Citizenship Studies, 2014 Vol. 18, No. 1, 46–62, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13621025.2012.707010

(Im)possible citizens: ’s ‘citizenship bonanza’ and its boundaries Elke Winter*

Department of Sociology and Anthropology, University of Ottawa, Ottawa, ON, Canada (Received 16 November 2011; final version received 1 April 2012)

This article discusses a recent amendment to the Canadian Citizenship Act, which retroactively restores or gives Canadian citizenship to ‘hundreds of thousands of unsuspecting foreigners, most of them Americans’ (P. Dvorak, 2009. Canada issues a wake-up call: you may be a citizen. The Wall Street Journal, 17 April. Available from: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123993183347727843.html) while also restricting the inheritance of Canadian citizenship to the first-generation born abroad. Aiming to redress past discriminations based on gender, marital status and dual citizenship while simultaneously curtailing modern citizenship’s dubious ius sanguinis provision, the new law might be interpreted as perpetuating Canada’s reputation as a world leader in interethnic relations and human rights. A contextual analysis of the new law, by contrast, shows that the opposite is the case: the boundaries that are being drawn by Canada’s new citizenship regime follow the now common trend of re-ethnicization and securitization. Specifically, they conflate kinship and Whiteness, thereby leading, on the one hand, to the construction of possible citizens whose authenticity and loyalty to the nation are unquestioned. On the other hand, within the logic of the new laws and their surrounding discourses, non-White, non-Christian ‘impossible citizens’ emerge, whose lack of loyalty and instrumental use of their are said to be eroding the value of citizenship from within. Keywords: birth; friend/enemy; making citizenship; securitization; unmaking citizenship; identity

1. Introduction

There’s a chance you’re Canadian and don’t even know it. [ ...] That’s the message of a fun new YouTube video announcement that the Canadian government has created to publicize a set of confusing tweaks to Canadian law that returns citizenship to some people who lost it and

Downloaded by [University of Ottawa] at 09:28 21 May 2015 grants it to some folks who never even had it. (Scola 2009; blog entry on 20 April, techPresident Personal Democracy Forum) The citizenship bonanza is the byproduct of a decades long struggle by a motley group of people who claim they were unfairly denied or lost their Canadian nationality. (Dvorak 2009, writing in the Wall Street Journal on 17 April) In the spring of 2008, the Canadian Parliament unanimously passed Bill C-37, a new amendment to the Canadian Citizenship Act, which took effect on 17 April 2009. The amendments retroactively restore or give Canadian citizenship to individuals who had lost or never acquired it due to stipulations of the 1947 Citizenship Act (e.g. citizenship determination based on the wedlock status of one’s parents, gender differences in being able to pass on citizenship through inheritance, distinction between foreign born and native born in cases of citizenship revocation).1 In order to alert unsuspecting individuals, the Canadian

*Email: [email protected]

q 2012 Taylor & Francis Citizenship Studies 47

government promoted the new law with the release of a peppy YouTube video entitled ‘Waking up Canadian’ (Canada 2009d). The 70-s clip features a chubby middle-aged White man who goes to bed in a black-and-white photographed environment. On the day, the new amendments come into force, he wakes up to the tune of the Canadian anthem in a room abundantly decorated with Canadian symbols: a hockey player, a beaver and a moose, a portrait of Queen Elizabeth II, national and historical flags, maple syrup and an order of poutine.2 After the protagonist receives a warm welcome by a black member of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, a woman’s voice cheerfully announces that on 17 April 2009, ‘you or someone you know may wake up Canadian [ ...] even if you live outside Canada’. Much less publicized by the Canadian government than the just visualized ‘repatriation clause’ of the new law, the new amendments also implement a post-2009 citizenship category for the second-generation born abroad. This stipulation, which has come to be known as the ‘first-generation limitation’, restricts the inheritance of Canadian citizenship to the first generation of children born abroad to Canadian citizens. It is said to ‘protect the value of Canadian citizenship for the future’ (Canada 2008) by preventing its inheritance to ‘endless generations’ born abroad. While there have always been constraints for emigrants passing on or maintaining inherited citizenship, the first-generation limitation is a fundamental departure from Canada’s tradition of a mixed ius soli- and ius sanguinis-based citizenship law in so far as it imposes a definite and irrevocable loss of citizenship for individuals who inherited citizenship from (non-naturalized) parents born abroad. As such, it ranges among the strictest citizenship inheritance limitations among western states (Baubo¨ck et al. 2006). The coexistence of these two seemingly contradictory amendments – the repatriation clause and the first-generation limitation – provokes a sense of confusion about the logic and inclusiveness of the Canadian citizenship ‘bonanza’, as the Wall Street Journal put it (Dvorak 2009). Above all, it raises the following questions: Why would Canada reinvite some expatriates and their children while – in the very same law – cutting ties with others? Who is the new model citizen? And what/who is Canadian citizenship to be protected from? In order to answer these questions, the article first situates the 2008/2009 amendments in their historical political contexts, both internationally and nationally. On the one hand, the current changes to Canadian citizenship law are strongly impacted by policy changes in Europe, characterized by the retreat of multicultural policies (Joppke 2004), the return of assimilation (Brubaker 2001) and the renationalization of citizenship (Jacobs and Rea 2007). Indeed, several years into the new century, there were clear signs that the Canadian

