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Occasional Paper #284 The 1999 OSCE Istanbul Summit Decisions on and : Prospects for Implementation

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The 1999 OSCE Istanbul Sum- mit Decisions on Moldova and Georgia: Prospects for Implementation INTRODUCTION: BY AMBASSADOR WILLIAM HILL

In November 1999, members of the USSR suddenly collapsed in December Organization for Security and Coopera- 1991, leaving their status and future totally tion in Europe convened in Istanbul. One unclear. of the most noteworthy provisions of the Both Georgia and Moldova also had documents signed by the heads of state at regions and populations—Abkhazia, the summit was the commitment by the South Ossetia, and —that did Russian Federation to withdraw its troops not desire to leave the Soviet state or to and military equipment from Moldova become parts of independent Georgia or and Georgia by 31 December 2002. Moldova. These separatist entities fought Although Russia had agreed in previous armed conflicts with forces of the Geor- OSCE ministerial and summit documents gian and Moldovan governments. Russian to withdraw from Georgia and Moldova, troop remnants of the Soviet Army implementation of these Russian prom- intervened in both countries to stop the ises had been steadily delayed, making hostilities and separate the belligerents. It these unfulfilled commitments a source of is widely believed, especially among pro- tension between Russia and a large independence Georgians and Moldovans, number of OSCE participating states. For that the Russian troops actually supplied the first time, the specific deadlines agreed and supported the separatist forces. There in the Istanbul summit documents held is probably some—perhaps consider- out the hope for a near-term resolution of able—truth to these allegations. A decade these lingering irritants in relations later, all three conflicts remain unresolved. between Russia, the neighboring newly In both countries the Russian troops independent states of the former Soviet remain as part of the peacekeeping forces Union, and the major states of western that monitor and enforce the ceasefires Europe and North America. and serve to discourage a resumption of The establishment of Georgia and hostilities. Moldova as independent, sovereign states Since 1992 the policy of all OSCE and the removal from them of a Russian participating states, including the Russian military presence were difficult and Federation, has been to support the complicated processes. The majority independence, sovereignty, and territorial Georgian and Moldovan populations integrity of Georgia and Moldova. No were deeply resentful of what they saw as state recognizes the separatist entities in almost two centuries of Russian and South Ossetia, Abkhazia, or Transnistria. Soviet occupation, and uncompromisingly All OSCE participating states accept and insistent on national self-determination as support the request of Georgia and the Soviet Union disintegrated in the late Moldova for the withdrawal of foreign 1980s and early 1990s. However, both (i.e. Russian) military forces from their Georgia and Moldova were part of the territories. Russian empire and Soviet Union for Within Georgia and Moldova, pro- much of the nineteenth and twentieth independence and nationalist forces have centuries, and by 1991 both countries had continuously and impatiently demanded a substantial indigenous ethnic Russian the withdrawal of Russian military forces, population. Over the course of centuries, and angrily denounce Russia for alleged the Russians and the Soviets had estab- deceit and foot dragging in implementing lished a number of important military its stated intention to withdraw. However, objects in Georgia and Moldova. These portions of the local population in Geor- military facilities and their weapons and gia and Moldova, in particular some personnel remained in place when the ethnic Russian elites, are hesitant to see 6 all the Russian forces go. There are also military incentives for fulfilling their some noisy and influential groups in the commitments. Finally, at the Istanbul Russian government, legislature, and Summit participating states expressed a academic establishment that desire to willingness to provide financial support maintain a Russian presence and connec- for the Russian Federation in the with- tion in Georgia and Moldova and vehe- drawal of its forces and equipment from mently oppose Russian government Georgia and Moldova. efforts to withdraw military forces from Following the Istanbul Summit, the Georgia and Moldova. Finally, even if the Russian Federation made progress in commanders are prepared to withdraw, both Georgia and Moldova on the with- they have nowhere in Russia for their drawal of its weapons and troops. To be troops to go—that is, no billets and no sure, the Russian withdrawal in both budget. countries was uneven, often interrupted, Despite the political, technical, and and plagued by arguments and delays. financial obstacles, Russia has made Nonetheless, in 2000-2001 the Russians progress over the past decade in removing removed considerable amounts of heavy its weapons, ammunition, and troops from weaponry from Georgia and successfully both Georgia and Moldova. The number emptied some of the key facilities specifi- of Russian troops and amounts of weap- cally mentioned at Istanbul. However, onry, ammunition, and equipment are contentious disputes arose over delays by much less than they were a decade ago, in Russian forces in removing equipment many cases by an order of magnitude or and abandoning other sites. Spillover more. The OSCE Istanbul Summit effects from the conflict in Chechnya, decisions on Georgia and Moldova played including an OSCE border monitoring a crucial role in achieving a large measure operation and political tensions over the of this success. presence of Chechen and foreign combat- The major innovations at the ants in Georgia’s Pankisi gorge have, Istanbul Summit with respect to the especially during the past year, somewhat Russian withdrawal from Georgia and overshadowed public discussion of Moldova were the adoption of specific, progress (or the lack of it) in meeting the near-term deadlines for implementation Istanbul deadlines. Under the pressure of of the withdrawal, and the linkage of the events, Georgian President Shevardnadze entire process in both countries to the has backed away somewhat from absolute adapted Treaty on Conventional Forces in insistence of full implementation of the Europe (CFE). The Russian Federation Istanbul decisions. had committed itself in a string of high- The process of the Russian with- level OSCE documents from 1992 for- drawal from Moldova took somewhat ward to withdrawal of its military forces longer after Istanbul to get going than in from Georgia and Moldova, but always Georgia. All of the Russian military found convenient explanations why facilities in Moldova are located in the circumstances prevented for the moment Transnistrian separatist region, and implementation of these commitments. separatist leaders sought to prevent any Adoption of a set of deadlines at Istanbul movement on the withdrawal. Also, put increased pressure on Russian au- financial assistance to Russia for the thorities to begin real operational plan- withdrawal from Moldova was provided ning for the withdrawals. Linkage of the through the OSCE Mission, a first for the withdrawals to ratification and entry into OSCE and for Russia, which required the force of the adapted CFE Treaty gave negotiation of formal procedures, includ- Russian leaders much greater political and ing observation and verification. In 2001 7 the Operative Group of Russian Forces in Thus at the end of this year Russian Moldova overcame Transnistrian resistance military forces will not have withdrawn and destroyed or withdrew all of its heavy fully either from Georgia or from weaponry, as required by the interim Moldova, contrary to the formal political Istanbul deadline. Agreement was also commitments adopted at the Istanbul reached in October 2001 on a project for Summit. This failure to meet all the the destruction or removal of the vast deadlines set raises several questions: 1.) is amount of Russian ammunition stored in this a failure for the OSCE as an institu- northern Transnistria. However, separatist tion, and does it reflect poorly on the resistance resuming in November 2001 capabilities and prospects of the organiza- has stalled implementation of the ammu- tion? 2.) whether a failure or not, why nition project since that time. should the Istanbul commitments and the In recent weeks Russian Federation process of Russian military withdrawal Deputy Foreign Minister Trubnikov and from Georgia and Moldova matter to the State Duma Speaker Seleznev have both U.S.? 3.) given the impending failure to admitted it is likely Russia will not meet meet these Istanbul deadlines, what the overall 31 December 2002 deadline for should the U.S. and other OSCE partici- complete withdrawal of all troops, arms, pating states do about it? and ammunition from Moldova. Like other These issues and others were ex- Russian officials, they blame the resistance plored at a Kennan Institute seminar at of Transnistrian separatist authorities, and the Woodrow Wilson International Center pledge Russia will finish the job as soon as for Scholars on 24 October 2002. political circumstances permit.

8 9 The 1999 OSCE Istanbul Summit Decisions on Moldova and Georgia: Prospects for Implementation 24 October 2002

Kennan Institute, Woodrow Wilson Center 1300 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW Washington, D.C.

Panelist List Chair: Blair A. Ruble, Director, Kennan Institute.

Panelists:

Rudolf Perina, Special Negotiator for Nagorno-Karabakh and Eurasian Conflicts, U.S. Department of State.

William Hill, former Head of Mission, OSCE, Moldova, and former Public Policy Scholar, Woodrow Wilson Center.

Ceslav Ciobanu, former Ambassador of the Republic of Moldova to the United States, and Public Policy Scholar, Woodrow Wilson Center.

Craig Dunkerley, former Special Envoy for Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, U.S. Department of State.

Charles King, Assistant Professor, Department of Government and School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, and former Short-term Scholar, Kennan Institute.

