Summary Migration Radar T2

Summary

Migration radar T2

May – August 2019

Development of asylum-related migration

Colophon Title Development of asylum-related migration. May-August 2019.

Contents The migration radar summary is an analysis product that focuses on monitoring the asylum-related migration to the Netherlands. For each issue, on the basis of a survey, five significant nationalities are selected that are discussed in more detail. For comparison, the data from the most recent four months have been supplemented with data from the previous four months and from the same period a year earlier.

Reporting The migration radar summary is based on data from various databases (IND METis, IOM, UNHCR), media messages, public Frontex data, and public country information from the IND / TOELT. The migration radar summary is published once in four months.

Cooperation The migration radar summary is an analysis product of the Research & Analysis department of the Immigration and Naturalisation Service (IND/SUA/O&A), and was created through cooperation with the TOELT (IND) service department, the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee (KMar), Migration Coordination Directorate (DRM), Migration Policy Department (DMB), Repatriation and Departure Service (DT&V), Central Agency for the Reception of Asylum Seekers (COA), Foreign Affairs (BZ) and Police.

IND Research & Analysis Ministry of Justice and Security Immigration and Naturalisation Service Rijnstraat 8 | 2515 XP | Den Haag Postbus 16275 | 2500 BG | Den Haag Contents

1. ASYLUM APPLICATIONS...... 4

1.1 FIRST ASYLUM APPLICATIONS IN THE NETHERLANDS...... 4 1.2 ASYLUM INFLUX FROM SAFE COUNTRIES OF ORIGIN...... 5 1.3 ASYLUM INFLUX FROM VISA-FREE COUNTRIES...... 6 1.4 ASYLUM INFLUX OF UNACCOMPANIED MINORS………….…………………………...... …………… 6 1.5 DUBLIN ...... 7

2. SIGNIFICANT NATIONALITIES………...... 9

2.1 AFGHANISTAN ...... 9 2.1.1 Asylum influx ...... 9 2.1.2 Developments...... 9 2.2 AZERBAIJAN ...... 10 2.2.1 Asylum influx...... 10 2.2.2 Developments...... 10 2.3 IRAN ...... 11 2.3.1 Asylum influx...... 11 2.3.2 Developments...... 11 2.4 NIGERIA ...... 12 2.4.1 Asylum influx...... 12 2.4.2 Developments...... 12 2.5 SYRIA ...... 12 2.5.1 Asylum influx...... 12 2.5.2 Developments...... 13

3. ROUTES AND DEVELOPMENTS IN OTHER COUNTRIES OF ORIGIN...... 14

3.1 ROUTES……………………...... 14 3.1.1 Central Mediterranean route ...... 15 3.1.2 East Mediterranean route: arrivals by sea ...... 15 3.1.3 East Mediterranean route: arrivals by sea land ...... 15 3.1.4 West Balkan route ...... 15 3.1.5 Western Mediterranean route ...... 15 3.2 MAIN SOCIAL-POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN THE REGIONS...... 15 3.2.1 North Africa ...... 15 3.2.2 South-Sahara, Niger ...... 19 3.2.3 East Africa ...... 19 3.2.4 Middle East……...... 21 3.2.5 Latin America ...... 24 3.2.6 Balkan, Albania ...... 25 3.2.7 Eastern Europe, Moldavia ...... 26

4. (POLICY) DEVELOPMENTS ...... 27

4.1 EUROPEAN POLICY ...... 27 4.2 DUTCH POLICY ...... 27 1. Asylum applications

1.1 First asylum applications in The Netherlands In the second four-months period of 2019, approximately 7,200 first asylum applications were submitted in the Netherlands. The number of applications is comparable to the previous four- months period, but increased slightly compared to a year ago in the same period. The inflow seems to be stabilising from November 2018 with some fluctuations throughout the months. Figure 1.1 shows a visual overview of the countries of origin of asylum seekers in the Netherlands. The top 5 nationalities that applied for asylum in the Netherlands were Syrian, Nigerian, Iranian, Turkish and Moroccan (see figure 1.2).

Figure 1.1 Countries of origin of first asylum seekers in the Netherlands in T2 (four- months period) 2019

Source: Metis data May up to and including August 2019, as of August 2019. This data does not include resettlement and relocation. Image made with datawrapper.de relocation. Top 5 is based on T2 2019 Metis Source:

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1.5 Dublin The total number of Dublin claims1 in the second four-months period of 2019 (around 3,850) increased compared to a year ago in the same period, but decreased compared to the previous period. In the first four-months period of 2019, most of the claims were made from the Netherlands to Italy and Germany. The number of the registered Dublin claims to Greece increased, both in comparison with the previous four-months period and in comparison with last year in the same period. Figure 1.6 shows which countries the claims for the top 5 nationalities were sent to. It is noticeable that the majority of the Dublin claims for the Nigerians and Gambians were sent to Italy and the majority of the Dublin claims for the Syrians were sent to Greece. Dublin claims for the Moroccans and Algerians were sent to Germany and a larger number of different countries.

1 In all cases with a claim indication for Greece, a Dublin claim procedure is performed (with Greece as a claim country). However, based on the European Commission's recommendation, the IND only sends claims to Greece to a limited extent (for non-vulnerable migrants). The claims that are not sent to Greece are immediately closed again after registration by the registration desk (as is also the case with the West Balkan cases). Therefore, only a part of the registered claims is actually sent. The underlying idea of this registration is that in this way an insight is provided into the number of Dublin claims that could have been sent to Greece. The Netherlands follows developments in Italy and assesses Dublin cases of the families with minor children on an individual basis. There is no question of a policy change regards sending of Dublin claims to Italy. No claims are being sent to Hungary. Due to the fact that, unlike claims to Greece, no steps have been made yet to start sending claims, the registrations of claims to Hungary have not been included in the Dublin figures at all.

Figure 1.6 Sankey-diagram of Dublin claims from the top 5 nationalities sent to the top 5 countries in the second four-months period

Source: Metis May up to and including August 2019, as of 2 September 2019. The cases that are still open are not included in this graph. The figures cannot be linked to the influx figures from the same period and are not part of a cohort. Figure via www.sankeymatic.com 2. Significant nationalities This chapter focuses on specific nationalities in order to understand the background characteristics of certain groups of asylum seekers. The selection of these nationalities was made by means of a survey conducted among the readers of the Migration Radar. Reasons for wanting to see a certain nationality in the spotlight were usually related to an increased influx, developments in the country of origin or signals regarding disturbance. Subsequently, the Migration Radar team, in consultation with the consultative group, made a selection of the nationalities mentioned in the survey. The information about developments in countries of origin is based on public sources.

2.1 Afghanistan

2.1.1 Asylum influx The number of asylum applications from Afghans in the second four-months period (around 150) shows an increase compared to the previous four-months period (+53, + 56%) and compared to the same period last year (+26, + 13%). This seems to be mainly due to the influx in May and August. More than half (61%) of the people who entered is male. It is also noticeable that one third of the inflow is minors and one third is between 20 and 29 years old. A quarter (24%) of minors is an unaccompanied minor (8% of the total influx of Afghans).

2.1.2 Developments Negotiations between the US and the Taliban in Doha, Qatar, on the conditions for the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan by the US were continued. In August 2019, the 8th and 9th round of the discussions between those parties took place. Acceptance of the deal by the two parties at the table, the Afghan government and population were uncertain. The Taliban refused to engage in direct talks with the Afghan government for a long time, but in July 2019, the first discussions took place between the Taliban on the one hand and Afghan officials and civil rights activists, including women on the other. 2 In the meantime, (major) in Kabul and elsewhere by the Taliban continued.3 Although at the beginning of September 2019, it seemed that an agreement had been reached between the US and the Taliban, President Trump announced in a tweet of September 7 that the deal had been cancelled. New negotiations in the short term are therefore not expected. Citizens fear an increase in violence. 4 On 17 August 2019, IS committed a major attack during a wedding party in Kabul, resulting in at least 63 deaths and 182 injured.5 The presidential election took place on 28 September 2019.6 Despite the fact that there are more candidates, there is a battle between incumbent President Ghani and government leader Abdullah. Out of 35 million Afghans, only two million people showed up during the elections. Both problems at the polling stations and threats from the Taliban probably led to the low turnout. In total, the Taliban carried out 68 attacks, killing at least five people and injuring dozens of people. It is not yet clear who will be the president. The electoral commission says that the preliminary results are not expected before October 17, and with the final result only to be expected on November 17.7

2 AAN, 4Februaryy 2019. 'Nothing is agreed until everything is agreed'- First steps in Afghan peace negotiations. https://www.afghanistan- analysts.org/nothing- is-agreed-until-everything-is-agreed-first-steps-in-afghan-peace-negotiations/ ; Aljazeera, 13 August 2019. 'Peace deal is near' - What we know so far about US-Taliban talks. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/05/taliban-talks-peace-afghanistan-190510062940394.html ; RFE-RL, 12 August 2019. Taliban: Afghan Peace Talks With U.S. 'Long And Useful'; Sides To Consult. https://www.rferl.org/a/taliban-afghanistan-talks-end-both-sides-to- consult/30105119.html 3 Asian News International, 13 July 2019. 11 killed in Afghanistan hotel attack, Taliban claims responsibility. https://global.factiva.com/ha/default.aspx?mod=SavedSearch_SelectSearch#./!?&_suid=156689906641107678218976909304 ; NRC, 7 August 2019. Fourteen dead, nearly 150 injured in the Kabul attack. https://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2019/08/07/bijna-honderd-gewonden-bij-aanslag-kabul-a3969373 ; VK, 29 July 2019. Attack in Kabul in the run-up to elections shows powerlessness of the Afghan government. https://www.volkskrant.nl/nieuws- achtergrond/aanslag-in-kabul-in-aanloop-verkiezingen-laat-machteloosheid-afghaanse-regering-zien~b62d0d86/ ; The Washington Post, 1 July 2019. At least 27 dead in two Taliban attacks as Afghanistan peace talks continue. https://global.factiva.com/ha/default.aspx?mod=SavedSearch_SelectSearch#./!?&_suid=156689906641107678218976909304 4 AAN (8 September 2019) Trump Ends Talks with the Taleban: What happens next?. https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/trump-ends-talks-with-the- taleban-what-happens-next/ 5 Al Jazeera, 18 August2019. Afghanistan: Scores killed in Afghan wedding blast. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/08/afghanistan-scores-killed-kabul- wedding-blast-190818050258914.html 6 AAN, 28 July 2019. Afghanistan’s 2019 elections (6) -Presidential campaign kicks off amid uncertainty. https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/afghanistans- 2019-elections-6-presidential-campaign-kicks-off-amid-uncertainty/ 7 NOS, 29-09-2019, Particularly low turnout in presidential elections in Afghanistan, https://nos.nl/artikel/2303836-bijzonder-lage-opkomst-bij- presidentsverkiezingen-afghanistan.html

