ARIS & PHILLIPS CLASSICAL TEXTS JULIUS CAESAR The Civil War Books I & II

EDITED WITH AN INTRODUCTION, TRANSLATION & COMMENTARY BY T. M. Carter THE CIVIL WAR I & II De Bello Civili Aris & Phillips is an imprint of Oxbow Books Published in the United Kingdom by OXBOW BOOKS 10 Hythe Bridge Street, Oxford 0X1 2EW and in the United States by OXBOW BOOKS 908 Darby Road, Havertown, PA 19083

©J. M. Carter 1991 First printed 1991 Reprinted 2014 Paperback Edition: ISBN 978-0-85668-462-3 A CIP record for this book is available from the British Library All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical including photocopying, recording or by any information storage and retrieval system, without permission from the publisher in writing.

For a complete list of Aris & Phillips titles, please contact: UNITED KINGDOM UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Oxbow Books Oxbow Books Telephone (01865) 241249 Telephone (800) 791-9354 Fax (01865) 794449 Fax (610) 853-9146 Email: [email protected] Email: [email protected] www.oxbowbooks.com www.casemateacademic.com/oxbow Oxbow Books is part of the Casemate Group CONTENTS vii AcknowledgementIntroduction s I The Late Republican background 1 II Caesar's command in Gaul 7 III Pompey*s strategy in Italy 13 IV Composition and purpose of the Bellum Civile 16 V Literary style and character 21 VI Narrative technique 24 VII The text 28 Table of dates 31 Select bibliography & abbreviations 32 I Editions and translations 33 II Works referred to 33 III Abbreviations 36 THE CIVIL WAR - text and translation 37 BOOK I 38 BOOK II 110 COMMENTARY 151 BOOK I 153 BOOK II 215 Index to the text 239

Maps I Italy 171 II Spain 193 III Africa (Gulf of Tunis) 229 vii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS My thanks are due to Royal Holloway and Bedford New College, and to the British Academy, for making possible a period of sustained study at the Fondation Hardt in 1988; to Geoffrey Kaye of IBM for making available, free of charge, his concordancing program KAYE; to various friends and colleagues, particularly Rosalind Thomas, Boris Rankov, and Paul Tweddle, for sundry help and advice; but above all to Malcolm Willcock, the general editor of the series, for his interest and countless valuable comments, and to Stephen Usher, without whose initial suggestion and encouragement this edition would not exist. Needless to say, the responsibility for any shortcomings remains entirely mine, but without the support of all these people this would have been a much poorer book. And last, but emphatically not least, I should like to thank my wife, who has patiently lived with a much longer period of literary gestation than she, or I, ever anticipated.

Royal Holloway & Bedford New College University of London December 18th 1990 INTRODUCTION

I. The Character of Late Republican Politics and the Antecedents of the War The Roman aristocracy was an aristocracy of wealth and office, not of birth. The republican constitution called for a pair of annually elected chief magistrates, the consuls, to whom was entrusted executive responsibility for the welfare of the state, including command of its army in the field.1 The history of Rome was one of successful expansion through more or less continuous war, waged by a citizen army conscripted as required and commanded by the magistrates who happened to be in office. This expansion not only increased the power of the state and the wealth of individuals, but also by its success ensured that the link between elected office and military responsibility remained an unquestioned part of the Roman system. There was no separation of military and civil career, because the army was the state in military guise. Very early in the process, it seems, the winning of public status by the holding of high office, and above all the winning of glory by military success during a necessarily brief tenure of command, came to be the goals of the Roman elite. Such achievements conferred honour and authority on a man, and brought his views respect when matters of public policy and concern were debated. Besides establishing him as a person of importance in society, they also ensured him a role as patron and protector of others at all levels, from friends and political proteges of his own class to humble farmers on his 1 This was always the theoretical position, but after 80 B.C. (although there are many exceptions, see Balsdon) it was not the normal practice for a consul to have command of an army during his year of office. This task passed to proconsuls of individual provinces while the consuls remained in Rome in their civilian capacity as chief executives of state. 2 De Bello Civili estates. Thus it was the ambition of any Roman who embarked on public life to become consul. Since office was unpaid, wealth was a prerequisite for a public career, and the magistrates were drawn exclusively from the landowning upper class. During the early Republic a number of subordinate magistracies had been created or adapted to meet particular needs. By the early second century B.C. these had been arranged into a regular sequence, so that to become a legitimate, and plausible, candidate for election to the consulship a man would normally have to hold three or four previous posts (all annual) with at least a two-year interval between each, starting not before the age of thirty after some preliminary officer service with the legions. Each of these posts had to be competed for by election in one or other of the two Roman political assemblies,2 which all registered adult male citizens were entitled to attend - though in practice it was mostly those who actually lived in or near Rome who did so. Once elected to the most junior of these magistracies, the quaestorship, a man became (for life, unless deeply disgraced and expelled) a member of the senate, the deliberative body of the state, which was composed of all ex-magistrates, was presided over by the consuls, and numbered, by the end of the Republic, about 600 senators. The senate lacked real constitutional power, being in origin merely the advisory council of the consuls (and before them, of the kings), but custom and convenience placed in its hands many administrative decisions, in particular those concerning finance and foreign and provincial affairs. Its collective experience also gave it immense prestige and authority. But since in debate senators spoke in order of seniority, and at as great a length as they chose, a voice was practically denied to any but ex-consuls and serving magistrates or magistrates-elect. It was also necessary to have attained either the consulship or the next senior office, the praetorship (of which there were eight each year in the last period of the Republic) to become one of the annual governors (proconsuls) of the ten or so overseas provinces which existed in the first century B.C. These proconsuls, like the consuls in Rome, exercised supreme authority, both military and civilian, in their areas, and by the end of the Republic it was only3 by holding such a post that a man could hope to command an army in the field and thus be in a position to win the military glory so coveted by the Roman noble. It was not particularly difficult for an ambitious man, given the necessary wealth and the right connections, to enter on a public career and

2 The comitia centuriata and the comitia tribute or concilium plebis. 3 But see n.l above. Introduction 3 become a senator, but it was another matter to reach the top, and reap the spectacular rewards of power, status, and money - this last not emphasised in the contemporary sources, but obviously important. Every step required election, and the competition became increasingly fierce as one climbed the ladder - the cursus honorum - which led from the quaestorship to the consulship (for which the law laid down a minimum age of 42). The Roman people liked to elect its magistrates from established senatorial families, but although a man who could claim consular ancestors was at an advantage it was by no means certain that such an aristocrat would defeat a newcomer, as Cicero's surviving speech pro Plancio demonstrates. Patronage and influence commanded votes, but not enough of them, and so in the late Republic there occurred a great intensification of other ways of winning support - notably by the provision of free dinners, the staging of ever more lavish public entertainments and spectacles, and the practice of more or less overt bribery. The peculiarities of the voting system in the assemblies, and the fact that presence in person' was required, also opened the way to intimidation, whether by hired thugs or by interested parties, such as soldiers or veterans who in their role as citizen-voters were legitimate participants in the process. And since the electoral assemblies also functioned as the sovereign law-making bodies of the state, it was possible for populist magistrates to embark on legislative activity designed to benefit the ordinary Roman and win the politician concerned an enthusiastic following. Here the office of tribune of the people (plebs) was of great importance, because not only did the tribunes (of whom there were ten) have die right to summon the assembly and put legislation to it, but they also enjoyed the right of vetoing any act or decision of the senate or of any regular magistrate (including the consuls and the other tribunes). The tribunate with its remarkable and potentially revolutionary powers was really an anomalous survival from the very different social and political conditions of the fifth century B.C., but it had become one of the normal 'career' magistracies. In spite of its name (meaning something like 'officer' or 'representative' of the people) it was by the late Republic as much the monopoly of the senatorial class as any other elected office. And in spite of its power, it was held by men who were nearer the beginning than the end of their political careers. The tribunate is rightly identified as an irritant in the body politic. A tribune, working in alliance with a consul or proconsul - above all when that man could command the loyalty, and therefore the votes, of citizen-soldiers who had served under him - could be a most effective political tool. This was why L. Sulla in 81-80 B.C., wishing at the conclusion of a civil war to establish the senate as the centre of gravity of politics and diminish the democratic element in the constitution, decided to curb the powers of the tribunes (see I.7.2n.). 4 De Bello Civili It is against this background of ambition, competitiveness, and political institutions adequate for a city-state but unsuitable for running an empire, that the relationship of Gaius Julius Caesar (100 - 44 B.C.) and Gnaeus Pompeius Magnus (106 - 48 B.C.) must be set. The latter's public career began in the civil wars of 88 - 80 when he supported Sulla against the political heirs of C. Marius, and he exploited events to such effect that he was able to break every rule in (he constitutional book. He commanded armies in Italy, Africa, and Spain, earned two triumphs, and became consul in 70 B.C. (at the age of 36, six years before the legal minimum), all without ever having held elected office or been admitted to the senate. He chose not to govern a province after his consulship, but in 67, by a law (Lex Gabinia) passed in the assembly with popular support against the traditionalists, he was granted a novel and immensely powerful Mediterranean-wide command to deal with the pirate scourge which was disrupting not merely trade but vital food supplies to Rome. Succeeding brilliantly within the space of a few months, he was immediately appointed by the same popular means (Lex Manilia, 66 B.C.) to take over a long- running war in Asia Minor, Armenia, and Syria, against Mithridates, King of Pontus. Rapid victory enabled him to make a diplomatic settlement and readjustment of alliances along the entire eastern border of Rome's empire, from the Black Sea to Palestine, and he returned to Rome in 62 as the greatest conqueror of the age, to be voted a third triumph which he celebrated in 61. Caesar's early career, by contrast, was normal. Six years younger than Pompey, he was too young to take any serious part in the civil war of the 80s, in which he was none the less firmly identified as a Marian supporter. His aunt Julia was Marius1 wife, and his own wife Cornelia was the daughter of Cinna, the Marian leader who after Marius' death held four successive consulships during Sulla's absence in the east. Pardoned by Sulla, he proceeded in due time regularly up the cursus honorum and began to make his mark in the sixties as a popular politician, organising magnificent gladiatorial shows, attempting to pass controversial laws through the assembly, and securing election, at vast expense, to the office of High Priest (Pontifex maximus), a life-long appointment more prestigious and political than religious by our standards. In some or all of these activities he was aided by M. Licinius Crassus, a man of distinguished family and great wealth. Crassus was a little older than Pompey, had been like him an active supporter of Sulla in the 80s, and was now something of a political patron. It seems that he and Caesar were attempting to steal some of Pompey's political clothes while the great man was away in the east. Introduction 5 Thus an alliance between the three did not appear at all probable. Yet it came about, through the obstinacy of those, notably the younger Cato, who disapproved of actions that failed to conform to the mos maiorum, the way things had always been done. This group believed in the principle of collective oligarchic government, disliked popular legislation that had not been first considered and approved by the senate, and objected to excessive power or privilege granted to individuals. By refusing special requests from Crassus and Caesar, and by persistently blocking ratification of Pompey's eastern settlement and failing to agree rewards for his discharged soldiers, they forced the three of them, some time in 60, into an unofficial compact inaccurately but conveniently known as the 'first triumvirate'. By this Pompey would join Crassus in supporting Caesar's candidature for the consulship of 59, and when Caesar became consul he would see that legislation was put through to satisfy each of them: for himself, a great command; for Crassus, a rebate to a tax-company, with which he had close links, which had overbid on the normally lucrative contract to collect the taxes of the province of Asia; for Pompey, ratification of his diplomatic settlement and provision of land for his veterans. The compact was sealed by the marriage of Caesar's daughter Julia to Pompey. The alliance was completely successful in attaining its aims, but at the cost of illegality, because Caesar refused to recognise the validity of his colleague Bibulus' claim to be 'watching the heavens for omens' - a claim which should have caused the suspension of the legislative process, even though it was manifestly a cynical blocking tactic. Caesar was also not above using force, or the threat of it, at the voting assembly, by appealing to Pompey's veterans. In addition, he won the favour of the Roman populace by legislating for the distribution to them, as smallholdings, of the extraordinarily rich land in Campania owned by the state and hitherto leased to wealthy private individuals. Thus the 'triumvirate' gained a solid base of support amongst various categories of the citizens, at the price of alienating some moderate senatorial opinion (for example, Cicero) by their disregard of constitutional proprieties and upper-class property rights, and of so offending the group symbolised by Cato and Bibulus that these men's overriding political aim became to take vengeance on Caesar and bring his career to an end. The vicissitudes of Roman politics between 59 and 49 are almost too well documented in the contemporary letters and speeches of Cicero, and the details are not in general important for an understanding of Caesar's Civil War. Caesar himself devoted these years chiefly to the conquest of Gaul, establishing himself as a military commander and extender of the empire to rival Pompey. He also worked tirelessly, especially in the later 6 De Bello Civili part of the period, to build and maintain his political support, using the profits of his Gallic campaigns to finance ambitious public building schemes in the capital, pay the debts of young aristocrats, and generally offer assistance to all those who were prepared to turn to him for any reason. Early in 56 the working arrangement with Pompey and Crassus, its immediate aims attained, had almost collapsed, not least through the populist political activities of an ambitious and unscrupulous young aristocrat, P. Clodius Pulcher, but was patched up (with arrangements referred to in the following section) at a meeting held at Luca in the spring of that year. Its final failure was brought about by the death of Julia, of whom Pompey was genuinely fond, in childbirth in 54, and by the death of Crassus at the hands of the Parthians in the Syrian desert in 53. The way now lay open for the enemies of Caesar to make overtures to Pompey: in alliance with them he could bring Caesar to heel and enjoy an undisputed position as the greatest military figure of the age, senior statesman, counsellor of the Republic, and champion of senatorial government. The violence and anarchy then current in die capital gave rise at the beginning of 52 to the circumstances under which Pompey became sole consul (see the following section) and it must have been at about this time that he decided to throw in his lot with Caesar's enemies - a move clearly signalled by his marriage to the daughter of one of them, Q. Metellus Scipio (cf 1.1- 2,4). Thus Pompey ended his political career where it had begun, in the arms of the aristocracy whom Sulla had attempted to entrench in power thirty years previously after his victory over the Marians. Given the ethos of Roman political competition, and the status, resources, and determination of the contenders, a bruising struggle for supremacy was inevitable, although it was not until 50 that men began seriously to forecast war. As to the nature of the conflict, modern writers tend to emphasise its structural factors, as for example Christian Meier: 'the more the Republic depended on the great individuals, the more they were resisted. The more they were resisted, the more they had to strive to win further power, and the more dangerous they became. In this struggle the institutions of the Republic were worn down...'.4 Raaflaub and Gruen have shown that, although the political culture of the time valued personal dominance, a civil war was by no means inevitable and that even in 51 and 50 Romans were not polarised between Pompeians and Caesarians: Caesar was manoeuvring to defend his own position. In antiquity, elements of character seemed more important, 4 Between Republic and Empire: Interpretations of Augustus and his Principate, ed. K. A. Raaflaub and M. Toher (Univ. of California Pr., Berkeley etc., 1990), p. 59. Introduction 7 though there was no agreement about the motivation for Caesar's drive to power. What we now see is a struggle for personal power at the expense of the state' wrote Cicero in December 50 (An. 7.3.4), and in de Officiis (III.82) he says that Caesar was fond of quoting Euripides to the effect that if the law was to be broken, it should be done to achieve personal rule. Plutarch, Dio, and others took the same view as Cicero, emphasising the deep-seated character of Caesar's lust for domination (philarchia). The epic poet Lucan attempted to dignify this trait by investing Caesar with heroic qualities, but could not sustain the effort. On the other side there were those who saw him as actuated by more immediate motives. Pompey, according to Suetonius (Divus Iulius 30.2), alleged that Caesar wanted to create chaos because he could not satisfy the expectations he had created amongst the people of Rome, while others thought he was afraid of the legal vengeance threatened by Cato and his allies - a view close to Caesar's own, that he went to war at least in part to defend his standing (dignitas) against a long-laid plot to undo him (see commeiitary on 1.85).

II. The Dispute over Caesar's Tenure of Gaul When Caesar became consul in 59, the tribune Vatinius carried a law which gave him the provinces of Cisalpine Gaul and Illyricum for five years, until March 1, 54 (Cic. Prov. Cons. 37); and to these the senate shortly afterwards, at Pompey's instigation, added Transalpine Gaul when that province fell vacant through the death of its governor. In 56 the triple alliance of Pompey, Crassus, and Caesar, the 'first triumvirate', was re• formed after almost disintegrating. As a result violence and obstruction of various kinds were systematically employed to block the elections and ensure that the year 55 opened without consuls, so that Pompey and Crassus could, under the archaic procedures of an interregnum, in effect be nominated without opposition to the consulship. They then received five- year commands in Spain and Syria respectively under a law proposed by the tribune Trebonius, and protected Caesar's position by themselves passing a law (the Lex Licinia Pompeia) which prolonged his command in Gaul for a further five years. This law appears to have fixed the limit of his tenure by a mechanism which is discussed below but cannot have been unclear or problematic in 55. By 53 political anarchy in Rome was so severe that the consuls of that year were unable to hold the elections for their successors and 52 opened without regular magistrates. A prime factor in the anarchy was the intense and violent rivalry between T. Annius Milo and P. Clodius Pulcher, the one 8 De Bello Civili a candidate for the consulship, the other for the praetorship. Both men had gangs of armed supporters who terrorised ordinary voters and fought with each other. There was even talk of the necessity for a dictatorship. The situation was resolved by the murder of Clodius, on January 18th, at the hands of Milo's retainers in a chance wayside encounter between the two men not far from Rome. The breakdown of public order was such that at Clodius1 funeral his followers were able to light an impromptu pyre for him in the Forum which spread to the Senate House and burnt it down. As a result Pompey, who in spite of holding the governorship of Spain since 54 had adopted the unprecedented course of leaving the province to his legati Varro, Petreius, and Afranius, while he himself stayed in the vicinity of Rome and exercised his supervision of the corn-supply (see 1.85.8n.), was called upon to accept an equally unprecedented sole consulship and use his prestige and authority to deal with the situation. It was in this context, with Pompey's personal power sharply enhanced, that in March 52 a special law was passed (Law of the Ten Tribunes) specifically permitting Caesar to stand for the consulship in absence, but apparently not naming any particular year in which he might do this (1.9.2, 32.3; Suet. DJ 26.1; Cic. An. 7.3.4, 7.7.6, Fam. 8.8.9 fin.). This privilege was only of value to Caesar if he retained his province while securing election to the consulship of the following year, so that he could pass straight from proconsulship to consulship without relinquishing the imperium (military and executive authority) which he had held continuously since 59 and becoming, for however short an interval, a private citizen open to prosecution at the hands of his enemies for the various illegalities of his first consulship (a view which has been questioned in modern scholarship but is surely correct, see I.9.2n.); nor would he have to go through a period when, although consul-elect, it was still possible for him to be brought to trial for offences alleged to have been committed in connection with the elections. A second advantage was that he would not have to depart for Rome when the campaigning season had hardly started in order to present himself as a candidate before the elections, which were held in July or August; by standing in absence, he would secure a whole campaigning season in the year in which he was a candidate and - assuming he stood in 50, as was evidently at one stage the expectation (Cic. Fam. 8.8.9, written Oct. 51) - would not therefore effectively have to forgo the final year of the five (54 - 50) which were envisaged by the Lex Licinia Pompeia of 55. The privilege5 seems to have 5 Some doubt about the validity of the privilege was created when Pompey subsequently passed a general law on magistracies which inter alia laid it down that all candidates for office should present themselves in person for election; a Introduction 9 been designed as a kind of compensation for Pompey's third consulship in 52, to allow Caesar the prospect of a consulship in 50 or, more probably, 49 (the possibility that he might not be elected was not taken seriously by anybody, such was his appeal to the voters at large). In either case Caesar depended on securing a further dispensation from the laws, so that he did not have to observe the prescribed ten-year interval between consulships. In 52 this cannot have appeared a problem because Pompey's own third consulship had followed his second after only two years, but as the political climate changed it could possibly have become awkward. A candidature in 49 had the advantage of not requiring such a dispensation, because as Caesar himself was to observe (m.1.1) he was legally entitled to be consul again in 48; on the other hand such a candidature might be more controversial because it implied that he would stay in Gaul for a year longer than appears to have been intended by the '5 years' of the Lex Licinia Pompeia. Surprising though it may seem, this extra year was in fact no less than he could have expected when that law was passed, for the following reason. At that time the Lex Sempronia of Gaius Gracchus, in force since 122 B.C., required that the two provinces to which the consuls of any year were to be appointed should be named before those consuls were elected, that is by about the middle of the preceding year. From the sixties it had become normal for the consuls to spend the whole of their year of office in Rome and only to go to their designated provinces in the following year, as proconsuls. It was also the practice for a proconsul to remain in his province until his successor chose to arrive, so that there were no set dates for the expiry of provincial governorships. Thus under this system, if Caesar was to be replaced in Gaul at the end of 50 (say), it was necessary first of all for Gaul to be named by the senate before the elections of 51 B.C. as one of the two provinces which would be allotted to the consuls who were about to be chosen for 50. Then the successful candidate to whom Gaul was assigned after the elections would expect to spend 50 in Rome, not taking over the province until early in 49 when he was ready to do so, as proconsul. None the less, the possibility existed (see Balsdon) that circumstances might arise in which the consul was sent, or decided to go, to his province during his year of office instead of waiting until it was over, and this consideration could not be ignored when it came to drafting a law. How then did the law of Pompey and Crassus attempt to fix a term for Caesar's tenure of Gaul? Much modern discussion, from the great German rider was then added, apparently on Pompey's own authority, after the passing, to exempt Caesar fromth e operation of this clause. 10 De Bello Civili historian Mommsen onwards, has been vitiated by the belief that a phrase of Cicero's6 shows that the Lex Licinia Pompeia named a date by which Caesar had to vacate the province. It is true that the earlier Lex Vatinia had specified a calendar date (Mar. 1st 54) for the end of Caesar's first five-year term; but not only does Cicero's speech de provinciis consularibus illustrate the problems caused by this, but also the ancient disagreement and the modern debate over what limit might have been set by the lex Licinia Pompeia seem to indicate that the end of Caesar's command in 50-49 was specified in some other way (see Cuff). If there was a date in the law, we should surely have heard of it. The clue to a better answer lies in the fact that the consul of 51, M. Marcellus (brother of the consul of 49), attempted to ensure that the designation of a successor to Caesar was the senate's first business from March 1,50 (Cic. Fam. 8.8.5), while Pompey's view was that no senatorial decision could rightfully (sine iniuria) be made before this date, but that after it Caesar could be replaced (Cic. Fam. 8.9.5,8.8.9). The most convincing explanation of these facts is that the five years for which Caesar was granted the proconsulship of Gaul by the Lex Licinia Pompeia were defined, not by fixing a date on which his governorship had to end (for this was not the way the system worked, as we have seen), but by barring the senate until 50 from treating Gaul as a province that could legitimately be allocated to the next consuls, those of 49 (so Balsdon). The reason for specifying 50 was to guarantee Caesar five full years as governor. But under normal circumstances the consuls of 49 would not in fact go out to their provinces until they had completed their year of office. Caesar could therefore expect that no-one would be available to succeed him in Gaul until early in 48 - by which time, having invoked his privilege of standing for election in absence, he should already have become consul. However, a law passed by Pompey later in 52, which put into effect a senatorial resolution of the previous year (Dio 40.46.2), changed the whole system of appointment of provincial governors in such a way that this privilege of Caesar's became worthless. Pompey's law (Lex Pompeia de provinciis) aimed to sever the link between urban magistracy and provincial promagistracy so that it was less easy for candidates to spend 6 Quid ergo? exercitum retinentis cum legis dies transient rationem haberi placet? (Att. 7.7.6, c. 19 Dec. 50; cf. also An. 7.9.4) 'You may ask whether I approve of allowing a commander who retains his army after the expiry of the term legally assigned to stand for office* (tr. Shackleton Bailey). This does not prove, or disprove, that any particular date had actually been fixed either by the Lex Licinia Pompeia or subsequently - though one or more dates had certainly been proposed since the question had been opened to debate on March 1st 50, and eventually, whether by agreement or diktat, one would have to be enforced. Introduction 11 vast sums on their electoral efforts in the expectation of being very soon able to recoup their outlay at the expense of their provincial subjects. It did this by placing a five-year interval between magistracy and promagistracy, and by stipulating that in the first five years of the system, while the magistrates of 52 waited their time, provincial governors should be appointed from former consuls and praetors who had not in fact gone on to govern provinces (this was how Cicero, consul in 63, became governor of Cilicia against his will in 51 - 50). Governors of provinces being now drawn by definition from amongst men not currently holding office, and therefore able to leave Rome at once, there was no reason why an existing governor should not be replaced at any time that the senate might decree. There was also no need to declare the consular provinces long in advance, as required by the now superseded Lex Sempronia. Suddenly, it became constitutionally possible for a successor to Caesar to be actually appointed on the very first day that the Lex Licinia Pompeia permitted discussion of the matter. It was this fact which caused the difference of opinion between Caesar and his enemies. Caesar evidently considered that under the 'old rules' of the Lex Sempronia he had a normal expectation of being able to remain in Gaul until early 48, and an absolute right to remain until at least early 49. His enemies, playing by the 'new rules' introduced by Pompey, considered that there was no legal reason why he could not be replaced as from March 1 50, and it is quite plain that it was not only they, but Pompey too, who wanted this to happen. The only difference between the two views was that M. Marcellus clearly thought that a resolution of the senate which aimed to ensure in advance that an appointment was actually made on or as soon as possible after March 1, 50, did not infringe the terms of the Lex Licinia Pompeia, while Pompey thought it did (Cic. Fam. 8.8.5,9). Pompey was also prepared to offer a degree of compromise, as appears from the report (Cic. Fam. 8.11.3, April 50) that he had Tiatched' a scheme with the senate that Caesar should relinquish Gaul on the Ides of November (clearly, from the context, those of 50); on the one hand this allowed Caesar to be elected in absence, even though Pompey was said to be afraid of him becoming consul-designate while still holding his army and province, but on the other hand forced him to use the privilege in 50, which he did not want. In the event, no positive decision could be taken. For whatever reason, Caesar had previously decided not to stand in 50 for the consulship of 49. Perhaps he had further schemes in Gaul, or perhaps he wanted to postpone his consulship until 48 so that he would be in office until Pompey's 12 De Bello Civili command in Spain, which had been renewed for a further four7 years in 52, expired. Having taken this decision, he considered that he had a right to remain in Gaul until after the consular elections in 49 (see I.9.2n.). He therefore had to ensure that the senate did not appoint anyone to replace him until then. This was not difficult. Although the procedures of the Lex Sempronia had been immune from tribunician veto, Pompey had neglected to build the same safeguard into his new law. It was now possible for tribunes acting in Caesar's interest (C. Pansa and others in 51, C. Curio in 50, and M. Antonius and Q. Cassius in 49) to obstruct discussion in the senate and veto any appointment to Gaul. This they did, Curio's role being decisive, until the situation was reached with which Caesar's narrative begins. Various compromises were proposed, but the intransigence of a handful of Caesar's bitterest opponents prevented their acceptance. On Dec. 1st Curio's motion that both Pompey and Caesar should give up their provinces and armies was passed in the senate by 370 votes to 22, but the consul C. Marcellus (cousin of his homonymous successor) dismissed the senate and (as was his constitutional right) took no steps to implement the motion. A few days later, on the strength of a rumour that Caesar was invading Italy, Marcellus went to Pompey and placed a sword in his hands, entrusting him on his own authority with the defence of Rome and the command of troops in Italy. Meanwhile, although Caesar maintained contact with Rome and had proposed that he retain only Cisalpine Gaul and Illyricum, with two legions, until his second consulship, Pompey's own attitude was hardening. Cicero wrote on Dec. 24th, after a long private meeting with Pompey, that not only was there no chance of peace, but Pompey did not even want it (An. 7.8.4). Finally, on Jan. 7th 49 the new consul Lentulus did what his predecessors in office had shrunk from doing, and acted. He overrode the veto of Antony and Cassius, had the senate declare a state of emergency, and proceeded to the long-delayed business of appointing new provincial governors, including a successor to Caesar. Caesar, who had been preparing for war (see I.8.1n.), was thus offered a pretext to start it, in defence of the safety and the constitutional rights of the tribunes - and, as he admits, of his own personal dignitas (1.7.7,9.2), for he preferred war to the political extinction and exile his enemies wished to inflict upon him. This final step, we may feel, had been made easy by the violence and extremism which had increasingly come to dominate the politics of the closing years of the Republic.

7 Plut. Pomp. 55.7. Dio 40.56.2 says five years, but is perhaps counting 52 itself as one of them. Introduction 13 UL Pompey's strategy in Italy Pompey perhaps hoped, that in the event of an invasion of Italy by Caesar, he would have sufficient time to gather together a force strong enough to mount some effective resistance in the north of the country. Caesar had recently sent back to him, allegedly en route for a Parthian war, two veteran legions (see I.2.3n.), of whose loyalty to himself he had an optimistic view. He also had two legions' worth of other troops fairly newly raised in Italy (1.6. In.), so that he had, at least in theory, a considerable force. He is extremely unlikely to have known that two of Caesar's Gallic legions (the Eighth and Twelfth), which had been in winter quarters well beyond the Alps, had already received marching orders (I.8.1n.). He would have expected Caesar to have immediately available only the Thirteenth, which was stationed on garrison duties in Cisalpine Gaul, plus any new recruits he could raise hurriedly. Thus he may have hoped either to deal with Caesar fairly swiftly, or else force him to commit more legions to the Italian front so that his own six veteran legions in Spain could march into Gaul, sweep aside the remainder of Caesar's Gallic army and then take Caesar himself in rear. He also had enormous resources in the East, and at least fifteen fleets (named by Cicero, Att. 9.9.2), with which he could control the sea and food supplies. In addition, he believed that the population of Italy was solidly behind him, because of the thanksgivings which had been spontaneously offered at Naples in the autumn of 50 when he recovered from a severe illness, and had then spread across the country: 'there was no containing the great crowds which thronged to meet him from every direction1 (Plut. Pomp. 57). He is also said to have declared that he had only to stamp his foot and armies would appear. He was undone by Caesar's speed of action and the inability, or reluctance, of his newly recruited troops to make any effective resistance. A string of northern towns fell in the first few days of the invasion. Arretium, a third of the way from the Rubicon to Rome, was in Caesar's hands within a week, while Pompey's two veteran legions were still in winter quarters in Apulia. By avoiding bloodshed and acting magnanimously towards his captured or defeated opponents, Caesar was belying the rumours that he would behave like a second Sulla, and neutralising what little stomach the ordinary population of Italy had for a fight. Pompey and the consuls, followed by many senators, abandoned Rome for Campania a week after Caesar crossed the Rubicon. Some abortive negotiations then took place, through Sex. Roscius and L. Caesar, while Caesar continued to advance southwards. When these broke down there ensued what was effectively a race for Brundisium, the port which was the gateway to the East. Pompey's forces, with one exception, made no 14 De Bello Civili serious attempt to withstand Caesar. Pompey himself avoided battle, and by making his headquarters at Luceria on the eastern side of the Apennines, for which he admittedly had a perfectly good reason because that was where the two veteran legions were, had also managed to keep his line of escape open. The one exception to the tale of surrender and retreat was the stand of L. Domitius at Corfinium, in the enclosed Paelignian plain in the mountains east of Rome. Domitius hoped that if he could detain Caesar here, Pompey could block the passes and destroy him by starvation. Pompey, who had a more accurate idea of the relative quality of the two armies but was unable to dissuade Domitius of the folly of his enterprise (see his letters to Domitius, Cic. Att. 8.12B-D), preferred to make good his retreat with the rest of his forces intact than come to Domitius' aid. He therefore used the breathing-space afforded him by Domitius' resistance to fall back on Brundisium and make the necessary preparations to ferry his army across the Adriatic. Domitius, after a brief siege, had to surrender along with more than thirty cohorts (three legions), but Pompey managed to extricate himself from Italy without further loss. It would appear, then, that Pompey, once he had taken the decision to abandon Rome, never intended to make a fight of it in Italy - his mastery of the sea, the East, and Spain, encouraging him to think that he had the strength to turn the tide, return, and liberate a grateful country, just as he had helped Sulla do in 83. This simple analysis, which gains its attraction from the historical fact that Caesar took Italy in little more than nine weeks, is probably mistaken. One can perhaps dismiss as mere exhortation Pompey's letter to Cicero of late January (Att. 7.16.2) in which he claimed an intention to march north into Picenum and make a return to Rome possible for his allies. But it is unjustifiable to argue that he went to Luceria because it was on the way to Brundisium; he went because it was absolutely necessary for him to rally the two veteran legions there, which had to form the core of any force capable of withstanding Caesar's. He was not immediately aware (though he soon came to realise) that the loyalty of these two legions was not what he had been led to believe, and that Caesar's Gallic veterans were more than a match for any troops that could be quickly raised in Italy. Nor is there any need to see the consuls' initial base in Campania, and Cicero's own proconsular command on that side of Italy, as mere shams. Accurate information about the extent of Caesar's advance and the strength of his forces must have been in very short supply. Caesar himself probably changed his strategy after the first few days of his invasion. His thrust to Arretium, on the western side of the Apennines, indicates a plan to march on Rome, the obvious target while it was the Introduction 15 centre of the opposition. When he learnt that Pompey and the consuls had left the city, it became important to bring Pompey to battle as soon as possible, while still unready, and therefore he drove straight down the eastern side of the peninsula towards Luceria. In this situation Pompey's own plans will have been equally fluid. Any general must plan for the worst as well as for the best, and there is no inconsistency in believing that Pompey hoped to resist Caesar in Picenum (note the activities of Vibullius Rufus, 1.15.4) while at the same time making sure he could carry out an efficient retreat to Brundisium and the East if he had to. Neither was it politically desirable to abandon Italy if this could be avoided. It was not until Feb. 13th or 14th that Pompey first gave official notice of his intention to do so, in a letter to the consuls (Cic. Att. 8.12A.3), but it is impossible to know when he first seriously considered the idea. Of course, it was in the air towards the end of 50, and figures in Cicero's remarkable analysis of the possible courses evehts might take (Att. 7.9, 25 Dec. 50), but Pompey at this time seems to have been sanguine enough about the outcome of an armed confrontation. Appian (B.C. 2.36) says that in Rome the senate, unprepared for Caesar's swift advance and regarding the defence of Rome as important, 'did not allow Pompey to act according to his own judgment but urged him to turn to Italy to raise troops'. This sounds like an echo of a defence on Pompey's part against charges like that of Cato (1.30.5.) that he had been over-confident and unprepared. Cicero, whose analyses tended to vary with his mood, put forward two contradictory explanations for Pompey's behaviour: one, that he had panicked as a result of Caesar's initial success, the other, that he had a long- laid plan to stir up war so that he could levy great armies and ultimately return like a second Sulla to enjoy the mastery of Italy (e.g. Att. 8.11.2, 9.10.4). If this second explanation is (in a less highly-coloured form) true, as von Fritz (1942) has argued, and is not just a figment of Cicero's depressed imagination, influenced by his personal memories of that earlier civil war, Pompey kept a number of important potential allies in the dark. One may accept, with Syme (1939), that Pompey had for a long time seen that crisis in the state, this time provoked by confrontation with Caesar, might give rise once again to a situation which he could exploit to his own benefit. But the idea that he deliberately planned a war in Italy in order to have an excuse for leaving it seems a little fantastic. The true explanation of Pompey's withdrawal from Italy is surely that he was forced to carry out his worst-case strategy, which none the less still gave him a very good chance of winning a long-drawn-out and much larger-scale war. On this interpretation, Domitius' mistaken resistance at Corfinium becomes a little easier to understand. Insubordination on his part may be 16 De Bello Civili ruled out, because he was not Pompey's subordinate - indeed one of Pompey's most tiresome handicaps was that until the end of the year he lacked a clear legal position as overall commander, in spite of the fact that he needed to function as one. He was merely a colleague of the consuls and of other proconsuls like Domitius and Cicero, which explains the pleading tone of his letters dissuading Domitius from foolish heroics. The explanation of the debacle surely lies in the confused command structure, in the different attitudes held by various persons on the Pompeian side towards the possibility of abandoning Italy, and in the difficulties both of obtaining information about the enemy and of forming and communicating changes of plan. Domitius was a less experienced commander than Pompey and had less good information about the general state of his side's resources. He was also by nature a fighter (in spite of Caesar's unflattering picture of his escape from Massilia, II.22.2-4), and seeing what he thought was a chance to trap his hated personal enemy, could not resist taking it. Pompey, a realist who already knew he must withdraw from Italy, left him to it. IV. The Composition and Purpose of the Bellum Civile Although Caesar was reckoned by Suetonius to be as great an orator as he was a general, none of his speeches survive. Nor indeed do any of his other literary works, except the accounts of the Gallic and Civil wars. These lack literary pretension and might seem to be raw material for historians rather than history proper, but Cicero's judgment of the product was that they were 'unadorned, straight, and attractive' (nudi sunt, recti et venusti) and that while fools might be tempted to 'give them a hair-do', sane men would only be discouraged (Brutus 262). Hirtius, who composed an eighth book of the Gallic War to fill the lacuna between Caesar's two works, concurred: he speaks of their easy elegance and the fact that they pre-empt rather than promote writing by others (BG 8.4-5). Certainly we know of no-one who tried to use them as the basis for an elaborated version of the events they recount, while posterity has continued to admire them for their directness and purity of style. As to the content, another contemporary, Asinius Pollio, who served as an officer of Caesar's during the civil war and later himself wrote a history of it, observed that they were put together with insufficient care and insufficient regard for the truth, but was prepared to believe that Caesar would have rewritten and corrected them (Suet. Div. Iul 56.4). Both Cicero and Hirtius refer to Caesar's narratives as commentarii ('notes', 'aides-m6moire'). There has been scholarly speculation about the character of the commentarius when raised to the level of a literary genre, Introduction 17 but this is difficult to establish as no other examples survive, and it is more than possible that Caesar's are sui generis. We know that Sulla, the victor of an earlier civil war, wrote (in Greek) hypomnemata, a term which Lucian later explicitly identified with compositions like Caesar's8, and these were obviously used by Plutarch when he was writing his Lives of Sulla and Marius. Although they were published posthumously and were dedicated to Lucullus, who was charged with turning them into History (presumably in Latin), Sulla's motive is clear: self-justification from beyond the grave, not a concern for the needs of biographers and historians. Also in Greek was the memoir which Cicero wrote of his own controversial consulate. He claimed that this was raw material for Posidonius, but in fact he composed it with all the rhetorician's tricks, and could dismiss as 'pretty rough' his friend Atticus' efforts in the same genre (An. 2.1.1-2). We may suspect that the allegedly factual and unelaborated nature of the commentarius form was a device to lend authenticity to an account, particularly an autobiographical one, and further that its predicated artlessness imposed few rules of style or presentation upon its author. In Caesar's case, the form and style are clearly appropriate to what was, in the case of the Gallic War, a kind of report by a commander in the field to the senate and people of Rome, who had appointed him. This mode of writing once established, it was natural for him to continue with it in the present work, which lacks the same justification for its existence. The Civil War itself looks unfinished, though this has not prevented some (e.g. Barwick) from thinking that Caesar published it in this form. In particular, it breaks off abruptly in the middle of the sequence of events which led from Pharsalus, via the murder of Pompey, to Caesar's Alexandrian war and meeting with Cleopatra. It also contains cross- references to events said to have been already described, but in fact lacking in the text. Pollio's remark, cited above, that Caesar would have revised it, implies that the author had not published it himself, revision after publication being an impossibility in the ancient world. This implication is supported, or at least not contradicted, by Cicero's failure to mention the work in his considerable correspondence of 49 - 44. And Hirtius, in his preface to the eighth book of the Gallic War, speaks of the 'last, unfinished work' which he himself completed 'starting from the events in Alexandria'. Though it is possible to argue that Hirtius is referring to another work of Caesar's (of which we have no other knowledge), this description fits the end of the Civil War as we have it tolerably well. Cumulatively, the evidence is strongly in favour of supposing that Caesar never completed or revised his account, and that it must have been found amongst his papers

Quomodo historia scribenda 16 18 De Bello Civili after his death. If this is so, we can infer that publication took place immediately, because otherwise Hirtius, who became consul in January 43 in a national crisis and died in battle in April, would hardly have had time to write his continuations of Caesar's narratives. The question then arises, why did Antony and Dolabella, to whom as consuls the administration of the murdered dictator's papers was entrusted by the senate, authorise publication of a work in which Caesar himself had presumably lost interest? Surely because the work presents Caesar, murdered by the 'liberators' in the interests of the Republic, as a champion of the Republican constitution and Republican values. Above all in the opening chapters, but insidiously throughout, one of the methods Caesar uses to denigrate his opponents is to accuse them of acting illegally or in bad faith, and of placing personal advantage above the interests of the state. (Other failings are ineptitude, incompetence, cowardice, and poor judgment). He reinforces this picture of his enemies as false Republicans (unlike himself) by slanted presentation of motive, by selective reporting, by chronological displacement, and by ignoring the illegalities of his own behaviour and the threat that others saw it constituted. The scenes in Rome in the early days of January 49 are characterised by the emotive language of personal judgment, for example 'thus the majority... voted unwillingly and under duress for Scipio's motion'; 'decrees of the gravest and most intemperate character were passed* (1.2.6, 5.4). The mutiny of the Marsi at Corfinium (1.20) is told as though it were wholly praiseworthy. The relationship of his own military offensive to the peace negotiations conducted through L. Roscius and L. Caesar is deliberately falsified, nor are the terms offered on either side properly clarified (1.9.5 - 11.4). He misrepresents Pompey's willingness to respond to overtures (1.26.2). He conceals the fact that he gave some of his legions orders to march to Italy before war actually broke out (I.8.1n.). He is, in short, economical with the truth, because the whole narrative was designed to show that his own behaviour was legal and reasonable while that of his opponents was in fact a subversion of the principles of the very Republic which they claimed to be defending. The extent of Caesar's inaccuracy has been a point of some debate, and Rambaud has gone so far as to maintain that the narratives of both Caesar's works, especially the Gallic War, are fundamentally and systematically falsified. This view has not won much support, and is in any case intrinsically not so likely for the Civil War, where many members of Caesar's potential audience would know from personal experience what the true facts were. We should not forget that the same letters of Cicero, which give us a knowledge of detail possibly not available even to Caesar when Introduction 19 he was writing, and enable us to identify the misrepresentations noted above, also confirm the general accuracy of Caesar's version of the invasion of Italy. Cicero fails us after April, at least for the subject matter of Civil War I'll, because the action had shifted out of Italy and he himself left the country by early June, and there is no other contemporary source. Pollio's history and the other first-hand accounts, like that of Livy, are lost and can be detected only by the presence of a certain amount of non-Caesarian material in the biographies of Plutarch and the even later histories written by Appian and Dio. The broad agreement of all these with Caesar, together with the lack of any real motive on his part for falsifying the Spanish campaign, suggests that the facts are substantially correct. It may be otherwise with the strangely unbalanced, and perhaps unfinished, treatment of the siege of Massilia (see II.8-16n., 14.1n.). Lucan in his Pharsalia, an epic poem on the Civil War composed under Nero, made use of the lost history written by his uncle the elder Seneca, but it would be a brave man who tried to disentangle fact from fiction in the Pharsalia, let alone fact from fact. There is very little we can do, after 1.33, except to accept Caesar's account but be aware of the bias in presentation which is apt to lie beneath the deceptively straightforward surface of the text. An important aspect of Caesar's portrait of himself as a great man worthy of the traditions of the Republic is his military achievement. This was already amply documented in the Gallic War, but the requirements of the Civil War were rather different. Here Caesar needed to show that his qualities as a commander of men, a true imperator (see I.13.1n.), were superior to those of the commanders on the other side, and that it was not luck, but his own skill, which brought him victory. Military success also served as a sort of confirmation of the the lightness of his political position. His military operations depended on the loyalty and energy of his soldiers and on his own strategic and tactical foresight and power of decision (e.g. 1.71-2). Obviously his successes at Ilerda, in Further Spain, and at Massilia, were in themselves impressive. But the way the tale is told not only creates dramatic interest (see 1.38,47, 61, introductory nn.) but creates the illusion that Caesar himself is omniscient and all-controlling (an impression aided by the apparently objective third-person narration, which blurs the distinction between what Caesar knew at the time and what he found out later). It may, for instance, have been accident in the shape of a flood at Ilerda which reduced him to near-defeat, but it was a brilliant stratagem of his own together with the bravery of his cavalry and the news of his men's success in a naval encounter off Massilia which tipped the balance again (1.48-56). In this same naval battle his fleet was outnumbered, but the quality of the men who manned it was decisive - furthermore the other side had to rely in part on slaves, so that his own side 20 De Bello Civili possessed a moral as well as a qualitative superiority. The whole narrative of the chase from Ilerda (1.61 ff.) contrasts the astonishing energy and fortitude of Caesar's army with the dubious loyalty of Afranius', the clear implication being that Caesar was worthy to command while Afranius was not. Indeed the theme of loyalty makes its appearance at the very beginning of hostilities, when the soldiers of the Thirteenth legion, before marching to Ariminum, respond enthusiastically to Caesar's speech and declare themselves ready to defend their general (1.7.8), while the Pompeian levies in Picenum desert Varus, who is himself already discredited by flight (1.13.2-3). Caesar's omission of the mutiny of his Ninth legion at Placentia late in 499 - achieved by placing the African campaign between his departure from Massilia and his re-appearance as consul in Rome at the start of Book III - is notorious, but is completely intelligible in the light of the requirements of his narrative. The impression of Caesar's omnicompetence is further stressed by the fact that the narrative is centred on himself and his actions. He attempts no general survey of the state of public opinion in Italy at the opening of 49, nor any assessment of the strength and motives of his own support (unless such a passage figured in the lost opening of Book I). The motives and numbers of uncommitted senators, and the nature of their views, are merely hinted at in passing (1.2.6, 3.S). The political position in Rome is completely ignored after 1.33, except for the tantalising information at 1.53.2. Questions of strategy are hardly discussed. He seldom mentions any of his subordinate officers if he himself was in charge, so that all the responsibility and all the credit become his. Even at the siege of Massilia his two commanders, Trebonius by land and D. Brutus by sea, are allowed little positive role and the siege, set in train by Caesar before he departed for Spain, proceeds by a kind of impersonal momentum of its own, aided by the initiative and bravery of his anonymous troops. On the other hand Curio in Africa steps into the part of Caesar (with similar reduction or suppression of the contribution of subordinates like Pollio, cf. Appian BC 2.45), and his failure provides a kind of counterpoint which brings out all the more strongly the uniqueness of Caesar's own ability as a leader. The content and emphasis, then, of the Civil War reflect Caesar's desire to portray himself as a better Republican and a better Roman than his enemies. Such an image was important to him at the beginning of the war. But the pose ceased to make a great deal of sense, or to correspond to reality, as Collins has argued, once his rival was dead and he moved to a more and more autocratic position of power. It is tempting to speculate that

9 Suet. D J. 69; Appian B.C. 2.47; Dio 41.26 Introduction 21 his Alexandrian adventure in the winter of 48-47 and his experience as the temporary and unofficial consort of a queen gave him a taste for a different sort of pre-eminence from that traditionally approved in Roman society, but the reason does not matter. There can be no doubt that as a matter of fact his political attitudes changed radically from 47 onwards, so that the considerations which led him to start writing the Civil War became increasingly irrelevant. This being so, it is easy to understand why he lost interest in completing the story. When he started must be a matter of guesswork, but he composed other works (the two books de Analogia and his poem Iter) while travelling and surely there were moments in 49 and 48 when he would have been able to write. Perhaps put aside at some point during his time in Alexandria, the work was overtaken by its author's personal development and lost its raison d'itre. This it only recovered, paradoxically, after its author's murder, to which we probably owe its publication.

V. Literary Style and Character of the Bellum Civile The style that Caesar chose to convey his message had of course to match his seemimgly artless presentation of the 'facts'. The principles of ancient higher education, which was designed to produce effective orators, that is to say persuaders, prescribed the careful matching of style and argument to audience, subject-matter, and desired effect. Educated persons in the late Republic were very conscious of style, and even of the moral connotations of the position adopted between the two poles of contemporary practice: on the one hand the 'Asianists', who favoured a luxuriant, elaborate and high-flown style, full of a charm which could be considered meretricious and perhaps even morally corrupt; and on the other the 'Atticists', who admired the clear and restrained language and the limpidity of style associated (somewhat uncritically) with the Attic orators of the classical period. Since Caesar, who was acknowledged to be one of the leading orators of the day, belonged to the 'Atticist' group we may safely assume that he had long been practising the art of clothing large frameworks of argument and persuasion in straightforward but telling language, avoiding all excess, strangeness, and specious elaboration of surface structure. A procedure of this sort is no less sophisticated than that needed to produce more obviously artistic compositions like the speeches of Cicero. Caesar's use of language is therefore likely to be no less calculated than his choice of literary form: as a recent study (Gotoff) has concluded, 'close reading will permit... some correlations to be discovered between techniques of composition and desired effects.' 22 De Bello Civili The clarity and directness of Caesar's style is achieved by fairly obvious means. His expression is fundamentally brief and avoids all redundancy. This lends great forcefulness (e.g. 11.39.1), but can on occasion produce inelegance and obscurity, for instance when plain ablatives, without prepositions, are piled up (1.32.3, 11.25.1). There is much asyndeton, especially between sentences (e.g. 1.3-4), which gives the narrative a staccato, thrusting quality. Many of the sentences are either quite short or display some co-ordination of clauses rather than attempting to produce a tightly locked periodic structure completed by a single main verb (for examples, see 1.18 - where the translation is reasonably faithful to this aspect of the original - and 1.55 - where it is not). There is of course much subordination, particularly with relative, temporal, and causal clauses. Such was the nature of literary Latin at this stage of its historical development. Nevertheless Caesar usually writes in such a way that the meaning, and the overall shape, remain clear as the sentence is built up. Occasionally, whether for variety or to convey the complexity of the situation or the inevitability of the conclusion, he will write a long but carefully balanced periodic sentence (see 1.34, 11.16). The verbs carry a great deal of the meaning and tend to take their expected position at clause- ends, so that even these long sentences are formed of a number of clearly marked and easily comprehensible sense-units. Except in rhetorical contexts (e.g. 1.7) abstract nouns are not very frequent, so that an impression of actuality and immediacy is created. Things are said in fundamentally simple ways, using a limited and carefully chosen vocabulary. This is not simply because much of the narrative has the same sort of subject-matter. Caesar avoids a surprising number of words which were in the ordinary stock in his day, e.g. amo, clamo, haereo, nescio, pendeo, per do, surgo; fluvius, gaudium, imago, ingenium, medicina, neglegentia, sapientia, transfuga (!); anxius, impotens, securus, validus - and this is only a brief selection from well over a hundred listed by Richter 180-1. Caesar must have made a deliberate choice to restrict his use of synonyms and not to employ certain expressions. More unexpectedly, he does not use several very common conjunctions like quamquam, quomodo, quando, quia, donee, and others (for these, see RE 10.271-2). Eden has suggested that in this case we may be witnessing not merely a desire to keep 'only one symbol for one concept or relationship', but also an avoidance of words which had a plebeian flavour. And for avoidance of another sort, we have his own words: 'shun a rare and unusual word as you would a reef10 - though he is prepared to use these when they are technical terms appropriate to the context (e.g II.10.7, phalangis).

10 Quoted by Aulus Gellius (1.10.4) Introduction 23 Another notable feature of Caesar's style is its apparent objectivity. This is a result partly of the factual nature of the subject-matter, which contains very little digression11, analysis, speculation, or unnecessary description, and partly of Caesar's celebrated technique of referring to himself always in the third person. The extreme infrequency of direct speech, and that usually in short quotations of at most a few lines, also distances the reader from events and reinforces the general impression that they are being reported soberly and truthfully. Absence of detail in much of the narrative is yet another factor that contributes to the same effect. These characteristics, taken together, suggest that whatever the nature of the commentarius-genre (if it existed, see the previous section) Caesar's writing also owed a good deal to a genre that certainly did exist, the Roman annalistic historians. These were men like Calpurnius Piso (writing c. 130 B.C.) and Claudius Quadrigarius (writing in the 70s), who are both quoted in extenso by Aulus Gellius (7.9.2-6, 9.13.7-19, respectively). They wrote plain, unpretentious, year-by-year accounts of Roman history which Livy used to construct his own much more elevated and consciously artistic version. This annalistic material is supposed to have been based (at least in part) on records which went back to the sack of Rome by the Gauls in 390, or according to some even earlier. Eden has shown that several somewhat inelegant features of Caesar's style reflect the linguistic habits of the annalists, amongst them close repetition of a word (e.g. II.23.5, navibus.. navibus... navem), pronouns repeated with different reference (e.g. n.20.8, eum)y resumptive pronouns and adverbs which could have been avoided (e.g. 1.78.2, Ilerdam... ibi... ibi), and antecedent of a relative repeated (e.g. II.23.3, longis navibus..., quas navis), an archaic feature which is also preserved in the legal phraseology of the late Republic. It is therefore reasonable to suppose that Caesar intended to suggest some connection between his own writing and this distictively Roman kind of history. By doing this he will have distanced himself stylistically, as he had also done formally by his choice of the commentarius-formy from the unreliability and romanticism of a certain kind of polished history, derived from Greek ideals and antecedents, which was the norm of the time (see Gabba, Wiseman ch. 1). This sort of history is revealingly illuminated in a long letter of Cicero (Fam. 5.12) in which he begs his friend Lucceius to compose a monograph about him, and not to scruple to improve the truth and play on the reader's emotions while he is about it. One can see why 11 Of the three examples in the Gallic War, two (those on the Suebi, 4.1-3, and on Britain, 5.12-14) are fairly short and explain facts material to the context; only the third (on the Gauls and Germans and the Great Hercynian Forest, 6.11-28) is an ethnographic digression of a type that was at home in contemporary Hellenistic history (Gabba). The Civi7 War contains no digressions. 24 De Bello Civili Caesar, anxious above all to convey that what he says is true, preferred a very different style.

VL Narrative Technique The most striking thing about Caesar's narrative is its rapidity. This is in part the consequence of his chosen style and in part the necessary condition for its success, since the plain style is not best fitted to luxuriate in description or plumb psychological depths. He presses on with the essentials. These, for him, are the things that affect the course and outcome of the struggle: political action, military action, and decision-taking. All kinds of other subjects which a historian could legitimately treat form no part of the story - unless directly relevant to its development. Such topics, in the case of the army, include the weather, time of year, details of marches, commissariat, care of the wounded, temporary difficulties, morale, command structure; in the case of the theatre of war, climate, topography, population, past history; and in the case of individuals, personal appearance, character traits, anecdotes, emotional reactions, desires and ambitions. Caesar concentrates instead on the immediate factors that move the action forward, and the narrative is often a mere outline. He makes this narrative cohere by constructing chains of action or consequence, which are explicitly related to each other. The first chain is followed through to some logical stopping point and a new chain then begins, although its start may have preceded the point reached at the end of the previous chain. This temporal overlap is not always admitted or made explicit, so that false impressions can arise of chronological or causal relationships - though we should remember that in the ancient world news travelled relatively slowly, so that events occurring in one place did not necessarily at once affect those in another. The opening of Book I is a good example of the technique. Chs. 1-5 take the political developments in Rome up to the flight of the tribunes Antony and Cassius, then ch. 6 continues with what this flight made possible (though Caesar leaves his readers to grasp this point for themselves), namely the long-obstructed appointment of provincial governors and the mobilisation of an army against Caesar. Ch. 7 then switches to Caesar at Ravenna, with the words 'When he learnt this news' beginning a fresh chain whose start strictly belongs immediately after ch. 5. By constructing the narrative in this way Caesar makes it appear that it is his enemies who are threatening him, and not the other way about. This chain goes on with Caesar's progress to Introduction 25 Ariminum, his meeting there with Roscius and L. Caesar, and the story of the negotiations thus set in train, whose collapse (actually about Jan. 28th) leads by way of a 'therefore' (see 1.11.4n.) into the next chain. This, which had in fact begun long before, by Jan. 16th, narrates his advance on Arretium, Pisaurum, Fanum, and Ancona, ending (chh. 12-13) with the capture of Iguvium and Auximum. Ch. 14 ('When the news of these events reached Rome..') constitutes the fourth chain and like ch. 7 begins at a point earlier than than that reached at the end of the previous chapter, because we know that Iguvium and Auximum had not yet fallen when the news from the north threw Rome into a panic and caused its abandonment. Ch. 15 then returns to Caesar and operations in Picenum in order to lead into the more detailed narrative of the siege of Corfinium, which occupies the next major block of events, down to ch. 23. Caesar gives only one date, that of the flight of the tribunes from Rome, and but for Cicero's correspondence we should have no idea that these chronological displacements existed. Caesar thus made order out of the confusing tangle of reality by subordinating the actual relationships of events to the logical relationships, or underlying truth, that he perceived or wished others to believe. Clarity is achieved, but at a price. Speeches, whether direct or indirect, provide another means of shaping the narrative. Set speeches had been an indispensable part of 'proper' history ever since Herodotus. These purported to give the words, or at least the general drift, of the speaker, but can seldom have done so.12 They were a device used by historians to characterise a speaker, represent contrasting points of view, or present an analysis, and at the same time provided some drama and some variety of tone and style in the writing. In the case of Caesar, we often find indirect reports of what he or others said (e.g 1.7,9, 22, 32, etc.). Indirect speech is an organic part of his exposition, since by providing justification and explanation it reveals why people act as they do, and its manner of presentation harmonises with its surroundings. But direct speech is another matter. In the Civil War the substantial examples are confined to the episode of Curio (see 11.31-32n.) and in the Gallic War to the dramatic and eventful Book VII, in which Caesar's control of his new conquests hung in the balance. Direct reporting creates great vividness and immediacy, but at the same time undermines the impression of dispassionate objectivity, and hence trustworthiness, given by the rest of the narrative. It is therefore hardly surprising that it is so rare in Caesar. On the other hand his willingness to use it at crucial moments is Occasionally edicts, or letters, or sayings, are quoted (e.g. Sail. B.C. 35, Suet. DA. 28.2, 51.3, 58.2) but these are to be distinguished from longer free inventions. 26 De Bello Civili proof that for all the dryness of his style and the austerity of his approach he is creating literary structures which gain from the emphasis and emotional power it can provide. The episode of Curio, which constitutes the second half of Book II, is just such a structure. This crypto-tragedy is rightly felt to stand apart from the rest of the Civil War in the dramatic nature of its presentation and its concentration on the character of Curio. In depicting the catastrophic failure of a friend for whose fatal decisions he bore no responsibility, Caesar may have been stimulated to write in a way that he had hitherto denied himself. Here only in the Civil War do we find *Einzelszenen\ little vignettes of action which humanise and enliven the context: Curio encouraged to attack by his officer Rebilus (34.4), Fabius the Paelignian almost successful in killing Varus (35.1-2). Caesar had employed these vignettes from time to time in the Gallic War (e.g. 5.44, the story of the rivalry of the centurions Pullo and Vorenus), but perhaps judged that the greater scale, variety, and (for Romans) intrinsic interest of the Civil War did not require them. There is also more emphasis on the states of mind and emotional reactions of the participants than in the rest of the work. The focus, though, is chiefly the character and judgment (or lack of it) of Curio. This is presented both through the three speeches Caesar has him make and through comments in the narrative (e.g. 23.1, 37.1, 38.2), so that the final disaster comes not as a sudden unexpected shock, but as a dreadful confirmation of a possibility inherent in the situation from the start. The method, and effect, are not unlike those used by Thucydides, on a far grander scale, in telling of the calamity of the Athenians at Syracuse, with the same stress laid on the character of the commander. This kind of narrative is a long way from the dryness of the early books of the Gallic War. Caesar has here temporarily transformed his chosen style of writing into something much deeper and more satisfying, and revealed a degree of literary artistry which he mostly chose to keep hidden. His ability to handle still larger structures and impose coherence and meaning on events can be seen in the whole organisation of the narrative of the Ilerda campaign (see the introductory notes to 1.37,48, and 61). It can also be seen in the way in which, instead of treating the concurrent siege of Massilia as a single unit of narrative, he breaks it up so that it is interleaved with the events in Spain. Thus the preparations for the siege are started before Caesar leaves for Spain. Then the first naval battle is recounted as a piece of news that arrived at a crucial juncture in the Ilerda campaign. That campaign over, virtually all the rest of the story of the siege follows, up to the last truce. The narrative then returns to Spain, where Caesar rounds off the Spanish operations by accepting the surrender of Varro, before Introduction 27 travelling back to accept the final submission of Massilia. It has been pointed out (e.g. by Barwick 132-4) that the description of the first naval battle is 'inserted', because it can be removed from its context without leaving any trace in the surrounding chapters. It may be right to deduce that Caesar originally wrote the whole Spanish narrative as a single continuous account without reference to the siege, but the fact that he then re-arranged his material shows that he was conscious that the interlocking of the two series of events needed to be made explicit. This battle came at the turning-point of the Ilerda campaign, and constituted the first tightening of the screw on Massilia. Thus its placing in the Ilerda narrative is highly significant, serving to mark the point (note 59.1, 'fortune swiftly changed') at which the Pompeians, by deciding to abandon the town, sealed their own fate. In the same way, Caesar's decision to place the main narrative of the siege of Massilia before the conquest of Further Spain serves several purposes: it marks off the Ilerda campaign as a decisive unit; it stresses the co-extensiveness of the siege with the Spanish operations; it heightens the importance of the struggle at Massilia because success in Spain is not yet certain; and it allows his own journey back from Gades to terminate naturally and effectively with his acceptance of the Massiliot surrender, instead of this appearing as a kind of footnote to a long and dramatic narrative in which he himself had played no part. All historians have to select, arrange, and emphasise in order to bring out their interpretation of what happened. Caesar very clearly chooses to give great attention to some events (like the siege of Corfinium or the building of the siege-tower at Massilia) and ignore or play down others (like the crossing of the Rubicon). The emphasis in his work is overwhelmimgly on three things: battles, technical operations, and diplomatic transactions. These were the things he thought important, because it was through these that he secured success against the odds. The clarity may be deceptive, but the picture that emerges is masterly. We see a decisive and rapidly-moving leader of great tactical skill, commanding men of loyalty, commitment, and bravery against others who are not themselves cowardly or unworthy but are too often let down by the various deficiencies of character, leadership, or judgment of their commanders. This leader had been forced into war by the political intransigence and bad faith of men who then resisted his attempts at negotiation and preferred to embark on a struggle in the field which they could not win. Caesar's rapidity of narrative, concentration on essentials, and selection and arrangement of facts carry the reader along. He makes you feel his victory was inevitable; and that is testimony to the fact that his qualities as a writer are as impressive as his qualities as a general. 28 De Bello Civili \TL The Text All surviving manuscripts of the Bellum Civile share a good deal of textual corruption. They also lack the beginning of the work and have some other lacunae in common (e.g. at 1.39.2 and n.29). It is certain therefore that all are derived from a single archetype, and that this archetype did not contain either a complete or a very reliable text. Between the Renaissance and the early nineteenth century many errors were put right, but no systematic basis of criticism existed. Then editors of the B.C. from Nipperdey (1847) to Fabre (1936) established a handful of MSS as primary, and derived from them a modern recension of the text which is still however far from, agreed. Further progress has since been made, above all by Hering (1963) and Brown (1972), who have shown that of the eight MSS regarded as independent witnesses by Fabre and by Klotz (in his second edition, 1950), three derive from the others and may be eliminated (L, N, and R).13 Thus we are left with only five MSS which need be considered in the establishment of the text, namely those referred to in this edition and those of Fabre, Klotz, and Brown (forthcoming) as S, M (which Klotz calls W), U, T, and V. S is the oldest, and preserves valuable readings otherwise lost (e.g. Awcimo at 1.15.1 where the others have maximo), but is disfigured by such a mass of careless or illiterate errors that one sometimes wonders whether its correct readings against the consensus of the others are the result of anything more than chance. M and U are obviously closely related, as are T and V. Hering has argued that S is closer to TV than to MU, while Brown believes that the three branches are independent of each other and derive from three copies of the archetype. In this she is a heretic by the canons of conventional stemmatic theory, which holds, for no very compelling reason apart from the convenience of editors, that an archetype is never copied more than twice14. These are waters in which it is risky for the inexpert to bathe, and I will only observe that I have found it convenient in my own apparatus criticus to use the abbreviation 8 for the consensus of MUTV - in other words that in practice I have encountered a significant degree of agreement of MUTV against S. The reason for this may of course be simply the carelessness of S. It is also my impression that the single most reliable witness to Caesar's original words is M. But since I have not myself collated the MSS and have perforce depended on the 13 Hering's further hypothesis that V depends on T and may also be disregarded is more doubtful. 14 Brown's view is given some support by M. Winterbottom (in L.D. Reynolds (ed.) Texts and Transmission, [Oxford 1983], 36) against Hering (Gnomon 45 [1973] 763-6). Introduction 29 apparatus of Fabre (the best of those available), which Brown says contains at least 250 errors15, all this must remain sub judice until Brown's own edition appears. This state of affairs will explain why I have felt unable to adopt any of the existing standard texts - namely those of du Pontet (OCT), Fabre (Budf), and Klotz (Teubner)16 - and have preferred to constitute my own on the basis of the published evidence, inadequate though that may be. In spite of the fact that a volume such as this makes no pretensions to establishing a definitive text, decisions have to be made about what Latin to print. In consequence, I have occasionally made changes or deletions that have not so far as I know been suggested previously. These new readings are justified in the notes and for convenience I give a list here. Otherwise, I freely admit to eclecticism: if it is to be intelligible, a text of the Bellum Civile can hardly fail to be eclectic. Emendations, believed new, admitted to the text BOOK I 15.6 del. Ahenobarbum 24.3 del. praetor (after Manlius) 30.2 Valerius 30.2 Tubero 44.2 barbaris «iimicare barban» genere quodam 51.2-3 transp. praeterea 63.3 circumfusi 80.4 del equitesque BOOK II 5.3 custodiisque publicis 6.3 coniunctis Albici 9.5 del. m (after ancorariis) 15 Brown (1972) 9: Fabre collated SNTU but relied on the reports of others for LMRV, while both Klotz' editions 'offer a collage of readings, often erroneous, taken from various sources'. 16 cf. Winterbottom (n. 2 above):The standard texts, maiked by remarkable indifference to what the manuscripts actually read, are those of A. Klotz (Teubner, Leipzig, B.G. 19484; B.C. 19502...) and O. Seel (Teubner, Leipzig, B.G. 19703)'. [For the B.G., the new Teubner text by Hering (1987) should now replace those of Seel and Klotz; Klotz' B.C. was revised, with addenda but little alteration, by W. Trillitzsch in 1964]. 30 De Bello Civili

