruvian foreign policy’ , p56. 30 MarshallSinger, WeakStates in a Worldof Powers: The Dynamics ofInternational Relationships , New York:Free Press, 1972;and Hey, `Foreign policy options under dependence’ . 31 Eschbach,`Dilemmas ofsovereignty’ , p391. 32 Acosta, `Consideracionesla polõÂtica exteriorde Venezuela’ ,p7;and Bagley & TokatliaÂn,`Colombian foreignpolicy in the 1980s’ , p38. 33 Bagley& TokatliaÂn,`Colombian foreign policy in the 1980s’ , p36. 34 DavidPion-Berlin, `The fall ofmilitary rule in Argentina: 1976± 1983’ , Journalof Interamerican Studies andWorld Affairs ,27(2),1985, pp 55±76. 35 WolfGrabendorff, `Mexico’ s foreignpolicy: indeed a foreignpolicy?’ , Journalof Interamerican Studies andWorld Affairs ,2,1978, pp 85± 91; Olga Pellicer, `Mexico’s position’, ForeignPolicy , 44, 1981, pp88± 92; Elizabeth Ferris, `Mexico’ s foreignpolicies: a studyin contradictions’ , inLincoln & Ferris, The Dynamics ofLatin American Foreign Policies ,pp213±228; Jorge Castan Äeda,`Don’ t cornerMexico!’ , ForeignPolicy ,61,1985, pp 75±90; Eschbach, `Dilemmas ofsovereignty’; andJeanne AKHey &Lynn Kuzma, `Anti-USforeign policy of dependent states: Mexicanand Costa Rican participationin Central American peace plans’, ComparativePolitical Studies ,26(1),1993, pp 30±62. 36 St John, TheForeign Policy of Peru ,p213;and Milenky, Argentina’sForeignPolicies ,pp123±124. 654 THREE BUILDING BLOCKS OF ATHEORY OF LATIN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

37 Eschbach,`Dilemmas ofsovereignty’ , p399. 38 Bagley& ToklatiaÂn,`Colombian foreign policy in the 1980s’ p 35;Acosta, `Consideracionessobre la polõÂtica exteriorde Venezuela’ ,p11;Ferrero Costa, `Peruvian foreign policy’ , p56;and Martz, `Thefate ofa small state’ . 39 Ashley,`Jamaican foreignpolicy in transition’ , p149;and Braveboy-Wagner, TheCaribbean in World Affairs, p 171. 40 Garry EVanden& WaltraudQueiser Morales,`Nicaraguan relations with the nonaligned movement’ , Journalof Interamerican Studies and World Affairs ,27(3),1985, pp 145±147. 41 Forexample, JiriValenta, `Nicaragua: Soviet±Cuban pawn or non-alignedcountry?’ , Journalof Interamer- icanStudies and World Affairs ,27(3),1985, p 164. 42 Acosta, `Consideracionessobre la polõÂtica exteriorde Venezuela’ ,pp7±9. 43 Hans JMorgenthau& KennethW Thompson, PoliticsAmong Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace , New York:Knopf. 44 Eschbach,`Dilemmas ofsovereignty’ , p389;and Hey &Kuzma, `Anti-USforeign policy of dependent states’ ,pp46±49. 45 Hey &Kuzma, `Anti-USforeign policy of dependent states’ . 46 JosephS Tulchin,`Continuity and change in Argentine foreign policy’ , inMun Äoz& Tulchin, Latin AmericanNations in World Politics ,1996,pp 165±196. 47 Bagley& TokatliaÂn,`Colombian foreign policy in the 1980s’ , p36. 48 Hey, Theoriesof Dependent Foreign Policy . 49 William Jesse Biddle& JohnD Stephens,`Dependent development and foreign policy: the case of Jamaica’ , InternationalStudies Quarterly ,33,1989, pp 411± 434. 50 Tulchin,`Continuity and change in Argentine foreign policy’ , pp175±176. 51 Vanderlaan, Revolutionand Foreign Policy in Nicaragua . 52 James DCochrane,`Characteristics ofcontemporary Latin American internationalrelations’ , Journal of InteramericanStudies and World Affairs ,20(4),1978, p 456;Vanderlaan, Revolutionand Foreign Policy inNicaragua ,pp9,15; Heraldo Mun Äoz,`The dominant themes inthe study of Latin America’ sforeign relations’, WorldAffairs ,150(2),1987, p 133;and Jorge G CastanÄeda,`Latin America andthe end of the Cold War’ , WorldPolicy Journal ,7(3),1990, p 471. 53 DavidPion-Berlin, `The de® ant state: Chilein the post-coup era’ ,inAbraham FLowenthal& JSamuel Fitch(eds), Armies andPolitics in Latin America ,p330,New York:Holmes andMeier. 54 Mares, `Mexico’s foreignpolicy as amiddlepower’ , p100. 55 Hey, Theoriesof Department Foreign Policy . 