Downloaded by [University of Ottawa] at 09:28 21 May 2015 government – in an interesting reversal of the habitual transfer of knowledge in matters of citizenship and integration – was actively looking towards Europe for inspiration and ‘best practices’ in policy-making (Connell 2008, Macdougall 2008). On the other hand, the recent citizenship reform cannot be understood without reference to changes at the political level within Canada: the dwindling of Que´be´cois nationalism in the early 2000s, the demise of the in the wake of a huge corruption scandal3 and the rapid rise of the Conservative Party of Canada, who in 2000 shed its original name (Reform Party of Canada) and regional status, was voted into office at the federal level for the first time in 2006 and became a majority government in 2011. The anti-immigrant roots of the party and a number of more recent policy changes – e.g. a more comprehensive citizenship study guide, a more demanding citizenship test,4 mandatory language tests for skilled immigrant applicants, new requirements asking citizenship candidates to prove fluency in either of Canada’s two official languages and to remove their facial veil when pronouncing the citizenship oath – suggest that Canada is indeed ‘Europeanizing’ its citizenship regime (Marwah and Triadafilopoulos 2009). 48 E. Winter

Second, the article engages in a contextual interpretation of the 2008/2009 amendments to the Canadian Citizenship Act. Situating the new law within the public debates about the Lost and the ‘Lebanon evacuation crisis’ leads me to conclude that the boundaries that are being drawn around Canada’s citizenship regime follow the European trend of re-ethnicizing citizenship. Specifically, they conflate kinship and Whiteness, leading, on the one hand, to the construction of ‘possible citizens’ whose authenticity and loyalty to the nation seem beyond doubt. On the other hand, within this logic, non-White, non-Christian ‘impossible citizens’ emerge, whose instrumental use of their Canadian passport is said to be eroding the value of citizenship from within.

2. The context: renationalizing citizenship Independent Canadian citizenship was first introduced in 1947. It altered the status of the Canadian people from British subjects to Canadian citizens and introduced formal criteria – in addition to ius sanguinis and ius soli – of how one could become a naturalized Canadian. It also instituted formal citizenship hearings and ceremonies. If the first two decades of Canadian citizenship were characterized by strong nationalization – which Canadian political stakeholders like to downplay – they were followed by two decades of de-ethnicization (Breton 1988). It is this second phase of Canada’s citizenship regime between the mid-1960s and mid- 1980s – 20 years of progressive liberalism, combining both individual human rights and a commitment to social citizenship – to which Canada owes much of its international reputation (Winter forthcoming). Specifically, the Citizenship Act of 1977 can be seen of a corollary of a series of separate but interrelated policies between the mid-1960s and late 1980s. In 1967, the Canadian federal government implemented a supposedly ‘race blind’ point system. Legally enshrined by the 1976 Immigration Act, it replaced immigrant selection according to ‘national preference’.5 In 1969, the Official Languages Act recognized the equality of French and English as Canada’s official languages. In 1971, Prime Minister declared that ‘multiculturalism within a bilingual framework’ not only constituted an official state policy but was also the essence of (Canada 1971, p. 8580). Multiculturalism was recognized in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms in 1982; it became law through the 1988 Multiculturalism Act.6 Reducing the residence requirement for citizenship candidates from 5 to 3 years, allowing dual citizenship and entirely removing all special treatment of British nationals in the citizenship application, the 1977 Citizenship Act

Downloaded by [University of Ottawa] at 09:28 21 May 2015 modernized Canada’s citizenship regime and complemented its new pluralist approach to immigration, integration and national identity transformation. By the late 1980s and early 1990s, the country had become a role model for many societies in the world with respect to policies and practices pertaining to immigration, multiculturalism and citizenship (Kymlicka and Opalski 2001). The immigrant selection programme, specifically the point system, inspired (but was ultimately not incorporated in) Germany’s first in-migration law of 2005. Canadian multicultural policies were studied – and in part imitated – by policy-makers and scholars in Germany, the UK and the Netherlands (e.g. Runnymede Trust: Commission on the Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain 2000). Language courses and settlement programmes were copied from , the world’s seemingly ‘most multicultural city’ (Doucet 2001). Citizenship ceremonies became popular throughout Europe (including in Jacobine France; see Fassin and Mazouz 2007). Ius soli was heralded over ius sanguinis and ethnic nationhood (Brubaker 1992). In short, ‘the Canadian way’ of dealing with ethnic diversity was widely praised in the international arena (Kymlicka 2004). Citizenship Studies 49