Manuscripts and Sigla Primary S Florence, Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana, Ashbumhamensis 33. Mid tenth century; probably French. Some quaternions out of place. M Location as S, Plut. lat. 68.8. Tenth/eleventh century, parts written in the twelfth, with twelfth-century and humanistic corrections; probably Italian. Lacks thefirst 3 3 chapters of Book I. U Rome, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat lat 3324. Eleventh/twelfth century; probably French. Contemporary corrections and marginalia. T Paris, Bibliotheque Nationale, Lat. 5764. Second half of the eleventh century; probably French. Some contemporary corrections. V Vienna, Oesterreichische Nationalbibliothek, 95. First half of the twelfth century; perhaps written at Trier. Some contemporary corrections. Secondary m Location as S, Plut. lat. 68.6. A twelfth/thirteenth century copy in Beneventan script of M, made before M lost itsfirst 3 3 chapters. N Naples, Biblioteca Nazionale, IV c.ll. Eleventh century; probably French. Replaces S, its exemplar, for die lacuna between n.18.6 and 19.3 Other sigla co Consensus of SMUTV p Consensus of thefirst hand s of MUTV q Any later MSS ed. pr. First printed edition, Rome 1469 (G. A. Bussi) Editing conventions * indicates suspected corruption in the Latin text (replaces obelus). < > enclose additions to the transmitted text (shown by italics in the translation). [ ] or { }, normally used to enclose text considered to be spurious, have not been employed. Instead, the offending words have beenremoved an d the fact noted in the apparatus criticus. Introduction 31 TABLE OF DATES N.B. (a) Bracketed numbers show chapter in the text; (b) The entry in italics is not mentioned by Caesar; (c) All dates are pre-Julian, i.e. those in use at the time, and are up to two months in advance of the true dates (see 1.40.3n.); (d) Where a reference is not given, see the commentary on the relevant passage. Att. and Fam. refer to Cicero's letters. For dates between Jan. 28th and Feb. 4th I accept the arguments of von Fritz (1941). Event Date Reference BOOK I 49 B.C. Curio delivers Caesar's letter to consuls (1.1) Jan. 1 Tribunes fleeRom e (5.4) night Jan. 7/8 Caesar crosses Rubicon (8.1) Jan. 10/11 or 11/12 Fall of Anetium, Pisaurum, Fanum, Att 7.11.1, and Ancona (11.4) by Jan. 16 Fam. 16.12.2 Caesar meets Roscius and L. Caesar at Ariminum (8.2) Pompey leaves Rome (14.3) Jan. 17 or 18 I.11.4n. Consuls leave Rome Jan. 17 1.14. In. Fall of Iguvium (12.3) Jan. 18 1.14.3 Roscius & L. Caesar meet not before Jan. 20 AH.7.13B.3 consuls and Pompey at Teanum (10.1) Jan. 23 Att. 7.14.1 Senate meets at Capua [102] Caesar marches from Ancona to Auximum (12, Jan. 25 Att. 7.15.2 Rejection by Caesar of Pompeian terms (11) 3) by Jan.28 Caesar begins advance from Jan. 28/29? Auximum to Asculum (15.1-3) by Feb. 1 Capture of Firmum (16.1) Feb. 4 Caesar reaches Corfinium (16.2) Feb. 15 Pompey leaves Canusium (24.2) Feb. 21 Att. 9.1.1 Caesar captures and leaves Corfinium (23.5) Feb. 21 Att. 8.14.1 Caesar reaches Brundisium (25.1) Mar. 9 Att. 9.13A.1 Pompey quits Brundisium (28.5) Mar. 17/18 Att. 9.15A Caesar holds a senate in Rome (32.2,33.3) Apr. 1-3 Att. 9.17.1 Caesar arrives at Massilia (34.1) c. Apr. 19 Curio sets out for Sicily (30.2) after mid-April Att. 10.4.8-11 Caesar leaves Massilia (36.5) early June Caesar reaches Ilerda (41.1) cJune 23 1st naval battle off Massilia (56 - 58) end of June L59.1n. Afranius and Petreius surrender (83.4) Aug. 2 BOOKn 2nd naval batde off Massilia (3-7) ?mid - late July Surrender of Massilia (22) Curio sails fromSicil y for Africa (23.1) ??lat?c. Auge Octobe. 1 r n.21.5n. Curio's defeat by Juba (41-2) ?? September App.£C2.47 32 De Bello Civili

SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY [For full bibliography to ca.1974, see H. Gesche, Caesar (Darmstadt, Wissenschaftliche Biichgesellschaft, 1976)]

I. Editions and Translations

(a) Whole Work ed du Pontet R. (Oxford, Clarendon, Oxford Classical Texts, 1900) ed Klotz A. (3rd ed. with add. and corr. by W. Trillitzsch, Leipzig, Teubner, 1964) ed & tr. Peskett A.G. (London & New York, Heinemann-Macmillan, Loeb Classical Library, 1907) ed & tr. Fabre P., 2v. (Paris, Les Belles Lettres, Budi, 1936) ed & tr. (with brief comm.) Schttnberger O. (Munich & Zurich, Artemis, 1984) ed & comm. Kraner F., Hofmann F., & Meusel H. (12th ed. with textual and bibliographical addenda by H. Oppermann, Berlin, Weidmann, 1959) ed & comm. Moberley C. E. (Oxford, Clarendon, 1899) tr. Long F. P. (Oxford, Qarendon, 1906) tr. Warrington J. (London, Everyman edn., 1953) tr. Gardner J. F., with the Alexandrian, African, and Spanish Wars, (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1967 [reissued New York, Dorset Pr., 1985])

(b) Individual Books (Latin text with commentary) ed Peskett A.G. Book I (Cambridge, C.U.P., 1890) ed Rambaud M. La Guerre Civile, I (Paris, P.U.F. [Coll. £rasme, 5], 2nd ed. 1970) Bibliography 33 II. Books and Articles Referred To

Adcock F.E. Caesar as Man of Letters (Cambridge, 1956) BalsdonJ.P.V.D. 'Consular provinces under the late Republic', JRS 29 (1939), 57-73,167-183 Barwick K. Caesars Bellum Civile: Tendenz, Aufbau, Abfassungszeit (Leipzig 1951) Bayet J. 'Style indirect libre', Revue de Philologie 58 (1931) 327ff.,59(1932)5ff. Bleicken J. Lex Publico (Berlin 1975) Botermann H. Denkmodelle am Vorabend des Btirgerkrieges', Historia 38 (1989), 410-430 BtfmerF. 'Der Commentarius,, Hermes 81 (1953), 210-250 Braund D. Rome and the Friendly King (London 1983) Brown V. The Textual Transmission of Caesar's Civil War (Mnemosyne Suppl. 23, Leiden, 1972) Brunt P.A. (1975) Two great Roman landowners', Latomus 34 (1975), 619-635 id. (1986) 'Cicero's ojficium in the Civil War',//W 76 (1986), 12- 32 id. (1988) The Fall of the Roman Republic (Oxford, 1988), ch. 3 'The equites in the Late Republic' [an earlier version in R. Seager (ed.), The Crisis of the Roman Republic (Oxford, 1969)] // Foro Romano, II: Periodo repubblicano e augusteo Coarelli F. (Rome, 1985) 'On the date and interpretation of the Bellum Civile\ Collins J.H. American Journal of Philology 80 (1959), 113- 132 Crawford M.H. Roman Republican Coinage (2v., Cambridge, 1974) Cuff P J. The terminal date of Caesar's Gallic command', Historia 7 (1958), 445-471 Degrassi A. Inscriptions Italiae XIII/2 (Rome, 1963) DobsonB. see Domaszewski Die Rangordnung des romischen Heeres (1908), 2nd Domaszewski A. von ed rev. B. Dobson (K5ln & Graz, 1967) Drumann W. & Groebe P. Geschichte Roms (5 v., Berlin, 1899-1912) Eden P. T. 'Caesar's style: inheritance versus intelligence^ Glotta 40(1962), 74-117 Ernout A. & Thomas F. Syntaxe Latine (Paris, 2nd ed. 1955) 34 De Bello Civili Euzennat M. 'Ancient Marseille in the light of recent excavations', American Journal of Archaeology 84 (1980), 133-140 Fritz K. von (1941) The mission of L. Caesar and L. Roscius in January 49 B.C.', TAPA 72 (1941), 125-156 id. (1942) 'Pompey's policy before and after the outbreak of the Civil War', TAPA 73 (1942), 145-180 Gabba E. True history and false history in classical antiquity', JRS 71 (1981), 50-62 Gamsey P. D. A. Famine and Food Supply in the Graeco-Roman World (Cambridge, 1988) Caesar, Politician and Statesman (Oxford, 6th ecL tr. GelzerM. P. Needham, 1968) Towards a practical criticism of Caesar's style', GotoffH. C. Illinois Class. Stud. 9 (1984), 1 - 18 The Last Generation of the Roman Republic (Berkeley Gruen E. S. & Los Angeles, 1974) Histoire ancienne dAfrique du Nord, VH (Paris, Gsell S. 1928) Hering W. Die Recensio der Caesarhandschriften (Berlin, 1963) Holmes T. Rice The Roman Republic and the Founder of the Empire (Oxford, 1923) 3 v. Keppie L. Colonies and Veteran Settlement in Italy, 47-14 B.C. (London, 1983) Kiihner R. & C. Stegmann Ausfuhrlich Grammatik der Lateinische Sprache, II: Satzlehre (Leverkusen, 3rd ed., 1955) Lawrence A.W. Greek aims in Fortification (Oxford, 1979) L6zine A. Utique: notes de topographie', in R. Chevallier (ed.), Melanges ...offerts d Andri Piganiol (Paris, 1966) Eintott A. W. The quaestiones de sicariis et veneficis and the Latin Lex Bantina\ Hermes 106(1978), 125-138 McGushinP. Gai Sallusti Crispi Bellum Catilinae. A Commentary (Leiden, 1977) Marsden E.W. Greek and Roman Artillery: Historical Development (Oxford, 1969) Marshall A. J. The Lex Pompeia de provinciis (52 B.C.) and Cicero's imperium in 51-50 B.C.', in H. Temporini (ed.), Aufstieg und Niedergang derRomischen Welt 1.1 (1972), 887 ff. Meier C. Caesar (Berlin, 1982) [in German] Bibliography 35 The Calendar of the Roman Republic (Princeton, Michels A. K. 1967) Morrison J.S. & Greek Oared Ships 900-322 B.C. (Cambridge, 1968) Williams R.T. OttmerH.-M. Die Rubikon-Legende. Untersuchungen zu Caesars und Pompeius' Strategic vor und nach Ausbruch des Burgerkrieges (Boppard / Rhein, 1979) in E. de Ruggiero (ed.), Dizionario Epigrafico vol IV Passerini A. (1949) *.v.Legio,p.586ff. Raaflaub K. Dignitatis Contentio (Munich, 1974) Raditsa L. 'Julius Caesar and his writings1, in H. Temporini (ed.), Aufstieg und Niedergang derRomischen Welt 1.3 (1973), 417 ff. Uart de la Deformation Historique dans les Rambaud M. Commentaires de Cesar (Paris, 2nd. ed., 1966) RichterW. Caesar als Darsteller seinen Taten (Heidelberg, 1977) Rowe G. O. 'Dramatic structures in Caesar's Bellum Civile\ TAPA 98 (1967), 399-414 Schtfnberger O. [see Editions] Seager R. Pompey, a Political Biography (Oxford, 1979) Shackleton-Bailey D. R. The Roman nobility in the second Civil War', (1960) Classical Quarterly 10 (1960), 253-267 id. (1965) Cicero's Letters to Atticus, Vol. I (Cambridge, 1965) id. (1968) Cicero's Letters to Atticus, Vol. IV (Cambridge, 1968) Sherwin-White A. N. Violence in Roman polities', JRS 46 (1956), 1-9 Starr C.G. The Roman Imperial Navy 31 B.C. - AD. 324 (Cornell Studies in Class. Phil., vol. 26,1941) Staveley E. S. 'Lex Curiata', Historia 5 (1956), 84-90 Stockton D. 'Quis iustius induit arma?', Historia 24 (1975), 232- 259 StofifelE. G. Histoire de Jules Cisar, La Guerre Civile (Paris, 1887) Syme R. (1937) •Who was Decidius Saxa?', JRS 27 (1937), 127-137 id. (1938) The allegiance of Labienus', JRS 28 (1938), 113-125 id. (1939) The Roman Revolution (Oxford, 1939) id. (1958) Imperator Caesar: a study in nomenclature', Historia 7 (1958), 172-188 Teutsch L. Das Stddtewesen in Nordafrika von C. Gracchus bis zum Tode des Kaiser Augustus (Berlin, 1962) Tozzi P. Storia Padana Antica (Milan, 1972) VallejoJ. 'Sobre la Otogesa de Cesar Bell. Civ. 1,61,68, y 70', Emerita 14 (1946), 259-271 36 De Bello Civili 'Caesar's Bibracte narrative and the aims of Caesarian Williams M. F. style', Illinois Classical Studies 10 (1985), 215- 226 Wiseman T. P. Clio's Cosmetics (Leicester, 1979) Wistrand E. The date of Curio's African campaign', Eranos 61 (1963), 48-54

in. Abbreviations BC C. Iulius Caesar, Bellum Civile BG C. Iulius Caesar, Bellum Gallicum CJL Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum HS sestertius (Roman unit of account) ILLRP Inscriptiones Latinae Liberae Rei Publicae (ed. A. Degrassi, 2v., Florence 1957,1963) ELS H. Dessau, Inscriptiones Latinae Selectae (1892-1916) JRS Journal of Roman Studies K.-H.-M. see Bibliography (Editions), s.v. Kraner MRR T. R. S. Broughton, The Magistrates of the Roman Republic (New York, 1951-60) n. note RE Realencyclopddie der Klassischen Altertumswissenschaft, by A. Pauly, ed, G. Wissowa (Stuttgart, 1893-) TAPA Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association TLL Thesaurus Linguae Latinae THE CIVIL WAR I & II De Bello Civili 38 CIVLICAESARIS DE BELLO CIVILI LIBER I 1 litteris Caesaris consulibus redditis aegre ab his impetratum est summa tribunorum plebis contentione ut in senatu recitarentur; ut vero ex litteris ad senatum referretur, impetrari non potuit. 2 referunt consules de republica infinite. L. Lentulus consul senatui rei publicae se non defuturum pollicetur, si audacter ac fortiter sententias dicere velint; 3 sin Caesarem respiciant atque eius gratiam sequantur, ut superioribus fecerint temporibus, se sibi consilium capturum neque senatus auctoritati obtemperaturum; habere se quoque ad Caesaris gratiam atque amicitiam receptum. 4 in eandem sententiam loquitur Scipio: Pompeio esse in animo rei publicae non deesse, si senatus sequatur; si cunctetur atque agat lenius, nequiquam eius auxilium, si postea velit, senatum imploraturum. 2. Haec Scipionis oratio, quod senatus in urbe habebatur Pompeiusque aderat, ex ipsius ore Pompei mitti videbatur. 2dixerat aliquis leniorem sententiam, ut primo M. Marcellus, ingressus in earn orationem, non oportere ante de ea re ad senatum referri quam dilectus tota Italia habiti et exercitus conscripti essent, quo praesidio tuto et libere senatus quae vellet decernere auderet; 3ut M. Calidius, qui censebat ut Pompeius in suas provincias proficisceretur, ne qua esset armorum causa; timere Caesarem, ereptis ab eo duabus legionibus, ne ad eius periculum reservare et retinere eas ad urbem Pompeius videretur; ut M. Rufus, qui sententiam Calidi paucis fere mutatis rebus sequebatur. 4 hi omnes convicio L. Lentuli consulis correpti exagitabantur. 5 Lentulus sententiam Calidi pronuntiaturum se omnino negavit, Marcellus perterritus conviciis a sua

DE CIVILI BELLO INCIPIT LIBER NONUS S: iNciprr LIB Vim BELLI CTVILIS U: INCIPIT LIBER PRIMUS BELLI CTVILIS T: INCIPIT LIBER PRIMUS CIVILIS BELLI V: deficit M usque ad 333 tri-, servat textum m 1 1 lacunam statuit Glandorp | litteris Caesaris Vossius : litteris a Fabio C. Caesaris co 2 infinite Hotman: in civitate co 2 1 aderat co: aberat Victorius 3 ereptis Nipperdey : conepus co 39 CAESAR THE CIVIL WAR BOOK I 1. ...when Caesar's letter was delivered to the consuls, it was only the strenuous efforts of the tribunes that won agreement from them that the letter should be read out in the senate; but it was impossible to make them agree that a motion should be put to the senate on the basis of its contents. 2 They initiated a general debate on public affairs. Consul Lucius Lentulus promised the senate that he would not fail the republic, if they were willing to express their opinions boldly and forcefully; 3 but if they kept an eye on Caesar and tried to please him, as they had done on previous occasions, he would decide for himself what to do and would not obey the authority of the senate; he too could take refuge in Caesar's favour and friendship. 4 Scipio spoke to the same effect: Pompey's intention was to do his duty to the republic, if the senate would follow him; but if they hesitated and procrastinated they would beg in vain for his help if they wanted it later. 2. This speech of Scipio's seemed to be launched from Pompey's very lips, since the senate was meeting in the city and Pompey was nearby. 2 Less impetuous views had been expressed, first for example by Marcus Marcellus, who embarked on an exposition of the view that no motion on the subject should be put to the senate before levies were held throughout Italy and armies raised, under whose protection the senate could make the decisions it desired in safety and freedom; 3 also by Marcus Calidius, who gave it as his opinion that Pompey should leave for his provinces, so that there should be no reason for fighting; Caesar (he said) was afraid that it was to endanger him that Pompey was seen to be keeping back and holding near Rome the two legions that had been taken from him; and by Marcus Rufus, who expressed the same views as Calidius with some slight variations. 4 These were all attacked and abused by consul Lucius Lentulus. 5 Calidius' motion he totally refused to put, and Marcellus, taking 40 De Bello Civili sententia discessit. 6 sic vocibus consulis, terrore praesentis exercitus, minis amicorum Pompei plerique compulsi, inviti et coacti Scipionis sententiam sequuntur: uti ante certain diem Caesar exercitum dimittat; si non faciat, eum adversus rem publicam facturum videri. 7intercedit M. Antonius, Q. Cassius, tribuni plebis. refertur confestim de intercessione tribunorum. 8dicuntur sententiae graves; ut quisque acerbissime crudelissimeque dixit, ita quam maxime ab inimicis Caesaris collaudatur. 3. Misso ad vesperum senatu, omnes qui sunt eius ordinis a Pompeio evocantur. laudat promptos atque in posterum confirmat, segniores castigat atque incitat. 2multi undique ex veteribus Pompei exercitibus spe praemiorum atque ordinum evocantur, multi ex duabus legionibus quae sunt traditae a Caesare arcessuntur. 3 completur urbs et ipsum comitium tribunis, centurionibus, evocatis. 4 omnes amici consulum, necessarii Pompei atque eorum qui veteres inimicitias cum Caesare gerebant in senatum coguntur; 5 quorum vocibus et concursu terrentur infirmiores, dubii confirmantur, plerisque vero libere decernendi potestas eripitur. 6pollicetur L. Piso censor sese iturum ad Caesarem, item L. Roscius praetor, qui de his rebus eum doceant; sex dies ad earn rem conficiendam spati postulant. 7dicuntur etiam ab nonnullis sententiae, ut legati ad Caesarem mittantur qui voluntatem senatus ei proponant. 4. Omnibus his resistitur omnibusque oratio consulis, Scipionis, Catonis opponitur. Catonem veteres inirnicitiae Caesaris incitant et dolor repulsae. 2 Lentulus aeris alieni magnitudine et spe exercitus ac provinciarum et regum appellandorum largitionibus movetur seque alterum fore Sullam inter suos gloriatur ad quern summa imperii redeat. 3 Scipionem eadem spes provinciae atque exercituum impellit quos se pro necessitudine partiturum cum Pompeio arbitratur, simul iudiciorum metus atque ostentatio sui et adulatio potentium qui in re publica iudiciisque turn plurimum pollebant 4 ipse Pompeius ab inimicis Caesaris incitatus et quod neminem dignitate secum exaequari volebat totum se ab eius amicitia averterat et cum communibus inimicis in gratiam redierat quorum ipse maximam partem illo adfinitatis tempore iniunxerat Caesari; 5 simul infamia duarum legionum permotus quas ab itinere Asiae Syriaeque ad suam potentiam dominatumque converterat, rem ad anna deduci studebat.

3 1 promptos Pantagathus : Pompeius co 3 et ipsum Hug : et (ad m) ius co | tribunis centurionibus evocatis Oudendorp : tr (trds SmU2) pi centurio evocat co 4 3 metus adulatio atque co: adulatio post et trsp. Vielhaber Book I 41 fright at the abuse, withdrew his. 6 Thus the majority, forced by the consul's words, by the fear inspired by an army on the doorstep, and by the threats of Pompey's friends, voted unwillingly and under duress for Scipio's motion: that Caesar should dismiss his army before a certain date; and if he did not, he would be judged to be committing an act hostile to the state. 7 The motion was vetoed by the tribunes Marcus Antonius and Quintus Cassius. This veto was immediately put to the senate for its consideration. 8 Stern views were expressed; the bitterer and harsher they were, the greater their enthusiastic approval by Caesar's enemies. 3. When the senate was dismissed towards evening, all its members were summoned by Pompey. He praised those who were ready and encouraged them for the future, and reproached and urged on the more hesitant. 2 Many men who had served in Pompey's previous armies were called up in hope of reward or rank, and many were summoned from the two legions which Caesar had handed over. 3 The city, everi the Comitium itself, was full of officers, centurions, and re-enlisted men. 4 All the friends of the consuls, and all the associates of Pompey and of the men who had long been Caesar's enemies were assembled in the senate. 5 Their words and their numbers frightened the less resolute, and emboldened the hesitant, but took away from the majority the power of free decision. 6 Censor Lucius Piso, likewise praetor Lucius Roscius, promised to go to Caesar to inform him of these developments ; they requested a period of six days to complete this business. 7 Some also proposed that a delegation be sent to Caesar, to put the senate's wishes to him. 4. All these proposals were resisted, and Lentulus, Scipio, and Cato spoke against them all. Cato was driven by long-standing enmity to Caesar and resentment at his electoral defeat. 2 Lentulus was motivated by the size of his debts, by the hope of an army and provinces, and by the prospect of inducements offered by kings who desired recognition; he also boasted to his intimates that he would be a second Sulla, to whom supreme power would fall. 3 Scipio was impelled by the same hope of a province and armies, which he thought he would share with Pompey on account of his marriage-tie with him; he was also driven on by his fear of prosecution, his love of self-display, and the flattery he received from powerful men who were particularly influential at that time in public life and the courts. 4 Pompey himself, urged on by Caesar's enemies and by his desire that no one should match his own standing, had turned entirely away from friendship with Caesar and had re• established cordial relations with their joint enemies, the greater number of whom he had inflicted on Caesar at the time of their family connection; 5 at the same time, disturbed by the scandal of the two legions which he had deflected from their march to Asia and Syria to bolster his own power and dominance, he was keen to settle matters by fighting. 42 De Bello Civili 5. His de causis aguntur omnia raptim atque turbate. nec docendi Caesaris propinquis eius spatium datur nec tribunis plebis sui periculi deprecandi neque etiam extremi iuris intercessione retinendi, quod L. Sulla reliquerat, facultas tribuitur; 2sed de sua salute septimo die cogitare coguntur, quod ill! turbulentissimi superioribus temporibus tribuni plebis octavo denique mense variarum actionum respicere ac timere consuerant. 3 decurritur ad illud extremum atque ultimum senatus cbnsultum, quo nisi paene in ipso urbis incendio atque in desperatione omnium salutis latorum audacia numquam ante discessum est: dent operam consules, praetores, tribuni plebis, quique consulibus sunt ad urbem, ne quid res publica detrimenti capiat. 4 haec senatus consulto perscribuntur a. d. VII. id. Ian. itaque V primis diebus quibus haberi senatus potuit, qua ex die consulatum iniit Lentulus, biduo excepto comitiali, et de imperio Caesaris et de amplissimis viris, tribunis plebis, gravissime acerbissimeque decernitur. 5 profugiunt statim ex urbe tribuni plebis seseque ad Caesarem conferunt. is eo tempore erat Ravennae exspectabatque suis lenissimis postulatis responsa, si qua hominum aequitate res ad otium deduci posset. 6. Proximis diebus habetur extra urbem senatus. Pompeius eadem ilia quae per Scipionem ostenderat agit; senatus virtutem constantiamque collaudat; copias suas exponit: legiones habere sese paratas X; 2 praeterea cognitum compertumque sibi alieno esse animo in Caesarem milites neque iis posse persuaded uti eum defendant aut sequantur. 3 statim de reliquis rebus ad senatum refertur: tota Italia dilectus habeatur; Faustus Sulla propere in Mauretaniam mittatur, pecunia uti ex aerario Pompeio detur. refertur etiam de rege Iuba ut socius sit atque amicus. 4 Marcellus hoc se passurum in praesentia negat. de Fausto impedit Philippus, tribunus plebis. 5de reliquis rebus senatus consulta perscribuntur. provinciae privatis decernuntur, duae consulares, reliquae praetoriae. Scipioni obvenit Syria, L. Domitio Gallia. Philippus et Cotta privato consilio praetereuntur, neque eorum sortes deiciuntur. 6 in reliquas provincias praetores mittuntur. neque exspectant, quod superioribus annis acciderat, ut de eorum imperio ad populum feratur, paludatique votis nuncupatis exeunt. 7 consules, quod ante id tempus accidit numquam, ex urbe

5 2 octavo Vcorr: orto S : octo P I menses variarum P : mense suarum S 3 latorum co (cf. Cic. Sest. 77): relatorum Giesing : paucorum Nipperdey : senatorum Meusel | pro add. Pantagathus 5 lenissimis Beroaldus : levissimis co 6 3 statim SU2 : stantC?) saltern m : saltern U*T: vel statim saltim V I propere p : pro praetore Manutius 4 hoc se Nipperdey: non S : n p 7 ne auspicato quidem add. la Penna (Maia 1955,130) Book I 43 5. For these reasons everything was done in haste and confusion. Caesar's relations were allowed no time to inform him, nor were the tribunes given any opportunity to make a plea against the danger that threatened them, nor even to retain their fundamental rights by veto, which Lucius Sulla had left untouched; 2 but after seven days they were forced to look to their own safety, a thing which the famous revolutionary tribunes of earlier times had not usually had to consider or fear for until eight months of the year had passed and they had a variety of actions to account for. 3 Recourse was had to that last and final decree of the senate, which had never before been passed except when the city was almost ablaze and the recklessness of those who were proposing laws was putting everyone's safety at risk: "Let the consuls, praetors, tribunes and those proconsuls who are in the neighbourhood of Rome take action to see that the state suffers no harm." 4 These words were recorded in a decree of the senate passed on January 7th. And so on the first five days on which the senate could be convoked after the start of Lentulus' consulship (the two comitial days excepted), decrees of the gravest and most intemperate character were passed, about Caesar's tenure of command and about persons of the highest importance, tribunes of the people. 5 The tribunes fled at once from Rome, and went to Caesar. He was at that time at Ravenna, awaiting the answer to his very modest demands to see if by some sense of natural justice the matter could be peacefully resolved. 6. On the following days the senate met outside the city. Pompey made the same points as he had made through Scipio to them; he praised the courage and determination of the senate; he detailed his forces, saying he had ten legions fully prepared; 2 and furthermore he had discovered for certain that the soldiers were hostile to Caesar and would never be persuaded to defend or follow him. 3 Immediately the remaining business was brought before the senate: to institute recruitment in the whole of Italy; to send Faustus Sulla with all speed to Mauretania; and to give money from the treasury to Pompey. There was also a proposal to make king Juba an ally and friend. 4 Marcellus said that for the present he would not allow this. Philippus, a tribune, vetoed the motion about Faustus. 5 The decisions of the senate about the remaining matters were duly recorded. Provinces were allotted to men who were not holding office: two to ex- consuls, the remainder to ex-praetors. Syria fell to Scipio, Gaul to Lucius Domitius. Philippus and Cotta were passed over by private arrangement, and their names were not put into the ballot. 6 To the other provinces praetors were sent. They did not even wait, as had happened in previous years, for their authority to be conferred by the people, and they went out from the city in military dress after making their solemn vows. 7 The consuls left the city without taking the auspices, a thing which had never 44 De Bello Civili proficiscuntur, lictoresque habent in urbe et Capitolio privati contra omnia vetustatis exempla. 8 tota Italia dilectus habentur, arma imperantur, pecuniae a municipiis exiguntur, e fanis tolluntur, omnia divina humanaque iura permiscentur. 7. Quibus rebus cognitis, Caesar apud milites contionatur. omnium temporum iniurias inimicorum in se commemorat; a quibus deductum ac depravatum Pompeium queritur invidia atque obtrectatione laudis suae, cuius ipse honori et dignitati semper faverit adiutorque fuerit. 2 novum in re publica introductum exemplum queritur, ut tribunicia intercessio armis notaretur atque opprimeretur; 3 Sullam nudata omnibus rebus tribunicia potestate tamen intercessionem liberam reliquisse; 4 Pompeium qui amissa restituisse videatur bona etiam quae ante habuerint ademisse; 5 quotienscumque sit decretum, darent operam magistratus, ne quid res publica detrimenti caperet, qua voce et quo senatus consulto populus Romanus ad arma sit vocatus, factum in perniciosis legibus, in vi tribunicia, in secessione populi, templis locisque editioribus occupatis. 6 atque haec superioris aetatis exempla expiata Satumini atque Gracchorum casibus docet; quarum rerum illo tempore nihil factum, ne cogitatum quidem. 7 hortatur, cuius imperatoris ductu Villi annis rem publicam felicissime gesserint plurimaque proelia secunda fecerint, omnem Galliam Germaniamque pacaverint, ut eius existimationem dignitatemque ab inimicis defendant. 8 conclamant legionis XIII., quae aderat, milites - hanc enim initio tumultus evocaverat, reliquae nondum convenerant - sese paratos esse imperatoris sui tribunorumque plebis iniurias defendere. 8. Cognita militum voluntate, Ariminum cum ea legione proficiscitur ibique tribunos plebis, qui ad eum confugerant convenit; reliquas legiones ex hibernis evocat et subsequi iubet. 2 eo L. Caesar adulescens venit, cuius pater Caesaris erat legatus. is, reliquo sermone confecto, cuius rei causa venerat, habere se a Pompeio ad eum privati officii mandata demonstrat: 3 velle Pompeium se Caesari purgatum, ne ea quae rei publicae causa egerit in suam contumeliam vertat. semper se rei publicae commoda privatis necessitudinibus habuisse potiora. Caesarem quoque pro sua dignitate

7 2 quae superioribus annis armis esset restituta post opprimeretur add. co, del. Nipperdey: sine ante armis add. Hotman 4 bona Victorius : dona co 6 nulla lex promulgate non cum populo agi coeptum, nulla secessio facta post quidem add. G), del. Nipperdey (sed vide Barwick 1951 p.94, Bayet 1931) Book I 45 happened before, and men holding no elected office were attended by lictors in the city and in the precinct of Capitoline Jupiter, contrary to all precedent. 8 All over Italy men were conscripted, and weapons requisitioned; money was exacted from the towns, and taken from the temples; and all the laws of god and man were overturned. 7. When he learnt this news Caesar addressed his soldiers. He detailed all the wrongs done him in the past by his personal enemies; he complained that they had detached Pompey and twisted his judgment from malice and jealousy of his own renown, while he himself had always supported and promoted Pompey's distinction and status. 2 He complained that a new precedent had been introduced into public life, whereby the tribunician veto was being censured and suppressed by force. 3 Sulla, who had stripped the tribunician power of everything, had at least left the veto unimpaired; 4 Pompey, who was thought to have restored the property they had lost, had taken away even what they had previously possessed. 5 Whenever it had been decreed that the magistrates should take steps to ensure that the state suffered no harm - the words and decree of the senate which called the Roman people to arms - this had been done when subversive laws were proposed, when the tribunes turned to violence, when the people seceded, when the temples and commanding positions were seized. 6 He also pointed out that these memorable events of earlier years had been atoned for by the fates of Saturninus and the Gracchi; but that at the present time none of this had taken place, indeed had not even been contemplated. 7 He exhorted them to defend from his enemies the reputation and standing of the man under whose generalship they had for nine years played their part for Rome with oustanding success and won a large number of battles and pacified the whole of Gaul and Germany. 8 The soldiers of the Thirteenth legion, which was present because he had called it up at the beginning of the trouble while the others were not yet gathered, shouted that they were ready to defend their general and the tribunes from harm. 8. Having discovered the feelings of his men, he set out with this legion for Ariminum and there met the tribunes who had fled to him; the rest of the legions he called out from winter quarters and ordered to follow after him. 2 Young Lucius Caesar, whose father was an officer of Caesar's, arrived at Ariminum. When the other matters, which were the reason for his journey, had been disposed of, he revealed that he had a mission of a personal sort from Pompey to Caesar: 3 Pompey wished to explain himself to Caesar, to stop Caesar turning to his discredit actions which he had taken for the benefit of the state. He had always, he said, regarded the advantage of the state as more important than his private interests. Caesar too had a duty laid on him by his position to set aside for the sake of the state his 46 De Bello Civili debere et stadium et iracundiam suam rei publicae dimittere neque adeo graviter irasci inimicis ut, cum illis nocere se speret, rei publicae noceat. 4 pauca eiusdem generis addit cum excusatione Pompei coniuncta. eadem fere atque eisdem verbis praetor Roscius agit cum Caesare sibique Pompeium commemorasse demonstrat. 9. Quae res etsi nihil ad levandas iniurias pertinefre videbantur, tamen idoneos nactus homines per quos ea quae vellet ad eum perferrentur, petit ab utroque, quoniam Pompei mandata ad se detulerint, ne graventur sua quoque ad eum postulate deferre, si parvo labore magnas controversias tollere atque omnem Italiam metu liberare possint. 2 sibi semper primam fuisse dignitatem vitaque potiorem. doluisse se quod populi Romani beneficium sibi per contumeliam ab inimicis extorqueretur, ereptoque semenstri imperio in urbem retraheretur, cuius absentis rationem haberi proximis comitiis populus iussisset. 3 tamen hanc iacturam honoris sui rei publicae causa aequo animo tulisse; cum litteras ad senatum miserit ut omnes ab exercitibus discederent, ne id quidem impetravisse. 4 tota Italia dilectus haberi, retineri legiones ii quae ab se simulatione Parthici belli sint abductae, civitatem esse in armis. quonam haec omnia nisi ad suam pemiciem pertinere? 5 sed tamen ad omnia se descendere paratum atque omnia pati rei publicae causa, proficiscatur Pompeius in suas provincias, ipsi exercitus dimittant, discedant in Italia omnes ab armis, metus e civitate tollatur, libera comitia atque omnis res publica senatui populoque Romano permittatur. 6 haec quo facilius certisque condicionibus fiant et iure iurando sanciantur, aut ipse propius accedat aut se patiatur accedere; fore uti per colloquia omnes controversiae componantur. 10. Acceptis mandatis, Roscius cum Caesare Capuam pervenit ibique consules Pompeiumque invenit; postulata Caesaris renuntiat. 2illi deliberata respondent scriptaque ad eum mandata per eos remittunt, quorum haec erat summa: 3 Caesar in Galliam reverteretur, Arimino excederet, exercitus dimitteret; quae si fecisset, Pompeium in Hispanias iturum. 4 interea, quoad fides esset data Caesarem facturum quae polliceretur, non intermissuros consules Pompeiumque dilectus.

8 3 ut T : ne m : om. SUV 4 verbis Clarke : rebus Ro beneficium Aldus : pro beneficio co | per contumeliam UTV : contumelia Sm 10 2 re add. Gruter Book I 47 passion and resentment, and not to be so angry with his enemies that in the hope of harming them he did harm to the state. 4 Lucius added a little more in the same vein, along with excuses for Pompey's behaviour. Praetor Roscius discussed almost the same things with Caesar in the same terms and indicated that Pompey had made these points to him. 9. None of this appeared to have anything to do with the redress of his grievances; nevertheless, having found suitable bearers of his wishes, Caesar asked them both, since they had carried a message from Pompey to himself, not to find it too much trouble to take his demands back to Pompey, bearing in mind that by a small expenditure of effort they could put an end to matters of great dispute and free the whole of Italy from fear. 2 For himself, he said, his standing had always been the leading consideration, more important than his life. He felt hurt because a favour granted by the Roman people had been insultingly wrenched from him by his enemies; six months of his governorship snatched away, he was being dragged back to Rome even though the Roman people had sanctioned his candidature in absence at the next elections. 3 Yet he had accepted this loss of public position with equanimity, for the state's sake; when he sent a letter to the senate proposing that all parties should surrender their armies, even that request had been unsuccessful. 4 Men were being conscripted all over Italy, the two legions which had been taken from him on the pretext of a Parthian war were being kept back, and the community was under arms. What was the purpose of all this, if not his own destruction? 5 None the less, he was ready to descend to any depths and put up with anything for the sake of the state. Pompey should go to his provinces, they should both disband their armies, everyone in Italy should lay down their arms, the community should be freed from fear, and the senate and people of Rome should be permitted free elections and complete control of the state. 6 So that these proposals could be realised more easily and on agreed terms, and could be solemnly ratified by oath, Pompey should either himself come to meet Caesar or allow Caesar to meet him; discussion would resolve all their differences. 10. Taking this message, and accompanied by Lucius Caesar, Roscius reached Capua and there found the consuls and Pompey; he reported Caesar's demands. 2 After considering the matter, they responded and sent back with Roscius and Caesar a written message, which in brief was this: 3 Caesar was to return to Gaul, withdraw from Ariminum, and disband his armies; if he did this, Pompey would go to Spain. 4 In the meantime, until guarantees had been given that Caesar would do what he promised, the consuls and Pompey would not stop levying troops. 48 De Bello Civili 11. Erat iniqua condicio postulare ut Caesar Arimino excederet atque in provinciam reverteretur, ipsum et provincias et legiones alienas tenere; exercitum Caesaris velle dimitti, dilectus habere; 2polliceri se in provinciam iturum neque ante quem diem iturus sit definire, ut, si peracto consulatu Caesaris non profectus esset, nulla tamen mendaci religione obstrictus videretur; 3 tempus vero colloquio non dare neque accessurum polhceri magnam pacis desperationem adferebat. 4itaque ab Arimino M. Antonium cum cohortibus V Arretium mittit; ipse Arimini cum duabus subsistit, ibique dilectum habere instituit; Pisaurum, Fanum, Anconam singulis cohortibus occupat. 12. Interea certior factus Iguvium Thermum praetorem cohortibus V tenere, oppidum munire, omniumque esse Iguvinorum optimam erga se voluntatem, Curionem cum tribus cohortibus quas Pisauri et Arimini habebat mittit. 2 cuius adventu cognito diffisus municipii voluntati Thermus cohortes ex urbe reducit et profugit. milites in itinere ab eo discedunt ac domum revertuntur. 3 Curio summa omnium voluntate Iguvium recipit. Quibus rebus cognitis, confisus municipiorum voluntatibus Caesar cohortes legionis xm ex praesidiis deducit Auximumque proficiscitur; quod oppidum Attius cohortibus introduces tenebat, dilectumque toto Piceno circummissis senatoribus habebat. 13. Adventu Caesaris cognito, decuriones Auximi ad Attium Varum frequentes conveniunt; docent sui iudicii rem non esse; neque se neque reliquos municipes pati posse C. Caesarem imperatorem, bene de re publica meritum, tantis rebus gestis, oppido moenibusque prohiberi; proinde habeat rationem posteritatis et periculi sui. 2 quorum oratione permotus Varus praesidium quod introduxerat ex oppido educit ac profugit. 3 hunc ex primo ordine pauci Caesaris consecuti milites consistere coegerunt. 4commisso proelio, deseritur a suis Varus; nonnulla pars militum domum discedit; reliqui ad Caesarem perveniunt, atque una cum iis deprensus L. Pupius, primi pili centurio, adducitur, qui hunc eundem ordinem in exercitu Cn. Pompei antea duxerat. 5 at Caesar milites Attianos collaudat, Pupium dimittit, Auximatibus agit gratias seque eorum facti memorem fore pollicetur.

11 2 consulatu Caesaris non Nipperdey: cos Caesaris (Cesar m) cons P : Caesaris cods S 4 duabus legionibus co: duabus Davis Book I 49 11. It was unreasonable of Pompey to demand that Caesar should withdraw from Ariminum and return to his province, while he himself kept not only provinces but also legions that were not his; to want Caesar's army disbanded, but go on enlisting men himself; 2 and to promise to go to his province but not to specify a date by which he would go, so that if he had not started out by the end of Caesar's consulship, he would not appear to have been guilty of deception in accepting a solemn obligation; 3 indeed not to spare the time for a meeting, nor to promise to attend, indicated that the chances for peace were very slender. 4 And so from Ariminum he sent Marcus Antonius to Arretium with five cohorts; he himself stayed at Ariminum with two, and began to enlist troops there; Pisaurum, Fanum, and Ancona he occupied with a cohort each. 12. Meanwhile, learning that praetor Thermus was holding Iguvium with five cohorts and fortifying the town, and that all the townspeople were very sympathetic to himself, he sent Curio there with the three cohorts which he had at Pisaurum and Ariminum. 2 Thermus, hearing of Curio's arrival and having little confidence in the loyalty of the population, withdrew his cohorts from the town, and fled. On the march his soldiers deserted him and returned home. 3 Curio took Iguvium with the complete approval of all. When Caesar heard of these events, relying on the goodwill of the towns he withdrew the cohorts of the 13th legion from their garrison duties and set out for Auximum; Attius had brought cohorts in to hold this town and had sent senators round to conduct a levy all over Picenum. 13. Hearing of Caesar's arrival, the members of the town council of Auximum went in a body to see Attius Varus; they told him that a decision did not rest with them; neither they, nor their fellow townsmen, could tolerate it if Gaius Caesar, imperator, who deserved well of the state and had such great achievements to his credit, were excluded from the town and its defences; accordingly, he should think about the future and the danger he was in. 2 Moved by what they said, Varus withdrew the garrison which he had put in, and fled. 3 A few of Caesar's leading troops caught up with him and forced him to stand his ground. 4 When battle was joined, Varus was deserted by his soldiers; a proportion of them went home; the rest made their way to Caesar, and together with them was brought as a prisoner their highest-ranking centurion, Lucius Pupius, who had previously held this same post in Pompey's army. 5 But Caesar simply praised Attius' soldiers, sent Pupius away, and thanked the inhabitants of Auximum, promising that he would remember what they had done. 50 De Bello Civili 14. Quibus rebus Romam nuntiatis, tantus repente terror invasit ut, cum Lentulus consul ad aperiendum aerarium venisset ad pecuniamque Pompeio ex senatus consulto proferendam, protinus aperto sanctiore aerario ex urbe profugeret. Caesar enim adventare iam iamque et adesse eius equites falso nuntiabantur. 2 hunc Marcellus collega et plerique magistratus consecuti sunt. 3 Cn. Pompeius pridie eius diei ex urbe profectus iter ad legiones habebat quas a Caesare acceptas in Apulia hibernorum causa disposuerat. 4 dilectus circa urbem intermittuntur; nihil citra Capuam tutum esse omnibus videtur. Capuae primum sese confirmant et colligimt dilectumque colonorum qui lege Iulia Capuam deducti erant habere instituunt; gladiatoresque quos ibi Caesar in ludo habebat ad forum productos Lentulus libertatis confirmat atque his equos attribuit et se sequi iussit; 5 quos postea, monitus ab suis, quod ea res omnium iudicio reprehendebatur, circum familias conventus Campaniae custodiae causa distribuit. 15. Auximo Caesar progressus omnem agrum Picenum percurrit. cunctae earum regionum praefecturae libentissimis animis eum recipiunt exerci- tumque eius omnibus rebus iuvant. 2etiam Cingulo, quod oppidum Labienus constituerat suaque pecunia exaedificaverat, ad eum legati veniunt, quaeque imperaverit se cupidissime facturos pollicentur. 3 milites imperat; mittunt. interea legio XII. Caesarem consequitur. cum his duabus Asculum Picenum proficiscitur. id oppidum Lentulus Spinther X cohortibus tenebat; qui, Caesaris adventu cognito, profugit ex oppido, cohortesque secum abducere conatus magna parte militum deseritur. 4relictus in itinere cum paucis incidit in Vibullium Rufum missum a Pompeio in agrum Picenum confirmandorum hominum causa, a quo factus Vibullius certior quae res in Piceno gererentur, milites ab eo accipit, ipsum dimittit. 5 item ex finitimis regionibus quas potest contrahit cohortes ex dilectibus Pompeianis; in his Camerino fugientem Lucilium Hirrum cum sex cohortibus quas ibi in praesidio habuerat excipit; quibus coactis XIII efficit. 6 cum his ad Domitium4 Corfinium magnis itineribus pervenit, Caesaremque adesse cum legionibus duabus nuntiat. 7 Domitius per se circiter XX cohortes Alba, ex Marsis et Paelignis, finitimis ab regionibus, coegerat.

14 4 circa Nipperdey: intra mV : contra SUT | spe add. Herzog 5 familias Rubens (cf. Cic. Att. VII.14.2): familiares G) 15 1 Auximo ...progressus Sm2 : Maximo ...progressu P 6 Abenobarbum post Domitium habent co, delevi (v. nn.) Book I 51 14. When the news of these events reached Rome, such a violent and sudden panic occurred that although consul Lentulus had come to open the treasury and provide funds for Pompey in accordance with a senatorial decree, he fled from the city the moment he had opened the inner treasury. The reason was the false report that Caesar's arrival was imminent and that his cavalry were at hand. 2 Lentulus was followed by his colleague Marcellus and a number of the magistrates. 3 Pompey had set out from Rome on the previous day and was making his way to the legions he had received from Caesar and had put into winter quarters around Apulia. 4 Recruiting in the neighbourhood of Rome was discontinued; it seemed to everyone that nothing north of Capua was safe. It was at Capua that they first took heart and collected themselves, and began a levy amongst the colonists who had been settled there by the Julian Law. The gladiators whom Caesar had in training there were brought to the town square by Lentulus, who encouraged them with the hope of freedom and gave them horses and ordered them to follow him; 5 afterwards, because this action had been universally condemned, on the advice of his friends he distributed them amongst the households of the Campanian Assembly so that they could be kept under guard. 15. Advancing from Auximum, Caesar overran the whole of Picenum. All the districts of the region received him most willingly and assisted his army with all kinds of supplies. 2 Even from Cingulum, a town which Labienus had established and provided with buildings at his own expense, there came a deputation promising to execute with all eagerness whatever orders Caesar should give. 3 He demanded troops; they sent them. Meanwhile the Twelfth legion caught up with him. With these two he set out for Asculum Picenum. This town was held with ten cohorts by Lentulus Spinther, who on learning of Caesar's approach fled the town and in the attempt to bring his cohorts away with him was deserted by a large part of his soldiers. 4 Left on the march with a few of them, he fell in with Vibullius Rufus, sent by Pompey to Picenum to stiffen resistance. After being informed by him of the situation in Picenum, Vibullius accepted command of his soldiers and sent him away. 5 Vibullius also assembled from the neighbouring regions what cohorts he could from the Pompeian levies, amongst them a garrison of six cohorts which he intercepted fleeing from Camerinum under Lucilius Hirrus ; gathering these up, he put together thirteen in all. 6 With these he made his way by forced marches to Domitius in Corfinium and broke the news that Caesar was close upon them with two legions. 7 Domitius on his own account had assembled twenty cohorts from Alba, from the Marsi and Paeligni, and from the neighbouring regions. 52 De Bello Civili 16. Recepto Firmo expulsoque Lentulo, Caesar conquiri milites qui ab eo discesserant, dilectumque institui iubet; ipse, unum diem ibi rei frumentariae causa moratus, Corfinium contendit.. 2eo cum venisset, cohortes V praemissae a Domitio ex oppido pontem fluminis interrumpebant qui erat ab oppido milia passuum circiter III. 3 ibi cum antecursoribus Caesaris proelio commisso, celeriter Domitiani a ponte repulsi se in oppidum receperunt. Caesar, legionibus traductis, ad oppidum constitit iuxtaque murum castra posuit. 17. Re cognita, Domitius ad Pompeium in Apuliam peritos regionum magno proposito praemio cum litteris mittit qui petant atque orent ut sibi subveniat: Caesarem duobus exercitibus et locorum angustiis facile intercludi posse frumentoque prohiberi. 2 quod nisi fecerit, se cohortesque amplius XXX magnumque numerum senatorum atque equitum Romanorum in periculum esse venturum. 3 interim suos cohortatus tormenta in muris disponit certasque cuique partes ad custodiam urbis attribuit; 4 militibus in contione agros ex suis possessionibus pollicetur, XL in singulos iugera, et pro rata parte centurionibus evocatisque. 18. Interim Caesari nuntiatur Sulmonenses, quod oppidum a Corfinio VII milium intervallo abest, cupere ea facere quae vellet, sed a Q. Lucretio senatore et Attio Paeligno prohiberi, qui id oppidum VII cohortium praesidio tenebant. 2 mittit eo M. Antonium cum legionis XIII. cohortibus V. Sulmonenses, simul atque signa nostra viderunt, portas aperuerunt universique, et oppidani et milites, obviam gratulantes Antonio exierunt. 3 Lucretius et Attius de muro se deiecerunt. Attius ad Antonium deductus petit ut ad Caesarem mitteretur. Antonius cum cohortibus et Attio eodem die quo profectus erat revertitur. 4 Caesar eas cohortes cum exercitu suo coniunxit Attiumque incolumem dimisit. Caesar primis diebus castra magnis operibus munire et ex finitimis municipiis frumentum comportare reliquasque copias exspectare instituit. 5 eo triduo legio VIII. ad eum venit cohortesque ex novis Galliae dilectibus XXII equitesque ab rege Norico circiter CCC. quorum adventu altera castra ad alteram oppidi partem ponit; his castris Curionem praefecit. 6 reliquis diebus oppidum vallo castellisque circummunire instituit. cuius operis maxima parte effecta, eodem fere tempore missi ad Pompeium

17 4 XL co: quina dena (i.e. XV) Fabre : quadrina Buecheler, cf. Liv. 35.40.6 18 2 Xm Vossius : VQI co 6 circummunire <;: circumvenire co Book I 53 16. Now that Firmum was in his hands, and Lentulus had been driven out, Caesar gave orders for the soldiers who had abandoned the latter to be rounded up, and recruitment to begin; he himself paused for one day to provision, and set off for Corfinium. 2 When he arrived, five cohorts sent forward from the town by Domitius were breaking down the bridge over the river about three miles from the town. 3 Domitius1 men engaged Caesar's advance guard there, but were quickly driven back from the bridge and withdrew into the town. 4 Caesar brought his legions across and halted by the town, making camp next to the wall. 17. When he found out what had happened, Domitius sent to Pompey in Apulia men who knew the country and had been promised a large reward, carrying a letter begging and praying Pompey to come and help him: Caesar, he said, could easily be trapped by two armies blocking the passes, and cut off from food; 2 unless Pompey acted, he himself and more than thirty cohorts and a large number of senators and Roman knights would be placed in danger. 3 In the meantime he encouraged his men, placed artillery on the walls, and allocated to each man his particular place in the defence of the city; 4 he addressed an assembly of the troops and promised them land from his own estates, twenty-four acres per head and pro rata for centurions and re-enlisted men. 18. The news was meanwhile brought to Caesar that the population of Sulmo, a town seven miles from Corfinium, wanted to place themselves at his disposal, but were being stopped by Quintus Lucretius, a senator, and Attius the Paelignian, who were holding the town with a force of seven cohorts. 2 He sent Marcus Antonius there with five cohorts of the Thirteenth legion. As soon as the people of Sulmo saw our standards, they opened their gates and all came out cheering, soldiers and townsfolk alike, to meet Antonius. 3 Lucretius and Attius jumped off the wall. Attius was brought to Antonius and asked to be sent to Caesar. Antonius returned with the cohorts and Attius on the same day on which he had set out. 4 Caesar incorporated these cohorts into his own army and sent Attius away unharmed. From the first day Caesar began to fortify his camp with great earthworks and bring in grain from the nearby towns and await the arrival of the rest of his forces. 5 Within three days the Eighth legion reached him, and twenty- two cohorts from new recruiting in Gaul, and about three hundred cavalry from the king of Noricum. On their arrival, he placed a second camp at the other side of the town, with Curio in command. 6 On the subsequent days he began to surround the town with a rampart and forts. When the greater part had been finished, the messengers who had been sent to Pompey 54 De Bello Civili revertuntur. 19. Litteris perlectis, Domitius dissimulans in consilio pronuntiat Pompeium celeriter subsidio venturum, hortaturque eos ne animo deficiant, quaeque usui ad defendendum oppidum sint parent. 2 ipse arcano cum paucis familiaribus suis colloquitur consiliumque fugae capere constituit. 3 cum vultus Domitii cum oratione non consentiret atque omnia trepidantius timidiusque ageret quam superioribus diebus consuesset, multumque cum suis consiliandi causa secreto praeter consuetudinem colloqueretur, concilia conventusque hominum fugeret, res diutius tegi dissimularique non potuit. 4Pompeius enim rescripserat sese rem in summum periculum deducturum non esse, neque suo consilio aut voluntate Domitium se in oppidum Corfinium contulisse: proinde, siqua fuisset facultas, ad se cum omnibus copiis veniret. 5 id ne fieri posset obsidione atque oppidi circummunitione fiebat. 20. Divulgato Domiti consilio, milites qui erant Corfini primo vesperi secessionem faciunt atque ita inter se per tribunos militum centurionesque atque honestissimos sui generis colloquuntur: 2 obsideri se a Caesare; opera munitionesque prope esse perfectas; ducem suum Domitium, cuius spe atque fiducia permanserint, proiectis omnibus fugae consilium capere; debere se suae salutis rationem habere. 3 ab his primo Marsi dissentire incipiunt eamque oppidi partem quae munitissima videretur occupant, tantaque inter eos dissensio exsistit ut manum conserere atque armis dimicare conentur; 4 post paulo tamen internuntiis ultro citroque missis, quae ignorabant de L. Domiti fuga cognoscunt. 5 itaque omnes uno consilio Domitium productum in publicum circumsistunt et custodiunt legatosque ex suo numero ad Caesarem mittunt: sese paratos esse portas aperire, quaeque imperaverit facere, et L. Domitium vivum in eius potestatem tradere. 21. Quibus rebus cognitis, Caesar, etsi magni interesse arbitrabatur quam primum oppido potiri cohortesque ad se in castra traducere, ne qua aut largitionibus aut animi confirmatione aut falsis nuntiis commutatio fieret voluntatis, quod saepe in bello parvis momentis magni casus intercederent, 2 tamen veritus ne militum introitu et nocturni temporis licentia oppidum diriperetur, eos qui venerant collaudat atque in oppidum dimittit, portas murosque adservari iubet. 3 ipse iis operibus quae facere instituerat milites

20 1 primo V: prima SmUT I tribunos Beroaldus: tribunum

21 5 vero Faerno: eo co 6 summae Lipsius : summa co 22 3 agit add. Bentley 23 2 quinque senatorii ordinis Davis: quinquaginta ordines co: quinquaginta ordinis senatorii Meusel: senatorii ordinis Cons tans 3 a parte Vascosan : aperte co Book I 57 watched. 3 He himself stationed soldiers on the siege works which he had begun, not at fixed intervals as had been his practice on preceding days, but with an unbroken line of lookouts and pickets so that the whole fortification was continuously manned; 4 he sent round military tribunes and commanders of contingents, alerting them not only to guard against organised sallies but also to watch for individuals slipping out secretly. 5 In truth not a single man was so relaxed or feeble as to take any rest that night. 6 Such was the pitch of tension at this critical moment that in their thoughts and feelings they were pulled in various directions, wondering what would happen to the Corfinians themselves, or to Domitius, or to Lentulus, or to the rest, and what fate awaited whom. 22. About the fourth watch Lentulus Spinther communicated from the wall with our lookouts and guards: he wished, if permission could be given, to meet Caesar. 2 Permission granted, he was conveyed from the town, and Domitius' soldiers did not leave him until he was brought into Caesar's presence. 3 He discussed his safety with Caesar; he begged and pleaded to be spared, reminded him of their old friendship, and rehearsed Caesar's favours to him, which were very considerable: 4 through Caesar he had become a member of the pontifical college, had received Spain as his province after his praetorship, and had been assisted in his candidature for the consulship. 5 But Caesar interrupted him: it was not to do harm that he had crossed the boundary of his province, but to defend himself from the insults of his enemies, to restore to their proper dignity the tribunes who had been expelled from Rome in the course of this affair, and to assert his own freedom and that of the Roman people, who were oppressed by an oligarchic clique. 6 Heartened by what Caesar said, Lentulus asked to be allowed to return to the town: his success in securing his own safety would be an encouragement to the hopes of the others; some were so terrified that they were being driven to take extreme decisions about their lives. Permission granted, he departed. 23. At dawn Caesar ordered all senators, sons of senators, military tribunes, and Roman knights to be brought before him. 2 There were five of senatorial rank, Lucius Domitius, Publius Lentulus Spinther, Lucius Caecilius Rufus, quaestor Sextus Quintilius Varus, and Lucius Rubrius; and in addition Domitius' son, several other young men, and a great number of Roman knights and members of local councils whom Domitius had called up from the towns. 3 They were all brought forward, and forbidding his soldiers to insult and jeer at them, he spoke a few words to them, to the effect that they had shown him no gratitude for the very substantial favours he had done them, and sent them away unharmed. 4 He returned to Domitius the six million sesterces which Domitius had brought with him 58 De Bello Civili advexerat Domitius atque in publico deposuerat, adlatum ad se ab Hllviris Corfiniensibus Domitio reddit, ne continentior in vita hominum quam in pecunia fuisse videatur, etsi earn pecuniam publicam esse constabat datamque a Pompeio in stipendium. 5 milites Domitianos sacramentum apud se dicere iubet atque eo die castra movet iustumque iter conficit, VII omnino dies ad Corfinium commoratus, et per fines Marrucinorum, Frentanorum, Larinatium in Apuliam pervenit. 24. Pompeius, his rebus cognitis quae erant ad Corfinium gestae, Luceria proficiscitur Canusium atque inde Brundisium. 2 copias undique omnes ex novis dilectibus ad se cogi iubet; servos, pastores armat atque iis equos attribuit; ex his circiter CCC equites conficit. 3 L. Manlius Alba cum cohortibus sex profugit, Rutilius Lupus praetor Tarracina cum tribus; quae procul equitatum Caesaris conspicatae, cui praeerat Vibius Curius, relicto praetore signa ad Curium transferunt atque ad eum transeunt. 4 item reliquis itineribus nonnullae cohortes in agmen Caesaris, aliae in equites incidunt. reducitur ad eum deprensus ex itinere N. Magius Cremona, praefectus fabrum Cn. Pompei. 5 quern Caesar ad eum remittit cum mandatis: quoniam ad id tempus facultas colloquendi non fuerit atque ipse Brundisium sit venturus, interesse rei publicae et communis salutis se cum Pompeio colloqui; neque vero idem profici longo itineris spatio, cum per alios condiciones ferantur, ac si coram de omnibus condicionibus disceptetur. 25. His datis mandatis, Brundisium cum legionibus VI pervenit, veteranis III et reliquis quas ex novo dilectu confecerat atque in itinere compleverat; Domitianas enim cohortes protinus a Corfinio in Siciliam miserat. 2repperit consules Dyrrachium profectos cum magna parte exercitus, Pompeium remanere Brundisi cum cohortibus XX; 3 neque certum inveniri poterat obtinendine Brundisi causa ibi remansisset, quo facilius omne Hadriaticum mare ex ultimis Italiae partibus regionibusque Graeciae in potestate haberet atque ex utraque parte bellum administrare posset, an inopia navium ibi restitisset; 4 veritusque ne ille Italiam dimittendam non existimaret, exitus administrationesque Brundisini portus impedire instituit. 5 quorum operum haec erat ratio, qua fauces erant angustissimae portus, moles atque aggerem ab utraque parte litoris iaciebat, quod iis locis erat

4 Hllviris Mommsen : iis (his V) viris co: Ilviris Aldus 24 3 Manlius UTV : Manilius m : Mallius S | praetor T : praeter SUV : pt m : delevi I Alba S : Albam p 4 N. Perizonius: Cn. co 25 1 in p: mi S 3 ex ultimis S : extremis P Book I 59 and deposited in the treasury, and which the four magistrates of Corfinium had handed over to himself; this he did in order not to seem greedier of men's money than of their lives, in spite of the fact that this was indisputably public money and had been provided by Pompey as pay for the troops. 5 He ordered Domitius' soldiers to take the oath of loyalty to himself, and on that day moved camp and completed a normal march; having spent seven days in all at Corfinium, he reached Apulia by way of the territory of the Marrucini, the Frentani, and Larinum. 24. When he learnt what had happened at Corfinium, Pompey set out from Luceria for Canusium and thence to Brundisium. 2 He ordered all newly recruited forces to be concentrated with him; he armed slaves and shepherds and gave them horses, creating about three hundred cavalry from them. 3 Lucius Manlius fled from Alba with six cohorts, praetor Rutilius Lupus from Tarracina with three; when these sighted Caesar's cavalry under the command of Vibius Curius, they left tlie praetor, transferred their standards to Curius, and went over to him. 4 In the same way on the other lines of march some cohorts fell in with Caesar's infantry, others with his cavalry. A staff officer of Pompey's, Numerius Magius from Cremona, was captured on the march and brought to Caesar, 5 who sent him back to Pompey with the message that since up to that time there had been no chance of a meeting, and he himself was on the way to Brundisium, it would be in the interests of the republic and the common good for him to confer with Pompey; nor were the same results to be expected from negotiations conducted at a distance, with terms relayed by others, as when all the terms could be discussed together face to face. 25. After dispatching this message, he arrived at Brundisium with six legions, three of them veteran, the remainder those which he had newly raised and made up to strength along the way; they did not include Domitius' cohorts, which he had sent directly from Corfinium to Sicily. 2 He found that the consuls had left for Dyrrachium with a large part of the army, while Pompey remained at Brundisium with twenty cohorts; 3 and he could not discover for certain whether Pompey had stayed there to hold Brundisium, so that he could more easily control the whole Adriatic from the most distant parts of Italy and the coasts of Greece, and conduct the war from both quarters, or whether he had stopped there because of a shortage of ships; 4 and fearing that his opponent had decided not to abandon Italy, Caesar began to block the entrance and the facilities of the port of Brundisium. 5 This was the way in which he did it. Where the passage into the port was at its narrowest, he threw out breakwaters and an earth bank from each shore, the sea being shallow there. 6 As he proceeded further 60 De Bello Civili vadosum mare. 6 longius progressus, cum agger altiore aqua contineri non posset, rates duplices quoquo versus pedum XXX e regione molis collocabat. 7 has quaternis ancoris ex ini angulis destinabat, ne fluctibus moverentur. 8 his perfectis collocatisque, ahas deinceps pari magnitudine rates iungebat. 9 has terra atque aggere integebat, ne aditus atque incursus ad defendendum impediretur; a fronte atque ab utroque latere cratibus ac pluteis protegebat; 10 in quarta quaque earum turres binorum tabulatorum excitabat quo commodius ab impetu navium incendiisque defenderet. 26. Contra haec Pompeius navis magnas onerarias quas in portu Brundisino deprehenderat adornabat. ibi turres cum ternis tabulatis erigebat easque multis tormentis et omni genere telorum completas ad opera Caesaris appellebat ut rates perrumperet atque opera disturbaret. sic cotidie utrimque eminus fundis, sagittis, reliquisque telis pugnabatur. 2 atque haec Caesar ita administrabat ut condiciones pacis dimittendas non existimaret; ac tametsi magnopere admirabatur Magium, quern ad Pompeium cum mandatis miserat, ad se non remitti, atque ea res saepe temptata etsi impetus eius consiliaque tardabat, tamen omnibus rebus in eo perseverandum putabat. 3 itaque Caninium Rebilum legatum, necessarium Scriboni Libonis, mittit ad eum colloqui causa; mandat ut Libonem de concilianda pace hortetur; in primis, ut ipse cum Pompeio colloqueretur, postulat; 4 magnopere sese confidere demonstrat, si eius rei sit potestas facta, fore ut aequis condicionibus ab armis discedatur; cuius rei magnam partem laudis atque existimationis ad Libonem perventuram, si illo auctore atque agente ab armis sit discessum. 5 Libo a colloquio Canini digressus ad Pompeium proficiscitur. paulo post renuntiat, quod consules absint, sine illis non posse agi de compositione. 6 ita saepius rem frustra temptatam Caesar aliquando dimittendam sibi iudicat et de bello agendum. 27. Prope dimidia parte operis a Caesare effecta, diebusque in ea re consumptis Vim, naves a consulibus Dyrrachio remissae quae priorem partem exercitus eo deportaverant Brundisium revertuntur. 2 Pompeius sive operibus Caesaris permotus sive etiam quod ab initio Italia excedere constituent, adventu navium profectionem parare incipit, 3 et quo facilius impetum Caesaris tardaret, ne sub ipsa profectione milites oppidum