In the first half of 2019, UNAMA reported 3812 civilian casualties as a result of the conflict (1,366 dead and 2,446 injured). It is a decrease of 27% compared to the same period in 2018 and the lowest number of civilian casualties over the first six months of a year since 2012. The number of civilian casualties is comparable in Q1 and Q2 of 2019, while in Q2, there were 200 civilian deaths more than in Q1.8 Percentage-wise, there are many more civilian casualties as a result of air strikes in the first half of 2019 compared to the first half of 2018 (14% and 7% respectively of the total number), with the air strikes resulting in 369 deaths and 156 injuries in 9 2019.

According to UNHCR, a total of 4,198 registered Afghan refugees returned from abroad during the period 1 January - 31 July 2019: 3,031 people from Pakistan, 1,106 from Iran, and 61 from other countries. This is 59% lower than the number of returned registered Afghan refugees in the same period in 2018.10 The IOM indicates that in the period 1 January - 10 August 2019, 293,402 undocumented Afghans returned from Iran and Pakistan (279,588 from Iran and 13,814 from Pakistan). Among them there is also a large number of deportees. The average monthly return in the first four-months period of this year is similar to that in May, June and July this year. 11 According to UNOCHA, in Afghanistan,74,115 people were displaced by the conflict in the country 12 itself during the period 1 May - 22 August 2019.

2.2 Azerbaijan

2.2.1 Asylum influx The number of asylum applications from Azerbaijani in the second four-months period (around 140) shows an increase compared to the same period last year (+36, + 36%), but a decrease compared to the previous four-months period (-20, -13%). The increased influx in 2019 occurred mainly during the first five months. In the summer months, the influx is decreasing and it is comparable to the influx of 2018. Slightly more men (60%) than women (40%) entered. More than a third (39%) of the influx concerns minors. No unaccompanied minors entered. The number of first asylum applications in the EU+ in 2019 shows the same level and similar pattern as in 2018.

2.2.2 Developments There are no recent developments worth mentioning here. We can, however, provide a description of the current situation from which potential push factors can be derived. Human Rights Watch qualifies the human rights situation in Azerbaijan as ‘appalling’.13 According to Freedom House, the country has an authoritarian regime that has restricted civil liberties in recent years.14 Freedom House qualifies Azerbaijan as ‘not free’ with a score of 11 out of 100.15

8 UNAMA, 30 July 2019. Midyear update on the protection of civilians in armed conflict: 1 January to 30 June 2019. https://unama.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/unama_poc_midyear_update_2019_-_30_july_2019_english.pdf; UNAMA, 24 April 2019. Quarterly report on the protection of civilians in armed conflict: 1 January to 31 March 2019. https://unama.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/unama_protection_of_civilians_in_armed_conflict_ - _first_quarter_report_2019_english_.pdf 9 UNAMA, 30 July 2019. Midyear update on the protection of civilians in armed conflict: 1 January to 30 June 2019. https://unama.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/unama_poc_midyear_update_2019_-_30_july_2019_english.pdf; UNAMA, 15 July 2018. Midyear update on the protection of civilians in armed conflict: 1 January to 30 June 2018. https://unama.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/unama_poc_midyear_update_2018_15_july_english.pdf 10 UNHCR, 31 July 2019. Afghanistan: Voluntary Repatriation Response Snapshot 01 January - 31 July 2019. https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/70670.pdf 11 IOM, August 2019. Return of undocumented Afghans, Weekly situation report 04-10 August 2019. https://afghanistan.iom.int/sites/default/files/Reports/iom_afghanistan-return_of_undocumented_afghans-_situation_report_04-10_aug_2019.pdf 12 UNOCHA, 25 August 2019. Afghanistan: Conflict induced Displacements (as of 25 August 2019) Actual displacement between 1 May 2019 and 4 August 2019 https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/afghanistan/idps 13 https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2019/country-chapters/azerbaijan 14 https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2019/azerbaijan 15 https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2019/azerbaijan

Azerbaijan scores relatively poorly on the Global Corruption Perceptions Index 2018 of Transparency International; Azerbaijan scores 25 out of 100 points and takes the 152nd place worldwide (out of 180).16 The US State Department writes that despite progress made in the fight against corruption, there are still many signs of corruption of higher-level government personnel.17 According to Human Rights Watch, the Azerbaijani Order of Lawyers does not work independently 18 of the authorities and human rights lawyers are harassed.

The US State Department writes that torture and mistreatment of detainees and prisoners occur on a large scale within the police and the judiciary and often remains unpunished.19

Freedom of press

The government has a strong hold on the media. In 2017, the new legislation strengthened the state control of online media; it became possible to block websites without going to court. The authorities make use of this possibility. In addition, according to Freedom house, social media gets hacked and critical journalists (and their family members) are harassed, threatened and / or 20 arrested. According to the US State Department, human rights activists who are active online are also harassed, threatened and arrested.21

LHBTI

Neither homosexual orientation nor the performance of homosexual acts is punishable. However, the general social climate in relation to LGBTI people is negative. LGBTIs face discrimination both from the society and from the authorities.22 In the most recent edition of the Rainbow-Europe ranking of ILGA-Europe, Azerbaijan scores with a score of 3 out of 100 as the lowest of the 49 23 European countries assessed in terms of LGBTI rights.

2.3 Iran

2.3.1 Asylum influx The number of first asylum applications from Iranians (around 520) shows a decrease compared to the previous four-months period (-134, -20%), but a comparable level with the same period a year ago (-13, -2%). The strong increase of the influx that occurred in the past autumn, did not continue. The influx seems to have stabilized since December 2018, with fluctuations here and there. The ratio between male and female asylum seekers is about the same. Most asylum seekers are between 30 and 39 years of age. About a quarter (23%) of the asylum seekers are minors, of whom less than 5% are unaccompanied minors.

2.3.2 Developments The human rights situation in Iran has not improved. Well-known Iranians with many followers on Instagram (actors, athletes, models) were summoned by the security body and in some cases prosecuted for the content of posted messages.24 Protests against the compulsory headscarf also led to long prison sentences (16-23 years). People were charged with inciting people to corruption and prostitution, conspiring against national security, propaganda against the state and insulting the sacred. 25

16 https://www.transparency.org/cpi2018 17 https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/AZERBAIJAN-2018-HUMAN-RIGHTS-REPORT.pdf 18 https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2019/country-chapters/azerbaijan 19 https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/AZERBAIJAN-2018-HUMAN-RIGHTS-REPORT.pdf 20https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2019/azerbaijan en https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/AZERBAIJAN-2018-HUMAN- RIGHTS-REPORT.pdf 21 https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/AZERBAIJAN-2018-HUMAN-RIGHTS-REPORT.pdf 22https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/AZERBAIJAN-2018-HUMAN-RIGHTS-REPORT.pdf en https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/international-travel/International-Travel-Country-Information-Pages/Azerbaijan.html 23 https://rainbow-europe.org/country-ranking en https://www.ilga-europe.org/sites/default/files/Attachments/rainbowmap2019online_0_0.pdf 24 Centre for Human Rights in Iran, 16-08-2019, Iran Cracks Down on Instagram Celebrities as It Tightens Noose on Freedom of Speech and Expression, 22-08- 2019, https://www.iranhumanrights.org/2019/08/iran-cracks-down-on-instagram-celebrities-as-it-tightens-noose-on-freedom-of-speech-and-expression/ Journalists, filmmakers and scientists were also sentenced to prison terms. The Iranian economy is increasingly suffering from American sanctions. Unemployment is rising, products are becoming more expensive, shortages of medicines are increasing and there is a sharp fall in oil exports and a shrinking economy. The Rial has become more valuable: 26 it is 190,000 for a dollar a year ago compared to around 120,000 for a dollar now.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg warns of a large influx into the EU of Afghans from Iran as tensions between Iran and the US continue to escalate.27 Recent figures on the departure of Afghans from Iran to Afghanistan or Turkey appear to be not yet available.

2.4 Nigeria

2.4.1 Asylum influx The number of asylum applications from Nigerians (863) has risen sharply, both compared to the same period a year ago and compared to the previous four-months period (+699, + 426%; +154, + 22% respectively). This mainly concerns transit passengers from Italy; most Dublin claims are sent back to Italy. There are more men (70%) than women (30%) and most asylum seekers are between 20 and 29 years old. Almost a fifth (17%) of the asylum influx concerns a minor, all of whom have travelled with (one) parent (s).