10 11 TRANSCRIPT

Ruble: Welcome to today’s session course, had a very direct role in the on the 1999 Istanbul summit decisions on original negotiation of these commit- Moldova and Georgia. Let me introduce ments in Istanbul. And that is a very direct today’s speakers… Ambassador Perina, source for these commitments. And I see Special Negotiator for Nagorno-Karabakh in the audience also—I will not let him and Eurasian Conflicts, U.S. Department escape—Ambassador Swartz, who is now of State, is on my right. Ambassador directly involved in Moldova as head of William Hill, former Head of Mission, the OSCE mission and the current OSCE, Moldova, and a former Public implementation of these commitments, at Policy Scholar at the Wilson Center is least in the case of Moldova. So it really is next. Ambassador Ceslav Ciobanu, former a very impressive gathering to look at this Ambassador of the Republic of Moldova important subject. Let me just begin, since to the United States and Public Policy there are a number of us who will be Scholar at the Wilson Center is to my left. giving oral remarks, and I think then that Ambassador Craig Dunkerley, former we probably want to get as quickly as Associate Dean at FSI, is to his left. And possible into questions and discussion, Professor Charles King from Georgetown which always tends to be, I think, the is at the end. And what’s exceptional is most interesting part of these seminars. not just the presence of four ambassadors Let me make a few broad comments but four ambassadors who really have about how I think we look at this at the quite substantial academic credentials as moment in the State Department, to the well. I actually have their extensive bios, degree that it’s a mixture of official and and I could go on and tell you all the personal views on this subject. In a broad wonderful things that they’ve done, but I sense, let me say that, getting right to the think in the interest of time we will just crunch of the matter of our discussion, the begin. What I do want to emphasize, “Prospects for Implementation of the however, is that these are all people who Istanbul Commitments,” there is obvi- personify the Wilsonian idea of bringing ously an element of concern about the together the world of ideas and the world prospects for implementation. We have of public affairs, and they’ve done so for made progress on both the commitments decades very effectively both as diplomats in Moldova and the commitments in and as scholars. The plan is to start on my Georgia. And I’m starting out here with far right and move to my far left. So let us the presumption that most people know begin with Ambassador Perina. what the commitments are. Rather than Perina: Thank you very much. First getting into a historical discussion, I think of all let me thank the Wilson Center for we can get right to the crunch of the organizing this event and this discussion. I matter. We have not been happy, very think it’s a particularly timely discussion frankly, with the amount of progress that given that some of the original deadlines we have seen over the past year. It is a in the Istanbul commitments are coming matter of some concern, and it is a matter up this year quite rapidly. I also want to of concern for us as we approach the thank you and congratulate you on the Porto OSCE Ministerial in December participation that you have gotten. Cer- where obviously this issue will have to be tainly it is very impressive. When I look looked at and will have to be reviewed. around I see a number of people who in I think the commitments are some- the past have worked directly on the what different, and we should take them implementation of the 1999 commitments one at a time because they do differ in in Moldova. Ambassador Dunkerley, of nature. If we look at Moldova, for ex- 12 ample, we have basically, over the past We all recognize that this problem ex- year, only had one train leave very re- isted, but frankly we were and we are cently with the armaments that are all disappointed that greater efforts were not supposed to be withdrawn this year. Now made to deal with this. These after all are we did have last year, to look at the past a commitments made by the Russian little bit, we did have last year the TLE Federation, a very significant power in [Treaty Limited Equipment] commitment Europe today, and it’s always difficult to on equipment withdrawal. The CFE believe that somebody like Mr. Smirnov [Conventional Forces in Europe] treaty in Transnistria can effectively block the was completed last year. It was expected implementation of an important serious that that would be completed last year. I commitment that was made to the entire think we should be glad that was imple- international community at the highest mented. It was not an exceptionally level in Istanbul in 1999. Looking at the challenging task, I think, to withdraw the situation now, it is of course unlikely and TLE equipment by the end of 2001. perhaps physically impossible that the Everybody always knew the bigger commitment as stated in Istanbul will be challenge was to withdraw all the remain- implemented by the end of this year. It ing aspects of Russian forces by the end seems very difficult if not impossible to of 2002. Everybody knew that this would imagine how that can be done. be a difficult task, because there is a lot But I would say one very important here to withdraw. I mean, the estimates fact to keep in mind is that there is still are over 40,000 tons of ammunition in the time left in this year to do a lot and, in a Colbasna Arsenal alone. So this was going sense, to turn the situation around. We do to be a challenge. Nobody ever doubted have several months left when the de facto that. There was a voluntary fund estab- stalemate that has existed here, the paraly- lished to help the Russian Federation in sis that has existed here, can be turned this task because we all knew that it was around. The obstacles which have been also going to be expensive to move this put forth in the withdrawals can be amount of ammunition and weapons. But removed, and a lot can be done between I must say we have been disappointed. We now and the end of December. And have been disappointed that over the past frankly, I think how much is done will be year really only one train has left. There is a crucial factor in determining how this some discussion now of a subsequent issue is looked upon and how it is dis- train going, but obviously we have not cussed at the Porto Ministerial at the made the progress over the past year that beginning of December. If we have the is necessary to fulfill this commitment. situation as it is now, where very little is Now the reasons for this, I am sure, happening with the exception of the one will be discussed here. Frankly, a variety train that left several weeks ago, I think of reasons were given, but they all came this will become a real problem at the down to what the Russian Federation said Porto Ministerial. It will have to be was obstruction caused by the addressed, and it will clearly not be a Transnistrian regime in Tiraspol. One success for OSCE, and it will not be one demand after another kept coming from of the positive aspects of the Ministerial. Tiraspol, all of which, I think, could be Hopefully we can, though, get a put in the general category of sort of process going between now and the end extortion, frankly, and wanting money and of the year, where we see that the road- payment and claiming that this was blocks that the Russian Federation has materiel belonging to Transnistria, and been dealing with are removed, that the that it could not be exported and so on. trains are moving, and that the removal of 13 this ammunition is underway. It would bases to Georgian authorities. This is what also be helpful to see some things that we was in the Istanbul commitments. Some believe can be done despite the obstruc- of the deadlines, in fact, have already been tion of the Transnistrian authorities; for missed here, but I think the good news example, the removal by air of small arms here is that, in our assessment, this does and a lot of destruction that could perhaps not involve sort of a physical process that be undertaken in place in Transnistria. If by definition takes a certain amount of efforts are being made to implement time and cannot be hastened. This really this—and let me say that there’s been a lot involves a question of political will and of Western assistance given here. There’s making the effort to reach agreements on been technology put in place at consider- the disposition of these bases and to come able expense to Western countries and to to some agreement between Georgia and the World Voluntary Fund in order to the Russian Federation on when these facilitate this, and this technology has bases will be handed over to Georgian unfortunately not been taken advantage authorities and the conditions of transpar- of. If all of these things are reversed, and ency under which this will be done. we see that serious efforts are underway We think that since this is a political and serious efforts are being taken and process, it is a matter of agreement that that some of these problems are being this eminently can be done. It can even be addressed, I think then this would be seen done in time for the Porto Ministerial, in a very different light at Porto. and we certainly hope that it will be done. We would certainly regret that the It is not a question of physically removing original deadline has been missed, but we large amounts of weapons, which in some would clearly see evidence of an intention cases is just physically impossible to do. here to fulfill the commitment. We would This is something that is eminently see evidence that the problems are being possible to do. It depends very much on effectively dealt with, and we could, to the negotiation process between Georgia some degree, feel that we have had a and the Russian Federation and their success and that we are on track and are political will. We believe that Georgia making progress in these commitments. does want to resolve these issues, and is So I think a lot will depend on what making an effort to engage in a serious happens in the next few months. And as I negotiating process. We think that if this is say, even though the deadline itself reciprocated by the Russian Federation probably will not be met, and this will we do have a chance of resolving these have to be addressed at the Porto, a lot issues and of coming to a conclusion here, definitely can be done in the next few and we think this would be a very positive months, and a lot depends on in fact how development. But, again, as in the case of much is done. That’s in regard to Moldova, an enormous amount depends Moldova. on what happens in the next few months, In the case of Georgia, we have a and I think that will be the key to deter- somewhat different situation in that the mining how both of these issues are dealt matter relates not so much to removal or with at the Porto Ministerial. Perhaps I destruction of large amounts of weapons should stop there and let all the others and ammunition, but it relates to agree- speak, and then we’ll have a chance to get ments regarding bases on Georgian into discussion. Thank you very much. territory which were used and in some Ruble: Before Ambassador Hill cases are still being used by the Russian speaks, I would like to welcome Ambassa- forces, and to agreements on the disposi- dor Manoli, Moldovan Ambassador to the tion of these bases and the return of these United States, Ambassador Stewart, the 14 former U.S. Ambassador to Moldova, and and in Moldova. In each place it was beset Ambassador Mikeladze, Georgian Ambas- by difficulties, disputes, delays, starts and sador to the United States, to our discus- stops; but real progress was made. The sion. numbers are lower now, sometimes by an Hill: Thank you very much, Blair. I order of magnitude or more. And I would have a brief paper of prepared remarks argue that things happened because of the that, if anyone is interested, afterwards I’ll additional pressure afforded by these be happy to give you a copy, but just decisions. drawing briefly from that, I’d like to say Things happened that might not that what’s new about the OSCE Istanbul have happened had events simply contin- summit commitments was not the com- ued as they had in the 1990s. But the mitment by Russia to withdraw its simple fact is, looking at the arithmetic, military forces from Georgia or Moldova. and in terms of Moldova particularly, at Since 1992 Russia has recognized the recent statements by Russian Deputy sovereignty, independence, and territorial Foreign Minister Trubnikov and by integrity of Moldova and Georgia, had Russian Duma Speaker Seleznev, who accepted both states as members in the was in Moldova early this week, some of UN and the OSCE, and had promised or the deadlines are going to be missed. undertaken obligations to regularize the Now you can argue over who is at fault. I status or remove troops and bases from can see from being in Moldova and the territory. But Russia had always found Transnistria, there was real Transnistrian excuses or circumstances that prevented resistance. It is also true that somehow this from happening quickly. Russian Federation officials managed to What you had in the Istanbul overcome this resistance every year just summit, at least from the perspective of before OSCE Ministerials. So there are at somebody who then worked in the least two sides to that coin, but the point trenches on this, first of all there were is that looking at the things that have to be deadlines set for things to happen with done and the time left to do it, it’s not the withdrawal of Russian military forces. going to happen by the Porto Ministerial. And this had not been done in previous So there are three questions that I documents. There had been political ask about this. Does this mean that the commitments, but general ones, without Istanbul Accords, and the OSCE by specifics. And second, the withdrawal of implication, are failures? Secondly, why the Russian forces was linked to the should we care? Why should the U.S. adapted CFE treaty, and the adapted CFE care? Is it important that the Istanbul treaty made explicit at the time of adop- commitments be met? And, third, what tion that the CFE treaty would not be should the U.S. and other OSCE partici- ratified by a number of states and would pating states do about this? not go into force until and unless there Well, I think I’ve already hinted at was satisfactory progress on the Russian the answer to the first question. I think withdrawal from Georgia and Moldova. the decisions adopted at Istanbul on And this provided a very important Moldova and