26 3 familiarem necessarium co: del. familiarem Holder Book I 61 and the bank could not be held together in the deeper water, he stationed double pontoons, thirty feet long and wide, in line with the breakwater. 7 Each of these he kept in place with four anchors, one at each corner, so that they would not be swung by the waves. 8 When these had been completed and put in place, he joined to them in sequence other pontoons of equal size, 9 and covered them with earth and filling material so that it should not be difficult to move rapidly on to them to defend them; at the front and on both sides he protected them with wicker-work and penthouses; 10 on every fourth one he hastily raised two-storey towers to make the pontoons more easily defensible against ship-borne attack and fire. 26. In answer, Pompey fitted out large cargo ships which he had captured in the port of Brundisium. On them he erected towers with three storeys, and arming them with a large number of catapults and all sorts of weapons he drove them against Caesar's constructions s6 as to break through the rafts and disturb the operations. There were daily engagements of this kind, with both sides using slings, arrows, and other weapons at a distance. 2 In addition, Caesar so directed these operations as not to consider a negotiated peace out of the question; and although he was very surprised that Magius, whom he had sent with a message to Pompey, had not been sent back to him, and although his numerous attempts in this connection were hindering his assault and his planning, none the less he considered that he ought to persevere with the matter by every possible means. 3 He therefore sent his officer Caninius Rebilus, a friend of Scribonius Libo, to confer with him; he told Rebilus to encourage Libo to mediate a peace; above all he requested a meeting between himself and Pompey ; 4 he indicated that he had great confidence that, if this were granted, hostilities could be suspended on fair terms; and a great part of the praise and credit for such an outcome would be Libo's, if hostilities were brought to an end on his initiative and by his action. 5 Libo, leaving the meeting with Caninius, went to Pompey. A little later he brought the answer back that the consuls were not there, and without them it was impossible to discuss a settlement. 6 So after several vain attempts Caesar finally concluded that he must abandon the matter and pursue the war. 27. When Caesar had spent nine days in completing almost half the work, the ships which had ferried the first part of the army to Dyrrachium, and had been sent back from there by the consuls, returned to Brundisium. 2 On the arrival of the ships Pompey began to make preparations for departure, whether disturbed by Caesar's siege-works or indeed because he had from the start intended to withdraw from Italy; and so that he could more easily delay Caesar's attack and stop the soldiers bursting into the 62 De Bello Civili irrumperent, portas obstruit, vicos plateasque inaedificat ac fossas transversas viis praeducit atque ibi sudes stipitesque praeacutos defigit. 4haec levibus cratibus terraque inaequat; aditus autem atque itinera duo quae extra murum ad portum ferebant maximis defixis trabibus atque eis praeacutis praesaepit. 5 his paratis rebus, milites silentio naves conscendere iubet, expeditos autem ex evocatis sagittariis funditoribusque raros in muro turribusque disponit. 6 hos certo signo revocare constituit, cum omnes milites naves conscendissent, atque iis expedito loco actuaria navigia relinquit. 28. Brundisini Pompeianorum militum iniuriis atque ipsius Pompei contumeliis permoti Caesaris rebus favebant. 2itaque, cognita Pompei profectione, concursantibus illis atque in ea re occupatis, vulgo ex tectis significabant. per quos re cognita, Caesar scalas parari militesque armari iubet, ne quam rei gerendae facultatem dimittat. 3 Pompeius sub noctem naves solvit, qui erant in muro custodiae causa collocati, eo signo quod convenerat revocantur, notisque itineribus ad naves decurrunt. 4 milites, positis scalis, muros ascendunt, sed moniti a Brundisinis ut vallum caecum fossasque caveant, subsistunt et longo itinere ab his circumducti ad portum perveniunt duasque naves cum militibus, quae ad moles Caesaris adhaeserant, scaphis lintribusque reprehendunt, reprehensas excipiunt. 29. Caesar, etsi ad spem conficiendi negotii maxime probabat coactis navibus mare transire et Pompeium sequi priusquam iile sese transmarinis auxiliis confirmaret, tamen eius rei moram temporisque longinquitatem timebat, quod omnibus coactis navibus Pompeius praesentem facultatem insequendi sui ademerat. 2 relinquebatur ut ex longinquioribus regionibus Galliae Picenique et a freto naves essent exspectandae. id propter anni tempus longum atque impeditum videbatur. 3 interea veterem exercitum, duas Hispanias confirmari, quarum erat altera maximis benefices Pompei devincta, auxilia, equitatum parari, Galliam Italiamque temptari se absente nolebat. 30. Itaque in praesentia Pompei sequendi ratronem omittit, in Hispaniam proficisci constituit; duumviris municipiorum omnium imperat ut naves

27 5 cum add. Koechfy : sagittarios funditoresque Meusel Book I 63 town when he was in the act of leaving, he blocked the gates, built walls across the alleys and open places, and dug trenches across the streets, fixing sharpened stakes and posts in them. 4 These he covered over level, using wickerwork and earth; as for the entrances and the two roads which led beyond the wall to the port, he made palisades across them of massive sharpened posts set in the ground. 5 When these preparations had been made, he ordered his troops to embark in silence, and stationed on the wall and the turrets a few lightly armed men from among his veterans, along with archers and slingers. 6 These he arranged to recall by an agreed signal when all the soldiers had embarked, and left light fast boats for them in a convenient spot. 28. The townspeople of Brundisium, who resented the damage inflicted on them by the soldiery and the insulting manner in which Pompey himself had treated them, were on Caesar's side. 2 So when they knew about Pompey's departure, they signalled everywhere from the roofs while the Pompeians were preoccupied with mustering. Realising through them what was happening, Caesar ordered ladders to be got ready and the soldiers to arm, so as not to lose any chance of a success. 3 Pompey set sail as it was getting dark. The men who had been left to guard the wall were recalled by the signal which had been agreed and ran down to the sea by paths they knew. 4 The soldiers set the ladders in place and climbed the walls, but on being warned by the inhabitants to beware of the concealed palisade and trenches, they halted and were led by them a long way round to reach the port, where using dinghies and small boats they made fast and captured two ships carrying soldiers which had run foul of Caesar's breakwaters. 29. Although Caesar's best hopes of putting an end to the business lay in requisitioning ships to cross the Adriatic and following Pompey before he could strengthen himself with overseas reinforcements, he was still afraid of the delay and the length of time demanded by this course, because Pompey had requisitioned all the ships and removed any immediate chance of pursuit. 2 It remained to wait for ships from the more distant regions of Gaul, Picenum, and the Straits. That seemed to be a long and awkward business, on account of the time of year. 3 In the meantime he was unwilling by his absence to permit a veteran army and the two Spanish provinces (one of which was firmly attached to Pompey by the outstanding favours he had done it) to consolidate their strength, to allow auxiliary troops and cavalry to be raised, and to open Gaul and Italy to attack. 30. For the moment, therefore, he abandoned the idea of pursuing Pompey, and decided to make for Spain; he ordered the chief magistrates of all the Italian towns to seek out ships and see that they were sent to 64 De Bello Civili conquirant Brundisiumque deducendas curent. 2 mittit in Sardinian! cum legione una Valerium legatum, in Siciliam Curionem pro praetore cum legionibus HI; eundem, cum Siciliam recepisset, protinus in Africam transducere exercitum iubet. Sardinian! obtinebat M.Cotta, Siciliam M. Cato; Africam sorte Tubero obtinere debebat. 3 Caralitani, simul ad se Valerium mitti audierunt, nondum profecto ex Italia sua sponte Cottam ex oppido eiciimt. ille perterritus, quod omnem provinciam consentire intellegebat, ex Sardinia in Africam profugit. 4 Cato in Sicilia navis longas veteres reficiebat, novas civitatibus imperabat. haec magno studio agebat. in Lucanis Brutiisque per legatos suos civium Romanorum dilectus habebat, equitum peditumque certum numerum a civitatibus Siciliae exigebat. 5 quibus rebus paene perfectis, adventu Curionis cognito, queritur in contione sese proiectum ac proditum a Cn. Pompeio qui, omnibus rebus imparatissimis, non necessarium bellum suscepisset et ab se reliquisque in senatu interrogatus omnia sibi esse ad bellum apta ac parata confirmavisset. haec in contione questus ex provincia fugit. 31. Nacti vacuas ab imperiis Sardiniam Valerius, Curio Siciliam, cum exercitibus eo perveniunt. 2 Tubero cum in Africam venisset, invenit in provincia cum imperio Attium Varum; qui ad Auximum, ut supra demonstravimus, amissis cohortibus protinus ex fuga in Africam pervenerat atque earn sua sponte vacuam occupaverat, dilectuque habito duas legiones effecerat, hominum et locorum notitia et usu eius provinciae nactus aditus ad ea conanda, quod paucis ante annis ex praetura earn provinciam obtinuerat. 3 hie venientem Uticam navibus Tuberonem portu atque oppido prohibet, neque adfectum valetudine filium exponere in terra patitur, sed sublatis ancoris excedere eo loco cogit. 32. His rebus confectis, Caesar, ut reliquum tempus a labore intermitteretur, milites in proxima municipia deducit; ipse ad urbem proficiscitur. 2 coacto senatu, iniurias inimicorum commemorat. docet se nullum extraordinarium honorem appetisse, sed exspectato legitimo tempore consulatus eo fuisse contentum quod omnibus civibus pateret. 3 latum ab X tribunis plebis, contradicentibus iniinicis, Catone vero acerrime repugnante et pristina consuetudine dicendi mora dies extrahente, ut sui ratio absentis haberetur, ipso consule Pompeio; qui si improbasset,

30 2 Q. addidi IL. addidi Book I 65 Brundisium. 2 To Sardinia he sent his officer Quintus Valerius with one legion, to Sicily propraetor Curio with three; he also ordered Curio, when he had gained control of Sicily, to take his army across to Africa immediately. Marcus Cotta was holding Sardinia, Marcus Cato Sicily; Lucius Tubero should, by lot, have been holding Africa. 3 As soon as the people of Caralis heard that Valerius was being sent against them, they threw Cotta out of the town of their own accord before Valerius had yet left Italy. Terrified because he knew that the whole province felt the same, Cotta fled from Sardinia to Africa. 4 In Sicily Cato was repairing old warships and ordering the communities to provide new ones. This he did with great energy. In Lucania and Bruttium he was conscripting Roman citizens through his officers, and demanding quotas of infantry and cavalry from the communities of Sicily. 5 These measures were almost completed when, hearing of Curio's arrival, he protested at a public gathering that he had been abandoned and betrayed by Gnaeus Pompeius, who had undertaken an unnecessary war in a state of complete unreadiness and when pressed by himself and others in the senate had confirmed that everything was ready and fit for war. After making these complaints in public, he fled the province. 31. Valerius and Curio, finding Sardinia and Sicily empty of commanders, proceeded there with their armies. 2 When Tubero reached Africa, he found Attius Varus in control of the province; the latter, having lost his cohorts at Auximum as described above, had come to Africa immediately after making his escape; finding it without a governor he had on his own initiative taken command, and raised two legions by conscription, possessing the means to attempt this in his familiarity and association with the men and the places of that province, because a few years previously he had governed it after his praetorship. 3 He barred Tubero from the port and the town when he came with his ships to Utica, and without allowing him to land his sick son forced him to weigh anchor and depart. 32. These matters dealt with, Caesar dispersed his soldiers to the nearby towns to rest from their exertions; he himself made his way to Rome. 2 A senate was called, and he spoke of the wrongs done him by his enemies. He explained that he had sought no position out of the ordinary, but had waited the legitimate interval for the consulate and been content with what was open to any citizen. 3 A law had been carried by the ten tribunes against the opposition of his enemies - Cato indeed had resisted bitterly and dragged out the days in lengthy speeches in the old-fashioned way - a law which permitted him a candidature in absence, and this in Pompey's own consulship; if Pompey had disapproved of it, why had he let it be passed? 66 De Bello Civili cur ferri passus esset, si probasset, cur se uti populi beneficio prohibuisset? 4 patientiam proponit suam, cum de exercitibus dimittendis ultro postulavisset, in quo iacturam dignitatis atque honoris ipse facturus esset. 5acerbitatem inimicorum docet qui, quod ab altero postularent, in se recusarent atque omnia permisceri mallent quam imperium exercitusque dimittere. 6iniuriam in eripiendis legionibus praedicat, crudelitatem et insolentiam in circumscribendis tribunis plebis; condiciones a se latas, expetita colloquia et denegata commemorat. 7 pro quibus rebus hortatur ac postulat ut rem publicam suscipiant atque una secum administrent. sin timore defugiant illi, se oneri non defuturum et per se rem publicam administraturum. 8 legates ad Pompeium de compositione mitti oportere; neque se reformidare quod in senatu Pompeius paulo ante dixisset, ad quos legati mitterentur, his auctoritatem attribui timoremque eorum qui mitterent significari. 9 tenuis atque infirmi haec animi videri. se vero, ut operibus anteire studuerit, sic iustitia et aequitate velle superare. 33. Probat rem senatus de mittendis legatis; sed qui mitterentur non reperiebantur, maximeque timoris causa pro se quisque id munus legationis recusabat. 2 Pompeius enim discedens ab urbe in senatu dixerat eodem se habiturum loco, qui Romae remansissent et qui in castris Caesaris fuissent. 3 sic triduum disputationibus excusationibusque extrahitur. subicitur etiam L. Metellus tribunus plebis ab inimicis Caesaris, qui hanc rem distrahat reliquasque res quascumque agere instituerit impediat. 4 cuius cognito consiUo, Caesar, frustra diebus aliquot consumptis, ne reliquum tempus amittat, infectis iis quae agere destinaverat, ab urbe proficiscitur atque in ulteriorem Galliam pervenit. 34. Quo cum venisset, cognoscit missum a Pompeio Vibullium Rufum quern paucis ante diebus Corfinio captum ipse dimiserat; 2profectum item Domitium ad occupandam Massiliam navibus actuariis septem quas Igili et in Cosano a privatis coactas servis, libertis, colonis suis compleverat; 3praemissos etiam legatos Massilienses domum, nobiles adulescentes, quos ab urbe discedens Pompeius erat adhortatus, ne nova Caesaris officia veterum suorum beneficiorum in eos memoriam expellerent. 4 quibus mandatis acceptis, Massilienses portas Caesari clauserant; Albicos, barbaros homines qui in eorum fide antiquitus erant

32 5 altero S: alterorum mTV: altero non U 7 illi se oneri non defuturum m : illis se oneri (oneri se V) non futurum SUTV 9 operibus m^1: opibus Sn^UTV2 33 3 -duum incipitM 34 1 inHispaniam add. Aldus (cf. 38J) Book I 67 And if he approved of it, why had he not allowed Caesar to enjoy this favour from the people? 4 He pointed out his own forbearance in requesting of his own accord that armies be dismissed, by which he would have been depriving himself of status and office. 5 He spoke of the harshness of his enemies, who refused to do in their own case what they demanded of a rival, and preferred anarchy to the surrender of command and armies. 6 He emphasised their injustice in taking his legions, their savagery and arrogance in restricting the tribunes; he mentioned the terms that he had put forward, the meetings that he had proposed and been refused. 7 He encouraged and requested them, in the light of these facts, to take responsibility for the state and administer it together with himself. But if they were frightened and ran away, he would not shirk the task and would administer the state by himself. 8 Delegates ought to be sent to Pompey to arrange a settlement; nor was he afraid of Pompey's recent remark in the senate that to receive a delegation implied authority, and to send it, fear. 9 Such a sentiment indicated a weiak and shallow spirit. He, on the other hand, wanted to win the contest for justice and equity in the same way as he had striven to be superior in action. 33. The senate agreed in the matter of sending delegates; but none could be found to send, and the chief reason they all refused appointment was fear. 2 For on his departure from the city Pompey had said in the senate that he would make no distinction between those who remained in Rome and those who were with Caesar's army. 3 In this way three days dragged by in arguments and excuses. Also Lucius Metellus, a tribune, was put up by Caesar's enemies to disrupt this business and to interfere with whatever else he decided to do. 4 When he realised Metellus' objective, after wasting several days and not wishing to lose any more time, Caesar abandoned what he had intended to do, and leaving Rome arrived in further Gaul. 34. When he reached there, he learnt that Vibullius Rufus, whom he himself had captured at Corfinium a few days previously and allowed to go free, had been sent by Pompey to Spain; 2 that Domitius likewise had set out to gain control of Massilia with seven light ships which he had requisitioned from private owners at Igilium and in the territory of Cosa and manned with slaves, freedmen, and tenant-farmers of his own; 3 and also that a Massiliot delegation had been sent back home ahead of him, consisting of young nobles whom Pompey, as he left Rome, had encouraged not to let Caesar's recent favours drive from their minds the recollection of his own earlier benefits to them. 4 Accepting these instructions, the people of Massilia had closed their gates against Caesar; they had summoned to their side the Albici, a native people who were under their protection from of old and lived in the mountains above 68 De Bello Civili montesque supra Massiliam incolebant, ad se vocaverant; 5 frumentum ex finitimis regionibus atque ex omnibus castellis in urbem convexerant, armorum officinas in urbe instituerant, muros, portas, classem reficiebant. 35. Evocat ad se Caesar Massilia XV primos. cum iis agit ne initium inferendi belli ab Massiliensibus oriatur; debere eos Italiae totius auctoritatem sequi potius quam unius hominis voluntati obtemperare. 2reliqua quae ad eorum sanandas mentes pertinere arbitrabatur commemorat. 3 cuius orationem legati domum referunt atque ex auctoritate haec Caesari renuntiant: intellegere se divisum esse populum in partes duas. neque sui iudicii neque suarum esse virium discernere utra pars iustiorem habeat causam. 4principes vero esse earum partium patronos civitatis, quorum alter agros Volcarum Arecomicorum et Helviorum publice iis concesserit, alter bello victos Sallyas attribuerit vectigaliaque auxerit. 5 quare paribus eorum beneficiis parem se quoque voluntatem tribuere debere et neutrum eorum contra alterum iuvare aut urbe aut portibus recipere. 36. Haec dum inter eos aguntur, Domitius navibus Massiliam pervenit atque ab iis receptus urbi praeficitur; summa ei belli administrandi permittitur. 2 eius imperio classem quoquo versus dimittunt; onerarias naves quas ubique possunt deprehendunt atque in portum deducunt, parum clavis aut materia atque armamentis instructis ad reliquas armandas reficiendasque utuntur; 3frumenti quod inventum est in publicum conferunt; reliquas merces commeatusque ad obsidionem urbis, si accidat, reservant 4quibus iniuriis permotus Caesar legiones tres Massiliam adducit; turns vineasque ad oppugnationem urbis agere, naves longas Arelate numero XH facere instituit. 5 quibus effectis armatisque diebus XXX a qua die materia caesa est, adductisque Massiliam, his D. Brutum praeficit, C. Trebonium legatum ad oppugnationem Massiliae relinquit. 37. Dum haec parat atque administrat, C. Fabium legatum cum legionibus m quas Narbone circumque ea loca hiemandi causa disposuerat in Hispaniam praemittit celeriterque saltus Pyrenaeos occupari iubet qui eo tempore ab L. Afranio legato praesidiis tenebantur. 2 reliquas legiones quae longius hiemabant subsequi iubet. 3Fabius, ut erat imperatum,

35 3 Romanum add. ed.pr. 4 post partium add. Ca Pompeium et C. Caesarem co, del. Hoffmann | victos Sallyas Glandorp : victas Gallias SMU: victas Galliae TV : victas urbes (vel partes) Galliae Rambaud: victa Gallia alia Paul Book I 69 Massilia; 5 they had transported grain into the city from the neighbouring regions and all the forts, they had set up arms factories in the city, and they had begun to repair the walls, gates, and fleet. 35. Caesar summoned the Fifteen from Massilia to his presence. He urged them not to allow the Massiliots to be responsible for the start of hostilities; they ought rather to follow the lead of the whole of Italy than humour the wishes of a single individual, 2 He also drew their attention to the other factors which he thought relevant to bringing them to their senses. 3 The delegation reported what he had said and on public authority made the following reply to Caesar: they understood that the Roman people were divided into two parties, but it was beyond both their strength and their powers of judgment to decide which party had the juster cause. 4 Indeed, the leaders of those parties were patrons of their own state; one had granted them public ownership of the land of the Volcae Arecomici and the Helvii, while the other, having defeated the Sallyes in war, had attached this people to their state and increased their revenues. 5 Therefore, since the benefits the Massiliots had received were equal, they ought to render equal goodwill to each, and help neither one against the other nor receive either in the city or its harbours. 36. While these negotiations proceeded, Domitius reached Massilia with his ships and was admitted by the city and placed in charge; he was granted supreme military command. 2 On his orders the fleet was sent off in all directions; wherever they could they seized merchantmen and brought them back to port, those that were deficient in fastenings or in timbers and fittings being used to fit out and repair the others; 3 any grain discovered was added to the public stock; and the other goods and provisions were kept against the eventuality of a siege. 4 Roused by these hostile moves, Caesar brought up three legions against Massilia; he began to deploy siege- towers and mantlets for an assault on the city, and to build warships, to the number of twelve, at Arelate. 5 These were finished and equipped in thirty days from the felling of the timber; when they had been brought to Massilia he put Decimus Brutus in command of them and left his deputy Gaius Trebonius to take control of an attack on the city. 37. While he was making these preparations and arrangements, he sent ahead to Spain his deputy Gaius Fabius with the three legions which he had stationed for the winter around Narbo and its neighbourhood, giving him orders to seize the passes through the Pyrenees which were at that time held by garrisons posted by Pompey's deputy Lucius Afranius. 2 He ordered the other legions, which were in more distant winter quarters, to follow. 70 De Bello Civili adhibita celeritate praesidium ex saltu deieeit magnisque itineribus ad exercitum Afrani contendit. 38. Adventu L. Vibulli Rufi, quern a Pompeio missum in Hispaniam demonstratum est, Afranius et Petreius et Varro, legati Pompei, quorum unus Hispaniam citeriorem a saltu Castulonensi ad Anam duabus legionibus, tertius ab Ana Vettonum agrum Lusitaniamque pari numero legionum obtinebat, 2officia inter se partiimtur, uti Petreius ex Lusitania per Vettones cum omnibus copiis ad Afranium proficiscatur, Varro cum iis, quas habebat, legionibus omnem ulteriorem Hispaniam tueatur. 3 his rebus constitutis, equites auxiliaque toti Lusitaniae a Petreio, Celtiberiae, Cantabris, barbarisque omnibus qui ad Oceanum pertinent, ab Afranio imperantur. 4 quibus coactis, celeriter Petreius per Vettones ad Afranium pervenit, constituimtque communi consilio bellum ad Ilerdam propter ipsius loci opportunitatem gerere. 39. Erant, ut supra demonstratum est, legiones Afrani m, Petrei duae, praeterea scutatae citerioris provinciae et caetratae ulterioris cohortes circiter XXX equitumque utriusque provinciae circiter V milia. 2 Caesar legiones in Hispaniam praemiserat VI, auxilia peditum nulla, equitum III milia quae omnibus superioribus bellis habuerat et parem ex Gallia numerum quam ipse pacaverat, nominatim ex omnibus civitatibus nobilissimo et fortissimo quoque evocato; huic optimi generis hominum ex Aquitanis montanisque qui Galliam provinciam attingunt < adiecerat>. 3 audierat Pompeium per Mauretaniam cum legionibus iter in Hispaniam facere confestimque esse venturum. simul a tribunis militum centurionibusque mutuas pecunias sumpsit; has exercitui distribuit. 4 quo facto, duas res consecutus est, quod pignore animos centurionum devinxit et largitione militum voluntates redemit. 40. Fabius finitimarum civitatum animos litteris nuntiisque temptabat. in Sicore flumine pontes effecerat duos distantes inter se milia passuum nil. his pontibus pabulatum mittebat, quod ea quae citra flumen fuerant superioribus diebus consumpserat. 2 hoc idem fere atque eadem de causa

38 1 tribus legionibus, alter ulteriorem add. Nipperdey 39 1 ulterioris Hispaniae cohortes co: del. Hispaniae Madvig : et citerioris provinciae et ulterioris Hispaniae et utriusque provinciae del. Nipperdey \ XXX Stoffel: LXXX co 2 praemiserat ad VI milia auxilia co: seel, ad et milia Chacon I quae q: om. co I pacaverat p: peccaverat SI adiecerat vel addiderat coniecit Nipperdey Book I 71 3Fabius, in accordance with his instructions, made haste to eject the garrison from the pass and headed for Afranius' army by forced marches. 38. On the arrival of Lucius Vibullius Rufus, who as noted had been sent to Spain by Pompey, Afranius and Petreius and Varro, Pompey's deputies (of whom one held nearer Spain with three legions, the second further Spain from the Castulo ranges to the Ana (Anas!) with two legions, and the third the country from the Ana to the territory of the Vettones and Lusitania with a like number ) 2 divided their responsibilities amongst themselves so that Petreius was to set out with all his forces from Lusitania by way of the Vettones to Afranius, while Varro guarded the whole of further Spain with the legions he already had. 3 When this had been decided, cavalry and auxiliary troops were demanded by Petreius from the whole of Lusitania, and by Afranius from Celtiberia, the Cantabri, and all the native tribes stretching to the Atlantic coast. 4 These collected, Petreius quickly reached Afranius by way of the Vettones, and they decided to conduct a campaign jointly at Ilerda because of the opportunities offered by the site. 39. As indicated above, Afranius had three legions, Petreius two, and in addition there were about thirty cohorts of heavy- and light-armed native infantry from the nearer and further provinces respectively, and about five thousand cavalry from both provinces. 2 Caesar had sent ahead to Spain six legions, no auxiliary infantry, and three thousand cavalry which he had had in all his previous campaigns, and an equal number from the parts of Gaul pacified by himself, consisting of the noblest and bravest summoned by name from all the tribal states; to this force he had added of first-rate men from amongst the Aquitani and the mountain peoples who border the province of Gaul. 3 He had heard that Pompey was marching with legions through Mauretania, and would come with all speed. At the same time he borrowed money from his junior officers and centurions and distributed it to the army. 4 By this he achieved two things: by the loan he secured the loyalty of the centurions and by the handout he gained the support of the men. 40. Fabius began to solicit the support of the nearby peoples by writing to them and sending messengers. Over the river Segre he had two bridges built four miles apart. By these bridges he used to send out his cavalry to graze, because he had recently used up what lay on his own side of the river. 2 Practically the same thing, and for the same reason, was being done by the Pompeian commanders, and there were frequent cavalry engagements. 3 When according to their daily routine two of Fabius' 72 De Bello Civili Pompeiani exercitus duces faciebant, crebroque inter se equestribus proeliis contendebant. 3 hue cum cotidiana consuetudine egressae pabulatoribus praesidio propiore legiones Fabianae duae flumen transissent impedimentaque et omnis equitatus sequeretur, subito vi ventorum et aquae magnitudine pons est interruptus et reliqua multitudo equitum interclusa. 4 quo cognito a Petreio et Afranio ex aggere atque cratibus, quae flumine ferebantur, celeriter suo ponte Afranius, quern oppido castrisque coniunctum habebat, legiones mi equitatumque omnem traiecit duabusque Fabianis occurrit legionibus. 5 cuius adventu nuntiato, L. Plancus, qui legionibus praeerat, necessaria re coactus locum capit superiorem diversamque aciem in duas partes constituit, ne ab equitatu circumveniri posset. 6ita congressus impari numero magnos impetus legionum equitatusque sustinet. 7commisso ab equitibus proelio, signa legionum duarum procul ab utrisque conspiciuntur, quas C. Fabius ulteriore ponte subsidio nostris miserat suspicatus fore id quod accidit, ut duces adversariorum occasione et beneficio fortunae ad nostros opprimendos uterentur. quarum adventu proelium dirimitur ac suas uterque legiones reducit in castra. 41. Eo biduo Caesar cum equitibus DCCCC quos sibi praesidio reliquerat in castra pervenit. pons qui fuerat tempestate interruptus paene erat refectus; hunc noctu perfici iussit. 2 ipse, cognita locorum natura, ponti castrisque praesidio sex cohortis relinquit atque omnia impedimenta, et postero die omnibus copiis triplici instructa acie ad Derdam proficiscitur et sub castris Afrani consistit et ibi paulisper sub armis moratus facit aequo loco pugnandi potestatem. potestate facta, Afranius copias educit et in medio colle sub castris constituit 3 Caesar, ubi cognovit Afranium stare quo minus proelio dimicaretur, ab infimis radicibus montis intermissis circiter passibus CCCC castra facere constituit, 4 et, ne in opere faciundo milites repentino hostium incursu exterrerentur atque opere prohiberentur, vallo muniri vetuit, quod eminere et procul videri necesse erat, sed a fronte contra hostem pedum XV fossam fieri iussit. 5 prima et secunda acies in armis, ut ab initio constituta erat, permanebat; post hos opus in occulto a tertia acie fiebat. sic omne prius est perfectum quam intellegeretur ab Afranio castra muniri. 6 sub vesperum Caesar intra banc fossam legiones reducit atque ibi sub armis proxima nocte conquiescit.

40 3 propiore ponte legiones Nipperdey : proprio religiones MT : proprio legiones SMW*V 41 2 sex edpr.: ex SUTV: et MI cohortis p: cohortibus SI consistit ed. pr.: constitit co 3 per add. ed.pr. Book I 73 legions went out in this direction to guard the grazers and had crossed the river by the nearer bridge, and their equipment and all the cavalry were following, suddenly the bridge was broken by a gale and flood of water, and the mass of cavalry behind were cut off. 4Petreius and Afranius realised from the debris and wickerwork brought down by the river what had happened, and Afranius rapidly took four legions and all his cavalry across the river by his own bridge, near his camp and the town, and went to meet Fabius' two legions. 5 On the report of their approach Lucius Plancus, who was in command of the legions, had no alternative but to occupy higher ground and draw up his line of battle in two parts facing in different directions, so as not to be outflanked by the cavalry. 6 By this means, although outnumbered, he withstood heavy attacks from the legions and the cavalry. 7 Battle had been started by the cavalry when both sides sighted in the distance the standards of the two legions which had been sent round by the further bridge to help our men by Gaius Fabius, who suspected the likelihood of what in fact occurred, namely that the opposing generals would take advantage of the chance offered by luck to overwhelm our forces. Their arrival broke up the battle and each side withdrew its legions to camp. 41. Within two days Caesar reached the camp with the nine hundred cavalry he had kept to guard him. The bridge which had been broken by the storm was almost repaired; he gave orders for it to be completed during the night. 2 He himself, when he had seen the lie of the land, left behind all the baggage together with six cohorts to guard the camp and the bridge, and on the next day marched all his forces, drawn up in triple column, to Ilerda and halted opposite Afranius' camp, and remaining there for a while with arms at the ready, gave him the opportunity of an engagement on level ground. The opportunity offered, Afranius led his forces out and halted half-way down the slope below his camp. 3 When Caesar realised that it was Afranius' decision to refuse battle, he decided to construct a camp about four hundred yards from the lowest slopes of the hill, 4 and so that the soldiers should not be in fear of a sudden assault by the enemy while they were digging and be prevented from carrying out the work, he ordered them not to protect themselves with a rampart, which of necessity would stand out and be seen from a distance, but to make a fifteen-foot ditch on the side facing the enemy. 5 The first and second ranks stayed under arms, as had been the case from the beginning; behind them the work was done in secret by the third rank. In this way it was all completed before Afranius was able to realise that a camp was being fortified. 6 Towards evening Caesar withdrew the legions behind this ditch and rested there the following night under arms. 74 De Bello Civili 42. Postero die omnem exercitum intra fossam continet et, quod longius erat agger petendus, in praesentia similem rationem operis instituit singulaque latera castrorum singulis attribuit legionibus munienda fossasque ad eandem magnitudinem perfici iubet; reliquas legiones in armis expeditas contra hostem constituit. 2 Afranius Petreiusque terrendi causa atque operis impediendi copias suas ad infimas montis radices producunt et proelio lacessunt, neque idcirco Caesar opus intermittit, confisus praesidio legionum trium et munitione fossae. 3 illi non diu commorati nec longius ab infimo colle progressi copias in castra reducunt. 4 tertio die Caesar vallo castra communit, reliquas cohortes, quas in superioribus castris reliquerat, impedimentaque ad se traduci iubet. 43. Erat inter oppidum Ilerdam et proximum collem ubi castra Petreius atque Afranius habebant, planities circiter passuum CCC, atque in hoc fere medio spatio tumulus erat paulo editior; 2 quern si occupavisset Caesar et communivisset, ab oppido et ponte et commeatu omni quern in oppidum contulerant se interclusurum adversarios confidebat. 3 hoc sperans legiones III ex castris educit acieque in locis idoneis instructa unius legionis antesignanos procurrere atque eum tumulum occupare iubet. 4 qua re cognita, celeriter quae in statione pro castris erant Afrani cohortes breviore itinere ad eundem occupandiun locum mittuntur. 5 contenditur proelio, et, quod prius in tumulum Afraniani venerant, nostri repelluntur atque aliis summissis subsidiis terga vertere seque ad signa legionum recipere coguntur. 44. Genus erat pugnae militum illorum ut magno impetu primo procurrerent, audacter locum caperent, ordines suos non magnopere servarent, rari dispersique pugnarent; 2 si premerentur, pedem referre et loco excedere non turpe existimarent, cum Lusitanis reliquisque barbaris genere quodam pugnae assuefacti; quod fere fit, quibus quisque in locis miles inveteraverit, ut multum earum regionum consuetudine moveatur. 3 haec turn ratio nostros perturbavit insuetos huius generis pugnae; circumiri enim sese ab aperto latere procurrentibus singulis arbitrabantur; ipsi autem suos ordines servare neque ab signis discedere neque sine gravi causa eum locum quern ceperant dimitti

43 1 inter oppidum Ilerdam et proximum collem Sulpizio : in oppido Ilerda et proximo colle co 44 2 dimicare barbaro addidi: barbaris genere quodam co: barbaris quodam genere Kraner: barbaris genere quodam Novdk. (Cf. 11.38.4 quadam barbara consuetudine) Book I 75 42. On the next day he kept his whole army inside the ditch and for the moment, because rampart material could only be got from some distance away, he organised a similar procedure for the work, allotting each legion a side of the camp to fortify, and ordering ditches of the same size to be dug; the rest of the legions he drew up in battle order, without their heavy equipment, facing the enemy. 2 In order to spread fear and hinder the work Afranius and Petreius brought their forces down to the lowest slopes of the hill and made harrassing attacks, but Caesar did not on that account interrupt the work, trusting to the protection afforded by the three legions and the ditch. 3 The enemy did not stay long nor advance far from the bottom of the hill, and withdrew to camp. 4 On the third day Caesar fortified the camp with a rampart, and gave orders for the other cohorts, which he had left in the first camp, and the baggage to be brought across to him. 43. There was between the town of Ilerda and the nearest hill where Petreius and Afranius had their camp about five hundred yards of level ground, and roughly in the middle of this was a slightly raised hillock; 2 if he could occupy this and fortify it, Caesar was confident that he would cut off the opposition from the town and the bridge and all the supplies which they had brought into the town. 3 Hoping to achieve this, he led three legions out from camp and after drawing up his battle line in a suitable place ordered the elite troops of one legion to run forward and seize the hillock. 4 This being observed, Afranius' cohorts which were on guard in front of his camp were quickly sent the shorter distance to seize the same spot. 5 An engagement occurred, and because Afranius1 troops had reached the hillock first, our men were driven off, and when other reinforcements were sent they were compelled to turn tail and withdraw to the body of the legions. 44. The way the opposing soldiers fought was first to make a great charge forward and boldly capture ground, not preserving much of their formation and fighting scattered and in small groups, and if they were under pressure, to think it no disgrace to retreat and give up their position, 2 being accustomed to fight with the Lusitani and the other natives in a kind of native style of battle; because it is common for soldiers who have served long periods in particular places to be greatly affected by the practice of those regions. 3 This procedure at that time unsettled our men who were unaccustomed to this style of fighting; for they thought that they were being outflanked on their open side when individuals ran forward; but they considered that they themselves ought to keep rank and not part company from the standards or be pushed from ground they had captured for any but 76 De Bello Civili censuerant oportere. 4 itaque, perturbatis antesignanis, legio quae in eo cornu constiterat locum non tenuit atque in proximum collem sese recepit. 45. Caesar paene omni acie perterrita, quod praeter opinionem consuetudinemque acciderat, cohortatus suos legionem nonam subsidio ducit; hostem insolenter atque acriter nostros insequentem supprimit rursusque terga vertere seque ad oppidum Ilerdam recipere et sub muro consistere cogit. 2 sed nonae legionis milites elati studio, dum sarcire acceptum detrimentum volunt, temere insecuti longius fugientis in locum iniquum progrediuntur et sub montem in quo erat oppidum positum Ilerda succedunt. 3 hinc se recipere cum vellent, rursus illi ex loco superiore nostros premebant. 4 praeruptus locus erat, utraque ex parte derectus, ac tantum in latitudinem patebat ut tres instructae cohortes evun locum explerent, ut neque subsidia ab lateribus summitti neque equites laborantibus usui esse possent. 5ab oppido autem declivis locus tenui fastigio vergebat in longitudinem passus circiter CCCC. 6 hac nostris erat receptus, quod eo incitati studio inconsultius processerant; hoc pugnabatur loco et propter angustias iniquo et quod sub ipsis radicibus montis constiterant, ut nullum frustra telum in eos mitteretur. tamen virtute et patientia nitebantur atque omnia vulnera sustinebant. 7augebantur illis copiae, atque ex castris cohortes per oppidum crebro summittebantur, ut integri defessis succederent. 8 hoc idem Caesar facere cogebatur, ut summissis in eimdem locum cohortibus defessos reciperet. 46. Hoc cum esset modo pugnatum continenter horis quinque, nostrique gravius a multitudine premerentur, consumptis omnibus telis gladiis destrictis impetum adversus montem in cohortis faciunt paucisque disiectis reliquos sese convertere cogunt. 2 summons sub murum cohortibus ac nonnulla parte propter terrorem in oppidum compulsis, facilis est nostris receptus datus. 3 equitatus autem noster ab utroque latere, etsi deiectis atque inferioribus locis constiterat, tamen summa in iugmn virtute conititur atque inter duas acies perequitans commodiorem ac tutiorem nostris receptum dat. 4 ita vario certamine pugnatum est. nostri in primo congressu circiter LXX ceciderunt, in his Q. Fulginius ex primo hastato legionis XIIII., qui propter eximiam virtutem ex inferioribus ordinibus in eum locum pervenerat; vulnerantur amplius DC. 5 ex Afranianis

4 non tenuit Aldus: continuit co 45 3 nostros....473 superiore om. S 46 1 disiectis U: deiectis M: dilectis TV 3 summa in Forchammer: summum p : summum in M2 4 ex primo hastato co: primus hastatus Vascosan : centurio primi hastati Lipsius Book I 77 the most serious of reasons. 4 And so, when the elite formation had been disrupted, the legion which had taken up station on that wing did not maintain its position and withdrew to the nearest hill. 45. Almost his whole line being panic-stricken, a thing contrary to expectation and habit, Caesar rallied his men and led the Ninth legion to lend support; he checked the enemy who were insolently and eagerly pursuing our men, and forced them to turn back again and retreat to Derda town and halt beneath the wall. 2 But the soldiers of the Ninth legion, carried away in their enthusiasm for making good the loss they had suffered, rashly following the fugitives rather a long way advanced to sloping ground and came up beneath the hill on which the town of Ilerda stood. 3 When they wanted to withdraw from this spot, the enemy from their higher position again exerted pressure on our men. 4 The place was steep, sheer on both sides, and of such a width that three cohorts in formation filled it, so that it was impossible for reinforcements to be sent from the flanks or for cavalry to be used to support the hard-pressed. 5 Now from the town a slope with a gentle gradient stretched along for about six hundred yards. 6 This was the way our men had to withdraw, because in their enthusiasm they had somewhat unwisely advanced that far; this was where the fighting took place, the ground being disadvantageous both because it was constricted and because they had halted at the very base of the hill, so that every missile hurled at them found its mark. None the less they fought with stoical bravery and did not succumb to their wounds. 7 The enemy forces were increased, and cohorts from the camp were constantly sent up through the town, so that fresh troops replaced the weary. 8 Caesar was compelled to do the same so that he could withdraw weary men by sending up cohorts to the same place. 46. When the battle had gone on in this way for five hours continuously, and our men were being seriously troubled by superior numbers and had used up all their throwing weapons, they drew their swords and making an uphill attack on the enemy cohorts scattered a few of them and forced the rest to turn. 2 Having driven the cohorts up under the wall, and in some places frightened them into the town, our men gained an easy retreat. 3 Our cavalry too, although on both flanks they had taken up a position on downhill, lower-lying ground, none the less struggled with great courage towards the crest and riding between the two lines afforded our men a safer and more comfortable retreat. 4 Thus the fortune of battle was varied. On our side, about seventy men fell in the first engagement, including Quintus Fulginius, an ex-centurion of the first cohort of the Fourteenth legion, who had risen to that position from the lower ranks on account of his conspicuous courage; the wounded numbered more than 600. 5 On 78 De Bello Civili interficiuntur T. Caecilius, primi pili centurio, et praeter eum centuriones IIII, milites amplius CC. 47. Sed haec eius diei praefertur opinio ut se utrique superiores discessisse existimarent: 2Afraniani, quod, cum esse omnium iudicio inferiores viderentur, comminus tam diu stetissent et nostrorum impetum sustinuissent et initio locum tumulumque tenuissent, quae causa pugnandi fuerat, et nostros primo congressu terga vertere coegissent; 3 nostri autem, quod iniquo loco atque impari congressi numero quinque horis proelium sustinuissent, quod montem gladiis destrictis ascendissent, quod ex loco superiore terga vertere adversarios coegissent atque in oppidum compulissent. 4 illi eum tumulum pro quo pugnatum est magnis operibus muniverunt praesidiumque ibi posuerunt. 48. Accidit etiam repentinum incommodum biduo quo haec gesta sunt, tanta enim tempestas cooritur ut numquam illis locis maiores aquas fuisse constaret. 2 turn autem ex omnibus montibus nives proluit ac summas ripas fluminis superavit pontisque ambos quos C. Fabius fecerat uno die interrupit. 3 quae res magnas difficultates exercitui Caesaris attulit. castra enim, ut supra demonstratum est, cum essent inter flumina duo Sicorim et Cingam, spatio milium XXX neutrum horum transiri poterat, necessarioque omnes his angustiis continebantur. 4 neque civitates quae ad Caesaris amicitiam accesserant frumentum supportare, neque ii qui pabulatum longius progressi erant interclusi fluminibus reverti, neque maximi commeatus qui ex Italia Galliaque veniebant in castra pervenire poterant. 5tempus erat autem difficillimum, quo neque frumenta in hibernis erant neque multum a maturitate aberant, ac civitates exinanitae, quod Afranius paene omne frumentum ante Caesaris adventum Ilerdam convexerat, reliqui si quid fuerat, Caesar superioribus diebus consumpserat; 6 pecora, quod secundum poterat esse inope re subsidium, propter bellum finitimae civitates longius removerant. 7 qui erant pabulandi aut frumentandi causa progressi, hos levis armaturae Lusitani peritique earum regionum caetrati citerioris Hispaniae consectabantur; quibus erat proclive tranare flumen, quod consuetudo eorum omnium est ut sine utribus ad exercitum non eant. 49. At exercitus Afrani omnium rerum abundabat copia. multum erat frumentum provisum et convectum superioribus temporibus, multum ex

48 4 commeatus Beroaldus: comitatus co 5 hibernis co : horreis Apitz : cavemis Schulten : acervis Hofmann Book I 79 Afranius' side the dead included Titus Caecilius, a first centurion, and besides him four other centurions and more than 200 men. 47. But such were the opinions put about of the day's events, that both sides thought that they had got off best: 2 Afranius' men, because although everyone had reckoned them inferior, they had stood firm for so long in hand-to-hand fighting and withstood the attack of our men, and at the start had held the position and the hillock, which had been the cause of the battle, and had compelled our men to flee when the engagement first began; 3 our men, on the contrary, thought the same, because on disadvantageous ground and against superior numbers they had continued to fight for five hours, had climbed the hill with their swords drawn, and had forced their opponents to flee from higher ground before driving them into the town. 4 The other side fortified with mighty earthworks the hillock for which the battle had been fought, and stationed a guard there. 48. Within two days of these events a sudden blow fell. So great a storm arose that by common consent there had never been more extensive flooding in the area. 2 On this occasion in fact it melted the snow from all the mountains and overflowed the banks of the river and broke down on a single day both the bridges which Gaius Fabius had constructed. 3 This brought great problems for Caesar's army. Since his camp, as has been explained above, lay between two rivers, the Segre and the Cinca, it was impossible to cross either for thirty miles and everyone was perforce hemmed in within this restricted space. 4 Neither were the native communities which had come over to Caesar able to bring in grain, nor could the men who had gone rather far afield to forage, and been cut off by the rivers, make their way back, nor could the very substantial supplies which were coming from Italy and Gaul reach the camp. 5 It was in any case a most difficult time of year, at which there was neither grain in store, nor was it quite ripe in the fields, and the communities had been completely stripped because Afranius had taken almost all the grain into Ilerda before Caesar's arrival, and what remained Caesar had consumed on the preceding days; 6 the cattle, which could have served as a subsidiary source of support in a shortage, had been moved too far away by the neighbouring communities because of the war. 7 The troops who set out to find grain or fodder were constantly pursued by light-armed Lusitanians and by light infantry from Nearer Spain who were familiar with the region; for them it was easy to swim across a river, because they always bring inflatable skins with them when they go on active se Ivice. 49. By contrast, Afranius' army ha I plenty of supplies of all kinds. Much grain had been earmarked and ga iiered together previously, much was 80 De Bello Civili omni provincia comportabatur; magna copia pabuli suppetebat. 2 harum omnium rerum facultates sine ullo periculo pons Ilerdae praebebat et loca trans flumen integra quo omnino Caesar adire non poterat. 50. Hae permanserunt aquae dies complures. conatus est Caesar reficere pontes, sed nec magnitudo fluminis permittebat, neque ad ripam dispositae cohortes adversariorum perfici patiebantur; 2 quod illis prohibere erat facile cum ipsius fluminis natura atque aquae magnitudine, turn quod ex totis ripis in unum atque angustum locum tela iaciebantur; 3 atque erat difficile eodem tempore rapidissimo flumine opera perficere et tela vitare. 51. Nuntiatur Afranio magnos commeatus qui iter habebant ad Caesarem ad flumen constitisse. venerant eo sagittarii ex Rutenis, equites ex Gallia cum multis carris magnisque impedimentis, ut fert Gallica consuetudo; 2 erant cuiusque generis hominum milia circiter VI cum servis liberisque, sed nullus ordo, nullum imperium certum, cum suo quisque consilio uteretur atque omnes sine timore iter facerent usi superiorum temporum atque itinerum licentia. 3 erant complures honesti adulescentes, senatorum filii et ordinis equestris; erant legationes civitatum; erant legati Caesaris. hos omnis flumina continebant. 4 ad hos opprimendos cum omni equitatu tribusque legionibus Afranius de nocte proficiscitur imprudentisque ante missis equitibus aggreditur. celeriter sese tamen Galli equites expediunt proeliumque committunt. 5 ii, dum pari certamine res geri potuit, magnum hostium numerum pauci sustinuere; sed, ubi signa legionum appropinquare coeperunt, paucis amissis sese in proximos montes conferunt. 6 hoc pugnae tempus magnum attulit nostris ad salutem momentum; nacti enim spatium se in loca superiora receperunt. desiderati simt eo die sagittarii circiter CC, equites pauci, calonum atque impedimentorum non magnus numerus. 52. His tamen omnibus annona crevit; quae fere res non solum inopia praesentis, sed etiam futuri temporis timore ingravescere consuevit. 2 iamque ad denarios L in singulos modios annona pervenerat, et militum vires inopia frumenti deminuerat atque incommoda in dies augebantur; 3 et tarn paucis diebus magna erat rerum facta commutatio ac se fortuna inclinaverat, ut nostri magna inopia necessariarum rerum conflictarentur, illi omnibus abundarent rebus superioresque haberentur. 4 Caesar iis

51 1 commeatus Nipperdey: comitatus co 2 post erant add. praeterea co, transposui (v. seq.) 3 praeterea transposui ex superiore loco 52 2 denarios L Aldus: XL co :fort. HS XL ? Book I 81 being brought from all over the province, and a large amount of fodder was to hand. 2 Access to all this was provided without any clanger by the bridge at Ilerda and the safe country across the river which Caesar was quite unable to reach. 50. These floods lasted for several days. Caesar attempted to rebuild the bridges, but the swollen river would not allow it, and the enemy auxiliaries stationed by the bank made completion impossible; 2 these found it easy to stop the operation both on account of the state of the river itself and the size of the flood, and because their weapons were directed from all along the banks against a single narrow spot; and it was difficult to carry out the work in a violent current and at the same time avoid the weapons that were hurled. 51. News was brought to Afranius that a very substantial convoy which was on its way to Caesar had halted at the river.1 There had arrived archers from the Ruteni, and cavalry from Gaul, with many wagons and much baggage in the usual Gallic style; 2 there were about six thousand men of all sorts with their slaves and children, but there was no organisation and no recognised authority among them, because each did what he thought best and they all travelled boldly in the ill-disciplined manner of earlier times and journeys. 3 There were in addition a number of well-born young men, sons both of senators and of members of the equestrian order; there were delegations from native communities; there were envoys of Caesar's. All were checked by the waters. 4 To overwhelm them, Afranius set out by night with all his cavalry and three legions, and attacked them unawares by sending the cavalry on ahead. But the Gallic cavalry quickly prepared for action and joined battle. 5 Although they were outnumbered, as long as the fighting was like against like they withstood a large body of enemy; but when the standards of the legions began to approach, they retreated with a few losses to the nearest hills. 6 The duration of this encounter made a great difference to the safety of our people; for they gained the time to withdraw to higher ground. That day saw the loss of about two hundred archers, a few horsemen, and no great quantity of servants and equipment. 52. None the less, along with all this, the price engrain rose; this is a thing which is always triggered not only by current scarc*;y but also by fear of the future. 2 By now the cost had risen to fifty denarii a bushel, and the soldiers had been weakened through lack of grain and their discomforts were increasing daily;3 and so great a change had come over the situation in a few days, and fortune had so tipped the scales that our men were hit by a great shortage of necessities while our opponents had plenty of everything and were considered to hold the advantage. 4 From those communities 82 De Bello Civili civitatibus quae ad eius amicitiam accesserant quo minor erat frumenti copia, pecus imperabat; calones ad longinquiores civitates dimittebat; ipse praesentem inopiam quibus poterat subsidiis tutabatur. 53. Haec Afranius Petreiusque et eorum amici pleniora etiam atque uberiora Romam ad suos perscribebant. Multa rumore fingebant, ut paene bellum confectum videretur. 2 quibus litteris nuntiisque Romam perlatis, magni domum concursus ad Afranium magnaeque gratulationes fiebant; multi ex Italia ad Cn. Pompeium proficiscebantur, alii ut principes talem nuntium attulisse, alii ne eventum belli exspectasse aut ex omnibus novissimi venisse viderentur. 54. Cum in his angustiis res esset atque omnes viae ab Afranianis militibus equitibusque obsiderentur nec pontes perfici possent, imperat militibus Caesar ut naves faciant, cuius generis eum superioribus annis usus Britanniae docuerat. 2 carinae ac prima statumina ex levi materia fiebant; reliquum corpus navium viminibus contextum coriis integebatur. 3 has perfectas cams iunctis devehit noctu milia passuum a castris XXII, militesque his navibus flumen transportat continentemque ripae collem improviso occupat. 4hunc celeriter priusquam ab adversariis sentiatur communit. hue legionem postea transiecit atque ex utraque parte pontem institutum biduo perfecit. 5ita commeatus et qui frumenti causa processerant tuto ad se recepit, et rem frumentariam expedire incipit. 55. Eodem die equitum magnam partem flumen traiecit. qui inopinantes pabulatores et sine ullo dissipatos timore aggressi magnum numerum iumentorum atque hominum intercipiunt cohortibusque caetratis subsidio missis scienter in duas partes sese distributing alii ut praedae praesidio sint, alii ut venientibus resistant atque eos propellant, 2 unamque cohortem quae temere ante ceteras extra aciem procurrerat seclusam ab reliquis circumveniunt atque interficiunt, incolumesque ctun magna praeda eodem ponte in castra revertuntur. 56. Dum haec ad Ilerdam geruntur, Massilienses usi L. Domiti consilio navis longas expediunt numero XVII, quarum erant XI tectae. 2 multa hue minora navigia addunt ut ipsa multitudine nostra classis terreatur. magnum

4 quo ©: quod Vascosan : quom Buecheler 53 1 multa rumore fingebant V: multorum ora fingebant S: multarum fingebant M1: multa rumor fingebat M2U: multarum mmoie orat fingebant T: multa rumor adfingebat Stephanus : alii alia 55 1 magnum Nipperdey : quam magnum MU: iam magnum STV Book I 83 which had come over to him Caesar demanded cattle in proportion to their reduced stocks of grain; he sent the camp servants away to more distant communities; and he himself used whatever means he could to remedy the current lack of food. 53. Afranius and Petreius and their friends wrote to their people in Rome describing this situation in even fuller and more glowing terms than it warranted. They invented much by way of rumour, so that the war seemed practically over. 2 When these letters and reports reached Rome, there were great gatherings at Afraidus' house and great demonstrations of joy; numbers of people started out from Italy to join Gnaeus Pompeius, some wanting to be the foremost to bring such good news, others to avoid appearing to have waited for the outcome of the war or to be the last of all to have come. 54. In this desperate situation, since all the roads were beset by Afranius' infantry and cavalry, and it was impossible to complete the bridges, Caesar ordered his men to make boats of a type with which his experience of Britain had made him familiar some years before. 2 The keel and the main frames were made of light timber; the rest of the hull of the ship was woven from osier and covered with skins. 3 When these were finished he carried them by night on pairs of wagons twenty-two miles from the camp, and transporting soldiers in these boats across the river unexpectedly seized a hill adjacent to the bank. 4 This he swiftly fortified before the opposition could notice. To it he later sent across a legion and in two days completed a bridge that was begun from both sides. 5 Thus he safely recovered his convoy and the men who had gone out to seek grain, and began to see an improvement in his commissariat. 55. On the same day he put a large proportion of his cavalry across the river. They took by surprise foragers and groups of men who .were scattered about without the slightest fear, and intercepted an impressive number of men and pack-animals; when light-armed infantry cohorts were sent to help they expertly divided themselves into two, some to guard their booty, the others to resist the advancing enemy and drive them off; 2 and they cut off from the rest, surrounded, and killed one cohort which had rashly broken the line and run forward of the others. Without 1 ^ss, they returned to camp by the same bridge with a large amount of boot1 f 56. While these operations were taking place at Ilerda, the Massiliots, acting on the plan of Lucius Domitius, made ready seventeen warships, of which eleven had an upper deck. 2 To these they added many smaller ships, in the hope of scaring our fleet by their numbers alone. On them 84 De Bello Civlli numerum sagittariorum, magnum Albicorum, de quibus supra demonstration est, imponunt atque hos praemiis pollicitationibusque incitant. 3certas sibi deposcit navis Domitius atque has colonis pastoribusque quos secum adduxerat complet. 4 sic omnibus rebus instructa classe magna fiducia ad nostras navis procedunt quibus praeerat D. Brutus, hae ad insulam quae est contra Massiliam stationes obtinebant. 57. Erat multo inferior numero navium Brutus; sed electos ex omnibus legionibus fortissimos viros, antesignanos, centuriones, Caesar ei classi attribuerat, qui sibi id muneris depoposcerant. 2 hi manus ferreas atque harpagones paraverant magnoque numero pilorum, tragularum rehquorumque telorum se instruxerant. ita, cognito hostium adventu, suas navis ex portu educunt, cum Massiliensibus confligunt. 3 pugnatum est utrimque fortissime atque acerrime; neque multum Albici nostris virtute cedebant, homines asperi et montani et exercitati in armis; 4 atque hi modo digressi Massiliensibus recentem eorum pollicitationem animis continebant, pastoresque Domiti spe libertatis excitati sub oculis domini suam probare operam studebant. 58. Ipsi Massilienses et celeritate navium et scientia gubernatorum confisi nostros eludebant impetusque eorum e*Hniebant et, quoad licebat latiore uti spatio, producta longius acie circumvenire nostros aut pluribus navibus adoriri singulas aut remos transcurrentes detergere, si possent, contendebant; 2 cum propius erat necessario ventum, ab scientia gubernatorum atque artificiis ad virtutem montanorum confugiebant. 3 cum minus exercitatis remigibus minusque peritis gubernatoribus utebantur, qui repente ex onerariis navibus erant producti, nequedum etiam vocabulis armamentorum cognitis, turn etiam tarditate et gravitate navium impediebantur; factae enim subito ex humida materia non eundem usum celeritatis habebant. 4itaque, dum locus comminus pugnandi daretur, aequo animo singulas binis navibus obiciebant atque iniecta manu ferrea et retenta utraque nave diversi pugnabant atque in hostium navis transcendebant. et magno numero Albicorum et pastorum interfecto partem navium deprimunt, nonnullas cum hominibus capiunt, reliquas in portum compellunt. 5 eo die naves Massiliensium cum his quae sunt captae intereunt DC.

56 3 certas co: tectas Cornelissen 57 4 a add. ed. pr. I Domiti Hoffmann : indomiti co: illi Domiti Buecheler 58 3 nostri add. Aldus I cum (quom) Elberling : quo STV : qui MUI habebant Aldus: habuerant co Book I 85 they embarked large numbers of archers and large numbers of Albici (mentioned above) and encouraged them with rewards and promises. 3 Domitius asked for ships of his own and manned them with the tenants and shepherds he had brought with him. 4 In this way, with a fleet fully equipped, they came out in great confidence towards our ships, which were commanded by Decimus Brutus. These were keeping station off the island which is opposite Massilia. 57. Brutus was greatly outnumbered in ships; but Caesar had seconded from all his legions to this fleet picked men who had volunteered for this duty - soldiers distinguished for bravery, and guards of the standards, and centurions. 2 These had prepared iron claws and grappling irons and equipped themselves with a large quantity of heavy and light javelins and other varieties of throwing weapon. So on learning of the approach of the enemy, they took their ships out of port and engaged the Massiliots. 3 The fight was fierce and bitter on both sides; the Alblici were not much inferior in courage to our people, being tough mountaineers and practised in arms; 4 and while these had ringing in their ears the promises of the people of Massilia whom they had only just left, Domitius1 shepherds were spurred on by the hope of gaining their freedom and strove to demonstrate their efforts under the eyes of their master. 58. The Massiliots themselves, relying on the speed of their ships and the skill of their helmsmen, slipped out of our way and absorbed our attacks, and so long as they had plenty of searoom they extended their line furtber and attempted either to surround us or to make attacks in groups against individual ships or, if they could, to break off our oars by passing close alongside; 2 when they were obliged to come to closer quarters, they relied on the courage of the mountaineers instead of on the skill and tricks of the helmsmen. 3 We not only had less well trained oarsmen and less skilled helmsmen, who had been hastily recruited from merchantmen and had not even had time to learn the terms for the pieces of tackle, but were handicapped by the slowness and weight of our ships; for they had been constructed in a hurry from green timber and did not have the same capacity for speed. 4 Therefore, so long as the chance of hand-to-hand fighting was offered, our men willingly put single ships against two of theirs; they grappled them with the iron claws, held each of them, and fought from both sides of their own ship and climbed across on to the enemy's. And they sank some of the ships, killing many of the Albici and the shepherds, captured a few with their crews, and forced the rest back to port. 5 The number of Massiliot ships which came to grief that day, including the captured, was nine. 86 De Bello Civili 59. Hoc proelium Caesari ad Ilerdam nuntiatur; simul perfecto ponte celeriter fortuna mutatur. 2illi perterriti virtute equitum minus libere, minus audacter vagabantur; alias non longo a castris progressi spatio, ut celerem receptum haberent, angustius pabulabantur, alias longiore circuitu custodias stationesque equitum vitabant, aut aliquo accepto detrimento aut procul equitatu viso ex medio itinere proiectis sarcinis fugiebant. 3 postremo et plures intermittere dies et praeter consuetudinem omnium noctu constituerant pabulari. 60. Interim Oscenses et Calagurritani, qui erant cum Oscensibus contributi, mittunt ad eum legatos seseque imperata facturos poilicentur. 2hos Tarraconenses et Iacetani et Ausetani et paucis post diebus Illurgavonenses, qui flumen Hiberum attingunt, insequuntur. 3 petit ab his omnibus ut se frumento iuvent. poilicentur atque omnibus undique conquisitis iumentis in castra deportant. 4 transit etiam cohors Illurgavonensis ad eum cognito civitatis consilio et signa ex statione transfert. 5 magna celeriter commutatio rerum: perfecto ponte, magnis quinque civitatibus ad amicitiam arf'""otis, expedita re frumentaria, exstinctis rumoribus de auxiliis legionum quae cum Pompeio per Mauretaniam venire dicebantur, multae longinquiores civitates ab Afranio desciscunt et Caesaris amicitiam sequuntur. 61. Quibus rebus perterritis animis adversariorum, Caesar, ne semper magno circuitu per pontem equitatus esset mittendus, nactus idoneum locum, fossas pedum XXX in latitudinem complures facere instituit quibus partem aliquam Sicoris averteret vadumque in eo flumine efficeret. 2 his paene effectis, magnum in timorem Afranius Petreiusque perveniunt ne omnino frumento pabuloque intercluderentur, quod multum Caesar equitatu valebat. itaque constituunt ipsi locis excedere et in Celtiberiam bellum transferre. 3huic consilio suffragabatur etiam ilia res, quod ex duobus contrariis generibus quae superiore bello cum Q. Sertorio steterant civitates, victae nomen atque imperium absentis Pompei timebant, quae in amicitia manserant, magnis adfectae beneficiis eum diligebant, Caesaris autem erat in barbaris nomen obscurius. 4 hie magnos equitatus magnaque auxilia exspectabant et suis locis bellum in hiemem ducere cogitabant. 5 hoc

59 1 proelium Chacon: primum p: primum cum S 2 alias....alias p: alii....alii S 60 5 fit add. Buecheler 61 3 L. Sertorio sustinere extremum agmen atque interrumpi, alias inferri signa et universarum cohortium impetu nostros propelli, dein rursus conversos insequi. 2 totis vero castris milites circulari et dolere hostem ex manibus dimitti, bellum necessario longius duci, centurionesque tribunosque militum adire atque obsecrare ut per eos Caesar certior fieret ne labori suo neu periculo parceret; paratos esse sese, posse et audere ea transire flumen qua traductus esset equitatus. 3 quorum studio et vocibus excitatus, Caesar, etsi timebat tantae magnitudini fluminis exercitum

5 conquiri et Octogesam (Otogesam Schulten) Vascosan : conquireie toto gesma o>: conquirere et octogesma M21XX co: XXX von Goler 62 1 reduxerat co: deduxerat Estaco 2 exstarent Davis: exstare co I impedirentur M : non impedirentur SUTV 63 3 circumfusi scripsi: cixcumfusa co 64 1 non add. Hug I sustinere co: sustineri Giesing I inferri <;: ferri co I conversos M2: converso co: conversohoste Klotz Book I 89 out all along the Ebro and brought to Otogesa. This was a town on the Ebro twenty miles from the camp. 6 They ordered a bridge of boats to be made at that point on the river, transferred two legions across the Segre, and fortified a camp with a twelve-foot palisade. 62. When he learnt of this through his scouts, Caesar had the work of diverting the river continue night and day, with enormous effort on the part of the soldiers. He had brought his situation back to the point where the cavalry, although it was difficult and barely possible, could nevertheless cross the river, and had the courage to do so. 2 The infantry, on the other hand, could only clear the water with their shoulders and the tops of their chests, and were prevented from crossing by the swiftness of the stream as well as by its depth. 3 None the less, the news was on its way that the bridge over the Ebro was nearly finished at almost the same time as the ford was being found in the Segre. 63. Now indeed Caesar's opponents had all the more cause to hasten their march. Leaving two auxiliary cohorts to guard Ilerda, they crossed the Segre with all their forces and joined camp with the two legions they had brought across earlier. 2 Caesar was left with no choice but to inconvenience and harry his opponents' column of march with his cavalry. For his own bridge entailed a long detour, which meant that the enemy could reach the Ebro with a far shorter march. 3 The cavalry sent out by him crossed the river, and when Petreius and Afranius had struck camp in the third watch of the night, suddenly showed themselves to the rearguard and began to delay them and interfere with the march, swarming around in great strength. 64. At dawn a view could be had, from the higher ground which adjoined Caesar's camp, of the enemy rearguard under pressure from the attacks of our cavalry; sometimes the tail of the column was unable to resist and they were thrown into disorder, sometimes they advanced in regular formation and our side were driven off by an attack of all the cohorts, but then when they turned round followed them again. 2 But all over the camp the soldiers gathered in groups and regretted that the enemy had slipped from their grasp and that the war was inevitably being prolonged, and they approached the centurions and military tribunes and begged them to tell Caesar not to spare them effort or danger; they were ready, and they had the capability and the courage, to cross the river at the spot where the cavalry had crossed. 3 Stirred by their words and enthusiasm, although afraid to expose his army to such a powerfully flowing river, Caesar thought he ought to make the attempt and see what happened. 4 He therefore gave orders for the weaker men whose strength or spirit seemed unequal to the 90 De Bello Civili obicere, conandum tamen atque experiendum iudicat. 4 itaque infirmiores milites ex omnibus centuriis deligi iubet quorum aut animus aut vires videbantur sustinere non posse. 5 hos cum legione una praesidio castris relinquit; reliquas legiones expeditas educit magnoque numero iumentorum in flumine supra atque infra constitute traducit exercitum. 6 pauci ex his militibus arrepti vi fluminis ab equitatu excipiimtur ac sublevantur; interit tamen nemo, traducto incolumi exercitu, copias instruit triplicemque aciem ducere incipit. 7 ac tantum fuit in militibus studii, ut milium sex ad iter addito circuitu magnaque ad vadum fluminis mora interposita eos qui de tertia vigilia exissent ante horam diei DC consequerentur. 65. Quos ubi Afranius procul visos cum Petreio conspexit, nova re perterritus locis superioribus constitit aciemque instruit. 2 Caesar in campis exercitum reficit, ne defessum proelio obiciat; rursus conantis progredi insequitur et moratur. 3 illi necessario maturius quam constituerant castra ponunt. suberant enim montes atque a milibus passuum V itinera difficilia atque angusta excipiebant. 4 hos montes intrare cupiebant ut equitatum effugerent Caesaris, praesidi^que in angustiis collocatis exercitum itinere prohiberent, ipsi sine penculo ac timore Hiberum copias traducerent. 5 quod fuit illis conandum atque omni ratione efficiendum; sed totius diei pugna atque itineris labore defessi rem in posterum diem distulenmt. Caesar quoque in proximo colle castra ponit. 66. Media circiter nocte, iis qui aquandi causa longius a castris processerant ab equitibus correptis, fit ab his certior Caesar duces adversariorum silentio copias castris educere. quo cognito, signum dari iubet et Vasa' militari more conclamari. 2 illi, exaudito clamore, veriti ne noctu impediti sub onere confligere cogerentur aut ne ab equitatu Caesaris in angustiis tenerentur, iter supprimunt copiasque in castris continent. 3postero die Petreius cum paucis equitibus occulte ad exploranda loca proficiscitur. hoc idem fit ex castris Caesaris: mittitur L. Decidius Saxa cum paucis, qui loci naturam perspiciat. 4 uterque idem suis renuntiat: V milia passuum proxima intercedere itineris campestris, inde excipere loca aspera et montuosa; qui prior has angustias occupaverit, ab hoc hostem prohiberi nihil esse negotii.