2.4.2 Developments The safety situation in the North-West of Nigeria has deteriorated recently. This has resulted in a large group of refugees in the direction of Niger, mainly women and children. The increasing violence in the area was not a consequence of Boko Haram activities, but of an increase in the number of abductions and fights between farmers and nomads.28

The UNHCR reported that people were returning to Nigeria who initially fled to Niger. 29 In July 2019, the IOM set up a joint Task Force (Anti-Trafficking Task Force (ATTF)) together with UNHCR and Heartland Alliance International to tackle trafficking in human beings in the northeast of Borno 30 state.

The Mixed Migration Centre reports that there is an agreement on the Abuja Action Statement between Nigeria, Niger, Cameroon and Chad. The agreement concerns actions to better protection and the needs of refugees.31

2.5 Syria

2.5.1 Asylum influx The number of asylum applications from Syrians (1,126) shows an increase compared to the previous four-months period (+304, + 37%), but is comparable to the same period a year ago (- 51,-4%). It shows approximately the same course during 2019 as in 2018.

25 Centre for Human Rights in Iran, 19-08-2019, Arrests, Prison Sentences Fail to Stem Growing Public Opposition to Iran’s Mandatory Hijab Law, 22-08-2019, https://www.iranhumanrights.org/2019/08/arrests-prison-sentences-fail-to-stem-growing-public-opposition-to-irans-mandatory-hijab-law/ 26 The Arab Weekly, 20-07-2019, Indexes reveal Iran has one of the most ‘miserable’ economies in the world, 22-08-2019, https://thearabweekly.com/indexes-reveal-iran-has-one-most-miserable-economies-world en Aljazeera, 06-07-2019, The economic impact of US sanctions on Iran’s streets, 22-08-2019, https://www.aljazeera.com/blogs/middleeast/2019/07/economic-impact-sanctions-iran-streets-190706190053896.html 27 InfoMigrants, 08-07-2019, European politician warns US-Iran feud could prompt refugee influx, 22-08-2019, https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/18020/european-politician-warns-us-iran-feud-could-prompt-refugee-influx 28 Mixed Migration Centre, Quarterly Mixed Migration Update: West Africa, Quarter 2 (July) 2019, http://www.mixedmigration.org/wp- content/uploads/2019/07/qmmu-wa-q2-2019.pdf consulted on 23-07-2019 29 Mixed Migration Centre, Quarterly Mixed Migration Update: West Africa, Quarter 2 (July) 2019, http://www.mixedmigration.org/wp- content/uploads/2019/07/qmmu-wa-q2-2019.pdf consulted on 23-07-2019 30 IOM, Humanitarian Actors Establish First Anti-Trafficking Task Force in North-East Nigeria, 12 July2019, https://www.iom.int/news/humanitarian-actors- establish-first-anti-trafficking-task-force-north-east-nigeria consulted on 23-07-2019 31 MonthlyTrend Analysis West Africa, May MMC More asylum applications are submitted by Syrian men (77%) than by Syrian women (23%). About a fifth (21%) of the first asylum applications are submitted by minors. Slightly more than a third (39%) of the minors are unaccompanied minors (8% of the total influx of Syrians). There is an increase in the number of first asylum applications by Syrian unaccompanied minors compared to previous periods.

2.5.2 Developments

Although the Sochi agreement of 2018 initially prevented an attack on the de-escalation zone of Idlib, Idlib was heavily bombed by the Syrian army with the help of Russian air support at the end of April / beginning of May. A cease-fire that was agreed between the warring parties and Turkey, Russia and Iran on 2 August, was violated a few days later. The Syrian army is slowly conquering one place after the other in the south of the area, including the strategic place Khan Sheikhoun.32 The Syrian regime has opened a "humanitarian corridor" through which citizens can leave Idlib on the south side (towards the government area).33

According to the UN, 500 civilians have died during the Idlib offensive in recent months and 400,000 people have fled their homes. Medical infrastructure and ambulances have been frequently attacked. Around three million citizens still live in the area. Shooting by the rebels in the government area led to around 10,000 people fleeing and civilian deaths.34 Residents move deeper into the area, towards the Turkish border. However, Turkey does not intend to admit civilians or fighters from the area and wants to accommodate potential refugees from Idlib in camps in Syria itself.35

After reconquering the opposition areas, the pressure on Syrians in the neighbouring countries to return has increased. The fear of deportation is increasing among the Syrians in Turkey. Public opinion also seems to be opposed to the presence of the Syrian refugees. According to a poll, 80 36 per cent of the Turks think that all 3.6 million Syrians should leave. The Turkish government has restricted the registration of Syrian refugees, making it more difficult for this group to get protection from the Turkish government. Checks have been carried out in Istanbul in recent weeks, during which thousands of irregular migrants were removed from the city. In this process, deportations to Syria took place.37

32 Al-Monitor, 09-08-2019, Syrian regime pays heavy price for two strategic towns in Hama, 23-08-2019, https://www.al- monitor.com/pulse/originals/2019/08/syria-hama-idlib-countryside-rebels-regimeopposition-truce.html 33 Aljazeera, 22-08-2019, Syria opens 'humanitarian corridor' for civilians to leave Idlib, 23-08-2019, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/08/syria-opens- humanitarian-corridor-civilians-flee-idlib-190822102051112.html 34 The New York Times, 20-08-2019, Syrian Forces Move Into Strategic Town, Tightening Grip on Rebels, 23-08-2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/20/world/middleeast/syria-idlib-sheikhoun.html 35 Reuters, 22-08-2019, Syrian offensive puts Turkish troops and border plans in peril, 23-08-2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-security- turkey/syrian-offensive-puts-turkish-troops-and-border-plans-in-peril-idUSKCN1VC1PA 36 NRC, Expulsions lead to fear among Syrians, 2-8-2019, https://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2019/08/02/deportaties-lijden-tot-angst-onder-syriers-a3968913 37 The National, Syrian refugees in Istanbul nervous over raids, arrests by Turkish authorities, 17-07-2019, https://www.thenational.ae/world/europe/syrian- refugees-in-istanbul-nervous-over-raids-arrests-by-turkish-authorities-1.887957 en Middle East Eye, Turkey deports hundreds of Syrian refugees to war-torn Idlib province, 22-07-2019, https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/hundreds-syrian-refugees-deported-idlib-turkey 3. Routes and developments in other countries of origin

3.1 Routes In the second four-months period, 37,630 irregular border crossings were registered. This is an increase compared to the previous four-months period (+18,650, + 98%), but a decrease compared to the same period a year ago (-16.450, -30%).

Figure 1.7 Number of registered irregular border crossings in T2 2019

Figure 1.8 Development of the number of registered irregular border crossings along different routes

30000

25000

20000 T2 2018

15000 T3 2018

T1 2019

10000 T2 2019

5000

0 CMR WMR OMR Land OMR Sea West Balkan 3.1.1 Central Mediterranean route The total number of registered irregular border crossings by sea on the Central Mediterranean Route (4,365) increased by 565% in the second four-months period compared to the first. Last year, a total of nearly 20,000 irregular border crossings were registered in the first and second four-months period together, compared to more than 5,000 in 2019, which is a decrease of 75% in 2019.

3.1.2 East Mediterranean route: arrivals by see The total number of registered irregular border crossings by sea on the Eastern Mediterranean route (21,500) increased by 182% in the second four-months period compared to the first four- months period, and by 71% compared to the second four-months period last year. When the influx of 2019 (Jan-Aug) is compared with the influx in 2018 in the same period, there is a noticeable decrease of 22%.

3.1.3 East Mediterranean route: arrivals by over land The total number of registered irregular cross-border landings on the Eastern Mediterranean route (1,600) has further decreased compared to the previous four-months period (-1,440, -48%) and compared to the same period last year (-3,400, -68%). This means that the total number of registered irregular migrants (4,600) in 2019 (Jan-Aug) decreased by 57% compared to a year ago in the same period.

3.1.4 West Balkan route The total number of registered irregular border crossings on the West Balkan route (1,950) has increased compared to the same period year ago (+1,400, + 257%), but remained roughly the same as the first four-months period (+20, + 1%) . The total number of registered irregular border crossings (3,900) in 2019 (Jan-Aug) increased compared to the same period a year ago (+ 166%).

3.1.5 West Mediterranean route The total number of registered irregular border crossings on the West Mediterranean route by sea (8,250) increased compared to the previous four-months period (+ 2,500, + 44%), but decreased compared to the same period a year ago (-17,250, -68%) . This only concerns arrivals by sea to the mainland in Spain. In other reports the number may be higher, but this can be explained by the fact that such reports also include illegal border crossings to the Spanish Enclaves Ceuta and Melilla from Morocco.

3.2 Main social-political development in the regions This section describes the most important socio-political developments in countries of origin. This information is based on public sources.

3.2.1 North Africa

3.2.1.1 Algeria The protests in Algeria, also called Hirak, continued after the resignation of Bouteflika. The protesters still demand that the power system be reformed. Interim President Bensalah's proposal to set up a National Dialogue and Reconciliation Body to break the political impasse has been rejected by both demonstrators and the military.38 The elections in Algeria for the succession of the dismissed President Bouteflika, to be held on July 4, have been postponed because too few candidates stood for candidacy. No new election date has been set, which means that the interim president will stay in power longer than the original three months,

38 Al Monitor, Mediation rejected as Algeria’s protesters march on, 05-08-2019, https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2019/08/algeria-army-chief- reject-conditions-protesters-dialogue.html as the constitution prescribes.39 Postponing the elections resulted in tens of thousands of demonstrators.