The same economic and political trends – neo-liberalism and globalization – that propelled many other western countries to open their borders in order to attract the ‘best and the brightest’ (e.g. Hunger and Kolb 2003) also affected Canada’s approach to citizenship (albeit not directly its citizenship law). In the early 1990s, Abu-Laban and Gabriel observed the ‘selling’ of Canadian diversity and the ‘transformation of men and women of various ethnic backgrounds into trade-enhancing commodities’ (2002, p. 210). This observation resonates with Brodie’s (2002) concept of the ‘entrepreneurial citizen’, who is entrusted with making a contribution to Canada’s performance in a global market, and who often happens to be a transnationally engaged first- or second-generation immigrant. The neoliberal ‘cheapening’ of Canadian citizenship also involved the costs and the meaning of naturalization (Joshee and Derwing 2005, p. 68). In 1996, the format of the Canadian citizenship test was changed from an oral citizenship hearing to a ‘pencil and paper’ standardized multiple choice test.7 A multiple choice exam simultaneously taken by a large number of citizenship candidates presented itself as a low-cost alternative to time-consuming individual interviews with citizenship judges. Towards the end of the 1990s, many western immigrant-receiving societies experienced a move away from multiculturalism and saw the introduction of policies of ‘integration’ with assimilationist undertones. While Canada is a latecomer to this trend,8 early concerns about ‘social cohesion’ can be traced back to the same period. Critics link them to an increasing reliance on market forces and the consequences of neoliberal restructuring in the 1980s and 1990s, such as rising poverty, declining population health and a loss of confidence in public institutions (Jenson 1998). Furthermore, the emergence of the Reform Party in 1987, with its outspoken anti-immigration stance, which resonated with some sections of the electorate, was credited with seducing the federal Liberals into weakening their commitment to both multiculturalism and liberal immigration policies (Abu-Laban and Gabriel 2002, p. 69). While the party originated as a Western Canada- based socially conservative protest party, it expanded eastbound in the 1990s and had a strong presence on the national stage particularly with its vocal rejection of ‘lax’ immigration control, multiculturalism and ‘special treatment’ for Quebec. Over many years, the Reform Party’s agenda remained too extreme for the liking of central and eastern Canada. This only changed after it broadened its base first by changing into the Canadian Alliance in 2000 and then by merging with the Progressive Conservative Party of Canada in 2003. In the political climate of the new century, the Conservative Party of Canada, as the new party is called, has found more and more resonance with the Canadian Downloaded by [University of Ottawa] at 09:28 21 May 2015 electorate and forms the government since 2006. Indeed, after the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks and the subsequent American-led global ‘war on terror’, questions of security have taken on a heightened dimension in most western immigrant-receiving societies. Provisions curbing the danger that refugees allegedly pose to the Canadian nation – already included in the 2001 Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, which was not directly influenced by post-9/11 ideology (Aiken 2000, 2001, Lowry 2002) – became intensified in the subsequent years (Adelman 2002, Cre´peau 2002). Other national security measures in Canada include anti- legislation such as the Anti-terrorism Act (Daniels et al. 2001), technologically enhanced identification, such as the new permanent resident card introduced in 2002 (Browne 2005), the Smart Border declaration which commits North American border management agencies to combat ‘terrorist activity’ and ensure ‘public and economic security’ (Coˆte´-Boucher 2008) and the 2007 Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative (WHTI), which requires Americans and Canadians to use passports when crossing the border. 50 E. Winter

The impacts of the new security paradigm on migration and citizenship have been profound. They include fears surrounding dual citizenship (Stasiulis and Ross 2006, Nyers 2010), the alleged hijacking of Canadian foreign policy by diaspora groups (Satzewich 2007), the WHTI’s astonishing impact on enhancing the citizenship of Lost Canadians (Harder 2010), the similarly astonishing reluctance of the Canadian state to intervene on behalf of its ‘stranded’ citizens abroad in the cases of Omar Kader (held in Guantanamo Bay; see Macklin 2010), Suaad Hagi Mohamud and Abdihakim Mohammed (both independently held in Kenya for false charges of identity fraud) and Abousfian Abdelrazik (denied return to Canada from ; see Nyers 2011), as well as the deportation and torture of Syrian-born Canadian (Abu-Laban and Nath 2007). Identifying a shift from the dominant discourse of ‘social security’ in Canada’s late 1960s to personal security and ‘public safety’ in the new century, Brodie (2009, pp. 703– 704) argues that ‘the idea of a predator in our midst’ is becoming more prominent in the late 1990s and early 2000s (2009, p. 704). While, in the wake of 9/11, Muslims became constructed as the global enemy of western civilization (Karim 2003), there is indeed a growing fear about those outsiders within the nation (Sharma 2006, pp. 16–17, for a theoretical–historical account, see Dhamoon and Abu-Laban 2009): even in Canada, anxieties are expressed about adherence to immigrants’ basic liberal democratic values, homegrown terrorism and a ‘clash’ of cultures and/or religions undermining egalitarian gender relations (Thobani 2007, Chapter 6). Therefore, the alleged ‘civilizational superiority’ of western citizenship is said to be in need of protection. Despite these challenges, Canadian citizenship legislation itself remained astonish- ingly unchanged until very recently. The first proposals to eliminate oversights in the 1977 Act and to render citizenship legislation coherent with the Canadian constitution had been tabled by the federal Progressive Conservatives in 1987 (Canada 1987). Immediately overshadowed by a new round of constitutional debates and another wave of Que´be´cois nationalism, they were stalled until the 1990s, when several attempts introduced by the governing Liberals (since 1993) also got protracted and ultimately blocked due to opposition from ethno-cultural and civil rights organizations, as well as parliamentarians in both the House of Commons and the Senate (Garcea 2006). Apart from very few exceptions,9 no laws with respect to citizenship were passed in parliament for more than 20 years. Not so in Europe. Reacting to the same neo-liberal trends described above, Europe first opened and, according to some commentators, ‘de-ethnicized’ access to immigration and

Downloaded by [University of Ottawa] at 09:28 21 May 2015 citizenship at the turn of the twenty-first century (Joppke 2003) to subsequently draw cultural boundaries around what was supposed to be civic nations (Wright 2008). If several European countries had aimed to imitate the ‘best practices’ ‘made in Canada’ with respect to immigrant integration and citizenship, these policy measures were subsequently adapted to the reality of ‘old world’ nation-states that still tolerate immigration reluctantly and think of themselves as ethnically or at least culturally fairly homogeneous. Thus, Germany’s 2005 immigration law, for example, speaks more about ‘controlling’ migration than about facilitating the arrival of newcomers (Winter 2010). The Netherlands, notoriously, implemented integration-abroad measures and off-shore testing (Van Oers 2008). In the UK, the government suggested – but later discarded – a new category of ‘probationary citizens’, whose right to naturalization was to be ‘earned’ by learning English, paying taxes, obeying the law and contributing to the community (Kostakopoulou 2010). Many countries have introduced civic integration trajectories with (in part) mandatory courses on language and culture (Michalowski 2007). Citizenship tests were developed whose function, according to some commentators, is primarily exclusion and Citizenship Studies 51