6 pauci <;: paucis co I arrepti Aldus : arma co t in flumine arrepta S : in flumine P : vi fluminis Doberenz 7 addito ad vadum circuitu co, trsp. Scaliger 65 4 intrare cupiebant Nipperdey: intra se recipiebant co 66 1 aquandi Kindscher: adquandi T: adaquandi SMUVI militari ed.pr.: militaria co 4 prohiberi M2: prohibere co Book I 91 task to be picked out from all the centuries, 5 and these he left with one legion to guard the camp. He led the rest of the legions out without their heavy equipment, and after stationing a large number of baggage animals in the river above and below the ford, took the army across. 6 A few of these soldiers were swept away by the violence of the current and were rescued and given help by the cavalry; but not a single man was lost. When the army was safely across, he drew up his forces and began to lead them in triple column. 7 And such was the enthusiasm of the troops, that although their march was six miles longer because of the detour, and the fording of the river had caused considerable delay, before the middle of the afternoon they caught up men who had set out in the third watch of the night. 65. When Afranius caught sight of them in the distance and surveyed them together with Petreius, he was alarmed by this new development and halting on higher ground drew up his forces in battle order. 2 Caesar rested his army on the level, not wishing to put it into battle exhausted, and when the others again attempted to move on he pursued and delayed them. 3 Of necessity they pitched camp earlier than they had intended. For mountains were close by and after five more miles they would be on narrow and difficult tracks. 4 They wanted to enter these mountains to escape from Caesar's cavalry, and by placing guard forces in the narrows block his army's passage, while they themselves took their army across the Ebro free from fear and danger. 5 Tliis operation they had to attempt and complete by any means available; but exhausted by a whole day's fighting and the effort of the march, they put it off until the next day. Caesar too made camp on the next hill. 66. About midnight, men who had gone somewhat far from the camp to find water were caught by the cavalry, and Caesar learnt from them that the opposing generals were moving their forces in silence out of their camp. When he discovered this, he ordered the alert to be sounded and the military cry *Pack up' to be raised. 2 The other side, hearing the shouts and afraid that they would be forced to fight in the dark handicapped by their loads or that they would be held up in the narrows by Caesar's cavalry, cancelled the march and kept their troops in camp. 3 On the following day Petreius went out unobtrusively with a few horsemen to prospect the area. The same operation was conducted from Caesar's camp: Lucius Decidius Saxa was sent out with a few men to establish the lie of the land. 4 Each reported the same to his own side: that the next five miles were level marching, and then they would be into rough and mountainous country; whoever first seized these defiles would have no trouble in blocking the enemy's path. 92 De Bello Civili 67. Disputatur in consilio a Petreio atque Afranio et tempus profectionis quaeritur. plerique censebant ut noctu iter facerent: posse prius ad angustias veniri, quam sentiretur. 2 alii, quod pridie noctu conclamatum esset a Caesaris castris, argumenti sumebant loco non posse clam exiri. 3 circumfundi noctu equitatum Caesaris atque omnia loca atque itinera obsidere; nocturnaque proelia esse vitanda, quod perterritus miles in civili dissensione timori magis quam religioni consulere consuerit. 4 at lucem multum per se pudorem omnium oculis, multum etiam tribunorum militum et centurionum praesentium afferre; quibus rebus coerceri milites et in officio contineri soleant. 5 quare omni ratione esse interdiu perrumpendum; etsi aliquo accepto detrimento, tamen summa exercitus salva locum quern petant capi posse. 6 haec vincit in consilio sententia, et prima luce postridie constituunt proflcisci. 68. Caesar, exploratis regionibus, albente caelo omnis copias castris educit magnoque circuitu nullo certo itinere exercitum ducit. nam quae itinera ad Hiberum atque Otogesam pertinebant castris hc^tium oppositis tenebantur. 2 ipsi erant transcendendae valles maximae ac iifficillimae, saxa multis locis praerupta iter impediebant, ut anna per manu» necessario traderentur militesque inermes sublevatique alii ab aliis magnam partem itineris conficerent. 3sed hunc laborem recusabat nemo, quod eum omnium' laborum finem fore existimabant, si hostem Hibero intercludere et frumento prohibere potuissent. 69. Ac primo Afraniani milites visendi causa laeti ex castris procurrebant contumeliosisque vocibus prosequebantur nostros: necessarii victus inopia coactos fugere atque ad Ilerdam reverti. erat enim iter a proposito diversum, contrariamque in partem iri videbatur. 2 duces vero eorum consilium suum laudibus ferebant, quod se castris tenuissent; multumque eorum opinionem adiuvabat quod sine iumentis impedimentisque ad iter profectos videbant, ut non posse inopiam diutius sustinere confiderent. 3sed ubi paulatim retorqueri agmen ad dextram conspexerunt iamque primos superare regionem castrorum animum adverterunt, nemo erat adeo tardus aut fugiens laboris, quin statim castris exeundum atque occurrendum putaret. 4conclamatur ad anna, atque omnes copiae, paucis praesidio relictis cohortibus, exeunt rectoque ad Hiberum itinere contendunt.

67 2 a S : om. P : in Nipperdey 3 obsidere UTV : obsideri M : obsidiis S 6 vincit S : evincit P 69 1 nostros Morus : nos M : nos nec U : nec TV : om. S Book I 93 67. Petreius and Afranius debated with their advisers to decide the time of their departure. Several thought they should march at night, believing it possible to reach the pass before being noticed. 2 Others maintained that because on the previous day the signal to move had been shouted in the dark from Caesar's camp, a secret departure from their position was impossible. 3 They pointed out that Caesar's cavalry were all round them at night, and that every route and position was held against them; also that night battles were to be avoided, because a frightened soldier involved in civil war usually obeyed the dictates of fear, not his oath. 4 But in daylight, when all could see him, a man felt ashamed, and further ashamed beneath the gaze of the officers and centurions who stood beside him; it was by these feelings that soldiers were usually constrained and held to their duty. 5 Therefore on any calculation they ought to break out by day; although some losses might be sustained, nevertheless their objective could be gained with the main body of the army intact. 6 This view prevailed in the council, and they decided to start out at first light next day. 68. When the sky was light, Caesar, after reconnoitring the surrounding country, brought his entire force out of camp and led them in a wide circuit on no very definite line of march. The reason was that the routes which led to the Ebro and Otogesa were commanded by the enemy camp in his path. 2 He himself had to struggle across very deep and difficult gullies, and rocky bluffs blocked the way in many places, so that weapons had to be passed up from hand to hand and the soldiers completed a large part of their march unarmed, helping each other along. 3 But none of them refused this labour, because they reckoned it would be the end of all their labours, if they could cut the enemy off from the Ebro and prevent him getting corn. 69. At first Afranius' soldiers ran delightedly out of camp to enjoy the sight, pursuing our men with insults, thinking they had been forced to turn tail for lack of the necessary food and were going back to Ilerda. Their route, of course, pointed away from their destination and it seemed they were marching in the opposite direction. 2 The generals of the other side in fact congratulated themselves on their decision to stay in camp; and their opinion was greatly reinforced by the sight of men who had set out on a march without baggage animals or equipment, a thing which convinced them that it would not be possible for such a force to endure a shortage of food for very long. 3 But when they saw the column bend back little by little to the right, and noticed that the leaders were now more than abreast of the camp, no-one was so slow or afraid of exertion as not to realise that they had to go out and engage. 4 The cry to arms was raised, and the whole force, with a few cohorts left behind as a guard, marched out and hastened directly towards the Ebro. 94 De Bello Civili ' 70. Erat in celeritate omne positum certamen, utri prius angustias montesque occuparent; sed exercitum Caesaris viarum difficultates tardabant, Afrani copias equitatus Caesaris insequens morabatur. 2 res tamen ab Afranianis hue erat necessario deducta ut, si priores montes quos petebant attigissent, ipsi periculum vitarent, impedimenta totius exercitus cohortisque in castris reliclas servare non possent; quibus interclusis exercitu Caesaris auxilium ferri nulla ratione poterat. 3 confecit prior iter Caesar atque ex magnis rupibus nactus planitiem in hac contra hostem aciem instruit. Afranius, cum ab equitatu novissimum agmen premeretur, ante se hostem videret, collem quendam nactus ibi constitit. 4 ex eo loco IV caetratorum cohortis in montem qui erat in conspectu omnium excelsissimus mittit. hunc magno cursu concitatos iubet occupare, eo consilio uti ipse eodem omnibus copiis contenderet et mutato itinere iugis Otogesam perveniret. 5 hunc cum obliquo itinere caetrati peterent, conspicatus equitatus Caesaris in cohortis impetum facit; nec minimam partem temporis equitum vim caetrati sustinere potuerunt omnesque ab eis circumventi in conspectu utriusque exercitus interficiun.ur. 71. Erat occasio bene gerendae rei. neque vero id Cesarem fugiebat, tanto sub oculis accepto detrimento, perterritum exercitum sustinere non posse, praesertim circumdatum undique equitatu, cum in loco aequo atque aperto confligeretur; idque ex omnibus partibus ab eo flagitabatur. 2 concurrebant legati, centuriones tribunique militum: ne dubitaret proelium committere; omnium esse militum paratissimos animos; 3 Afranianos contra multis rebus sui timoris signa misisse: quod suis non subvenissent, quod de colle non decederent, quod vix equitum incursus sustinerent collatisque in unum locum signis conferti neque ordines neque signa servarent. 4 quod si iniquitatem loci timeret, datum iri tamen aliquo loco pugnandi facultatem, quod certe inde decedendum esset Afranio nec sine aqua permanere posset. 72. Caesar in earn spem venerat se sine pugna et sine volnere suorum rem conficere posse, quod re frumentaria adversarios interclusisset: 2 cur etiam secundo proelio aliquos ex suis amitteret? cur volnerari pateretur optime meritos de se milites? cur denique fortunam periclitaretur? praesertim cum non minus esset imperatoris consilio superare quam gladio. 3 movebatur etiam misericordia civium, quos interficiendos videbat; quibus salvis atque

70 4 hunc TV : hue SMU 71 3 decederent 5 :recederent co Book I 95 70. It was a contest that depended entirely on speed to decide which of the two first gained the pass and the mountains; but the difficulty of the terrain slowed Caesar's army down, while Afranius' troops were delayed by Caesar's pursuing cavalry. 2 For the Afranians, however, things had inescapably reached the point where, if they were the first to reach the mountains they were making for, although they themselves would be out of danger, they would be unable to rescue any of the entire army's baggage or the cohorts left in camp; these would be cut off by Caesar's army beyond any possibility of help. 3 Caesar reached the goal first, and emerging from the steep and rocky ground on to the level, drew up a battle-line here facing the enemy. Afranius, with his rear under pressure from the cavalry, and the enemy in sight ahead, gained a hill and halted there. 4 From this spot he sent four cohorts of Spanish light infantry towards the highest mountain in sight, with orders to proceed at great speed and seize it; his intention was to march there with his whole force and reach Otogesa by a different route along the ridges. 5 As these cohorts approached their objective from the side, Caesar's cavalry saw them and attacked; the light infantry were unable to resist the assault of the cavalry for more than a moment, and they were surrounded and killed to a man in sight of both armies. 71. Here was an opportunity for a notable success. Caesar did not fail to realise that an army terrified by suffering such a loss under their very eyes would not be able to hold out, particularly when entirely surrounded by cavalry, if there was a battle on level and open ground; and this was what was demanded of him on all sides. 2 Senior commanders, centurions, and officers ran to him, urging him not to hesitate to join battle and pointing out that every soldier was more than ready for it,3 while on the other hand the Afranians had indicated their fear in several ways: by failing to go to help their own men, by not leaving the hill, by barely withstanding the attacks of the cavalry, and by huddling together with their standards all in one place, preserving neither their ranks nor the identity of their units. 4 They said that if he was afraid of the unfavourable nature of the ground, there would still be a chance of a battle somewhere, because inevitably lack of water would force Afranius to leave his position. 72. Caesar had conceived the hope that he would be able to bring matters to a conclusion without fighting or shedding his men's blood, because he had cut his opponents off from food. 2 Why should he lose any of his men, even if the battle were to go his way? Why should he allow men who had served him so splendidly to be wounded? And why should he tempt fortune, especially when it was a true general's duty to secure victory as much by strategy as by the sword? 3 He was swayed too by pity for his fellow-citizens, whom he was aware had to lose their lives; he would much 96 De Bello Civili incolumibus rem obtinere malebat. 4 hoc consilium Caesaris plerisque non probabatur; milites vero palam inter se loquebantur, quoniam talis occasio victoriae dimitteretur, etiam cum vellet Caesar, sese non esse pugnaturos. ille in sua sententia perseverat et paulum ex eo loco digreditur ut timorem adversariis minuat. 5 Petreius atque Afranius oblata facilitate in castra sese referunt. Caesar praesidiis in montibus dispositis, omni ad Hiberum intercluso itinere, quam proxime potest hostium castris castra communit. 73. Postero die duces adversariorum perturbati, quod omnem rei frumentariae fluminisque Hiberi spem dimiserant, de reliquis rebus consultabant. 2 erat unum iter, Ilerdam si reverti vellent, alteram, si Tarraconem peterent. haec consiliantibus eis nuntiantur aquatores ab equitatu premi nostro. 3 qua re cognita, crebras stationes disponunt equitum et cohortium alariarum legionariasque intericiunt cohortis vallumque ex castris ad aquam ducere incipiunt ut intra munitionem et sine timore et sine stationibus aquari possent. 4 id opus inter se PetreiuA atque Afranius partiuntur ipsique perficiendi operis causa longius progredi; ntur. 74. Quorum discessu liberam nacti milites colloquiorum facultatem volgo procedunt, et quern quisque in castris notum aut municipem habebat conquirit atque evocat. 2 primum agunt gratias omnes omnibus quod sibi perterritis pridie pepercissent; eorum se beneficio vivere. dein de imperatoris fide quaerunt, rectene se illi sint commissuri, et quod non ab initio fecerint armaque quod cum hominibus necessariis et consanguineis contulerint quenmtur. 3 his provocati sermonibus fidem ab imperatore de Petrei atque Afrani vita petunt, ne quod in se scelus concepisse neu suos prodidisse videantur. quibus confirmatis rebus, se statim signa translaturos confirmant legatosque de pace primorum ordinum centuriones ad Caesarem mittunt. 4 interim alii suos in castra invitandi causa adducunt, alii ab suis abducuntur, adeo ut una castra iam facta ex binis viderentur; compluresque tribuni militum et centuriones ad Caesarem veniunt seque ei commendant; 5 idem hoc fit a principibus Hispaniae quos illi evocaverant et secum in

72 4 digreditur V : degreditur SMUT 74 1 Caesaris add. Giesing 2 dein de ...fide Ramorino: deinde ...fidem a) Book I 97 prefer to gain his ends by preserving them safe and sound. 4 Most disapproved of this plan of Caesar's, the soldiers indeed openly saying amongst themselves that as such a chance of victory was being thrown away they would not fight in future even when Caesar wanted them to. He persisted in his view, and moved away a little so that his opponents should feel less threatened. 5 Petreius and Afranius, given the opportunity, retreated back to their camp. Caesar posted detachments in the mountains, blocking every route to the Ebro, and fortified a camp as close as possible to the enemy's. 73. On the next day the opposing generals, troubled because they had lost all hope of getting provisions and reaching the Ebro, considered what else they could do. 2 They had to go one way, if they wanted to return to Ilerda, and another, if they were to make for Tarraco. While they were considering the matter, news arrived that the men who were fetching water were being harrassed by our cavalry. 3 After investigating, they posted numerous cavalry pickets and interspersed both legionary and auxiliary cohorts between them, then began to construct an earthwork from the camp to the water supply so that water could be fetched in security inside the fortification without the need for pickets. 4 Petreius and Afranius divided this work between them, and to see it finished proceeded a considerable distance from the camp. 74. Gaining the chance of unimpeded conversation by their commanders' absence, the soldiers came out in crowds, looking for and calling out the names of any acquaintances or fellow-townsmen they had in Caesar's camp. 2 First they all thanked everyone, because on the day before they had spared them when they were panic-stricken: it was thanks to them that they were alive. They then enquired about the great general's good faith, whether they were right to be thinking of entrusting themselves to him, and lamented because they had not done so at the start, and because they had fought against men who were their friends and kinsmen. 3 Emboldened by these exchanges, they asked for an assurance from the great general that he would spare the lives of Petreius and Afranius, so that they should not appear guilty of criminal behaviour towards their own side or to have betrayed them. This agreed, they confirmed that they would immediately bring their standards across, and sent some senior centurions to negotiate peace with Caesar. 4 Meanwhile some soldiers brought their friends #into the camp to entertain them, and others were invited out by their friends, so much so that the two camps seemed now to have become one; and a number of officers and centurions came to Caesar and put themselves at his disposal, 5 an action imitated by some leading Spaniards whom the Pompeians had summoned and had in camp with them, effectively as 98 De Bello Civili castris habebant obsidum loco, hi suos notos hospitesque quaerebant per quern quisque eorum aditum commendationis haberet ad Caesarem. 6 Afrani etiam filius adulescens de sua ac parentis sui salute cum Caesare per Sulpicium legatum agebat. 7 erant plena laetitia et gratulatione omnia, eorum qui tanta pericula vitasse, et eorum qui sine volnere tantas res confecisse videbantur, magnumque fructum suae pristinae lenitatis omnium iudicio Caesar ferebat, consiliumque eius a cunctis probabatur. 75. Quibus rebus nuntiatis Afranius ab instituto opere discedit seque in castra recipit, sic paratus, ut videbatur, ut, quicumque accidisset casus, hunc quieto et aequo animo ferret. 2 Petreius vero non deserit sese. armat familiam; cum hac et praetoria cohorte caetratorum barbarisque equitibus paucis, beneficiariis suis, quos suae custodiae causa habere consuerat, improviso ad vallum advolat, colloquia militum interrumpit, nostros repellit a castris, quos deprendit interficit. 3reliqui coeunt inter se et repentino periculo exterriti sinistras sagis involvunt gladiosque destrinj pnt atque ita se a caetratis equitibusque defendunt, castrorum propinqv jtate confisi, seque in castra recipiunt et ab iis cohortibus quae erant in stat one ad portas defenduntur. 76. Quibus rebus confectis, flens Petreius manipulos circumit militesque appellat, neu se neu Pompeium absentem imperatorem suum adversariis ad supplicium tradant, obsecrat. 2 fit celeriter concursus in praetorium. postulat ut iurent omnes se exercitum ducesque non deserturos neque prodituros neque sibi separatim a reliquis consilium capturos. 3 princeps in haec verba iurat ipse; idem ius iurandum adigit Afranium; subsequuntur tribuni militum centurionesque; centuriatim producti milites idem iurant. 4 edicunt, penes quern quisque sit Caesaris miles, ut producat: productos palam in praetorio interficiunt. sed plerosque ii qui receperant celant noctuque per vallum emittunt. 5 sic terror oblatus a ducibus, crudelitas in supplicio, nova religio iuris iurandi spem praesentis deditionis sustulit mentesque militum convertit et rem ad pristinam belli rationem redegit. 77. Caesar, qui milites adversariorum in castra per tempus colloquii venerant, summa diligentia conquiri et remitti iubet. 2 sed ex numero

75 1 Afranius Kindscher: Afranio co 76 2 postulat : postulant ceteri 5 terror oblatus Aldus : terror ablatus S: terrore oblato p 77 1 qui milites STV : qui post adversariorum transp. MU Book I 99 hostages. These looked for acquaintances and friends to effect an introduction to ask for Caesar's favour. 6 Even Afranius' adolescent son made a request to Caesar, through the latter's senior officer Sulpicius, to grant safety to himself and to his father. 7 The scene was one of general rejoicing and congratulation, both on the part of those who had escaped such great danger, and on the part of those who thought they had achieved such an important result without shedding blood; Caesar was on the point of reaping a great reward, as all agreed, for his earlier mildness, and his tactics were approved by everyone. 75. When this was reported, Afranius broke off the work he had begun and withdrew to the camp, prepared, so it seemed, to bear with equanimity whatever had occurred. 2 Petreius, on the other hand, remained himself. He armed his slave attendants, and with these and his praetorian cohort of Spanish light-armed and a few native cavalry detached for special duties whom it was his practice to have as a bodyguard^ he suddenly tore towards the rampart, interrupted the soldiers' talking, drove our men from the camp, and killed any he caught. 3 The others gathered together and, terrified by the sudden danger, wrapped their left hands in their cloaks and drew their swords; in this way, trusting in the proximity of their camp, they protected themselves from the light infantry and the cavalry, and retreated to the camp and were defended by the cohorts which were on guard at the gates. 76. The episode over, Petreius, with tears in his eyes, went around the ranks and appealed to the soldiers, begging them not to deliver either himself or their absent general Pompey to their opponents for punishment. 2 They quickly gathered in front of the commander's tent. He demanded that they all swear not to desert or betray their army or their leaders, nor to decide individually what they would do. 3 He himself was the first to take this oath; he also administered it to Afranius; the junior officers and centurions followed; and the soldiers came forward a company at a time to swear the same. 4 A proclamation was made that anyone who had a Caesarian soldier with him should bring him out, and those brought out were executed publicly in front of the headquarters tent; but the majority were concealed by those who had taken them in and were got out at night over the rampart. 5 Thus the terror inspired by their commanders, the savagery of the punishment, and the sanction of the new oath removed the hope of immediate surrender and changed the attitude of the men, reestablishing the previous state of war. 77. Caesar ordered any soldiers of the other side who had entered his camp during the period of fraternisation to be sought out and sent back. 2 But some of the group of junior officers and centurions stayed with him of 100 De Bello Clvili tribunorum militum centurionumque nonnulli sua voluntate apud eum .remanserunt. quos ille postea magno in honore habuit; centuriones in priores ordines, equites Romanos in tribunicium restituit honorem. 78. Premebantur Afraniani pabulatione, aquabantur aegre. frumenti copiam legionarii nonnullam habebant, quod dierum *XXII ab Ilerda frumentum iussi erant efferre, caetrati auxiliaresque nullam, quorum erant et facilitates ad parandum exiguae et corpora insueta ad onera portanda. 2 itaque magnus eorum cotidie numerus ad Caesarem perfugiebat. in his erat angustiis res. sed ex propositis consiliis duobus explicitius videbatur Ilerdam reverti, quod ibi paulum frumenti reliquerant: ibi se reliquum consilium explicaturos confidebant. 3 Tarraco aberat longius, quo spatio plures rem posse casus recipere intellegebant. hoc probato consilio ex castris proficiscuntur. 4 Caesar, equitatu praemisso, qui novissimum agmen carperet atque impediret, ipse cum legionibus subsequitur. nullum intercedebat tempus quin extremi cum equitibus proeliarentur. 79. Genus erat hoc pugnae. expeditae cohortes novisshium agmen claudebant pluresque in locis campestribus subsistebant. 2 si mons erat ascendendus, facile ipsa loci natura periculum repellebat, quod ex locis superioribus qui antecesserant suos ascendentis protegebant; 3 cum vallis aut locus declivis suberat, neque ii qui antecesserant morantibus opem ferre poterant, equites vero ex loco superiore in aversos tela coniciebant, turn magno erat periculo res. 4 relinquebatur ut, cum eiusmodi locis esset appropinquatum, legionum signa consistere iuberent magnoque impetu equitatum repellerent, eo summoto repente incitati cursu sese in vallis universi demitterent atque ita transgressi rursus in locis superioribus consisterent. 5 nam tantum ab equitum suorum auxiliis aberant, quorum numerum habebant magnum, ut eos superioribus perterritos proeliis in medium reciperent agmen ultroque eos tuerentur; quorum nulli ex itinere excedere licebat quin ab equitatu Caesaris exciperetur. 80. Tali dum pugnatur modo, lente atque paulatim proceditur crebroque ut sint auxilio suis subsistunt; ut turn accidit. 2 milia enim progressi IV vehementiusque peragitati ab equitatu montem excelsum capiunt ibique una

2 in priores Chacon : amplioies p : amplioris S 78 1 nonnullam Gryphius : nonnulli co IXXII co, sed vix sana : XII Peskett, Vm von Goler, alii alia 3 aversos Aldus (nepos): adversos co ^ sese in vallis.... n.19.3 custodias om. hie, post III A3 2 add. S Book I 101 their own accord. These he afterwards treated with great respect; he gave the centurions back their former rank, and the Roman "knights' their officer status. 78. Afranius' men were finding it difficult to obtain animal fodder, and could hardly get water. The legionaries had a certain amount of corn, because they had been ordered to carry with them from Ilerda twenty- two (?) days' rations, but the light infantry and the auxiliaries, whose opportunities for getting food were limited and whose bodies were unused to load-bearing, had none. 2 Consequently every day a great number of them deserted to Caesar. Such was the situation in which they were caught. But of the two plans proposed it seemed more straightforward to return to Ilerda, because there they had left a little corn: there they were confident that they could work out the rest of their plan. 3 Tarraco lay further away, and they realised that over this distance the project was more exposed to hazard. This plan agreed, they set out from their'camp. 4 Caesar sent his cavalry on ahead to harry and impede the rear of the column, and himself followed with the legions. In no time the rearmost were fighting with the cavalry. 79. The fighting was of this kind. Lightly armed cohorts brought up the rear of the column, and when the ground was level several of them stood fast. 2 If a hill had to be climbed, the nature of the terrain easily warded off the danger, because those who were in the van occupied higher ground and protected their own men as they climbed; 3 when a depression or a down- slope was met and those in the van were unable to assist those behind them, while the cavalry on the other hand were able to hurl their weapons from above at men who were not facing them, then things were highly dangerous. 4 They had to resort, when they approached a place of this description, to ordering the legions to halt in battle order and drive back the cavalry with a great charge; when this had been done they all suddenly sprinted down into the depression and crossing it in this way halted again on higher ground. 5 For they were so far from receiving any help from their own cavalry, of which they had a considerable number, that they enclosed them in the middle of the column and actually protected them because they had lost their nerve as a result of previous encounters ; it was not possible for any of them to move outside the line of march without being picked off by Caesar's cavalry. 80. When fighting goes on in this way, progress is slow and gradual, and there are frequent halts to give assistance to one's men; as then happened. 2 For after advancing four miles, and becoming more violently troubled by the cavalry, they occupied a high hill and there fortified a camp on one side 102 De Bello Civili fronte contra hostem castra muniunt neque iumentis onera deponunt. 3 ubi Caesaris castra posita tabernaculaque constituta et dimissos equites pabulandi causa animum adverterunt, sese subito proripiunt hora circiter sexta eiusdem diei et spem nacti morae discessu nostrorum equitum iter facere incipiunt. 4 qua re animum adversa, Caesar refectis legionibus subsequitur, praesidio impedimentis paucas cohortis relinquit; hora x subsequi, pabulatores revocari iubet. celeriter equitatus ad cotidianum itineris officium revertitur. 5 pugnatur acriter ad novissimum agmen, adeo ut paene terga convertant, compluresque milites, etiam nonnulli centuriones, interficiuntur. instabat agmen Caesaris atque universum imminebat. 81. Turn vero neque ad explorandum idoneum locum castris neque ad progrediendum data facultate consistunt necessario et procul ab aqua et natura iniquo loco castra ponunt. 2 sed isdem de causis Caesar, quae supra sunt demonstratae, proelio non lacessit et eo die tabernacula sta ui passus non est, quo paratiores essent ad insequendum omnes, sive n<\ctu sive interdiu erumperent. 3 illi, animadverso vitio castrorum, to a nocte munitiones proferunt castraque castris convertunt. hoc idem postero die a prima luce faciunt totumque in ea re diem consumunt. 4 sed quantum opere processerant et castra protulerant, tanto aberant ab aqua longius, et praesenti malo aliis malis remedia dabantur. 5 prima nocte aquandi causa nemo egreditur ex castris; proximo die praesidio in castris relicto universas ad aquam copias educunt, pabulatum emittitur nemo. 6 his eos suppliciis male haberi Caesar et necessariam subire deditionem quam proelio decertare malebat. conatur tamen eos vallo fossaque circummunire, ut quam maxime repentinas eorum eruptiones demoretur; quo necessario descensuros existimabat. 7 illi, et inopia pabuli adducti, et quo essent ad iter expeditions, omnia sarcinaria iumenta interfici iubent. 82. In his operibus consiliisque biduum consumitur; tertio die magna iam pars operis Caesaris processerat. illi impediendae reliquae munitionis causa hora circiter IX. signo dato legiones educunt aciemque sub castris instruunt. 2 Caesar ab opere legiones revocat, equitatum omnem convenire iubet, aciem instruit; contra opinionem enim militum famamque omnium

80 4 refectis Deiter (Philologus 44,1864,368): relictis co: relictis legionibus Dinter: eductis Faerno I has add. H. Schiller I post pabulatores add. equitesque (-que om. M) co, delevi 81 2 et p: ex S 7 ad iter Faerno : ad id co 82 1 reliquae Forchhammer: rei quae p: rei SI causa S : causa fiebat MU: ftebat causa TV I educunt Aldus : ducunt co Book I 103 only, facing the enemy, without unloading their baggage animals. 3 When they saw that Caesar had pitched camp and his tents were set up and his cavalry sent away to forage, they burst out suddenly towards the middle of the same day and hoping that pursuit would be delayed because of the departure of our cavalry began to march on. 4 When he saw this, Caesar followed with his legions refreshed, leaving a few cohorts to guard the baggage; he gave orders that these should follow late in the afternoon, and that the foragers should be recalled. With all speed the cavalry resumed their daily duty during the march. 5 The fighting was intense at the rear of the column, to the point that they almost turned tail, and a number of soldiers and even some centurions were killed. 81. Then indeed they had to stop, without the opportunity either of looking for a suitable spot for a camp or of proceeding further, and they made camp a long way from water and on naturally unfavourable ground. 2 But for the same reasons as have been explained above Caesar did not attempt to engage them, and that day he did not permit tents to be erected, so that they should all be the more ready to take up the pursuit whether the enemy broke out by night or by day. 3 His opponents, aware of the unsuitability of their campsite, carried their defences forward all night and exchanged camp for camp. They did the same from dawn on the following day and spent the entire day in this activity. 4 But the more they advanced by entrenchment and advancing their camp, the further they were from water: they were trying to cure their present predicament by incurring others. 5 On the first night no-one left camp to fetch water; on die next day they left a guard in camp and led out their whole force to water, but no-one was sent out to forage. 6 Caesar preferred to see them racked by these sufferings and submit to the inevitable surrender than to finish the campaign by battle. However, he made an effort to surround them with a ditch and rampart, in order to impede as far as possible any sudden sallies on their part; for to these he thought they would surely resort. 7 His opponents, constrained by lack of fodder and because they wished to be less encumbered on the march, ordered all their beasts of burden to be slaughtered. 82. Two days were consumed in these works and stratagems; by the third day a great part of Caesar's earthwork was complete. The opposition, to impede the rest of the work, gave the signal and led out their legions in the middle of the afternoon, forming up in battle-order below their camp, 2 Caesar recalled his legions from fortification, ordered all his cavalry to gather, and drew up a battle-line; for to seem to have avoided battle despite the feelings of the soldiers and the reputation he enjoyed with all would have seriously undermined his position. 3 But he was swayed by the same 104 De Bello Civili videri proelium defugisse magnum detrimentum afferebat. 3 sed eisdem de causis quae sunt cognitae quo minus dimicare vellet, movebatur, atque hoc etiam magis quod spatii brevitas etiam in fugam coniectis adversariis non multum ad summam victoriae iuvare poterat. 4 non enim amplius pedum milibus duobus ab castris castra distabant. hinc duas partes acies occupabant duae; tertia vacabat, ad incursum atque impetum militum relicta. 5 si proelium committeretur, propinquitas castrorum celerem superatis ex fuga receptum dabat. hac de causa constituerat signa inferentibus resistere, prior proelio non lacessere. 83. Acies erat Afraniana duplex legionum V, tertium in subsidiis locum alariae cohortes obtinebant; 2 Caesaris triplex; sed primam aciem quaternae cohortes ex V legionibus tenebant, has subsidiariae ternae et rursus aliae totidem suae cuiusque legionis subsequebantur; sagittarii funditoresque media continebantur acie, equitatus latera cingebat. 3 tali in ;tructa acie tenere uterque propositum videbatur: Caesar, nisi coactus, prt\elium non committere, ille, ut opera Caesaris impediret. producitur tamen res aciesque ad solis occasum continentur; inde utrique in castra discedunt. 4postero die munitiones institutas Caesar parat perficere; illi vadum fluminis Sicoris temptare, si transire possent. 5 qua re animadversa, Caesar Germanos levis armaturae equitumque partem flumen traicit crebrasque in ripis custodias disponit. 84. Tandem omnibus rebus obsessi, quartum iam diem sine pabulo retentis iumentis, aquae, lignorum, frumenti inopia, colloquium petunt et id, si fieri possit, semoto a militibus loco. 2 ubi id a Caeare negatum et palam si colloqui vellent concessum est, datur obsidis loco Caesari filius Afrani. 3venitur in eum locum quern Caesar delegit. audiente utroque exercitu loquitur Afranius: non esse aut ipsis aut militibus suscensendum quod fidem erga imperatorem suum Cn. Pompeium conservare voluerint. 4 sed satis iam fecisse officio satisque supplicii tulisse: perpessos omnium rerum inopiam; nunc vero paene ut feras circummunitos prohiberi aqua, prohiberi ingressu, neque corpore dolorem neque animo ignominiam ferre posse. 5 itaque se victos confiteri; orare atque obsecrare, si qui locus misericordiae relinquatur, ne ad ultimum supplicium progredi necesse habeat. haec quam potest demississime et subiectissime exponit.

83 3 nisi coactus (-tis M) proelium non committere MU : nisi coactus proelium committere STY: nisi coactus proelium ne committeret Fabre: nisi coactus proelium committeret Nipperdey: nisi coactus proelium non committeret edd. vett. 84 4 feras Vossius : feminas co 5 habeat SMU: habeant TV Book I 105 reasons as have been explained to wish not to fight, and all the more so because the restricted space could be of little help in securing a decisive victory even if his adversaries were put to flight. 4 For there were no more than three thousand metres between the two camps. Of this space, two thirds were occupied by the two battle formations and one third remained empty for the soldiers to advance and attack. 5 If battle were joined, the proximity of their camp would afford the losers an immediate refuge in their flight. For this reason he had decided to resist if the enemy attacked, but not to initiate hostilities. 83. Afranius1 battle-order was a double line formed of his five legions, with the third, reserve, line made up of the auxiliary cohorts; 2 Caesar's line was triple; but four cohorts from each of the five legions formed the first rank, backed up by three from each and then three again; archers and slingers were enclosed in the middle of the line, and the cavalry surrounded the flanks. 3 These formations adopted, both men thought they were achieving their purpose: Caesar to avoid battle unless it were forced on him, his opponent to do likewise with the aim of impeding Caesar's fortification work. The confrontation was nevertheless prolonged and the men remained in battle line until sunset; then both sides went back to camp. 4 On the following day Caesar prepared to complete the fortifications he had in hand, his opponents to try a ford in the river Segre, to see if they could cross. 5 Observing this, Caesar sent some German light-armed and a part of his cavalry across the river and set up a series of guard-posts along the banks. 84. At last, cut off from everything, their animals kept in camp for the fourth day now without grazing, and short of water, fuel, and food, they asked to negotiate, if possible in a place away from the troops. 2 When Caesar refused this request, and granted them, if they wished, negotiations in public, Afranius' son was given to Caesar as a hostage. 3 The meeting then took place in a spot chosen by Caesar. Afranius spoke in front of both armies: he said that neither they themselves nor their soldiers ought to be the objects of anger because they had wished to remain loyal to their general Gnaeus Pompeius. 4 But they had satisfied their duty and had suffered enough punishment: they had put up with lack of everything; and now, almost as though they were wild beasts, they were walled in, kept from water, and kept from moving, and their bodies could not stand the suffering nor their minds the disgrace. 5 And so they admitted they were beaten; they begged and entreated, if there were any place left for pity, that it would not be necessary for Caesar to proceed to the ultimate punishment. This was the case he put as humbly and unassertively as possible. 106 De Bello Civili 85. Ad ea Caesar respondit: nulli omnium has partis vel querimoniae vel miserationis minus convenisse. 2reliquos enim omnis officium suum praestitisse:

85 2 se add. Aldus I noluerit S1: noluerint S2p 3 imparatos Bentley : imperitos co 6 tantaque auxilia parata Nipperdey : tantasque classis paratas co Book I 107 85. To this Caesar replied that no-one in the world was less well suited to make these complaints and these appeals for pity. 2 For everyone else had done their duty: he himself, by his unwillingness to fight even when circumstance, place, and time had been favourable, so that the chances of peace should remain as high as possible; his own army, by saving and protecting those who were in its power when it had been wronged and its men killed; and finally, the soldiers of the other army, by taking the initiative in negotiating for peace, a course which they thought they had to adopt to secure their common safety. 3 Thus compassion had guided the roles of all, no matter what their rank. It was the leaders themselves who had shrunk from peace. They had not respected the rules either of negotiations or of a truce, and they had brutally put to death men who were caught unawares and had been misled by the negotiations. 4 As a consequence there had happened to them what very often happens to men who are excessively stubborn and arrogant, namely that they turn back to and passionately seek what they have just spurned. 5 He was not now going to exploit either their abject condition or any opportunity offered by the circumstances in order to build up his own resources; but he wished the armies which they had sustained against him for many years to be disbanded. 6 For there was no other reason for which six legions had been sent to Spain and a seventh raised there, nor such large auxiliary contingents raised, nor militarily expert commanders sent out to them. 7 None of this had to do with the pacification of Spain, none of it had been designed for the purposes of a province which thanks to a long period of peace needed no protection. 8 All this had been aimed for a long time past at himself; it was against him that new sorts of command had been invented, so that the same man could preside at the gates of Rome over the affairs of the city and also be governor in absentia for so many years of two of the most warlike provinces; 9 it was against him that the rules for holding magistracies had been changed, so that men were sent out to the provinces not directly after their praetorships or consulships, as had always been the case, but as approved and chosen by a narrow group; to oppose him, the excuse of age was not accepted, as witness the fact that men who had proved themselves in previous campaigns were called out of retirement to command armies; 10 in his case alone the practice had not been maintained that had always been observed for all other victorious generals, that after gaining their successes they returned home either with some degree of honour or certainly without disgrace to dismiss their armies. 11 None the less, he had borne and would continue to bear all this with patience; and he was not now going to act so as to retain for himself the army he had taken from them, easy though that might be, but to ensure that they should not tfave one to use against him. 12 Accordingly, as had been proposed, they should leave the provinces and dismiss their army; if that 108 De Bello Civili excederent exercitumque dimitterent; si id sit factum, se nociturum nemini. hanc unam atque extremam esse pacis condicionem. 86. Id vero militibus fuit pergratum et iucundum, ut ex ipsa significatione cognosci potuit, ut qui aliquid iusti incommodi exspectavissent ultro praemium missionis ferrent. 2 nam cum de loco et de tempore eius rei controversia inferretur, et voce et manibus universi ex vallo ubi constiterant significare coeperunt ut statim dimitterentur, neque omni interposita fide firmum esse posse, si in aliud tempus differretur. 3 paucis cum esset in utramque partem verbis disputatum, res hue deducitur ut ei qui habeant domicilium aut possessionem in Hispania, statim, reliqui ad Varum flumen dimittantur; 4ne quid eis noceatur neu quis invitus sacramentum dicere cogatur, a Caesare cavetur. 87. Caesar ex eo tempore, dum ad flumen Varum veniaf^ir, se frumentum daturum pollicetur. addit etiam ut quod quisque eorum ji bello amiserit quae sint penes milites suos, iis qui amiserant restituat; militibus aequa facta aestimatione pecuniam pro his rebus dissolvit. 2 quascumque postea controversias inter se milites habuerunt, sua sponte ad Caesarem in ius adierunt. 3 Petreius atque Afranius cum stipendium ab legionibus paene seditione facta flagitarentur, cuius illi diem nondum venisse dicerent, Caesar ut cognosceret postulatiun est, eoque utrique quod statuit contend fuerunt. 4 parte circiter tenia exercitus eo biduo dimissa, duas legiones suas antecedere, rehquas subsequi iussit, ut non longo inter se spatio castra facerent, eique negotio Q. Fufium Calenum legatum praeficit. 5 hoc eius praescripto ex Hispania ad Varum flumen est iter factum, atque ibi reliqua pars exercitus dimissa est.

86 1 iusti TV: victi SMU 4 sacramentum TV : sacramento SMU 87 1 quod Nipperdey : quid co I amiserant SMUT : amiserint V I restituat co: restituatur Aldus 3 flagitarentur Aldus : flagitareturc o 4 praeficit co:praefecit <; Book I 109 were done, he would harm no-one. This was his single and final condition for peace. 86. It was indeed extremely welcome and agreeable to the soldiers, as could be gathered from the way they showed their reactions, that men who had expected some not unjustified penalty should win the reward of discharge without even asking for it. 2 For when argument arose about the time and place of discharge, they all began to indicate by shouting and waving from the rampart where they had taken their places that they should be discharged immediately, and that no guarantee, however good, could make the promise valid, if their discharge were to be put off. 3 After brief debate of both views, the position was reached that those who had a home or property in Spain would be discharged at once, and the others at the river Var; 4 Caesar gave his word that they would not suffer any harm and that no-one would be compelled to enlist against his will. 87. Caesar promised to provide food from then until they reached the Var. He added that if losses had been suffered by anyone in the war, he would restore whatever his soldiers might have in their possession to its owners; he compensated his soldiers on a fair cash valuation for these items. 2 If the soldiers had any disputes amongst themselves after this, they came to Caesar of their own accord for a decision. 3 When Petreius and Afranius were faced with a near-mutiny by their legions demanding pay, which according to them was not yet due, a request was made for Caesar to settle the matter, and both sides were happy with his decision. 4 After about a third of the army had been discharged on that day and the next, he gave orders that two of his own legions should take the lead, and the remainder follow, in such a way as to make camp not far from each other, and he placed in charge of this operation his legate Quintus Fufius Calenus. 5 The march was made from Spain to the Var according to these instructions of his, and there the remainder of the army was discharged. 110

DE BELLO CIVILI LIBER II 1. Dum haec in Hispania geruntur, C. Trebonius legatus, qui ad oppugnationem Massiliae relictus erat, duabus ex partibus aggerem, vineas turresque ad oppidum agere instituit. 2 una erat proxima portui navalibusque, altera ad portam, qua est aditus ex Gallia atque Hispania, ad id mare quod adtingit ad ostium Rhodani. 3 Massilia enim fere tribus ex oppidi partibus mari alluitur; reliqua quarta est quae aditum *\abeat ab terra, huius quoque spatii pars ea quae ad arcem pertinet loci ntfura et valle altissima munita longam et difficilem habet oppugnationet . 4 ad ea perficienda opera C. Trebonius magnam iumentorum atque hominum multitudinem ex omni provincia vocat; vimina materiamque comportari iubet. quibus comparatis rebus aggerem in altitudinem pedum LXXX exstruit. 2. Sed tanti erant antiquitus in oppido omnium rerum ad bellum apparatus tantaque multitudo tormentorum, ut eorum vim nullae contextae viminibus vineae sustinere possent. 2 asseres enim pedum XII cuspidibus praefixi atque hi maximis ballistis missi per IIII ordines cratium in terram defigebantur. 3 itaque pedalibus lignis coniunctis inter se porticus integebantur, atque hac agger inter manus proferebatur. 4 antecedebat testudo pedum LX aequandi loci causa facta item ex fortissimis lignis, convoluta omnibus rebus quibus ignis iactus et lapides defendi possent. 5 sed magnitudo operum, altitudo muri atque turrium, multitudo tormentorum omnem administrationem tardabat. 6crebrae etiam per Albicos eruptiones fiebant ex oppido ignesque aggeri et turribus inferebantur; quae facile nostri milites repellebant, magnisque ultro illatis detrimentis eos qui eruptionem fecerant in oppidum reiciebant.

1 2 portui M2U: oportuit M1: portu STVI portam Jurin : partem co I adtingit Bucheler : adigit CO : adiacet Nipperdey 2 6 etiam Nipperdey: tamen co 111

THE CIVIL WAR BOOK II 1. While this was happening in Spain, Caesar's deputy Gaius Trebonius, who had been left to conduct the attack on Massilia, began to construct a siege-ramp, siege-sheds, and towers against two sides of the town. 2 One was next to the port and the ship-sheds, the other at the gate to Gaul and Spain, beside the sea that adjoins the mouth of the Rhone. 3 Massilia, roughly speaking, is washed by the sea on three sides; on the fourth and last side it can be approached by land. Here too, the part formed by the citadel is protected by its situation and by a very deep valley, and this makes any attack long and difficult. 4 To complete these siege-works Trebonius called up a huge number of men and pack-animals from all over the province, and gave orders for timber and bundles of osier to be brought in. When these were ready he constructed a siege-ramp eighty feet high. 2. But so great was the store of every sort of military equipment long held in the town, and so great the mass of artillery, that no siege-screens of woven osier could possibly resist them. 2 Twelve-foot shafts, sheathed with metal points and fired from the largest catapults, would drive into the earth after passing through four layers of hurdles. 3 And so galleries were constructed with foot-square beams fastened together, and in this way material for the siege-ramp was passed forward from man to man. 4 In front, to level the ground, there went a sixty-foot 'tortoise' similarly made from massive timbers, and draped with every device to protect it from fire and the impact of stones. 5 But the scale of the siege-works, the height of the wall and towers, and the quantity of artillery slowed down the whole operation. 6 Also the Albici made frequent sallies from the town and attempted to set fire to the siege-ramp and towers; our soldiers easily beat off these attempts, and drove those who had made the sally back into the town, inflicting great losses in return. 112 De Bello Civili 3. Interim L. Nasidius ab Cn. Pompeio cum classe navium XVI, in quibus paucae erant aeratae, L. Domitio Massiliensibusque subsidio missus freto Siciliae imprudente atque inopinante Curione pervehitur, 2appulsisque Messanam navibus atque inde propter repentinum terrorem principum ac senatus fuga facta ex navalibus eorum navem deducit. 3hac adiuncta ad reliquas naves, cursum Massiliam versus perficit, praemissaque clam navicula Domitium Massiliensisque de suo adventu certiores facit eosque magnopere hortatur ut rursus cum Bruti classe additis suis auxiliis confligant. 4. Massilienses post superius incommodum veteres ad eundem numerum ex navalibus productas navis refecerant summaque industria armaverant (remigum, gubernatorum magna copia suppetebat), 2 piscatoriasque adiecerant atque contexerant, ut essent ab ictu telorum remiges tuti; has sagittariis tormentisque compleverunt. 3 tali modo instructa classe, omnium seniorum, matrum familiae, virginum precibus e\ fletu excitati, extremo tempore civitati subvenirent, non minore animo an fiducia quam ante dimicaverant naves conscendunt. 4 communi enim fii vitio naturae, ut invisitatis atque incognitis rebus magis confidamus, ut tumaccidit; adventus enim L. Nasidi summa spe et voluntate civitatem compleverat. 5 nacti idoneum ventum ex portu exeunt et Tauroenta, quod est castellum Massiliensium, ad Nasidium perveniunt, ibique naves expediunt, rursusque se ad confligendum animo confinnant et consilia communicant, dextra pars attribuitur Massiliensibus, sinistra Nasidio. 5. Eodem Brutus contendit aucto navium numero. nam ad eas quae factae erant Arelate per Caesarem, captivae Massiliensium accesserant sex. has superioribus diebus refecerat atque omnibus rebus instruxerat. 2 itaque suos cohortatus, quos integros superavissent, ut victos contemnerent, plenus spei bonae atque animi adversus eos proficiscitur. 3 facile erat ex castris C. Treboni atque omnibus superioribus locis prospicere in urbem, ut omnis iuventus quae in oppido remanserat, omnesque superioris aetatis cum liberis atque uxoribus custodiisque publicis aut muro ad caelum manus tenderent aut templa deorum immortalium adirent et ante simulacra proiecti victoriam ab dis exposcerent. 4 neque erat quisquam omnium quin in eius diei casu suarum omnium fortunarum eventum consistere existimaret. 5 nam et honesti ex iuventute et cuiusque aetatis amplissimi nominatim

3 2 navem Oudendorp : unam M2: om. co 4 4 invisitatis Elberling : invisis latitatis Oautanubus M2) co I post confidamus add. vehementiusque exterreamur co, del Fabre 5 3 publicis custodiisque (-quae SV) co, transposui: locis post publicis add. Bucheler: alii alia Book II 113 3. Meanwhile Lucius Nasidius was sent by Pompey with a fleet of sixteen ships, amongst them a few warships, to help Lucius Domitius and the Massiliots; he went by way of the Sicilian straits, taking Curio, who was being thoughtless, by surprise, 2 and landing at Messana, where resistance collapsed as a result of a sudden panic on the part of the leading citizens and council, he got a ship launched from the docks. 3 Adding this to his others, he completed his voyage to the neighbourhood of Massilia, where he secretly sent on a boat to inform Domitius and the Massiliots of his arrival and urge them most strongly to use the help of his reinforcements to try another battle with Brutus' fleet. 4. The Massiliots, after their earlier reverse, had repaired old ships which they brought out of their sheds to bring their fleet up to its previous size, and had put much energy into equipping them (they had plenty of oarsmen and captains), 2 and had increased their numbers with Ashing boats which they had decked so that the oarsmen might be safe from the impact of missiles; these they filled with archers and artillery. 3 When a fleet had been got ready by these methods, they embarked with no less courage and confidence than when they had fought before, spurred on by the tears and entreaties of the older men, the women, and the girls, who all begged them to help the city in its hour of crisis. 4 Now it is a common failing of human nature to be more confident in strange and unprecedented circumstances; as then happened; for the arrival of Nasidius had filled Massilia with hope and enthusiasm. 5 Getting a favourable wind, they came out of port and reached Nasidius at Tauroeis, a fortified outpost of Massilia; there they got their ships ready and for a second time prepared themselves mentally for battle and discussed their plans. The Massiliots took the right wing, Nasidius the left. 5. Brutus hurried to the same spot with an increased number of ships. In addition to those which had been built at Arelate on Caesar's instructions, he had acquired six by capture from the Massiliots. These he had repaired and fully equipped during the intervening days. 2 So exhorting his men to despise, as already beaten, opponents they had defeated when these had been at full strength, he sailed out against them full of hope and courage. 3 From Trebonius' camp and any piece of high ground it was easy to look over the city and see how all the young people who had remained in the town, and all those of more advanced years, together with the children and wives and men posted as guards, either stretched their hands out to heaven from the wall, or went to the temples of the immortals and threw themselves down in front of their images to implore victory of the gods. 4 There was not a soul who did not believe that the outcome of that day's fight would determine the fortunes of all of them. 5 Both the young men of 114 De Bello Civili evocati atque obsecrati navis conscenderant, ut, si quid adversi accidisset, ne ad conandum quidem sibi quicquam reliqui fore viderent; si superavissent, vel domesticis opibus vel externis auxiliis de salute urbis confiderent. 6. Commisso proelio, Massiliensibus res nulla ad virtutem defuit; sed memores eorum praeceptorum quae paulo ante ab suis acceperant, hoc animo decertabant ut nullum aliud tempus ad conandum habituri viderentur et, quibus in pugna vitae periculum accideret, non ita multo se reliquorum civium fatum antecedere existimarent, quibus urbe capta eadem esset belli fortuna patienda. 2diductisque nostris paulatim navibus et artificio gubernatorum et mobilitati navium locus dabatur, et si quando nostri facultatem nacti ferreis manibus iniectis navem religaverant, undique suis laborantibus succurrebant. 3 neque vero coniunctis Albici comminus pugnando deficiebant neque multum cedebant virtute nostris. simul ex minoribus navibus magna vis eminus missa telorum multa nostris de improviso imprudentibus atque impeditis vulnera inferebant. 4 conspicataeque naves triremes duae navem D. Bruti, quae ex insigni facile agnosci poterat, duabus ex partibus sese in earn incitaverant. sed tantum re provisa Brutus celeritate navis enisus est, ut parvo momento antecederet. 5illae adeo graviter inter se incitatae conflixerunt, ut vehementissime utraque ex concursu laborarent, altera vero praefracto rostro tota collabefieret. 6 qua re animadversa, quae proximae ei loco ex Bruti classe naves erant, in eas impeditas impetum faciunt celeriterque ambas deprimunt. 7. Sed Nasidianae naves nullo usui fuerunt celeriterque pugna excesserunt; non enim has aut conspectus patriae aut propinquorum praecepta ad extremum vitae periculum adire cogebant. 2 itaque ex eo numero navium nulla desiderata est; ex Massiliensium classe V sunt depressae, IEH captae, una cum Nasidianis profugit; quae omnes citeriorem Hispaniam petiverunt. 3 at ex reliquis una praemissa Massiliam huius nuntii perferendi gratia cum iam adpropinquaret urbi, omnis sese multitudo ad cognoscendum effudit, et, re cognita, tantus luctus excepit, ut urbs ab hostibus capta eodem vestigio videretur. 4 Massilienses tamen nihilo setius ad defensionem urbis reliqua apparare coeperunt. 8. Est animadversum ab legionariis qui dextram partem operis administrabant ex crebris hostium eruptionibus magno sibi esse praesidio

6 3 coniuncti Albicis co, correxi: coniunctis Albicis Stephanas : coniuncti Albici Heller Book II 115 good family, and the most distinguished men of any age, had been individually called out and begged to embark; so that if things turned out badly, they saw that there was nothing else left to try; but if they were victorious, they trusted that the city would be saved either by its own resources or with outside help. 6. When the battle began, the Massiliots showed no lack of courage; on the contrary, remembering the exhortations they had just heard from their families and friends, they fought in a way that suggested that this was their last chance, and that those who found their lives in danger in the fight thought they were anticipating by very little what lay in store for the rest of their townspeople, on whom the fortune of war would inflict a similar fate. 2 As our ships gradually became separated from each other, the skill of their captains and the manoeuvrability of their ships was given room, and if our side seized a chance of grappling and holding a ship alongside, the Massiliots came to its help from all directions. 3 And when the ships did lie together, the Albici were neither reluctant to fight hand-to-hand nor much inferior in courage to our men. At the same time a great hail of missiles thrown from the smaller boats caused many injuries to our men who were unprepared, encumbered, and taken by surprise. 4 Two triremes, spotting Decimus Brutus1 ship which was recognisable by its flag, raced from opposite directions towards it. But as Brutus was on his guard against the manoeuvre, his ship was quick enough to slip from between them with only a few moments in hand. 5 The triremes, travelling fast, collided with each other so heavily that they both suffered severe damage from the impact, and one of them had her ram broken off and was in a state of collapse. 6 Observing this, the nearest ships of Brutus' fleet attacked them as they were in difficulties and rapidly sank them both. 7. Nasidius* ships, however, were useless and quickly withdrew from the fighting; no sight of native land, no exhortations of families and friends forced them to risk their lives. 2 And so none of them were lost; from the Massiliot fleet five were sunk, four captured, and one escaped with Nasidius' squadron; these latter all sailed off to Nearer Spain. 3 As one of the other ships, which had been sent on ahead to Massilia with the news, approached the city, a great crowd poured out to find out the result, and when they knew it their grief was so great that one might have thought the city had been captured that very moment by the enemy. 4 But the Massiliots none the less began to go on with their preparations for defending the city. 8. As a result of the frequent sallies made by the enemy, it was observed by the legionaries who were working on the right-hand portion of the siege- 116 De Bello Civili posse, si ibi pro castello ac receptaculo turrim ex latere sub muro fecissent. quam primo ad repentinos incursus humilem parvamque fecerunt. 2 hue se referebant; hinc, si qua maior oppresserat vis, propugnabant; hinc ad repellendum et prosequendum hostem procurrebant. patebat haec quoquo versus pedes XXX, sed parietum crassitudo pedes V. 3 postea vero, ut est rerum omnium magister usus, hominum adhibita sollertia, inventum est magno esse usui posse, si haec esset in altitudinem turris elata. id hac ratione perfectum est. 9. Ubi turris altitudo perducta est ad contabulationem, earn in parietes instruxerunt ita ut capita tignorum extrema parietum structura tegerentur, nequid emineret ubi ignis hostium adhaeresceret. 2hanc insuper contignationem, quantum tectum plutei ac vinearum passum est, latericulo adstruxenmt supraque eum locum II tigna transversa iniecerunt non longe ab extremis parietibus, quibus suspenderent earn contignationem, quae turri tegimento esset futura, supraque ea tigna derecto transversas trabes iniecerunt easque axibus religaverunt. 3 has trabes paulo longiores atque eminentiores quam extremi parietes erant effecerunt, ut esset ubi tegimenta praependere possent ad defendendos ictus ac repellendos, cum infra earn contignationem parietes exstruerentur; 4 eamque contabulationem summam lateribus lutoque constraverunt, ne quid ignis hostium nocere posset, centonesque insuper iniecerunt, ne aut tela tormentis missa tabulationem perfringerent aut saxa ex catapultis latericium discuterent. 5 storias autem ex funibus ancorariis in longitudinem parietum turris latas nn pedes fecerunt easque ex tribus partibus quae ad hostes vergebant eminentibus trabibus circum turrim praependentes religaverunt; quod unum genus tegimenti ahis locis erant experti nullo telo neque tormento traici posse. 6 ubi vero ea pars turris quae erat perfecta tecta atque munita est ab omni ictu hostium, pluteos ad alia opera abduxerunt; turris tectum per se ipsum pressionibus ex contignatione prima suspendere ac tollere coeperunt. 7 ubi quantum storiarum demissio patiebatur, tantum elevarant, intra haec tegimenta abditi atque muniti parietes lateribus exstruebant rursusque alia pressione ad aedificandum sibi locum expediebant. 8 ubi tempus alterius contabulationis videbatur, tigna item ut primo tecta extremis lateribus instruebant exque ea contignatione rursus summam contabulationem storiasque elevabant. 9 ita tuto ac sine ullo vulnere ac periculo sex tabulata exstruxerunt fenestrasque, quibus in locis visum est, ad tormenta mittenda in struendo reliquerunt.