A large number of political leaders was arrested because of suspicions of large-scale corruption. The former Prime Minister Ahmed Ouyahia, a large number of ministers, the youngest brother of former President Bouteflika and two chiefs of the security services are among them. 4041

Algeria as transit country In May, the Spanish police rolled up a criminal network that brought migrants from Bangladesh, Pakistan, India and Sri Lanka to Spain. The network arranged fraudulent visas through the Algerian embassy in India. The migrants flew to Algeria with those visas. From Algeria, the migrants crossed the Algerian-Moroccan border through the mountains and went by foot to Spain. In Spain the criminal network gave them false documents and arranged various services for the migrants, such as applying for residence permits and sham marriages to legitimize their stay in Spain.42

According to the Mixed Migration Centre, Algeria has become a transit country for migration since the implementation of migration controls in Niger.43

3.2.1.2 Morocco In the run-up to the reintroduction of compulsory military service, the Moroccan authorities have started to select the first group of recruits consisting of 15,000 men who will be employed on 1 September. Conscription has duration of 12 months and the conscripts will receive a salary between 1050 and 2100 dirhams per month.44 As indicated in an earlier edition of the Migration Radar, the reintroduction of military service will create more jobs among Moroccan youth, among other things. A study by the Arab Barometer research network and BBC News Arabic has shown that more than 40% of Moroccans currently consider emigrating. Among Moroccans between the ages of 18 and 29, no less than 70% want to emigrate. The research shows that mainly "economic considerations" were mentioned as the driving factor.45

On the occasion of the Sugar Festival, the 20-year anniversary of the Moroccan king Mohammed VI and the Sacrifice Party, the Moroccan king granted grace to 5,869 prisoners, including those 46 arrested and detained during the protests in Al-Hoceima and Jerada.

Morocco as transit country

39 Deutsche Welle, Algeria postpones presidential vote after contenders disqualified, 02-06-2019 https://www.dw.com/en/algeria-postpones-presidential- vote-after-contenders-disqualified/a-49007409; Brookings, the Cancellation of Algeria’s Elections Is an Opportunity for Democratization, 04-06-2019 https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2019/06/04/the-cancellation-of-algerias-elections-is-an-opportunity-for-democratization/; Al Monitor, Mediation rejected as Algeria’s protesters march on, 05-08-2019, https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2019/08/algeria -army-chief-reject-conditions- protesters-dialogue.html 40 Deutsche Welle, Algeria: Said Bouteflika and two spy chiefs arrested, 04-05-2019, https://www.dw.com/en/algeria-said-bouteflika-and-two-spy-chiefs- arrested/a-48604645 41 Deutsche Welle, Algerian ex-PM Ahmed Ouyahia detained over corruption, 12-06-2019, https://www.dw.com/en/algerian-ex-pm-ahmed-ouyahia-detained- over-corruption/a-49167080 Arabnews, Algeria’s ex-police chief detained in corruption probe: state TV, 05-07-2019 http://www.arabnews.com/node/1521116/middle-east 42 Europol, Bangladeshi migrants forced to pay up to €20 000 each for an inhumane journey to Europe , 03-05-019, https://www.europol.europa.eu/newsroom/news/bangladeshi-migrants-forced-to-pay-to-%E2%82%AC20-000-each-for-inhumane-journey-to-europe 43 MTA West Africa May 44 Middle East Monitor, Moroccan army to choose first batch for conscription Monday, dated 19 August 2019, found on: https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20190819-moroccan-army-to-choose-first-batch-for-conscription-monday/ 45 Arab Barometer, Arab Barometer V Morocco Country Report 2019, found on : https://www.arabbarometer.org/wp- content/uploads/ABV_Morocco_Report.pdf , BBC News, The Arab world in seven charts: Are Arabs turning their backs on religion?, dated 24 June 2019, found on: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-48703377 46 Maroc.ma, Eid Al Fitr: HM the King Pardons 755 Convicts, dated 4 June 2019, found on: http://www.maroc.ma/en/royal-activities/eid-al-fitr-hm-king- pardons-755-convicts, Maroc.ma, Throne Day: HM the King Pardons 4,764 People, dated 29 July2019, found on: http://www.maroc.ma/en/royal- activities/throne-day-hm-king-pardons-4764-people, Maroc.ma, HM the King Pardons 350 People on Eid Al Adha, dated 12 August 2019, found on: http://www.maroc.ma/en/royal-activities/hm-king-pardons-350-people-eid-al-adha According to UNHCR, between January and April 2019, due to the increased pressure on the route to Spain via the Strait of Gibraltar the number of newly registered migrants in Morocco increased by 52% compared to the number of migrants registered by UNHCR in the same period in 2018.47 According to IOM estimates, 15,000 people have so far reached Spain this year and more than 200 people died trying to make the crossing from Africa to Spain. At the end of July, the Moroccan authorities rescued 242 migrants from Sub-Sahara Africa trying to cross the Strait of Gibraltar on rubber boats.48

3.2.1.3 Tunisia On 2 August, the state of emergency in Tunisia was again extended for the duration of one month.49 On Thursday, June 27, two suicide attacks took place in the capital, Tunis, in which one 50 officer was killed and seven got injured. The Islamic State has claimed the attacks. On 2 July 2019 a militant blew himself up in Tunis. He was presumably the brain behind the double 51 suicide attack on 27 June.

On 25 July 2019, Tunisian President Beji Caid Essebsi passed away.52 At that time, President Mohamed Ennaceur was appointed as interim president of Tunisia.53 He was supposed to hold presidential elections within 45 to 90 days.54 Het Tunisian election committee (ISIE) brought forward the presidential elections date to 15 September.55 The turnout in the first round of the presidential election was low (45%), but slightly higher than in the local elections last year (34%). Two men who do not have any affinity with the established order t have won: businessman- benefactor Nabil Karoui and especially the lawyer Kaïs Saïed. The second round to be held by November 3 at the latest, will show which of them succeeds President Béji Caïd Essebsi. However, the results of this first round may already have an impact on the parliamentary elections in early October.56 The parliamentary elections are held on October 6, which means there are two election campaigns at the same time with a lot of political rivalry because there are more than 200 existing parties that cannot claim an absolute majority alone.57

Tunisia as transit country UNHCR reports that at the end of June 2019, 2,073 refugees registered by the UNHCR will be staying in Tunisia. This is an increase of 38% compared to the beginning of this year (1,290 people).

47 UNHCR, UNHCR Update: Morocco February – May 2019, found on op: http://reporting.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/UNHCR%20Morocco%20Operational%20Update%20 -%20February%20-%20May%202019_1.pdf 48 Deutsche Welle, Morocco rescues 242 migrants in Mediterranean, dated 27 July 2019, found on: https://www.dw.com/en/morocco-rescues-242-migrants- in-mediterranean/a-49766768 49 Jawhara FM, Prolongation de l’état d’urgence, dated 5-7-2019, https://www.jawharafm.net/fr/article/prolongation-de-l-etat-d-urgence/90/69811 ; Tunisie Numérique, Businessnews, Le président de la République décrète l’état d’urgence, dated 2-8-2019, https://www.businessnews.com.tn/le-president- de-la- republique-decrete-letat-durgence,520,89869,3 50 Reuters, One dead, several hurt in suicide bomber attacks in Tunisian capital, dated 27-6-2019 https://www.reuters.com/article/us-tunisia- security/one- dead-several-hurt-in-suicide-bomber-attacks-in-tunisian-capital-idUSKCN1TS1I0 51 Al Jazeera, Tunis attack: Wanted man blows himself up after police chase, dated 3-7-2019, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/07/tunisia-wanted- man- blows-police-chase-190703023031969.html 52 Agence Tunis Afrique Presse, President Beji Caid Essebsi passes away, dated 25-7-2019 https://www.tap.info.tn/en/Portal-Top-News- EN/11672780- president-beji-caid 53 Agence Tunis Afrique Presse , Décès de Caïd Essebsi: Mourou dirigera le parlement après l’investiture de Mohamed Ennaceur à la présidence par interim, 25-7-2019https://www.tap.info.tn/fr/Portail-Politique/11673630-décès-de-caïd 54 L’opinion, En Tunisie, le malaise du président Essebsi ajoute à la confusion pré-électorale, 30-06-2019 https://www.lopinion.fr/edition/international/en- tunisie-malaise-president-essebsi-ajoute-a-confusion-pre-electorale-191209 ; The Arab Weekly, Tunisia says no 'power vacuum' despite president's illness , d.d. 28-6-2019 https://thearabweekly.com/tunisia-says-no-power-vacuum-despite-presidents-illness 55 Le Figaro, NouveauTunisie: la présidentielle avancée après le décès du chef de l'Etat, 25-07-2019 http://www.lefigaro.fr/flash-actu/tunisie-la-presidentielle- avancee-apres-le-deces-du-chef-de-l-etat-20190725 ; Kapitalis, Tunisie : L’Instance des elections annonce le nouveau calendrier électoral, 26-07-2019 http://kapitalis.com/tunisie/2019/07/26/tunisie-linstance-des-elections-annonce-le-nouveau-calendrier-electoral/ 56 De Volkskrant, Outsiders make short work of old politics in Tunisia, dated 16-09-2019, https://www.volkskrant.nl/nieuws- achtergrond/buitenstaanders-maken-korte-metten-met-oude-politiek-in- tunesie~b8c5e820/?referer=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.google.nl%2Furl%3Fsa%3Dt%26rct%3Dj%26q%3D%26esrc%3Ds%26source%3Dweb%26cd%3D1%26ve d% 3D2ahUKEwjY8JL-8ObkAhWLJFAKHfUAAVgQFjAAegQIAhAB%26url%3Dhttps%253A%252F%252Fwww.volkskrant.nl%252Fnieuws - achtergrond%252Fbuitenstaanders-maken-korte-metten-met-oude-politiek-in-tunesie%7Eb8c5e820%252F%26usg%3DAOvVaw1zCOv_xYzTD2yKhQi3OuXT 57 France 24, Après le deuil national en Tunisie, "les prochaines élections s’annoncent tendues, 28-07-2019, https://www.france24.com/fr/20190728-tunisie- politique-election-presidentielle-essebsi-loi-electorale Among them there are 1,064 people from Syria. The others are mainly from Eritrea, Ivory Coast, 58 Somalia and Sudan.

