Mathematical Reasoning: Writing and Proof
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
Load more
Recommended publications
-
UNDERSTANDING MATHEMATICS to UNDERSTAND PLATO -THEAETEUS (147D-148B Salomon Ofman
UNDERSTANDING MATHEMATICS TO UNDERSTAND PLATO -THEAETEUS (147d-148b Salomon Ofman To cite this version: Salomon Ofman. UNDERSTANDING MATHEMATICS TO UNDERSTAND PLATO -THEAETEUS (147d-148b. Lato Sensu, revue de la Société de philosophie des sciences, Société de philosophie des sciences, 2014, 1 (1). hal-01305361 HAL Id: hal-01305361 https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01305361 Submitted on 20 Apr 2016 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents entific research documents, whether they are pub- scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, lished or not. The documents may come from émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de teaching and research institutions in France or recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires abroad, or from public or private research centers. publics ou privés. UNDERSTANDING MATHEMATICS TO UNDERSTAND PLATO - THEAETEUS (147d-148b) COMPRENDRE LES MATHÉMATIQUES POUR COMPRENDRE PLATON - THÉÉTÈTE (147d-148b) Salomon OFMAN Institut mathématique de Jussieu-PRG Histoire des Sciences mathématiques 4 Place Jussieu 75005 Paris [email protected] Abstract. This paper is an updated translation of an article published in French in the Journal Lato Sensu (I, 2014, p. 70-80). We study here the so- called ‘Mathematical part’ of Plato’s Theaetetus. Its subject concerns the incommensurability of certain magnitudes, in modern terms the question of the rationality or irrationality of the square roots of integers. As the most ancient text on the subject, and on Greek mathematics and mathematicians as well, its historical importance is enormous. -
Mapping the Meaning of Knowledge in Design Research Kristina Niedderer University of Hertfordshire
V.2:2 April 2007 www.designresearchsociety.org Design Research Society ISSN 1752-8445 Mapping the Meaning of Knowledge in Design Research Kristina Niedderer University of Hertfordshire Knowledge plays a vital role in our life This question has arisen for design in Table of Contents: in that it reflects how we understand the UK, as well as more generally for the world around us and thus deter- creative and practice-led disciplines Articles: 1 Mapping the Meaning of Knowledge mines how we act upon it. In this sense, (CPDs), because research regulations in Design Research knowledge is of particular importance and requirements in the UK remain Kristina Niedderer for designers because they act to shape silent about what knowledge and our world. Conventionally, knowledge understanding mean in the context of 3 Call for Papers: Design Research creation has been assumed by (design) their specifications while implicitly pri- Quarterly research. However developments of oritising propositional knowledge over Case Studies in Research: Knowledge using practice within research have knowledge that cannot be expressed in and Inquiry pointed to knowledge creation within that form (Niedderer 2007). and through practice. This has raised This has led to a number of prob- Listings: the question of the meaning, role and lems concerning the role and format 14 Current Research in Design: format of knowledge in both research of knowledge in research and practice ToCs from Leading Design Journals and practice, and about the compatibil- in the UK. For example, because of the ity between knowledge of research and language-based mode of proposition- 21 Upcoming Events Worldwide practice. -
Marko Malink (NYU)
Demonstration by reductio ad impossibile in Posterior Analytics 1.26 Marko Malink (New York University) Contents 1. Aristotle’s thesis in Posterior Analytics 1. 26 ................................................................................. 1 2. Direct negative demonstration vs. demonstration by reductio ................................................. 14 3. Aristotle’s argument from priority in nature .............................................................................. 25 4. Priority in nature for a-propositions ............................................................................................ 38 5. Priority in nature for e-, i-, and o-propositions .......................................................................... 