9 1 ad contabulationem earn Aldus : ut contabulationis causa co 3 infra earn Eussner: inter earn S.interea P: intra M2 5 ancorariis HI in co, correxi Book II 117 works that they would have much better protection if they were to make there, under the wall, a brick tower to serve as a fort and refuge. This they first made low and small, for use in case of sudden attacks. 2 To it they used to retreat; from it they used to offer resistance, if superior forces had overwhelmed them; and from it they used to dash forward to drive off and chase the enemy. It was thirty feet square, but the walls were five feet thick. 3 Later, though, taught as usual by experience, and applying their own ingenuity, they realised that it would be a great advantage if it were built up to the height of a tower. This was done in the following way. 9. When the tower had been built sufficiently tall for the first floor to be put in, they fitted this into the walls in such a way that the ends of the beams were covered by the outermost skin of wall, so that nothing showed which the enemy's fire could lay hold of. 2 On top of this floor, they built the brick up as far as the roof of the siege-shed and screens allowed, and above that they laid from side to side, not far from the ends of the walls, two beams to support the deck which was going to cover the tower, and placed on these beams timbers running from front to back which they fastened together with planks. 3 They made these timbers slightly longer, projecting a little beyond the face of the wall, so that there would be some points from which coverings could be hung in front to absorb and keep off hits while the walls were being built below this deck; 4 they covered its planked top with a layer of bricks and clay to make it proof against attack with fire, and on top again they put padded quilts so that the bolts of the artillery were unable to smash through the timber, nor the stones of the catapults break up the brickwork. 5 They made mats from anchor rope, the length of the walls of the tower and four feet wide, and tied them to hang around the tower from the projecting timbers on the three sides which faced the enemy; this was the only sort of protection, as they had proved elsewhere, through which no weapon or artillery missile could pass. 6 When the part of the tower which had been completed was roofed and armoured against every sort of enemy projectile, they removed the siege- sheds to other duties; then taking the weight of the tower's roof, which formed a separate unit, on lifting devices placed on the first floor, they started to jack it up. 7 When they had raised it as far as the fall of the rope mats allowed, concealed and secure inside this protection they went on constructing the brick walls, then jacked it up again to make further room for themselves to build. 8 When it seemed time for another floor, they put in beams as they had done at first, with their ends covered by the outer skin of bricks, and from this floor they again went on raising the top covering and the mats. 9 In this way, safely and completely free from injury and danger, they constructed six storeys, leaving apertures for artillery in appropriate places as they built. 118 De Bello Civili 10. Ubi ex ea turri quae circum essent opera tueri se posse sunt confisi, rausculum pedes LX longum ex materia bipedali, quem a turri latericia ad hostium turrim murumque perducerent, facere instituerunt; cuius musculi haec erat forma. 2 duae primum trabes in solo aeque longae distantes inter se pedes IIII collocantur inque eis columellae pedum in altitudinem V defiguntur. 3 has inter se capreolis molli fastigio coniungunt, ubi tigna quae musculi tegendi causa ponant collocentur. eo super tigna bipedalia iniciunt eaque laminis clavisque religant. 4 ad extremum musculi tectum trabesque extremas quadratas regulas IIII patentis digitos defigunt, quae lateres qui super musculo struantur contineant. 5 ita fastigato atque ordinatim structo, ut trabes erant in capreolis collocatae, lateribus luto musculus, ut ab igni qui ex muro iaceretur tutus esset, contegitur. 6 super lateres coria inducuntur, ne canalibus aqua immissa lateres diluere possit. coria autem, ne rursus igni ac lapidibus corrumpantur, centonibus conteguntur. 7 hoc opus omne tectum vineis ad ipsam turrim perficiunt subitoque inopinantibus hostibus phalangis subiectis ad turrim hostium admovent, ut aedificio iungatur. 11. Quo malo perterriti subito oppidani saxa quam maxima possuit vectibus promovent praecipitataque muro in musculum devolvunt. ictum firmitas materiae sustinet, et quicquid incidit fastigio musculi delabitur. 2 id ubi vident, mutant consilium; cupas taeda ac pice refertas incendunt easque de muro in musculum devolvunt. involutae labuntur, delapsae ab lateribus longuriis furcisque ab opere removentur. 3 interim sub musculo milites vectibus infima saxa turris hostium, quibus fundamenta continebantur, convellunt. musculus ex turri latericia a nostris telis tormentisque defenditur; hostes ex muro ac turribus summoventur; non datur libera muri defendimdi facultas. 4 compluribus iam lapidibus ex ilia quae suberat turri subductis, repentina ruina pars eius turris concidit, pars reliqua consequens procumbebat, cum hostes urbis direptione perterriti inermes cum infulis se porta foras universi proripiunt, ad legatos atque exercitum supplices manus tendunt. 12. Qua nova re oblata, omnis administratio belli consistit militesque aversi a proelio ad studium audiendi et cognoscendi feruntur. 2 ubi hostes

10 5 lateribus lutoque Aldus : in lateribus luto co (in om. M2) 7 ante phalangis habent machinatione navali SMUT (om. V in lacuna septem litterarum): del. Paul Book II 119 10. When they were sure that from this tower they could protect any nearby siege-works, they started to construct, from two-foot square timber, a gallery sixty feet long to lead from the brick tower to the enemy wall and tower. The gallery was like this: 2 first two baulks of equal length were laid on the ground four feet apart, and into them were inserted uprights five feet high. 3 These were connected by low-pitched trusses, on which were to be placed the beams to roof the gallery. There, on top, they laid two- foot-square beams and fastened them with nails and metal plates. 4 At the edge of the roof of the gallery and the outermost beams, they fixed three- inch wide strips to hold the bricks which were to be laid on top of the gallery. 5 The gallery was thus given a pitch to its roof and properly put together, and when the beams had been placed on the trusses it was covered with bricks and clay to make it safe from the fire being hurled from the wall. 6 On top of the bricks hides were stretched to stop water sprayed from pipes washing them to pieces. And the hides, for protection in turn against fire and the impact of stone, were covered with quilts. 7 They completed this whole work close by the tower under the shelter of screens; then when the enemy were off guard, they put rollers underneath it and suddenly moved it up to the enemy tower so as to abut it. 11. Panic-stricken by this sudden reverse the defenders used crowbars to bring up the largest pieces of stone they could, and tipped them forward off the wall on to the gallery. The strength of the timber stood up to the impact, and everything that fell on the pitched roof of the gallery slid off. 2 Seeing this, the defenders changed their plan. They set light to barrels full of pitch and pine-shavings and rolled these from the wall on to the gallery. The barrels spun along it and rolled off, and when they reached the ground they were pushed away from the sides of the structure with forks and poles. 3 Meanwhile under the gallery the soldiers were levering away the lowest stones which formed the foundations of the enemy tower. Our side protected the gallery by firing javelins and artillery bolts from the brick tower, so that the enemy were driven from their wall and towers and given no real chance of defending the wall. 4 By now a good number of stones had been removed from under the near tower, and when suddenly a part of it collapsed and the rest of it in consequence was on the point of doing so, the enemy, terrified by the thought of a sack of their city, all poured out of the gate, unarmed and with the sacred ribbons of suppliants tied around their foreheads, stretching out their hands for mercy to the officers and army. 12. In the face of this new development, all warlike activity stopped and the soldiers turned from fighting, eager to listen and discover what was 120 De Bello Civili ad legatos exercitumque pervenerunt universi se ad pedes proiciunt; orant ut adventus Caesaris expectetur. 3captam suam urbem videre; opera perfecta, turrim subrutam; itaque ab defensione desistere. nullam exoriri moram posse quominus, cum venisset, si imperata non facerent, ad nutum e vestigio diriperentur. 4 docent, si omnino turris concidisset, non posse milites contineri quin spe praedae in urbem irrumperent urbemque delerent. haec atque eiusdem generis complura ut ab hominibus doctis magna cum misericordia fletuque pronuntiantur. 13. Quibus rebus commoti legati milites ex opere deducunt, oppugnatione desistunt; operibus custodias rehnqunt. 2indutiarum quodam genere misericordia facto, adventus Caesaris exspectatur. nullum ex muro, nullum a nostris mittitur telum; ut re confecta, omnes curam et diligentiam remittunt. 3 Caesar enim per litteras Trebonio magnopere mandaverat ne per vim oppidum expugnari pateretur, ne gravius permoti milites et defectionis odio et contemptione sui et diutino labore omnes puberes interficerent; 4 quod se facturos minabantur, aegreque tunc stmt re enti quin oppidum inrumperent, graviterque earn rem tulerunt, quod stetisse per Trebonium quominus oppido potirentur videbatur. 14. At hostes sine fide tempus atque occasionem fraudis ac doli quaerunt interiectisque aliquot diebus, nostris languentibus atque animo remissis, subito meridiano tempore, cum alius discessisset, alius ex diutino labore in ipsis operibus quieti se dedisset, anna vero omnia reposita contectaque essent, portis foras erumpunt, secundo magnoque vento ignem operibus inferunt. 2 himc sic distulit ventus uti uno tempore agger, plutei, testudo, turris, tormenta flammam conciperent et prius haec omnia consumerentur quam quemadmodum accidisset animadverti posset. 3 nostri repentina fortuna permoti anna quae possunt arripiunt, alii ex castris sese incitant. fit in hostis impetus eorum, sed muro sagittis tormentisque fugientes persequi prohibentur. 4 illi sub murum se recipiunt ibique musculum turrimque latericiam incendunt. ita multorum mensum labor hostium perfidia et vi tempestatis puncto temporis interiit. 5 temptaverunt hoc idem Massilienses postero die. eandem nacti tempestatem maiore cum fiducia ad alteram turrim aggeremque eruptione pugnaverunt multumque

14 3 de add. Hoffmann 4 mensum SM'U : mensium M2TV Book II 121 happening. 2 When the enemy reached the officers and army, they all threw themselves at their feet, begging them to wait for Caesar's arrival. They said that they saw their city had been taken; that the siege-works were complete, and their tower undermined; and so they were abandoning resistance. Nothing could occur to delay an immediate and total sack if, when he arrived, they did not obey his orders to the letter. 4 They argued that if the tower had completely collapsed the soldiers could not have been prevented from bursting into the city in the hope of booty, and destroying it. This and much else of the same sort, as might be expected from highly educated men, was delivered with great pathos and plentiful tears. 13. Moved by all this, the officers withdrew their men from the siege operations and stopped the attack, leaving guards on the siege-works. 2 A species of truce was granted out of compassion, and Caesar's arrival awaited. No weapon was thrown from the wall, no weapon from our side; as though the siege was over, everyone relaxed and became careless. 3 Caesar in fact had sent the most solemn instructions to Trebonius not to let the city be taken by force, in case the soldiers, incensed by the Massiliot treachery and contempt for them, and by the duration of their labours, should kill all the adults; 4 this they were threatening to do, and were with difficulty restrained from bursting in to the city, being much annoyed because it seemed to be Trebonius' fault that they were not in possession of the town. 14. The enemy, on the other hand, deceitfully looked for the right moment for an act of treacherous cunning; after an interval of a few days, when our men were relaxed and unconcerned, at midday, when some soldiers had gone off duty and some were resting from their daily tasks at the siege-works themselves, and all their weapons and armour were laid aside and wrapped up, the enemy suddenly burst out of the gates and in a strong and favourable wind set fire to the siege-works. 2 The wind spread the flames to such effect that the ramp, the siege-sheds, the 'tortoise', the tower, and the artillery caught fire simultaneously and were all destroyed before anyone could notice how it had happened. 3 Our men responded to this sudden blow of fortune by seizing what weapons they could, and others rushed from the camp. They attacked the enemy but were prevented from pursuing them as they withdrew by arrows and bolts fired from the wall. 4 The enemy retreated beneath the wall where they had a free hand to burn the gallery and the brick tower. In this way the labour of many months was destroyed in a moment by the treachery of the enemy and the force of the gale. 5 The Massiliots attempted exactly the same thing on the next day. With the same gale blowing, they sallied out and fought with greater confidence at the other tower and siege-ramp and set fire to them at many 122 De Bello Civili ignem intolerant. 6 sed ut superioris temporis contentionem nostri omnem remiserant, ita proximi diei casu admoniti omnia ad defensionem paraverant. itaque multis interfectis reliquos infecta re in oppidum reppulerunt. 15. Trebonius ea quae sunt amissa multo maiore militum studio administrare et reficere instituit. nam ubi tantos suos labores et apparatus male cecidisse viderunt indutiisque per scelus violatis suam virtutem irrisui fore perdoluerunt, quod, unde agger omnino comportari posset, nihil erat reliquum, omnibus arboribus longe lateque in finibus Massiliensium excisis et convectis, aggerem novi generis atque inauditum ex latericiis duobus muris senum pedum crassitudine atque eorum murorum contignatione facere instituerunt, aequa fere latitudine atque ille congesticius ex materia fuerat agger. 2 ubi aut spatium inter muros aut imbecillitas materiae postulare videretur, pilae interponuntur, traversaria tigna iniciuntur quae firmamento esse possint, et quicquid est contignatum cratibus consternitur, crates luto integuntur. 3 sub tecto miles dextra ac sinistra muro tectus, adversus plutei obiectu, operi quaecumque sunt usui sine periculo subportat. 4celeriter res administratur; diuturni laboris detrimentum soilertia et virtute militum brevi reconciliatur. portae, quibus locis videtur, eruptionis causa in muro relinquuntur. 16. Quod ubi hostes viderunt, ea quae diu longoque spatio refici non posse sperassent, paucorum dierum opera et labore ita refecta, ut nullus perfidiae neque eruptioni locus esset neque quicquam omnino relinqueretur, qua aut telis militibus aut igni operibus noceri posset, 2eodemque exemplo sentiunt totam urbem, qua sit aditus ab terra, muro turribusque circumiri posse, sic ut ipsis consistendi in suis munitionibus locus non esset, cum paene inaedificata ab exercitu nostro moenia viderentur ac telum manu coiceretur, 3 suorumque tormentorum usum, quibus ipsi magna speravissent, spatii propinquitate interire parique condicione ex muro ac turribus bellandi data se virtute nostris adaequare non posse intellegunt, ad easdem deditionis condiciones recurrunt.

6 superioris temporis co: superiore tempore Chacon I contentionem M*TV : contemptionem &M}\5 15 1 contignatione Nipperdey: contignationem co 3 obiectu Aldus : obiectus co 16 1 nullus q: nullius co I aut telis Forchhammer: aut eis co: aut vis M2 2 inaedificata du Pontet: inaedificata (aedif- S) in muris co 3 usum M2TV : usu SM!U I speravissent SUTV : superavissent MI spatii propinquitate Held: spatio (spatii V) propinquitatis co Book II 123 points. 6 But just as our men had earlier completely relaxed their previous concentration, so now they had learnt their lesson from the events of the day before and had thoroughly prepared their defence. As a result they killed many of the enemy and drove the others back unsuccessful to the town. 15. Trebonius began to take in hand and make good his losses with greatly increased determination on the part of his soldiers. For they saw that their immense efforts and preparations had come to nothing, and were bitter that a mockery had been made of their courage by the wrongful violation of the truce; and so, because no material was available anywhere to build a ramp, as all the trees far and wide throughout the territory of Massilia had been cut down and brought in, they began to make a ramp of a new and unprecedented sort by laying two brick walls six feet thick and bridging these walls with a timber floor; this ramp was of about the same breadth as the previous solid ramp. 2 When either the distance between the walls or the weakness of the timber seemed to demand it, uprights were placed in between and cross beams laid on them to support the structure, and the floored parts were covered with wicker hurdles and coated with clay. 3 In the space beneath this roof the men, protected to left and right by the walls and in front by the advanced siege-shed, quite safely brought forward whatever was required for the construction. 4 Progress was swift; by the ingenuity and courage of the soldiers the lost fruits of their long- drawn-out labours were soon recovered. Doorways were left in the walls at suitable spots to allow sallies. 16. When the enemy saw that the damage which they had hoped could not be repaired for a long time and without considerable delay had been made good by a few days' toil and exertion in such a way that there was no opportunity for deception or sallies, and no means at all were left of injuring the soldiers with weapons or the siege-works with fire; 2 when by the same token they became aware that the whole city could be encircled on the landward side by a wall and towers, so that they would have no chance of standing firm on their own defences because their fortifications seemed to have been almost walled in by our army, and were within range of weapons thrown by hand; 3 and when they realised that owing to the shortness of the range their own artillery, on which they rested their hopes, had become useless, and that once the fighting was conducted on equal terms from wall and towers they could not match our men in strength and courage, they sought the same conditions again for surrender. 124 De Bello Civili 17. M. Varro in ulteriore Hispania initio cognitis iis rebus quae sunt in Italia gestae diffidens Pompeianis rebus amicissime de Caesare loquebatur: 2praeoccupatum sese legatione ab Cn. Pompeio, teneri obstrictum fide; necessitudinem quidem sibi nihilo minorem cum Caesare intercedere, neque se ignorare quod esset officium legati, qui fiduciariam operam obtineret, quae vires suae, quae voluntas erga Caesarem totius provinciae. 3 haec omnibus ferebat sermonibus neque se in ullam partem movebat. 4 postea vero cum Caesarem ad Massiliam detineri cognovit, copias Petrei cum exercitu Afrani esse coniunctas, magna auxilia convenisse, magna esse in spe atque exspectatione et consentire omnem citeriorem provinciam, quaeque postea acciderant de angustiis ad Ilerdam rei frumentariae accepit, atque haec ad eum latius atque inflatius Afranius perscribebat, se quoque ad motus fortunae movere coepit. 18. Dilectum habuit tota provincia, legionibus completis duabus cohortes circiter XXX alarias addidit. frumenti magniun numerum coegit, quod Massiliensibus, item quod Afranio Petreioque mitteret. naves longas X Gaditanis ut facerent imperavit, complures praeterea Hispali faciendas curavit. 2 pecuniam omnem omniaque ornamenta ex fano Herculis in oppidum Gadis contulit; eo sex cohortes praesidii causa ex provincia misit Gaiumque Gallonium equitem Romanum familiarem Domitii, qui eo procurandae hereditatis causa venerat missus a Domitio, oppido Gadibus praefecit; arma omnia privata ac publica in domum Galloni contulit. 3 ipse habuit graves in Caesarem contiones. saepe ex tribunali praedicavit adversa Caesarem proelia fecisse, magnum numerum ab eo militum ad Afranium perfugisse; haec se certis nuntiis, certis auctoribus comperisse. 4 quibus rebus perterritos civis Romanos eius provinciae sibi ad rem publicam administrandam sestertium centies et octogies et argenti pondo XX milia, tritici modios CXX milia polliceri coegit 5 quas Caesar esse arnicas civitates arbitrabatur, his graviora onera iniungebat praesidiaque eo deducebat et iudicia in privatos reddebat qui verba atque orationem adversus rem publicam habuissent; eorum bona in publicum addicebat. provinciam omnem in sua et Pompei verba ius iurandum adigebat. 6 cognitis iis rebus quae sunt gestae in citeriore Hispania, bellum parabat. ratio autem haec erat belli, ut se cum II legionibus Gadis conferret, naves frumentumque omnem ibi contineret; provinciam enim omnem Caesaris rebus favere cognoverat. in insula frumento navibusque comparatis bellum duci non difficile existimabat.

18 1 Petreioque ed.pr.: Pompeioque co 4 perterritos M2: perterritus SM^JV : pertritis TI CLXXX (= centies et octogies) UTV : DXXX (= octogies) S : CLXXXX (= centies et nonagies) M I modios co: modium Hotman Book II 125 17. When Marcus Varro in Further Spain initially learnt what had happened in Italy he had little confidence in the Pompeian cause and spoke of Caesar in the most friendly terms: 2 he said his position was predetermined by the command he held on Pompey's behalf and that he was bound by loyalty; however, he also enjoyed no less a degree of friendship with Caesar, and he was perfectly well aware what the duties were of a deputy holding a position of trust, what forces were available to him, and how the whole province felt towards Caesar. 3 Such was the tone of all his conversations, and he made no move towards either side. But later he learnt that Caesar was held up at Massilia, that Petreius' forces had joined Afranius' army, and that large auxiliary contingents had gathered while as many more were hoped for and expected and the whole of Nearer Spain was unanimous for Pompey, and when the news reached him of the difficulties that had occurred after that over the food supplies at Ilerda, a crisis much exaggerated to him by Afranius, he too began to move to the side which fortune favoured. 18. He conducted a levy throughout the province and brought up to strength his two legions, to which he added about thirty auxiliary cohorts. He requisitioned a large amount of grain to send to Massilia and likewise to Afranius and Petreius. He instructed the people of Gades to build ten warships and had several more built at Hispalis. 2 He removed all the money and treasures from the shrine of Hercules into the town of Gades, and sent six cohorts from the province to guard it; to command the town he appointed Gaius Gallonius, a Roman knight who was an associate of Domitius and had been sent there by Domitius to see to a legacy; and he gathered all privately and publicly owned weapons into Gallonius' house. 3 He himself spoke against Caesar at public gatherings. From his official platform he more than once announced that Caesar had suffered a reverse and that large numbers of his men had deserted to Afranius; these facts he had discovered from reliable reports and reliable authorities. 4 By these means he frightened the Roman citizens of the province and forced them to promise to contribute to the public account 18 million sesterces and 20,000 pounds of silver, and 120,000 bushels of wheat. 5 He imposed harsher burdens on those communities he suspected of favouring Caesar, and sent for trial ordinary citizens who might have spoken, whether privately or publicly, against the interest of the state; the property of these people was confiscated. 6 On learning of the course of events in Nearer Spain, he prepared to fight. His plan was to take himself to Gades with the two legions, and keep his ships and all his food-supplies there; for he had realised that the entire province supported Caesar. On an island, with food and ships to hand, he did not consider it difficult to drag out the campaign. 126 De Bello Civili 7 Caesar etsi multis necessariisque rebus in Italiam revocabatur, tamen constituerat nullam partem belli in Hispaniis relinquere, quod magna esse Pompei beneficia et magnas clientelas in citeriore provincia sciebat. 19. Itaque duabus legionibus missis in ulteriorem Hispaniam cum Q. Cassio, tribuno plebis, ipse cum DC equitibus magnis itineribus praegreditur edictumque praemittit, ad quam diem magistratus principesque omnium civitatum sibi esse praesto Cordubae vellet. 2 quo edicto tota provincia pervulgato nulla fuit civitas quin ad id tempus partem senatus Cordubam mitteret, non civis Romanus paulo notior quin ad diem conveniret. 3 simul ipse Cordubae conventus per se portas Varroni clausit, custodias vigiliasque in turribus muroque disposuit, cohortes duas, quae colonicae appellabantur, cum eo casu venissent, tuendi oppidi causa apud se retinuit. 4 isdem diebus Carmonenses, quae est longe firmissima totius provinciae civitas, deductis tribus in arcem oppidi cohortibus a Varrone praesidio, per se cohortes eiecit portasque praeclusit. 20. Hoc vero magis properare Varro, ut cum legionibus quam primum Gadis contenderet, ne itinere aut traiectu intercluderetur, tanta ac tarn secunda in Caesarem voluntas provinciae reperiebatur. 2progresso ei paulo longius litterae Gadibus redduntur, simul atque sit cognitum de edicto Caesaris, consensisse Gaditanos principes cum tribunis cohortium quae essent ibi in praesidio, ut Gallonium ex oppido expellerent, urbem insulamque Caesari servarent. 3 hoc inito consilio denuntiavisse Gallonio ut sua sponte, dum sine periculo liceret, excederet Gadibus; si id non fecisset, sibi consilium capturos. hoc timore adductum Gallonium Gadibus excessisse. 4 his cognitis rebus, altera ex duabus legionibus, quae vernacula appellabatur, ex castris Varronis, adstante et inspectante ipso, signa sustulit seseque Hispalim recepit atque in foro et porticibus sine maleficio consedit. 5 quod factum adeo eius conventus cives Romani comprobaveruht, ut domum ad se quisque hospitio cupidissime reciperet. 6quibus rebus pertemtus Varro, cum itinere converso sese Italicam venturum praemisisset, certior ab suis factus est praeclusas esse portas. 7 turn vero omni interclusus itinere ad Caesarem mittit paratum se esse legionem, cui iusserit, tradere. ille ad eum Sextum Caesarem mittit atque huic tradi iubet. 8 tradita legione Varro Cordubam ad Caesarem venit;

praemisisset Chacon : promisisset co Book II 127 7 Caesar had many urgent matters which were calling him back to Rome, but had decided to leave no trace of war in the two Spanish provinces, because he knew that Pompey had done many favours and exercised extensive patronage in the Nearer one. 19. He therefore sent two legions to Further Spain with Quintus Cassius, tribune of the people, while he himself went on ahead with six hundred cavalry by forced marches, sending on an edict announcing the day on which he wished the magistrates and leading citizens of all communities to be ready to meet him in Corduba. 2 After this edict had been made known all over the province there was not a community that did not send members of its council to Corduba at the right time, not a single Roman citizen of any standing who did not gather on the day. 3 At the same time the association of Roman citizens at Corduba on its own initiative closed the gates against Varro, and stationed guards and lookouts on the towers and wall; they also detained two cohorts of the sort called 'settler', which arrived there by chance, to protect the town. 4 At about the same time the people of Carmona, by far the strongest township of the whole province, spontaneously ejected a garrison of three cohorts which had been put into the citadel by Varro, and shut the gates against them. 20. Because of this Varro hurried all the more to make for Gades with his legions as soon as possible, so strong and so favourable to Caesar were the feelings of the province found to be. 2 When he had gone a little further a letter from Gades informed him that as soon as the news of Caesar's edict became known, the leading citizens of Gades had agreed with the officers of the cohorts of the garrison there to expel Gallonius from the town and hold the city and island for Caesar. 3 After adopting this plan they had invited Gallonius to leave Gades voluntarily while he could safely do so; if he refused, they would act as they thought best. Thus frightened, Gallonius had quitted the town. 4 When this news became known, one of the two legions, called the local one, pulled up its standards, marched out of Varro's camp under his very eyes, and withdrew to Hispalis where the men stayed in the town-square and colonnades without harming anyone. 5 The local association of Roman citizens approved of this behaviour so much that they all eagerly offered the soldiers the hospitality of their homes. 6 These events caused Varro to panic, and turning back on his line of march he sent ahead to Italica to announce his arrival, when he was informed by his staff that the gates had been shut against him. 7 Then finally, with every destination barred, he sent a message to Caesar that he was ready to hand over the legion to anyone he might name. Caesar sent him Sextus Caesar and ordered the handover to be made to him. 8 This done, Varro came to Caesar at Corduba; he gave his word for the correctness of the accounts he presented of the public finances, handed over the money which was with 128 De Bello Civili relatis ad eum publicis cum fide rationibus quod penes eum est pecuniae tradit et quid ubique habeat frumenti ac navium ostendit. 21. Caesar contione habita Cordubae omnibus generatim gratias agit: civibus Romanis quod oppidum in sua potestate studuissent habere, Hispanis quod praesidia expulissent, Gaditanis quod conatus adversariorum infregissent seseque in libertatem vindicavissent, tribunis militum centurionibusque qui eo praesidii causa venerant quod eorum consilia sua virtute confirmavissent. 2 pecunias quas erant in publicum Varroni cives Romani polliciti remittit; bona restituit iis quos liberius locutos banc poenam tulisse cognoverat. 3 tributis quibusdam publicis privatisque praemiis reliquos in posterum bona spe complet biduumque Cordubae commoratus Gadis proficiscitur; pecunias monimentaque quae ex fano Herculis collata erant in privatam domum referri in templum iubet. 4provinciae Q. Cassium praeficit; huic Iin legiones adtribuit. ipse iis navibus quas M. Varro quasque Gaditani iussu Varronis fecerant Tarraconem paucis diebus pervenit. ibi totius fere citerioris provinciae legationes Caesaris adventum exspectabant. 5 eadem ratione privatim ac publice quibusdam civitatibus habitis honoribus Tarracone discedit pedibusque Narbonem atque inde MassiUam pervenit. ibi legem de dictatore latam seseque dictatorem dictum a M. Lepido praetore cognoscit. 22. Massilienses omnibus defessi malis, rei frumentariae ad summam inopiam adducti, bis proeho navali superati, crebris eruptionibus fusi, gravi etiam pestilentia conflicted ex diutina conclusione et mutatione victus - panico enim vetere atque hordeo corrupto omnes alebantur, quod ad huius modi casus antiquitus paratum in publicum contulerant - deiecta turri, labefacta magna parte muri, auxiliis provinciarum et exercituum desperatis, quos in Caesaris potestatem venisse cognoverant, sese dedere sine fraude constituunt. 2 sed paucis ante diebus L. Domitius, cognita Massiliensium voluntate, navibus ED comparatis, ex quibus duas familiaribus suis attribuerat, unam ipse conscenderat, nactus turbidam tempestatem profectus est. 3 hunc conspicatae naves quae iussu Bruti consuetudine cotidiana ad portum excubabant, sublatis ancoris sequi coeperunt. 4 ex his unum ipsius navigium contendit et fugere perseveravit auxilioque tempestatis ex conspectu abiit, duo perterrita concursu nostrarum navium sese in portum receperunt. 5 Massilienses anna tormentaque ex oppido, ut est

21 3 publicis SM2^ : populis M!U : populis publicis Meusel Book II 129 him, and made a statement of what ships and food supplies he had anywhere. 21. Caesar called a public meeting in Corduba and expressed his thanks to all in their various categories: to the Romans because they had exerted themselves to keep the town in their own control, to the Spaniards because they had expelled the garrisons, to the people of Gades because they had sabotaged the efforts of their opponents and had asserted their own freedom, to the officers and centurions who had come to Gades to garrison it because they had courageously supported the plans of the townspeople. 2 He remitted the contributions which the Romans had promised Varro they would pay to the treasury, and restored the property of those he had discovered to have suffered this penalty for speaking too freely. 3 To some he granted rewards, both public and private, and to the others held out the hope of benefits to come, and after staying two days in Corduba set out for Gades; there he ordered the money and treasures which had been transferred to a private house to be taken back to the temple. 4 He put Quintus Cassius in charge of the province, giving him the four legions. He himself with the ships which Varro, and the people of Gades on Varro's orders, had built, reached Tarraco in a few days. There delegations from almost the entire Nearer province were waiting for him. 5 He similarly distributed honours, both private and public, to various communities, and leaving Tarraco travelled by land to Narbo and from there to Massilia. There he heard that a law had been passed about the appointment of a dictator and that he had been named dictator by praetor Marcus Lepidus. 22. The Massiliots, exhausted by all their sufferings, their food running critically low, twice defeated at sea, unsuccessful in many a sally, ravaged by disease on account of the long blockade and change of diet (they were all living off old millet and rotting barley, which they had contributed long ago to the public provision against such an event), their tower collapsed, long stretches of their walls seriously weakened, and without hope of assistance from provinces or armies which they had learnt had come under Caesar's control, decided to surrender in good faith. 2 However, a few days previously Domitius, becoming aware of the wishes of the Massiliots, made ready three ships, of which he put two under the command of his personal friends, embarking on the third himself, and took advantage of some wild weather to set out. 3 The ships which on Brutus' orders were keeping their usual daily watch off the port spotted him, hoisted anchor, and set off in pursuit. 4 Of the three, Domitius' own vessel made a great effort and continued to flee, and with the help of the storm disappeared from sight, but the other two were terrified by the encounter with our ships and went back to port. 5 The Massiliots, as instructed, brought their weapons and artillery 130 De Bello CMIi imperatum, proferunt, navis ex portu navalibusque educunt, pecuniam ex publico tradunt. 6 quibus rebus confectis Caesar magis eos pro nomine et vetustate quam pro mentis in se civitatis conservans duas ibi legiones praesidio relinquit, ceteras in Italiam mittit; ipse ad urbem proficiscitur. 23. Isdem temporibus C. Curio in Africam profectus ex Sicilia et iam ab initio copias P. Atti Van despiciens duas legiones ex mi quas a Caesare acceperat, D equites transportabat biduoque et noctibus tribus navigatione consumptis appellit ad eum locum qui appellator Anquillaria. 2 hie locus abest a Clupeis passuum XXII milia habetque non incommodam aestate stationem et duobus eminentibus promunturiis continetur. 3huius adventum L. Caesar filius cum X longis navibus ad Clupea praestolans, quas navis Uticae ex praedonum bello subductas P. Attius reficiendas huius belli causa curaverat, veritus navium multitudinem ex alto refugerat, appulsaque ad proximum litus trireme constrata et in litore relicta pedibus Hadrumetum profugerat. 4 id oppidum C. Considius Longus unius legionis praesidio tuebatur. reliquae Caesaris naves eius fuga se Hadrumetum receperunt. 5hunc secutus Marcius Rufus quaestor navibus XII, quas praesidio onerariis navibus Curio ex Sicilia eduxerat, postquam in litore relictam navem conspexit, hanc remulco abstraxit; ipse ad C. Curionem cum classe redit. 24. Curio Marcium Uticam navibus praemittit; ipse eodem cum exercitu proficiscitur biduique iter progressus ad flumen Bagradam pervenit. 2 ibi C. Caninium Rebilum legatum cum legionibus reliquit; ipse cum equitatu antecedit ad Castra exploranda Cornelia, quod is locus peridoneus castris habebatur. 3 id autem est iugum derectum eminens in mare, utraque ex parte praeruptum atque asperum, sed tamen paulo leniore fastigio ab ea parte, quae ad Uticam vergit 4 abest derecto itinere ab Utica paulo amplius passus mille. sed hoc itinere est fons, quo mare succedit longius, lateque is locus restagnat; quern si qui vitare voluerit, sex milium circuitu in oppidum pervenit. 25. Hoc explorato loco Curio castra Vari conspicit muro oppidoque coniuncta ad portam quae appellatur Belica, admodum munita natura loci, una ex parte ipso oppido Utica, altera a theatro, quod est ante oppidum, substructionibus eius operis maximis, aditu ad castra difficili et angusto. 2 simul animadvertit multa undique portari atque agi plenissimis viis, quae

24 1 biduique co:triduique Kiibler 2 Cornelia M : Comeliana SU : canidiana [caind- T] TV 4 abest.. mille om. S : pass mille (J: passuum millibus m Stoffel 25 1 Belie* Freinsheim : bellica a> Book II 131 out of the town, took their ships out of the port and the ship-sheds, and handed over the money in their treasury. 6 When this had been done, Caesar spared them, more in accordance with the fame and antiquity of their state than with what they deserved of himself, and leaving two legions there as a garrison sent the others to Italy; he himself set off for Rome. 23. Concurrently with these events Gaius Curio set out from Sicily for Africa; already having a low opinion of the forces of Publius Attius Varus, he took across two legions out of the four he had been given by Caesar, and five hundred cavalry, and after a voyage of two days and three nights landed at a place called Anquillaria. 2 This place is twenty-two miles from Clupea, possesses an anchorage that is quite convenient in summer, and is enclosed by two headlands. 3 Young Lucius Caesar, who had been waiting for him off Clupea with ten warships (these were ships captured in the war with the pirates which Attius Varus had had repaired for this war), had taken fright at the number of ships and abandoned the open sea; driving his decked trireme ashore on the nearest beach he had left it there and fled by land to Hadrumetum,4 a town which was held by Gaius Considius Longus with a garrison of one legion. On Caesar's flight, the rest of his squadron withdrew to Hadrumetum. 5 Giving chase with twelve ships, which Curio had brought out from Sicily to guard the transport vessels, quaestor Marcius Rufus noticed the ship left on the shore and towed it off; and himself rejoined Curio with his fleet. 24. Curio sent Marcius ahead to Utica with the ships, while he himself made for the same place with his army and after two days' march reached the river Bagradas. 2 There he left his deputy Gaius Caninius Rebilus in command of the legions, and himself went ahead with the cavalry to reconnoitre Scipio's Camp, because the site was considered to be perfect for a camp. 3 It is a level ridge jutting into the sea, steep and difficult on both sides, but with a slightly more gentle slope on the side towards Utica. 4 As the crow flies, it is rather more than a mile from Utica, but there is a spring in the way, to which the sea comes up from a fair distance; the ground is boggy over a wide area, and anyone who wants to avoid it has a six-mile detour to reach the town. 25. After inspecting the place Curio observed Varus' camp which lay alongside the town wall at the gate named after Baal; it was quite well protected by the nature of its site, on one side the town of Utica itself, on the other the theatre (which is in front of the town) with its massive supporting walls giving a difficult, constricted, approach to the camp. 2 At the same time he noticed that the roads were packed with people carrying or driving great quantities of the things which are brought in from the 132 De Bello Civili repentini tumultus timore ex agris in urbem conferantur. 3 hue equitatum mittit ut diriperet atque haberet loco praedae; eodemque tempore his rebus subsidio DC equites Numidae ex oppido peditesque CCCC mittuntur a Varo, quos auxili causa rex Iuba paucis diebus ante Uticam miserat. 4 huic et paternum hospitum cum Pompeio et simultas cum Ciuione intercedebat, quod tribunus plebis legem promulgaverat, qua lege regnum Iubae publicaverat. 5 concurrunt equites inter se; neque vero primum impetum nostrorum Numidae ferre potuerunt, sed, interfectis circiter CXX, reliqui se in castra ad oppidum receperunt. 6 interim adventu longarum navium Curio pronuntiari onerariis navibus iubet, quae stabant ad Uticam numero circiter CC, se in hostium habiturum loco qui non ex vestigio ad Castra Cornelia naves traduxisset. 7 qua pronuntiatione facta, temporis puncto sublatis ancoris, omnes Uticam relinquunt et quo imperatum est transeimt, quae res omnium rerum copia complevit exercitum. 26. His rebus gestis Curio se in castra ad Bagradam recipit atque universi exercitus conclamatione imperator appellatur posteroque die Uticam exercitum ducit et prope oppidum castra ponit. 2 nondum opere castrorum perfecto equites ex statione mmtiant magna auxilia equitum peditumque ab rege missa Uticam venire; eodemque tempore vis magna pulveris cernebatur, et vestigio temporis primum agmen erat in conspectu. 3novitate rei Curio permotus praemittit equites, qui primum impetum sustineant ac morentur; ipse celeriter ab opere deductis legionibus aciem instruit. 4 equites committunt proelium et, priusquam plane legiones explicari et consistere possent, tota auxilia regis impedita ac perturbata, quod nullo ordine et sine timore iter fecerant, in fugam coiciunt equitatuque omni fere incoliuni, quod se per litora celeriter in oppidum recipit, magnum peditum numerum interficiunt. 27. Proxima nocte centuriones Marsi duo ex castris Curionis cum manipularibus suis XXII ad Attium Varum perfugiunt. 2 hi sive vere quam habuerant opinionem ad eum perferunt, sive etiam auribus Vari serviunt (nam quae volumus et credimus libenter, et quae sentimus ipsi reliquos sentire speramus) confirmant quidem certe totius exercitus animos alienos esse a Curione maximeque opus esse in conspectum exercitus venire et colloquendi dare facultatem. 3 qua opinione adductus Varus postero die

26 4 equites Chacon: equitesque co I 27 2 conspectum <;: conspectu co I exercitus Meusel: exercitum co Book II 133 country to the town when there is a sudden fear of war. 3 He sent his cavalry off in that direction to plunder and win some booty; and at the same time there were dispatched from the town by Varus to help the people six hundred Numidian horse and four hundred infantry, whom King Juba had sent as assistance to Utica a few days previously, . 4 The king had been influenced by ties of friendship with Pompey which he had inherited from his father, and by enmity with Curio, who as tribune had proposed a law which made Juba's kingdom the property of the Roman people. 5 The cavalry charged each other; but the Numidians were unable to stand up to the first shock of our attack and after losing a hundred and twenty dead the rest retreated to the camp by the town. 6 Meanwhile the warships arrived and Curio ordered a proclamation to be made to the merchant vessels, of which about two hundred were at anchor at Utica, that he would regard as hostile those who did not forthwith bring their ships across to Scipio's Camp. 7 When this proclamation had been made, they all immediately weighed anchor, left Utica, and came across to where they had been ordered. This manoeuvre gained the army supplies of every sort. 26. After these exploits, Curio went back to the camp at the Bagradas and was hailed as 'Victorious General' by the whole army, and on the following day led his army to Utica and encamped near the city. 2 While the camp was still being fortified the cavalry outposts brought news that large reinforcements of infantry and cavalry sent by the king were on their way to Utica; at the same time a great cloud of dust was seen and in a moment the head of the column appeared. 3 Curio, disturbed by the unexpectedness of this, sent his cavalry forward to absorb the first assault and delay the attackers, while he himself swiftly took the legions from the fortification work and drew them up in battle order. 4 The cavalry engaged, and before the legions could fully deploy and take up their positions, had put to flight all the king's reinforcements (who were encumbered with baggage and thrown into confusion because they had been travelling confidently and in no sort of order), and killed a large number of infantry, the cavalry escaping practically unhurt because they fled rapidly along the shore to the town. 27. The following night two Marsic centurions with twenty-two of their men deserted from Curio's camp to Attius Varus. 2 Whether they communicated their true opinion to him, or whether they told Varus what he wished to hear (for we are both ready to believe the things we want to believe, and hope other people feel what we feel ourselves), at any rate they definitely asserted that Curio did not have the support of any of his army and that it was vitally important for Varus to show himself to the army and offer them the opportunity of negotiation. 3 Under the influence of these 134 De Bello Civili mane legiones ex castris educit. facit idem Curio, atque una valle non magna interiecta suas uterque copias instruit. 28. Erat in exercitu Vari Sex. Quintilius Varus, quern fuisse Corfini supra demonstratum est. hie dimissus a Caesare in Africam venerat, legionesque eas transduxerat Curio quas superioribus temporibus Corfinio receperat Caesar, adeo ut, paucis mutatis centurionibus, idem ordines manipulique constarent. 2 hanc nactus appellationis causam Quintilius circumire aciem Curionis atque obsecrare milites coepit, ne primam sacramenti, quod apud Domitium atque apud se quaestorem dixissent, memoriam deponerent neu contra eos arma ferrent qui eadem essent usi fortuna eademque in obsidione perpessi, neu pro iis pugnarent a quibus contumeliam perfugae appellarentur. 3 hue pauca ad spem largitionis addidit, quae ab sua liberalitate, si se atque Attium secuti essent, exspectare deberent. 4hac habita oratione, nullam in partem ab exercitu Curionis fit significatio, atque ita suas uterque copias reducit. 29. At in castris Curionis magnus omnium incessit timor animis; is variis hominum sermonibus celeriter augetur. unusquisque enim opiniones fmgebat et ad id quod ab alio audierat sui aliquid timoris addebat. 2 hoc ubi uno auctore ad plures permanaverat, atque alius alii tradiderat, plures auctores eius rei videbantur. 3 *...civile bellum... genus hominum quod liceret libere facere et sequi quod vellet... legiones hae quae paulo ante apud adversarios fuerant... nam etiam Caesaris beneficium mutaverat.. consuetudo qua offerrentur... municipia etiam diversis partibus coniuncta... neque enim ex Marsis Paelignisque veniebant ut qui superiore nocte in contuberniis... commilitesque nonnulli... graviora sermones militum... 4dubia durius accipiebantur *. nonnulla etiam ab iis qui diligentiores videri volebant fingebantur. 30. Quibus de causis consilio convocato de summa rerum deliberare incipit. 2 erant sententiae quae conandum omnibus modis castraque Vari oppugnanda censerent, quod huius modi militum consiliis otium maxime contrarium esse arbitrarentur; postremo praestare dicebant per virtutem in pugna belli fortunam experiri, quam desertos et circumventos ab suis gravissimum supplicium perpeti. 3 erant qui censerent de tertia vigilia in Castra Cornelia recedendum, ut maiore spatio temporis interiecto

28 2 per add. Kubler: contumeliam S : contumelia P 29 1 at Manutius: atque co I animis Vossius: nam co 3-4 locus non sanandus; vide nn. I liceret MU: licere STV 4 nonnulla £: nonnulli co 30 2 in add. Chacon : militum consiliis otium p: consilium militum solium S Book II 135 views Varus led his legions out of camp early the next day. Curio did the same, and they both drew up their forces separated by a single small valley. 28. Present in Varus' army was Sextus Quintilius Varus, who had been at Corfmium, as mentioned above. On being released by Caesar he had come to Africa, while Curio had brought across the legions which Caesar had earlier gathered from Corfmium in a state in which they retained, with the alteration of a few centurions, their original structure of ranks and companies. 2 Seizing this chance of making an appeal, Quintilius began to go round Curio's ranks and beg the soldiers not to put aside the memory of their first oath, which they had sworn before Domitius and himself as quaestor, nor to bear arms against men who had shared the same fortunes and endured the same hardships in the siege, nor to fight for those by whom they had been insultingly labelled deserters. 3 To this he added a few words to raise the hope of a cash payment which they could expect out of his generosity if they followed himself and Attius. 4 After he had finished speaking, there was no sound from Curio's army, and so both withdrew their forces. 29. But in Curio's camp everyone began to be very frightened, and their fear grew rapidly as they talked amongst themselves. For each one of them gave his imagination play and added something of his own terror to what he had heard from someone else. 2 When this had spread from its original author to a larger group, and they had passed it from one to another, there seemed to be wide authority for it. 3 * Civil war... the sort of men... freely doing what they liked and seeking what they wanted... these legions which had very recently been on the opposing side... for Caesar's favour to them had also altered... the practice by which they were being offered... their towns also connected with the different sides... nor had they come from the Marsi and Paeligni as men who on the night before in their tents... and some fellow soldiers... more serious matters... talk amongst the soldiers... what was uncertain was interpreted for the worse...* Some details too were invented by those who wished to seem better informed. 30. For these reasons he called a council and began to consider his general strategy. 2 Opinions were expressed in favour of making every possible effort and attacking Varus' camp, because when soldiers were contemplating plans of this sort, idleness was the most harmful thing of all; they said that it was better, finally, to try the fortune of war by bravery in battle than to be deserted and thwarted by their own men and suffer the severest of punishment. 3 Some thought that they should retreat to Scipio's Camp during the third watch of the night, so that the increase in the intervening distance should bring the men to their senses, and at the same 136 De Bello Civili militum mentes sanarentur, simul, si quid gravius accidisset, magna multitudine navium et tutius et facilius in Siciliam receptus daretur. 31. Curio utrumque improbans consilium, quantum alteri sententiae deesset animi, tantum alteri superesse dicebat: hos turpissimae fugae rationem habere, illos etiam iniquo loco dimicandum putare. 2 "Qua enim", inquit, "fiducia et opere et natura loci munitissima castra expugnari posse confidimus? 3 aut vero quid proficimus, si accepto magno detrimento ab oppugnatione castrorum discedimus? quasi non et felicitas rerum gestarum exercitus benevolentiam imperatoribus et res adversae odia concilient! 4 castrorum autem mutatio quid habet nisi turpem fugam et desperationem omnium et alienationem exercitus? nam neque prudentes suspicari oportet sibi parum credi, neque improbos scire sese timeri, quod illis licentiam timor augeat noster, his studia deminuat. 5 quod si iam," inquit, "haec explorata habeamus, quae de exercitus alienatione dicuntur, quae quidem ego aut omnino falsa aut certe minora opinione esse confido, quanto haec dissimulari et occultari quam per nos confirmari praestet? 6 an non, uti corporis vulnera, ita exercitus incommoda sunt tegenda, ne spem adversariis augeamus? 7 at etiam, ut media nocte proficiscamur, addunt, quo maiorem, credo, licentiam habeant qui peccare conentur. namque huius modi res aut pudore aut metu tenentur, quibus rebus nox maxime adversaria est. Square neque tanti sum animi, ut sine spe castra oppugnanda censeam, neque tanti timoris, uti spe deficiam; atque omnia prius experienda arbitror magnaque ex parte iam me una vobiscum de re iudicium facturum confido." 32. Dimisso consilio, contionem advocat militum. commemorat quo sit eorum usus studio ad Corfinium Caesar, ut magnam partem Italiae beneficio atque auctoritate eorum suam fecerit. 2 "Vos enim vestrumque factum ", inquit, "omnia deinceps municipia sunt secuta, neque sine causa et Caesar amicissime de vobis et illi gravissime iudicaverunt. 3 Pompeius enim nullo proelio pulsus vestri facti praeiudicio demotus Italia excessit; Caesar me, quern sibi carissimum habuit, provinciam Siciliam atque Africam, sine quibus urbem atque Italiam tueri non potest, vestrae fidei commisit. 4 at sunt qui vos hortentur ut a nobis desciscatis. quid enim est illis optatius quam uno tempore et nos circumvenire et vos nefario scelere obstringere? aut quid irati gravius de vobis sentire possunt quam ut eos

31 7 at Beroaldus: aut co 8 uti spe Meusel: ut ipse co 32 4 at sunt Paul: ad(as- S)sunt SMU : adsunt nobis TV Book II 137 time, should any more serious setback occur, the great number of ships would allow a safer and easier withdrawal to Sicily. 31. Curio disapproved of both plans, saying that what the one lacked in spirit the other possessed to excess: one side were planning a highly discreditable flight, the other thought they ought to fight even when the ground was unfavourable. 2 "What confidence do we have", he said, "that it is possible to storm a camp whose defences, both natural and man-made, are extremely strong? 3 Or where is our advantage, if we suffer great losses and have to abandon our attack on the camp? As if it were not success that earns generals the goodwill of their armies, and failure their loathing! 4 Does a move of camp mean anything but ignominious flight, absence of all hope, and disaffection amongst the troops? Good soldiers should not suspect they are distrusted, nor bad soldiers know they are feared, because our fear increases the insubordination of the Jatter while it erodes the loyalty of the former. 5 But if now", he said, "we were quite certain of what is being said about the disaffection of the army (and I think it either quite untrue or certainly much exaggerated) would it not be better for it to be concealed and not admitted than for it to be reinforced by our own actions? 6 Is it not the case that the defects of an army, like the wounds on a body, should be hidden so as not to encourage the enemy? 7 And furthermore, they add that we should set out in the middle of the night, I suppose so that those who attempt criminal behaviour may have greater freedom. For things of this sort are held in check either by fear or by a sense of shame, and darkness is particularly hostile to both. 81 am, therefore, neither so brave as to think we ought to make a hopeless assault on the camp, nor so timid as to give up hope; I think we should first put everything to the test, and I have great confidence that together with you I shall presently be able to make a judgment on the matter." 32. Dismissing his council, Curio called the soldiers together for an address. He reminded them of the use Caesar had made of their support at Corfinium, so that thanks to their services and their example he had made a large part of Italy his. 2 "Because all the towns then imitated you and your action, and not without reason did Caesar judge most favourably, and our enemies most harshly, of you. 3 For Pompey, without suffering a reverse on the field of battle, was pushed aside by the verdict you had already passed, and left Italy; while Caesar committed to your trust both myself, whom he held very dear, and the province of Sicily and Africa, without which he cannot keep Rome and Italy safe. 4 But there are men here who advise you to abandon us. What more can they desire than to cheat us and at the same time make you guilty of an awful crime? In their fury, what worse fate can they imagine for you than that you should betray those who 138 De Bello Civili prodatis qui se vobis omnia debere iudicant, in eorum potestatem veniatis qui se per vos perisse existimant? 5 an vero in Hispania res gestas Caesaris non audistis? duos pulsos exercitus; duos superatos duces; duas receptas provincias; haec acta diebus XL, quibus in conspectum adversariorum venerit Caesar. 6 an, qui incolumes resistere non potuerunt, perditi resistant? vos autem, incerta victoria Caesarem secuti, diiudicata iam belli fortuna victum sequamini, cum vestri officii praemia percipere debeatis? 7desertos enim se ac proditos a vobis dicunt et prions sacramenti mentionem faciunt. 8 vosne vero L. Domitium, an vos Domitius deseruit? nonne extremam pati fortunam paratos proiecit ille? nonne sibi clam vobis salutem fuga petivit? nonne proditi per ilium Caesaris beneficio estis conservati? 9sacramento quidem vos tenere qui potuit, cum proiectis fascibus et deposito imperio privatus et captus ipse in alienam venisset potestatem? 10 relinquitur nova religio, ut eo neglecto sacramento quo tenemini, respiciatis illud quod deditione ducis et capitis deminutione sublatum est. 11 at, credo, si Caesarem probatis, iam me offenditis. qui de meis in vos meritis praeiudicaturus non sum, quae sunt adhuc et mea voluntate et vestra exspectatione leviora; sed tamen sui laboris milites semper eventu belli praemia petiverunt, qui qualis sit futurus, ne vos quidem dubitatis. diligentiam quidem nostram aut, quern ad finem adhuc res processit, fortunam cur praeteream? 12 an paenitet vos quod salvum atque incolumem exercitum nulla omnino nave desiderata traduxerim? quod classem hostium primo impetu adveniens profligaverim? quod bis per biduum equestri proelio superaverim? quod ex portu sinuque adversariorum CC naves oneratas adduxerim eoque illos compulerim, ut neque pedestri itinere neque navibus commeatu iuvari possint? 13 hac vos fortuna atque his ducibus repudiatis, Corfiniensem ignominiam, Italiae fugam, Hispaniarum deditionem, - en Africi belh praeiudicia! - sequimini? l4equidem me Caesaris militem dici volui, vos me imperatoris nomine appellavistis. cuius si vos paenitet, vestrum vobis beneficium remitto, mihi meum restituite nomen, ne ad contumeliam honorem dedisse videamini." 33. Qua oratione permoti milites crebro etiam dicentem interpellabant, ut magno cum dolore infidelitatis suspicionem sustinere viderentur; discedentem vero ex contione universi cohortantur, magno sit animo, nec

6 incerta Aldus : certa co 11 iam co: in <; I praeiudicaturus co: praedicaturus Aldus 13 in Italiae co : in del. Chacon I fugam Chacon : fuga an(in T) p : an S I en Bucheler: in co: del. Meusel Book II 139 believe they owe everything to you, and come into the power of those who think you have ruined them? 5 Or perhaps you have not heard of Caesar's exploits in Spain? Two armies defeated; two generals overcome; two provinces gained; and this done in forty days from the time when Caesar set eyes on his opponents. 6 Or do you think that men who could offer no resistance when they were unharmed, can resist now they are finished? Are you who followed Caesar when his victory still hung in the balance really going to follow the loser now that the result of the war is settled and you ought to reap the reward of your services? 7 They say they have been deserted and betrayed by you, and mention your previous oath. 8 But did you desert Domitius, or did Domitius desert you? Did he not reject you when you were prepared to hold out to the bitter end? Did he not seek safety in flight without telling you? When he had betrayed you, were you not saved by Caesar's kindness? 9 As for the oath, how could he have held you to it, when after throwing away his insignia pf office and laying down his command he passed into another's power as a private citizen and a prisoner himself? 10 We have arrived at a new sort of obligation, when you pay no attention to the oath you are under now, but respect the one which has been annulled by your leader's surrender and loss of legal rights. 11 But, I suppose, if you approve of Caesar, you are now turning on me! I am not going to make any premature claims on your gratitude for services which are as yet less substantial than I would like, or than you hope for; none the less, soldiers have always sought the rewards of their labours in the results of a war, and not even you can be in doubt as to what that will be. Why should I not mention my thoroughness or (as far as things have gone) my good fortune? 12 Or are you sorry because I brought this army across safe and sound without the loss of a single ship? Or because on arriving I scattered the enemy fleet at the first attack? Or because I won a cavalry victory twice in two days? Or because I got from the enemy's harbour and anchorage two hundred loaded vessels and forced him into die position of being unable to receive supplies either by land or sea? 13 Turning your backs on this good fortune and these leaders, are you attracted by the disgrace of Corfinium, the flight from Italy, the surrender of the two Spains - and there you have a foretaste of the outcome of the war in Africa! 14 Indeed, it was my wish to be called a soldier of Caesar's, and you have saluted me as a victorious general. If you regret this, I give you back your gift; but you must restore me my good name, so that it does not seem that you have given me an honour in order to insult me." 33. The soldiers were moved by this speech and frequently interrupted Curio while he was still speaking, so that they appeared to be very hurt by the suspicion of their disloyalty; but as he left the gathering they all encouraged him to be of good heart, and not to hesitate to join battle on the 140 De Bello Civili ibi dubitet proelium committere et suam fidem virtutemque experiri. 2 quo facto commutata omnium et voluntate et opinione consensu suo constituit Curio, cum primum sit data potestas, proelio rem committere; posteroque die productos eodem loco quo superioribus diebus constiterat in acie collocat. 3 ne Varus quidem Attius dubitat copias producere, sive sollicitandi milites sive aequo loco dimicandi detur occasio, ne facultatem praetermittat. 34. Erat vallis inter duas acies, ut supra demonstratum est, non ita magna, at difficili et arduo ascensu. hanc uterque si adversariorum copiae transire conarentur, exspectabat, quo aequiore loco proelium committeret; 2 simul ab sinistro cornu P. Atti equitatus omnis et una levis armaturae interiecti complures, cum se in vallem demitterent, cernebantur. 3 ad eos Curio equitatum et duas Marrucinorum cohortis mittit; quorum primum impetum equites hostium non tulerunt, sed admissis equis ad suos refrigerant; relicti ab his, qui una procurrerant levis armaturae circumveniebantur atque interficiebantur ab nostris. hue tota Vari conversa acies suos fugere et concidi videbat. 4 turn Rebilus, legatus Caesaris, quern Curio secum ex Sicilia duxerat, quod magnum habere usum in re militari sciebat: "Perterritum," inquit, "hostem vides, Curio; quid dubitas uti temporis opportimitate?" 5 ille unum elocutus, ut memoria tenerent milites ea quae pridie sibi confirmassent, sequi sese iubet et praecurrit ante omnes. adeoque erat impedita vallis, ut in ascensu nisi sublevati a suis primi non facile eniterentur. 6 sed praeoccupatus animus Attianorum militum timore et fuga et caede suorum nihil de resistendo cogitabat, omnesque iam se ab equitatu circumveniri arbitrabantur. itaque priusquam telum adigi posset aut nostri propius accederent, omnis Vari acies terga vertit seque in castra recepit. 35. Qua in fuga Fabius Paelignus quidam ex infimis ordinibus de exercitu Curionis primus agmen fugientium consecutus magna voce Varum nomine appellans requirebat, uti unus esse ex eius militibus et monere aliquid velle ac dicere uideretur. 2 ubi ille saepius appellatus aspexit ac restitit et quis esset aut quid vellet quaesivit, humerum apertum gladio appetit, paulumque afuit quin Varum interficeret; quod ille periculum sublato ad eius conatum

33 1 nec ibi V : neubi SN^U: necubi T: neu M2 2 suorum Stephanus (cf. 37.6): suo co: summo Hotman 3 Attius secl.Meusel 34 1 at Chacon: aut co 3 admissis Faerno : amissis co 6 adigi Faerno : abici co 35 1 primus Paul: primum co Book II 141 spot and put their loyalty and courage to the test. 2 This caused a general change in attitudes and opinions, and Curio decided with the agreement of his advisers to proceed with a battle as soon as the chance arose; and next day he led them out and formed them up in battle order in the same position as they had occupied a few days before. 3 Nor for his part did Varus Attius hesitate to lead out his forces, so as not to miss any opportunity, if the chance arose, either of appealing to the soldiers or of fighting on favourable ground. 34. Between the two lines there was, as described above, a depression, not particularly deep but hard and difficult to climb. Both commanders were waiting to see if the opposing forces would try to cross it, so that battle could be joined where the ground was more favourable to themselves; 2 at the same time, on the left wing, all Attius' cavalry together with a number of interspersed light-armed werp observed as they were going down into the depression. 3 To meet them Curio sent his cavalry and two cohorts of Marrucini, whose first attack the enemy horse failed to withstand and fled at full gallop to their own lines; abandoned, the light- armed who had run forward along with them were surrounded and killed by our men. Varus' whole army was watching and saw the flight and death of their men. 4 Then Rebilus, one of Caesar's officers, whom Curio had brought with him from Sicily because he knew he was an extremely experienced soldier, said "You see the enemy is terrified, Curio; why do you hesitate to take your opportunity?" 5 Curio, saying only one thing to his soldiers, that they should remember what they had promised him the day before, ordered them to follow him and ran forward at their head. And in fact the depression was so difficult that the first men could not easily climb up out of it unless they were helped by their comrades; 6 but the morale of Attius' troops had been undermined by the panic and flight and slaughter of their men to such an extent that they had no thoughts of resistance and believed that already they were all surrounded by the cavalry. And so before a weapon could be hurled or our troops could come any nearer, Varus' whole formation tinned round and retreated to camp. 35. In this rout, Fabius, a Paelignian from the lowest ranks of Curio's army who was the leading pursuer of the retreating forces, shouted out Varus' name and kept asking for him, so that it seemed he was one of his soldiers and wanted to tell him something and speak to him. 2 When Varus, hearing his name constantly called, looked at him and stopped and asked who he was or what he wanted, Fabius lunged with his sword at Varus' unprotected shoulder and almost killed him; Varus escaped the 142 De Bello Civili scuto vitavit. Fabius a proximis militibus circumventus interficitur. 3 hac fugientium multitudine ac turba portae castrorum occupantur atque iter impeditur, pluresque in eo loco sine vulnere quam in proelio aut fuga intereunt, neque multum afuit quin etiam castris expellerentur, ac nonnulli protinus eodem cursu in oppidum contenderunt. 4 sed cum loci natura et munitio castrorum adiri tunc quod ad proelium egressi Curionis milites iis rebus indigebant quae ad oppugnationem castrorum erant usui. 5 itaque Curio exercitum in castra reducit suis omnibus praeter Fabium incolumibus, ex numero adversariorum circiter DC interfectis ac mille vulneratis; qui omnes discessu Curionis multique praeterea per simulationem vulnerum ex castris in oppidum propter timorem sese recipiunt. 6 qua re animadversa Varus et terrore exercitus cognito bucinatore in castris et paucis ad speciem tabernaculis relictis de tertia vigilia silentio exercitum in oppidum reducit. 36. Postero die Curio obsidere Uticam valloque circummunire instituit. erat in oppido multitudo insolens belli diuturnitate otii, Uticenses pro quibusdam Caesaris in se beneficiis illi amicissimi, conventus qui ex variis generibus constaret, terror ex superioribus proeliis magnus. 2 itaque de deditione omnes iam palam loquebantur et cum P. Attio agebant ne sua pertinacia omnium fortunas perturbari vellet. 3 haec cum agerentur, nuntii praemissi ab rege Iuba venerunt, qui ilium adesse cum magnis copiis dicerent et de custodia ac defensione urbis hortarentur. quae res eorum perterritos animos confirmavit. 37. Nuntiabantur haec eadem Curioni, sed aliquamdiu fides fieri non poterat; tantam habebat suarum rerum fiduciam. 2 iamque Caesaris in Hispania res secundae in Africam nuntiis ac litteris perferebantur. quibus omnibus rebus sublatus nihil contra se regem nisurum existimabat. 3 sed ubi certis auctoribus comperit minus V et XX milibus longe ab Utica eius copias abesse, relictis munitionibus sese in Castra Cornelia recepit. 4 hue frumentum comportare, castra munire, materiam conferre coepit statimque in Siciliam misit, uti duae legiones reliquusque equitatus ad se mitteretur. 5 castra erant ad bellum ducendum aptissima natura loci et munitione et maris propinquitate et aquae et salis copia, cuius magna vis iam ex proximis erat salinis eo congesta. 6 non materia multitudine arborum, non frumentum, cuius erant plenissimi agri, deficere poterat. itaque omnium

35 4 prohibebat Manutius : non poterat S in margr. om. co I turn add. Bucheler 36 1 si post conventus co : del Vascosan 37 5 loci et Jurin : et loci co Book II 143 danger by raising his shield to block the thrust. Fabius was surrounded and killed by the nearest soldiers. 3 The gates of the camp were choked and the way blocked by the chaotic mass of fugitives; more died there without a wound on them than were killed in the rout and fighting, and they were nearly driven out from the camp as well, some indeed heading directly for the town without stopping. 4 But at the time access was barred not only by the natural position and fortifications of the camp, but by the fact that Curio's soldiers, who had come out for a battle, were without the equipment needed to attack a camp. 5 And so Curio led his army back to camp without losing a man except Fabius, and having killed about six hundred of his opponents and wounded a thousand; on his departure all the latter, and many more who pretended to be wounded, were frightened enough to go back from the camp into the town. 6 Varus, noticing this and sensing the fear in his army, left a trumpeter and a few tents for appearances in his camp, and withdrew his army into the town iij silence during the third watch of the night. 36. On the following day Curio began to lay siege to Utica and surround it with a palisaded earthwork. In the town were the populace, whom long peace had left unaccustomed to war, the citizens of Utica, who were very well disposed to Caesar on account of certain favours he had done them, the association of Romans, which was composed of people of various sorts - and great fear as a result of the recent battles. 2 And so they all now openly talked of surrender, and approached Attius to dissuade him from ruining them all by his obstinacy. 3 While the matter was under discussion, messengers arrived who had been sent ahead by King Juba to say that he was at hand with a large force and to encourage them to guard and defend the city. This news restored their shattered morale. 37. The same news reached Curio, but for a while he did not believe it, so great was the confidence he had in what he was doing. 2 Already, too, reports and letters about Caesar's successes in Spain were being passed about. Encouraged by all these factors, he thought that the king would take no action against him. 3 But when he discovered on good authority that the king's forces were less than twenty-five miles from Utica, he left his fortifications and withdrew to Scipio's Camp. 4 Here he began to bring in grain, fortify a camp, and collect timber, and sent at once to Sicily for the two legions and the rest of his cavalry. 5 The camp was an ideal base for a campaign, with its natural position, its man-made defences, the sea close by, and plenty of water and salt, of which a huge quantity was already there, collected from the nearby salt-pans. 6 There could be no shortage of timber, as the trees were numerous, nor of grain, as the fields were full of it. 144 De Bello Civili suorum consensu Curio reliquas copias exspectare et bellum ducere parabat. 38. His constitutis rebus probatisque consiliis, ex perfugis quibusdam oppidanis audit Iubam revocatum finitimo bello et controversiis Leptitanorum restitisse in regno, Saburram, eius praefectum, cum mediocribus copiis missum Uticae appropinquare. 2 his auctoribus temere credens consilium commutat et proelio rem committere constituit. multum ad hanc rem probandam adiuvat adulescentia, magnitudo animi, superioris temporis proventus, fiducia rei bene gerendae. 3 his rebus impulsus equitatum omnem prima nocte ad castra hostium mittit ad flumen Bagradam; quibus praeerat Saburra, de quo ante erat auditum; sed rex cum omnibus copiis insequebatur et sex milium passuum intervallo ab Saburra consederat. 4equites missi nocte iter conficiunt imprudentisque atque inopinantis hostis aggrediuntur. Numidae enim quadam barbara consuetudine nullis ordinibus passim consederant. 5 hos oppressos somno et dispersos adorti magnum eorum numerum interficiunt; multi perterriti profugiunt. quo facto ad Curionem equites revertuntur captivosque ad eum reducunt. 39. Curio cum omnibus copiis quarta vigilia exierat cohortibus V castris praesidio relictis. Progressus milia passuum VI equites convenit, rem gestam cognovit; ex captivis quaerit quis castris ad Bagradam praesit; respondent Saburram. 2reliqua studio itineris conficiendi quaerere praetermittit, proximaque respiciens signa: "Videtisne," inquit, "mihtes, captivorum orationem cum perfugis convenire? abesse regem, exiguas esse copias missas, quae paucis equitibus pares esse non potuerint? 3 proinde ad praedam, ad gloriam properate, ut iam de praemiis vestris et de referenda gratia cogitare incipiamus." 4 erant per se magna, quae gesserant equites, praesertim cum eorum exiguus numerus cum tanta multitudine Numidarum conferretur. haec tamen ab ipsis inflatius commemorabantur, ut de suis homines laudibus libenter praedicant. 5 multa praeterea spolia praeferebantur, capti homines equitesque producebantur, ut quicquid intercederet temporis, hoc omne victoriam morari videretur. 6 ita spei Curionis militum studia non deerant. equites sequi iubet sese iterque accelerat, ut quam maxime ex fuga perterritos adoriri posset, at illi itinere totius noctis confecti subsequi non poterant atque alii alio loco resistebant. ne haec quidem res Curionem ad spem morabatur.