In recent months several boats with migrants on board have sunk off the coast of Tunisia. In May, at least 65 migrants drowned, in July – 80; both boats departed from Libya but sank off the Tunisian coast.59 In June, a ship with 75 migrants was anchored off the coast of Tunisia for three weeks. After three weeks, the ship received permission from the Tunisian authorities to moor.

3.2.1.4 Libya The offensive in West Libya that started on April 4 continues. The troops of the Libyan National Army (LNA) led by General Khalifa Haftar, with the ultimate goal of taking the capital Tripoli, made some progress in the first weeks of the offensive, but have since remained stuck on the southern edge of the city after which the focus was moved to the north.60 They say that Haftar was mistaken in the power of the warring groups loyal to Prime Minister Fayez al Serraj's internationally recognized interim Government of National Accord (GNA), who managed to prevent the breakthrough of the LNA in Tripoli so far.61 Because of the continuing chaos in the country, IS sees 62 the opportunity to move up from the south of the country.

At present, the warring parties are far from finding a peaceful solution, pointing at each other to blame for its failure. According to the WHO, a report published in June shows that more than 600 people were killed and more than 3,500 were injured during the offensive in West Libya. There are also civilians among the victims. According to the UNHCR, at the end of June, nearly 94,000 people 63 were displaced due to fighting in the southern suburbs of Tripoli.

On 4 August 2019, an air raid took place on a government building in southern Libya, in the city of Murzuq, with 42 people killed. The UN holds the Haftar warring groups responsible for the attack.64 During the Sacrifice Feast a two-day ceasefire was agreed around Tripoli, after which the battle 65 was resumed.

Libya as transit country

During the peak of the refugee crisis in 2016, 181,000 migrants from Libya arrived in Italy. Since this year, the number has fallen sharply to 2,144 migrants in June 2019. The significant decrease may be related to the rescue ships being averted by the Italian Ministry of the Interior. In June, Prime Minister Al Serraj no longer threatened to stop migrants from Libya during when crossing to

58 UNHCR, Operational update Tunisia, July 2019, https://data2.unhcr.org/fr/documents/download/70304 59 UNHCR, UNHCR – 65 reported drowned after shipwreck off coast of Tunisia, 10-05-2019 https://www.unhcr.org/news/press/2019/5/5cd5a74c4/unhcr-65- reported-drowned-shipwreck-coast-tunisia.html ; UNHCR, UNHCR saddened by large loss of life in Tunisia shipwreck, calls for end to detention in Libya, 04-07- 2019, https://www.unhcr.org/news/press/2019/7/5d1e3fa24/unhcr-saddened-large-loss-life-tunisia-shipwreck-calls-end-detention-libya.html 60 NRC, 42 killed in air raid in Libya, dated 5 August 2019, found on: https://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2019/08/05/42-doden-bij-luchtaanval-in-libie- a3969170 61Al-Monitor, Battle for Tripoli appears destined to grind on in Libya, dated 25 June 2019, found on: https://www.al- monitor.com/pulse/originals/2019/06/libya-tripoli-battle-hifter-sarraj-political-settlement.html, Trouw, The situation in Libya is now really dire, on 22 May 2019, found on: https://www.trouw.nl/nieuws/de-situatie-in-libie-wordt-nu-echt- nijpend~b050ea2a/?referer=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.google.com%2Furl%3Fsa%3Dt%26rct%3Dj%26q%3D%26esrc%3Ds%26source%3Dweb%26cd%3D1%26v e d%3D2ahUKEwj-7af3yZPkAhVHsaQKHQPwD5wQFjAAegQIARAB%26url%3Dhttps%253A%252F%252Fwww.trouw.nl%252Fnieuws%252Fde -situatie-in-libie- wordt-nu-echt-nijpend%7Eb050ea2a%252F%26usg%3DAOvVaw0IQ1vdHSnv7jYkBDVpaskw 62 De Volkskrant, Libya threatens to no longer prevent migrants from coming to Europe if the fighting continues, dated 17 June 2019, found on: https://www.volkskrant.nl/nieuws-achtergrond/libie-dreigt-migranten-richting-europa-niet-langer-tegen-te-houden-als-gevechten-voortduren~b5a022d4/ 63 Al-Monitor, Battle for Tripoli appears destined to grind on in Libya, dated 25 June 2019, found on: https://www.al- monitor.com/pulse/originals/2019/06/libya-tripoli-battle-hifter-sarraj-political-settlement.html 64 NRC, 42 dead in air raid in Libya, dated 5 August 2019, found on: https://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2019/08/05/42-doden-bij-luchtaanval-in-libie- a3969170 65 VOA News, Libya Officials: Fighting Around Tripoli Resumes, Truce Over, dated 13 August 2019, found on: https://www.voanews.com/middle-east/libya- officials-fighting-around-tripoli-resumes-truce-over Italy, after Italy adopted a decree giving rescue vessels the chance of being fined up to 50,000 euros when they bring rescued migrants ashore in Italy.66

On July 2, a bombing raid was carried out at a detention centre in Tajoura, near Tripoli, killing at least 53 detainees.67 In the detention centre there were also migrants from sub-Saharan Africa who were arrested on their way to Europe.68The UN calls on the Libyan authorities to dismantle all detention centres for refugees, as the centres are not suitable for accommodating migrants. Libyan Interior Minister Fathi Basgagha has announced that three detention centres in Misrata, Tajoura and Khoms will be closed following criticism of the return of migrants to the bombarded detention centre in Tajoura. Other organizations fear that with the closure of detention centres the remaining centres will become overcrowded.69

On July 25, a boat capsized off the coast of Libya, killing an estimated 150 migrants. So far it has 70 been the worst boat disaster in 2019. The survivors were brought back to Libya.

3.2.2 Sub-Sahara, Niger The UN Special Rapporteur on Migrant Rights reported that the recent measures taken by the Nigerian government - to better manage the influx of migrants - had a negative impact on the rights of migrants in that country. Due to the measures taken, migration was criminalized and the 71 freedom of movement restricted.

In April, around 20,000 Nigerians fled to the Diffa region in Niger when the violence in their country increased. At the end of May, the UNCHR indicated that at that time there were approximately 250,000 people (118,900 refugees, 104,300 displaced persons and 25,700 returnees) in the Diffa region. At the end of May, some 56,000 Malian refugees were also in Niger, mainly in the western part of the country. The state of emergency still applies to this part.72

3.2.3 East Africa

3.2.3.1 Sudan The number of people in Sudan (both Sudanese and refugees) in need of humanitarian assistance has risen to more than 8 million. This has to do with continuing civil unrest, an expanding economic crisis, increasing price rises and fighting in the Darfur region and in the capital Khartoum. Rising commodity prices, cash and fuel shortages, and disruption to basic services make it difficult 73 for the people, especially for internally displaced persons and refugees in the country.

The popular revolts described in the previous Migration Radar have not diminished in the past four- months period. The revolts are accompanied by a lot of violence on the side of government forces, even hospitals, are being attacked. The demonstrations took place throughout

66 De Volkskrant, Libya no longer threatens to stop migrants to Europe if the fighting continues, dated 17 June 2019, found on: https://www.volkskrant.nl/nieuws-achtergrond/libie-dreigt-migranten-richting-europa-niet-langer-tegen-te-houden-als-gevechten-voortduren~b5a022d4/ 67 IOM, Tripoli Update 21, dated 30 July 2019, found on: https://displacement.iom.int/system/tdf/reports/DTM_Update-Tripoli_2019-07- 30_FINAL.pdf?file=1&type=node&id=6345 68 De Volkskrant, With the deadliest bombing so far, the civil war in Libya is entering a more dangerous phase, dated 3 July 2019, found on: https://www.volkskrant.nl/nieuws-achtergrond/met-het-dodelijkste-bombardement-tot-nu-toe-gaat-de-burgeroorlog-in-libie-een-gevaarlijker-fase- in~b2270155/ 69 BBC News, Libya to close 'inhuman' migrant detention centres after outcry, dated 2 August 2019, found on: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa- 49203792: https://www.volkskrant.nl/nieuws- achtergrond/tientallen-lichamen-aangespoeld-bij-libie-ergste-tragedie-op-zee-dit-jaar~bc3a40eb/ 71 Mixed Migration Centre, Quarterly Mixed Migration Update: West Africa, Quarter 2 (July) 2019, http://www.mixedmigration.org/wp- content/uploads/2019/07/qmmu-wa-q2-2019.pdf consulted on 23-07-2019 72 Mixed Migration Centre, Quarterly Mixed Migration Update: West Africa, Quarter 2 (July) 2019, http://www.mixedmigration.org/wp- content/uploads/2019/07/qmmu-wa-q2-2019.pdf consulted on 23-07-2019 73 European Committee, European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations, Sudan, 08-07-2019 https://ec.europa.eu/echo/where/africa/sudan_en, the country.74 Peace consultations were held in Ethiopia on 15 July and the warring parties reached a provisional agreement that the armed groups would be involved in the further development of a 75 interim government. On 17 August 2019, the various parties signed an agreement creating a new interim government that will be led by citizens.76 On 21 August, Chad closed its border with Sudanto to prevent the influx of refugees / migrants.77

Sudan as transit country Sudan remains an important reception and transit country for migrants from the Horn of Africa en route to Libya and / or Europe.78 Sudan accommodates more than 3 million people, both from their own country and from neighbouring countries.79 In June, Sudan reopened its border crossings with 80 Eritrea, following a consultation between the two governments.