56 JohnD Martz, Politicsand Petroleum in Ecuador ,New Brunswick,NJ: TransactionBooks, 1987, pp329± 330: and Catherine M Conaghan, RestructuringDomination: Industrialists and the State in Ecuador,Pittsburgh:University of Pittsburgh Press, 1988,p 127. 57 MunÄ oz, LasRelaciones Exteriores delGobierno Militar Chilens , p 304. 58 Milenky, Argentina’s ForeignPolicies , pp 19±20. 59 Bagley& TokatliaÂn,`Colombian foreign policy in the 1980s’ , andDavid, ChoosingSides . 60 Hey,`Compliance, consensus and counterdependence’ ; andJeanne AKHey,`Ecuadoran foreign policy since 1979:ideological cycles ora trendtowards neoliberalism?’ , Journalof Interamerican Studies and WorldAffairs ,37(4)1995, pp 57±88. 61 James EDougherty& RobertL Pfaltzgraff (eds), ContendingTheories of International Relations: A ComprehensiveSurvey ,New York:Harper andRow, 1990, pp 124± 125. 62 Hey &Kuzma, `Anti-USforeign policy of dependent states’ . 63 Heine, `Postplantationsocieties andworld order’ . 64 KennethM Coleman& LuisQuiros-Varela, `Determinants ofLatin American foreignpolicies: bureau- cratic organizationsand development strategies’ ,inFerris &Lincoln, LatinAmerican Foreign Policy: Globaland Regional Dimensions ,pp39± 59; and Michael Ty Snarr, `Latin American foreignpolicy towardsthe United States from1948± 1978: exploring the salience ofdevelopment strategies’ ,unpublished PhDdissertation, Ohio State University,1995. 65 Bagley& TokatliaÂn,`Colombian foreign policy in the 1980s’ . 66 Braveboy-Wagner, TheCaribbean in World Affairs , p 171. 67 Richardson& Kegley,`Trade dependenceand foreign policy compliance’ ;Neil RRichardson,`Economic dependenceand foreign policy compliance: bringing measurement closer toconception’ , inKegley & McGowan, ThePolitical Economy of Foreign Policy Behavior ,pp87±110; Moon, `The foreign policy of thedependent state’ ;Bruce Moon,`Consensus or compliance? Foreignpolicy change and external dependence’, InternationalOrganization ,39,1985, pp 297± 329; and Hey, `Compliance, consensus and counterdependence’. 68 Forexample, Richardson& Kegley,`Trade dependenceand foreign policy compliance’ . 69 Moon,`The foreign policy of the dependent state’ ;andMoon, `Consensus or compliance?’ . 70 Valenta, `Nicaragua’ ,p168. 71 Vanden& Queiser Morales,`Nicaraguan relations with the non-aligned movement’ , p151. 655 JEANNE AKHEY

72 Hey, Theoriesof Dependent Foreign Policy . 73 JohnR Redick,`Latin America’ semergingnon-proliferation consensus’ , Arms ControlToday ,24(2)1994, p 5. 74 Eschbrach,`Dilemmas ofsovereignty’ ; andHey &Kuzma, `Anti-USforeign policy of dependent states’ . 75 St John, TheForeign Policy of Peru . 76 Hey &Kuzma, `Anti-USforeign policy of dependent states’ . 77 Ashley,`Jamaican foreignpolicy in transition’ . 78 St John, TheForeign Policy of Peru . 79 Jeanne AKHey,`Political manipulation of foreign policy in the Dura ÂnBalleÂnpresidency’, Canadian Journalof Latin American and Caribbean Studies ,21(42),1997. 80 Cochrane,`Characteristics ofcontemporary Latin American internationalrelations’ . 81 Selcher,`Current dynamics and future prospects of Brazil’ srelationswith Latin America’ . 82 Bagley& TokatliaÂn,`Colombian foreign policy in the 1980s’ ; andSelcher, `Current dynamics and future prospects’. 83 Mares, `Mexico’s foreignpolicy as amiddlepower’ , p100. 84 Cochrane,`Characteristics ofcontemporary Latin American internationalrelations’ , p456;Vanderlaan, Revolutionand Foreign Policy in Nicaragua ,pp9,15;Mun Äoz,`The dominant themes inthe study of Latin America’ sforeignrelations’ , p133;Heraldo Mun Äoz,`The dominant themes inLatin American foreign relations:an introduction’ , inMunÄoz&Tulchin, LatinAmerican Nations in WorldPolitics ,1996,pp 1±16; CastanÄecla, `LatinAmerica andthe end of theCold War’ ;LouisBalthazar, `Changesin the world system andUS relationswith the Americas’ ,inGordonMace &Jean-PhilippeThe Ârien(eds), ForeignPolicy and Regionalismin the Americas ,pp19±38, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1996; and Monica Hirst, `The foreignpolicy of Brazil: fromthe democratic transitionto its consolidation’ , inMun Äoz& Tulchin, Latin AmericanNations in World Politics ,1996,pp 197±223. 