38 2 animi superioris ed. pr.: superioris animi co Book II 145 And so with the agreement of all his staff Curio prepared to wait for the rest of his forces and prolong the campaign. 38. When things had been thus organised, and his plans were agreed, he was told by some deserters from the town that Juba had been called back by a border invasion and some trouble to do with the inhabitants of Leptis and had stayed behind in his kingdom, while Saburra, his general, had been sent on with a modest force and was approaching Utica. 2 Rashly believing this source of information, he changed his plan and decided to proceed by giving battle. In thinking this the correct course, he was much affected by his youth, his nobility of spirit, his previous successes, and his self- confidence. 3 Under the influence of these factors, he sent off all his cavalry as night fell to the enemy camp at the River Bagradas, where Saburra, about whom he had previously heard, was in command; but the king with all his forces was following behind and had stopped six miles away. 4 The cavalry sent completed their journey while it was still dark and attacked the enemy off guard and unawares. For the Numidians had camped indiscriminately, in no sort of formation, as seems to be the habit of foreign peoples. 5 The cavalry swept in on them as they lay fast asleep in scattered groups; a large number were killed and many fled in panic. After this the cavalry returned to Curio, bringing him the prisoners. 39. Curio had left camp before dawn with all his forces, leaving five cohorts behind on guard. After six miles he met the cavalry and learnt what they had done; he asked the prisoners who was in command of the camp at the Bagradas, and they replied Saburra. 2 Eager to reach his objective, he omitted to enquire about the rest of the facts, and turning his gaze to the units nearest to him said "You see, men, that the prisoners1 story agrees with the deserters? That the king is not present, and that a weak force was sent which could not stand up to a few cavalry? 3 Hurry on then to booty and to glory, so that we may now start to think about rewarding you and showing you our gratitude." 4 The achievement of the cavalry was in fact great, particularly when their small numbers were compared with the great mass of Numidians. But it was exaggerated in their account of it, men always being willing to speak up in their own praise. 5 In addition, many items of loot were shown round, and captured men and horses were produced, so that any time lost seemed only to be putting off the moment of victory. 6 Thus Curio's hopes were supported by the enthusiasm of his men. He ordered the cavalry to follow and speeded up his march so that he could fall on the enemy when they were at their most panic-stricken as a result of the rout. But the cavalry, exhausted by travelling all night, were unable to keep up and stopped one after another. Not even this fact moderated Curio's optimism. 146 De Bello Civili 40. Iuba certior factus a Saburra de nocturno proelio n milia Hispanorum et Gallorum equitum, quos suae custodiae causa circum se habere consuerat, et peditum earn partem cui maxime confidebat, Saburrae summittit; ipse cum reliquis copiis elephantisque LX lentius subsequitur. 2 suspicatus praemissis equitibus ipsum adfore Curionem Saburra copias equitum peditumque instruit atque his imperat ut simulatione timoris paulatim cedant ac pedem referant; sese, cum opus esset, signum proelii daturum et, quod rem postulare cognovisset, imperaturum. 3 Curio ad superiorem spem addita praesentis temporis opinione hostes fugere arbitrates copias ex locis superioribus in campum deducit. 41. Quibus ex locis cum longius esset progressus, confecto iam labore exercitu XVI milium spatio constitit. 2 dat suis signum Saburra, aciem constituit et circumire ordines atque hortari incipit; sed peditatu dumtaxat procul ad speciem utitur, equites in aciem immittit. 3 non deest negotio Curio suosque hortatur ut spem omnem in virtute reponant. ne militibus quidem, ut defessis, neque equitibus, ut paucis et labore confectis, studium ad pugnandum virtusque deerat; sed hi erant numero CC, reliqui in itinere substiterant. 4 hi quamcumque in partem impetum fecerant, hostes loco cedere cogebant, sed neque longius fugientes prosequi nec vehementius equos incitare poterant. 5 at equitatus hostium ab utroque cornu circumire aciem nostram et aversos proterere incipit. 6 cum cohortes ex acie procucurrissent, Numidae integri celeritate impetum nostrorum effugiebant, rursusque ad ordines suos se recipientes circumibant et ab acie excludebant. sic neque in loco manere ordinesque servare neque procurrere et casum subire tutum videbatur. 7 hostium copiae summissis ab rege auxiliis crebro augebantur; nostros vires lassitudine deficiebant, simul ii qui vulnera acceperant neque acie excedere neque in locum tutum referri poterant, quod tota acies equitatu hostium circumdata tenebatur. 8 hi de sua salute desperantes, ut extremo vitae tempore homines facere consuerunt, aut suam mortem miserabantur aut parentes suos commendabant, si quos ex eo periculo Fortuna servare potuisset. plena erant omnia timoris et luctus. 42. Curio ubi perterritis omnibus neque cohortationes suas neque preces audiri intellegit, unam ut in miseris rebus spem reliquam salutis esse

41 1 XVI ©: Xn Stojfel Book II 147 40. Juba, being informed by Saburra of the night battle, sent forward to him two thousand Spanish and Gallic cavalry, whom it was his practice to have with him as a bodyguard, and the most reliable part of his infantry; he himself followed behind more slowly with the rest of his army and sixty elephants. 2 Suspecting from his cavalry patrols that Curio himself was in the vicinity, Saburra drew up his cavalry and infantry in formation and told them to give way gradually, pretending to be afraid, and retreat; he himself would give the signal to engage when it was necessary, and would give them such orders as he saw were demanded by the circumstances. 3 Curio's previous optimism was reinforced by his view of the present situation, and thinking that the enemy were turning tail he led his troops down from higher ground on to the level. 41. When he had gone some distance from this position, he halted his exhausted army which had now marched sixteeq miles. 2 Saburra gave the signal to his men, formed them into battle order, and began to go round the ranks and encourage them; but he used his infantry only in the rear, for appearances' sake, and put the cavalry into the front line. 3 Curio did not shirk his task, and encouraged his men to regard bravery as their only hope. Nor indeed did either the infantry, though tired out, or the cavalry, though few and exhausted by their efforts, lack enthusiasm or courage for the fight; but the latter numbered only two hundred, the remainder having stopped along the way. 4 Wherever they attacked, they forced the enemy to give ground, but they could neither pursue fugitives any distance nor spur their animals to additional speed. 5 But the enemy cavalry began to go round to the rear of our line and pick off men whom they took from behind. 6 Whenever cohorts ran forward from the line, the Numidians were fresh enough to escape the attack by a quick retreat, and then when our men were reforming into their ranks they surrounded them and prevented them rejoining the line. Thus it appeared safe neither to stay in the same place and keep formation, nor to run forward and risk the outcome. 7 The enemy forces were continually augmented by reinforcements sent up by the king; tiredness sapped the strength of our troops, and at the same time those who had been wounded could neither drop out of the line nor be carried to any safe spot, because the whole line was gripped in the encirclement carried out by the enemy cavalry. 8 These men, despairing of salvation, behaved as men do in the last moments of their lives, either bewailing their own deaths or commending their parents to anyone whom good fortune might be able to save from this danger. Fear and grief were everywhere. 42. When Curio realised that in the general panic neither his exhortations nor his pleas were being heard, he considered that the situation was so desperate that the only hope was for them all to take up a position on the 148 De Bello Civili arbitrates proximos colles capere universos atque eo signa inferri iubet. hos quoque praeoccupat missus a Saburra equitatus. 2 turn vero ad summam desperationem nostri perveniunt et partim fugientes ab equitatu interficiuntur, partim integri procumbunt. 3hortatur Curionem Cn. Domitius, praefectus equitum, cum paucis equitibus circumsistens, ut fuga salutem petat atque in castra contendat, et se ab eo non discessurum pollicetur. 4 at Curio numquam se amisso exercitu, quern a Caesare fidei commissiun acceperit, in eius conspectum reversurum confirmat atque ita proelians interficitur. 5 equites ex proelio perpauci se recipiunt; sed ii, quos ad novissimum agmen equorum reficiendorum causa substitisse demonstratum est, fuga totius exercitus procul animadversa, sese incoliunes in castra conferunt. milites ad unum omnes interficiuntur. 43. His rebus cognitis Marcius Rufus quaestor in castris relictus a Curione cohortatur suos ne animo deficiant. illi orant atque obsecrant ut in Siciliam navibus reportentur. pollicetur magistrisque imperat navium ut primo vespere omnes scaphas ad litus appulsas habeant. 2 sed tantus fuit omnium terror, ut alii adesse copias Iubae dicerent, alii cum legionibus instare Varum iamque se pulverem venientium ceraere, quanun rerum nihil omnino acciderat, alii classem hostium celeriter advolaturam suspicarentur. itaque perterritis omnibus sibi quisque consulebat. 3 qui in classe erant, proficisci properabant. horum fuga navium onerariarum magistros incitabat; pauci lenunculi ad officiiun imperiumque conveniebant. 4 sed tanta erat completis litoribus contentio qui potissimum ex magno numero conscenderent, ut multitudine atque onere nonnulli deprimerentur, reliqui hoc timore propius adire tardarentur. 44. Quibus rebus accidit ut pauci milites patresque familiae, qui aut gratia aut misericordia valerent aut naves adnare possent, recepti in Siciliam incolumes pervenirent. reliquae copiae missis ad Varum noctu legatorum numero centurionibus sese ei dediderunt. 2 quorum cohortes militum postero die ante oppidum Iuba conspicatus, suam esse praedicans praedam, magnam partem eorum interfici iussit, paucos electos in regnum remisit, cum Varus suam fidem ab eo laedi quereretur neque resistere auderet. 3 ipse equo in oppidum vectus prosequentibus compluribus senatoribus, quo in numero erat Ser. Sulpicius et Licinius Damasippus, quae fieri vellet Uticae constituit atque imperavit, diebusque post paucis se in regnum cum omnibus copiis recepit.

44 3 paucis diebus post Damasippum add. co, del. Jurin I diebusque M2: diebus quae M!U : diebus aeque V : diebus aequae ST Book II 149 adjoining high ground, and he ordered the standards to proceed in that direction. But Saburra had already seized this too by sending some cavalry. 2 Then indeed our men became completely despairing; some took to flight and were cut down by the cavalry, others collapsed although unwounded. 3Gnaeus Domitius, Curio's cavalry commander who was guarding him with a few troopers, advised him to save himself by flight and make all speed back to the camp, and promised that he would stay with him. 4 But Curio swore that after losing die army which Caesar had given him on trust he would never let Caesar see him again, and so died fighting. 5 Of the cavalry a handful extricated themselves from the battle; but those who, as mentioned above, had halted at the rear to rest their horses, saw from a distance the total rout of the army and got themselves safely back to camp. The infantry were killed to a man. 43. When he learnt the news quaestor Marcius Rufus, who had been left in the camp, encouraged his men not to lose heart. They begged and pleaded to be taken back to Sicily in the ships. He promised to do so and instructed the captains of the ships to see that all their small boats were at the beach in the early evening. 2 But they were all so terrified that some said Juba's forces were near, others that Varus was on them with his legions and they could already see the cloud of dust as they came, none of which things had in fact happened, and yet others suspected that the enemy fleet would swiftly descend on them. And so in the general panic every man looked after himself. 3 Those aboard the warships hurried to start out. Their flight provoked the captains of the merchantmen, and few ship's tenders gathered for their designated task. 4 But on the packed beaches the struggle to settle who from this large number of men should embark was so fierce that some of the boats sank from weight of numbers and the rest were reluctant to approach because they feared the same fate. 44. For these reasons it came about that only a few soldiers and heads of families, being those who could make a claim on the good will or pity of others, or could swim to the ships, were taken on board and reached Sicily safely. The troops who were left sent some centurions at night to Varus as their representatives and surrendered to him. 2 On the following day Juba, seeing the cohorts of these soldiers in front of the town, declared that they were his spoil and gave orders for the greater part of them to be put to death; he picked out a few and sent them back to his kingdom, while Varus complained that his word of honour had been violated by the king, but did not dare to resist. 3 Juba himself rode into the city with several senators in train, amongst them Servius Sulpicius and Licinius Damasippus, decided what he wanted to do with Utica and gave his orders, and a few days later withdrew with his entire army to his own kingdom. 151

COMMENTARY

Within the commentary, references in the form 26.2 are to chapter and subsection of the current book of the Civil War; in the form II.44.2 to chapter and subsection of a different book. Abbreviations for ancient authors generally follow those of the Oxford Latin Dictionary, Lewis and Short's Latin Dictionary, and Liddell and Scott's Greek-English Lexicon. Modern authors are referred to by plain surname, with year if necessary, and listed in the bibliography which follows the Introduction. For other abbreviations, see the list at the end of the bibliography. 153

COMMENTARY

BOOK I

1-33 The capture of Italy, Sicily and Sardinia 1-6 Caesar begins with the political moves made against him, and the tribunes who supported him, in the first days of January. The aim is to show his chief enemies as men who are unwilling to negotiate, contemptuous of the constitution, and actuated by discreditable personal motives. The climax of this first section is the flight of the two tribunes from Rome on January 7th, but Caesar rounds it off with an account of the decisions made by the senate after they had gone, when his enemies had a free hand to make the dispositions they wished. In spite of his superficially dispassionate tone, the presentation here is more consistently subjective and biased against his opponents than anywhere else in the work. 1 1 ...when Caesar's letter was delivered to the consuls: could Caesar have plunged thus, without introduction or explanation, into his narrative? Modem editorial consensus (Fabre, Klotz, Oppermann, Trillitzsch) holds so, but there are strong reasons for believing that at least several sentences have been lost from the start of the book: (a) the narrative at the end of Bellum Gallicum 8 fails to join up properly with the beginning we have here, although Hirtius wrote it specifically to fill the gap between Caesar's two works {B.G. 8 praef); (b) the contents of Caesar's letter were very important and however hastily Caesar may have written the BC it is almost inconceivable that he did not spell out the offer he was making: that either he should be allowed to retain his command, or that all holders of commands should lay them down (cf. 9.3n.); (c)the principles of clear exposition inculcated by ancient education, nicely exemplified by Caesar's 154 Book I famous introduction to his own Gallic War, make it improbable that Caesar, for all his directness, began quite so abruptly. The letter was in fact brought by C. Curio (Appian B.C. 2.32,127; Dio 41.1.1), and delivered to the consuls (L. Cornelius Lentulus and C. Claudius Marcellus) in the senate-house so that they could not suppress it. Fabius' name, present in all our MSS, is an ignorant addition made when the beginning of the book had already been lost. C. before Caesaris is also intrusive, being against his practice except when quoting from the record as at 13.1; note the bald Caesari when he first mentions his own name in the BG, at 1.7.1. (For the general situation at the end of 50 B.C. see Introduction sec. II). the strenuous efforts of the tribunes: (I so translate tribuni plebis, 'tribunes of the people', throughout). These will have been the pro- Caesarian tribunes Mark Antony and Q. Cassius (see 2.7). On the question of the motion to be debated, although the tribunes possessed (and used) the right of putting business to the senate, and could therefore have put Caesar's proposals themselves, they enjoyed a low priority and had to wait for the debate initiated by the consuls to reach its end. 2 a general debate on public affairs: in the handbook which Varro wrote to guide Pompey on senatorial procedure (Gellius NA. 14.7.9) he specified that debate could be either infinite de republica ('about public affairs, without restriction') or de singulis rebus finite ('restricted to individual topics'). In a crisis, and on the first day of the new consuls' term of office, die former was clearly appropriate: Cicero's fifth Philippic, delivered on Jan. 1st 43 B.C., was made de re publico (Phil. 5.34, cf. 6.1). Hotman's correction of the MSS' in civitate to infinite must be right. Consul Lucius Lentulus: L. Cornelius Lentulus Cms, of prominent noble family, was one of the hard-line opponents of Caesar. Thanks to the understanding reached by Pompey and Caesar at Luca in 56 he had been kept out of the consulship for 55, and was fortunate to have been elected for 49. His remarks refer to the understandable reluctance hitherto of the moderate majority of the senate to commit themselves to armed struggle with Caesar without exploring all possibilities for an agreement. Presumably his odd and apparently inconsistent reference to his own ability to 'fall back on Caesar's favour and friendship' means that he too, like Curio and Caelius Rufus, might change sides for a price: his debts were large (4.2) and his cupidity patent (Cic. Att. 11.6.6). 4 Scipio: Q. Caecilius Metellus Pius Scipio Nasica had become Pompey's consular colleague and also his father-in-law in 52, after Pompey had turned down Caesar's proposal that he should marry Caesar's great-niece Octavia (sister of the future emperor Augustus). Commentary 155 2 1 launched from Pompey's very lips: the metaphor, entirely appropriate in the context, is that of a weapon being hurled; orationem mittere is not used as an expression by L,ivy, Cicero, Sallust, or Caesar (this passage excepted), whereas Caesar frequently uses mittere with telum, pila, or the like (e.g asseres missi, EL2.2). since the senate was meeting in the city and Pompey was nearby: 'in the city' signifies 'within the pomoerium\ the sacred boundary of the city. Caesar needs to mention this fact because the senate was not infrequently convened outside the pomoerium in order to allow holders of proconsular imperium like Pompey, who could not enter the city unless they relinquished it, to express their views in person (6.1, Cic. Fam. 8.4.4). The logic of the clause is difficult because Caesar is making clear that a) Pompey was not present, but b) Scipio's speech was a true representation of his views because in a rather different sense he was present (that is, close by in his house in the suburbs, cf. 3.1). The correction to aberat is tempting, but unnecessary and logically inferior, because it produces no explanation of the fact it purports to explain. 2 Marcus Marcellus: M. Claudius Marcellus, consul in 51 and brother of Gaius, Lentulus' colleague. Both followed Pompey in the war, while their cousin C. Marcellus, who as consul had placed the sword in Pompey's hand at the end of 50 (see Introduction sec. II), remained neutral, mindful perhaps of his marriage to Caesar's great-niece Octavia. 3 Marcus Calidius, who gave it as his opinion that Pompey should leave for his provinces: M. Calidius, a leading orator of the day, had been praetor in 57 and was one of those who, along with Cicero and Cato, attempted to save Milo from conviction for the murder of Clodius in 52. Pompey's provinces were the two Spains, Nearer and Further, which he had been appointed to govern by the Lex Trebonia of 55, but had not since visited. He had exercised his authority in absentia through his legati (deputies, see 38.1) while he himself remained in the neighbourhood of Rome, overseeing the com supply to the capital and even contriving to be appointed to a constitutionally unprecedented sole consulship after Clodius' murder. In the Latin, note the reflexive suas referring obviously not to the speaker, Calidius (who had no provinces), but to the nearer subject, Pompey. On the other hand, in the next part of Calidius' remarks, explaining Caesar's fears, Caesar uses the more correct ab eo and ad eius periculum to refer to himself because there would have been far greater scope for misunderstanding of a similar reflexive, if he had chosen to employ it: Calidius, Pompey, and himself were all possible referents, the two legions that had been taken from him: the Parthians had defeated Crassus at Carrhae in the desert east of Syria in 53 B.C. and continued to menace that province. To meet this threat the senate had 156 Book I agreed in the summer of 50 to withdraw one legion each from Caesar and Pompey and send them to Syria. Pompey surrendered a legion which he had previously lent to Caesar, so that in effect Caesar's army was reduced by two legions (Hirt BG 8.54). Both these (I and XV) came to Italy en route for the East, but were delayed there by Pompey as the likelihood of armed struggle with Caesar increased. Marcus Rufus: M. Caelius Rufus was the talented and unstable young reprobate so brilliantly defended by Cicero in 56 B.C. He became tribune in 52, aedile in 50, and was by this time such a prominent supporter of Caesar that he accompanied Q. Cassius and Antony on their flight from Rome a few days after this debate. 6 the majority ...voted unwillingly and under duress: a clearly subjective interpretation by Caesar of the vote against him. before a certain date: Mommsen argued from 9.2 that this was July 1st, noting that Velleius (2.49.4) says that the senate voted that Caesar should 'return as a private citizen to Rome and entrust himself as a consular candidate to the votes of the Roman people'; but the text is uncertain and the inference not inevitable. See further Introduction sec. II. he would be judged to be committing an act hostile to the state: this form of words was used as a warning to obstructive or revolutionary individuals not to persist in a course of action (cf. Cic QF. 2.3.3, where a serious riot on the previous day was declared to have been 'against the state'). Marcus Antonius and Quintus Cassius: these were the men who had taken over from Curio the role of blocking, by their tribunician veto, any moves in the senate to oust Caesar fromhi s command before the legal date (whatever that was). Quintus Cassius is not to be confused with his fellow- tribune Gaius Cassius, who was at this time a Pompeian and later murdered Caesar. (The singular verb with the plural subject seems odd, but was in fact the standard form of senatorial record for a multiple veto, cf. Cic. Fam. 8.8.6,7,8. The first intercessor is the important one, the others subordinate.) This veto was immediately put to the senate: tribunes were normally comparatively junior senators, and it was possible for the consuls to put pressure on them to withdraw a veto by having the senate consider the justification for it, and discovering how much (or how little) support there was for it. It is notable how the three consecutive short sentences, each beginning with a verb (contrary to ordinary Latin word-order) raise the level of excitement of the narrative. 3 2 Pompey's previous armies: these were the armies which Pompey had commanded in Spain (dismissed in 70) and in the East against Mithridates Commentary 157 (dismissed in 62). Although the armies of the late Republic were not in theory professional, in fact men served for long periods in the hope of reward through booty or on discharge, and permanent and possibly lucrative soldiering was available to the Roman equivalents of senior N.COs. and middle-ranking officers. many... from the two legions which Caesar had handed over: these legions (2.3n.) were currendy in Apulia (14.3), but perhaps some detachments were stationed rather nearer to Rome. 3 even the Comitium itself: this was the original assembly place of the people in the mid-republican period, a circular area adjoining the senate- house in the Forum. With the growth of Rome in the late Republic it became too small to serve any longer for electoral or legislative assemblies, but public meetings (contiones) could still be held there (see Coarelli). The point of Caesar's remark seems to be that armed soldiers, whose rightful place was outside the pomoerium (2. In.) had invaded the very heart of civil life. 5 frightened the less resolute and emboldened the hesitant: the less resolute' are those against war, 'the hesitant' Pompey's followers. 6 censor Lucius Piso, likewise praetor Lucius Roscius: Piso was Caesar's father-in-law, consul in 58, censor in 50-49, and target of Cicero's celebrated invective in Pisonem.; L. Roscius Fabatus had previously served in Gaul with Caesar, either as quaestor or legate. 7 a delegation: that is, an official deputation as opposed to the informal efforts of Piso and Roscius (on whom see 8.4n. and von Fritz 1941). 4 1 Cato: M. Porcius Cato, famous for his rectitude and austerity, was one of Caesar's most determined opponents. He stood for the consulship of 52 but was defeated. The accounts of Dio (40.58) and Plutarch (Cato 49-50) ascribe this to his refusal to court popularity with the voters, but in view of what Caesar says here and the fact that one of the successful candidates, Ser. Sulpicius Rufus, was at least prepared to be fair to Caesar, one may assume that the activities of Caesar's supporters played an equally important part in his failure. 2 Lentulus was motivated: some support for Caesar's uncomplimentary view of his opponents' motives is given by Cicero, who says that the greed and bellicosity of 'certain men' on both sides had impeded his own attempts from 4th January to bring about a compromise (Fam. 16.11.2, written 12th January); cf. also Fam. 7.3.2, referring to the rapacity and indebtedness of many of the leading Pompeians. inducements offered by kings: the power of Rome was so great that kings on the fringes of her empire, principally but not exclusively in the east, in effect required her approval to be secure on their thrones against pretenders 158 Book I and internal upheavals. Powerful Romans, whose recommendations could be decisive, could expect to profit from this state of affairs, a second Sulla: L. Cornelius Sulla had been the victor of a much more biUer civil war in 88-82 B.C. On its conclusion he was elected dictator, and used his power to proscribe and exile hundreds of his former opponents, and to expel many peasants and more substantial landowners from their land all over Italy to provide settlements for the soldiers without whose misguided loyalty he could have achieved nothing. 3 marriage-tie: see 1.4n. 4 joint enemies...at the time of their family connection: in April 59 B.C., when the coalition of Pompey, Crassus, and Caesar known as the 'first triumvirate' had been formed, the pact had been sealed by Pompey's sudden marriage to Caesar's daughter Julia (Cic. Att. 2.17.1). Before this Pompey and Caesar had been in rival camps, and thus many of Pompey's existing enemies would not have been hostile to Caesar. 5 scandal of the two legions: see 2.3n. 5 1 in haste and confusion: turbate is found nowhere else in classical Latin and may belong to the vocabulary of popular speech (Richter 188). their fundamental rights by veto, which Lucius Sulla left untouched: the tribunate had developed in the fifth century as a revolutionary magistracy to represent and protect the commons in their struggle for political rights against an oppressive aristocracy. The tribunes' power was ultimately founded on their sacrosanct inviolability, together with their right to forbid (veto = 1 forbid') any magistrate, except a dictator, to carry out an action. Their legislative and magisterial powers, though formidable, were secondary. When Sulla (see 4.2n.) reformed the constitution in 81-80 B.C., he identified the tribunate as a major source of political instability and severely restricted the tribunes' powers of legislation and their ability to proceed to higher office (see 7.2n); but even he did not go so far as to interfere with the veto. (Certain Roman laws forbade tribunician veto of their machinery, e.g. C. Gracchus' law on the allocation of consular provinces; but this principle, obviously, is pre-Sullan. See Lintott). 2 the famous revolutionary tribunes of earlier times: Caesar appears to be referring most immediately to P. Sulpicius (tr. pi. 88 B.C.), who along with his colleague P. Antistius was declared a public enemy by Sulla (then consul) some time in the summer of that year, and less precisely to the brothers Tiberius (tr. pi. 133) and Gaius (tr. pi. 123, 122) Sempronius Gracchus, the former killed during, the latter just after his period of office, and to L. Appuleius Saturninus (tr. pi. 103, 100, 99), lynched in the first few days of his third tribunate. 3 that last and final decree of the senate: this emergency decree, commonly known as the senatus consultum ultimum (abbreviated as s.c.u.), Commentary 159 in fact conferred no powers on the magistrates that they did not already possess, nor did it in any way suspend the constitution, as its vague wording (also given by Gcero in a paraphrased but essentially similar form, Fam. 16.11.2) shows. It was a signal fromth e senate that the state was in danger and that strong action was required, but it was no more than an encouragement to the magistrates to act resolutely. The powers which Sallust (Cat 29.3) says it conferred seem rather to stem from the declaration of a tumultus (military emergency in Italy) which could clearly be an appropriate action in certain circumstances, like the Catilinarian conspiracy itself, when the s.c.u. had already been passed (cf. Cic. Phil. 5.31,34). The s.c.u. was first used in the crisis which resulted in the death of C. Gracchus in 121, presumably because the dictatorship was felt to be obsolete. It is recorded on a number of occasions thereafter, which confirm Caesar's point that it had hitherto been passed only when there was the possibility of armed violence in, or against, the city by Roman citizens: Saturninus and Glaucia (100 B.C.), Sulla (83), Lepidus (77), Catiline (63), Metellus Nepos (62), and Clodius (52). Caesar's narrative implies that it was directed on this occasion against Antony and Cassius, but the real target must have been himself and the parallel, if any, was with Sulla in 83. The difference was that he was merely thought (but rightly) to be capable of taking up arms against the government, while Sulla had actually done so. (For a good brief discussion of the s.c.u. and its history see Gardner's translation, appx. II). men who were proposing laws: latorum, the reading of the MSS, is both defensible (see e.g. Qc. pro Sest. 77) and perfectly intelligible in the context. The means by which revolutionary tribunes achieved their aims was precisely by putting laws to the popular assembly (comitia tribute) - we should speak of a 'reform programme' - and the violence engendered by a tribunate such as that of Saturninus or Sulpicius was directed above all at the manipulation of this assembly and its voting procedures. 4 the two comitial days: namely Jan. 3 and 4. The Roman calendar set aside certain days as 'comitial', i.e. days when electoral or legislative assemblies could be held. In the late republic the senate did not normally meet on such days, and was indeed debarred by law from meeting on certain of them (Cic. QF. 2.2.3; and see 6. In). decrees of the gravest and most intemperate character: Caesar presents the decrees as unjustified, as though he had a right to be sitting on the northern border of Italy with an army which people realised he was prepared to use to protect his personal position. Even a sympathiser like Caelius Rufus (2.3a), writing to Cicero in August of 50 B.C., already foresaw war and acknowledged the weakness of Caesar's legal position (Cic. Fam. 8.14.2-3). 160 Book I 5 the tribunes fled at once from Rome, and went ....to Ravenna: Cicero says unequivocally that Antony and Cassius were not violently expelled. Accompanied by Curio, who had brought Caesar's letter, and Caelius Rufus, Cicero's Mend and correspondent, they travelled by night (Cic. Fam. 8.17.1, 16.11.2; for a colourful version Plut. Caes. 31.2). Ravenna lay within Caesar's province of Cisalpine Gaul, where he habitually wintered during his years of command in Gaul, but conveniently (or ominously) near the border of Italy proper. his very modest demands: see 9.3a This cryptic allusion is unintelligible in the present state of the text, and surely confirms that the start of the book has been lost 6 1 following days: Jan 8th to Jan 15th, after which it was not permitted to hold a senate until February (Cic. Q.F. 2.2.3). Jan 7th and 8th were 'comitial' days (see 5.4a), but it seems that if necessary senate meetings could be held on such days (A. K. Michels The Calendar of the Roman Republic 43-45; Cic. Fam. 8.8.5). outside the city: that is, outside the sacred boundary of the city, to allow Pompey to attend (cf. 2.1.) Scipio: see 2.1. ten legions.... (2)..hostile to Caesar: neither of these 'facts' was true, as shortly emerges from the narrative, and at 30.5 Caesar puts into Cato's mouth an explicit condemnation of the way Pompey misled the senate. The figure of ten legions, if right, is to be made up of 6 Spanish legions (85.6, the seventh there mentioned being the one raised by Varro after the outbreak of war, cf. EL20.4 and Cic. Fam. 16.12.4), the 2 taken from Caesar, which were in winter quarters at Capua (Hirt. BG 8.54.1-3, App. B.C. 2.30), an under-strength one freshly conscripted by Domitius (App. B.C. 2.32), and possibly the one which was left to Pompey, after he had lent the other to Caesar, of the two he was permitted to raise in 52 (App. B.C. 2.24; Dio 40.50.1; cf. Cic. Fam. 8.4.4, mentioning an army at Ariminum). The ninth and tenth of this collection, being recently raised, were of doubtful value, and Cicero (Att. 7.13.2, dated 23 January 49) declares that the only hope against Caesar lies in the two taken back from Caesar. It is clear from m.4.1-2 that Pompey had no legions east of the Adriatic. As to the loyalty of Caesar's soldiers, Pompey was misled by his officers, as he soon found out (App. B.C. 2.30, Cic. Att. 8.12A.3,12C.2). 3 Faustus Sulla with all speed: Manutius' emendation of propere to pro praetore seems unnecessary, though accepted by all recent editors. Faustus did not need imperium to go as an ambassador to the independent kingdom of Mauretania to solicit support, whereas speed was important: Bocchus and Bogud, the kings of Mauretania, were later given recognition by Caesar on account of their hostility to their neighbour Juba, who supported Pompey Commentary 161 (Dio 41.42.7). On other grounds too Faustus (although he was Sulla's son and Pompey's son-in-law) is unlikely to have been given at this point the propraetorian status he acquired in Greece later in the year (ILS 8778), since his initial appointment in Italy was as proquaestor (Cic. Att. 9.1.4) nor had he yet held the praetorship. Juba: king of Numidia, he possessed an effective army, as the sequel showed (IL36.3 - 44). He enjoyed inherited ties with Pompey, and had once suffered personal violence at the hands of Caesar (Suet. DJ. 71). Furthermore Curio, as tribune, had attempted to turn his kingdom into a Roman province (IL25.3-4 and n.). 4 Marcellus: the consul, more moderate than his colleague, may have considered it premature to make an official ally of a man so obviously hostile to Caesar. Philippus: son of L. Marcius Philippus (consul in 56 B.C.) and therefore stepbrother to the future Augustus, Caesar's great-nephew. This did not stop him resisting Caesar three months later (33.3n.). One would expect to find his praenomen L. in the text (see 12.In.), but perhaps the influence of the surrounding bare names caused Caesar to omit it. 5 duly recorded: these decisions thus acquired legal validity. Provinces...to men not holding office: until Pompey's law of 52 B.C. (lex Pompeia de provinciis), which passed into law a senatorial decree of 53 (Dio 40.46.2), the practice had been for magistrates with imperium (consuls and praetors) to go to provinces either during or immediately after their year of elected office. The powers with which they had been formally invested on election were extended for as long as was necessary by a simple decree of the senate. (For the question of whether a lex curiam had normally been passed, and what powers were conferred by it, see Cic. leg.agr. 2.30, Staveley, and Shackleton-Bailey on Cic. Fam. 1.9.25; on the nature of a lex curiata see the following n.). The Lex Pompeia, by imposing an interval of five years between urban magistracy and provincial promagistracy, caused these powers to lapse. Caesar is therefore technically correct in representing the men who were now appointed to these provinces by senatorial decree as 'not holding office', and by implication castigating the Pompeians for flouting constitutional usage. His point, however, is extremely partisan, and has much to do with the vexed question of the appointment of a successor to himself in Gaul. It is not clear whether he intends to imply that the Lex Pompeia itself was unconstitutional, though starting with himself (85.9) many have seen it as a device whereby he could be replaced in Gaul somewhat earlier than would otherwise have been the case (see Introduction sec. II). It is not*clear whether Domitius, who was to have Transalpine Gaul (Cic. Fam. 16.12.3) and had been consul in 54, was a legal appointee under it; but there can be no doubt that Scipio, consul only in 52, was not. On the other hand the two 162 Book I men passed over, L. Philippus (see n. on 4 above) and L. Aurelius Cotta (cos. 65) had both held their consulships more than 5 years previously and were thus legally qualified for appointment, although it is not apparent whether it was by their own wish or by intrigue that their names were not put into the ballot Cotta, like Philippus, was related to Caesar, whose mother was an Amelia. (On the Lex Pompeia, see Marshall; the mechanism whereby governors were to be appointed after its passing is seen functioning in the senatorial decree of 29 Sept. 51 quoted by Caelius in Cic. Fam. 8.8.8). 6 as had happened in previous years: these years are 51 and 50 B.C. when it had become technically necessary for governors appointed under the terms of the Lex Pompeia to have imperium conferred on them de novo rather than by extension. Whereas the latter could be done by senatorial decree, conferment on persons not currently holding elected office could only be carried out by the people (normally by using the formality of a lex curiata, passed in a vestigial assembly in which the Roman people were represented by thirty lictors; see Staveley). they went out from the city in military dress: military dress was in fact normal when a promagistrate made his official departure for his province (cf. Cic. II in Verr. 5.34). Caelius ap. Cic. Fam. 8.10.2 seems to show that it was normal for the senate, not the people, to vote that the consuls should go out in military dress. 7 : since the consuls often left Rome, there is only one way of taking the transmitted text so that it makes any kind of sense: 'it had never previously happened that the consuls had left Rome while at the same time men holding no elected office {privati) had lictors...'; but even this is illogical, because it had never been the practice for privati to have lictors at all and so it made no difference whether the consuls were in Rome or not Some words have dropped out, and the conjecture of la Penna adopted here is supported by Plutarch Pomp. 61.4: The consuls fled the city without even making the sacrifices usual when departing for war1 (for the equation sacrifice = taking the auspices, cf. Cic. de div. 1.28). Caesar seems here to anticipate the panic of January 18th-19th described at 14 below, so that the whole chapter is to be seen as a rapid and damning sketch of the cumulative illegalities of his opponents, leading into the justification in the next chapter of his own outrageous illegality.

7-1P On receipt of the news of the tribunes'flight, Caesar evidently felt he had an adequate pretext to put into action his plan of invading Italy. He justifies this to his soldiers (and his readers) before putting himself outside the law by marching on Ariminum (the famous crossing of the Rubicon not being mentioned). There Commentary 163 follows an account of a further attempt at reaching a negotiated settlement through the good offices of the praetor Roscius and his own distant relative Lucius Caesar. 7 1 When he learnt this news: Caesar is still at Ravenna. He has been accused of deliberate falsehood on this point, since other versions of the outbreak of war say he delivered this justificatory speech at Ariminum after he had met the tribunes there (Suet DJ. 33, Dio 41.4.1). However, the narratives of Appian {B.C. 2.35) and Plutarch (Caes. 32), which like Suetonius derive from the first-hand account of Pollio, who was then serving with Caesar, say nothing of a speech either at Ravenna or at Ariminum. Caesar's version notoriously fails to mention the Rubicon, which marked the boundary of his province, and gives no details of the ruse by which he occupied Ariminum, but it does not contradict Pollio. It is therefore likely that Pollio's account was accurate: Caesar did send a picked force forward with concealed weapons to enter and seize Ariminum; he did pretend not to be doing so; and when he followed in haste and secrecy at night he did hesitate at the Rubicon in full awareness of what he was doing. But he must have given some explanation or justification of his decision to move, if only to the officers of the force he sent ahead to Ariminum; and it is almost inconceivable that when the rest of the Thirteenth legion caught up with him there, and the fleeing tribunes Antony and Cassius had arrived from Rome, he did not make some sort of address to his men. Caesar, then, is here employing a Thucydidean technique: this speech spells out, at the appropriate logical point, the considerations which actuated him to take the actions he did A far more serious criticism of Caesar is that it appears from his narrative that he made no military move until the senate had taken the measures detailed in ch. 6 above. He represents himself as responding to a threat, whereas the truth was that he himself, with his legions, constituted the threat. There can be no doubt, in fact, that he acted immediately the events of ch. 5 were reported to him (see Table of Dates). Caesar's presentation is undoubtedly tendentious. It masks the speed of his reaction, and presents his enemies as having gone further than they actually had when he decided to take the offensive. On the other hand, the measures of ch. 6 were not the result of what he now did. They followed inexorably from the determination of his enemies to crush him, and logically form a continuous whole with what precedes. The chronological displacement aids the clarity of the analysis and does not fundamentally distort the truth as Caesar saw it. detached Pompey: see Introduction sec. I. 2 the tribunician veto: Sulla in 81-80 had removed from the tribunes the rights of bringing before the people legislation not previously approved by the senate, and of proceeding to higher political office; he thus emasculated 164 Book I the tribunate politically while still leaving in being its ancient protective role. The lost rights were partially restored during the 70s, and fully restored during the first consulship of Pompey and Crassus in 70. In the MSS the words 'which had been restored by force some years before' follow 'veto', but to speak of the process as violent is a palpable exaggeration (see Cic. 1 in Verr. 44-45; Sherwin-White) and in any case the remark has no bearing on the veto, which had never been suppressed, as Caesar himself immediately goes on to say. I therefore follow Nipperdey in treating these words as an inaccurate marginal comment mistakenly copied into the text. 4 Pompey, who was thought to have restored...: the reference is to Pompey's support for the restoration of all the tribunes' rights in 70 B.C. (see preceding n.). 5 the magistrates should take steps...: see 5.3 and note. when the people seceded: in this context, Caesar can only be referring to the occupation of the Aventine by the Gracchans in 121 after the outbreak of violence and before the passing of the s.cu. If so, this casts some light on how Caesar and his contemporaries viewed the famous 'secessions of the plebs' which won them political concessions in the fifth and third centuries B. C. temples: Roman temples stood on podia which could be up to 4m. high. The temple of Castor in the forum is attested as a key point in riots (Plut. CatoMin. 27-28). 6 the fates of Saturninus and die Gracchi: L. Appuleius Saturninus, against whose political violence the s.cu. was passed in December 100, was stoned to death by a mob who tore the tiles off the roof of the senate house, where he and his followers had been temporarily placed for safe custody after capture. Ti. Gracchus died in a riot which broke out at an assembly held near the end of his tribunate in 133; there had of course been no s.cu. (first used against his brother Gaius), but the circumstances were, on a smaller scale, not unlike those in which Gaius had recourse to arms. C. Gracchus, after taking refuge with his supporters on the Aventine after a civil disturbance connected with an attempt to repeal his legislation in the early days of 121 B.C., fled from the successful assault of the consul Opimius and ordered a slave to kill him. 7 nine years: 58-50 B.C. This use of an ablative, whose normal function should be to indicate the time within which a thing happens, to qualify an action which goes on in practice all through that time is paralleled at 46.1 and 47.3, and marks the start of the process which led to the disappearance of the accusative of 'duration of time'. the whole of Gaul and Germany: Germania, here translated 'Germany', included some tribes which dwelt west of the Rhine and was a somewhat amorphous concept to Romans of Caesar's day; even so, it was an exaggeration on Caesar's part to say that it had been pacified. Commentary 165 8 the Thirteenth legion: this legion had been stationed on garrison duties in Cisalpine Gaul (Hirt. BG 8.54.3). For it to have been assembled at Ravenna on Jan. 10th or 11th, Caesar must have given his orders by the beginning of January at the latest. His opponents were therefore absolutely right to judge that he was already preparing to use force in support of his demands. Caesar attempts to hide this crucial fact by the insertion of ch. 6 between chh. 5 & 7, and by the phrase 'the beginning of the trouble', which is masterly: on the one hand tumultus ('trouble') is a vague word which could well describe the situation in which Caesar judged that his opponents would resort to force against him, as the preceding chapter is carefully placed to demonstrate that they did; while on the other it is a technical term for a military emergency (in Italy) in which it would indeed be the duty of a commander of troops to call them up. The fact that it was Caesar himself who created the emergency is concealed. 8 1 Having discovered the feelings of his men, he set out...for Arimimim: Caesar first pretends that he had no part in determining the feelings of his men, and then suppresses not only the actual crossing of the Rubicon, but also the fact that on this journey he had left his province and therefore stood now for the first time in armed defiance of the constitution. See 7. In. The crossing of the Rubicon took place on the night of 10/11 or 11/12 Jan.: it cannot be much earlier (unless Caesar did not even wait for the news of the passing of the s.cu. on Jan. 7th to reach him), nor much later, or else the fleeing tribunes, who left Rome incognito on the night of 7/8 Jan., would surely have journeyed on to Ravenna. the rest of the legions: in fact, only the Eighth and Twelfth. At the beginning of the winter Caesar had 4 legions under Trebonius in northern Gaul and 4 under Fabius amongst the Aedui in modem Burgundy (Hirt. BG 8.54.4). At some time, presumably in Nov. or Dec, he moved Fabius and 3 of his legions to the neighbourhood of Narbo in the south-west of Gaul (37.1) in order to foil any attempt on the part of Pompey's legates with their 7 legions in Spain to seize the Gallic province or move quickly to Italy; and it must be assumed that he withdrew Trebonius and his 4 legions southwards to fill the gap left by Fabius. Whether the Eighth and Twelfth were detached and brought nearer to Italy before receiving the orders alluded to here is not clear: Ottmer even makes a case for their presence in Cisalpine Gaul before the end of 50. All one can say is that they were not together when Caesar ordered them to Italy, since the Twelfth caught up with him in Picenum before he attacked Asculum about Feb. 8th (15.3), and the Eighth at Corfinium between Feb 16th and 18th (18.5). Given that legions were capable of marching over long distances and under favourable conditions a maximum of about 30 km. a day (they averaged 27 V3 between Corfinium and Brundisium), and that it was about 850 - 900 km. from 166 Book I Aquae Sextiae to Asculum by way of Placentia, then they would have taken about a month to cover this distance. It seems unlikely that a legion would in fact have been in winter quarters so far south as Aquae Sextiae, and one should therefore add not only the time a messenger would take to travel from Ravenna, but also the extra marching time from winter quarters to Aquae Sextiae - say a minimum of a week. Thus Caesar certainly gave marching orders to his two Transalpine legions before Jan. 7th, and probably before the end of 50 B.C. (App. B.C. 2.34; Rambaud 106). If this calculation is correct, Caesar is here falsifying the record, and his decision to invade Italy in strength (or at least to be in a position to do so if necessary) was taken in the period of franticdiplomati c activity between the end of Curio's tribunate (Dec. 10th) and the latter's departure for Rome with Caesar's letter on Dec. 28th: it must have been at this time that Caesar finally decided what his negotiating position would be (cf. App. B.C. 2.32; Plut Caes. 31, Cic. 37; Cic. Att. 7.4.2; Suet. DJ. 29.2). The purpose of this falsification, and that concerning the summoning of the Thirteenth legion (discussed 7.8n.), was to present himself as doing nothing hostile before the passing of the s.cu. by his enemies. If Ottmer's case is sound, and the legions had been moved south of the Alps by this time, Caesar's literal veracity can be defended; but his intention to make war, or use the threat of it, must be put further back still, to the time when he took the decision to move these legions. 2 Young Lucius Caesar: this man's father (consul in 64), was a distant relative of Caesar and served as one of his legates from5 2 to 49, remaining thereafter in the Caesarian camp, but his son did not share his sympathies. The message that the son brought was confidential, and Cicero for one knew nothing of the fact that Pompey had opened this channel of communication (Att. 7.13a.2: L.Caesar is a 'loose broom'; Dio 41.5.1). Most authorities place the date of this meeting about Jan. 17th or 18th, cf. lO.ln. See Shackleton-Bailey (1968) 441-7, von Fritz (1941). 4 Praetor Roscius: cf. 3.6: why Piso had gone back on his promise is not clear, but perhaps it was because he was too closely related to Caesar, being his father-in-law. Caesar's words imply that Roscius' mission, though to the same effect as L. Caesar's, was separate. 9 2 his standing had always been...more important than his life: it is significant for the understanding of Roman society that Caesar was able to advance such an intensely personal reason for his treason: he could with equal accuracy have claimed to be standing up for the right of all free inhabitants of Italy who were not of the narrow governing oligarchy to participate in the government of their country. Note also Cicero's definition of the cultured man as one who places his dignitas above all else: hominum duo esse genera, alterum indoctum et agreste, quod anteferat Commentary 167 semper utilitatem honestati, alterum humanum atque expolitum, quod rebus omnibus dignitatem anteponat (Part. Or. 90). He also observes that brave men, when wounded, prefer to die than to surrender even a little of their dignitas (Tusc. 2.58). six months of his governorship snatched away: on the general question of the terminal date of Caesar's command in Gaul, see Introduction sec. II. Caesar's argument here is that since, in his view, he had a right to stay in his province until the beginning of 49, his privilege of standing in absence for the consulship had been in effect taken from him, and the Roman people who granted it (by the Law of the Ten Tribunes) mocked, if he could not use it to stay for a further period. Cicero reluctantly accepts this very point in a letter written in mid-December 50 (Att. 7.7.6). However, under pressure, Caesar was now offering (sec. 5n.) to waive his privilege and return to Rome in the middle of the year (49) to stand in person, like everyone else, under the Lex Pompeia de iure magistratuum. He would thus forgo six months' governorship - a loss certainly, but not of great importance beside the unstated fact that for a brief space before election he would be a private citizen, open to legal action and the possibility of political extinction: Brunt (1986) 18 reestablishes against Shackleton- Bailey (1965) 39, and others, the older communis opinio that this was a real consideration in Caesar's mind, as Asinius Pollio reported (ap. Suet. D J. 30.4). The fact that Domitius had already been appointed to succeed him is passed over in silence by Caesar because it was illegal (6.5n.) and therefore irrelevant. all parties should surrender their armies: this proposal was contained in the letter which Curio delivered to the consuls on Jan. 1st (Dio 41.1.4; App. B.C. 2.32; Plut. Pomp. 59.2 [inaccurate]) and was no doubt spelt out in more detail in the lost opening of this book. Caesar's point in saying that even with this request he was not successful is to emphasise that his previous negotiating position - two legions (or one) and Cisalpine Gaul until his consulship - was itself a considerable sacrifice compared with what had originally been arranged for him early in 52. 4 the two legions: see 2.3 5 Pompey should go to his provinces: on Pompey's provinces see 2.3n. , As to the offer in general, Cicero (Fam. 16.12.3) gives a rather more precise account: 'Terms have after all arrived from him: Pompey to go to Spain, recruiting to be cancelled, and our garrisons dismissed; he will hand over Further Gaul to Domitius, Nearer to Considius Nonianus (who have been allotted them); he will come and stand for the consulate, and no longer wishes to be a candidate in absentia', he will canvass in person for twenty- four days'. Caesar's wish that Pompey should remove himself from Rome supports the view that he was afraid of a prosecution backed by Pompey's military authority (as had happened to others between 52 and 50). 168 Book I complete control of the state: omnis res publica means literally 'the whole of the state', i.e every part of it The point is that senate and people had ceased to be, in Caesar's view, free agents because Pompey and the soldiers he commanded were in effect controlling, instead of being controlled by, them. 10 1 Capua: Roscius (and young Caesar) actually met the consuls at Teanum Sidicinum, about 20 k. north of Capua, on Jan. 23rd (Cic. Att. 7.14.1). 2 a written message: not for Caesar's eyes alone, but for general publication (Cic. Att. 7.17.2). Caesar was evidently right to insist that only face-to-face negotiations would yield any compromise. Cicero (Att. 7.14.1, Fam. 16.12.3) says that Caesar's terms (quoted above, 9.5n.) were approved on condition he withdrew his troops from the towns he had occupied outside his province, so that the senate could safely meet in Rome. Caesar's summary of this demand in the words 'withdraw from Ariminum' maintains the fiction that this was the only town he had occupied at this stage (and see 11.4n.). 3 disband his armies: this can hardly be a straightforward summary of the Pompeian demand, since Caesar had offered to hand over his provinces to Considius and Domitius (9.5n.) who would have a need for at least some legions. He thus contrives to misrepresent the terms proposed and maintain the invective against his enemies. 4 not stop levying troops: the way Caesar tells the story, this is the act of men determined to have a fight. In fact, Caesar was already sweeping through Umbria and Picenum (11.4a and see Table of Dates) and it was not unreasonable of the Pompeians to continue recruiting, simply to have some hope of defending themselves if the negotiations failed. 11 1 It was unreasonable: Cicero had a foreboding that this would be Caesar's reaction: 'It will be sheer lunacy for him [Caesar] not to accept, particularly as his demands are the height of cheek. Who is he to say 'on condition Pompey goes to Spain', 'on condition he disbands his garrisons'? None the less, the concession is made... But I still fear that even this will not satisfy him. After giving that message to L. Caesar, he should have stayed a bit quieter until the answer arrived back, but in fact he is reported as being very active at the moment' (Att. 7.17.2, 2 Feb.). For a full analysis of these negotiations, see von Fritz (1941), who concludes that Caesar's offer cannot have been serious, since it would have placed him for a time in the very position that he had striven for so long to avoid, that of a private citizen unprotected by imperium. It was, therefore, a delaying tactic, provinces and legions that were not his: one of the legions was of course rightly Pompey's, see 1.2n. The Latin here carries the same ambiguity as the Commentary 169 English, suggesting to the uninformed that the provinces also were not Pompey's. 2 by the end of Caesar's consulship: Caesar is disingenuous here in suggesting that he might reach the end of his consulship without having arranged for himself any province or command with imperium. II4 -13 Having followed the negotiations conducted through Roscius and young Caesar to their point of breakdown, Caesar turns to narrating the first stages of his advance southwards from Ariminum, which in fact started before the negotiations. The swift occupation of Auximum (modern Osimo)t Iguvium (Gubbio), and above all Arretium (Arrezzo) seemed to show that he was marching on the capital, as must have been the general expectation. 11 4 And so: it is hardly possible to dissociate this logical connector from what immediately precedes it, namely Caesar's complaint that the terms offered by his opponents were unreasonable. It is therefore an outright lie, which had it not been for the fortuitous survival of Cicero's correspondence, might have gone undetected. We can deduce that Ariminum, Pisaurum, Arretium, and possibly Ancona, had all fallen by January 16th, since the news was known in Rome by the evening of the 17th (Cic. Fam. 16.12.2: Cicero left Rome very early on the morning of the 18th). Yet Caesar cannot have had his interviews with L. Caesar and Roscius at Ariminum much, if at all, before Jan. 17th or 18th, assuming that the former made all speed to deliver his message to the consuls at Teanum (see 10.In.). For the chronology see Fritz (1941). five cohorts: that is, half the Thirteenth legion, the other half being used nearer at hand in detachments as here detailed. 12 1 praetor Thermus: Q. Minucius Thermus, a supporter and fellow-tribune of Cato in 62, attained the praetorship by 53 at the latest and governed Asia in 52-50 - well, according to Cicero (An. 6.1.13). Caesar is here following a well-established Republican usage in describing him as praetor when he must in fact have been a propraetor (cf. Cicero on Verres). Curio: C. Scribonius Curio, the celebrated tribune of 50 B.C., whose defection to Caesar's cause was of crucial importance in the political manoeuvring of that year, had gone to join Caesar at Ravenna when his period of office expired on December 10, and it was he who had brought Caesar's letter to the consuls on January 1st. Caesar must have thought highly of him as an officer to have entrusted to him the African campaign related in Book II. 2 his soldiers deserted him: not all of them, in spite of Caesar's innuendo; Thermus brought some cohorts to join Domitius at Corfinium early in February (Cic. Att. 7.23.1). 170 Book I 3 Attius: P. Attius Varus (whom Caesar cannot decide what to call, cf. n.34.2-6, though perhaps one or both of his other names have dropped out of the text, see IL23, 27) like Thermus had held a praetorship by 53 and governed a province, in this case Africa, in 52. Although not listed as such in MRR, he must have been a legatus of Pompey. See further 31.2 below. 13 1 Gaius Caesar, imperator: the formality of the author's reference to himself here, complete with praenomen, indicates that he is reproducing the language of the councillors. Imperator was originally purely a title of honour, meaning 'victorious commander', bestowed by acclamation on a general by his army after a great victory (e.g. on Curio at the Bagradas, n.26.1). It later also came to be used as a word for 'general'. Here the former meaning is the relevant one, emphasising the publicly and formally recognised greatness of Caesar's military achievements. 4 highest-ranking centurion: the primus pilus was the most senior 'non• commissioned' officer of a legion; the status, responsibility, and rewards of the post were such that a few years later, under Augustus, we sometimes find men of equestrian rank holding it. 14 A single chapter now switches to Rome and describes the panic and flight of the consuls to Capua after Pompey 's departure to the legions in Apulia. 14 1 When news...reached Rome: Cicero's letters (Att. 7.11, 7.12.2, Fam. 16.12.2) make it clear that the news was of the fall of Ariminum, Pisaurum, Ancona, and Arretium to Caesar's forces, that is the events narrated at 8.1 and 11.4 above. Chs. 12 and 13, though a logical continuation of the narrative of 11.4, and therefore placed immediately after it, occurred after the flight of the consuls from Rome. consul Lentulus...fled from the city: probably on Jan. 18th or 19th: Cicero saw him at Formiae on Jaa 21st (Att. 7.12.2), having himself left Rome on the 18th. Caesar clearly implies that Lentulus' behaviour was unworthy of any true consul of the Roman people. the inner treasury: this 'holier' (sanctius) treasury was fed by inter alia the 5% tax on manumissions of slaves and was a reserve which was not supposed to be touched except in extreme emergency (Livy 27.10.11). Did Lentulus open it and leave it open, a point of some importance to Caesar (see 33.3n)? Cicero (Att. 7.12.2) shows that it was at this time left closed. It is true that on Feb. 7th the consuls, then in Capua, were instructed by Pompey to go to Rome and remove the money from the aerarium sanctius, but the order could not be carried out (Cic. Att. 7.21.2). It must remain doubtful whether Lentulus opened the inner treasury at all, and Caesar's innuendo that he left it open is certainly unjustified. Commentary 171

I. Central and Southern Italy 172 Book I 3 around Apulia: Cicero (Att. 7.12.2) mentions Larinum, Luceria, and Teanum Apulum. For Pompey's strategy, see Introduction sec. HI. 4 At Capua they first took heart: Caesar exaggerates. In fact it was at Teanum Sidicinum that the consuls and Pompey received both T. Labienus, Caesar's most experienced and distinguished officer who had deserted him a few days previously, and L. Caesar, who brought Caesar's message (see 10.1: Cic. Att. 7.13a, 14). A senate was held at Capua on Jan. 25th (Cic. Att. 7.15.2). the gladiators: Cicero (Att. 7.14.2, 8.2.1) seems to corroborate Caesar's account here: 'Caesar's gladiators ...have been very sensibly distributed by Pompey among the population, two per household', but the chronology tells against Caesar. There is no time for all this to happen within the limits provided for it by Cicero's almost daily letters: the consuls left Rome between Jan. 18th and 20th, were at Teanum on the 22nd and 23rd, and cannot have reached Capua until at the earliest late on the 23rd - yet early on the 25th Cicero at Cales knows already that the gladiators have been distributed on Pompey's orders (see Shackleton-Bailey on Att. 7.14.2). This tale of Lentulus' arming of Caesar's own gladiators against him is either pure invention, designed to show Lentulus adopting the remedies of the desperate (cf 24.2), or at best an echo of a plan the consul might once have had. 5 the Campanian Assembly: this body was evidently the citizen assembly of Capua (which had been punished for its conduct during the Hannibalic war by loss of normal municipal identity and institutions) before the status of the community was changed as a resulto f Caesar's law of 59 setting up a colony there (Cic. pro Sest. 9). Presumably Caesar, in view of his personal role in the matter, is using constitutionally correct language, and we may therefore infer that the conventus Campaniae continued to exist after 59, at least for those who lived in the district and were not enrolled as citizens of the new colony. 15 - 23 Caesar leads into the account of the siege of Corfinium with a rapid sketch of his progress from Auximum southwards along the Adriatic side of the peninsula, while the resistance of the Pompeians collapses before him. Domitius then decides to make a stand at Corfinium with three legions but fails to persuade Pompey to come to his aid. Caesar starts to encircle the town with earthworks, and Domitius plans a secret escape. His soldiers get wind of this, morale collapses amomg both troops and officers, and Caesar receives the surrender of the town seven days after arriving there, without a life lost on either side. The main empliasis in the story is on the ineptitude of the Pompeian high command, the good sense of Domitius' mutinying soldiers, and the efficiency and clemency displayed by Caesar himself Commentary 173 15 2 Cingulum, a town which Labienus...: T. Labienus was bom at Cingulum c, 100 B.C.. Names in -ienus are non-Roman and it may safely be assumed that the Labieni were a leading family of Picenum owing their entry into Roman politics to the Social War. When first setded by Romans in the third century Picenum was a region containing very few towns, and the process of urbanisation and the formal creation of municipalities in place of praefecturae (the administrative districts mentioned in the previous sentence), as illustrated here by the case of Cingulum, belonged to the second and first centuries. Labienus will have been the commissioner (or one of them) appointed to give Cingulum its municipal charter. He had served with Caesar all through his Gallic campaigns (deriving his fortune therefrom, Cic Att. 7.7.6), but became the most notable defector from Caesar's side, abandoning him a few days after the crossing of the Rubicon (see 14,4n.). Syme (1938) argues that Labienus entered politics as a Pompeian partisan and was lent' to Caesar at the outset of his Gallic command. 3 The Twelfth legion caught up with him: Since the Twelfth had been in Transalpine Gaul at the beginning of the winter and could never have caught up with Caesar by this time (early February) unless it had received the order to march well before Caesar crossed the Rubicon, this apparently routine statement has enormous importance for a proper assessment of Caesar's willingness to resort to force in his quarrel with the Pompeians. See 8. In Lentulus Spinther: P. Cornelius Lentulus Spinther had been consul in 57 and governor of Cilicia 56-54, winning a triumph which he eventually celebrated in 51. He was the most senior of the Pompeian commanders in the north, occupying the strongest town with the largest force that we hear of. His formal status is obscure, perhaps legatus to Pompey; MRR does not list him under 49 B.C.. 4 VibuIIius accepted command: L. Vibullius Rufus is found acting as a confidential messenger and agent of Pompey's in 56 and 54 (Cic. Fam. 1.9.10, QF. 3.1.18). His energy and effectiveness on this present mission to Picenum were praised by Cicero (Att. 8.2.4; 8.1 IB). Taken prisoner, and released, by Caesar at Corfinium, and explicitiy called Pompei praefectum by Caesar at m.10.1, he is certainly to be identified with one of the two praefecti fabrwn (staff officers) whom Caesar says in a letter written about 5 March (Cic. Att. 9.7C.2) he has captured and let go. He must have been an eques, a conclusion corroborated by his omission from the list of senators taken at Corfinium (23.2). To a Roman of the late Republic, sharply conscious of status differences, the picture given by Caesar here of the relations between him and Spinther, one of the highest in the land, would have seemed remarkable. Doubtless the course of action adopted was agreed by the two men in the light of instructions from Pompey, but 174 Book I Caesar presents it as a travesty of the traditional order of things which the Pompeians claimed to be upholding (cf. n.44.3n.). 5 Lucilius Hirrus: C. Lucilius Hirrus, tribune in 53, evidenUy now one of Pompey's legates. 6 by forced marches to Domitius in Corfinium: Cicero (Att. 8.2.4, written on Feb 17) praises Vibullius* exploits. To extricate so many cohorts from the general Pompeian collapse in Picenum was an achievement. It was natural for Vibullius to join Domitius, who not only had the seniority of a proconsul, but was occupying a town lying directly in his line of march towards Pompey. It did not emerge until later that Domitius' stand at Corfinium was against Pompey's wishes. (This is the only place where the MSS give Domitius his cognomen Ahenobarbus. Since there is no apparent reason for Caesar to break with his usual practice here - and note that he does not even do so in the list at 23.2, where others have their cognomina - the name must surely be a marginal annotation later incorporated into the text.) 7 twenty cohorts: Caesar's figures for the size of Domitius' army do not quite agree with Pompey's. The latter (Cic. Att. 8.11 A and 12A.1) believed that Vibullius had brought in 14 cohorts from Picenum, while Hirrus was following with 5 more, and Domitius had 12 of lus own', perhaps the 4,000 men Appian (B.C. 2.32 and 38) says he left Rome with - making 31 as against Caesar's total of 33. The difference is hardly significant; Domitius clearly had the equivalent of just over three legions, although the greater part must have been scratch levies, no match for Caesar's Gallic army. 16 1 Firmum in his hands: Firmum was the point at which Caesar left the coast; its capture, probably on Feb. 4th (von Fritz 1941, 138-9), must have preceded that of Asculum. Corfinium: this town lay towards the southern end of the enclosed plain of the Paelignian country, to which only three passes give access. Domitius hoped to trap Caesar between himself and Pompey, if he could persuade the latter to move forward from Luceria. (Cicero's reactions to the developing crisis may be followed in Att. 8.3.7,6.1-3,7.1-2, and 8.8). 2 When he arrived: on Feb. 15 (23.5 with Cic. Att. 8.14.1). 17 2 Roman knights: the equites of the late Republic were no longer the cavalry of the army, but formed a homogeneous social class with the senators. A substantial number of its members were the sons, brothers, fathers, uncles, and more distant relatives of the latter. They were the larger, non-political, part of the wealthy elite which ruled the empire, and although their status was less exalted than that of senators, they were still persons of consequence. See Brunt (1988). Commentary 17s 4 twenty-four acres per head: editors have found it difficult to accept this figure (40 iugera), with its implications for the landed wealth of the Domitii, but Brunt (1975) defends the reading of the MSS. Assuming that Domitius* cohorts were under strength, and that he had about 12,000 men, the area required is between 500 and 600 square miles. This is not impossible for a leading family at this time, especially as some or even all of it may have been overseas. In favour of the figurei s the fact that known allotments in this period are of roughly this size: at Cremona in 41/40 ordinary setders appear to have received 35 iugera each, with the possibility of larger lots of 45, 60, 70, and 90 iugera (see Tozzi), and the Liber Coloniarum (ed. Lachmann, p.214) alleges that at Volterra allotments of 25, 35, 50 and 60 iugera were made T)y a triumviral law'. Evidence for other colonies of this epoch is summarised by Keppie 99. Allotments of the size envisaged by Buecheler's correction to 4 iugera per head are indeed attested for Roman colonial foundations, but only for those made before the middle of the second century B.C. 18 1 Sulmo: this, modem Sulmona, was the other important town of the Paelignian plain. Once again, Caesar portrays himself as the leader favoured by the mass of the Italian population, but it is impossible to know the real considerations which swayed the people of Sulmo and other towns. It may have been no more than a correct appreciation of the quality of the respective armies. 3 Lucretius and Attius jumped off the wall: Cicero (Att. 8.4.4) has a less colourful version, whereby Attius opened the gates and Lucretius simply fled'. 5 Within three days the Eighth legion reached him: i.e. by Feb 18th. See 15.3n. on the implications of this. With all these new forces Caesar now had the equivalent of just over five legions, which further recruiting increased to six by the time he reached Brundisium (25.1). the king of Noricum: K-H-M guess this king to be Voccio, but he is perhaps more likely to be a successor, since Voccio's sister was one of Ariovistus, wives and was killed by Caesar's troops in 58 (BG 1.53.4). 6 surround the town with a rampart: As used by Caesar, the legionary was a navvy as much as a soldier. To the men who encircled Alesia with 25 miles of complex earthworks, or carried out the work described below (25.5ff.) at Brundisium, the 8 km. or so to ring Corfinium was a simple maUer. 19 4 Pompey...had written back: three letters from Pompey to Domitius are preserved in Cicero's correspondence (Att. 8.12B-12D). A postscript to the second says Pompey cannot risk coming to help Domitius, while the third instructs him to extricate himself if he can. Pompey's points are that Caesar 176 Book I will not allow Domitius a battle, but proceed by blockade, and that he himself cannot trust either the effectiveness of his new recruits or the loyalty of the two veteran legions he has acquired from Caesar. 20 1 the soldiers...withdrew: Caesar is at pains to emphasise the procedural correctness of what was in truth a mutiny, assimilating it by his language to the civil procedures of the contio (public meeting) and the ancient 'withdrawings' (secessiones) of the plebs. Cf. his narrative of the rather similar failure of Pompeian loyalty at 74-77, also put in the best possible light. 3 the Marsi: it is highly probable that the Domitii had estates and ancient links of patronage in the Marsic territory, explaining both Domitius' recruitment of troops there, and their present loyalty. 21 1 because in war great events...: a rare Caesarian example of the kind of generalising reflection common in Thucydides and thenceforth beloved by historians with literary pretensions. It is noticeable that Caesar writes long and syntactically complex sentences above all when he is giving the reasons for adopting a particular course of action; commonly a series of subordinate clauses leads the reader through the various considerations until, as here, he reaches a decisive conclusion with the main verb(s). Cf. n.16. 6 Such was the pitch of tension...: another notable departure from Caesar's normal matter-of-fact manner. It serves to underline the crucial importance of the capture of Corfinium, and may well reflect something of Caesar's own anxiety and excitement as he stood on the brink of a success which exceeded anything he could reasonably have hoped for when he crossed the Rubicon. A bloodless victory here, and a swift pursuit of Pompey, meant that all, or almost all, Italy, would be in his hands with hardly a blow struck. 22 1 About the fourth watch: in the last watch of the night. 4 through Caesar: Spinther was elected to the college of Pontifices (one of the four great priestly colleges whose membership was highly prestigious and on occasion politically useful) some time after 63, when Caesar became Pontifex Maximus; was governor of Nearer Spain in 59, the year of Caesar's consulship; and was successful in his consular candidacy in 58, no doubt at least partly because of Caesar's support. 5 to assert his own freedom and that of the Roman people, who were oppressed by an oligarchic clique: these phrases were political slogans of the time: Augustus justifies his own revolutionary activities in 44 and 43 B.C. in almost exactly the same words (rem publicam a dominatione factionis oppressam in libertatem vindicaviy Res Gestae 1) and Sallust, writing not long after Caesar, says that the Gracchi 'began to assert the freedom of the plebs and reveal the crimes of the oligarchs' (vindicare Commentary 177 plebem in libertatem et paucorum scelera patefacere coepere, Bell. lug. 42.1). 6 take extreme decisions about their lives: the circumlocution for suicide will represent the diplomatic tone of the discussion between Caesar and Spinther. 23 1 sons of senators, military tribunes, and Roman knights: all these, technically, were equites Romani ('Roman knights', see 17.2), but Caesar lists them in descending order of status within that category. Sons of senators were likely to become senators; military tribunes (who commanded cohorts) might be sons of senators or they might be other equites who had an eye on a public career, whether in the senate or in military service; while the plain knights were those who possessed the social and census qualifications to belong to the order but chose to stay clear of public life. 2 Lucius Caecilius Rufus: as an ex-praetor (57 B.C.) Caecilius Rums is given his correct ranking in the list between the two ex-consuls (of whom Domitius precedes as commander) and the serving quaestor. Caesar is punctilious about such matters. It is consistent that he does not name Vibullius Rufus (see 15.4n.), who was one of the most notable captives but was not a senator. Sextus Quintilius Varus: he made his way to Africa after being released by Caesar. See BL28. 3 he spoke a few words...to the effect that..: the construction of a verb of saying or feeling with quod, which gives rise to the Romance construction with chelque, occurs in literary Latin of the classical period only when quod means 'the fact that' and can be taken as an explanation or amplification of an antecedent pronoun such as hoc (here pauca) which stands as a direct object to the verb (cf. the construction with quod at 39.4). In common speech the use of quod as an all-purpose conjunction to replace quom (- cum), quam, quantum, ut, ne, and others can be traced at least as far back as Plautus (Amph. 302), and Petronius makes uneducated freedmen say things like scis quod epulum dedi (Sat. 71.9). See Ktthner-Stegmann 274-5 and Ernout-Thomas 298-9. sent them away unharmed: Caesar had a consistent policy of clemency, even to the extent of twice letting Vibullius go (1H.10.1). Curio judged this to be a tactic, not a characteristic (Cic. Att. 10.4.8), and Cicero, with reference to Corfinium, speaks of Caesar's 'insidious clemency' (Att. 8.16.2); but apart from making changes of loyalty easy, it avoided an aftermath of the type that followed the Sullan civil war and embittered Roman politics for a generation. 4 six million sesterces: in spite of the notorious tendency of MSS to corrupt figures, this sum is of the right order of magnitude. It could have paid four legions for approximately three months at the new standard rate of pay 178 Book I introduced by Caesar in Gaul of 900 HS per annum for an ordinary soldier. Caesar's refusal to appropriate this money indicates his desire not to embitter feelings while there was still any chance of a negotiated settlement. the four magistrates of Corfinium: the MSS require correction, and although duumviri (Ilviri) were far commoner as chief local magistrates in the Roman world than quattuorviri (llllviri) the evidence of the local inscriptions (CIL 9. 297ff.) is decisive for the latter.. 5 on that day moved camp and completed a normal march: the day was 21st Feb. (Cic. Att. 8.14.1), and a normal march could apparentiy be as little as eight Roman miles or twelve km. (DI.76.1,4). 24 - 28 These chapters relate Caesar's advance to Brundisium, the escape of the Pompeian forces by sea in the face of his attempt to block the mouth of the harbour, and his capture of the town. During this process, further abortive attempts at negotiation take place. 24 2 he armed slaves: to arm slaves, in the ancient world, was an act of desperation. 3 Lucius Manlius: the MSS call him praetor (accepting praeterAlbam to be a corruption), but this seems unlikely to be right. We know that L. Manlius Torquatus left Formiae early in Feb. to join Pompey's forces, but he is not styled praetor by Cicero in a context where one would expect the tide if he possessed it {Att. 8.1 IB.1 with Shackleton-Bailey's n.). On the other hand to posit a different and otherwise unknown praetor L. Manlius (or Mallius) seems extravagant. Of course Caesar could have been in error, but it is perhaps more probable, as Shackleton-Bailey suggests, that a copyist anticipated praetor in the next line, and I have therefore deleted the word. Excluding Torquatus, seven of the eight praetors of 49 are known (see MRR 2). 4 Numerius Magius. see 26.2 and n. for the sequel. 25 1 he arrived at Brundisium with six legions: on March 9th, by Caesar's own report (Cic. Att. 9.13 A). On the number of legions, see 18.5n 2 Dyrrachium: modem Durres (Durazzo) in Albania, the port giving access to the western end of the Via Egnatia, which led across to Macedonia. 4 not to abandon Italy: see on 27.2. 26 1 towers with three storeys: this use of cum, exacdy as in English, is highly unusual in Latin (cf. the genitive binorum tabulatorum at 25.10 above), but can be paralleled from Livy (e.g. porcum cum ore humano, 27.4.11) 2 Magius...had not been sent back to him: this was not true. A letter of Caesar's own survives (Cic. Att. 9.13 A) 1 reached Brundisium on March 9th Commentary 179 and encamped by the walls. Pompey is in Brundisium. He sent Numerius Magius to me to discuss peace. I replied as I thought best...' Admittedly, Pompey had taken a long time to respond to his message, and when he did it appears that Numerius had nothing useful, or nothing that Caesar considered useful, to say; but the implication that Pompey was not prepared to make any response to Caesar's overtures can only be considered a deliberate falsification. One may save Caesar's credit by supposing that he is referring to Pompey's failure to send Magius back to him a second time, but if this is the case he gives his readers no inkling of the true state of affairs. 3 Caninius Rebilus, a friend of Scribonius Libo: Rebilus had served in Gaul as an officer of Caesar's in 52 (and probably also afterwards). He survived Curio's disaster in Africa to become famous as the man to whom Caesar gave the consulship for a single day, December 31, 45 B.C., so that Cicero was able to joke that no-one had breakfast while he was consul (Fam. 7.30, cf. Plut. Caes. 58.1). Scribonius Libo was a close associate of Pompey and was probably by now an ex-praetor, his daughter later married Sextus, Pompey's younger son, and his sister the future Augustus, becoming the mother of the emperor's only child Julia. (The MSS seem to indicate ObaXfamiliarem is an intrusive gloss on necessarium). 5 without them it was impossible to discuss a settlement: Cicero, in a letter written on March 17th (Att. 9.9.2), blames the consuls for leaving, so that a peace initiative which he himself was meditating has become impossible. 6 after several vain attempts: the truth of the matter was that neither side was prepared to trust the other. The nearest approach to an agreement was that related in 8-11 above, rejected by Caesar for reasons that verge on the quibbling but are very revealing of his attitude. 27 2 On the arrival of the ships Pompey began to make preparations for departure: since Pompey actually left on Mar. 17th (Cic. Att. 9.15a), just nine days after Caesar arrived, he must in fact have begun his preparations, which were elaborate, before the ships returned. from the start intended to withdraw from Italy: from Cicero's correspondence between January and March (esp. Att. 9.10), it seems that Pompey always had it in mind to withdraw from Italy if he saw no chance of matching Caesar there, but (naturally) did not advertise his intention. There can be no doubt that his plan was correct under the circumstances. (See Introduction sec. III). 28 3 Pompey set sail: on March 17th (Cic. Att. 9.15a). 4 the concealed palisade: described above, 27.3. The singular seems to be doing duty for more than one occurrence of the feature. 180 Book I 29-33 Caesar now deals rapidly with the immediate consequences of his success in Italy: his decision (29) not to pursue Pompey at once, his lieutenants' subsequent movements against the Pompeians in Sardinia and Sicily (30 - 31), and his own arrival in Rome and attempt to make political progress with those senators who had remained in Italy (32 - 33). 29 2 Gaul, Picenum, and the Straits: By 'Gaul1, Caesar means the Adriatic coast of Cisalpine Gaul, including such places as Ravenna and Aquileia, and by 'the Straits', the Straits of Messina through which any ships from the western Mediterranean would have to come. 3 a veteran army: Pompey had seven legions in Spain, as detailed by Caesar at 38.1; see also 85.6-7 and nn. thereto. Suetonius (DJ. 34.2) reports that Caesar said to his friends that he 'was going to meet an army without a leader and would return to meet a leader without an army', the two Spanish provinces: Nearer Spain was based on the Mediterranean seaboard from the Pyrenees to the mountains of the south-east, Further Spain on the valley of the Guadalquivir, with control in each case extending as far inland as the Romans could at any time establish it. Pompey's fief was Nearer Spain, where as proconsul he had fought Sertorius from 76 to 72; the scale of his ultimate success, and of his patronage, can be gauged from his trophy in the Pyrenees claiming that he had captured 876 towns from the Alps to the borders of Further Spain (Sail. Hist. 3.89; Strabo 3.4.1,7,9,4.1.3; Plin NH 3.18 cf. 7.96). 30 1 chief magistrates: Caesar says duumviri, but he must be using the term loosely to include those chief magistrates who bore other tides, as e.g. at Corfinium (23.4). sent to Brundisium: for the eventual crossing to meet Pompey. 2 Valerius: Although Caesar will sometimes refer to his enemies or to prominent persons, when he firstintroduce s them, by a single bald name, it is his practice to give lesser persons, and his own subordinates, the dignity of something more. Here, he will have written either Q. Valerium or Valerium Orcam. It is perhaps more likely that Q. was wrongly interpreted by a copyist as an abbreviation for -que, and discarded as nonsense, than that Orcam simply dropped out. propraetor Curio with three (legions): (i) Caesar appears to anticipate Curio's propraetorship, which was not conferred until the meeting of the senate at the beginning of April (32.2; Cic. Att. 10.4.8-11); and as Cicero's letter makes clear, Curio did not set out for Sicily until after the middle of April. But this is not an error, because what Caesar is doing here is to round off the story of the military operations in the Italian theatre of war. Logically, these two chapters form a sequel to Pompey's flight from Commentary 181 Brundisium, even if chronologically they belong after Caesar's return to Rome and departure for Massilia. (ii) Curio's three legions and Valerius' one were composed of new recruits and Domitius' Corfinian forces (25.1). Caesar needed his veterans for Spain. (iii) There is no need to emend the text to give Curio either 2 or 4 legions at this point; we are told that he later crossed to Africa 'with two of the four legions he had received from Caesar' (11.23.1), and these four are quite satisfactorily accounted for by the present three and Valerius' one - the latter being under Curio's overall command (cf. II37.4). Tubero: on the missing praenomen (or less probably nomen, Aelius), which possibly dropped out here because of its similarity of shape to the preceding E, see above on Valerius; in this context, with Cotta and Cato both given their praenomina immediately beforehand, the omission seems even odder. Tubero must, like them, have been appointed to his province in early January (6.5), but had not yet managed to make his way thither. 5 Gnaeus Pompeius: this formal manner of naming Pompey conveys coolness and a measure of contempt. he fled from the province: Cato left on April 23rd, from Syracuse (Cic. Att. 10.16.3), heading for Corcyra, and then on to join Pompey (App. B.C. 2.40 - with no mention of Curio, but with the detail, surely from PoUio's own history, that Pollio was sent to give Cato orders to quit). 31 2 as described above: see 13 for Varus' discomfiture at Auximum. he had on his own initiative taken command: the previous governor, C. Considius Longus, was still in the province, and he was commanding its existing single legion, stationed at Hadrumetum, when Curio invaded Africa in August (II.23.4). His term under the Lex Pompeia (see 6.5n.), which put strict limits on governors' tenure, may possibly have expired, but to describe the province as 'vacant', as Caesar does, is going rather far. In practice he surely had authority and surrendered it to Attius Varus, perhaps on Pompey's instructions. The situation was irregular, in that Considius should have handed over only to his legally appointed successor Tubero (30.2). Varus must have held imperium as a legate of Pompey (Cic. pro Lig. 22: imperium se habere dicebat, fasces certe habebat - 'he claimed imperium, and certainly held the symbols of that authority'), but this gave him no rightt o exercise it in the province at Tubero's expense. 3 Utica: after the destruction of Carthage in 146 B.C., Utica became the chief city of the Roman province. It lay about twenty miles west of Carthage (modem Tunis). 182 Book I 32 In this chapter Caesar takes the opportunity to justify himself once again (cf. 7.2, 9.2-6, 22.5), though his arguments gain nothing from repetition. The force of his words lies in their emotional characterisation of his opponents as harsh, power-hungry, selfish, unjust, savage, arrogant, and unreasonable. Dio (41.15- 16) says that his speech to the senate was temperate, and that to the people, whom like the senate he addressed outside the sacred boundary of the city, he promised 300 sesterces a head (a third of a legionary's yearly pay). 1 These matters dealt with: resumed from the end of 30.2. The intervening material is a particularly clear example of a narrative technique whereby Caesar, in the interests of logical completeness, follows one sequence of events on beyond the point from which another, subsequent, sequence will start, and thus seems to falsify temporal relationships. (See further Introduction, sec. VI). Caesar dispersed his soldiers: Cicero writes of individual legions at Tarentum, Brundisium, and Sipontum on March 25, a week after Brundisium fell (Att. 9.15.1; App. B.C. 2.40, with Hydruntum for Sipontum). Caesar had attacked the town with six legions, the three Gallic legions VHI, XII, and XIII and three raised for and during the campaign in Italy (25.1). It seems most probable that one of the latter went with Valerius to Sardinia, eventually to join Curio's cohorts from Corfinium and make up the force of four legions which was divided between Sicily and Africa. The Gallic legions, after what can only have been a short rest, joined Caesar to march to Massilia (see 39.2n.), leaving the other two newly recruited legions to garrison southern Italy, perhaps under Dolabella who had a general command in the Adriatic (Cic. Att. 10.7.1, Suet DJ. 36). Cicero speaks of two legions of troops recruited in Italy as disaffected (Att. 10.12a.3,14.2,15.1). 2 A senate was called: according to Dio (41.15), this was summoned by the tribunes Antony and Cassius; it took place outside the pomoerium, presumably to observe the constitutional niceties arising from Caesar's possession of proconsular imperium (see 2. In). Cicero, along with many others, refused to attend what he regarded as no due senate (Att. 10.1.2). the legitimate interval for the consulate: this passage is consistent with 9.2 and HI. 1.1 and must show, if Caesar is speaking the truth, that he intended to stand for the consulate of 48 (see Introduction sec. II), since the law prescribed an interval of ten years between one consulship and the next - a law waived for Pompey in 52, incidentally, though Caesar passes over that. 3 a law had been carried by the ten tribunes: see Introduction sec. II Cato: see4.In. a candidature in absence: opinions vary as to whether this, which was in fact a much more significant exemption from the normal rules than any Commentary 183 permission to hold an office early, was to protect Caesar from the danger of prosecution by his enemies (see 9.2n.) in the interval between laying down his proconsular command and being designated consul - as Cicero at any rate thought inevitable (Att. 7.9.2-3) - or to give him the maximum possible time in which to consolidate his conquest of Gaul. Either way, it was a remarkable privilege. in Pompey's own consulship: of 52 B.C. not allowed Caesar to enjoy this favour: for Pompey's 'moving of the goalposts' by other legislation, see 9.2a and Introduction sec n. 4 armies be dismissed: see 9.3a 5 what they demanded of a rival: the reference is to the attempt to make Caesar lay down his command, without requiring Pompey himself to do the same. Unlike Caesar, Pompey was technically in the clear, as his command in Spain had been extended in 52 for either 4 years (Plut. Pomp. 55.7) or perhaps less probably 5 (Dio 40.56.2; cf. Introduction sec. II). 6 he mentioned their injustice...: the complaints refer to events mentioned in 2.3 (legions), 5 (tribunes), 9.6,11.3,24.5,26.3-5 (meetings refused). 33 1 the chief reason they all refused appointment was fear: Cicero (Att. 10.1.4 [= 10.1a], written Apr. 4th) has a different view: Caesar's efforts were thought to be a sham. Cicero also thought that Sulpicius Rufus (cos. 51) would be an envoy. 2 Pompey had said....that he would make no distinction: corroborated by Cicero, Att. 9.10.2,11.6.6. 3 three days dragged by: April 1st (Cic. Att. 9.17.1) - 3rd. Lucius Metellus, a tribune: Metellus probably vetoed business in the senate (Cic. Att. 10.9A.1), but his most famous action was to forbid Caesar's soldiers to open the treasury (see 14.2n). Caesar was so angry that he had wanted to have Metellus killed but in the end contented himself with ignoring the prohibition (Cic. Att. 10.4.8, App. B.C. 2.41, Dio 41.17.2, Plut. Caes. 35). Pliny (NH 33.56) gives the sum removed by Caesar as 15,000 ingots of gold, 30,000 of silver, and 30 million (HS?) in coin; the weight of Pliny's 'ingot' is not known. Caesar's anger with Metellus doubUess arose from the fact that the tribune had effectively called his bluff as a constitutionalist. Even the plebs, according to Curio's report to Cicero (Att. 10.4.8) were displeased with Caesar over this business. 4 Caesar abandoned what he had intended to do: Caesar's projects, apart from sending an embassy to Pompey and getting authorisation to use the reserve in the inner treasury, included the distribution of money to the plebs mentioned by Dio (41.15); but what else he had in mind is unclear. He is very tight-lipped about these unsatisfactory few days in Rome, and is reported as being very angry with the senate afterwards (Cic. Att. 10.9A [= Fam. 8.16]. 1 ). It is a reasonable guess that what he wanted above all, and 184 Book I had in fact failed to secure, was some sort of approval, however worded, for his actions so far.