55 6. Accounting for Aristotle’s thesis in Posterior Analytics 1. 26 ................................................... 65 7. Parts and wholes ............................................................................................................................. 77 References ............................................................................................................................................ 89 1. Aristotle’s thesis in Posterior Analytics 1. 26 At the beginning of the Analytics, Aristotle states that the subject of the treatise is demonstration (ἀπόδειξις). A demonstration, for Aristotle, is a kind of deductive argument. It is a deduction through which, when we possess it, we have scientific knowledge (ἐπιστήμη). While the Prior Analytics deals with deduction in -
Phenomenal Concepts and the Problem of Acquaintance
Paul Livingston Phenomenal Concepts and the Problem of Acquaintance Abstract: Some contemporary discussion about the explanation of consciousness substantially recapitulates a decisive debate about ref- erence, knowledge, and justification from an earlier stage of the ana- lytic tradition. In particular, I argue that proponents of a recently popular strategy for accounting for an explanatory gap between phys- ical and phenomenal facts — the so-called ‘phenomenal concept strategy’ — face a problem that was originally fiercely debated by Schlick, Carnap, and Neurath. The question that is common to both the older and the contemporary discussion is that of how the presence or presentation of phenomenal experiences can play a role in justify- ing beliefs or judgments about them. This problem is, moreover, the same as what was classically discussed as the problem of acquain- tance. Interestingly, both physicalist and non-physicalist proponents of the phenomenal concept strategy today face this problem. I con- sider briefly some recent attempts to solve it and conclude that, although it is prima facie very plausible that acquaintance exists, we have, as yet, no good account of it. My aim in this paper is to demonstrate that proponents of a recently popular physicalist strategy for explaining consciousness — what has been called the phenomenal concept strategy — share with certain anti-physicalist phenomenal realists a common problem, which was also a problem for Schlick, Carnap, and Neurath in the days of the Vienna Circle. Though it has implications for ontology and metaphys- ics, this problem is essentially one about justification: how can judg- ments, claims, or beliefs about phenomenal experience be justified, at Correspondence: Email: [email protected] Journal of Consciousness Studies, 20, No. -
Ground and Explanation in Mathematics
volume 19, no. 33 ncreased attention has recently been paid to the fact that in math- august 2019 ematical practice, certain mathematical proofs but not others are I recognized as explaining why the theorems they prove obtain (Mancosu 2008; Lange 2010, 2015a, 2016; Pincock 2015). Such “math- ematical explanation” is presumably not a variety of causal explana- tion. In addition, the role of metaphysical grounding as underwriting a variety of explanations has also recently received increased attention Ground and Explanation (Correia and Schnieder 2012; Fine 2001, 2012; Rosen 2010; Schaffer 2016). Accordingly, it is natural to wonder whether mathematical ex- planation is a variety of grounding explanation. This paper will offer several arguments that it is not. in Mathematics One obstacle facing these arguments is that there is currently no widely accepted account of either mathematical explanation or grounding. In the case of mathematical explanation, I will try to avoid this obstacle by appealing to examples of proofs that mathematicians themselves have characterized as explanatory (or as non-explanatory). I will offer many examples to avoid making my argument too dependent on any single one of them. I will also try to motivate these characterizations of various proofs as (non-) explanatory by proposing an account of what makes a proof explanatory. In the case of grounding, I will try to stick with features of grounding that are relatively uncontroversial among grounding theorists. But I will also Marc Lange look briefly at how some of my arguments would fare under alternative views of grounding. I hope at least to reveal something about what University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill grounding would have to look like in order for a theorem’s grounds to mathematically explain why that theorem obtains. -