85 Braveboy-Wagner, TheCaribbean in World Affairs , p 160. 86 Eschbrach,`Dilemmas ofsovereignty’ ; andHey &Kuzma, `Anti-USforeign policy of dependent states’ . 87 Biddle& Stephens,`Dependent development and foreign policy’ . 88 Bagley& TokatliaÂn,`Colombian foreign policy in the 1980s’ , p37. 89 DavidJ Myers,`Brazil: thequest for South American leadership’, inMyers (ed), RegionalHegemons: ThreatPerception and Strategic Response ,p234Boulder, CO: Westview Press. 90 Braveboy-Wagner, TheCaribbean in World Affairs ,pp153± 156; and Heine, `Postplantationsocieties and worldorder’ . 91 James DCochrane,`Latin America inthe international arena’ , LatinAmerican Research Review , 26(3) 1991, p 25. 92 Mares, `Mexico’s foreignpolicy as amiddlepower’ ; andCastan Äeda,`Latin America andthe end of the Cold War’ . 93 Balthazar, `Changesin the world system andUS relations with the Americas’ ,pp33±35. 94 Braveboy-Wagner, TheCaribbean in World Affairs , p 160. 95 Libby,`The United States andJamaica’ . 96 Hey, Theoriesof Dependent Foreign Policy . 97 Milenry,`Problems, perspectives, and modes of analysis’ , p101. 98 Eschbrach,`Dilemmas ofsovereignty’; andBagley & TokatliaÂn,`Colombianforeign policy in the 1980s’ . 99 Hey &Kuzma, `Anti-USforeign policy of dependent states’ . 100 HolgerHenke, `Foreign policy and dependency: the case ofJamaica, 1972±1989’ , paperpresented at the AnnualMeeting of the Northeastern Political Science Association,Newark, NJ, 1973. 101 Braveboy-Wagner, TheCaribbean in World Affairs , p 222. 102 Ibid. 103 Milenky,`Problems, perspectives, and modes of analysis’ ; andNoam Chomsky, Turningthe Tide: US Interventionin Central America andthe Struggle for Peace ,Boston:South End Press, 1985. 104 See Hey,`Compliance, consensus and counterdependence’ . 105 AdrienneArmstrong, `The political consequences of economic dependence’ , Journalof Con¯ict Resolu- tion,25,1981, pp 401±428. 106 Peter Calvert, BoundaryDisputes in Latin America ,London:Institute for the Study of Con¯ict, 1983; Jack Child Geopoliticsand Con¯ ict inSouth America: Quarrelsamong Neighbors ,New York:Praeger, 1985; andHarry DTrain,`An analysis of theFalkland/ MalvinasIslands campaign’ , NavalWar College Review , 41(1),1988, pp 33± 50. 107 Milenky, Argentina’sForeignRelations ; Calvert, BoundaryDisputes in Latin America ; and Child, Geopolitiesand Con¯ ict inSouth America . 108 Ferris &Lincoln, LatinAmerican Foreign Policies ;Dominguez,`The foreign policies of Latin American states inthe 1980s’ ; andHey, `Ecuadoran foreign policy since 1979’. 109 Dominguez,`The foreign policies of Latin American states inthe 1980s’ . 110 Hey, Theoriesof Dependent Foreign Policy . 111 Gary FTreverton, Covert Interventionin Chile, 1970± 1973 ,Washington,DC: Institute for the Study of Diplomacy,1990. 656 THREE BUILDING BLOCKS OF ATHEORY OF LATIN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

112 FerreroCosta, `Peruvian foreign policy’ , p59. 113 ThomasM Landy, FromMiracle to Crisis: BrazilianForeign Debt and the Limits to Obligations , Washington,DC: Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, 1990, p 15. 114 Dominguez,`The foreign policies of Latin American states inthe 1980s’ , pp170±171. 115 Hey,`Ecuadoran foreign policy since 1979’. 116 Ashley,`Jamaican foreignpolicy in transition’ . 117 St John, TheForeign Policy of Peru ,pp214± 216. 118 Landy, FromMiracle to Crisis ,p22;and Hirst, `The foreign policy of Brazil’ ,pp206± 207. 119 FranciscoThoumi & Merilee Grindle, La PolõÂticade la Economõ ÂadelAjuste: La Actual Experiencia Ecuatoriana , Quito: FLACSO,1992;Hey, `Ecuadoran foreign policy since 1979;and Jeanne AKHey & ThomasKlak, `From protectionism to neoliberalism: tracing the transition in Ecuador 1982± 1994’ , paper presentedat theConference of theLatin American StudiesAssociation, Washington, DC, 27± 30 September 1995. 