34 - 86 The siege of Massilia begun, and the campaign of Derda 34 - 36 Massilia, modern Marseilles, was an independent city-state of considerable antiquity, established by Phocaean Greek colonists in the sixth century and allied to Rome almost from the time of its foundation. The Massiliots were thus free, in theory, to choose which side, if either, they would support in a Roman civil war. In practice, as events showed, Massilia could not stand out of the conflict. Not only had ties of patronage long existed between its upper class and Roman senators (cf. Cicero de RP 1.43), but the Roman province of Gallia Narbonensis, created seventy-five years previously, now enveloped its territory. With its harbour, docks, and strong defences, it was a town which neither Caesar nor Pompey could ignore or risk falling into the hands of the opposition. The narrative of the siege started in these three chapters is continued in 56-58 and II.1-16, and finished in 1122. 34 The syntactical structure of this chapter (preserved as far as possible in the translation) is remarkable. It consists of only two sentences. The first states three facts which Caesar learnt, all important but presented in order of increasing relevance to his immediate situation, and at increasing length. Each of the three limbs expressing these three facts (about Vibullius, about Domitius, and about the Massiliot delegation) is constructed from a main clause and a relative clause, which in the case of the third alone contains a further dependent clause (Pompey's instructions). This sentence is a particularly clear example of a complex tricolon auctum, the rhetorical figure whereby three parallel items are treated so that they build up to a climax at the third (e.g. 'let us fight for our friends, our families, and our beloved country'). The second long sentence then presents the results of the third of the three facts just stated, and it too is constructed, even more clearly, as a tricolon auctum. The length and syntactical complexity of its three limbs (ending at clauserant, vocaverant, and reficiebant) are sharply different, and the third has within it a sub-structure consisting of a diminishing tricolon (frumentum ...convexerant, armorum ...instituerant, muros ...reficiebant), of which the last element is again broken down into a triple structure ('walls, gates, and fleet'). The effect at the end is equivalent to a musical accelerando, preparing the reader for the simple, brief incisiveness of what follows at the beginning of the next chapter. 1 When he reached there: on April 19th, according to Stoffel, who must be approximately right: Caesar was en route on April 16th, having left on the Commentary 185 6th or 7th, and Atticus in Rome had heard by May 2nd at the latest of the Massiliot refusal to surrender (Cic. Att. 10.8.6, 10.8B, 10.10.4). It is ca. 850 km. from Rome to Massilia by the shortest (coastal) route, which entails supposing that Caesar himself, without legions, travelled at about 70 km. a day, and the news of Massiha's resistance rather faster in the opposite direction (perhaps by ship). These figures seem plausible in the light of other evidence, notably Caesar's own remarkable journey from Rome to Corduba in 46 B.C. (ca. 2500 km. in 27 days, see Cary's note on Suet. DJ. 56.5). (Orosius (6.15.6), supposedly based on Livy, makes Caesar travel by way of Ariminum to collect legions; but the route, being 270 km. longer, is preposterous for a man in a hurry, and there were certainly no legions there). Vibullius Rufus ...captured at Corfinium a few days previously: for Vibullius, see 15.4 and 23.2. 'A few days' is misleading, since Corfinium fell on Feb. 21st (Cic. Att. 8.14.1), unless Caesar means that Vibullius had been sent off by Pompey a few days after his release at Corfinium. 2 Domitius likewise: Domitius is Ahenobarbus, who had of course been appointed to succeed Caesar in Gaul (6.5); 'likewise' because he also owed his freedom to Caesar's magnanimity at Corfinium, and also repaid the gesture by continued opposition. Igilium: the modem island of Giglio, lying about 30 km. off Cosa. Cosa: a town about 100 km. north-west of Rome on the Etruscan coast, modem Ansedonia, situated just south of Orbetello and its lagoon. It can be regarded as virtually certain that Domitius had estates at Cosa: not only were the tenants who were pressed into these ships surely local, but an inscription of a freedmano f his comes fromth e territory (C/L 11.2638), and the Antonine Itinerary records a Domitiana positio where the northern causeway of the lagoon reaches Monte Argentario. 3 a Massiliot delegation....consisting of young nobles: we are not told what the business of this delegation was; but the cities of the Roman empire, whether nominally independent or not, often had occasion to seek rulings and privileges from the senate, or support from influential persons in Rome. A mission of this sort offered the chance to gain diplomatic experience and make useful contacts, and the Romans themselves sent 'young nobles' on this kind of task. Caesar's recent favours: see 35 and nn. thereto. 5 they were repairing the walls, gates, and fleet: since the Roman destruction of the naval power of Carthage after 202 B.C., the Massiliot fleet had been otiose except possibly as a defence against piracy or to help Roman operations such as those against Sertorius in the 70s. The walls and gates, likewise, had been largely superfluous as defences since 101 when the Romans had defeated the last serious threat to their control of southern Gaul. It is not surprising that repairs were needed. 186 Book I 35 1 the Fifteen: literally, the 'first fifteen', a Massiliot variation of the common 'first ten' (decemprimi or dekaprotoi) found especially in Greek cities. Strabo describes the Massiliot constitution: 'of all aristocracies theirs is the best ordered, since they have established a council of six hundred men who hold office for life....Over the council are set fifteeno f its number, and to them is given the handling of day-to-day business. And three again of the fifteen preside over them, holding supreme authority.' (4.179C) 4 Volcae Arecomici and Helvii....Sallyes: a difficult problem: which patron did what? Even if Hoffmann's surely correct deletion of the names of Caesar and Pompey as a gloss were wrong, the Latin would be no help, as alter...alter... does not always mean 'the first...the second...' and can sometimes be reversed (e.g. Cic. Off. 1.38: cum civi aliter contendimus si est inimicus, aliter si competitor: cum altero certamen honoris et dignitatis est, cum altero capitis et famae). The territory of the Volcae stretched from Toulouse to the Rhone, the Tectosages occupying the western half and the Arecomici the eastern The Helvii adjoined the latter to the north on the right bank of the Rhone. Since both tribes are mentioned by Caesar in connection with the revolt of Vercingetorix (BG 7.7-8, 64-65) without any indication of a relationship with Massilia, it is possible that their 'attribution' to Massilia was Caesar's work after the suppression of the revolt. As to the Sallyes (or Sallui, or Salluvii), who lived to the east and north-east of Massilia, we know that that they had rebelled against Rome in 90 B.C. and that Fonteius, as governor of Transalpine Gaul between 74 and 72, put into effect a decree of Pompey's which penalised unstated tribes near to Massilia with loss of land (Cic. Font. 13-14). But their presence in the text here is the result of an emendation, and certainty is not to be had. 36 Caesar now tellingly juxtaposes the Massiliots' protestations of neutrality with the fact that they simultaneously not only received into the city, but appointed to the supreme command, one of the most determined of all his enemies. It is unnecessary for him to pass any comment on the insincerity of the Massiliots. This seeming objectivity allows the reader to think he is drawing his own conclusions while he is in fact being manipulated by the author. 1 Domitius: see 34.2. It is an oddity of Caesar's account of the siege of Massilia that although Domitius was in command, we hear no more of him except for his initiation of the first sea-battle (56.1) and his escape (EL22.2- 4). 4 three legions: these must have been the legions under Trebonius' command (VI, X, and XTV) which had wintered in central Gaul. Caesar seems to imply below (37.2) that they were sent straight from their winter Commentary 187 quarters to Spain in the wake of Fabius, but his language is very imprecise, and conceals a more complicated truth. It must in fact have been these three legions which started the operations at Massilia, because the three veteran legions (VIII, XII, and XIII) which had to return from southern Italy after ejecting Pompey fromBrundisiu m can hardly have arrived before the very end of May (allowing 25 km. a day for a march of approximately 1400 km. via Rome and the Via Aurelia). Three of the six then went on to Ilerda, and since they were already there when Caesar arrived (39.1., 41.1n.) and it is a journey of 575 km, they must have left at the end of May at the latest. The inference seems inevitable that they set out for Spain the moment the Italian legions arrived; but their identity, apart from the Fourteenth (46.4), remains uncertain. It is true that a centurion of the Tenth displayed remarkable bravery in the naval battle off Massilia (Plut. Caes. 16.2), but Caesar had picked men from all his legions for the fleet (59.1), and this is no proof that the Tenth remained to besiege Massilia. Arelate: modem Aries, a leading town of the Sallyes and an important trading centre whose port on the Rhone had been made much more accessible by the canal constructed by Marius in 104 - 103 B.C. It soon became a Roman colony, being setded by Caesar's Sixth legion in 45 B.C. 5 Decimus Brutus....Gaius Trebonius: subsequently to be famous as participants in Caesar's murder, both were experienced officers and had served with Caesar in Gaul - Brutus since 57, Trebonius since 54, the year after he had as tribune performed a notable political service by passing the law which conferred five-year commands in Spain and Syria respectively on Caesar's allies Pompey and Crassus. Caesar rewarded them by granting Trebonius a suffect consulship in 45, and designating Brutus consul for 42, though he did not live to enjoy the office.

37-47 This block of chapters comprises what could be termed Act I of the three- act drama which ended in the surrender of Afranius and Petreius with the bulk of the Pompeian forces in Spain. In 37-40 the main characters, with the exception of the protagonist, are introduced and moved to the scene of conflict, their resources described, and the action begun. Caesar himself makes a delayed entrance at 41 and promptly initiates a daring escalation of the fighting, but has to remain content, when this first episode is over (47), with having seized the psychological rather than the military initiative. IF or a slightly different analysis, see Rowe, who divides the drama thus: i) 40-52, Pompeian successes; ii) 53, Pompeian hubris; Hi) 54-60, peripeteia; and iv) M-84, tragedy, in three parts (61-70, 71-74, 75-84)]. 37 1 Gaius Fabius with the three legions....around Narbo: Fabius had originally been stationed for the winter among the Aedui in Burgundy (Hirt. 188 Book I BG 8.54.4), but was probably ordered to move to Narbo (Narbonne) at the same time that Caesar withdrew die Twelfth from him for service in Italy. Narbo stood astride the road from Spain that Pompey's Spanish forces would have to use to reach Italy in winter, a strategic consideration passed over in silence by Caesar. These three legions were VII, IX, and XI. the passes through the Pyrenees: the principal passes meant are the one nearest the coast (Le Perthuis - La Junquera), through which the modern motorway goes, and the Col de la Perche about 100 km. west, which gives access to the upper valley of the Sicoris (Segre) and so to Ilerda. Lucius Afranius: see 38. In 2 the other legions: see 36.4n. 3 the pass: from the fact that the confrontation between Fabius' army and that of Afranius and Petreius took place at Ilerda, it must be practically certain that this pass is the Col de la Perche. 38 1 Vibullius Rufus....as noted: at 34.1. Afranius and Petreius and Varro: Pompey had appointed these legati in 55, when he became proconsul, and they had governed the province for him ever since. L. Afranius had served under him against Sertorius in Spain in the 70s and against Mithridates in the 60s, and had been consul in 60. M. Petreius, described by Sallust (Cat. 59.6) as a 'military man*, had held a praetorship in 64, and commanded the forces which defeated Catiline in 62. Neither was a member of the established aristocracy, and they owed their positions to the patronage of Pompey. The case of M. Terentius Varro, the celebrated polymath, was different, and it may be symptomatic of his more elevated social standing and wider ties among the political class that his commitment to the Pompeian cause was less firm than that of his colleagues (11.17). He too had served against Sertorius, became praetor (68?), and was cme of Pompey's fleet commanders against the pirates in 67. If the order of the names in the text is sound, Caesar expresses himself confusingly: it was actually Varro who held the second command and Petreius the third. As for the legions, one of Varro's two had been raised locally at the outbreak of hostilities (11.18.1, 20.4), but all the rest were Italian (85.6). 4 Ilerda: This town is modem Lgrida, which lies about 150 km. west of Barcelona, and is the principal town of the lower Segre basin. It stood on a steep hill on the right (north-western) bank of the river, over which there was a stone bridge. 39 K.-H.-M. doubt that this chapter was written by Caesar, largely on the grounds that he would not be expecting Pompey to make for Spain, and that the loyalty of his legions was certain enough to make the forced loan from his officers unnecessary. But regardless of whether or not Caesar actually believed the Commentary 189 rumour, others will have, and it constituted a psychological factor of importance at the time. Nor do we know exactly how short Caesar was of money at this point, nor how much his men, some of whom had marched with barely a halt from central Gaul to Brundisium and then back over the Pyrenees, needed a sweetener. The textual corruption so apparent in the chapter is quite incidental, and cannot be used to throw doubt on its authenticity. 1 thirty cohorts of heavy- and light-armed native infantry: the armour of these troops was, respectively, the scutum, a large shield made of wood, covered in leather, and rimmed with iron, and the caetra, a small round leather shield. There is a difficulty with the text here, since 48.7, where the context guarantees the soundness of the reading, mentions caetrati from Nearer Spain; but it seems easier to suppose that Caesar has been careless than to see (with Nipperdey) the extensive insertion of erroneous explanatory matter into the text. As to the number of cohorts, the MSS figure of eighty seems impossibly high. In the battle deployment of all Petreius' and Afranius' forces (83.1) the auxiliaries were only half as numerous as the 20 - 25,000 legionaries. Stoffel's correction of LXXX to XXX is simple and probable. 2 six legions: the text is corrupt, but the figure of six legions may be deduced from the operations described in 41 and 42 below and is confirmed by 64.6 with 83.2. They can be identified as VII, IX, XI, XIV, and two of VI, VIII, X, XII, and XHI (see 36.4n). no auxiliary infantry: editors are very reluctant to print the transmitted text (see apparatus criticus) but the circumstances are perfectly consistent with an absence of auxiliary troops at this stage, and the fact is important enough to be mentioned. The operation of legions did not depend on auxiliaries, who followed later, being firstrecorde d at 51 with the arrival of the Ruteni. See also 83.5n. an equal number from the parts of Gaul pacified by himself: Caesar means another three thousand cavalry from central and northern Gaul; the others must have been drawn from the old Roman province and the adjoining regions. He uses the expression 'Gaul, which he himself had pacified' because the area he had conquered was not yet a regular administrative province with an accepted designation, nor did he claim to have pacified all Gaul. This was not the first time he had used the technique of asking Gallic nobles for their services by name, cf. B.G. 7.39.1. A qui tarn and the mountain peoples who border the province of Gaul: the Aquitani inhabited S.-W. France, while the mountain peoples are those who lived on the western side of the Alps and in the Massif Central. 3 Pompey was marching....through Mauretania: Mauretania is modem Algeria. The rumour was as wild as the alternative version current at the 190 Book I same time in Rome, that Pompey was marching through Dlyricum to Gaul (Cic. Att. 10.6.3, 10.9.1). An equally hopeful converse report had circulated amongst the Pompeians in Campania in February, that Afranius had defeated Trebonius in the Pyrenees and was on his way to Italy (Cic. Att. 8.3.7) 40 1 two bridges: Fabius was on the same side of the river as the town, that is on the right or north-western bank, and presumably some 2-4 km.up-river of it. The bridges were temporary wooden ones, one of them by his camp and the other further upstream. See Map n. 3 daily routine—to stand guard over the grazers: the problems of commissariat, and in particular of securing enough food for horses to remain useful, bulk large in the Derda campaign. gale and flood: the pre-Julian calendar (used in this commentary in conformity with the sources) was on one estimate (le Verrier) about 26 days in advance of the true date, according to another (Holzapfel - Groebe) 40 - 50 days. The second seems more likely to be right; indeed Cic. Att. 10.17.2, making 16 May 49 B.C. an equinox, suggests it may be an underestimate. In that case, the collapse of the bridge (June 21 or 22, see 41.In.) occurred in late April by the true calendar, an entirely likely time for such an event. 4 his own bridge: the stone bridge. 5 Lucius Plancus: L. Munatius Plancus, who had commanded legions in Gaul in 54 and 53, eventually played an important part in the events that followed the death of Caesar, became consul in 42, founded the colony of Lugdunum (Lyon), and by adroit desertions (morbo proditor, Veil. Pat 2.83.1) survived the conflict of Antony and Octavian to become a pillar of the Augustan state and one of the last pair of non-imperial censors ever to hold office, in 22 B.C. 41 1 Caesar reached the camp: the official calendars of the Augustan era name August 2nd as the day on which Caesar accepted the capitulation of Afranius and Petreius (Degrassi, 491). This was only forty days after he came within sight of the enemy, at least according to the speech he puts into Curio's mouth (II.32.5). Thus he reached Ilerda on or, if we allow some rhetorical licence, about June 23rd. triple column: a formation used for dangerous marches. The legionaries marched in the three columns of their usual batde order, so that a ninety- degree turn by each man produced instant battle readiness. Afranius* camp: almost certainly on the flat-topped Mont de Gardeny, basically a continuation to the SW, parallel to the river, of the hill on which the town itself stood, but slightly separated from it (see 43.1). 4 fifteen-foot ditch: in width; perhaps half as deep. Commentary 191 5 before Afranius was able to realise that a camp was being fortified: it was more probably the extraordinary audacity of the tactic than the ancient lack of field-glasses that fooled Afranius. Caesar's intention may have been to cut Afranius off from the town and die bridge, even though the Pompeian camp was so close to them, but although he was unsuccessful (see 43) the nearness of his camp must have put the enemy under great psychological pressure and helped to win the initiative. 42 1 rampart material: that is, timber and possibly stone. Caesar means that it was impossible for him to construct the usual fortifications of a legionary camp under these highly unusual circumstances. allotting each legion a side of the camp: obviously the sides which were as yet unfortified. Three legions were therefore set to the digging, which with the three guarding them mentioned just below, gives the total of six accepted by most commentators. 2 the ditch: the one dug the previous day, on the front edge of the camp. 43 1 five hundred yards: the Roman mile, a thousand paces, is approximately 1,600 English yards. A Roman pace is therefore somewhere between a yard and a half and a metre and a half. 3 elite troops: antesignani, literally 'those in front of the standards'. In Sulla's time these men were the front rank of. the legion (Front. Strat. 2.3.17), but Caesar had begun to use them, or some of them, as a special body of troops to operate with cavalry or otherwise (as here) outside the normal legionary formation (57.1, an elite; DI.75.5, 84.3, fighting alongside the cavalry). A legion's standard was its symbolic, and often tactical, heart, and it is plausible that the men who were deployed in front of it were the best fighters. 44 1 not preserving much of their formation: this passage is rare contemporary testimony to the order and discipline of the Republican legions in battle. 2 being accustomed to fight: one or more words have dropped out of the text between barbaris and genere, of which very possibly the last is barbaro, to account for the omission, cum barbaris points to a missing verb such as dimicare or decertare; the infinitive is used with assuefactus to express the action one has become accustomed to performing. 3 outflanked on their open side : that is, on their right, the side not covered by the shield. In spite of Caesar's explanation, it is not at all clear what happened, nor why the technical peculiarity of the Pompeians' fighting style caused difficulty to Caesar's men. 192 Book I 45 4 sheer on both sides: two steep rock ridges flank the only easy approach to the town, fromth e south-west, and it was between these that Caesar's troops became trapped. 5 six hundred yards: see 43. In. 7 sent up through the town: while Caesar was attacking fromlandward , the Pompeians controlled access to the town on the riverward side where the gate to the bridge must have been. 46 4-5Quintus Fulginius, an ex-centurion of the first cohort .... Titus Caecilius, a leading centurion: Caecilius' rank of primus pilus (or primipilus) was that of the senior centurion of the first cohort and therefore of the whole legion Fulginius' status is less clear. In the imperial army primus hastatus was one of the centurions of the first cohort, and the same was probably true in Caesar's day (m.53.5; BG 5.44.1; ILLRP 499, triumviral; cf. e.g. CIL 2.1681, 2nd. cent. A.D.). Early editors disliked ex primo hastato (see app. crit.), but Gronovius explained the meaning as 'a former primus hastatus' and so made Fulginius a re-enlisted veteran, like Crastinus in Caesar's army at Pharsalus, 'who the previous year had been with him as primus pilus of the 10th legion' (IH.91.1). This straightforward conclusion has been resisted, perhaps out of a mistaken reluctance to allow that Caesar could use ex in this way, perhaps from an equally mistaken belief that Latin of the classical period does not permit prepositional phrases to function as adjectives. But Cicero (Balb. 43, defendunt ex nobilissimo civi sanctissimum hospitem; Part. Or. 17, nihil est tarn miserabile quam ex beato miser) and Horace (Od. 3.30.12, ex humili potens) show that this usage, though rare before the second century A.D., is unobjectionable. There is therefore no need to accept with most if not all modem translators the view adopted by K.-H.-M., who see Fulginius as a serving centurion holding a rank called (centurio) ex primo hastato - a term which is neither attested elsewhere, nor parallel to either of those used as alternatives to primus pilus, namely centurio primi pili and qui primum pilum ducit. (For the centurionate, see Domaszewski 90-97; Passerini 586 ff.; Dobson xx - xxix; TLL s.v. centurio col. 840). 47 Caesar, having concluded the previous chapter with a balance-sheet rather like the one he will give after the battle of Pharsalus (IDL99 - there, as here, making special mention of a centurion), now analyses the morale of the two sides after this eventful but indecisive day's fighting. The effect is to provide a recapitulation of the course of the engagement, bring the narrative to an emphatic pause, and leave the reader in suspense, ignorant of the way in which the balance will eventually tip. Commentary 193

II. The llerda region of Spain 194 Book I 48-60 In this second act of the drama, events at first go against Caesar. A great flood places him in very serious difficulties with his commissariat and cuts him off from reinforcements and extra supplies which were on their way to him from Gaul and Italy (48-52) 53 describes the rising hopes of the Pompeians and marks the low point of the campaign for Caesar. But the remaining chapters show fortune turning in his favour after he has, by a characteristically brilliant stratagem (54), started to extricate himself from a position his opponents thought hopeless: first there comes the news of a successful naval engagement at Massilia (56 - 58), and then the morale of the Pompeian troops begins to sag in the face of harrassment from Caesar's cavalry, the desertion of native tribes to Caesar, and the scotching of the rumour that Pompey was marching through Africa to their aid (59 - 60). 48 3 his camp, as has been explained above: a clear sign of the unrevised state of Caesar's writing, since he has neither explained on which bank his camp was situated, nor mentioned the Cinca. it was impossible to cross either for thirty miles: the Cinca joins the Segre fromth e west about 20 Roman miles downstream of Ilerda. The two rivers form two sides of a triangle (see Map II), and so the interpretation 'thirty miles apart' offered by K.-H.-M. makes no sense. Caesar must mean thirty miles upstream from Ilerda. This is, very roughly, the point at which both rivers debouch from the outlying ranges of the Pyrenees on to the great alluvial basin of Ilerda, and start to flow in wide deep beds. 4 the very substantial supplies: the MSS read 'company' (comitatus), as they do at 51.1, but the context here seems to require 'supplies' (commeatus). Quintilian (8.6.26) remarks 'we say supplies "come", which are brought* (dicimus 'venisse' commeatus, quae afferantur), which indicates that commeatus is perfectly appropriate here. (At 51.1 iter habebant is simply a variation for veniebant, and the correction should be accepted there also). 5 grain in store: editors have been reluctant to accept the reading of the MSS, literally 'grain in winter quarters', on the grounds that frumenta (pi.) usually means standing com; but the plural is required in precisely this sense for the young com in the immediately following clause, and emendation is surely not necessary. Hiberna can mean the winter range of cattle (Digest 32.1.67), and therefore evidentiy things other than winter- quarters for a military force. As a term for the places where grain was stored for the winter it seems eminently appropriate. nor was it quite ripe: in the hotter areas of the Mediterranean, com can be harvested before the end of May. 7 light infantry from Nearer Spain: caetrati, see 39.In. Commentary 195 inflatable skins Livy (21.27) corroborates this detail: 'throwing their clothes on air bladders, and their wicker shields on top, they lay on them and paddled across the river'. 49 2 the safe country across the river: temporarily safe, thanks to the flood. K.-H.-M. must be wrong in taking Integra to mean 'untouched by war', as before this both sides had been crossing the river daily (40.3). 50 2 all along the banks: the plural, in Latin as in English, may be used to signify only one side of a river (cf. Caesar BG 6.29.2: partem ultimam pontis quae ripas Ubiorum contingebat, where, as here, only one bank can be in question). 51 1 convoy: see48.4n. the river: to judge from Afranius' tactic (sec. 4), the spot must have been within a day's march upstream, possibly at modem Camarassa, where there are still the remains of a later Roman bridge. Caesar's reinforcements were on the left (east) bank of the Segre at this point because the route on the right, apart from being impracticable on account of steep rock faces close to the water, would have been blocked just above Camarassa by the confluence of the River Noguera, itself in impassable spate. Ruteni: a people who lived in the western Massif Central, north of the river Tarn. 3 Huesca, 70 km. northeast of Zaragoza) was at this time the chief town of the middle Ebro valley, while on the coast Tarraco (Tarragona), which gave its name to the province of Nearer Spain, was the leading port and the main centre of Roman citizens. Osca may or may not owe its name to a settlement of Italians from the Oscan-speaking areas of central Italy, but it is certain that Italians were settled at Gracchuris in the upper Ebro valley a little below Calagurris as early as 179 B.C., and a cohort of horse from Salduba, the later Caesaraugusta (Zaragoza), served with such distinction under Pompey's father in the Social War that he rewarded them with Roman citizenship on the field of battle (ILS 8888). The local communities were not simply native barbarians on whose territory someone else's civil war happened to be being fought, but were already perceptibly Romanised.

61'87 The third and final act of the drama portrays Caesar firmly in the ascendant. He seizes the initiative, with a move to divert part of the stream of the Segre so that his men can cross it much nearer to Ilerda, and never loses it throughout a series of twists to the tale. Pompeian morale in tatters, Afranius and Petreius decide to withdraw to Celtiberia, the region south of the Ebro valley, by taking ship down the Ebro from a point some twenty miles away from Ilerda (61). There follows the account of the chase and outflanking of the retreating Pompeian 200 Book I army as it strives to reach the key defile leading to the embarkation point on the Ebro (62-70). Caesar, having manoeuvred his opponents into a position in which they are cut off from supplies, in the hope of securing their surrender declines to offer battle; and in fact fraternisation occurs between the two armies, but is brusquely and brutally terminated by Petreius (71-75). The Pompeians then attempt to retrace their steps to Ilerda, where they have left food, but are so severely harrassed by Caesar's cavalry that they are forced to camp in an unsuitable place without access to water or forage (76-80). Again Caesar avoids fighting, removes their last hopes of suddenly breaking away by ringing them with an earthwork, and waits for thirst and hunger to have their effect. Finally Afranius and Petreius are forced to seek terms of surrender, and the Pompeian army is disbanded (80-87). 61 1 divert part of the Segre: once again, the scale and boldness of Caesar's military earthmoving is astonishing (see 18.6n.). The water-level must have subsided a little to have made this a practicable gambit, but the river must still have been very full and in powerful flow. Caesar chose a spot three miles above the town (64.7), where the flood-plain is wide and flat. 2 it was they who decided: ipsi is very emphatic, contrasted implicitiy with Caesar himself. He means that whereas it might have been expected that it would be he who would be forced to withdraw, in fact the turn of fortune brought the opposite result. Celtiberia: the mountainous and upland region lying to the south and southwest of the Ebro valley and dividing it from the headwaters of the great westward-flowing rivers of Spain. 3 the earlier war with Sertorius: for a full account of this, see Plutarch Sertorius 7-27. Quintus Sertorius had been a supporter of Marius in the civil war against Sulla, but anticipated the defeat of his side and left Italy in 83 B.C. to seek a base in the West Ejected once from Spain, he made a comeback and was so successful that he kept two Roman commanders, Pompey and Metellus Pius, at bay for several years (77 - 74 B.C.). Ultimately he was forced from Celtiberia to the north side of the Ebro valley, and was murdered (at Osca) by his subordinate Perperna (who was shortly afterwards abandoned by his allies and defeated). Afranius had served as an officer of Pompey's in this war. 5 Otogesa: it is disputed exactiy where this place was; it must have been at or below the confluence of the Segre and the Ebro, but not very far below or it would have been considerably more than 'twenty miles' fromIlerda . Rice Holmes IE. 399-404 puts forward spirited and plausible arguments in favour of Ribarroja. Others prefer Mequinenza, which is situated at the confluence itself (though on the wrong side of the Segre), or rather more convincingly Flix, which is a litde downstream of Ribarroja (but significandy further from Ilerda, see Map II). All identifications are Commentary 201 speculative and depend on a closer interpretation of Caesar's narrative of the chase (68 - 73) than it will really stand, but fortunately the exact position of Otogesa is not vitally important for an understanding of the tactics. The true distance from Ilerda to the nearest of the three proposed sites is 26 Roman miles as the crow flies, so perhaps von G&ler was right to emend the figure from XX to XXX; on the other hand, since Caesar never reached the place he may never have known exactly what the distance was. (The correct form of the name is almost certainly either Otogesa or Otobesa, see Vallejo; the evidence of the MSS is that the archetype had Otogesa). 62 1 he had brought his situation back to the point: editors (K.-H.-M., Klotz) have suspected 'brought back\ preferring deduxerat to reduxerat, but the thought is unexceptionable: Caesar has won back what he had lost by the sweeping away of Fabius' bridges early in the campaign, namely the ability to cross the Segre near to Ilerda. 3 none the less: the meaning is that in spite of making some progress, in that at least his cavalry could ford the river, Caesar was in danger of losing the race to be able to cross the Segre no later than, and close to, his enemies. The moment their bridge of boats over the Ebro was complete, they could start out with the expectation, if they were only free from harrassment, that they would reach it in a single day's march. Once across it, they could break it up, leaving Caesar and his army isolated and powerless on the north bank of the Ebro. 63 3 the third watch of the night: the night was divided into four watches of equal length, so at this time of year (midsummer) the third watch would run from about midnight to 2 a.m. swarming around in great strength: the natural meaning of the MS text (magna multitudine circumfusa) is that Caesar's cavalry were themselves surrounded by great numbers, but this hardly seems to be what die general sense of the passage requires. All modem translators in fact adopt the interpretation here given, and I therefore correct the text to circumfusi, which has a perfectly well-attested middle meaning (cf. 67.3). 64 1 sometimes the tail of the column was unable to resist ...sometimes they advanced...: the text of this sentence has suffered damage, and emendations are necessary, (i) Sustinere, which is often used intransitively by Caesar like the English 'hold out* (e.g. sec. 4 below and 71.1), demands a negative or virtual negative before it to make sense with the immediately following statement, (ii) Ferri signa also has to be corrected to inferri in order to have the Pompeians attack Caesar's cavalry as the context requires. Inferre signa is the regular Caesarian term for an organised attack by a substantial number of infantry (cf. 82.5, n.42.1). 202 Book I 5 without their heavy equipment: Roman legionaries were nicknamed 'Marius' mules' from the huge amount of equipment and radons they carried. To have carried heavy packs on this occasion would have made not only the fording of the Segre almost impossible, but also a rapid pursuit of the enemy very difficult. 6 in triple column: see 41.2n. 7 their march was six miles longer: i.e. than that of the Pompeians, who had crossed the Segre by the stone bridge at Ilerda. Caesar's ford was therefore three miles upstream of the town. A factor that Caesar does not call attention to is that the speed of the Pompeian march was very much reduced by the harrassment inflicted by his cavalry (cf. 70.1). Nevertheless, the determination, courage, and endurance of his troops is remarkable, even if it was in part motivated by the desire to shorten the campaign, and thus their period of service. the third watch: see 63.3n. 65 1 Afranius...together with Petreius: it appears from this passage that Afranius, though sharing command with Petreius, was the senior - perhaps because he had three legions to Petreius' two (39.1). halting on higher ground drew up his forces: the Latin (constitit aciemque instruit) switches from perfect to narrative present tense so violently that corruption of an original present (consistit) has been suspected (Chacon). But similar examples abound (e.g. distulerunt... ponit at the end of this chapter), and so far as the sequence of tenses is concerned the Latin reader evidendy perceived the narrative present as a syntactically exact (though psychologically more vivid) equivalent of a perfect (e.g 66.2 veriti ne..xogerentur aut nc.tenerentur iter supprimunt). The higher ground is not identifiable. The land rises gradually to the south-east, with many isolated flat-topped hills and 'headlands', all very suitable for a military camp. 3 mountains: Caesar refers to the wide and deep valley broken by many ridges and hills through which the Ebro finds it way on this stretch of its course. This valley's northern edge, which lies anything between 1 and 10 km. from the river, is constituted (for anyone approaching from the north) by littie more than a low ridge dominated at the end nearer the Segre by the volcano-shaped cone of Montmaneu (see Map II). narrow and difficult tracks: die only obvious ways from the rim of die plain down through the steep and broken country of the Ebro valley to the river itself neariy a thousand feet below are the valleys cut by the natural torrent-beds. It is impossible to be sure from Caesar's narrative which is in question, though one may rule out the gorge of the Segre. If that had been the route, Caesar could not have avoided mentioning the river. Commentary 203 66 1 the military cry Tack up1: vasa colligite was the phrase for 'collect your things' or 'pack up' (cf. Livy 21.47, where it means moving camp), and this was evidently shortened by military custom to simply yvasa\ 3 Decidius Saxa: this man went on to become tribune of the plebs in 43 B.C., leaving Rome to join Antony. Cicero jeers at him for his Celtiberian origin (Phil. 11.12) but one may assume he was of 6migr£ Italian stock. He is chiefly notorious for his defeat by the Parthians in 40 B.C. when commanding an army in Syria for Antony. See Syme (1937). 4 Each reported the same: this detail, like the account of the council of war of the Pompeians in the next chapter, must surely have been gleaned by Caesar from conversations with them after their surrender. Caesar uses it tellingly, and in this terse but far from artless narrative seems to be reaching towards a different and more dramatic style of historical writing. these defiles: see 65.3n. 67 3 a frightened soldier involved in civil war: a rare acknowledgement of the potential unreliability and unwillingness to fight of even experienced troops in such a conflict. Caesar takes care to attach the observation to the Pompeian side. This enables the great efforts of his men reported in the next chapter to appear all the more remarkable, and emphasises his own ability to command loyalty. 4 under the gaze of the officers and centurions beside him: I adopt the reading of all the MSS. This is followed only by K.-H.-M. among modem editions, but is surely more plausible than the renaissance correction to praesentiam: it is not the presence of the officers (who would be at hand whether it was night or day), but the fact mat by daylight they can see how a man behaves, that matters. 68 1 When the sky was light: whether or not albente caelo is a poetic expression (cf. Virgil Aen. 4.586; Quintilian 8.3.35 says that Sisenna was the first prose writer to use it, ca. 80 B.C.), it is certainly not Caesar's usual turn of phrase, which would be prima luce 'at first light'. This is a literary device to heighten the tone of the narrative and so emphasise the drama. 2 He himself: note the total identification of Caesar with his troops. very deep and difficult gullies: these are the numerous torrent-beds which intersect the landscape. Although they are mostly wide and flat- bottomed, their sides are miniature cliffs formed of bands of crumbling rock and earth. Occasional low flat-topped hills, nearly as awkward to surmount, constitute further impediments to progress. 69 2 without baggage animals or equipment: Caesar's army had set out on the chase as unencumbered as possible, 'without their heavy equipment' (64.5). 204 Book I 3 the column bend back.... to the right: the direction of progress from Ilerda to Otogesa being roughly south, this statement surely leaves little doubt that Caesar aimed to outflank the Pompeians to the east, on the side away from the river. His camp must have been to the north of his opponents', and perhaps slightly to the west to account for their initial impression that he was going back to Ilerda. From such a position his column would indeed have to bend right, both from his own point of view on the march, and from that of his opponents as they watched from their camp, in order to effect an outflanking movement to the east. K.-H.-M. speculate that Caesar was able to conceal his turn behind a ridge of ground, a desirable tactic in itself, and easy in this terrain (cf. 65. In); if he did so, his failure to mention it is a device to exaggerate the false confidence and military ineptitude of the Pompeians. 4 directly towards the Ebro: see 65.3n. 70.1-2 It was a contest... : the critical moment of the entire Ilerda campaign is the laconic statement at section 3: 'Caesar reached the goal first'. The supreme importance of the entrance to the mountainous region has been in the reader's mind since 65-6, where the analysis was presented first from Afranius' point of view (65.3-4) and then (66.4) as a truth confirmed both to him and to Caesar by investigation. The subsequent manoeuvres have been determined by it, and the point needs no further emphasis. Caesar characteristically rejects further dramatic description of the race or of the state of mind of the participants in favour of a brief recapitulation of the handicaps on either side (already quite vividly described at 64.1 and 68.2-3 respectively), and of what were surely his own reflections if he lost the race: 'Well, at least 111 have their baggage and a few auxiliaries.' But these thoughts are presented impersonally in such a way as to suggest disaster starting to close in on his opponents (note necessario, 'inescapably'), when in reality Afranius would probably have regarded the loss of his baggage as a trifling price to pay for an otherwise successful withdrawal from a difficult position. 3 emerging... on to the level: perhaps this level' is the plateau adjoining the slight saddle some 8 km. SW of Maials (see 65.3n.), perhaps the top of the rise that leads up to the saddle. There is a prominent small round hill in the centre of the saddle itself. 4 the highest mountain in sight: on the face of it, this ought to be (as Rice Holmes argues) Montmeneu, which lay to the west of Afranius' position, and at 495 m. is not merely the highest but also, when seen from a distance, the only prominent peak of the area. However, the nearer one gets to it and to the ridge which extends from it to the SE, the less prominently it stands out from some of the smaller hills of the ridge. One of the latter, nearer to Commentary 205 Afranius' temporary position, and giving more direct access to his projected high-level route to the Ebro, makes better tactical sense. 71-72 By way of introduction to the final stages of the campaign, Caesar pauses to present in dramatic form the arguments for and against battle as a way of defeating the Pompeians. The scene is set with the calm statement of the magnitude of the opportunity, and of Caesar's appreciation of it. Because his judgement stands outside the action, like a prologue, it has a privileged status and acquires an illusory validity as a seemingly objective statement. Then his officers come running on stage, as it were, urging him for all sorts of excellent reasons to offer battle. Finally Caesar replies, beginning with an initial aside to the audience explaining his hope for a peaceful resolution, and then clearly turning to his officers with a string of rhetorical questions and appeals to higher values such as non-violence and mercy to citizens. The stating of 'case for' and 'case against' in this dramatic and adversarial form is a good instance of the way in which habits of thought ingrained by rhetorical education and training could govern the literary shape of an analysis. It is easy to imagine the two cases expanded, written up, and given in direct speech; and we should then have an example of the paired speeches so often used by ancient historians, from Thucydides onwards, as a means of presenting an analysis. 71 3 the Afranians had indicated their fear: by using only negative forms of expression - not helping.., not leaving.., hardly resisting.., not preserving their ranks., (etc) - Caesar powerfully emphasises the paralysis of the Afranians. the identity of their units: as soon as the standard, which formed the essential reference point for the men of any particular unit, had moved too close to others, there was insufficient space for formation to be kept or for units to be distinguished. That this happened when the Afranians were not under any serious pressure was a sure sign of the failure of their morale. 4 the unfavourable nature of the ground: Caesar would have to attack uphill. Iniquitas can mean roughness of ground, but in contexts such as the present Caesar uses it to indicate that one side has a position above the other (cf.tf.G. 7.45.9). 72 3 pity for his fellow-citizens: true pity for his fellow-citizens would of course have prevented Caesar from crossing the Rubicon. In this narrower context the sentiment appears plausible, and serves to advertise a quality Caesar liked to lay claim to, his lenitas, 'mildness' (as exemplified, e.g., at Corfinium, 23.3, and in his later treatment of Massilia, II.22.6; cf. also 74.7). 4 the soldiers... openly saying... they would not fight: the soldiers are portrayed as even less perceptive than their officers, who at least have 206 Book I reasons, inadequate though these may be, for preferring a different course of action to the one favoured by their uniquely wise commander. We are aware, too, that the threat is empty, because of the tremendous loyalty to Caesar which his troops have consistently been shown to display, even in the most demanding situations such as fording the river and outflanking the Pompeians. Caesar... moved away a little: it seems that the archetype of our MSS had degreditur, 'moved dowri, and that digreditur, 'moved away', in V has no independent value, being either an error in copying or a conscious correction. None the less, this is the reading that gives better sense, because it is not the fact that Caesar is on higher ground (probably not the case anyway) than his opponents which is pinning them down, but that he, and particularly his cavalry, are near them. If Caesar did not want an immediate battle, he had to allow the Pompeians access to water. Otherwise they had no choice but to fight to get it. Back in their camp, they could be allowed to last out long enough for the idea of surrender to seem more and more desirable. 5 a camp as close as possible to the enemy's: Caesar did not re-use his camp of the previous two nights, which was presumably not close enough to Afranius' to allow either harrassment, or negotiation, or fraternisation, to take place easily. 73 2 Tarraco: the chief town of Nearer Spain, modem Tarragona. It lay about 75 km. ESE as the crow flies, but the distance was nearer to 100 km. by the route the army would have to take (via Montblanc) to avoid the intervening mountains. K.-H.-M. estimate four days' march. 3 cohorts, both legionary and auxiliary: auxiliary cohorts (called alariae, 'on the wing', from their original position on the batdefield) never formed part of a legion and remained separate tactical units, even if they were sometimes grouped together for particular purposes. 4 Petreius and Afranius divided this work between them: i.e. each supervised his own legionaries. 74 2 the great general's good faith: this translation attempts to reproduce the flavour of Caesar's way of referring to himself here. The point of the Latin word he uses, imperator, is that it carries the significance 'victorious general' (1.13.In.), and serves to elevate Caesar to a class far above Afranius and Petreius, who are always described as mere 'leaders', duces. Fides, honour or trust, is an equally resonant term: it was a quality the Romans liked to think they possessed, and the Latin phrase for unconditional surrender was 'to entrust yourself to' your victor. Commentary 207 lamented because... they had fought against friends and kinsmen: Caesar's men were equally culpable, but the skilful presentation blinds the reader to this. 3 not appear guilty: Caesar's purpose is to depict the Pompeian soldiers as decent men misled, who have finally come to their senses. One can be sure that the language in which he would have described a desertion of himself by his own men would have been very different. 6 Sulpicius: P. Sulpicius Rufus, who had been one of Caesar's legionary commanders in Gaul in 55 and 52, and became praetor in 48 B.C. (m.101.1; B.G. 4.22.6,7.90.7). 7 general rejoicing: the Latin here, plena laetitia, is the sole instance in Caesar oiplenus followed by an ablative rather than a genitive; perhaps the repeated eorum following caused him to avoid other genitives. his earlier mildness: cf. 72.3n. 75 2 Petreius...remained himself: this appears, for a moment, to be a compliment to Petreius for not throwing in the towel like Afranius; but the action he at once proceeds to take characterises him as as violent and unreasonable. To arm slaves was always the act of desperate men. his praetorian cohort: the cohort which acted as the general's bodyguard in batde. The stationing of such cohorts in Rome, and their permanent designation as praetorian, was an innovation of Augustus' linked to his permanent status as imperator and holder of imperium. detached for special duties: beneficiarii were so called because when soldiers were assigned to special duties, normally on headquarters staff, they were relieved of routine fatigues and were thus in receipt of a beneficium, a favour. 3 wrapped their left hands in their cloaks: as a substitute for the shields they did not have. 76 1 absent general Pompey: Pompey, unlike Afranius and Petreius, is called imperator. Since he is absent, the effect is to present the contest between his lieutenants, simple duces, and Caesar, an imperator, as uneven. There may also be a hint that Pompey ought to have been in Spain with his most loyal and experienced troops. for punishment: Petreius is portrayed as completely misjudging Caesar's attitude, as revealed in 74 above and by his actions at Corfinium (23) - not to mention the sequel. 2 in front of the commander's tent: a Roman military camp was always laid out with an open space in front of the commander's tent to serve as parade ground and assembly area. 208 Book I 11 The contrast between Caesar's treatment and Petreius' of their opponents' soldiers is so stark as to make one wonder about its authenticity. But Caesar had everything to gain from such tactics, and there is no need to suppose that his desire to present himself as the merciful, reasonable man has distorted the truth here. 78 1 twenty-two (?) days* rations: even though we know from Cicero (Tusc. 2.37) that Roman legionaries sometimes carried provisions for more than a fortnight, Afranius expected to reach the Ebro in two or three days, if that. Furthermore, Rambaud calculates that 22 days' rations would weigh 17 kilos, whereas Vegetius (1.19) gives the entire marching load of a legionary as 60 pounds (19.6 kilos). On both counts the figure of 22 must be corrupt. 12 or 8 are the most likely corrections, palaeographically speaking, and both make sense in the context. 3 Tarraco: see73.2n. 79 1 several of them stood fast: that is, some of the rearguard held off the enemy while some retired a little; then the former in their turn would retire behind the cover of the latter, and so on. 5 actually protected them: a reversal of the normal roles of cavalry and infantry, marked by Caesar's ultro. 80 2 more violently troubled: This is the only time Caesar uses the rare word peragitatus, expressive of the dramatic tension now being built up. they occupied a high hill: it is notable that Caesar hardly refers to Afranius and Petreius by name throughout his account of their final attempt to save themselves by going back to Ilerda. The vague 'they' sometimes refers to the leaders, sometimes to the Pompeian army in general; it is as though this army was leaderless. 3 towards the middle of the same day: Caesar says 'about the sixth hour1: the Romans divided the day into twelve hours between sunrise and sunset, regardless of the time of year, so that an hour was perceptibly longer in summer than in winter. The apparendy otiose 'same day' is added because once a Roman army had stopped marching and begun to fortify a camp, however early in the day, it was taken for granted that it would not move on again that day (see m.76.4, where Caesar successfully played the trick that the Pompeians attempted here). 4 late in the afternoon: literally, 'at the tenth hour'; see preceding note. the foragers should be recalled: after 'the foragers' the MSS have '(and) the cavalry', but these are identical groups, see the previous section. I therefore take equites to be a gloss on pabulatores, absorbed into the text by a process visible in the fact that M, on the whole the best MS, lacks -que. Commentary 209 81 2 reasons... explained above: see 72. g2 1 the middle of the afternoon: the 'ninth hour' - late for a battle. 2 the feelings of the soldiers: opinio, when used in conjunction with fama (e.g. Pompeius... utfamam opinionemque hominum teneret, IQ.56.2) seems to mean the good opinion or esteem in which one is held. Caesar here means that his soldiers expected him, in such a position, to fight(cf . 72.4). 83 1 the auxiliary cohorts: since there must have been 25 legionary cohorts (5 legions = 50 cohorts) in each of the first two lines, it is unlikely that a vastiy greater number of auxiliary cohorts could have been accommodated in the rear line. This supports the correction of the MS figureo f 80 cohorts to 30 at 39.1. Afranius had lost four of these some days before (70.4-5). 2 in the middle of the line: presumably in the second and third ranks, where there was more space, but Caesar's expression is vague. 3 Caesar not to join battle... his opponent to1 do likewise: editors have objected to the transmitted text, which appears to state Caesar's aim by means of an infinitive, and Afranius' by a purpose clause with ut. Both constructions are acceptable, but the effect is uncomfortable when they are used together as an antithetical pair. Hence the various emendments proposed to obviate a harshness more typical of Tacitus than of Caesar. But the problem is an unreal one: the aim of both Caesar and Afranius was the same, to avoid battle (proelium non committere), but Caesar did not want to fight unless he had to, while Afranius wished to keep Caesar's men standing to arms so that they could not complete their earthworks. On this interpretation the logical parallelism is between nisi coactus and ut... impediret, and the syntactical difficulty disappears. The thought is slightiy awkwardly and elliptically expressed, the awkwardness arising from Caesar's wish to convey the idea that not-to-fight (while seeming to want to) has a purpose. 4 On the following day: August 2nd of the pre-Julian system, as recorded in the inscribed calendars of the Julio-Claudian period (Fasti Amiterni and others, Degrassi 491). Groebe calculates the true date as June 10th, le Verrier as July 2nd. a ford in the river Segre: not Caesar's ford above the town. The river will have dropped to much more normal levels by this time, and its bed is wide and fairly shallow for considerable stretches of its course below Ilerda. 84 2 Caesar refused this request: Caesar, being a public speaker of considerable effectiveness, wished to capitalise on his success by putting his view of things to both armies, an opportunity that would be lost in private negotiation. In particular, as the speech that follows makes clear, he 210 Book I wanted to discredit the Pompeian leaders and make sure they received no gratitude for saving the lives of their men. Afranius' son: cf. 74.6 4 their general Gnaeus Pompeius: see 74.2n. and 76. In. 5 for Caesar to proceed to the ultimate punishment: Afranius means death. 85 Caesar's speech. It seems improbable that Caesar delivered such a speech in front of two exhausted armies, one of which was starving. Sections 1-5 are plausible, referring to events and decisions relevant to his audience. But after that he goes on to a much wider justification of his own position, aimed not even at Afranius and Petreius, but at a much broader Roman public opinion. In particular it is unlikely that Caesar uttered the sentiments of section 11 in front of the Pompeian army. He is therefore taking advantage of the speech-writing conventions of ancient historical writers to recapitulate his case. Most of the points are a repetition or amplification of remarks made at 9.2-4, 22.5, and 32.2-6. It is very noticeable that all reference to some matters which seemed important in January, namely the rights of the tribunes and his own claim to a second consulship, has disappeared. We have here a deeper and simpler perspective, in which Caesar interprets the actions of Pompey and the pauci as a long-laid plan to destroy him. The actual occurrence of war has laid bare its true basis, namely personal antagonism, and Caesar concerns himself with nothing else here at the climax of his second great campaign of the war, which brings the first book to a fitting end. 2 even when circumstance... had been favourable: see 71-72. 2-3 his own army... the other army... the leaders themselves: see 74-77. 4 As a consequence: igitur occurs only here in Caesar, which suggests that for him it was a far more powerful, and perhaps rhetorical, word than its apparent equivalent itaque. 6-7 six legions sent to Spain: Pompey had been given both Spains for five years by the Lex Trebonia of 55 B.C., as Crassus was given Syria, and Caesar (by the similar Lex Licinia Pompeia) the Gallic provinces. According to Plutarch (Pomp. 52) four legions were to be sent to Spain, but reinforcement evidendy occurred at a later stage. Caesar, like Pompey, took advantage of the provision in these laws which permitted troops to be raised in a province: his famous Tenth Legion (Alaudae, 'the Larks') was conscripted in Narbonese Gaul. 6 such large auxiliary contingents raised: the MSS read 'fleets', but these are quite mysterious. In this context of preparations against Caesar before 50 B.C., the words cannot refer to the Pompeian fleets we have heard of since the outbreak of war, which were in any case either in the East (Cic. Att. 9.9.2), or dubiously adequate and hastily gathered, like Domitius' Commentary 211 force at Massilia. Nor can they refer to the fleets of 67-66 B.C. with which Pompey operated against the pirates. I therefore adopt Nipperdey's eminently sensible suggestion (see apparatus criticus) which treats classis as a mistaken gloss on auxilia, which it then displaced in the text with consequent correction of the adjectival agreements, militarily expert commanders sent out: on the commanders, see 38.In. For the meaning of summitto in such a context, cf. 11.40.1, 41.7. 7 a long period of peace: a gross misstatement: Caesar himself had campaigned in Spain as recendy as 61-60 B.C., and the righting had been serious enough for him to be awarded a triumph (whose celebration his enemies forced him to forfeit). There was further fighting against the Spanish tribes in the thirties B.C. before the campaigns of Augustus and others in the twenties paved the way for Agrippa to bring the country at last fully under Roman control in 19-18 B.C. Caesar's false picture of a peaceful Spain is explained in part by his wish to impute to his enemies a long-standing vendetta against himself, in part by the fact that he had himself been awarded a triumph from Spain in 60 B.C. A triumph was supposed to mark a decisive victory, and one of the conditions for a commander to claim one was to bring home his army as a proof that peace had been established. An admission on Caesar's part that legions needed to be stationed in Spain in the mid-fifties was an admission that his own victory had been a littie hollow. 8 new sorts of command had been invented: perhaps no-one had envisaged that Pompey would take his right under the Lex Trebonia to govern Spain through legati so far as never to visit the place at all. This right was not technicaUy an innovation, being very similar to powers he had enjoyed when entrusted with a Mediterranean-wide command against the pirates in 67 B.C. by the Lex Gabinia. But unlike those powers, its only justification was personal, in that it allowed him to retain his supervision of the corn-supply of Rome and at the same time have an army at his disposal. What was entirely unprecedented, and cannot surely have been foreseen by anyone, was his appointment to the consulship in Rome in 52 B.C., so that the same man held responsibility both for an important province and for the conduct of affairs in Rome - a combination that was normal between the Hannibalic War and Sulla's reforms, but only because the consul went out to his province during his term of office. And this essentially is what angers Caesar - Pompey's flouting of the conventions and his consequent ability to manipulate the political scene fromclos e at hand. at the gates of Rome: Pompey, as a holder of proconsular imperium, had to lay this power down before entering the city (except during 52 when he was consul). Cf. 2.1. two of the most warlike provinces: the two Spains, Nearer and Further. 'Most warlike', in view of what has just been said in sec. 7, has to be read as 212 Book I sarcasm if it is not to register as blatantly inconsistent with what has just been said. the rules for holding magistracies had been changed: see 6.5 n (Provinces...) men... were called out of retirement: Caesar's point is obscure, unless he refers to the appointment of men like Lentulus Spinther (15.3n.) and Minucius Thermus (12.In.) to commands when he invaded Italy. If so, he overlooks the point that it was his own invasion which had provoked these appointments. 10 with some degree of honour... to dismiss their armies: for a governor to be unable to bring his army home and dismiss it was a sign that military business had been left unfinished in his province. Unless this was done a triumph could not be claimed (cf. 7n.); but the manner in which Caesar was to be superseded would not allow him to do it. Yet unprecedented numbers of days of thanksgiving in Rome had been decreed for his successes in Gaul - fifteen days in 57 B..C. (B.G. 2.35.4), twenty days in 55 and again in 52 (B.G. 4.38.5, 7.90.8) - and even his bitterest enemies could hardly deny that he had earned a triumph. 12 as had been proposed: the reference could be to the senatus consultum passed on Dec. 1st 50, on Curio's proposal, by the overwhelming majority of 370 to 22, which called on both Caesar and Pompey to lay down their commands and dismiss their armies (App. B.C. 2.30). Or the proposal may have been one of those put forward in the negotiations mentioned at 32.6. The demobilisation mentioned above in sec.5 seems only to refer to the immediate situation of Afranius and Petreius and their defeated armies, while the context here is the general dispute which had given rise to the war. 86 1 the reward of discharge: many of the troops will have been pressed men, or at least unwilling volunteers; and it was usual for those being discharged to receive some kind of bonus, however small. 3 the river Var: the eastern boundary of the province of Transalpine Gaul. 4 compelled to enlist against his will: re-enlistment on discharge from one campaign for service on another would of course be desired by the 'professional' soldier of the late Republic; but there will also have been conscripts and those who wished to soldier no more. 87 1-3 Caesar's fairness: these three items all stress not only Caesar's fairness, but the recognition of it by friend and foe alike. All three are left vague, even the explosive matter of pay. Caesar forbears from giving the details, perhaps not because they were complicated or did not bear out his confident statements, but because they would have seemed something of an anti- Commentary 213 climax at this point in the story. The preoccupations of his account are with military achievement and political self-justification. 4 two of his own legions... the remainder: the latter category must be interpreted as 'the remainder of those which were to go back to Italy\ since two of Caesar's present six legions remained in Spain to deal with Varro, as told in the sequel (11.17-21). Quintus Fufius Calenus: Calenus, tribune of the plebs in 61 B.C. and praetor in 59, the year of Caesar's consulship, was one of Caesar's most senior subordinates. He had been a legionary commander since at least 51 (B.G. 8.39.4), and went on to play an important part in the campaign in Greece in 48. He was rewarded with a consulship in 47. 215