Measure Theory and Probability
Measure theory and probability Alexander Grigoryan University of Bielefeld Lecture Notes, October 2007 - February 2008 Contents 1 Construction of measures 3 1.1Introductionandexamples........................... 3 1.2 σ-additive measures ............................... 5 1.3 An example of using probability theory . .................. 7 1.4Extensionofmeasurefromsemi-ringtoaring................ 8 1.5 Extension of measure to a σ-algebra...................... 11 1.5.1 σ-rings and σ-algebras......................... 11 1.5.2 Outermeasure............................. 13 1.5.3 Symmetric difference.......................... 14 1.5.4 Measurable sets . ............................ 16 1.6 σ-finitemeasures................................ 20 1.7Nullsets..................................... 23 1.8 Lebesgue measure in Rn ............................ 25 1.8.1 Productmeasure............................ 25 1.8.2 Construction of measure in Rn. .................... 26 1.9 Probability spaces ................................ 28 1.10 Independence . ................................. 29 2 Integration 38 2.1 Measurable functions.............................. 38 2.2Sequencesofmeasurablefunctions....................... 42 2.3 The Lebesgue integral for finitemeasures................... 47 2.3.1 Simplefunctions............................ 47 2.3.2 Positivemeasurablefunctions..................... 49 2.3.3 Integrablefunctions........................... 52 2.4Integrationoversubsets............................ 56 2.5 The Lebesgue integral for σ-finitemeasure................. -
Types of Science Fair Projects: the Good and the Bad Demonstrations, Experiments, Engineering Projects, and Computer Science Projects Science Fair Projects
Types of Science Fair Projects: The Good and the Bad Demonstrations, experiments, engineering projects, and computer science projects Science Fair Projects Experiments Math projects Engineering Computer Science Demonstrations What is a demonstration? • Demonstration projects are not permitted. • A demonstration shows how something works. • An experiment involves an independent and dependent variable. Demo → Experiment • The difference between a demonstration and an experiment is the manipulation of variables. • To change a demonstration to an experiment, modify the project to include an independent and a dependent variable. • Examples: Volcano, Motor Science Fair Projects Experiments Math projects Engineering Computer Science The Process is the Key • Science, engineering, and mathematics each have their own process for coming to new knowledge. • No matter what kind of project you are doing you must follow the process appropriate to your discipline. Image from http://sciencebuddies.org/science-fair-projects/project_scientific_method.shtml Computer Programming Math Projects Engineering Scientific Mathematical Process Method Reasoning/Proof Define a need State your question Define what is known Do background research Do background research Research & define all terminology Establish design criteria Formulate your hypothesis, Make a conjecture/assumption identify variables based on what you know Prepare preliminary designs Design experiment, establish Perform calculations procedure Build & test prototype Test your hypothesis by doing Look for counter examples an experiment Test & redesign as necessary Analyze your results and draw Recalculate and write up steps conclusions to the conclusion Present results Present results Present Results Scientific Method & Engineering Process Comparison used with permission from Science Buddies. Computer Science Projects • Computer science projects are a special type of engineering projects and therefore follow the engineering design process. -
Space-Based Space Surveillance Operational and Demonstration Missions