3.2.3.2 Eritrea Despite the signing of the agreement with Ethiopia a year ago (Joint Declaration of Peace and Friendship), this has not led to a visible improvement in the living conditions of ordinary citizens, and there are no signs that anything will change soon. According to the UN rapporteur for Eritrea, the outflow of Eritreans from Eritrea will continue for as long as the human rights situation in the country does not improve and the government does not implement changes to basic freedoms. According to the rapporteur in her annual report to the UN Human Rights Commission, hundreds of 81 people per month continue to flee the country.

National military service is still one of the main reasons for migration. The rapporteur also expressed her deep concern about the continued use of indefinite and arbitrary detention and 82 disappearances.

Somalia and Djibouti now maintain good relations with the Eritrean government; they refused to sign a resolution in July 2019 that would extend the mandate of the UN rapporteur for Eritrea. However, due to the intervention of a number of countries, including the Netherlands, the mandate was extended.83

The Mixed Migration Centre reports that the border crossings with Ethiopia were closed by the Eritrean government as of April 2019. This does not lead to a reduced influx to Ethiopia - in the past quarter an average of 250-300 border crossings were recorded per day. Sudan reopened its border crossings with Eritrea in the second quarter, following a consultation between 84 the two governments.

In May 2019, the UNHCR decided to send Eritrean refugees to a reception camp in Niger as part of a resettlement plan. The Eritrean government indicated that this decision was unacceptable. ______74 UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Bachelet urges Sudan to restore freedoms, investigate violations and move swiftly to civilian rule, 03- 07-2019 https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=24785&LangID=E 75 Sudan Tribune, FFC agree to include peace preamble in Sudan’s interim constitutional declaration, 15-07-2019 http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article67781 76 UN Security Council, Security Council Press Statement on Sudan, 21-08-2019, https://www.un.org/press/en/2019/sc13927.doc.htm consulted on 23-08- 2019 77 APA News, Chad closes borders with Libya, Sudan, CAR, 21-08-2019, http://apanews.net/en/news/chad-closes-borders-with-libya-sudan-car 78 Mixed Migration Centre, Quarterly Mixed Migration Update: East Africa & Yemen, Quarter 2 2019, https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/qmmu-eay-q2-2019.pdf 79 European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations, Sudan, 08-07-2019 https://ec.europa.eu/echo/where/africa/sudan_en 80 Mixed Migration Centre, Quarterly Mixed Migration Update: East Africa & Yemen, Quarter 2 2019, https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/qmmu-eay-q2-2019.pdf 81 VOA, UN Rapporteur: Eritrea Exodus Will Continue in Absence of Reforms, 02-07-2019, https://www.voanews.com/africa/un-rapporteur-eritrea-exodus-will- continue-absence-reforms 82 VOA, UN Rapporteur: Eritrea Exodus Will Continue in Absence of Reforms, 02-07-2019, https://www.voanews.com/africa/un-rapporteur-eritrea-exodus-will- continue-absence-reforms 83 Human Rights Watch, UN Rights Body Maintains Scrutiny of Eritrea’s Dire Rights Record 12-07-2019 https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/07/12/un-rights- body-maintains-scrutiny-eritreas-dire-rights-record 84 Mixed Migration Centre, Quarterly Mixed Migration Update: East Africa & Yemen, Quarter 2 (July) 2019, https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/qmmu-eay-q2-2019.pdf The government further indicated that migrants voluntarily returned from Libya and that the UNHCR had to come up with a plan quickly for an appropriate reception arrangement. 85

3.2.4 Middle East

3.2.4.1 Yemen Political situation and safety In June 2019, the United Arab Emirates began to reduce their military presence in a coalition led by Saudi Arabia. For the past four years, Saudi Arabia had been relying heavily on the UAE in the conflict in Yemen with regard to air strikes, intelligence work, ground operations and training of anti-Houthi units. The UAE decided to withdraw due to the increased tensions between Iran and the US.86 The UAE fear increasing risk of becoming the battlefield in a widening conflict.87 After the Hodeidah deal at the end of 2018, a ceasefire was announced in Hodeidah. However, this ceasefire was again violated in mid-May 2019 by flaring battles between the Houthis and the Saudi coalition, after the Houthis claimed responsibility for a drone attack on two oil Saudi pumping plants.88 According to the deal, the Houthis and coalition troops should withdraw.89 In addition to the withdrawal of the warring parties from Hodeidah and the Houthis from Sanaa, the deal also 90 includes the exchange of prisoners of war and release of the airport in Sanaa. At the end of June 2019, President Abdrabu Mansur Hadi accused the special UN envoy Martin Griffiths of taking part in the Houthis. According to Hadi, the Houthis transferred control in 91 Hodeidah to troops loyal to them, which the UN would, blindly permitted. At the beginning of July 2019, the coalition forces including the UAE started the withdrawal in Hodeidah. On 1 August 2019, the Houthis launched multiple missile attacks on targets in Aden, killing at least 49 people. One of the attacks was on a military parade. The Yemeni Hadi government states that the Houthis were supported in these attacks by other groups such as Al-Qaeda and IS, but also the Iranian government. On 10 August 2019, Southern Separatists, the Southern Transitional Council (STC), supported by the United Arab Emirates, seized the presidential palace of the internationally recognized government in Aden. Because the port city of Aden is an important point for the supply of grain and fuel and it has been relatively stable there in recent years, a serious situation 92 93 threatens to arise again.

Humanitarian situation According to a UN report released in June 2019, 7500 children were reported to have been killed in the last 5.5 years as a result of air strikes, rocket attacks, fights, suicide attacks, mines, and other explosives. In the period 1 July 2019 - 13 July 2019, 2,123 households were displaced (12,738 94 individuals).

85 Mixed Migration Centre, Quarterly Mixed Migration Update: East Africa & Yemen, Quarter 2 2019, https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/qmmu-eay-q2-2019.pdf 86 International Crisis Group, Yemen, June 2019, https://www.crisisgroup.org/crisiswatch/june-2019#yemen 87 Middle East Eye, The UAE's Yemen withdrawal leaves Saudi Arabia exposed, 22 July 2019, https://www.middleeasteye.net/opinion/how-will-riyadh-cope- uaes-yemen-withdrawal 88 Reuters, Fighting grips Yemen's Hodeidah port, complicating peace moves, 15 May 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security/fighting-grips- yemens-hodeidah-port-complicating-peace-moves-idUSKCN1SL09C 89 Al Jazeera, UAE reduces military forces in Yemen amid Gulf tensions: Report, 28 June 2019, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/06/uae-reduces-military- forces-yemen-gulf-tensions-report-190628091853545.html 90 The National, Yemen's government to resume talks with the UN, 30 June 2019, https://www.thenational.ae/world/yemen-s-government-to-resume- talks- with-the-un-1.880897 91 The National, Yemen's government to resume talks with the UN, 30 June 2019, https://www.thenational.ae/world/yemen-s-government-to-resume- talks- with-the-un-1.880897 92 De Volkskrant, New front threatens te emerge in war-torn Yemen after occupation of presidential palace in Aden, August 11, 2019, https://www.volkskrant.nl/nieuws-achtergrond/nieuw-front-dreigt-in-door-oorlog-verscheurd-jemen-na-inname-presidentieel-paleis-in-aden~be65090d/ 93 Independent, Southern Yemen separatists seize presidential palace, tearing coalition apart and sparking fears of new war, 10 August 2019, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/yemen-news-separatists-war-aden-presidential-palace-abu-dhabi-a9051691.html 94 DTM-IOM Displacement Matrix, IOM Yemen: Rapid displacement tracking 1 to 13 July, https://displacement.iom.int/system/tdf/reports/15%20July_2019_%20Rapid%20Displacement%20Tracking%20Report.pdf?file=1&type=node&id=6238 3.2.4.2 Turkey After İmamoğlu won the first mayor election of 31 March 2019, Erdoğan declared the victory of İmamoğlu invalid and accused the opposition of fraud and support for terrorism.95 Under pressure from the AKP government, the Supreme Electoral Council decided that new mayor elections were to be held.96 On 23 June 2019, Ekrem İmamoğlu, candidate of the opposition party CHP, won the mayor election in Istanbul for the second time.

Istanbul is an important city, both politically and economically. Governance over Istanbul is seen as an important step towards ultimately governance across Turkey. Erdoğan, who was the mayor of Istanbul, made the changeover to the premiership and followed by the presidency in Ankara, fears that the opposition could gain further power in Turkey.97 Erdoğan's attempts to weaken and accuse the opposition of fraud and terrorism during these elections appear to have had an adverse effect on the outcome.

Gülen At the beginning of July 2019, the Turkish government ordered the arrest of 176 military officials on suspicion of ties with the Gülen movement. According to the Turkish Interior Minister, Süleyman Soylu, 9,903 anti-FETÖ operations have been carried out so far in 2019.

In June 2019, a court in Ankara sentenced 151 Gülen suspects to life imprisonment for being involved in the 2016 coup. The conviction of 128 of them for ‘violation of the constitution’ and 98 ‘attempted murder of the president’ leads to a heavier sentence regime in prison.