Georgia provided the political reason, in addition to those that impetus for progress that otherwise would existed beforehand, driving the with- not have been made. And I think the drawal. Now, in the wake of Istanbul, OSCE and the states involved have had progress was made on removing Russian successes in both Georgia and Moldova troops, military equipment, arms, and since that time. Unfortunately, these ammunition from both states. The process successes are not total. One could re- was uneven. It was different in Georgia criminate over why the successes weren’t 15 greater, but I don’t think there’s a terribly in the Final Act in 1975. And this is great use in that. Why is this important? something that is in the overriding Well, I think generally for two reasons. interest of all of the states’ parties and all There’s a geopolitical reason. The conflicts of the states in Europe to continue. on the periphery of the former Soviet With the CFE tied to the Istanbul Union are unresolved conflicts. They decisions on Moldova and Georgia, it’s in constitute an irritant in relations, certainly the interests of all the parties to work to in the case of Georgia and Moldova, with find a satisfactory resolution to these most of the states in the Black Sea Basin— particular issues or problems so that the including two current allies (Greece and treaty can proceed towards entry into ), two presumptive allies ( force. So what should we do now? I think and Bulgaria), and others—and in Russia’s this is a classic case of the glass being half unsettled relations with the other indepen- full or half empty, and I would look at it dent states of the former Soviet Union, also and say that as a result of the OSCE in its unsettled relations with Western summit decisions in Istanbul, considerable European states and ultimately with the progress towards a resolution has been United States. made in both Georgia and Moldova. The U.S. alone can’t find solutions to Circumstances have changed. Unforeseen these conflicts, but we can work in concert complications have arisen. And we’re not with European allies and other states to going to meet all the deadlines. But all try to promote reasonable solutions and the states of the OSCE, including Russia, the achievement of stability, because with remain committed to the substance of what else is going on with Central Asia these commitments. So my view would and the Gulf, it’s in our interest to seek be that the Ministerial at Porto should and achieve stability and cooperation in adopt decisions that provide new driving these areas where there are not, at least in mechanisms, whether these are revised terms of the United States, vital interests deadlines or measures in addition to the at stake. Secondly, the argument of arms deadlines, such as increased inspection or control, the CFE regime: the CFE regime mediation. But the substance of the is a cornerstone of stability, predictability, commitments should be reinforced. and basically peace in Europe. When you Recriminations should be avoided: think that this is a continent that experi- simply say that for various reasons the enced the two largest wars in history and a deadlines weren’t met but the states forty-year period of an armed stand-off, remain committed and will fulfill these then the degree of stability, the reduction commitments in a prescribed time. in the number of arms, and really the The other thing that needs to be evaporation of the danger of conventional done is the unspoken part of the accords. war in Europe since the MBFR [Mutual The conflicts in Ossetia, South Ossetia, Balanced Force Reductions] and CFE Abkhazia, and Transnistria remain unre- process began and succeeded, are really solved. In each case there is still a neces- remarkable historical achievements. And sity for interposition forces. These inter- the CFE treaty maintains a regime of position forces are currently Russian. And inspection, reporting, predictability, and in many ways the current peacekeeping confidence. It eliminates or reduces the forces have provided a rather thin and fear of surprise attack. It increases confi- shaky justification for the continued dence in the behavior of other states. It’s a deployment of Russian forces in Georgia cornerstone, really, of this entire regime and Moldova. Something needs to be that’s been built up since the first confi- done about this. The question I raised is if dence-building measures were included all the Russians are withdrawn from 16 Moldova on 31 December 2002, who are mission to federalize Moldova lead to the going to be the peacekeepers on 1 settling of the Transnistrian conflict and January 2003? There is still going to be a thereby create a precedent for other such need, I believe, certainly in Moldova and frozen and forgotten conflicts in the Abkhazia. You’ll need something in South region? Ossetia also. In any case, there’s no reason Addressing these questions in why the OSCE could not provide man- connection with today’s subject is impor- dates, or the OSCE together with the UN, tant for Moldova and Georgia, the inter- could not provide mandates and truly ests of which are deeply affected by the international forces. I see no reason why presence of foreign troops on their the Russians couldn’t take part in such territory. But this is also important for international forces—they do so in Bosnia other countries involved in these conflicts and Kosovo—but it is time to address this and in the process of negotiated solutions, part of the problem associated with the because it acts as a test for their political conflicts to provide a more stable interna- will and maturity. This subject is impor- tional framework in which the conflicts tant for the United States, which invested can proceed to resolution. The Russian a lot of effort and money to facilitate a presence, or the presence of relics of solution and create a good precedent for Russian and Soviet bases, is part of the other hot spots. Finally, this is the prob- problem, but it’s not all of the problem, lem of credibility of the OSCE and the and one needs to address the rest of the international community as a whole, as problem. So this would be my prescrip- represented by the fifty-five heads of state tion for Porto, looking from the outside who signed the Istanbul Declaration. now rather than from the inside. We’ll see I’d like to address this issue from what happens. Thank you. Moldova’s perspective and as an indepen- Ruble: Thank you for those re- dent Public Policy scholar on the part of marks, now we will hear from Ambassa- the Wilson Center and Senior Research dor Ciobanu, currently a Public Policy Scholar at James Madison University. First Scholar here at the Wilson Center. of all I’d like to summarize the current Ciobanu: Thank you. This issue was situation as already mentioned by my the subject of United States Helsinki colleagues. Thirty days ago, on the eve of Commission hearings last year, in Sep- the CIS summit in Chisinau, a trainload of tember, as well as a seminar at the twenty-four carriages, which carried 320 Woodrow Wilson Center last December. ground-to-ground missiles, Urgan rocket The majority of today’s panelists partici- launchers, and over 5,000 howitzer projec- pated in these events. Last year’s hearings tiles, left Transnistria for Russia. The train on Capitol Hill reconfirmed the interest was prepared for departure as far back as in the destruction or removal of Russian December 2001, but was allowed to be materiel in Moldova and the withdrawal evacuated from Transnistria only after of Russian armed forces by 31 December Russian Deputy Defense Ministers and 2002, the deadline specified by the OSCE the leader of the Transnistrian separatist Declaration. At the same time, concern regime, , signed a protocol. was expressed that “the status of According to this protocol, Moscow had Transnistria within the sovereign nation of to pay $100 million for the opportunity to Moldova is still very unclear.” What is the execute its commitment from the OSCE status of this problem now? What will be Istanbul summit and withdraw the arms the next step if the provisions of the and troops from Transnistria. This amount Istanbul Declaration are not met? Can the represents so-called compensation to the recently proposed project of the OSCE region in place of the property of the 17 Russian authority, which has already been the request of Prime Minister Mikhail withdrawn. They are assessed at one Kasyanov. The political analysts are billion dollars. According to the signed considering that this is practically de jure document, the Transnistrian region’s debt recognition of the separatist regime. I of approximately $400 million for Russian want to emphasize that in keeping with gas was decreased by $100 million. In the Istanbul commitments, the Russian exchange, separatist authorities promised Federation is supposed to evacuate and not to interfere with the evacuation of scrap about 42,000 tons of ammunition, Russian armaments and ammunition. Mr. about 150 trainloads, before the year is up. Isakov, the Russian Deputy Defense If they maintain the current speed of Minister, stated that the Russian military is repatriation, one trainload in ten months, prepared to move one trainload of muni- it takes 122 years before the last load of tions out of the region every three days in ammunition leaves Moldova. The total order to fulfill the time limits fixed by the cost of ammunition withdrawal, according OSCE summit. He also said that Russia to Smirnov’s accountants, amounts to $500 plans to withdraw half of its 2,500 soldiers million, which is almost ten times more from Transnistria by the end of 2002. A than the Transnistrian budget but is four Russian official made these statements times less than the annual profit of its two weeks ago. mafiosi clan from contraband, smuggling, Two days ago, on 22 October, money laundering, et cetera. This last Gennady Seleznev, the speaker of the figure was mentioned by Moldovan Russian Duma, headed a Russian parlia- President in one of his mentarian delegation visit to Moldova televised speeches. and declared that the Russian Federation In my opinion, there really are some may not meet the deadlines for military new circumstances, linked first of all with withdrawal. “We are doing the best we the proposed federalization project from can, but circumstances that do not depend Moldova, and the interest of Moscow to on us, including the transit of trainloads change the status of the Operational through may break the succeed- Group of Russian Forces, formerly the ing holiday starts by the end of this year,” 14th Army, as some political analysts he said at a news conference. He men- speculated, into a peacekeeping force in tioned this because if the delay is not due the region under the OSCE umbrella. to the bad will of Moscow, the OSCE is Addressing this issue, I would like to likely to accept a new deadline for the focus on the federalization plan for evacuation of weapons and troops. I do Moldova proposed by the OSCE Rus- not know what are the impeding circum- sian-Ukraine mediators as a solution for stances to which Russia must refer, but Transnistrian settlement. At first glance, I’m asking myself, “Was three years not these two problems (withdrawal of enough to comply with the established ammunition and troops and settlement of time limits? What kind of circumstances the conflict with separatist leaders) are did not permit the Russian Duma to ratify unrelated issues. De facto, they are very the OSCE 1999 Istanbul documents?” closely linked with each other. The most Recently the Duma overwhelmingly intriguing comments, which I found on voted for the opening of a consulate in this situation, are those of Stefan Kitsak, Tiraspol, capital of the breakaway enclave Minister of Defense of the so-called Transnistria in eastern Moldova. It takes Transnistrian Republic. According to him, just a few days for the Russian lawmakers Transnistria has billed Russia only after it to accept this way, an initiative from became clear that Russia would leave the Zhirinovski’s Liberal Democratic Party, at region. As is known, during the referen- 18 dum, the population of Transnistria recently mentioned by the Honorable supported the presence of the Russian Pamela Smith, U.S. Ambassador to Army in the region as a guarantee for its Moldova. I share the Ambassador’s safety and, what is implicitly understood, opinion that a reintegration of the country as the current status. Now, citizens of the “would have overwhelming benefits for unrecognized Republic say that Russia is the people, for all parties of Moldova, by giving up its place in the region to the promoting stability, economic growth, and Americans. When asked this question, the the rule of law.” Tiraspol representatives replied, “Nature Because of federalization, the abhors a vacuum…” solution for conflicts like Transnistria is Another comment regarding this neither new nor definitive. Although this issue is that of Mr. Stepaniuk, leader of approach has been suggested among other the Communist majority fraction of the major principals of common settlement, Moldovan Parliament. One month ago, in particularly by the OSCE 1996 Lisbon an interview to Moscow, he declared that signing, and was accepted by some Russian troops should not be removed leaders—President Shevarnadze, for from Moldova until the new federaliza- example—it never brought the desired tion agreement proposed by the OSCE is result. In the case of Moldova, it might signed. In his opinion this may happen lead to a solution if some major obstacles within next 18 months. Stepaniuk also are eliminated. First, the proposed model stated that it is too early to replace these based almost entirely on Russian Federa- troops with other peacekeeping forces or tion practices—twenty-three of the forty- to transfer these responsibilities to the two articles were borrowed from the OSCE Mission. Finally, an article recently Russian Constitution—is asymmetrical in published by Moscow’s Noviye Izvestiya its socioeconomic and constitutional entitled “Chisinau Does Not Hurry dimension. The ten years of Moldova’s Moscow” stressed that there is no reason independence, also harshly criticized by to move Russian troops until parties the country’s current Communist govern- involved in the conflict solve the ment, was marked by radical economic Transnistrian problem. Unfortunately, reform, successful privatization, demo- neither Tiraspol nor Chisinau are rushing cratic transformation, and declaration of Moscow to liquidate its military base in democratic institutions, including free Transnistria. Period. elections from which, by the way, the So, the question, “Are the Russian Communist Party benefited at the last troops really