deterrence rather than access and integration. The new laws were also adapted to what has been called the ‘new normal’ of the post-9/11 world, namely the securitization of migration and citizenship (Bhandar 2004). According to Joppke: With sufficient time for post-2001 Islamic terrorism to have worked out its devious implications for citizenship, the subtly nationalist ‘re-ethnicizing’ trend [in the late 1990s and early 2000s] has been dwarfed by an open campaign for ‘re-nationalization’, partially revoking a prior (‘de-ethnicizing’) liberalization of access to citizenship (particularly through raising the hurdles for naturalization). (Joppke 2010, p. 14) While a utilitarian emphasis on the economic need and benefits of immigration has become a staple of the discourse of many European politicians (Faist 2009), the new laws tend to use the policy options of naturalization, integration and citizenship testing to raise the hurdles for those who want to settle permanently and/or become equal members of the polity. ‘Integration’ is more and more defined as a duty of immigrants and citizenship applicants, rather than as a balance of give and take – a two-way process – between a (heterogeneous) host society and (equally heterogeneous) newcomers. This trend, I will argue in the next section, can also be observed in the recent Canadian citizenship reform. In the next section, I will first situate the 2008/2009 amendments’ repatriation clause within its respective context. Next, I will scrutinize its sister clause, the first-generation limitation, and the public debates that catalysed its implementation.

3. The reform: redefining (im)possible citizens 3.1 Waking up Canadian? The repatriation clause – as the name suggests – was primarily a reaction to the so-called Lost Canadians and their struggle to (re)gain Canadian citizenship. Lost Canadians are individuals who were born in Canada, and/or have a Canadian parent, but who lack or have lost citizenship due to provisions of the 1947 Citizenship Act that were overhauled in the 1977 Citizenship Act, but not rectified retroactively. To be more precise, there are at least four distinct legal categories of Lost Canadians: (1) people naturalized to Canada who subsequently lived outside the country for more than 10 years prior to 1967. (2) People born abroad to a Canadian parent before the current Citizenship Act came into effect on 15 February 1977 and who were either not registered or not correctly registered at birth, who did not apply for the retention of Canadian citizenship by their 24th birthday and who were born abroad in wedlock by a Canadian mother (and foreign father) or out of wedlock

Downloaded by [University of Ottawa] at 09:28 21 May 2015 by a Canadian father (and foreign mother). (3) People who lost their citizenship between 1 January 1947 and 14 February 1977 because they or their parent acquired the nationality or citizenship of another country. (4) Second- and subsequent-generation Canadians born abroad since the current Citizenship Act came into effect on 15 February 1977 and who failed to apply for the retention of Canadian citizenship by their 28th birthday (for specific provisions and exceptions, see Becklumb 2008, pp. 1–5). While the phenomenon of the Lost Canadians has existed for decades, it remerged on the Canadian political agenda in the early 2000s, specifically after the WHTI was implemented in 2007. Among other things, the WHTI stipulates that Canadians and Americans need to provide passports, rather than driving licenses or birth certificates, when crossing their shared border. When applying for a Canadian passport, a large number of individuals living on both sides of the border became aware that they were not entitled to hold Canadian citizenship. The struggle of the Lost Canadians to gain citizenship attracted a fair amount of media attention and was hotly debated in both parliament and the courts, which – in the years 52 E. Winter

before 2008 – had variously granted and refused Lost Canadians’ claims to citizenship. The case of the Lost Canadians also attracted overwhelming public sympathy, and this in the post-9/11 era where questions of immigration and citizenship are often submitted to intense scrutiny due to concerns over national security. This is even more surprising in comparison to several recent cases (mentioned above) where the Canadian state has been very reluctant to ‘repatriate’ stranded citizens abroad, all of whom were of non-White complexion and of Muslim origin. The sympathy for the plight of the Lost Canadians becomes understandable if we take into account that the repatriation clause promises to rectify past discriminations mostly based on female gender, age (in the case of minors), anachronistic marriage rules and multiple citizenships. In fact, its implementation was deemed necessary for making the Citizenship Act compatible with the Constitution and the Charter of Rights and Freedoms (signed into law in 1982). Take, for example, the wedlock issue, which before 1977, prevented Canadian mothers from handing down citizenship to their children born abroad in wedlock. While the 1977 Act changed this provision and provided some relief retroactively (a limited time offer to apply for Canadian citizenship), it did not confer citizenship automatically upon application. In Benner v. Canada (Secretary of State), 1997 1 S.C.R. 358, the Supreme Court of Canada found that the required background checks, which could result in a denial of citizenship, infringed upon an individual’s equality rights guaranteed under the Charter. Furthermore, in Augier v. Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, 2004 FC 613, the Federal Court saw it as an infringement upon the Charter’s equality rights that the 1977 retroactive stipulation did not apply to children born to Canadian fathers out of wedlock abroad. Other issues that needed to be brought in line with the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms concerned the fate of Second World War brides and minors. Many European women married to Canadian serviceman subsequently lost Canadian citizenship because as ‘other than natural-born Canadian citizens’ under the 1947 Citizenship Act, they were not entitled to live outside the country for more than 10 years. Before the dual citizenship provision of the 1977 Act, minor children ceased to be Canadian when their ‘responsible parent’ (the father in the case of wedlock; the mother in the case of birth out of wedlock) became a citizen of another country. While the 1977 Act allowed minors, who had lost their citizenship due to their parent’s action, to regain Canadian citizenship by making a declaration between their 21st and 22nd birthday, many failed to do so and therefore ceased to be Canadians.