Turkey as reception and transit country In recent times, the attitude of the population and the policy towards the Syrian refugees in Turkey in particular has tightened up. The Turkish government has restricted the registration of Syrian refugees, making it more difficult for this group to get protection from the Turkish government. Checks have been carried out in Istanbul in recent weeks, during which thousands of irregular migrants were removed from the city. In the process forced evictions to Syria took place.99

3.2.4.3 Jordan On 4 August 2019, more than 660,000 Syrian refugees were registered in Jordan, of which 123,000 in camps and 537,000 outside camps. This situation is comparable to the previous language.100 Since the opening of the Jaber / Nassib border post between Jordan and Syria, around 20,000 Syrians are said to have returned, of whom 14,000 in 2019. However, most Syrians do not want to return due to compulsory military service and the lack of services and opportunities.101 Since 2016, more than 146,000 work permits have been issued to Syrians.102

95 Hürriyet Daily News, 300,000 operations held against terrorists: Interior Minister, 16-07-2019, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/300-000- operations-held-against-terrorists-interior-minister-144992 9696 The New York Times, Turkey orders new election for Istanbul Mayor, in setback for opposition, 06-05-2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/06/world/europe/turkey-istanbul-mayor-election.html 97 Economist, A re-election in Istanbul tests Presidents Erdogan’s power, 22-06-2019, https://www.economist.com/europe/2019/06/22/a-re-election-in- istanbul-tests-president-erdogans-power 98 France24, Turkish court sentences 151 to life in prison over failed 2016 coup, 20-06-2016, https://www.france24.com/en/20190620-turkey-court-sentences- 24-life-prison-failed-2016-coup 99 The National, Syrian refugees in Istanbul nervous over raids, arrests by Turkish authorities, 17-07-2019, https://www.thenational.ae/world/europe/syrian- refugees-in-istanbul-nervous-over-raids-arrests-by-turkish-authorities-1.887957 en Middle East Eye, Turkey deports hundreds of Syrian refugees to war-torn Idlib province, 22-07-2019, https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/hundreds-syrian-refugees-deported-idlib-turkey 100 UNHCR, 04-08-2019, Syria Regional Refugee Response Jordan, 15-08-2019, https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/syria/location/36 101 The Jordan Times, 05-07-2019, 20,000 Syrians have returned home since border reopening — UNHCR, 15-08-2019, http://www.jordantimes.com/news/local/20000-syrians-have-returned-home-border-reopening-%E2%80%94-unhcr 102 UNHCR, July 2019, Jordan Fact Sheet, 22-08-2019, https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/70665.pdf 3.2.4.4 Lebanon On 31 July 2019, more than 926,000 Syrian refugees were registered in Lebanon, spread among 103 approximately 211,000 households. It is a slight decrease compared to the end of March 2019.

In Lebanon, pressure seems to be being put on the Syrians to leave for Syria. For example, employers employing illegal Syrians can now be fined. However, a Lebanese investigator doubts whether this will lead to a return to Syria.104 Around a thousand Syrians returned to Syria at the end of July / beginning of August.105 Reasons for the Syrians not wanting to return are fear of conscription, arrests and the lack of basic services such as clean water, education and 106 healthcare.

In spring, the Lebanese Supreme Defence Council issued a decree that states that Syrians who enter Lebanon without valid documents after 24 April, will be deported. In the month of May, 300 Syrians were deported from Lebanon.107 In addition, Syrian children who were not born in Lebanon and who are younger than 15 years old can no longer receive legal residence on the basis of their parents' Lebanese sponsor.108

3.2.4.5 Iraq IS seems to be becoming more active in Iraq (and Syria). It is estimated that between 14,000 and 18,000 IS fighters are active in these countries. They are involved in killing people, committing 109 suicide attacks, burning harvests, extortion, kidnapping for ransom.

Return The IOM Iraq DTM Return Index, Findings Round Four, from July 2019 with data from March and April 2019 states that the number of returnees has increased again, but the number of returnees staying in serious or bad circumstances has also increased.110 The total number of IDPs at the end of June was 1,607,148 people.111About 300,000 of them are from Mosul. Two years after their return, they still have problems due to lack of houses and lack of new documents that have to replace lost documents.112

Minorities in northern Iraq, such as the Yezidis and the Shabak, are still afraid to return to their original place of residence prior to the arrival of IS in 2014 due to the poor security situation, destroyed agricultural land and inadequate water and electricity supplies.113

Iraq as reception country On July 31, 2019, nearly 229,000 Syrian refugees registered in Iraq, spread among 68,561 households.114 It is a slight decrease compared to the end of April.

103 UNHCR, 31-07-2019, Syria Regional Refugee Response Lebanon, 20-08-2019, https://data2.unhcr.org/ar/situations/syria/location/71 104 The Arab Weekly, 25-07-2019, Lebanon ups pressure on Syrian refugees to return, 20-08-2019, https://thearabweekly.com/lebanon-ups-pressure-syrian- refugees-return 105 AsiaNews.it, 04-08-2019, Caritas Lebanon: repatriation of a few thousand Syrian refugees "a drop in the ocean", 20-08-2019, http://www.asianews.it/news-en/Caritas-Lebanon:-repatriation-of-a-few-thousand-Syrian-refugees-a-drop-in-the-ocean--46720.html 106 Oxfam, 05-08-2019, Returning to Syria still "a distant dream" for refugees, 20-08-2019, https://www.oxfamamerica.org/explore/stories/returning-syria- still-distant-dream-refugees/ 107 Foreign Policy, 14-08-2019, Time Is Running Out for Syrians in Lebanon, 22-08-2019, https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/08/14/time-is-running-out-for- syrians-in-lebanon/ 108 Human Rights Watch, 05-07-2019, Lebanon: Syrian Refugee Shelters Demolished, 22-08-2019, https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/07/05/lebanon-syrian- refugee-shelters-demolished 109 Business Insider, 09-08-2019, A scathing new Pentagon report blames Trump for the return of ISIS in Syria and Iraq, 23-08-2019, https://www.businessinsider.nl/pentagon-blames-trump-for-return-of-isis-syria-and-iraq-2019-8?international=true&r=US 110 IOM Iraq, 29-07-2019, IOM Iraq DTM Return Index: Findings Round Four (July 2019), 23-08-2019, https://reliefweb.int/report/iraq/iom-iraq-dtm-return- index-findings-round-four-july-2019 111 IOM, 30-06-2019, Iraq Mission. Displacement Tracking Matrix, 23-08-2019, http://iraqdtm.iom.int/ 112 Norwegian Refugee Council, 04-07-2019, Mosul: Over 300,000 still unable to go back home two years since end of war, 26-08-2019, https://www.nrc.no/news/2019/july/mosul-over-300000-still-unable-to-go-back-home-two-years-since-end-of-war/ 113 European Union External Action, 07-07-2019, Yazidis in Iraq fear returning home, 23-08-2019, https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters- Homepage/65109/yazidis-iraq-fear-returning-home_et en European Union External Action, 10-07-2019, Iraq's religious minorities fear to return home, 23-08-2019, https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters- Homepage/65249/iraqs-religious-minorities-fear-return-home_et 114 UNHCR, 31-07-2019, Syria Regional Refugee Response Iraq, 23-08-2019, https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/syria/location/5 3.2.5 Latin America

3.2.5.1 Colombia In the first months of 2019, it became clear that the 2016 peace agreement between the Colombian government and the FARC did not bring the long-awaited peace and stability that many hoped for. The departure of the FARC from the outer and border areas has created a power vacuum for armed groups. Because the Colombian government is unable to guarantee security in these areas to date, a situation has arisen where armed militias and drug gangs are fighting over control in these former FARC / drug areas. It leads to civilian casualties, disappearances of civilians, sexual violence, the recruitment of minors and forced displacements of civilians. In the report The War in Catatumbo, Human Rights Watch speaks of forced displacement of more than 40,000 civilians in the Catatumbo area in the border region with Venezuela. The unsafe situation in the border region with Venezuela also affects the Venezuelan refugees who are staying there. Part of this vulnerable group of people is forced to work on coca plantations and many women end up in 115 the sex industry.

A former commander of the FARC has announced that the FARC will take up arms again because, according to his statement, the Colombian government is not complying with the peace agreement. The commander, Iván Márquez, was closely involved in the peace negotiations of three years ago. The fact that he is now turning away from the peace agreement may be an announcement of its 116 breakup.

Colombia as reception country On 5 August 2019, President Iván Duque announced that more than 25,000 Venezuelan children born in Colombia whose parents fled to Colombia would be granted Colombian nationality.118

3.2.5.2 Nicaragua There is unrest and violence in Nicaragua. Demonstrations directed against President Ortega's regime escalated due to the use of heavy force by the police and pro-government militias: many people were killed and wounded and many demonstrators were arrested and imprisoned. Talks with the opposition alliance, the so-called Alianza Cívica, followed in March 2019, after which 119 agreements were made about the release of demonstrators and political prisoners.

In May 2019 it actually came to an amnesty arrangement for some of the arrested demonstrators. However, the amnesty scheme applies to both arrested protesters and perpetrators of the violence (police officers and pro-government militias). Moreover, released political prisoners are no longer 120 allowed to engage in anti-government demonstrations.

115 HRW, The War in Catatumbo, 08-08-2019, https://www.hrw.org/report/2019/08/08/war-catatumbo/abuses-armed-groups-against-civilians-including- venezuelan-exiles 116 The New York Times, Colombia’s former FARC guerilla leader calls for return to war, 29-08-2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/29/world/americas/colombia-farc-rebel-war.html 117 The New York Times, Colombia’s former FARC guerilla leader calls for return to war, 29-08-2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/29/world/americas/colombia-farc-rebel-war.html 118 UN News, Colombia offers nationality rights to Venezuelan children born there: UN hails ‘very important step’, 06-08-2019, https://news.un.org/en/story/2019/08/1043771 119 VOA News, Nicaragua Opposition Demands Conditions for Resuming Talks, 19-03-2019, https://www.voanews.com/americas/nicaragua-opposition- demands-conditions-resuming-talks 120 The Guardian, Nicaragua frees more than 100 political prisoners under new amnesty law, 11-06-2019, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jun/11/nicaragua-political-prisoners-released-new-law In Nicaragua, there has been a de facto siege,121 since the end of 2018, which was confirmed in July 2019 when President Ortega stated that he no longer reigned as president of the country but 122 as commander-in-chief of the national police in a police state.

The Alianza Cívica wants civil liberties to be restored and early elections to be held. However, President Ortega has been refusing to comply with these demands up to now: the next elections are scheduled for 2021. The president is confident about the outcome of these elections; his 123 (Sandinista) movement would be ready to win the elections in 2021.