leaving?” probably should be elections. Moldova’s economic, social, and reformulated: “Are any of the involved political structure is totally different from parties really interested in withdrawal of that of Tiraspol’s Soviet-style regime. It Russian troops from Transnistria?” Some- would take time and a confrontation on one can put the question even in a more principles to reconcile these incongruities drastic manner, concluding that there is no in a functioning federal state, even though strong interest in a settlement, at least for to do so is questionable. the moment, in Chisinau, Moscow, or Second, in the short run, federaliza- Kyiv—not to mention Tiraspol. I don’t tion can possibly create a framework for want to argue with such an attitude. integration of the separatist regions and Instead, I would like to point to some offer a compromise to balance the con- facts concerning the federalization initia- flicting interests. It can create a precedent tive as an eventual solution for Transnistria of successful conflict resolution under the settlement, a “historical opportunity to umbrella of OSCE. But the experience of resolve that long-standing problem,” as the last decade, including that of Russia 19 and other former Soviet states, has gener- frozen and forgotten conflicts. Even if a ated a lot of doubt that federalization can settlement for one conflict can be found prevent ethnic and political conflicts. successfully, remember it cannot be There are no guarantees at all against the applied to others as a pattern. The situa- evolution of a separatist regime into a tion differs from case to case, and of secessionist one in the frame of a federal course that is mildly different. From my state and against discrimination toward point of view, the closest to a peaceful other ethnic groups. The presence of solution is the Transnistrian conflict Russian troops and materiel in because of a combination of favorable Transnistria and their eventual transfor- factors such as acceptance in principle by mation into peacekeeping forces may leaders, by the leaders of legitimate and cause rather than prevent destabilization. separatist regime of the OSCE proposed The closed relations between separatist federalization project, tolerance and leaders and Russian military forces in indifference of the population on both Transnistria and the North Caucasus are sides of the Nistru River, and the lack of fairly well known. struggle in the Moldovan Parliament. Third, it is obvious that, for example, Conflict resolution might be facilitated within the Caucasian context, autonomy even by the similarities of the Moldovan has been a source of conflict and not a and Transnistrian Russian-speaking elites solution to it. Will federalization as the with a Pan-Eastern Slavic and Soviet highest level of autonomy offer a viable appeal/orientation, as it was observed by solution for Moldova? It is clear that Taras Kuzio recently. Nevertheless, it will Transnistria’s separatist leaders will never not be easy to win acceptance of the voluntarily give up their ability to retain OSCE proposal, which has already control on the illegal multimillion dollar attracted heavy criticism and provoked transiting of drugs, tobacco and weapons. harsh turbulence in the political life of Federalization can legalize the regime on Moldova. Mr. George Soros, who recently that but not eradicate the causes of con- visited Moldova has spoken out categori- flict. In my opinion, the problem is not in cally against settling the Transnistrian the proposed federalization model, which conflict through federalization. Mr. Soros might be perfect from my point of view. said he had been shocked at the USA’s The problem is to understand why these support of that document. He believes stalemates—unrecognized separate that the effect of that document would be regimes and territories—have continued Moldova’s complete falling under the for so long. The existing “no peace/no protectorate of Russia. Walter Schwimmer, war” situation permits the consolidation the Council of Europe’s Secretary Gen- of these regimes, encourages their trans- eral, referring to Transnistrian settlement, formation into effectively independent suggested during his visit last week to state-like structures. The solution is found Moldova that the negotiators not cling to in the fact that not only separatist leaders the term “federalization,” or to limit benefit from cash flows generated by the themselves to only one plan for solving status quo in these conflict regions. For a the conflict that must be settled through a complete explanation, it is necessary to national consensus. follow the money trail—in the case of Ruble: Thank you Ambassador Transnistria, for example, from its capital Ciobanu. We will now hear from Ambas- Tiraspol to the capitals of Moldova, sador Dunkerley, former Associate Dean Ukraine and Russia. at the State Department’s Foreign Service Obviously there is no universal Institute and a key participant in the 1999 generally applicable resolution for such Istanbul negotiations. 20 Dunkerley: One of the inevitable to residual Russian forces on their territo- disadvantages of speaking in the latter half ries. of a panel like this is quite often you run Bill Hill has touched upon some of the risk of simply ending up nodding the reasons why that was so. In the first vigorously in assent to good lines that instance, CFE—the treaty, the negotiation have already been delivered. And certainly process, and the like—provided a means there’s a lot that I would want to sec- by which there could be much greater ond—points that have already been made specificity of commitments. CFE moved by the first three speakers. I think Rudy beyond simply the reference in past Perina is correct. We shouldn’t get in- OSCE documents about an early and volved in a long discussion of history, orderly withdrawal of Russian forces by counting individual trainloads and such establishing levels, by establishing like that. But I do think it is worthwhile at timelines, and by providing the means for this point to step back a little and reflect a monitoring and verification. It provided a bit more about how we actually got here much-needed specificity to the general to this particular point in regards to these principle that’s written into the treaty of Istanbul commitments, with the idea that, the necessity of host state consent for the by looking at those elements, they may stationing of forces on a country’s terri- give a certain sense of where we might go tory. next. Even more important than that, How did the CFE treaty end up however, the adapted CFE treaty provided getting so intimately involved in these a means of legitimizing “multilateral issues related to Russian bases in kibitzing” of what had previously been Moldova and Georgia? And there is, of treated as bilateral basing issues between course, an irony here, because the CFE the Russian Federation and these indi- treaty was originally conceived of and vidual countries. I think back to the originally negotiated in very different OSCE discussions of some of these issues circumstances, and focused on very in Vienna in the early 90s when the different sorts of political/military prob- question of the 14th Army in Moldova lems. At times, the CFE treaty in the past would come up. And essentially the has been used as a political vehicle. response at that time was, “That’s a Certainly the original CFE treaty played bilateral basing issue being handled an important political role in facilitating elsewhere.” By putting this question into acceptance of German unification. CFE the CFE treaty context, however, it be- adaptation, the updating of the CFE treaty comes a multilateral issue. And in that in the late 1990s, played a similar role context, both Georgia and Moldova regarding NATO’s first tranche of post- gained the ability to draw more effectively enlargement. The adapted CFE on political and material support from the treaty is going to continue to play a role rest of the international community. in connection with the next round of And finally and most importantly, NATO enlargement, probably with during this period of 1997-99, these issues regards to the accession of Baltic States. At began to be linked to questions of high a certain point in the negotiation of the political importance for a variety of adapted CFE treaty, running in the period capitals—that is, the successful conclusion 1997-99, it began to become increasingly of an adapted CFE treaty, a point of great clear that the adaptation negotiations and importance in Moscow, in Washington, CFE could provide a powerful vehicle for and in Western capitals. And it also countries such as Moldova and Georgia to provided a linkage to specific decision- pursue their security concerns with regard forcing events. In this case it was the 21 OSCE Istanbul summit in November of see at least some people in the room who 1999, which provided the pressure for probably will have to work on that memo. governments—not just the Russian I would suggest the following game-plan. Federation, but Western governments and Given the fact that such memos must the two governments involved—to take concentrate on the basics, the first point is tough decisions. The Istanbul commit- that progress on this issue needs to be a ments laid out in detail commitments by regular item in our high-level dialogue, the Russian Federation to do certain not just with the Russians but also with things with regards to withdrawal or other concerned states in this regard. destruction of their forces in Georgia and Now, the Porto Ministerial, the OSCE Moldova. Ministerial that is coming up at the end of Now, I would suggest as we look the year, provides one such reason for towards the future we keep in mind those injecting that into our high-level dialogue, elements which made that possibility of but I would make the point that it needs arriving at the commitments; that is to say to be there more regularly. That’s easy to the specificity of these commitments, the say, with the luxury of speaking here on a multilateral context of these commit- panel in the halls of academe. We know, ments, and not least their political linkage. however, it’s hard to implement in prac- I agree with Bill Hill’s characterization tice. Whenever we have high-level ex- that as we think about the implementation changes with the Russians, there’s already of these commitments, we take a view that an awfully packed agenda. I don’t have to recognizes there has in fact been some spell out the more pressing, immediate very significant progress achieved. Signifi- crises that need to be addressed when we cant numbers of Russian TLE (including meet at that level. But I do think that we tanks, artillery, armored combat vehicles) do need to do a better job of registering have either been withdrawn or destroyed. an interest in the Istanbul commitments Important bases have been already turned more regularly. Bill Hill spoke of the over. I’ll leave to Ambassador Mikeladze importance of this particular issue in that of Georgia to comment, if he wishes to, context. Here again, that’s easy for us to about just how important the Russian say in this particular room. I have to say turnover of Vaziani Air Base can be for that those of us involved and interested in Georgian security in this regard. We this particular issue within the govern- should not be at all surprised that this has ment have to do a better job of spelling not been an easy process. There are a out just why this issue is important. variety of equities and interests involved, As we think about pursuing a more certainly on the Russian side but also in cooperative partnership with the Russian the countries concerned, including Federation that our two presidents have elements which are at best grudgingly outlined and suggested, the degree to ambivalent about the implementation of which this issue of withdrawal either these commitments and at worst are reinforces or undercuts the pursuit of that actively opposed to these commitments. partnership needs to be made clearer. So it is not at all surprising that at this Again, I would emphasize it should be an particular point progress has been made, issue in our dialogue as well with Georgia but significant problems continue. and Moldova, because I have to say that at Of more interest, what do we do certain points in the past there has been now? Fortunately, my current duties do ambiguity or uncertainty as to the specifics not include having to write the memo to of their course as well. the Secretary of State outlining the game The second basic point I would plan on the way ahead in CFE, although I make in that notional game plan is the 22 absolute importance of keeping these Georgian government has been trying to issues firmly linked to CFE. It is not think about ways to enlist more effective enough to treat these solely as OSCE international assistance to address the issues. Why? Because CFE is a vehicle economic problems of that region, which which provides the best context in which would facilitate withdrawal. Those are some of these issues can be discussed in areas in which I think we in the West specific and detailed terms. In this regard, need to think more creatively. the U.S. has made clear that we would not Bill Hill has brought up the issue of go forward with submitting the adapted peacekeepers. I agree that fairly soon we treaty for ratification by the Senate unless should think more seriously about how to and until there is full implementation of pursue meaningful, credible alternatives the Istanbul commitments. I think that is a to the current peacekeeping arrangements good and wise posture to hold. I think it’s in Transnistria and in Abkhazia. But that one that we should actively encourage our will require a very clear decision on our NATO allies to support as well. At this part to address this seriously. In years past, stage I do not see any reason to step back in months past, we’ve tried to get such a from making clear that absolute linkage. discussion going in Vienna and elsewhere On the question of specifics, it’s not about other alternatives, but we’ve also, as enough simply to suggest, to hector, or to a government, been very, very careful accuse. I think it is very important, and about not suggesting our own participa- here I very much second Rudy’s point, to tion or a more ambitious role or commit- focus on specifics of process. If particular ment on the part of the U.S. And at some deadlines are not being met, we should point we need to think about a more continue to press the Russian Federation effective way to enlist others in making and other parties for specific follow-on that option meaningful. But I’ll pause dates, follow-on processes, and the