Downloaded by [University of Ottawa] at 09:28 21 May 2015 Given the misogynist and nationalist provisions under which some Canadians lost or never obtained Canadian citizenship, as well as the often ridiculously complex legal situations and bureaucratic hurdles associated with gaining or maintaining citizenship under these circumstances, the repatriation clause appears to be a step in the right direction. On paper, it reads not only like a rebuttal of patriarchal and ethnocentric norms for citizenship acquisition, inheritance and loss, but also suggests the introduction of a principle similar to what scholars have called ‘stakeholder citizenship’ (Baubo¨ck 2009)or ius connexio (Shachar 2002), namely the notion ‘that citizens [must] have a real connection to this country’ (former Immigration Minister Diane Finley, cited in The Ottawa Citizen 2008). While we can appreciate a law that promises to correct past injustices and oversights, it would be mistaken to interpret the recent amendments to the Canadian Citizenship Act as a prolongation of the human rights revolution and progressive liberalism that motivated (at least partially) the 1971 Multiculturalism Policy, the 1977 Citizenship Act and the 1982 Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Taking a closer look at both the arguments that were used Citizenship Studies 53

in public discourse to justify the Lost Canadians’ ‘repatriation’ and the ethnocultural characteristics of the targeted population, in the remainder of this section I will argue that the repatriation clause does not symbolize a return to Canada’s phase of citizenship de- ethnicization. In the following section, the argument that double standards are at work for different types of populations will be strengthened by a contextual analysis of the first- generation limitation clause. In a fascinating article published by this journal, Lois Harder examines the discourse surrounding the quandary of three prominent Lost Canadians – Don Chapman, Joe Taylor and Johan Teichroeb, all of whom are White English-speaking men having spent much of their lives in the USA, Britain and Canada, respectively. Harder’s analysis uncovers the kinship rules that are underlying Canadian ‘civic’ nationalism. In Chapman’s and Taylor’s cases, she argues, it is not the acts or commitments of the current generation that establish the ‘real’ connection to the country, but the military service and family trees of the fathers (e.g. Chapman is a seventh generation descendant of Canadians). These representations expose ‘the organic and tribalistic heart of the Canadian polity’ (Harder 2010, p. 205). In the media, political debates and court decisions, ‘“other” immigrants as well as Canadian citizens whose ancestry does not trace back through a White European heritage are implicitly, and sometimes explicitly, juxtaposed with the “authenticity” of the Lost Canadians’ (Harder 2010, p. 204). The ‘real’ connection to the country thus conflates kinship and ethnicity and ‘advance[s] a vision of the “authentic” Canadian replete in masculinity, racialized Whiteness and the moral worthiness of the exalted subject’ (Harder 2010,p.211). Put differently, in the discourses justifying the ‘repatriation’ of the Lost Canadians, the right to citizenship is naturalized and essentialized. It is viewed as an inherited ‘birthright’, which, apparently, leads to a ‘more authentic’ form of Canadianness and belonging to the ‘Canadian national family’ than citizenship that is granted through the regular naturalization processes (Harder 2010, p. 204). This double standard is particularly troublesome since placing ‘Canadians by birth’ and ‘Canadians by choice’ on an equal legal and symbolic footing is supposed to be one of the cornerstones of Canadian citizenship since its inception. The difference between Lost Canadians and those who become Canadian through naturalization is further accentuated by the fact that the new legislation restores citizenship to Lost Canadians retroactively to birth or to the time when citizenship was first lost. This provision enables them to confer their status upon their children, even in cases where the latter are the second-generation born abroad.10 To put it with one American TV journalist

Downloaded by [University of Ottawa] at 09:28 21 May 2015 commenting on the ‘Waking up Canadian’ YouTube video: ‘Baked bacon, maple syrup, and hockey, it can all be yours, for you and your children’ (Bloomberg News 2011). Once more, the ‘real connection’ to Canada seems to be transmitted by descent. By contrast, passing down citizenship to one’s children born abroad would not be possible if the Lost Canadians were to simply make use of the immigration and naturalization process to regain their citizenship (as citizenship would not be conferred retroactively, and adult children would have to initiate their own immigration process). Furthermore, under the new legislation residence in or immediate relocation of the Lost Canadians to Canada is neither a condition nor a required outcome. Thus, the ‘repatriation clause’ should better be titled ‘re-gaining citizenship clause’. Harder’s observation that the discourse surrounding the Lost Canadians conflates kinship with Whiteness gains particular salience since her three examined ‘cases’ are anything but demographic exceptions. This is because the phenomenon of Lost Canadians was created due to stipulations in the 1947 Citizenship Act and remedied (but not retroactively) by the 1977 Citizenship Act. As such, it dates back to the era when both the 54 E. Winter

Canadian-born population and the immigrants – whether war brides or those selected on grounds of ‘national preference’ – were predominantly White Protestants of European if not British ethnic background. Thus, if not intentional than at least in practice, the repatriation clause targets a population with very specific socio-demographic, ethno- national, linguistic and religious characteristics. This is not pure coincidence. Security records show that 240,000 Canadians were naturalized in the USA between 1947 and 1977 and therefore lost their Canadian citizenship (Dvorak 2009). An important source of potential applicants under the new legislation was therefore known beforehand: It is unknown how many individuals will obtain citizenship as a result of these amendments. However, given that the largest group of persons who lost their citizenship did so because they [were ‘border babies’ or] naturalized in the United States between 1947 and 1977, it is assumed that the majority of persons who will be restored or given citizenship under Bill C-37 currently live in the United States. (Canada 2009c) Knowing that many of the new citizens would be ‘our cousins from down south’ is likely to have eased the debates about their ‘repatriation’. Indeed, fears related to security, sociocultural integration, continuous presence in the country, dual citizenship or adaptation to ‘Canadian values’ were strangely absent from the debate. An easy and automatic belonging is also suggested by the ‘Waking up Canadian’ video, which, as Bell (2011) argues, is bereft of any representations relating to Canadian diversity, immigration, multiculturalism, Aboriginal peoples or bilingualism.11 To summarize with the Wall Street Journal, by resorting to YouTube, the Canadian government alerted ‘hundreds of thousands of unsuspecting foreigners, most of them Americans’ to a genuine ‘citizenship bonanza’ (Dvorak 2009).