BOOK n 1 - 22 The siege of Massilia and the Conquest of Spain 1 -2 These two chapters set the scene for the two chief episodes which follow, the naval battle (3 - 7) and the siege-works by land (8 -16). Caesar informs us in a summary way of the topography of Massilia, the huge scale and difficulty of the enterprise, and the quality of the resistance Trebonius encountered, before passing on to the arrival of Nasidius' ships and a more consecutive narrative. 1 1 Gaius Trebonius: see 1.36.5. Caesar left for Spain early in June by the pre-Julian calendar (1.41. In.). 2 the port: the ancient harbour (called Lacydon) was the modern Vieux- Port, a deep but now partly silted-up inlet to the south of the ridge on which the ancient city stood. Modern excavations have discovered walls and installations of the classical, hellenistic, and Roman periods, which testify to the importance and prosperity of the city (see Euzennat, with good plans and eariier bibliography). 3 washed by the sea on three sides: namely the port to the S., the nose of the promontory, and the coast running NE to the bay of La Joliette (possibly further, Euzennat 139 n.17). 4 a siege-ramp eighty feet high: the agger of siege-works was a bank made of earth with heavy timber shoring, so that it was liable to attack with fire (cf. 14.2. and BG 7.22.3). Its great height here (also attested at Avaricum, BG 7.24.1) was probably made necessary by the Very deep valley' mentioned in 1.3, plus the height of the wall it had eventually to match. As it was pushed forward sheds (plutei) and screens (yineae) were placed on it and around it (cf. 15.3) to protect the workers and the other soldiers who were defending them. The object was to advance it to the wall of the besieged town so as to allow either entry over the top, or the use of a ram or the driving of saps from the protection of a chamber in the front of the structure. This type of agger should be distinguished fromtha t meaning an encircling or defensive earthwork (as round a legionary camp): Caesar... agger em apparare... coepit: nam circumvallare loci natura prohibebat ('Caesar began to get ready... a siege-ramp...: because the terrain prevented encirclement1, BG 7.17.1 ). 216 Book II 2 1 artillery: I so translate tormenta, which were like large mounted cross• bows. The onager, the big Roman stone-thrower, is not well attested before the fourth century A.D. (for comprehensive information on ancient artillery of all sorts, see Marsden). 4 a sixty-foot 'tortoise*: a mobile, armoured hut under the protection of whose carapace the ground-clearing necessary for the secure foundation of the agger (presumably 60 feet wide at its base) could take place. 6 the Albici: see 1.34.4, 57.3. towers: Trebonius' were wooden, while the defenders' were of stone. 3 - 7 The second naval battle (mid - late July (?) 49). These five chapters are virtually independent of their surroundings, and could be removed from the narrative of the siege without leaving a trace. The battle is not precisely related to any particular point in the siege, except that it apparently preceded the construction of the attackers' brick tower. The human side of the drama is strongly emphasised, but Caesar leaves us in ignorance of the strategic context. Presumably the purpose of the battle was to break the blockade and allow food in, but he gives no hint that this was the case and says nothing of any food shortage until his summary of the final situation of the Massiliots at 22.1. However, no amount of food would have saved them from Trebonius' siegecraft so long as his army remained in position on the landward side, and only an equally strong army would have been capable of actually lifting the siege. In the event of naval victory, escape by sea would have become a theoretical possibility, but the difficulty of organising the evacuation of a substantial city like Massilia is obvious. Caesar's failure to discuss such matters is surprising, and can reasonably be taken as one indication among several of the unfinished nature of this book. The real problem for Massilia was that legions were needed to save it; but Caesar had tied down the bulk of Pompey's Spanish army at Ilerda, and Pompey himself, having been driven to Greece, was too far away and too busy regrouping to send any effective aid. Nasidius' squadron, even if it had shown greater enthusiasm for its task, was not the type of help most needed. 3 1 Lucius Nasidius: Since it can be calculated from 1.59.1 and the subsequent narrative that the first naval battle at Massilia occurred about June 27th, Nasidius probably set off (from the area of Dyrrachium?) sometime in June - which gives ample time for news of the danger to Massilia to reach Pompey (cf. 1.34. In.). If Nasidius' praenomen is correctly preserved here (and only here, since the Berne scholiast on Lucan 3.524 probably took his information from this passage), he was a different manfrom th e Q. Nasidius who served the Republican cause as an admiral in 43 and then joined Sextus Pompey in Sicily, striking coins which guarantee his praenomen. But the relationship, if any, of the two Nasidii is unknown, Commentary 217 and the view put forward in RE 16.2 col. 1789 that they were father and son is only a guess. Curio: see 130.2. 4 3 the tears and entreaties...: this pathetic detail, little more than a cliche" in more romantic styles of writing history, registers strongly in the context of Caesar's spare and matter-of-fact account, and together with the psychological observation of the following sentence, prepares us for the heightened emotional content of the next chapter. 4 to be more confident: after these words the MSS add 'and more gravely frightened', rightly ejected from the text by Fabre as incompatible with a sequel introduced by 'as then happened' and going on to illustrate only confidence, not fear. 5 Tauroeis: this must be the place called Tauroention by Strabo, one of a chain of Massiliot setdements designed to secure the coast to the east against the Sallyes of the interior (4.1.5,9). 5 1 built at Arelate... six by capture: see 1.36.4, 58.4. 3 It was easy to see...: the pause for description and reflection before the moment of crisis is an effective literary device to bring home the importance of the impending battle. Thucydides' famous account of the batde in the Great Harbour of Syracuse in 413, whose result spelt doom for the Athenian army watching it (7.71), is an obvious parallel, men posted as guards: the text is corrupt as transmitted. Most editors accept Bucheler's insertion of locis, but transposition is a neater solution and does not leave an ablative whose precise meaning is opaque floating awkwardly in no clear relation to the alternatives aut muro... aut templa. Custodiae publicae seems a legitimate expression to indicate a group which must have existed - those men who remained behind not from cowardice, but by public decision, to protect the city from a surprise attack while the naval battle took place. 6 2 As our ships gradually became separated...: it was obviously Brutus' aim to prevent the Massiliots fromexploitin g their superior seamanship, by using his ships as floating infantry platforms, as in the first battle (1.58.3-4). 3 when the ships did lie together: the reading of the MSS, coniuncti Albicis, is suspect: (i) if the meaning is no more than 'together with the Albici, the Massiliots fought bravely', coniuncti is a strange word to choose for cum; (ii) but if coniuncti is emphatic, as it always is in other authors and elsewhere in Caesar (e.g. HI.88.3: Ciliciensis legio coniuncta cum cohortibus Hispanis... in dextro cornu erant collocatae), and means 'when they joined with the Albici', the bravery of the Massiliots is qualified - in total contradiction to the point Caesar has just made at the beginning of the 218 Book II chapter. Although Heller's correction coniuncti Albici (adopted by Meusel and Klotz) takes a step in the right direction by making the Albici the subject of the sentence, a difficulty remains. Why did Caesar choose, quite unnecessarily, to describe them as coniunctil They have already featured prominently as allies, indeed the chief fighting men, of the Massiliots (134.4, EL2.6) and were important participants in the previous naval battle. I therefore read coniunctis Albici, which restores the necessary conditions (ships locked together) for the Albici to display their bravery, disposes of the awkward epithet, and is an equally easy correction. It also gives a nice antithesis with the preceding sentence: there, it is the seamanship of the Greeks before their ships were grappled that is stressed, here, the courage of their native allies after grappling had occurred. 4 two triremes, spotting...: it is unusual for Latin to personify in this manner (it is always 'the Romans' who act, not 'Rome'), but cf. the same phrase at 22.3. Did the fact that triremes had eyes painted on their prows make the personification more natural? Triremes were the thoroughbred warships of the fifth-century Greeks, with three banks of oars and a single man on each oar (see Morrison & Williams); they required great skill and training of their crews, but as this passage shows they were not completely displaced by the larger, heavier, and less manoeuvrable ships of the Hellenistic world, which did not need such skilled crews, were rowed with two or more men to an oar and probably did not have more than two banks of oars. Triremes formed a part of the Roman imperial fleet (Starr 52-55), though one cannot be certain whether the vessels were of the same form as their fifth-centurypredecessors . 7 Caesar does not so much relate the end of the battle as summarise its results. He does this in such a way as to underline the contrast between the bravery and tragedy of the Massiliots, fighting for their families and their very existence, and the selfishness and ineffectiveness of the reinforcements sent by the man to whom they were loyal. 2 to Nearer Spain: probably to Tarraco. 3 one might have thought the city had been captured: the thought is overtly tragic and dramatic, as terrible fates could be meted out to cities captured after prolonged resistance: unrestrained pillage by soldiery, execution or enslavement of all adult males, enslavement of women and children. In the case of Massilia, Caesar had given orders to Trebonius that this was not to happen, but the inhabitants were not to know this - and Caesar was far from sure that the soldiers were capable of being restrained if they did break in to the city (13.3-4; cf. his similar fears at Corfinium, 1.21.2). Commentary 219 8 * 16. The description of the siege, to which we now return, is eccentric. Although it deals very fully with the technical achievements which made the surrender inevitable, and with the sally by the inhabitants during the truce, which was a major setback to the besiegers, there are enormous gaps. Caesar gives no overall strategic or even tactical analysis and no indication of exactly what Trebonius9 plans were, nor what constraints, if any, he laboured under. There is no description of any siege-works apart from those at the brick tower, or of progress made at the other agger or elsewhere, though these things can be deduced from 22.1. Nothing at all is said of the sufferings of the besieged until tlie summing-up in 22, and no attempt is made to describe their morale, their attitude to Domitius, or the divisions between them that must surely have come to the surface as conditions in the town worsened. Perhaps most noticeable of all is the lack of precisely tliat note of human emotion which is so apparent in the account of the sea-battle above. Much of the text seems to derive from a report written from the point of view of an officer heavily involved in the work at the brick tower, and either uninterested in or ignorant of the wider picture. The contrast with the treatment of the siege at Corfinium in Book I (16 - 23) is striking. Caesar may well have intended to rework and refocus this narrative. 8 -10 Description of the siege works. This is a far more detailed description of the technicalities of military engineering than Caesar gives us anywhere else. Even his bridge across the Rhine (BG 4.17), surely a far more remarkable feat even if it was not carried out under enemy fire, is described with much greater economy. Since Caesar was not himself present when the tower and gallery were built, and they were destroyed by the defenders before he could see them, it is highly probable that he composed these chapters on the basis of a written report from Trebonius or one of his officers. It also seems likely that he kept some of the language of this report: note the slightly awkward use of contabulatio and contignatio for the same thing, along with a preference for the more technical word; the occurrence of insuper as a preposition (9.2); the frequency of the simple verb struo (used only once by Caesar outside this passage, trichilas structas in Pompey's camp at Pharsalus, m.96.1); and the rather odd tempus alterius contabulationis, 'time for another storey' (9.8). Ch. 10 is distincdy clumsy (see nn. to sea. 3-4), and it is very tempting to suggest that these chapters are not from Caesar's pen at all, but raw material from which he intended to select later. The general impression given by Book 2 is that it is far from finished, even if one is not prepared to see in the disconnected fragments of indirect speech at 29.3-4 an instance of Caesar caught in mid- composition. If this is the case, the great emphasis here laid on the siegecraft of the Caesarian forces is an accident, and one should not assume that Caesar would have given it such prominence in his finished narrative. The account is morally neutral and one notices the absence of Caesar's usual praise (whether explicit or implicit) for his men in such circumstances. 220 Book II

8 1a brick tower: later was unbaked, testa baked brick (Vitr. 2.8.17-18). Roman bricks were more like our tiles, square and relatively thin. 9 1 the enemy's fire: literally fire, incendiary warfare being a regular feature of ancient sieges. 2 on top of this floor: insuper is here a preposition, and need not be corrected to super. This passage joins one from the elder Cato (de Agr. 18.5) together with several occurrences in the late second century B.C. building contract from Puteoli (CIL I2 698 = Warmington Remains of Old Latin 4. 274 ff.) and in Caesar's contemporary Vitruvius (3.5.12, 4.8.1, 5.3.3, 5.12.4,10.14.2) to suggest that its use as a preposition may belong to the vocabulary of builders and architects. the deck: The word used by Caesar (contignatio) is extremely rare in literary Latin, its virtual equivalent contabulatio, also used in this chapter, being more common. Both signify any kind of compound timber deck or platform, and in particular such a structure used as a floor between storeys of a building. In so far as there is a difference, contignatio (from tignum) stresses the 'beam' element, and therefore the structural skeleton of the floor, not necessarily covered over, while contabulatio (from tabula) stresses the 'plank' element and therefore the continuity and solidity of the surface. The use of contignatio and its related verb in 15 below supports this distinction. the roof of the siege-shed: although this siege-shed has not been mentioned before, it is clear that the initial stages of building the tower could only have been carried out in the shelter of a pluteus (probably more than one, see 6). 4 padded quilts: these had a further advantage not mentioned: they were used in fire-fighting (which accounts for their availability here), and in fact the regular word for firemen in the early empire is centonarii (a meaning unknown to Lewis & Short). It was a regular practice to soak them with water, as must have been done at 10.6 below. the bolts of the artillery: see 2.1 and 16.3nn. 5 mats from anchor rope: the MSS say 'three mats', an obvious error, as a single four-foot wide mat hanging down on each of the three exposed sides of the tower would certainly be inadequate to provide the degree of safety boasted of in the last sentence of this chapter. Seven or eight would be needed on each side, as the tower was thirty feet square. Deletion of the offending figure is the simplest and best solution (perhaps it arose fromA S at the end of the previous word), though conceivably XXI could be read for HI; but the matter is not completely clear, as Caesar (or his informant) writes of the length' of the wall where what seems to be meant is the height. K.-H.-M. think the mats were thirty feet in length, to match the width of the Commentary 221 tower, and were hung up by their long sides. This would unfortunately provide protection (on the dimensions given) only for the top four feet of the tower, and therefore does not solve the problem. 6 lifting devices: pressio properly means the fulcrum on which a lever acts, but must have a wider sense here. 8 time for another storey: the Latin is a litde odd, and one might expect tempus contabulandi; but cf. such expressions as tempus iniuriae (Livy 3.46.5) and tempus cibi (Ovid Fasti 4.536). 10 1 a gallery: the purpose of this, when placed against the enemy wall, was to allow a ram to be used in safety, or saps to be driven from as near as possible to their goal. 4 strips to hold the bricks: these ran parallel to the ridge and stopped the lowest course of tiles ('bricks', 8. In.) from slipping off the edge of the roof. 3- 4 trusses, on which were to be placed the beams... There on top, they laid... beams: this is a very inelegant piece of repetition and it is difficult to believe Caesar himself wrote the passage, especially as the very same inelegance occurs in the next pair of sentences. 4- 5 the bricks which were to be laid on top of the gallery... it was covered with bricks: here the writer recapitulates quite unnecessarily and to an even greater extent than in the previous section, repeating the information he has only just given us about the fixingo f the trusses and the laying of the beams before telling us that the bricks which it was intended to put on the roof were actually put there. One is reminded of the pedanticism of Roman legal formulations. Perhaps some kind of building specification, or at least the phraseology of a man used to such specifications, lies behind this passage. 6 to stop water...washing them [bricks] to pieces: see 8. In. quilts: soaked in water. See9.4n. 7 rollers: we are not told how these were inserted under the musculus, whose weight when completed must have been immense. Perhaps they were put in position after the frameworkwa s complete but before the roof timbers were laid. 11 1 the pitched roof: it seems, from the stress laid previously on this feature of the musculus' construction, that a flat roof was normal. However strong a flat roof might be, it would eventually collapse if enough stone came to rest on top of it. 4 the sacred ribbons of suppliants: infulae were bands of coloured wool worn both by priests and by sacrificial animals. In circumstances like those described here they performed the function of the white flag in our society, but also implicit!y invoked divine protection. 222 Book II 12 4 highly educated men : in the ancient world this meant men who were proficient above all in rhetoric. Massilia was renowned for its rhetorical schools, which had come in the course of the first century B.C. to rival those of Athens (Strabo 4.1.5). Cicero (pro Flacco 63) speaks of the city's learning and seriousness (disciplina and gravitas). 14 1 an act of treacherous cunning: Dio has a rather different version, according to which Caesar's soldiers made a night attack during a 'sort of truce', to which the inhabitants responded so vigorously that the soldiers did not dare make any further attempts (41.25.2). If this is due the treachery was not one-sided, and it may be the explanation of the surprising fact that even after destroying the siege-works in the manner here described the Massiliots were granted another mice on the same terms (16.3). 2 the tower: evidently not the brick tower (see sect 4 below), but a conventional wooden one further from the wall. 5 the other tower and siege-ramp: the southern, or 'left-hand' ramp (assuming the description to be written from the attackers' point of view), see 2.1 and 8.1. 15 1 as all the trees...had been cut down and brought in: not only the previous siege-ramp and its surviving twin, which were faced on each side with heavy timber, but the massive musculus of ch. 10, must have been prodigious consumers of large timber. bridging these walls with a timber floor: this is a case where a 'floor', when seen from another point of view, as in sect. 3 below, could equally well be called a 'roof (cf. 9.2n.). 4 Doorways were left in the walls: this item reads like an afterthought; it would have been more logically placed at the end of sect. 2. 16 This one-sentence chapter is a striking example of 'periodic style' - the way in which classical Latin prose can organise a vast amount of information into a single sentence without losing its clarity. The technique is reminiscent of L34 (see a), expounding the factors which lead to the resulting decision. In both cases there is a triple structure, but here it is the verbs of perception (viderunt, sentiunt, intellegunt) which are subordinate, each being followed by complex dependent clauses, and they lead with logical inevitability to the stark statement of the main clause at the very end. 3 owing to the shortness of the range their own artillery ...had become useless: the tormenta of the Massiliots evidendy had a problem not unknown in twentieth-century artillery: difficulty in firing at angles near or below the horizontal, not because of any inherent limitations of principle, but because the builders or installers of the weapons failed to foresee the need for this point of aim. Since the tormentum fired tela (bolts or arrow- Commentary 223 or javelin-like missiles), employing the cross-bow principle (Vitruv. 10. 10,11), there is no intrinsic reason why it could not have fired at an angle of depression. The limitation on the field of firewa s almost certainly imposed by the size and placing of the wall apertures through which the weapons fired; the main purpose of the towers of Hellenistic and later defences was to contain artillery, and the apertures were constructed to suit. See Marsden 126 ff. and Lawrence 399 ff. the same conditions again for surrender: see 14. In. It is implied that the request was granted. 17-22. Caesar now turns back, without any kind of transition, to the Spanish theatre of war and the sequel to his victory at Ilerda. Apart from the actual surrender of Massilia, these are the only events described in book II of which the author was an eyewitness. The six chapters fall neatly into three pairs: the first pair relate Varro's shift from cautious near-neutrality to over-confident preparations to defend his province, the second the pitiful and sudden collapse of his attempt at resistance, and the third Caesar's dispositions for the province, followed by his departure for Tarraco and Massilia. As in the case of the Ilerda narrative, Caesar presents his opponents as lacking in judgement (e.g 18.2), in military awareness (18.6), and in appreciation of the degree of support and commitment he himself could command. Thus a certain air of inevitability and tightness seems to surround his success, particularly in the sequence of events narrated in 19 - 20. But it should be remembered that the enthusiasm for himself on which Caesar lays such stress must have been largely due to the situation. Very few of the inhabitants of the province, Roman or native, can have thought that Varro had any chance at all of holding out against Caesar, who had already won two major campaigns in the last six montfis against better generals and stronger opposition. One may therefore put a slightly different and more pragmatic construction upon statements like that made in 20.5. concerning the eagerness of the Romans ofHispalis to give bed and board to a legion that had just mutinied. 17 1 Marcus Varro: see L38.1 and n. the feelings of the whole province towards Caesar: Caesar had been proconsul of Further Spain in 61-60 B.C. and in addition to conducting campaigns of 'pacification' in what are now Portugal and Galicia had organised a settlement of debts by instalments, for which the inhabitants could have been expected to show gratitude (Plut. Caes. 12; hostile interpretation in Dio 37. 52-3). Gades in particular had benefited from his administrative attentions (Cic. Balb. 43). He had also served as quaestor in the province in 69-8 B.C. (on the date see MRRII136 n.7). 18 1 his two legions: see 138.1. Recruits were available because Baetica had been settled by Romans since the earlier part of the second century B.C. and 224 Book II was by now, as the subsequent narrative makes plain, very heavily Romanised Hispalis: Seville. 2 treasures from the shrine of Hercules: one of the treasures was the statue of Alexander which had stirred Caesar, when he was quaestor in the province, to lament that at the age at which Alexander had conquered the world he himself had done nothing worth remembering (Suet. D J. 7. 1-2). This Hercules is probably the god Melqart of the Phoenicians, who had preceded the Greeks in this part of the world and left their trace in many of its names: Gades is the Semitic gader, a wall. Domitius: Ahenobarbus, currently in command in Massilia (22.2a). 5 sent for trial: the ordinary phrase used of a competent magistrate (in Rome, the praetor) in deciding that a case should be tried is iudicium dare; the expression iudicium reddere (cf. Cic. Quinct. 71, Tac. Ann. 1.72) appears to be only a variant. 6 an island: the sand-bar connecting Cadiz to the mainland has built up since antiquity. 7 Pompey... had exercised extensive patronage: see 1.61.3. 19 1 two legions: a characteristic, and in the event justified, piece of bravado on Caesar's part He must have known that Varro also had two legions and would have been able to raise auxiliaries in addition, but reckoned that any risk involved was outweighed by the advantage of being able to send the bulk of his army back immediately to Italy, which was where he wanted it. Quintus Cassius: see 1.2.7, 5.5. Since tribunes were supposed to remain in Rome, available to the people, throughout their year of office, it is interesting that Caesar draws attention to Cassius* unconstitutional position by naming his office. Possibly he intends a contrast between his own deputy, an elected magistrate of the Roman people, and Varro's, a mere eques who chanced by on a financial errand. 3 the Roman citizens' group at Corduba: when a number of Roman citizens found themselves living in a non-Roman community, they often formed themselves into a conventus, a sort of club or association, which because of the power and standing of Rome had a great deal of influence, as here. Such associations of Roman citizens are found in both eastern and western halves of the empire (cf. H36.1, HL29.1, Komemann RE IV. 1180ff.) Corduba had been founded in 152 B.C. by M. Claudius Marcellus with a mixed Italian and native population (Strabo 3.2.1), but it is Brunt's view (1970, p.215) that the members of the conventus here mentioned are more probably rich and influential Roman traders (negotiatores), as found elsewhere, than descendants of the original Italian settlers. cohorts of the sort called 'settler': there is no agreement about the nature of these cohorts. If they were composed of Roman citizens from colonies, Commentary 225 as K.-H.-M. think, or simply Roman settlers in general, as Brunt (1970, pp. 230-1) suggests, the men must have been those who were over age, as others would have been recruited into the normal legions (in this case, the vernacula legio of 20.4 below, see n.). A further difficulty with K.-H.-M.'s explanation is that the word 'colony' has to be understood non-technically to mean any settlement in which Romans or Italians participated, since there were no towns with the status of Roman colonies in Spain at this date. However, there was, as Brunt recognises, a category of 'Romanised natives, perhaps partly of Italian descent', who would be eligible neither for the legions nor for the native auxiliary cohorts. Such people would appropriately be mustered into these cohorts, whose name is to be derived not from colonia (a colony), but from colonus, meaning a settier-farmer, particularly a peasant farmer. The adjective colonicus is used by Varro himself to refer to farming (colonicae leges, RR 1.2.17). 4 the people of Carmona... spontaneously ejected: unusually, the plural subject is followed by singular verbs, Carmorienses functioning as a simple equivalent to civitas Carmonensis. Carmona (which still retains the name) is an isolated acropolis-like hill to the south of the river in the Guadalquivir valley between Corduba and Hispalis. 20 2 when he had gone a title further: from Corduba, presumably, since the last thing, in fact the only thing, we have been told of Varro's whereabouts is that Corduba had shut him out (19.3). officers of the cohorts: these tribuni are the tribuni militum, of whom there were six to a legion, ranking immediately below its commanders. It is likely that at least three would have been detached with the six cohorts garrisoning Gades. On their social and political status see 1.23. In. 4 called the local one: the term vernacula legio is defined by the author of the Bellum Alexandrinum (53.5):'... no-one either bom in the province, like the soldiers of the vernacula legio, or who had become a provincial through long residence...'. This legion, then, is the one raised in Spain to which Caesar refers at L85.6, and it was composed of Roman citizens bom or resident in the province. 5 association of Roman citizens: see 19.3n. 6 Italica: a few miles from Seville, this town, like Corduba, lay on the right (north) bank of the Guadalquivir. It later attained the status of a Roman colony, and was the birthplace of the emperor Hadrian. 7 Sextus Caesar: grandson of Caesar's uncle of the same name, consul in 91 B.C. 8 the money which was with him: in spite of the fact that Varro is the subject of the sentence, and eum is used only a few words previously to mean Caesar, penes eum must mean 'with Varro'. This switch is harsh, but 226 Book II arises from the fact that the relative clause is explanatory in nature, and therefore objective, so that the reflexive penes se would be inappropriate. 21 1 to keep the town in their own control Although 'the town' in this context must be Corduba, the thanks would apply equally to the Romans of Hispalis and Italica (20.5-6). the Spaniards: the people of Carmona. asserted their own freedom: on this political catch phrase, see L22.5n. 2 the contributions... the property: see 18.4-5. this penalty: obviously, loss of property! 3 rewards, both public and private: it is far more likely that the type of reward was either public (e.g. advancement to office, right to a public statue) or private (e.g. gifts of money or land), than that the source from which these rewards were provided was either public (the treasury of the Roman state) or private (Caesar's personal fortune). 4 the four legions: Caesar's two and Varro's two. Tarraco: the capital of the Nearer province, modem Tarragona. 5 travelled... to Massilia: Caesar perhaps arrived towards the end of October; K.-H.-M. say 25th, but such precision is impossible. the appointment of a dictator: the dictatorship was an emergency office, allowing a single man unlimited authority for a limited period of time (six months). Instead of an equal colleague with powers of veto, as was the case with the consuls, the dictator had a junior to assist him, the magister equitum ('master of horse'), whom he personally appointed and whose authority derived from himself. The Romans made frequent use of this office for both military and political emergencies between the fifth and third centuries, but it effectively became obsolete with the rise of Rome to the status of a world power as a result of the Hannibalic war, and would have passed into oblivion had it not been needed by Sulla in 82 B.C. to provide him with a means whereby he could easily and without procedural opposition carry through a large number of constitutional reforms. The dictator was appointed (normally in accordance with a decree of the senate) on the nomination of one of the consuls, who by that act temporarily surrendered their responsibility for the state. In Sulla's case, the consuls of 82 (the younger Marius and C. Carbo) were of course his opponents in the civil war and were either already dead or shortly to become so. It was therefore impossible for him to be nominated in the usual way, and a special mechanism was set up by which in effect the Roman people (in one of their many constitutional guises) elected him dictator. Since he had just decisively defeated his opponents, and he intended to go far beyond what any previous dictator had done, he seems to have felt the need for some validation from the Roman people. The present case was rather different, although the consuls were equally hostile and equally absent from Rome. Caesar had not taken Rome with an army, and had no immediate plans for Commentary 227 reform. To judge from the fact that he was still writing the present account with the slant it has, he had not yet abandoned his pose of constitutionalist, and it is most unlikely that he would have wished to give his enemies the chance of calling him a tyrant by assuming a wide-ranging dictatorship of the type operated by Sulla. Why then was there a need for a dictatorship at all? The answer is simple: there had to be consuls elected for 48 B.C., yet the consuls of 49, whose constitutional duty it was to see that they had successors, were in Greece with Pompey. In such circumstances, the Romans had in earlier days frequently appointed a dictator specifically to conduct the elections. Since Marcellus and Lentulus would obviously not co-operate in any nomination, even of this limited type, it was necessary to devise some other legal means of appointing a dictator. The constitutional question of whether a praetor could legally hold consular elections was being discussed, and answered in the negative, by Cicero already in April 49, after the departure of Pompey and the consuls from Brundisium (Att. 9.9.3, 9.15.2). The problem was solved by passing the law here mentioned, which must have been an enabling statute permitting (say) any magistrate with imperiwn to nominate a dictator in the absence of the consuls. M. Lepidus, a partisan and one of the praetors, then named Caesar. Dio's language (41.36.1) is technically vague but does not contradict such an interpretation; he also notes that the appointment was 'against ancestral custom', which is true, but he does not say, and would have been (because of the law) incorrect in saying, that it was unconstitutional. Appian ( B.C. 2.48) misunderstands the purpose of this dictatorship and should be ignored. Caesar himself says nothing more about the office, but we know he held it for eleven days from entering Rome, had himself and P. Servilius Isauricus elected consuls for 48, and dealt with some pressing matters concerning debt and the return of political exiles (Dio 41.36-7, Plut. Caes. 37.1). 22 1 their food running critically low: this is new information, like the following remarks about the appalling nature of the grain; being presented without comment in a list which is otherwise a summary of things previously treated in greater detail, it perhaps suggests that Caesar intended to insert at least some words on the matter at an earlier stage in his narrative. provinces or armies: that is, Spain and the forces there, in good faith: by contrast with 12 -14 above. 2 However: the conjunction serves to convey the thought 'Even though the town surrendered, Caesar still did not capture Domitius'. It is remarkable that Caesar nowhere after 1.34.2 alludes to the fact that Domitius was in command in Massilia, although his position as proconsul of Gaul (admittedly not recognised by Caesar, 1.6.5) makes this certain. 228 Book II 4 Of the three: Caesar actually says 'of these', which naturally refers in Latin as in English to the most recently mentioned ships, those of Brutus. This is perhaps another sign of unrevised writing. 6 the fame and antiquity of their state: Massilia had been founded as a colony of the Greeks of Phocaea about 600 B.C. and had rapidly become a city of wealth and importance. Traditionally Rome's oldest overseas ally, her prosperity was derived from her position as an intermediary in the trade that flowed between the Mediterranean and Celtic worlds, he himself set off for Rome: Caesar does not see fit to mention that he went by way of Placentia in order to quell a serious mutiny by the Ninth legion (Suet. Div. Iul. 69). For his motives for this omission, see Introduction, sec. IV.

23 - 44 Curio's campaign against the Pompeians in Africa Taking up the narrative from the point where he left Curio (1.31), Caesar now tells of his defeat and death in Africa. The campaign was brief: Curio crossed to Africa from Sicily, landing somewhere to the north-east of Cartilage, and met with little opposition until he took up a position outside the provincial capital, Utica. After some initial successes, he staved off a serious threat posed by desertion and disloyalty amongst his men, and won a battle though he was not able to storm the town. Then hearing that relief was on its way to Utica from Juba, the king of Nwnidia, he was tricked by a false report into going out to do battle without taking proper precautions, and was caught unprepared. The Caesarians were routed, only a few managing to escape by sea. For the facts, Caesar again had to rely on information supplied by others, but it was surely the author himself who shaped the narrative into the tragic form it has (see Introduction, sec. VI). For the earlier stages his informant may have been Curio, by despatches. But someone else must have completed the story for him, and it is tempting to conjecture that this person was Gaius Asinius Pollio, whom we know from Appian (B.C. 2.45) to have been in Curio's army and who later wrote a history of this period. Pollio may even have supplied the whole story. 23 1 Concurrently with these events: isdem temporibus is a vaguer expression than eodem tempore', it does no more than fix Curio's campaign between April and the date of the surrender of Massilia (October or November?). In fact Curio probably did not set sail from Sicily before the beginning of August. Although he is represented (32.5) as knowing already, when he had barely arrived at Utica, that Caesar had defeated Afranius and Petreius, which occurred on August 2nd, a less rhetorical and possibly more reliable synchronism is given by the statement at 37.2 that news of Caesar's Commentary 229

III. The Province of Africa 230 Book II successes (unspecified) in Spain was starting to reach Africa some days later. For discussion of the chronology, see Wistrand. already having a low opinion: this remark immediately characterises Curio as over-confident, the fault which is to undo him. Attius Varus— two legions out of four: see L30 - 31.nn. Anquillaria: we know nothing of this place apart from what Caesar tells us. It is possible that it lay inside the Gulf of Tunis, and that the 22 miles measure the distance across the neck of land from Qupea, not along the coast; but in either case the 100 km. to the River Bagradas (between Carthage and Utica) seems too long a march to be completed in two days, as stated at 24.1. Perhaps, as Fabre suggests (ad loc.) the figure XXII is corrupt and should be larger. 3 Young Lucius Caesar: the man who had acted as an intermediary in the opening stages of Caesar's invasion of Italy; see L8.2n. the war with the pirates: Pompey's Mediterranean-wide campaign of 67 - 66 B.C. 4 Hadrumetum: modem Sousse (see Map HI). Considius Longus: this man had been governor of Africa in 50 B.C. He may still technically have retained imperium, since he had not left the province and his designated successor Aelius Tubero had been barred from landing (132); on the other hand he would appear to have placed himself under the authority of Attius Varus, who was doubtless a legatus of Pompey's. His single legion must have been the one already garrisoning the province when he was governor. 24 2 Caninhis Rebilus: see L26.3 Scipio's Camp: the Castra Cornelia were so called because P. Cornelius Scipio Africanus (the Elder) camped there when he attacked Utica in 204/3 B.C. The ridge (Kalaat el Oued) is about 60 feet high and though now distant several kilometres from the shore once fell steeply into the sea on three sides. The silting up of the coast has proceeded apace since the River Medjerdah (the ancient Bagradas) changed its course in the seventeenth century, when Utica was still a port (L6zine). See Map HI. 25 1 Baal: The Phoenician god familiar fromth e Old Testament 3-4King Juba... Pompey... Curio...: Juba was son of Hiempsal, who had been made king of Numidia by Pompey when he conquered the Marians in Africa in 81 B.C.; Juba had also once been involved in a physically violent altercation with Caesar when the latter was defending a Numidian noble, Masintha, against the king (Suet. DJ. 71). Curio's proposal in 50 to annex Numidia as a province was not novel: according to Cicero, Hiempsal bribed the tribune Rullus to safeguard his kingdom from exactly this fate in 63 B.C. (de Leg. Ag. 2.58). Juba's loyalties in the present conflict were Commentary 231 therefore a foregone conclusion (cf. I.6.3n.). Even before Pompey's gift of the throne to Hiempsal, the Romans had twice had Numidia in their power (having defeated Syphax, Hannibal's ally, in 202, and Jugurtha in 105), and twice chosen to establish another king, so their claim to it was not surprising: On 'client-kingship' and Roman provincial policies, see Braund. 26 1 'Victorious General': see 1.13.In., I.74.2n. A note of sarcasm is detectable in the opening 'exploits' (res gestae, a term normally implying at least noteworthiness and often a very great deal more, but capable of quite literal translation as 'things done'). Curio had patently done nothing to justify such a salutation. on the following day led his army to Utica: why, having prospected the excellent site of Scipio's Camp, to which furthermore, he had directed the ships from Utica, did Curio not use it? Appian in fact says (B.C. 2.44), that he did camp there, but that his opponents, anticipating this, poisoned the water supply (apparendy otherwise good, 37.5) so that his men fell sick. If this is not an entirely invented tale - and Appian's source for Curio's campaign was probably the eyewitness Pollio - Caesar has suppressed a stage in the campaign. If so, it must be because he wishes to concentrate exclusively on the military side of Curio's success and fall, and not to call attention to a piece of bad luck eariy in the narrative. On the other hand, Curio's fleet must have had a shore base, which can only have been Scipio's Camp; possibly, then, Appian has garbled some details given by Pollio about this, while Caesar has simply not bothered to mention its existence since it is of no importance at this point in his narrative. 27 1 two Marsic centurions: according to the next chapter, Curio's force was entirely drawn from the 33 cohorts which had surrendered to Caesar at Corfinium. A large number of these were recruited by Domitius from among the Marsi (1.15.7,20.3, 23.5, App. B.C. 2.40). 28 1 Sextus Quintilius Varus... at Corfinium: see 1.18. 2 the memory of their first oath: the Roman military oath (sacramentum) was binding until the general to whom it had been sworn discharged his men. Since it is very unlikely that Domitius did this, Curio's legionaries, although they would have sworn a fresh oath to Caesar, might well have felt themselves under some kind of moral pressure in their current situation (If primam is sound in the Latin, it must be taken as a transferred epithet). 29 In the present state of this paragraph, it is difficult to know what Curio's soldiers were afraid of, though Caesar surely made this clear in the now hopelessly garbled sentences of sections 3-4. One possibility is that those loyal to Caesar feared being outnumbered and cut to pieces, or having to 232 Book II surrender unconditionally (cf. 30.2), if significant desertion (perhaps by the Marsic & Paelignian contingent) took place. Another is that it was the Marsi (apart from the few who had already gone over) who were afraid of suffering punishment for their mutiny at Corfinium if they fell into the hands of Varus, by whatever means this might occur. That the situation was complex is sufficiendy indicated by some of the remaining fragments of the text, with their mention of such factors as Caesar's beneficium (perhaps his willingness to take these cohorts entire into his army after Corfinium) and the conflicting loyalties of the towns in central Italy. As to the corrupt passage of text, three views are possible: (i) it gives disconnected fragmentswhic h were all the copyist of the archetype could make out in the manuscript from which he was working (Fabre); (ii) it represents a once continuous and intelligible text which has suffered omissions and corruption to the point of becoming nonsense (most editors); (iii) these are Caesar's own notes which he intended to expand later (Klotz, praef. p. ix). In the absence of any evidence that such incoherent notes could ever have formed part of a published work (even an unfinished one) in antiquity, either (i) or (ii) seems likely to be the correct explanation. Between these the only essential difference is that in the first case emendation is impossible, in the second (in theory) possible. In practice, however, only wholesale alteration can restore continuous sense, and there is no kind of editorial consensus as to what a correct restoration might be. The least unsatisfactory course is to leave the text as it is. 30 1 he called a council: lie' is Curio, the non-sequitur being explained by the damaged state of the previous chapter. For the military council, cf. 1.67. 2 idleness was the most harmful thing: because it gave the soldiers time to talk and speculate. This use of contrarius to mean 'harmful' is unique in Caesar, though attested in contemporary authors (Lucr. 6.741, Averna avibus contraria; Virg. Georg. 1.286, nona dies contraria furtis; Pollio ap. Cic. Fam. 10.31.4, quod maxime contrarium fuit); but in must be inserted before consiliis to avoid the otherwise inevitable coupling contrarium consiliis which reverses the sense demanded by the context. 3 during the third watch of the night: see 1.63.3n 31 - 32 Curio's address to his council cf war, and the following one to his men, gain great impact from Caesar's use of direct speech, enhanced by the techniques of rhetoric, for the first and almost the only time in the work. There are no utterances of comparable length in this form anywhere else in the BC (or for that matter in the BG). All other major speeches are given indirectly (cf 1.7, 9, 32, 35, 85; 11.21), including Caesar's own, which thereby acquire a certain coolness and air of detached rationality. The device also enables the author to avoid speaking about himself in the first person and breaking the calculated impersonality of the Commentary 233 narrative. That direct speech goes with a heightening of dramatic tension is suggested by the four much shorter examples which occur in the prelude to, and at tfie climax of the battle of Pharsalus in Book III (111.85, 87, 91, 94), and by Curio's own third and final utterance (39.2-3 and n.). In the present context the effect is to concentrate the reader's attention on the character and leadership of Curio, the factor which emerges at tfie end as the fatal flaw in the African enterprise. Curio's fault is over-confidence. This is made quite plain in sees. 11- 14 of the second speech, where he wrongly predicts the outcome of the present campaign and is made to treat the whole struggle as already decided. On the other hand the arguments which concern Caesar's success, and loyalty to Caesar, are well-founded or at least plausible in the context, and thus a strong contrast is created between the qualities of the subordinate Curio (who thinks he is an imperator, see L13.1n.), and the true imperator Caesar. As to technique, the second speech in particular is full of rhetorical devices. Most obvious are the clusters of rhetorical questions (passim) which are a feature of set speeches of encouragement (hortationes) in other Latin writers, notably Livy; but we also find alliteration (e.g. sec. 2, v, s, and c), dramatic objection (4, at sunt..), repetition and amplification (5, duos/-as; 12, salvum atque incolumem, ex porta sinuque), inversion (8, vos ...Domitium, an vos Domitius?), antithesis and paradox (4, 10), homoioteleuton (12, profligaverim - superaverim), and clauses ending in striking rhythms (clausulae) which are amongst those used by Cicero and discussed by him in his almost exactly contemporary treatise Orator (2, iudicaverunt; 8, conservati; 10, deminutione sublatum est; 11, expectatione leviora and dubitatis; 14, dedisse videamini; and many others). 31 3 success that earns generals the goodwill of their armies: the word felicitas in the phrase here translated 'success' conveys the idea of good luck which may ensure continuing success. The power of the notion was such that Sulla adopted Felix as his cognomen, to suggest that he was permanently lucky (and the Romans also, to have him as their leader). 8 put everything to the test: the meaning of this phrase is obscure; Curio could be saying 'we ought to make every effort' or he could be saying 'we ought to investigate everything'. The former fits better with the character of energetic general, the latter with that of cautious leader. It is an equally open question whether Caesar intends his final sentiment to show Curio as playing for time with a fine-sounding but meaningless declaration, or as arriving at a sensible decision not to be panicked into action. 32 1 thanks to their services and their example: Curio's point should be treated with caution as a statement of what Caesar believed to be true. The setting of the speech requires an effective appeal to incipiently disloyal troops, and the claim that their example had been important was likely to gain their goodwill - a manoeuvre called captatio benevolentiae by the 234 Book II rhetoricians. What really won Italy for Caesar was the effectiveness of his military operations, combined with Pompey's unpreparedness and his own willingness to pardon his opponents. Corfinium would still have fallen, though not so quickly, if the troops of its garrison had remained loyal to Domitius. 3 myself, whom he held very dear: this remark is strictly unnecessary in the context, but reveals Caesar's warmth of feeling for Curio, one of his most dynamic supporters; this feeling may also explain the tragic mould in which the story of his downfall is cast. Sicily and Africa, without which he cannot keep Rome and Italy safe: before the annexation of Egypt in 30 B.C., Africa and Sicily were the principal sources of grain for the population of Rome. If he could not feed Rome, the political consequences for Caesar might be very serious. 5 forty days: see 23. In. and 1.41. In. 8 Domitius: for Domitius' behaviour at Corfinium, see 1.19-20. 9 insignia of office: the fasces were bundles of rods carried by lictors, who were the attendants of those magistrates who possessed that executive and military authority (imperium) of which the rods were the symbol. Consuls had twelve fasces, but a proconsul, like Domitius, only six. 10 loss of legal rights: a Roman citizen who was captured suffered deminutio capitis, which meant loss of his status as a free citizen. If a captive were sold into slavery, as could be done, he became literally a slave; but even if this did not happen the Romans seem to have felt in the early days of their society that some kind of stigma attached to having been, even if only temporarily and unwillingly, separated from die Roman community. Naturally, this archaic idea was hardly relevant to the situation of a Roman taken prisoner by another Roman, and Curio (or rather, Caesar, who detested Domitius) is really making a debating point. 11 my good fortune: see3n. 13 the disgrace of Corfinium...: the transmitted text makes no sense, and any emendation must start from the premise that the events mentioned are all Pompeian disasters (or in Curio's view about to be so), whose drift potential deserters would be mad to follow. Essentially I follow Chacon; Fabre's alternative (an Corfiniensem ignominiam, an Italiae fugam, an Hispaniarum deditionem, Africi belli praeiudiciaf sequimini?) is good, but is marginally further from the readings of the MSS. 14 restore me my good name: Curio means that they must remain loyal to him and not brand him as a general whose men desert. 33 2 a few days before: translators generally (Fabre, Schtfnberger, Long) give 'on the previous days', but since it appears from the preceding narrative that Curio had in fact only once led his army out, the ablative must convey the Commentary 235 sense 'within the period of the previous days'. Cf. 19.4, isdem diebus, referring to an event that certainly took place on a single day. 3 nor for his part: ne...quidem does not always mean 'not even'; for a parallel to the usage here see BG 5.44.5. Varus Attius: 'Attius' is not necessarily an intrusion into the text, as Meusel argued (K.-H.-M 321), although it is true that the inversion of nomen (the family name) and cognomen (third name) is found nowhere else in Caesar. Such inversions begin to be found in the late Republic and are common by the time of Tacitus. They parallel the fashion started by Sulla when he rejected the restricted and time-honoured set of Roman praenomina (first names, such as Gaius and Lucius) and called his son Faustus - which as a cognomen would pass without comment. For discussion of the quirks of Roman nomenclature at tins period see Syme (1958), 172-4, who asserts that inversions of the type found here start with 'persons of low degree' and gradually climb the social scale. 34 1 as described above: 27.3. K.-H.-M. claim that this trench-like depression can (or could a hundred years ago) still be seen 140 m. from the walls of Utica, being 160 m. long, 70 m. across, and 4 m. deep, with steep sides. 3 Varus* whole army: Caesar seems unable to make up his mind what to call the Pompeian commander, fluctuating between Attius and Varus (cf. also 33.3n. and 1.12-13). 4 Rebilus: evidently Curio's army second-in-command, see 24.2. (also 1.26.3), though Marcius Rufus, as quaestor, outranked him in the event of Curio's absence or death. Rebilus' experience is stressed here to account for the correctness of an apparently rash piece of advice. On his career, see I.26.3n. 35 4 access was barred: that is, barred to Curio's troops. (The text has suffered damage at this point, see apparatus criticus, but the general sense is not in doubt.) 36 1 There were in the town the populace, ...the citizens, ...the association of Romans: Caesar distinguishes between (i) the incolae, who are the native population of the surrounding districts (cf. 25.2), under the administration of the town but possessing restricted civic rights,(ii ) the full citizens of the town, more privileged and less numerous than the first group, and (iii) those Roman citizens who lived or did business in Utica, for whose association (conventus) and its importance see 19.3 with n. Caesar's careful phrase describing this third group must mean that it contained supporters of both Pompey and himself, although in the later African campaign of 46 B.C. the Roman citizens declared solidly for Pompey (Bell. Afr. 87-90). They were a prosperous and powerful group, some members being equites Romani 236 Book II (Bell. Afr. 68.3). What favour Caesar had conferred on the Uticenses (i.e. group (ii) above) is not known, but it was by a lex Iulia (Bell. Afr. 87) and presumably therefore dates to 59. Teutsch 56 argues for Mommsen's view that Utica became a municipium iuris LatinU rejecting that of Gsell 44-45 (supported by Ville, RE Suppb. DC. col. 1869) that some form of land assignation was made. 37 1 for a while he did not believe it: this detail is unnecessary to the stricdy military narrative. Caesar could have begun this chapter at 3, but then he would have presented a different picture of Curio. As it is, the reader is being prepared to see Curio's final mistake as part of a pattern, an almost inevitable consequence of his character. 2 reports... about Caesar's successes in Spain: Curio had already referred to these successes in his speech of a few days previously, but it is quite probable that Caesar allowed himself some rhetorical licence in composing the speech. See 23. In. for the chronology. 4 the two legions: see 23.1 5 the camp... with its natural position: see 24.2-4 with n. 38 1 his kingdom: Numidia surrounded die Roman province of Africa (roughly the territory which Carthage had been allowed to retain after her defeat by Scipio Africanus in 202) to the west and south. 2 Rashly believing this source of information: it appears that the false report was a deliberate stratagem on the part of Juba, who desired vengeance on Curio for his attempt to rob him of his throne (Frontin. Strat. 2.5.40, Dio 41.41.3-5). his youth, his nobility of spirit...: Caesar clearly not only misted Curio, but liked him, and this sympathetic summary of his character hints at Caesar's sense of personal as well as public loss when this dashing young man met his unexpected end 5 fast asleep: Caesar's phrase is literally 'oppressed by sleep', perhaps a subconscious elevation of style as the climax of the tragedy approaches. This is, astonishingly, the only occurrence of sleep (somnus) in his works and the stems dormi- and (con)sopU are entirely lacking. 39 2 'You see, men... that the king is not present': Caesar uses a story-telling motif that is at least as old as Herodotus, namely the wrongly interpreted answer. Croesus thought, when the Delphic oracle said that a great empire would fall if he crossed the River Halys, that the Persian empire and not his own was meant (Hdt. 1.53.2). Here, Curio thinks that because the king is not at the Bagradas he is nowhere near. In both cases reflection, or further questioning, would have prevented the disaster. But Curio is driven on to his fate by his overweening confidence. The element of tragedy is further Commentary 237 emphasised by the dramatic device of direct speech, for the third and final occasion in the book. 40 1 two thousand Spanish and Gallic cavalry: it appears that Caesar had no monopoly of the loyalties of the Gallic horse (cf. L39.2) and that the concept of mercenary service was well established amongst those tribes and nations upon whom the Romans drew for their auxiliaries. 3 the level: presumably on the left bank of the Bagradas, though the fact that the river is not mentioned as an obstacle at any point in the narrative is without significance, as it must have been perfectly easy to cross at this time of year. 41 1 sixteen miles: Stoffel, as a military man, questioned the figure, but we know that Curio left base before dawn and had marched fast after the first six miles. If we assume an average pace of three (Roman) miles per hour under such circumstances, it need have taken no longer than six hours before battle actually began around noon. 3 only two hundred: 'only' is missing in the Latin, which unlike English can tolerate the omission where the sense is obvious. 8 These men... bewailing their own deaths...: cf. 5.3 for a similarly emotional detail placed before a moment of crisis, in that case the second attempt of the Massiliots to break the naval blockade. 42 1 Saburra had already seized this too: the force of 'too' (quoque) is that other routes of escape had also been cut off by Saburra, chiefly by surrounding the Romans. 2 others collapsed although unwounded: it is tempting to take integri ('whole') in its common moral sense, and see a contrast between those men who retained a proper sense of their duty as soldiers and those who broke and fled; but Caesar never uses integer except in a literal sense, and the meaning must simply be that Curio's men collapsed from heat, exhaustion, and lack of will to resist. 4 the army which Caesar had given him on trust: a legal metaphor, which, whether or not Curio actually used it, certainly indicates Caesar's own view of delegated command. 5 as mentioned above: 39.6. 43 1 quaestor Marcius Rufus: he commanded the squadron of warships accompanying the invasion flotilla (23.5) and was therefore the obvious man to leave at base. in the early evening: presumably of the same day as the battle at the Bagradas. If that took place about noon, as argued above (41.1), and was 238 Book II over quite quickly as seems likely in the circumstances, the first horseman could have been back at Scipio's Camp by mid-afternoon. 3 the warships hurried to start ...few ship's tenders gathered: Appian {B.C. 2.46) says that the flight of the fleet was led by one Flamma and that it was Pollio who, by rowing out and making entreaties, persuaded the captains of the merchantmen to send their boats. 44 1 soldiers and heads of families: this is a strange phrase. One would not expect 'heads of families' to be mentioned in such a context or to be seen as a different group from 'soldiers'. The implication is that conscripts (as these men were) were normally not heads of families, but sons whose fathers were alive; this deduction is supported by the Augustan rale that soldiers had to remain unmarried during their period of active service. As for the Latin, note Caesar's avoidance of archaism: he writes (as at 4.3) the everyday genitive form familiae for the usual familias. 2 Juba... Varus...: both men are damned, Juba for savagery, Varus for spinelessness. 3 Juba rode into the city with several senators in train: Roman senators had been in the habit for at least a hundred years of giving orders to, not following in the train of, such vassal kings as Juba - who owed his throne to Pompey (25.3n.). Jugurtha, one of Juba's predecessors on the Numidian throne, is reported as being afraid of M. Aemilius Scaurus, the leader of a senatorial delegation in 112 B.C. (Sallust BJ 25. 4-10). It had been Roman senators, not foreign kings, who took decisions such as the ones Juba is here represented as making. Not for the first time, Caesar emphasises the topsy• turvy world of the Pompeians (see esp. 1.5.1-3,6.5-8,15.4). Servius Sulpicius and Licinius Damasippus: This Sulpicius is likely to be the son of the famous jurist of the same name, who was consul in 51 B.C. He is also probably to be identified with the moneyer SER(vius) SULP(icius) whose name appears on denarii issued in that year (Crawford RRC 1.459). Damasippus is almost certainly P. Licinius Crassus Damasippus, who was killed in Africa serving as legatus propraetore under Metellus Scipio in 46 B.C., after escaping from Utica at the time of Cato's suicide (Bell. Afr. 96, Plut. Cato Minor 70, Crawford no. 460). His names show that he must have been adopted into the family of the Licinii Crassi, and it is quite possible that he was the son of the infamous L. Iunius Damasippus, who as praetor in 82 B.C. carried out a massacre of suspected Sullan sympathisers in Rome, in the interests of the beleaguered Marians. If so, his support of Pompey against Caesar was a decisive rejection of any inherited political loyalty (Caesar being Marius' nephew and first married to Cinna's daughter). The singular erat (if not a copyist's mistake) may be paralleled from 1.2.7 (see n.) and shows the greater importance in Caesar's mind of Sulpicius. 239

INDEX OF PROPER NAMES (Aelius) Tubero, L. 1.30,31 Bagradas EL24,26,38,39 (Aemilius) Lepidus, M. (pr. 49) 11.21 Britannia 1.54 Afraniani(-a) 1.43,46,47,54,69-71, Brundisium, -inus 1.24-8,30 78,83 Bruttii 1.30 Afranius (filius) 1.74, 84 Brutus v. Iunius Afranius, L. 1.37-43,48-53,60-76, 84, 87; H.17,18 Caecilius, T. 1.46 Africa (-us) 1.30,31; 11.23,28,32,37; (Caecilius) Metellus, L. (tr. pi. 49) H.32 1.33 Ahenobarbus v. Domitius (Caecilius Metellus Pius) Scipio, Q. Alba 1.15,24 (cos. 52) 1.1,2,4,6 Albici L34,56-58; H.2,6 Caecilius Rufus, L. 1.23 Anas 1.38 (Caelius) Rufus, M. 1.2 Ancona 1.11 Calagurritani 1.60 Anquillaha 11.23 Calenus v. Fufius Antonius, M. (tr. pi 49) 1.2, 11,18 Calidius, M. 1.2 (Appuleius) Satuminus, L. 1.7 (Calpumius) Piso (Caesoninus), L. Apulia 1.14,17,23 (cos. 5%) 1.3 Aquitani 1.39 Camerinum 1.15 Arecomici 1.35 Campania 1.14 Arelate 1.36; H.5 Caninius Rebilus, C. 1.26; H24,34 Ariminum 1.8,10-12 Cantabri 1.38 Arretium 1.11 Canusium 1.24 Asculum 1.15 Capitolium 1.6 Asia 1.4 Capua 1.10,14 Attiani 1.13; 11.34 Caralitani 1.30 Attius 1.18 Carmonenses 11.19 Attius Varus, P. 1.12,13, 31; H.23,25, Cassius (Longinus), Q. (tr. pi. 49) 1.2; 27-8, 30,33-6,43-4 H.19,21 (Aurelius) Cotta, L. {cos. 65) 1.6 Castulonensis saltus 1.38 (Aurelius) Cotta, M. 1.30 Cato v. Porcius Ausetani 1.60 Celtiberia 1.38,61 Auximum (-ates) 1.12,13,15, 31 Cinga 1.48 Cingulum 1.15 240 (Claudius) Marcellus, C. (cos. 49) 1.6, 14; v. also consules Galli 1.51; 11.40 (Claudius) Marcellus, M. (cos. 51) 1.2 Gallia L6,7,10,18,29,33, 39,48,51; Clupea n.23 Considius Longus, C. 11.23 n.i consules 1.1,3,7,10,25-27 Gallonius,C. 11.18,20 Corduba 11.19-21 Germani, -ia 1.7. 83 Corfinium,-enses 1.15-21,23-25,34; Gracchi v. Sempronii 11.28, 32 Graecia 1.25 Cornelia, Castra 11.24,25,30,37 Hadriaticum mare 1.25 (Cornelius) Lentulus, L. (cos. 49) 1.1, 2,4, 5,14; v. also consules Hadrumetum 11.23 (Cornelius) Lentulus Spinther, P. (cos. Helvii 1.35 57) 1.15,16,21-23 Hercules 11.18,21 (Cornelius) Sulla, Faustus 1.6 Hiberus 1.60-63,65, 68,69,72,73 (Cornelius) Sulla, L. (cos. 88) 1.4,5,7 Hirrus v. Lucilius Cosanus ager 1.34 Hispalis 11.18,20 Cotta v. Aurelius Hispani 11.21,40 Crassus v. Licinius Hispania 1.30, 34, 37-39,74, 85-87; Cremona 1.24 HI, 32,37 Curio v. Scribonius Hispaniae (provinciae) 1.2,9-11,29, Curius v. Vibius 39, 85; 11.18,32 Hispania (prov. Citerior) 1.22,29,38, Damasippus v. Licinius 39,48,49;II.7,17,18,21 Decidius Saxa, L. 1.66 Hispania (prov. Ulterior) 1.38, 39; Domitiani 1.16,22,23,25 fi.17-21 Domitius, Cn. 11.42 Iacetani 1.60 Domitius Ahenobarbus, L. (cos. 54) lanuarius 1.5 L6,15-17,19-21,23, 34,36,56,57; Igilium 1.34 E.3,18,22,28,32. Iguvium, -ini 1.12 Dyrrachium 1.25,27 Ilerda 1.38,41-49,56,59,63,69,73, 78; 11.17 Ebro v. Hiberus Illurgavonenses 1.60 Italia 1.2,6,9,25,27,29,30,35,48, Fabianae (legiones) 1.40 53; 11.17,18,22,32 Fabius, C. 1.37,40,48 Italica n.20 Fanum 1.11 Iuba 1.6; n.25,26, 36-44 Firmum 1.16 Iulia(lex) 1.14 Frentani 1.23 Iulius Caesar, C. passim Fufius Calenus, Q. 1.87 Iulius Caesar, L. 1.8,10; n.23 Fulginius, Q. 1.46 Iulius Caesar, Sex. 11.20 (Iunius) Brutus, D. 1.36,56,57; DL3, Gades 11.18,20,21 5,6,22 Labienus, T. 1.15 241 Larinates 1.23 Noricus(rex) 1.18 Legio: Numidae H.25, 38,39,41 VIII 1.18 IX 1.45 Oceanus 1.38 XH 1.15 Otogesa 1.61,68,70 Xm 1.7,12,18 Oscenses 1.60 XIV 1.46 Fabianae 1.40 Paelignus, -i 1.15,18; H.29,35 vernaculae n.20 Parthicum (bellum) 1.9 veteranae 1.25 Petreius, M. 1.38-43, 53, 61-67, 72-76, Lentulus v. Cornelius 87; n.17,18 Lepidus v. Aemilius Philippus v. Marcius Leptitani 11.38 Picenum, -us 1.12,15, 29 Libo v. Scribonius Pisaurum 1.11,12 Licinius (Crassus) Damasippus, P. Piso v. Calpurnius H.44 Plancus v. Munatius Longinus v. Cassius Pompeianus, -i 1.15,28,40; H17 Longus v. Considius Pompeius (Magnus), Cn. 1.1-10,13, Lucani 1.30 14, 17, 19, 24-30, 32-35, 38, 39, 53, Luceria 1.24 60, 61,76, 84; II.3,17,18,25, 32 Lucilius Hirrus, C. 1.15 (Porcius) Cato, M. 1.4,30,32 Lucretius, Q. 1.18 Pupius, L. 1.13 Lupus v. Rutilius Pyrenaeus,-i 1.37 Uisitani,-ia 1.38,44,48 Quintilius Varus, Sex. 1.23; 11.28 Magius,N. 1.24,26 Manlius (Torquatus?), L. 1.24 Ravenna 1.5 (Marcius) Philippus, L. (cos. 56) 1.6 Rebilus v. Caninius (Marcius) Philippus, L. (tr. pi. 49) 1.6 Rhodanus II. 1 Marcius Rufus (q. 49) H.23,24,43 Roma (sive urbs) 1.2,3,5,6,9,14,32- Marrucini 1.23; n.34 34, 53; E.22,32 Marsi 1.15,20; H.27,29 Romani (cives) 1.30; H.18-21 Massilia, -ienses 1.34-36,56-58; n.l, Romani (equites) 1.17,23,77; n.18 3-7,14,15,17,18,21,22 Romanus (populus) 1.7,9,22,35 Mauretania 1.6,39,60 Roscius, L. 1.3,8,10 Messana n.3 Rubrius,L. 1.23 Metellus v. Caecihus Rufus v. Caecihus, Caelius, Marcius, Minucius Thermus, Q. 1.12 Sulpicius, Vibullius Munatius Plancus, L. 1.40 Ruteni 1.51 Rutilius Lupus, P. 1.24 Narbo 1.37; H.21 Nasidianae (naves) n.7 Saburra 11.38-42 Nasidius,L. 11.3,4 Sallyes 1.35 242 Sardinia 1.30,31 Satuminus v. Appuleius Saxa v. Decidius Scipio v. Caecilius Metellus Scribonius Curio, C. 1.12,18, 30,31; H.3,23-43 Scribonius Libo, L. (cos. 34) 1.26 Segre v. Sicoris (Sempronii) Gracchi 1.7 Sertorius, Q. 1.61 Sicilia 1.25,30,31; H.3, 23,30, 32, 34,37,43,44 Sicoris 1.40,48, 61-63, 83 Spinther v. Cornelius Lentulus Sulla v. Cornelius Sulmonenses 1.18 Sulpicius, Ser. n.44 Sulpicius (Rufus), P. 1.74 Syria 1.4,6 Tarracina 1.24 Tarraco, -nenses 1.60,73,78; n.21 Tauroeis II.4 Terentius Varro, M. 1.38; 11.17,19-21 Thermus v. Minucius Trebonius, C. 1.36; II.l, 5,13,15 Tubero v. Aelius Utica, -enses 1.31; 11.23-26,36-38,44 Valerius (Orca), Q. 1.30,31 Varro v. Terentius Varus v. Attius, Quintilius Varus, flumen 1.86,87 Vettones 1.38 Vibius Curius 1.24 Vibullius Rufus, L. 1.15,34,38 Volcae Arecomici 1.35