like. here. In turn, I think the U.S. and other like- Ruble: Thank you for your com- minded members of the CFE/OSCE ments Ambassador Dunkerley; we will community also need to do what has now turn to our last panelist, Professor been done quite effectively in the last year Charles King, Assistant Professor of or so, which is to continue to put forward Government at Georgetown University. very specific suggestions aimed at over- King: Thank you very much. I’m in coming practical operational problems on an even more difficult position than Craig the ground. And here I’m thinking of the Dunkerley was, but I found myself active financial assistant program managed agreeing with just about everything he by the OSCE Mission in Moldova. had to say, and especially the point about I’m thinking also of some of the thinking more creatively about how we things that have occurred in the Georgian assist some of these processes. There is a context. I think we need to think more great deal of expertise in this room on imaginatively, more creatively, in this both these countries as well as on the regard. For example, one of the main OSCE and on military/political affairs in roadblocks relating to one of the remain- general, so let me not stand in the way of ing Russian bases in Georgia, Akhalkalaki, a broader discussion. What I want to do is relates to the very dismal economic just make three very brief points, as a way circumstances of that particular region of of wrapping up. Georgia. And under that circumstance, it is First of all, I think even though we not surprising that the local community is often do want to separate the disputes indeed resistant to the closure of that ongoing in Georgia and Moldova with particular military base. I know that the regional separatists from the CFE com- 23 mitments, I do think they are inextricably and the central government, but also, as linked in many instances. We have to keep part of that, keeping either the bases in mind, of course, that in the wars of the where they are or Russian equipment early 1990s, separatists in every case—in where it is as well. Ambassador Ciobanu South Ossetia, in Abkhazia, in Transnistria, addressed this point in some detail. In the if you wanted to expand the discussion we Moldovan case one can also make paral- could also talk about Karabakh—won the lels with the Georgian case. The situations wars militarily. We are now in a rather have not yet reached what a colleague of difficult position of trying to convince the ours just over at Johns Hopkins, Bill victors to negotiate with the vanquished, Zartman, famously called “a hurting which is never a terribly easy thing to do. stalemate,” the kind of situation that leads The status of Russian forces there, I to resolution in any sort of conflict. In fact, think, is inextricably linked to the out- these situations are at the very least come of these particular negotiations. The acceptable stalemates in both Georgia and CFE commitments, and particularly the Moldova. And to some degree we might Istanbul commitments from 1999, are not even describe them as “winning stale- just aspects of the bilateral relations mates” for lots of people concerned. between these individual countries and Finally, the tragedy at the heart of the Russian Federation. They are general many of these disputes, and their connec- OSCE commitments now. Nor are they tions to the status of Russian troops and simply a matter of U.S.-Russian relations. equipment, is that where there is a They’re wrapped up in domestic politics constituency for resolving the conflicts, not only between the capitals and the that constituency is virtually powerless. separatist zones but also within the Where there are groups that have the capitals themselves, and within the sepa- power to resolve the conflict, there are not ratist zones. Some of the bases, of course, constituencies for resolving it. For ex- are in the separatist areas themselves, in ample, you might think that the close to Transnistria and, in the case of Gudauta, 300,000 internally displaced persons in in Georgia. Even beyond those areas, as Georgia who have been living in tempo- Craig Dunkerley pointed out, the bases rary housing for close to a decade would are wrapped up in ongoing discussions be a genuine constituency for resolution about regional development and so forth and change. That group is virtually power- in other parts of Georgia. He mentioned less when it comes to real political power the base in Akhalkalaki, which is vital to in the country. In fact, they have become the regional economy there. Very recently something of a political football used by the Georgian government has made an the government in exile from Abkhazia, effort to think more broadly about which still has set-aside seats in the regional development in the south. But Central Georgian Parliament, which so far there’s also, of course, the base in Batumi, has been a major block on real resolution which is wrapped up in discussions with Abkhazia. between Georgia and the autonomous Perhaps one of the most worrying Republic of Adjar, perhaps even wrapped things in terms of a long-term resolution up in the personal political ambitions of of these conflicts, of the long-term Aslan Abashidze, the ruler of Adjar. stability of both Moldova and Georgia, Secondly, the longer the conflicts and of when, especially in the Georgian have ground on, the larger the constitu- case, bases in Abkhazia in the south of the ency has become for keeping the situation country, in Batumi, are closed down, is the exactly the way it is. Not only in terms of degree to which over the last several years relationships between the separatist zones Russia has made citizens of what were 24 simply either ethnic Russians or, in some this event. cases, people with no connection to the Stewart: I’m Todd Stewart. Just to Russian Federation itself other than clear up any possible misunderstandings, political sympathy. It may well now be the I’m the former U.S. Ambassador to case that a plurality, perhaps even in some Moldova, having left that job in 1998 and of the conflict areas, a majority, of inhabit- retired from the Foreign Service. This ants of these areas are now Russian means that I do enjoy the luxury of passport holders, which raises an ex- frankness in my retirement and conse- tremely important question about the quently can go ahead and say the follow- degree to which Russia now has created, ing in that spirit. Given the levers of in fact, a legitimate political interest in power and influence that Moscow exer- what happens in those areas on the cises over Tiraspol, it’s laughable to ground. We’re not talking any more about maintain, as Moscow has, that Tiraspol can illegitimate Russian attempts to influence effectively block a determined effort by the affairs of countries on its border. It has Moscow to implement its obligations now created a situation in which it has, under the 1999 Istanbul declaration. The under international law, quite a legitimate real question, therefore, is why Moscow interest in the affairs of its own citizens in has not made that determined effort. other countries. Some motives were suggested, particularly Now that certainly doesn’t extend to by Ambassador Ciobanu, but I would be the right to keep a base there indefinitely, interested in hearing from other members but it does mean that there is a certain of the panel who are free to speculate on piquancy to Russian arguments now that this sort of thing as to exactly what the was not there in the past. In all of these Russian motives are in this situation—in ways there are a variety of complex issues other words, why they have not done that are intertwined. We can separate them what they said they were going to do. from the point of view of analyzing Ruble: Would anyone on the panel separately the commitments that the like to address that question? Russian Federation made in 1999, but in Hill: I think I can say a couple of terms of moving forward and thinking things about it at the moment, and even in more creatively about how we assist in the the hopes that I’ll be able to get back to resolution of these conflicts, I think we do Moscow, but I think in what I wrote I have to recognize the ways in which they suggested that this is as much not just a interrelate. I’m going to stop there. Thank question of Transnistrian resistance but a you. political problem in Moscow. There are Ruble: Let me ask if a panelist who political reasons. There are economic/ spoke earlier would like to make a commercial reasons. There are reasons of second intervention. You’re under no nostalgia for empire. There are reasons of obligation, but I want to be sure people the presence of ethnic Russian popula- have a chance to respond before I open it tions. And they come together, but for a to discussion. If no one on the panel has long time one of the reasons the Russians anything they would like to add, I know gave for not submitting the bilateral treaty that there are a lot of people in the room reached with Moldova in October of 1994 who have direct experience with the to the Duma was that it would be rejected issues on the table, and so I think we’ll by the Duma. And I think this case fits the open the discussion. We have approxi- old adage that I got from my superiors in mately one hour left and I would ask that Moscow when I served there years ago. people please identify themselves. I They said, “Never exclude the possibility would also remind you that we are taping that they might actually be telling the 25 truth.” The Duma has remained a center have not been strong enough to overcome of support both because of political ties the pressures of inertia. Now, I also think and economic ties for support for that this is changing to some degree. It’s Transnistria and other separatist move- always easy to kick issues down the road, ments, and it’s ultimately, I think, been a and I guess we’re all guilty of that to some political calculation in Moscow for some degree, but it catches up with us. And I time. think that is what is happening in this What needs to be done is to get the issue. The deadlines are coming due. government to act, to overcome, to make There is this linkage to CFE that has been it important enough for them to override mentioned by all of the other speakers. the interests of the separatists so that CFE, in turn, is related to many other they’re willing to take whatever political issues that have been mentioned (NATO flack they’re going to get from domestic expansion, and so on). opponents in Moscow. But the fact I also sense that it is becoming a remains that the Tiraspol regime—it’s not larger issue internationally, with Western the only one, but it’s one that I know governments. A lot has been done in intimately—has strong connections, and it good faith by Western governments in has strong connections not only in Mos- terms of the Voluntary Fund and so on to cow. It has strong connections with highly facilitate this. Significant amounts of placed political circles in Kyiv. And the money have been donated, not just by the separatists work these, and it’s been for United States but also by Western govern- some time a situation where one can ments. All of this has made this a greater recognize that the executive branch in priority, I think, among Western govern- Moscow has the levers to overcome local ments. It has given the issue greater resistance, if it makes a political decision visibility. And I think all of these are also and exercises the political will to use these exerting greater influence. levers. But the political calculations Finally, I would say on the ground domestically, within Moscow, have been that the frustration is rising. I think there’s such that it’s been rare that you have been a new situation in Moldova with the able to get a government in Russia to present Moldovan government. President maintain an extended push on this that Voronin is absolutely determined to do hasn’t been eroded by internal opposi- something about this, and I think he is tion, especially from the Duma but also upping the ante here and exerting his own within the executive branch and particu- pressures. I think, likewise, in Georgia the larly old defense and intelligence minis- frustration is growing. It is growing year tries. by year with the continuation of the Ruble: Would any of the other present situation. It is becoming a real panelists care to respond to the points political problem domestically. So in the raised by Ambassador Stewart? past when the commitments were made it Perina: I agree with what Bill is was easy to kick this issue down the road, saying, but I would maybe phrase it a little but all of this is catching up. And if it differently in one sentence, and that is to wasn’t a high priority in the past, I think say that I think simply in the past it has people are going to have to look at this not been a high enough priority for again, and I think it is becoming certainly Russia to act on this, that some of these a bigger problem for the Russian Federa- other considerations that Bill has men- tion. tioned (Duma pressure and so on) just Ruble: Another question from the made it difficult to really deal with this audience, may I remind you to please issue. And the countervailing pressures remember to identify yourself. 