3.2 Citizenship in need of protection? According to the columnist Allan Thompson (2009), the second part of the 2008/2009 amendments to the Canadian Citizenship Act, the so-called first-generation limitation, is bound to ‘create a new class of ‘Lost Canadians’.12 Unlike in the case of the repatriation clause, there are no government-sponsored video advertisements about this stipulation. However, the Citizenship and Immigration Canada website explains: Under the old rules, it was possible for Canadians to pass on their citizenship to endless generations born outside Canada. To protect the value of Canadian citizenship for the future, the new law limits – with a few exceptions – citizenship by descent to one generation born outside Canada. (Canada 2009a, emphasis added) Downloaded by [University of Ottawa] at 09:28 21 May 2015 Specifically, only Canadians who were either born in Canada or have immigrated to Canada (and were subsequently granted citizenship through naturalization) are allowed to pass on their Canadian citizenship to their offspring if the latter is born abroad. Canadians who have inherited Canadian citizenship when born abroad are not entitled to passing on their citizenship.13 A number of factors align the first-generation limitation clause with Canada’s reputation as a world leader in interethnic relations and individual human rights, but some of these factors have to be weighted carefully. First, and most importantly, ‘citizens by choice’ (through naturalization) are considered equal to citizens by birth on Canadian soil. This is undoubtedly a step in the right direction. Second, the amendments make an effort to prioritize some kind of ‘connection’ with the country over citizenship inheritance. This is similar to the ‘stakeholder’ and ius connexio principles discussed earlier. Nevertheless, as argued above, in the case of the Lost Canadians, this ‘real connection to the country’ has tribal and ethnic underpinnings. Furthermore, the passing on of citizenship ‘to endless Citizenship Studies 55

generations born outside Canada’ (Canada 2009a) has never been without difficulty: under the previous provisions, all those who derived Canadian citizenship as the second or subsequent generation born abroad (with naturalized parents being considered equal to being born on Canadian soil) needed to apply – on the basis of residency in Canada or an otherwise demonstrated ‘substantial connection’ with Canada – for the retention of their Canadian citizenship before their 28th birthday. The new amendments make a clear but radical decision (a definite second-generation cut-off at birth abroad) at the cost of discretion. Third, the first-generation limitation reduces the extent of Canadian citizenship’s ius sanguinis provision. The connection between entitlement to membership in the modern state and circumstances of birth whether birth to certain parents (ius sanguinis) or birth in a certain territory (ius soli) has recently come under attack for being anachronistic, irrational and very little merit-based: We reject heredity as a determining factor in almost any other admission criteria (such as those concerning competitive job offers or selective university programs). However, family ties and birthright entitlements still dominate our imagination and our laws when it comes to articulating principles for allotting membership in a state. (Shachar 2002,p.5) Citizenship based on ius sanguinis is particularly doubtful in the context of immigration where it creates permanent boundaries between insiders and outsiders even in the second and subsequent generations. On the one hand, we may therefore appreciate the first-generation limitation clause as an attempt to both de-ethnicize Canadian citizenship and strengthen individual human rights. On the other hand, it can be argued that the current law does not go far enough. The first-generation limitation clause only curbs the ius sanguinis provision while leaving ius soli intact. It thus continues to subscribe to a principle which leaves the decision over children’s life chances to the accident of birth (Shachar 2002, p. 4). In fact, the law is less interested in promoting global social justice for non-members than in ‘protect[ing] the value of Canadian citizenship’ (Canada 2009a) for those inside. The notion that the value of Canadian citizenship needs to be ‘protected’ and/or ‘strengthened’ has become a recurrent theme in the government’s discourse on citizenship legislation and policy (Canada 2009b, 2010). This begs the question: who or what does Canadian citizenship need protection from? Once again, context matters. Contrary to the repatriation clause, which had been in the making for roughly 20 years, the introduction of the first-generation limitation came as a surprise. It is widely viewed as a swift ‘political move in response to the outcry during the 2006 Lebanon crisis’ (Chianello 2009). Indeed, soon after the Israel–Lebanon war had begun, the Israeli Downloaded by [University of Ottawa] at 09:28 21 May 2015 military blockaded the country and made escape by either land, sea or air virtually impossible. Attempting to protect their citizens trapped in a foreign country, many states – among them Canada – spent large amounts of resources on evacuating their stranded citizens. Roughly, 15,000 Canadian evacuees were brought to Canada on ships, chartered commercial flights and Canadian Forces aircrafts at a total cost estimated to be between CAD 75 and 76 million (Canada 2007). After the evacuation, it was alleged that many of the Canadian evacuees were dual citizen of Canada and Lebanon and that many had never lived in or even visited Canada. This raised concern among politicians and within the Canadian public about the level of obligation the Canadian government has to its (dual) nationals living abroad. In stark contrast to the debate surrounding the Lost Canadians – most of whom were living abroad and were to become dual citizens – ‘there was a widespread assumption that [these ] dual citizens had a thin allegiance to Canada, and yet they imposed a heavy burden on the Canadian government and taxpayer when they made rights claims about protection’ 56 E. Winter