120 Eschbach,`Dilemmas offoreign policy’ , pp388, 398. 121 JorgeChabat, `Mexican foreign policy in the 1990s: learning to live with interdependence’ , inMun Äoz& Tulchin, LatinAmerican Nations in World Politics ,1996,pp 149±163. 122 Bagley& TokatliaÂn,`Colombianforeign policy in the 1980s’ , p45;Mun Äoz,`The dominant themes inLatin America’ sforeignrelations’ , p135;and Cochrane, `Latin America inthe international arena’ ,p225. 123 JohnWilliamson, `Democracy andthe ª Washingtonconsensusº ’, WorldDevelopment ,21(8),1993, pp1329± 1336; Osvaldo Hurtado, personal interview, Quito, 30 May 1994; and Hey &Klah,`From protectionismto neoliberalism’ . 124 FerreroCosta, `Peruvian foreign policy’ , p56;and Biddle & Stephens,`Dependent development and foreignpolicy’ . 125 St John, TheForeign Policy of Peru , p 210. 126 Coleman& Quiros-Varela, `Determinants ofLatin American foreignpolicies’ ; andSnarr, `Latin American foreignpolicy towards the United States from1948± 1978’ . 127 Hey, Theoriesof Dependent Foreign Policy ;andHey, `Ecuadoran foreign policy since 1979’. 128 FrancisFukuyama TheEnd of History andthe Last Man .New York:Free Press, 1992. 129 Dominguez,`The foreign policies of Latin American states inthe 1980s’ . 130 Ibid, p 164. 131 RobertH Dix, ThePolitics of Colombia ,New York:Praeger, 1987, p 194;and Ashley, `Jamaican foreign policyin transition’ . 132 MunÄ oz, LasRelaciones Exteriores delGobierno Militar Chilens . 133 Bagley& TokatliaÂn,`Colombianforeign policy in the 1980s’ , pp45± 48; Tokatlia Ân,`Thepolitical economy ofColombian± US narcodiplomacy’, p223;and St John, TheForeign Policy of Peru , p 213. 134 HaroldMolineu, USPolicy toward Latin America: FromRegionalism to Globalism ,Boulder,CO: Westview Press, 1990,p 33. 135 Walter Vanderbush& ThomasKlak, ` ªCoveringºLatin America: theexclusive discourse of The Summit ofthe Americas (as viewedthrough the NewYork Times )’ , ThirdWorld Quarterly ,17(3),1996, pp 573±56. 136 Mares, `Mexico’s foreignpolicy as amiddlepower’ , pp98±99; Eschbach, `Dilemmas offoreign policy’ , p397;and Hey &Kuzma, `Anti-USforeign policy of dependent states’ . 137 Grabendorff,`Mexico’ s foreignpolicy’ ; Pellicer, `Mexico’s position’; Ferris,`Mexico’ s foreignpolicies’ ; andCastan Äeda,`Don’ t cornerMexico!’ . 138 Hey,`Foreign policy options under dependence’ . 139 Milenky, Argentina’s ForeignPolicies ,pp9±16; Acosta, `Consideracionessobre la polõÂtica exteriorde Venezuela’ ;p11;Martz, `The fate ofa small state’ ;RolandH Ebel,Raymond Taras &James DCochrane, PoliticalCulture and Foreign Policy in Latin America: Case Studiesfrom the Circum-Caribbean , Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1991;and Bustamente, `Ecuador’. 140 Hey, Theoriesof Dependent Foreign Policy . 141 Ebel et al., PoliticalCulture and Foreign Policy in Latin America . 142 Myers,`Brazil’ ,p234.See alsoDaniel Zirker,`Brazilian foreignpolicy and subimperialism during the politicaltransition of the 1980s: a review andreapplication of Marini’ s theory’, LatinAmerican Perspectives ,21(1),1994, pp 115± 1131. 143 Calvert, BoundaryDisputes in Latin America ;Hirst,`The foreign policy of Brazil’ ;andManfred Wilhemy, `Politics,bureaucracy, and foreign policy in Chile’ , inMunÄoz&Tulchin, LatinAmerican Nations in World Politics,1996,pp 61±79. 144 Williamson,`Democracy andthe ª Washingtonconsensusº ’ ;andHurtado, personal interview. 145 Dominguez,`The foreign policies of Latin American states inthe 1980s’ . 146 William CSmith,Carlos H AcunÄa&EduardoA Gamarra (eds) LatinAmerican Political Economy in the Ageof Neoliberal Reform ,New Brunswick:Transaction Publishers, 1994; and Balthazar, `Changesin the worldsystem andUS relationswith the Americas’ .

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