26 Joyal: Paul Joyal, Daily Report on one should not turn blind eyes to what Russia, Intercon International. Ambassa- has been really achieved and I have to dor Mikeladze was the Georgian Ambas- recognize that there was a certain level of sador to the OSCE during this period, progress both in Moldova and in Georgia. and I would be very interested to hear his But I will speak about Georgia, first of all view both from a personal and a profes- in terms of reduction of the overall sional level of the discussion today and his numbers of the conventional armed forces inside views into the decisions that we’re on the Georgian territory and also with speaking about. regard to the closure of one of the Ruble: I have no problem giving bases—Vaziani, as was mentioned by the Ambassador the floor if he feels Ambassador Dunkerley. comfortable, but my rule of thumb is that And, of course, again, Georgia also people who are in the audience have the never closed its eyes, let’s say, never right not to participate. They have the looked through fingers to what was done right to speak or remain silent, as they by the Russian Federation. We were the feel comfortable. first, in fact, who have recognized the Mikeladze: Thank you very much, progress achieved by the Russian Federa- and I thank my old friend Paul Joyal for tion in the Georgian territory. But at the inviting me to say a couple of words, but same time, of course, one cannot turn a first of all I’d like to thank—I recognize blind eye at what has not been achieved. here in this hall a number of people who And there are significant, very important directly participated in this process before elements still in the Istanbul statement the Istanbul, in the process of adaptation and the joint statement of the Russian of the CFE treaty and of course at the Federation in Georgia—elements that are summit and then afterwards in the imple- still open. And I have to admit, I have to mentation of the CFE treaty, adapted CFE recognize again, that unfortunately there is treaty. I don’t want to name them since no progress in the discussion on these I’m afraid to miss someone, but they have problems. Again, in the Georgian case, my admiration. First of all, of course, the these are the duration for the remaining Istanbul commitments are extremely two bases in Georgia. We have the prob- important for my country since they have lem of Gudauta Military Base, with contributed immensely to our move to different, much deeper aspects to these independent statehood, but again I don’t problems. But, again, I think we do not want to go into history, into a historical have the time, the possibility, to go into discussion, as Craig has said, but to detail. comment on some of the ideas which I My next question is—and I think heard today, and maybe raise a couple of this somehow will be the answer to the questions which seem important to me. question of the Ambassador—what are First of all, about the assessment of the reasons of not having achieved big where we are, assessment of the state of progress? Our own impression is that at where we are, and what has been done, the operative basis, the Russian Federa- and what has to be done. In general, in tion lacks the political will, and as Ambas- my view, there was a very provoking, sador Perina said, “the reciprocity on the intriguing question from Mr. Hill on Russian Federation side.” But in general, whether it is a failure or not. In my view, and in broader terms, in my view, the of course, this state of affairs cannot be major problem is that of course the called a “victory,” but at the same time I Russian Federation has de jure officially wouldn’t call it a complete failure. We are recognized the state of independence of somewhere in between, and I think that these two states but de facto the Russian 27 government speaks absolutely opposite. not only the varied concrete projects but And we can bring a number of proofs, a also it seems to me that sometimes number of examples to prove this idea. Georgian fantasy and imagination is very Another thing, since the separatist move- limited in this regard because all that I’ve ments and the end result of these frozen witnessed personally, all our new sugges- conflicts also have been mentioned, in my tions/offers/proposals are rejected. And view the policy, official or unofficial the suggestion of new ideas, new views policy, of the Russian Federation is the on this issue, would be welcomed, of full integration of the separatist regions course, by us. Thank you very much. into the Russian Federation. And this Ruble: I’d like to thank the Ambas- regime, which Mr. King spoke about, of sador for offering his insight on this topic. the introduction of Russian citizenship to Another question from the audience, the separatists, of course serves this please go ahead. interest. And since we have again also Cheney: Owen Cheney, the Army touched this problem of unresolved Staff. The question I have is with regard to conflicts and citizenship and these sorts of Ambassador Hill. You mentioned the things, in my view this policy also puts a internationalization of the peacekeeping very big question mark about the peace- force. In each one of these places you keeping and mediator role/function of have the OSCE and perhaps the UN the Russian Federation in the peace there as observers, especially in the case of process both in Moldova and Georgia. So Georgia. Georgia has asked and several I simply do not understand what sort of times been rebuffed on either making the mediation…how Russia can mediate force more international, maybe have the between its own citizens and another UN take over the peacekeeping role as country, independent state. well as have observer status. And the U.S. Now, in answer to your question, has also been very reluctant, especially what can be done? First of all, in my view, now with the global war on terrorism I share fully what Craig said, that we have going on. What approaches do you have, to all recognize that this is the question of or what new ideas do you have, in order the CFE and, of course, that this is a to break the resistance either on the multilateral problem. It is a problem of Russian side (the reluctance to give up the international community. And I think their presence, which is justified by the multilateral means and multilateral performing those peacekeeping duties in methods should be applied. Otherwise, those countries) and also the Western leaving this question at the bilateral level resistance (in order to place the amount of would mean not solving the issue for resources and troops on the ground in many years. And the next point I want to order to make a sufficient UN or OSCE comment on is what Craig said about the peacekeeping mission really work in necessity to generate very concrete and those areas)? If you could comment on specific ideas concerning both the with- that, please. drawal of the military bases and the Hill: Sure. Well, first of all, in over- solution of the consequent possible coming or convincing the Russian Fed- hypothetical problems which could eration, I don’t think this would be easy, emerge afterwards in the post-withdrawal but I think increasingly Russia has real- process. ized that in the case of the peacekeeping Finding some financial resources to presence in both Georgia and in support the development of the local Moldova, the legal basis of this presence is infrastructure and so on and so on would limited and shaky and increasingly is seen be, of course, of crucial importance. And by partners, whose acceptance Russia 28 desires in other areas and for other spondence with generally accepted reasons, as insufficient and simply masking international law and international the perpetuation of a Russian military practices. And, therefore, it’s something to presence there for other reasons. There’s a point to rather than simply accepting a long history with this where Russia tried continuation of the status quo. as early as 1992 to get an OSCE mandate as Dunkerley: Well, I’d certainly a justification for CIS peacekeeping in a second what Bill has just said. One, this number of these areas. And it’s popped up peacekeeping force need not be unusu- again from time to time. But from my ally large or ambitious in terms of size. personal experience I’ve come to believe Two, it doesn’t require U.S. forces, though that the Russian Federation might be open we should be careful that our own deci- to a serious discussion of finding a broader sion not to be engaged in such peace- international mandate for a truly interna- keeping not become a political excuse for tional force in both of these countries that others not to face up to tough decisions. I would provide some real solid interna- think the details, as Bill says, are difficult, tional legitimacy to a peacekeeping opera- but workable. But the problem is to get tion beyond simply bilateral agreements other nations to take tough decisions seen as fig leafs reached under pressure for involving their own participation. An continuing a Russian imperial presence. OSCE agreement to the formation of Now, in terms of the force in each of such forces really would, one, require a the conflict areas here, looking at a major political push in which we would different kind of force with somewhat have to be actively engaged in promoting different tasks and functions facing it, in such a venture. And two, it would not take no case do I think it has to be terribly place in isolation. It would have to be in large, and in no case do I think that it the context of some meaningful move- necessarily has to include U.S. forces. I ment towards a genuine political settle- think you can look for the inclusion of ment, whether that is in a Transnistrian or truly neutral forces to provide the bulk, if Abkhazian venue. you’re putting in national troop units. In Ruble: Dr. King, would you like to the case of Moldova I think we’re prob- add anything to what Ambassador Hill or ably talking companies. In the case of Ambassador Dunkerley have said? Abkhazia, maybe battalions, but not large King: Well, I just think Craig’s last units. In all of the cases, the other things point is absolutely key. I mean, in the you’re talking about are military observers. current context I can’t imagine why the They can be very, very small, but mobile, UN or OSCE would want the peace- groups. And there, I think, both the locals keeping role in either of these conflicts. and the Russians would be prepared to The only reason that Russian peacekeep- accept forces from say all of the states ing in both Abkhazia and Transnistria participating in PFP, which gives you a works, insofar as it does, is precisely wide range. The details are difficult or because it’s not really a peacekeeping complicated, but they’re not insuperable. mission. It is a Russian troop presence This has been done in other places. But that by and large turns a blind eye to the transition to such forces and to such a smuggling that goes on back and forth mandate accomplishes a couple of things across those boundaries. It turns a blind that are highly desirable in terms of really eye to the actions of the military forces of consolidating the independence and the separatists that are active in that zone. sovereignty of the states involved and And so having a group in that would be a putting the actions of all the states, includ- real peacekeeping mission actually trying ing the Russian Federation, into corre- to control what was going on across those 29 boundaries would be incredibly destabi- that we would still want withdrawal and lizing, it strikes me. implementation of the Istanbul commit- Hill: Well, I was basically just going ments if there were no political settle- to endorse the view that Craig and ment, and we would still want a political Charles both made. Really, I think in this settlement even if there were no progress whole debate about the Russian peace- on Istanbul. But clearly, in a realistic sense, keeping forces, people don’t often say it they are very, very much interrelated. And directly, but the debate is are these peace- if we had a political settlement, in fact it keeping forces part of the problem or part would greatly, greatly facilitate the imple- of the solution? I think this is how it is mentation of Istanbul, and it would seen in the countries themselves. In truth, resolve many of the issues that we’re the answer is mixed, because on the one facing. hand nobody really wants to see a return One other point on the issue of to violence and conflict and to a real hot making a mandate for the peacekeeping war in these areas. And probably the forces in the absence of a political settle- Russian presence does prevent that. On ment: I feel a little uneasy about this, the other hand, when you just have a frankly, because we are in a sense then troop presence without progress toward creating a situation to make the status quo political settlement, it is something that is more acceptable, to make it easier not to seen as perpetuating the status quo, find a solution here. In the case of freezing the conflict, freezing the status Moldova, our position has always been quo, and not providing motivation to- that we would like to see a political wards solution of the fundamental prob- settlement, to see what a political settle- lem. And I think, increasingly, the prob- ment looks like, in order to be able to lem that Russia faces in both Moldova judge what kind of a peacekeeping force and Georgia, but particularly in Georgia, or implementation force would be is its presence is increasingly seen by most necessary. And I still think there’s a lot to Georgians as being part of the problem be said for that sort of logic. So, really, and not part of the solution. when you get down to it, the key thing Obviously the way to deal with this here is a political settlement. We really is that we have to have more progress on have a ways to go on that, very frankly, in the fundamental issue here, which is Georgia. But we have made considerable really behind Istanbul and behind peace- progress in the last six months in the case keeping forces and behind everything, of Moldova. Ceslav Ciobanu referred to and that is finding a settlement to these aspects of this: the federalization program, conflicts. And everything else we’re doing the federalization concept that was put is in a sense dealing with the symptoms of forward by the mediators. We have, for the this fundamental problem. And I think we first time, a document that is endorsed by have to always keep that in the back of all of the mediators and basically accepted our minds. I did not originally speak very by the Moldovan government. And, again, much about the political settlement, the the obstacle here seems to be Tiraspol. specific topic of this discussion, but if I And the question is, in this case, can we could, let me just say that in the case of really deal with Tiraspol now to change Moldova where we have come, I think, this fundamental situation? closest, closer than we have probably ever Ruble: Thank you for your re- been to a political settlement of the sponse. We will take a question from this conflict, this is really key. I mean, Istanbul gentleman here in front and then we will and a political settlement are not strictly take a question from the back of the speaking linked in any way, in the sense room. 30 Merry: Wayne Merry, American ship. When Primakov came in and when Foreign Policy Council. A couple of Rodionov came in, those two ministries points: one, I’ve noticed no one has almost traded the positions that they had mentioned the GUUAM, which is carried out under Grachov and Kozyrev. interesting since it was created as a reac- But I think Moscow is a little more tion to CFE adaptation issues, not just dynamic over time than some people with Georgia and Moldova but also, of would think it is, and I think personalities course, Azerbaijan and Armenia and often have a lot to do with it. Obviously, Ukraine, and is somewhat indicative of the personality of Shevardnadze has a the nature of multilateral diplomacy here great deal to do with it, but the personali- because it was an entirely reactive mea- ties of the top leadership in all of these sure