3.2.5.3 Venezuela The report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), published in July, mentions a violation of all human rights. The OHCHR is concerned that the outflow of Venezuelan refugees will continue to grow and the situation of those left behind will deteriorate if 124 improvements are not made.

Impact of Venezuelans on Aruba, Bonaire and Curacao The Working Group of the Organization of American States (OAS) writes in its report on the regional consequences of the large outflow of migrants from Venezuela published in July that several Caribbean countries are violating the basic rules of international refugee law. For example, in Curacao Venezuelans are detained and deported without these people having access to a fair trial in the country. Venezuelans are not registered and therefore receive no international 125 protection or other residence status, which forces them to become illegal.

In connection with the crisis in Venezuela, the Cabinet decided on 26 April this year to reserve an amount of € 23.8 million in the Spring Memorandum for assistance to the immigration chains in Aruba and Curacao. In consultation with the implementing organizations in the Netherlands and with the countries of Aruba and Curacao, DMB is finalizing a plan of approach. For the IND, this will include the temporary deployment of IND staff in the second half of 2019 and in 2020 to support the immigration services on Aruba and Curacao in the asylum process.

On 5 August this year, it was announced that Curacao and Trinidad and Tobago had reached an agreement on a direct flight between the two countries.126 This new direct flight may possibly form a new route for Venezuelans who want to flee to Curacao.

3.2.6 Balkans, Albania The fall of the communist regime in 1992 marked the start of a large-scale exodus of Albanians to the EU in particular. The United Nations Development Program estimated the Gross National Income per capita for 2017 at 11,886 USD. The Albanians scored their 'overall life satisfaction' in 127 2017 with a score of 4.6 out of ten points.

121 The legal and constitutional basis is missing up to now. 122 El Confidencial, State of Siege is the new “Normalicy” in Nicaragua, 28-11-2018, https://confidencial.com.ni/state-of-siege-is-the-new-normalicy-in- nicaragua/; El Confidencial, Nicaragua: Political Reform and Elections in 2020, 30-07-2019, https://confidencial.com.ni/nicaragua-political-reform-and- elections-in-2020/ 123 The New York Times, Vatican Envoy: Nicaraguan Government Says Talks 'Concluded', 01-08-2019, https://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2019/08/01/world/americas/ap-lt-nicaragua.html 124 Human Rights Council, Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the situation of Human rights in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela , Human rights in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 05-07-2019, https://reliefweb.int/report/venezuela-bolivarian-republic/report-united- nations-high-commissioner-human-rights-situation 125 OAS, OAS Working Group to Address the Regional Crisis Caused by Venezuela’s Migrant and Refugee Flows, July2019, http://shapersforvenezuela.com/wp- content/uploads/2019/07/OAS-Working-Group-to-Address-the-Regional-Crisis-Caused-by-Venezuelas-Migrant-and-Refugee-Flows.pdf 126 Curacao Chronicle, New flight between Curacao and Trinidad and Tobago to strengthen ties among countries, 05-08-2019, https://www.curacaochronicle.com/post/main/new-flight-between-curacao-and-trinidad-and-tobago-to-streghthen-ties-among-countries/ 127 United Nations Development Programme, Human development indices and indicators, 2018 statistical update, http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/2018_human_development_statistical_update.pdf The country is plagued by crime and corruption. Prime Minister Rama and his Socialist Party are regularly associated with corruption and crime. The opposition regularly organizes protest demonstrations. A demonstration of 11 May ended up in violence. However, the main opposition party, the Democratic Party, is also associated with corruption and crime. Local elections took place on 30 June 2019. They were largely boycotted by the opposition. Irregularities were reported 128 during these elections.

It is expected that in October, the European Council will take a decision on starting accession negotiations with Albania. The prospect is for the European Council to decide that Albania is not 129 ready to start accession negotiations because Albania is not yet ready for it.

3.2.7 Eastern Europe, Moldavia The United Nations Development Program estimated the Gross National Income per capita for 2017 at 5,554 USD. In 2017, the Moldovans scored their overall life satisfaction 5.3 out of ten points.130

Parliamentary elections took place on 24 February 2019, with the three largest parties together holding 81 out of 101 seats. It concerns the Democratic Party of the then President Plahotniuc, the pro-Russian Socialist Party and the pro-EU bloc called ACUM. The Socialist Party and ACUM eventually concluded a government coalition with each other in June. It was followed by a struggle for power with the government of Plahotniuc who refused to resign. Under pressure from both Western countries and Moscow, the government of Plahotniuc surrendered on 14 June 2019. On 9 July 2019, the parliament approved an impeachment procedure against the Advocate General, who is seen as defending the interests of the former President Plahotniuc.131 Plahotniuc regime is generally regarded as oligarchic and corrupt. The new government has announced that it wants to fight corruption. As a reward for the good course the country is taking, the EU has promised an amount of 45 million euros in aid.132

On 7 August, the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee in Ter Apel arrested two Moldavians on suspicion of human trafficking. The two men transported ten people from Moldova in a van. These 133 ten people applied for asylum.

128 Al Jazeera, A disputed election leaves Albania's democracy in tatters, 01-07-2019, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/07/disputed-election-leaves- albania-democracy-tatters-190701195743565.html 129 The Guardian, Edi Rama, Albania's unconventional PM who wants to escape the 'curse of history', 10-06-2019, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jun/10/edi-rama-albania-pm-escape-curse-of-history 130 United Nations Development Programme, Human development indices and indicators, 2018 statistical update, http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/2018_human_development_statistical_update.pdf 131 The New York Times, Moldova Had Two Governments. One Has Finally Resigned, 14-06-2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/14/world/europe/moldova-new-government.html 132 RFE/RL, Moldovan Prime Minister Secures $45 Million In Aid In Brussels, 25-07-2019, https://www.rferl.org/a/moldovan-prime-minister-secures-45-million- in-aid-in-brussels/30074269.html; RFERL, EU To Unblock Some Financial Aid To Moldova Due To Reform Progress, 15-07-2019 https://www.rferl.org/a/moldova-eu-aid-hahn-/30057151.html 133 Dagblad van het Noorden, Two Moldavians arrested in Ter Apel for human smuggling, 08-08-2019, https://www.dvhn.nl/groningen/Twee- Moldavi%C3%ABrs-opgepakt-in-Ter-Apel-wegens-mensensmokkel- 24717091.html?harvest_referrer=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.google.com%2Furl%3Fsa%3Dt%26rct%3Dj%26q%3D%26esrc%3Ds%26source%3Dweb%26cd%3D 3% 26ved%3D2ahUKEwiOq_eE_fzjAhXKDewKHZdZATMQFjACegQIARAB%26url%3Dhttps%253A%252F%252Fwww.dvhn.nl%252Fgroningen%252FTwee - Moldavi%2525C3%2525ABrs-opgepakt-in-Ter-Apel-wegens-mensensmokkel-24717091.html%26usg%3DAOvVaw2uzcPY7yaFv1TdNq16cN2F 4. (Policy) developments

4.1 European policy The most important European and international developments are listed in the diagram below. One of these developments is the more negative attitude towards Syrians in Lebanon and Turkey. For example, the High Defence Council of Lebanon decided to dismantle unauthorized permanent buildings that host refugees in Lebanon.134 In Italy, tensions within the government have led to adaptation of the "safety decree" regarding the Italian navigation code and sanctioning of people rescuing migrants at sea. The Italian government fell in August. The new government consists of the social democratic PD and the populist five-star movement, again under the leadership of Conte. An informal JHA Council took place at the end of July with France and Germany proposing a temporary disembarkation mechanism and automatic redistribution among Member States.135 Meanwhile, Italy, Malta, Germany and France reached an agreement on the reception of migrants at the end of September, this agreement will be presented to other European member states on 8 136 October.

Diagram 4.1 Time line of the European and international policy developments

April-July 23 May 27 June 18-19 July 24 September Tightening of the Adjustment of the Support package for JHA Council Agreement between IT, DE, FR policy regarding Salvini “safety decree’ Syrian refugees disembarkation & MT over transition Syrians

May-June 7 June 7 July 13 August European elections + EUROPOL and FRONTEX New Cabinet in Greece The fall of the Italian government Strategic agenda action plan and the new government in September

4.2 Dutch policy The diagram below shows the most important Dutch policy developments. The Dutch-flagged rescue vessel Sea-Watch 3 was released on 1 June after it was seized by the Italian judicial authorities. 137 Following the sharp increase in human trafficking declarations at the start of 2019, the policy regards granting of B8 / 3 residence permits to Dublin claimants changed. 138 In addition, the general official reports have led to a number of changes in the country-related asylum policy for Afghanistan, Iran and Libya.

Diagram 4.2 Time line of (policy) developments in the Netherlands

June-July 1 July August 1 August Sea -watch developments Adjustment of the country-based Measures against influx Adjustment of the policy regarding human asylum policy of asylum seekers from Georgia trafficking residence permits to Dublin claimants

134 Al Jazeera, ‘Lebanon troops demolish Syrian refugee homes as deadline expires’, from 01-07-2019, found on: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/07/lebanon-troops-demolish-syrian-refugee-homes-deadline-expires-190701111106849.html 135 Letter to Parliament ‘Report of the informal JHA Council on 18-19 July 2019 in Helsinki’ from 22-08-2019 136 Volkskrant, Four countries reached an agreement on reception, 24-09- 2019 137 Trouw, ‘Rescue boat Sea-Watch 3 may sail again’, from https://www.trouw.nl/nieuws/reddingsschip-sea-watch-3-mag-weer-varen~b911ae73/ 138 Letter to Parliament ‘Human trafficking’, from 28-06- 1995