SPACE-BASED SPACE SURVEILLANCE OPERATIONAL AND DEMONSTRATION MISSIONS Diego Escorial Olmos(1), Fernando E. Alemán Roda(2), Kevin Middleton(3), Joris.Naudet(4) (1)GMV, Isaac Newton 11, Tres Cantos 28760, Madrid, Spain, Email: [email protected] (2)GMV, Isaac Newton 11, Tres Cantos 28760, Madrid, Spain, Email: [email protected] (3) RAL Space, STFC Rutherford Appleton Laboratory, Harwell, Oxford Didcot, Oxon, OX11 0QX, United Kingdom, Email: [email protected] (4)QinetiQ Space, Hogenakkerhoekstraat 9, 9150 Kruibeke, Belgium, Email: [email protected] ABSTRACT objects. In order to include a detected object in the catalogue, the accuracy envelope shall be better than GMV is currently leading, under ESA contract, an 2.5km. These requirements shall be achieved by the assessment study to define a demonstration mission for SBSS operational system in conjunction with the space-based space surveillance. The project team ground based segment of the SST (Space Surveillance includes QinetiQ Space as responsible for the platform and Tracking) system that would be also available in the and RAL Space for the payload activities. future. During the first phase of the study a high-level In terms of reactiveness, the system shall be able to definition of a future operational mission has been fulfil a tracking request for any GEO “catalogued” or carried out including the definition of user requirements “pre-catalogued” object before 48 hours after the for a future Space Based Space Surveillance (SBSS) request is issued. This requires that the space segment service. shall be able to be re-planned or re-programmed in less During the second phase of the study a precursor than 24 hours to accommodate the active tracking mission to demonstrate the SBSS operational needs has request. -
The Development of Mathematical Logic from Russell to Tarski: 1900–1935
The Development of Mathematical Logic from Russell to Tarski: 1900–1935 Paolo Mancosu Richard Zach Calixto Badesa The Development of Mathematical Logic from Russell to Tarski: 1900–1935 Paolo Mancosu (University of California, Berkeley) Richard Zach (University of Calgary) Calixto Badesa (Universitat de Barcelona) Final Draft—May 2004 To appear in: Leila Haaparanta, ed., The Development of Modern Logic. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004 Contents Contents i Introduction 1 1 Itinerary I: Metatheoretical Properties of Axiomatic Systems 3 1.1 Introduction . 3 1.2 Peano’s school on the logical structure of theories . 4 1.3 Hilbert on axiomatization . 8 1.4 Completeness and categoricity in the work of Veblen and Huntington . 10 1.5 Truth in a structure . 12 2 Itinerary II: Bertrand Russell’s Mathematical Logic 15 2.1 From the Paris congress to the Principles of Mathematics 1900–1903 . 15 2.2 Russell and Poincar´e on predicativity . 19 2.3 On Denoting . 21 2.4 Russell’s ramified type theory . 22 2.5 The logic of Principia ......................... 25 2.6 Further developments . 26 3 Itinerary III: Zermelo’s Axiomatization of Set Theory and Re- lated Foundational Issues 29 3.1 The debate on the axiom of choice . 29 3.2 Zermelo’s axiomatization of set theory . 32 3.3 The discussion on the notion of “definit” . 35 3.4 Metatheoretical studies of Zermelo’s axiomatization . 38 4 Itinerary IV: The Theory of Relatives and Lowenheim’s¨ Theorem 41 4.1 Theory of relatives and model theory . 41 4.2 The logic of relatives . -
ARISTOTLE's FOUNDATIONALISM Breno Andrade Zuppolini Aristotle
ARISTOTLE’S FOUNDATIONALISM Breno Andrade Zuppolini UNICAMP Resumo: Para Aristóteles, conhecimento demonstrativo é o resultado do que ele denomina 'aprendizado intelectual', processo em que o conhecimento da conclusão depende de um conhecimento prévio das premissas. Dado que demonstrações são, em última instância, baseadas em princípios indemonstráveis (cujo conhecimento é denominado 'νοῦς'), Aristóteles é frequentemente retratado como promovendo uma doutrina fundacionista. Sem contestar a nomenclatura, tentarei mostrar que o 'fundacionismo' de Aristóteles não deve ser entendido como uma teoria racionalista da justificação epistêmica, como se os primeiros princípios da ciência pudessem ser conhecidos enquanto tais independentemente de suas conexões explanatórias com proposições demonstráveis. Argumentarei que conhecer os primeiros princípios enquanto tais envolve conhecê-los como explicações de outras proposições científicas. Explicarei, então, de que modo conhecimento noético e conhecimento demonstrativo são, em certo sentido, estados cognitivos interdependentes – ainda que o conceito de νοῦς se mantenha distinto de (e, nas palavras de Aristóteles, mais 'preciso' do que) conhecimento demonstrativo. Palavras-chave: Aristóteles; fundacionismo; ciência; demonstração. Abstract: For Aristotle, demonstrative knowledge is the result of what he calls ‘intellectual learning’, a process in which the knowledge of a conclusion depends on previous knowledge of the premises. Since demonstrations are ultimately based on indemonstrable principles (the knowledge of which is called ‘νοῦς’), Aristotle is often described as advancing a foundationalist doctrine. Without disputing the nomenclature, I shall attempt to show that Aristotle’s ‘foundationalism’ should not be taken as a rationalist theory of epistemic justification, as if the first principles of science could be known as such independently of their explanatory connections to demonstrable propositions. -