(Nyers 2010, p. 54). Thus, to answer the question raised above, Canada is seen as being in need of protection from free riders and those who allegedly abuse Canadian citizenship without having a ‘real connection to the country’. Indeed, in the case of the Lebanon evacuation ‘crisis’, the debate was dominated by the representation that naturalized Canadians (and their children) living abroad were merely ‘citizens of convenience’ who solely obtain and maintain their Canadian citizenship for instrumental reasons in order to ensure access to social benefits, economic opportunities and a safe place in times of war or economic recession (Worthington 2006). These emigrant immigrants, so the accusation goes, do not have any meaningful ties to Canada and use this country merely as a ‘hotel’ into which they can check in and out at their leisure (Kent 2008). Comparing the Lebanon evacuation debate with the Lost Canadians debate – which took place at roughly the same time – reveals a number of double standards with respect to the populations and issues at stake. First, issues of residency and return migration were treated differently in both debates. While it was positively noted that some of the Lost Canadians had lived in Canada (Canadian Broadcasting Corporation 2007), the question of whether their often American-born and grown-up children deserved to inherit the Canadian citizenship of their parents was not raised. By contrast, in the case of the Canadians living in Lebanon, the number of years that the first generation has spent in Canada was rarely honoured. Rather, it was underlined that they left Canada to ‘go back’ to their ‘motherland’ from where there might be importing ‘old world’ conflicts into Canada (Granatstein 2007). Neither concern was raised in the debate about the Lost Canadians residing in the USA. Second, questions about the state’s financial obligations to its citizens abroad and the emigrant citizens’ duty to pay taxes in Canada did not emerge in the debate around the Lost Canadians. On the one hand, this is understandable as their ‘repatriation’ did not require government spending and chances are low that huge amounts of Canadians living in the USA will have to be evacuated at considerable costs. On the contrary, famous or affluent dual American-Canadian citizens are actually seen as a resource for Canada. On the other hand, it is surprising that the costs of evacuating Canadians from Lebanon were rarely counteracted by calculations about the financial and political benefits of Canadians’ transnational business activity abroad (for an exception, see Devoretz and Woo 2006). Third, as mentioned above, dual citizenship, which scored high on the agenda in the Lebanon evacuation debate, was never a concern with respect to the Lost Canadians, who all were to become dual citizens. (None of them was stateless.) In their case, strategic

Downloaded by [University of Ottawa] at 09:28 21 May 2015 reasons for taking up Canadian citizenship were downplayed and patriotic feelings were highlighted (Canadian Broadcasting Corporation 2007). This discrepancy shows that dual citizenship seems to be tolerated in some cases but not in others. In public discourse, the Lost Canadians from the USA were depicted as perfectly deserving ‘authentic’ Canadians. Their struggle was sometimes tragic but none of them was in a life-threatening situation. By contrast, the Canadians of Lebanese background evacuated from a warzone were not considered Canadian enough. Consequently, in public discourse, they were seen as lacking a legitimate reason for being rescued even if their life was in danger. Legitimacy is here derived neither from an objective situation of need nor from an ethics of care (that Canadians like to pride themselves of). Thus, where does it come from? While kinship was a central theme in the debate about the Lost Canadians, it was not brought up in relation to the Canadians rescued from Lebanon. Questions of race, culture and religion were avoided in both cases. Implicitly, however, they are tainting any current discussion about dual citizenship, residence requirements and citizens’ ‘real connection to the country’. It does not appear to be pure coincidence that the two seemingly contradictory Citizenship Studies 57

stipulations of the recent amendments to the Canadian Citizenship Act were introduced with very different populations in mind: Lost Canadians from the USA on the one hand and, on the other hand, ‘citizens of convenience’ from Lebanon and, by extension, from other Arab/Muslim/non-Western immigrant-sending countries. Today, almost 60% of Canada’s immigrants come from countries in Asia and the Middle East (and only 16% are from Europe, Statistics Canada 2009). Many of them are dual citizens, live transnational lives, travel to their country of origin frequently and/or live there temporarily or permanently.14 In sum, it is predominantly non-White Canadians and those of Arab descent and/or Muslim faith who were – and still are – at the centre of the second debate. It is precisely these Canadians’ authenticity that is cast in doubt – so much in doubt that the Canadian government feels compelled to legislate ‘a real connection to the country’ which, in the case of the Lost Canadians and their children, is taken for granted. Put provocatively, if you happen to be an individual of White Protestant background, born to a Second World War hero who can trace his/her Canadian ancestry back several generations, you are entitled to making a living abroad and still claim your birthright entitlement to Canadian citizenship. By contrast, if you happen to be a first-, second-or third-generation Muslim immigrant from Lebanon, to be a deserving citizen, you must ‘make up’ for your ‘flaws’ by living, paying taxes and giving birth to your children on Canadian soil.