driven by the unwillingness of things, I think, sometimes determines a Washington initially to take concerns of great deal as to how much the diplomacy the regional new states seriously, when we can conduct. really wanted to deal just with Moscow, But there’s a very strong tendency of given our sense of the greater importance both those governments, Georgian and of CFE. And my conclusion from that, to Moldovan, to try to portray this as being some degree fast forwarding, is that I all Moscow’s fault. And that reflects the would question whether it is in the extent to which the Istanbul Summit and interest of the United States to make the these weapons issues and deployment adapted CFE treaty ratification hostage issues are really sort of the tail of the dog just to Istanbul Summit fulfillment, of the regional disputes—first Ossetia, because there’s an enormous amount, I then Transnistria and Abkhazia. And they think, of American national interest reflect the extent to which, bluntly, involved in CFE. And given the vagaries Georgia and Moldova are two of the more of treaty ratification, not just in this dysfunctional states that emerged from the country but in other places, anything that collapse of the Soviet Empire. They may delays bringing that treaty into full force, I not be the most dysfunctional, but they’re think, is a very risky proposition. I simply fairly dysfunctional, and neither of them think that the issues involved in the has even begun the process of taking Istanbul Summit are much less important serious political responsibility for the than what’s incorporated in that treaty as situations that created those regional in the interest of the United States to get disputes in the first place. And I think it into force right away. that’s particularly true in Georgia, where Second, while I would never ever there’s been very little effort to try to question Moscow’s willingness to be come to grips with the legacy of the mendacious in its conduct in its periph- Gamsakhurdia Period, and what that ery—I didn’t spend all those years in the meant both in Ossetia and for the Abkhaz. service and not learn something—still, And as both Charles King and Ambassa- there’s a tendency, I think, to see Moscow dor Ciobanu mentioned, the web of as more monolithic than it is in many of corruption that’s involved with flows of these issues. I think in the Caucasus, money—not just from Transnistria to obviously, its perspective in recent years Moscow and to Kyiv, but heavily through has been overwhelmingly driven by its Chisinau—has created what I think in disastrous policies in Chechnya. I remem- both of these countries is considerable ber very well how the positions on body of shared cynicism and a shared self- Transnistria in the Ministry of Foreign interest in not bringing these issues to any Affairs and the Ministry of Defense kind of resolution. virtually inverted with change in leader- And, finally, I will end on a really 31 dreadful point, which is to question alluded to the vagaries of Senate support whether or not the continuation of multi- for arms control treaties. I would submit lateral diplomacy in these two cases may that to go forward now with submitting a also be perpetuating the stalemate. Now, as treaty on which the U.S. Government and a former diplomat, I know diplomats NATO allies have all attached great abhor the thought that diplomacy could importance to full compliance in particu- ever not make things better or might lar obligations—to change and to submit potentially make things worse. There are the treaty at this particular time, essentially other instances of multilateral diplomacy giving up on the problems that we’ve that are smokescreens that prevent local been discussing today regarding full and regional leaders from dealing with Russian compliance and fulfillment of issues that they don’t want to deal with. I particular commitments—would be a think these two are classic candidates for mistake. In that particular situation we precisely that. And some of the participants would in fact be inviting even more will know that the State Department has on trouble and more questions about several occasions tried to get me to go out whether or not that treaty should be to some of these missions and, despite the ratified by the Senate. considerable temptations, I declined to do I take your point. It’s a particular so, largely because I’d come to the conclu- judgment call as to at what point one sion that Abkhazia and Transnistria were should submit the treaty, but I would two instances in which multilateral submit that there are some very good diplomacy, while it was not perhaps part reasons for following the course that we of the problem, certainly was no longer and the other members of the alliance at part of the solution and, like the Russian this stage have taken. As for your com- peacekeepers themselves, had become an ments about our OSCE missions, I’ll institutional mechanism for perpetuating defer to one or two of my colleagues. the status quo rather than getting political Ciobanu: I would like to make just leaders to face up to local issues. a few comments. Sometimes it seems to Ruble: I suspect that comment me that multilateral diplomacy is an might warrant a response from our excuse to not do anything. I’m sorry to be panelists. Ambassador Dunkerley will so leery, but we had multilateral diplo- respond first to Mr. Merry’s comments. macy in Moldova during the last ten years. Dunkerley: Well, I’ll respond to the And what really happened in these last first point, in regards to the question of ten years of conflict is Transnistrian CFE ratification. I readily agree with the separatists. The Transnistrian region is basic proposition that the CFE treaty and much more close to being recognized particularly the adapted CFE treaty is very now—officially recognized—than it was much in the U.S. national interest, and is ten years ago. And the solution of this in the interest of our allies and others conflict is still uncertain. Is federalization party to the treaty. It is already bringing us the solution or isn’t it? In my opinion, particular and important benefits. I think sometimes it’s necessary to apply bilateral when the time comes and the adapted diplomacy in a more active way, a more treaty is submitted to the Senate, there drastic manner, let’s say. will be a very good story to tell on behalf I remember meeting with one high of ratification of the treaty. Underlying the official from the Ministry of Foreign treaty, however, is a basic political question Affairs of Russia when I used to be of confidence in compliance and imple- Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of mentation of the obligations undertaken. Moldova. He told me that we know about And this is a real world concern. You the leader of the Transnistria region, this 32 guy, you know, this son of a bitch, but we places you haven’t had success. Other had no time to deal with him. And that’s multilateralizations also have stunning, not it. I think that sometimes it’s necessary to only lack of success but stunning failures. just be more active in bilateral diplomacy But the point is that if a multilateral and to combine both approaches, bilateral institution is going to be worth anything, and multilateral. Second comment: it has to take on the tough problems, the recently I saw some very interesting stubborn problems, as well as those that information. Moldova was ranked num- are subject to easy resolution. And it’s not ber ten in the world among weapons always a measure of the effectiveness of trader specialists. Number ten. It is very the diplomacy that you don’t produce interesting. Moldova exports a lot of wine, immediate and newsworthy results. I and wine especially now is like a political mean, I think in some of these cases you life, especially young wine. You know that have to look rather to Arthur Conan Moldova hosted an international wine Doyle and talk about the dogs that don’t festival, which was a successful event. bark, because there’s an element of that Moldova was at the CIS Summit, so- there, too. called presidential club, but Moldova It’s hard to argue about what-might- became a leader in weapons trading have-beens or could-have-been-worse, because of Transnistria, first of all. And it’s but there are records, I would say, if you a very serious issue, which affected not go back and we went into the details in only the security of Moldova, Ukraine, both of these places where you could and other countries, but international look at things that have been done. No, security as well. the problems haven’t been solved here, Hill: I wanted to say particularly to but that’s because the conflicts in both Wayne’s concluding shot, as a former states are part of larger historical processes colleague in Moscow, I would say you involving the disintegration of the Soviet really missed a chance. I don’t agree with Empire, the relationship of Moscow with your assessment of the multilateral diplo- its former vassal states, and the shifting of macy. I do know, with all due respect to tectonic plates in Eurasia. And to expect it my friend Ambassador Ciobanu, that all to be settled n a few years, I think, is when I used to go into the Moldovan overly optimistic. To draw a very broad Foreign Ministry they would tell me that historical analogy, in 1989 you had a the mission wasn’t being active enough. process start in Europe that’s somewhat What they usually meant was the mission akin to what happened in 1789, and if you wasn’t doing what they wanted, but it was remember in 1802 what was Napoleon doing something with which they dis- doing and what was the status of the agreed or with which they had problems. various European states? So I think in I think that the OSCE missions in terms of historical transitions, we may particular in Moldova and Georgia are actually be in much better shape than the two of those—and you can exclude my Europe of the end of the 18th and the period, but certainly with my predeces- beginning of the 19th Centuries. And part sors and successor and the mission in of that is because we’ve developed better Georgia—these are two of the missions tools, including the multilateral institu- that have functioned and done some of tions. They’re not perfect yet, but my own the best work that OSCE has done. OSCE inclination is to look at how to make missions in the Baltics and Ukraine and them more effective and better rather than others have produced effects, and the to give up the ghost on them. effects of the activities of the OSCE Perina: Just very briefly, because as missions have varied. And in some of the sometimes has been the case in the past, I 33 could not disagree with my friend Wayne conflicts earlier. Merry more on most of the points he Ruble: Thanks to each of you for made, but let me address the one about your responses. Currently, we have about where he said that these are basically ten or fifteen minutes left and I see there dysfunctional states, which I think is a are other people who have responses to very unfair characterization. But it’s also a the points raised by Mr. Merry. Following self-fulfilling prophecy, given the current those remarks, I will then give Wayne a situation, because certainly these states do very brief rejoinder, if he feels he needs it. have very big problems, but these prob- And there’s a gentleman in the back lems are compounded and made all the who’s been very patient who will get the more difficult to resolve by the existence last question. So let’s begin to keep the of secessionist states on their territory. In time frame in mind. the case of Moldova, it is hemorrhaging Mikeladze: I’m sorry to be so late. I funds and taxes and custom duties than think Ambassador Perina already stated any state that size desperately needs. And what I wanted to say, and my thoughts go it is hemorrhaging these because of the in line with what Ambassador Perina has existence of a secessionist Transnistria, expressed with regard to the notion of which is Europe’s biggest duty-free shop dysfunctional states. It may be partly true, now. I think, also, in the case of Georgia, of course, and we regret to recognize it. the solution for Georgia is to create a state But at the same time if we try to analyze that controls its own territory and controls what are the reasons, the simplest expla- its own borders, and this is key to making nation for this failure or dysfunction is it a viable state. And these secessionist that these are the only two states where movements are a key part of the problem. we still have the presence of the Russian But, moreover, if Wayne is right and, military troops, which of course contrib- you know, these are dysfunctional states, I utes significantly to first the instigation would argue that this is all the more and then the non-resolution of the ethnic reason for Western engagement rather conflicts in Georgia and Moldova. And than for Western disengagement. It is a when we speak about the problems key interest of the United States that these existing in these countries (crime, corrup- states prove successful, because if they do tion), of course the level of these things not prove successful, you will have a major are very high in Georgia and Moldova, regional crisis. For the same reason, we and we recognize this fact, but at the same are interested in Macedonia becoming time we have to think also how these successful in the Balkans, and for other problems were created. Of course, mostly states being viable; because if they did not they are result of the non-resolved exist there would be a vacuum which conflicts in Moldova and Georgia. would draw in many countries and which When one-third of the population would create a crisis far greater than the became refugees in their own country, present one. Basically, our experience when the government simply does not over the last decade, particularly looking have all methods to control its own at Yugoslavia, has been that when you see territory, when the country cannot get rid regional crises, it is better to engage of the foreign military presence in viola- earlier rather than later. As in the case of tion of the principle of the host nation’s Kosovo, the subsequent consequences free consent of foreign military presence, were greater, and the international com- then how can one speak about the failure munity was still in the end drawn in, of these states and the dysfunction of perhaps much more deeply than it might these states? And now about have been if it had tried to resolve those multilateralism: like democracy, of course, 34 it is not perfect, but we do not see any- Ruble: Thank you for your remarks, thing better than multilateral diplomacy in Ambassador Swartz. Would anyone else the solution of