Plato on the Foundations of Modern Theorem Provers
The Mathematics Enthusiast Volume 13 Number 3 Number 3 Article 8 8-2016 Plato on the foundations of Modern Theorem Provers Ines Hipolito Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umt.edu/tme Part of the Mathematics Commons Let us know how access to this document benefits ou.y Recommended Citation Hipolito, Ines (2016) "Plato on the foundations of Modern Theorem Provers," The Mathematics Enthusiast: Vol. 13 : No. 3 , Article 8. Available at: https://scholarworks.umt.edu/tme/vol13/iss3/8 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks at University of Montana. It has been accepted for inclusion in The Mathematics Enthusiast by an authorized editor of ScholarWorks at University of Montana. For more information, please contact [email protected]. TME, vol. 13, no.3, p.303 Plato on the foundations of Modern Theorem Provers Inês Hipolito1 Nova University of Lisbon Abstract: Is it possible to achieve such a proof that is independent of both acts and dispositions of the human mind? Plato is one of the great contributors to the foundations of mathematics. He discussed, 2400 years ago, the importance of clear and precise definitions as fundamental entities in mathematics, independent of the human mind. In the seventh book of his masterpiece, The Republic, Plato states “arithmetic has a very great and elevating effect, compelling the soul to reason about abstract number, and rebelling against the introduction of visible or tangible objects into the argument” (525c). In the light of this thought, I will discuss the status of mathematical entities in the twentieth first century, an era when it is already possible to demonstrate theorems and construct formal axiomatic derivations of remarkable complexity with artificial intelligent agents the modern theorem provers. -
The Effectiveness of Teachers' Use of Demonstrations for Enhancing Students' Understanding of and Attitudes to Learning the Oxidation-Reduction Concept
OPEN ACCESS EURASIA Journal of Mathematics Science and Technology Education ISSN: 1305-8223 (online) 1305-8215 (print) 2017 13(3):555-570 DOI 10.12973/eurasia.2017.00632a The Effectiveness of Teachers' Use of Demonstrations for Enhancing Students' Understanding of and Attitudes to Learning the Oxidation-Reduction Concept Ahmad Basheer The Academic Arab College for Education in Israel - Haifa Muhamad Hugerat The Academic Arab College for Education in Israel - Haifa Naji Kortam The Academic Arab College for Education in Israel - Haifa Avi Hofstein The Academic Arab College for Education in Israel – Haifa & Weizmann Institute of science, Israel Received 02 February 2016 ▪ Revised 14 July 2016 ▪ Accepted 26 July 2016 ABSTRACT In this study we explored whether the use of teachers' demonstrations significantly improves students’ understanding of redox reactions compared with control group counterparts who were not exposed to the demonstrations. The sample consisted of 131 Israeli 8th graders in middle schools (junior high school). Students' attitudes and achievements as well as their understanding of redox and electrolysis were assessed by administering a questionnaire that investigated their attitudes (perceptions) towards a demonstration in chemistry. The findings showed that the experimental group's achievements and understanding of the subject were statistically significantly better than those of their control group counterparts. Keywords: chemistry demonstrations, redox reactions, electrolysis, achievement, attitudes, electrochemical row, chemistry education INTRODUCTION Rationale for the Study The concept of oxidation-reduction is one of the key concepts taught and learned in chemistry in the middle school (junior high schools) in most countries around the world (GCE Ordinary Level). Butts and Smith (1987), for example, reported that high-school students found the concepts of electrolysis relatively difficult to understand.