4. Conclusion Officially, the 2008/2009 amendments to the Canadian Citizenship Act were meant to bring this Act in line with the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which is celebrating its 30th birthday in 2012. They set out to redress past discriminations based on gender, marital status and dual citizenship while simultaneously curtailing citizenship’s ius sanguinis provision, and thereby limiting privileges where they may no longer be warranted. In practice, however, the message sent by these amendments is far removed from the spirit of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which – in respect to the principles of ethnic and racial non-discrimination – is still viewed as one of the most liberal and progressive legal documents of its kind (Behiels 2009). This article first situated the 2008/2009 amendments to Canadian Citizenship Act in their historical national and international context. It then proposed a contextual analysis of the two main sister clauses of the amendments, the repatriation clause and the first- generation limitation clause. Interpreting the amendments from within their surrounding

Downloaded by [University of Ottawa] at 09:28 21 May 2015 public discourses, this article concludes that the reform of Canada’s new citizenship regime follows the now common trend of re-ethnicization and securitization of citizenship. Specifically, the amendments redraw the boundaries between possible and impossible citizens. The repatriation clause establishes a category of White and unmarked ‘possible’ citizens that Eva Mackey called ‘Canadian-Canadians’ (Mackey 1999, p. 168). This category, of which the Lost Canadians are part of, is situated at the centre of the nation. Its loyalty and commitment are without doubt. It is invited to partake in Canada’s ‘citizenship bonanza’. Compared to this category, all others are at varying degrees deviant and/or suspicious. They become ‘impossible’ (at varying degrees) and have to redeem themselves by proving their loyalty to the country. Admittedly, in the Canadian case, entitlement to citizenship is not purely a question of ethnicity. Rather, it must be acquired through the ‘proper’ combination of ancestry/kinship (number of generations a person can trace back their Canadian ancestry) race/ethnicity and religion (ideally White, Christian, European heritage), migration status (naturalized citizens or citizenship acquired at birth on Canadian soil) and place of residence (within 58 E. Winter

Canada or abroad). Impossible citizens can thus become possible. Also, in principle, everyone is equal before the law. This explains why, according to the first-generation limitation clause, in the future, both Canadians of Lebanese background and formerly Lost Canadians will have to give birth on Canadian soil if they want to safeguard Canadian citizenship for their grandchildren. In practice, however, not all Canadian citizens will be affected in the same way by these stipulations because not everyone is likely to give birth abroad. Future research will have to provide concrete data. For now, I would argue that, overall, recent immigrants to Canada – most of them racialized and from non-western countries – are more likely to be internationally mobile, live transnational lives and have children abroad than their more settled ‘old stock’ Canadian-Canadian counterparts.

Acknowledgements The author gladly acknowledges funding for this project from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC). She is particularly grateful for the very insightful and generous comments by the journal’s three anonymous reviewers; their suggestions have undoubtedly improved this article. All remaining errors and shortcomings are the authors’.

Notes 1. These stipulations had been rectified in the 1977 Citizenship Act, but not in a retroactive way. This led to the phenomenon of the Lost Canadians, which will be further explored below. 2. A poutine is a Que´be´cois dish: fries/chips with gravy and cheese. 3. Aiming to counter minority nationalism and raise the ‘visibility’ of the federal government in the province of Quebec, the federal Liberals had become entangled in a ‘sponsorship scandal’ with dubious expenditures. They were reduced to a minority government in 2004, removed from power in 2006 and, in 2011, lost Official Opposition status to the . 4. When the test was first implemented in March 2010, the federal government anticipated a passing rate of 75% (down from 94%). However, when the failing rate amounted to over 30% of the candidates in the first 6 months, the test questions were adjusted a year later, resulting in reducing the failure rate to 20%. 5. For a critical view on how racism and exclusion continued even through the point system, see Simmons (1998). 6. Less well known internationally, but equally important for Canadians was the 1995 enactment of the Employment Equity Act that requires employers to increase the representation of four designated groups: women, individuals with disabilities, Aboriginal peoples and ‘visible minorities’. Since the 1960s and early 1970s were also the apex of liberal progressivism and the development of the Canadian welfare state, Brodie reminds us that the citizen at the time was ‘very much a product of the welfare state’ (2002, pp. 59–60). Downloaded by [University of Ottawa] at 09:28 21 May 2015 7. Before 1996, citizenship applicants met initially with a citizenship officer and were then scheduled for a hearing or a personal interview with a . 8. Elsewhere I have argued that this time lag was, in part, caused by the apparent de-coupling of communitarian claims (as ascribed to ‘old-style’ Que´be´cois nationalism) from dominant interpretations of multiculturalism (Winter 2011). 9. For example, in order to reduce the risk of creating stateless persons, in 2005, the 1977 Citizenship Act was amended to relieve people who lost their citizenship as minors between 1947 and February 1977 because they or their parents became citizens of another country; these people no longer had to become permanent residents of Canada in order to resume Canadian citizenship. See Section 11 (1.1) of the Canadian Citizenship Act (Canada 1977). 10. As long as the children were born before 17 April 2009. 11. The black Mountie speaks English without an accent and is clad in a uniform that identifies him as Canadian; hockey is privileged over Canada’s national sport, which is Lacrosse; the represen- tation of Canada’s two official languages amounts to nothing more than a bilingual calendar. 12. The amendments do address the loss of citizenship that stems from pre-1947 laws and policies. They do not redress the status of individuals who have lost Canadian citizenship under the provisions of the 1977 Citizenship Act because they failed to retain it by the age of 28 years. Citizenship Studies 59

However, for Canadians of the second- or subsequent-generation born abroad who have not yet lost their citizenship (i.e. they are younger than 28 years on 17 April 2009), the new amendments eliminate the requirement to apply for citizenship retention. 13. Exceptions are made for children of parents working abroad with the Canadian Armed Forces, as federal public servants or in the service of a province. 14. There are no official statistics on the number of Canadians living abroad, the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada (2006, p. 1) estimates that their number is about 2.7 million or 9% of the total domestic population. Furthermore, it is estimated that approximately one-third of immigrants to Canada return to their countries of origin after becoming Canadian citizens (Bramham 2009).

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