these conflicts. The prob- like to comment on this? lem, again, is not the peacekeeping itself, Joyal: Yes, Paul Joyal again. I just which I like… and you reminded me of a wanted to follow up on a point that very interesting idea of one well known Charles King made in his presentation. In analyst who said that peacekeeping in the your first point, Dr. King, you emphati- Russian interpretation is to keep this cally stated that the separatists did win piece and that piece of land. [Laughter] these conflicts. The Georgian ambassador So the problem is to break through just referred to an instigation of at least the Russian monopoly over the peace the Abkhazian conflict—I assume the process in these countries, Moldova and implication is Russian instigation. Well, Georgia. It’s been completely monopo- whatever the case is, could you please lized by one neighboring country that has better define how you define the Abkhaz direct strategic interests in this area. Then, separatist victory and how they were able if not multilateral, then what? A bilateral to constitute an Air Force and Navy framework for the solution? I would during that conflict as quickly as they did? gladly invite you to one of the bilateral Ruble: We will have Dr. King meetings between Georgia and Russia, respond to Mr. Joyal’s question, and then either on political/military issues or the we’ll finish with one final question. general framework agreement. Then you King: Two points. First, very few will see everything with your own eyes. people in Washington are more support- Thank you very much. ive of the OSCE and CFE than I am. In Ruble: It appears that several other fact, the American cynicism towards these people would like to comment on that two organizations depresses me enor- subject. We’ll take a comment from mously. I have the greatest regard for the Ambassador David Swartz, current Head work that OSCE missions do. But, two, it’s of the OSCE Mission in Moldova. an axiom in mediation theory that the Swartz: I had a brief comment on parties to a dispute have to want to settle Ambassador Perina’s linkage between the at least as much as the mediator. In labor political settlement and the carrying out mediation there are certain modalities that of the 1999 Istanbul Summit commit- are established that determine when the ments. Ambassador Perina argued, I think mediator should walk away from the quite rightly, that indeed if there were a table. Multilateral diplomatic institutions political settlement it would be easier to have not yet established mechanisms for carry out the 1999 commitments, but I determining how and when to do that, would argue that the reverse is true also, but there are times when multilateral that the presence of Russian forces over diplomacy could contribute by at least and above the peacekeeping forces is holding out the credible threat to the widely seen as a sign of Moscow support parties that it will walk away. for the Tiraspol regime. If those forces Ruble: One final question from this were removed in accordance with the gentleman and then we’ll wrap up. Istanbul commitments, this would be a Shayan: Scott Shayan, former intern pretty clear signal to Tiraspol and to here at the Center. I was wondering, in everyone else in the region that that light of the mediator’s proposal to federal- support was substantially weakened and ize Moldova, I was wondering how would certainly encourage Tiraspol to feasible you fellows think it would be come to the table and arrive at a settle- with men like Smirnov holding power in ment. Tiraspol. In other words, to actually 35 maybe paraphrase some of Dr. King’s about the greatest threat facing the coun- work, why be a mayor of a city when you try, Karabakh comes very close to the top. can be the president of your own country? If you take a poll in Moldova, Transnistria And using that logic, how many of these comes very close to the bottom. That is, leaders who have tasted state-like sover- the more democratic the countries eignty already, how do we avoid a zero- become, the more individuals feel that sum game in coming to a political solu- they have other issues, other political tion, especially with something like issues on the table that they want to federalization? discuss. The more authoritarian the Ruble: Since we have a couple country is, the more these issues can be questions on the table, I’ll give Dr. King used for popular mobilization. One only the opportunity to respond and then I’ll has to look for the degree to which now give each panelist an opportunity to make parliamentarians in Azerbaijan have a final observation. started a voluntary fund to increase the King: Just very briefly, on Paul strength of the Azeri military to fight Joyal’s point, all I meant was of course we groups that are increasingly being known all know that in the origins of all of these in Azerbaijani parlance as terrorists, as the conflicts, the Russian Federation—either Armenian terrorists in Karabakh. So that in the form of individual military units puts anyone from the outside in a very and military commanders on the ground difficult position. or even in terms of the support of the On the federalization plan, I’m not defense and foreign ministries—the terribly keen on it. I agree with much of Russian Federation plays a key role in what Ambassador Ciobanu said. I do supplying weapons, even men and sol- think it yokes what has been a relatively, diers and officers to the separatist sides. So relatively successful process of democrati- I wouldn’t contest that at all. But it is clear zation and openness in Moldova proper, that that separatist side with Russian with a regime that has done very little to support won militarily, which sets up a reform itself. The great irony here is that very difficult negotiating arrangement the old idea of a common state, put now. That was my only point. forward by Primakov, looks actually rather Let me make just a brief point that I better than the plan I think currently on didn’t get to make earlier, then I’ll com- the table, but that’s my own view, and ment very briefly to the question of Ambassador Perina and others may have federalization, and that is Wayne Merry’s different ones. issue about the sides actually wanting a Ruble: Ambassador Dunkerley, settlement. The real difficulty is, even if would you care to add any final observa- we charitably concluded that all of the tions or comments? elite negotiating sides really did want a Dunkerley: When we were on the quick settlement to this (I think that even shores of the Bosphorus in 1999 negotiat- is being charitable in the extreme when ing late-night the substance of the we look at various negotiating positions) Istanbul commitments, all of us recog- farther down there is very little constitu- nized at the time that we were not creat- ency to solve the separatist issue. The great ing some new silver bullet. We recognized irony here is that the more democratic the complexity of the problems in Geor- any of these countries become —and we gia and Moldova. We recognized that what can add Azerbaijan into the mix—the we were trying to eke out might represent more democratic they become, the less a modest step towards affecting aspects of these conflicts matter to individual citi- the problem, which might hopefully zens. If you take a poll in Azerbaijan facilitate broader positive movement. 36 When the agreement on the Istanbul ing a political settlement: This is and has commitments was concluded, I recall been a chicken-and-egg process, and in turning to the Georgian Foreign Minister the end I think, in terms of practicalities, and observing that now the hard part what is needed right now is a force that begins. There has been a great deal of separates and keeps the former combat- energy and imagination—and dare I say it, ants apart. What you call it and how it’s even creativity—expended, in trying to composed and other details (what it does) move this implementation forward. There are things that need to be worked out. has been some significant results, some Right now, it’s basically Russians and significant success, but also—and it’s no representatives, in Moldova at least, of surprise, nor should we be particularly former combatants who are in direct dismayed—some outstanding problems contact. Now, we can do better than this, still persist. All of this underscores a need and I think changing it might well, as not for despair but a renewed, patient, Professor King suggested, be somewhat determined diplomatic effort. And for destabilizing in the sense that it will be those multilateral diplomats who feared conducive, leading towards conditions that unemployment, this simply confirms that might actually promote or make easier a there are more jobs there. political settlement by enforcing more Ruble: Ambassador Ciobanu, any consistently and more effectively existing final thoughts on the points that have agreements. But it’s a complicated and been raised here today? interrelated process. Ciobanu: Yes. As Lee Hamilton Secondly, on the federalization plan, recently observed in one of his comments the reaching of a political settlement in about the new Middle East initiative by both Georgia and Moldova—I’m much President Bush, it is not enough to set more familiar with Moldova—but the clear goals in crisis resolution; it is impor- crux of the problem here is sharing power tant to provide a mechanism for achieving from the center with areas outside the these goals. So I have a lot of respect and I center. And in Moldova it’s certainly a appreciate the personal contributions of problem that Moldova is a multiethnic, Ambassador Hill, Ambassador Perina, multinational, multilingual state. And a Ambassador Dunkerley, Ambassador state that is unitarist in terms of the Stewart, and many present key actors to political center, linguistics, or other things the solution, but I think it is the right is not going to be successful in enlisting time to make some conclusions after all the cooperation of all its citizens. The these efforts and activities. In the case of OSCE mission recognized this early on in Moldova and Transnistria, the situation is its activity, if you read Report 12 from not very much different from that of the August or September of 1993 of the Middle East in this respect. It is difficult to original OCSE mission. It pointed out reach a reasonable solution. Finally, I that the interference from the north, from would like to thank you, Blair, for putting outside, was not the sole reason, in its on these discussions. estimation, for the secession conflict, and Ruble: Ambassador Hill, would you the remedy of that was not going to be care to add any final comments? the only thing necessary in order to reach Hill: Thank you very much. Two a political solution. There are other quick points that have come up in the possible solutions. Federalization is one. discussions: First, on the sequence of Autonomy is another. If you look at it, doing a mandate for peacekeeping or though, the autonomy agreement with interposition or stabilization or whatever- Gagauzia is working badly. And why is it you-want-to-call-them forces and reach- working badly? It’s not just the Gagauz 37 being unreasonable, but it’s the fact that the international community to do all it especially in the executive branch in can with negative and positive incentives Chisinau now there are ministries that to motivate the parties to reach a solution. don’t want to share authority with the Secondly, on federalization, this is a constituent parts. And until this is rem- controversial issue in Moldova. I very edied, I have no brief for the Transnistrians, much agree with what Bill said. I think and it may well be the only way to reach ultimately any solution to this conflict is an agreement with them is to remove going to have a federalist type of structure. certain of the individuals who are in the Of course, with Smirnov around, it will Transnistrian regime. But nonetheless, have to be imposed. Smirnov does not there are actions that are going to have to like this kind of a solution, but inherently be taken from Chisinau now. many people just react to federalism as I personally believe that federaliza- though it is an unworkable model in a tion is a workable and perhaps desirable country of this size, which I think is not solution. In fact, this is what a group of true. You have many federal models from academics and diplomats from the rest of Belgium to Switzerland of small countries Europe—the Council of Europe and where this kind of a solution would be from Moldova and Transnistria—reached acceptable. But the key thing here—and at an informal seminar in Kyiv that we had we really don’t have time to get into in 2000. It remains a workable solution if that—is that if you look at the draft all parties will commit to it and work out document and you cannot separate the the details. But solutions require all concept of federalism from a specific parties and not just some. proposal in a specific document, I think if Ruble: Ambassador Perina, any final you look at the document itself that has thoughts you would like to add in clos- been put forward by the mediators, it is ing? clear that the overwhelming authority in Perina: Just two quick points on such a structure would be with the central what Charles King said, and then the government and that a separatist entity question back there about federalization. like Transnistria would lose many of the Charles made a valid point that solutions sources of viability that it now uses, from to these secessions, conflicts may be customs duties to a monopoly on taxes, to getting less important to local populations. all kinds of things. This, in fact, would I would say that that’s interesting, but it is lead, I am confident, to a transformation not the decisive factor. I would again of Transnistria from what it is now to argue that the international community something different. I think what goes on has its own interests, regardless of whether now in Transnistria, the kinds of actors the local population wants to solve these who are now active in Transnistria would conflicts or doesn’t want to solve them. It find it very, very difficult to continue these is in the interests of the international kinds of activities in the kind of federal community to resolve these, in a sense, structure which has been proposed by the black holes in Europe, these sources of mediators. And I would say, ultimately, the potential instability, in very sensitive greatest source of argument for this is that regions, regions where there are now all of the key players now accept this pipelines going out, where there are document or are supportive of it except many, many important things taking place Mr. Smirnov, and that is not a coinci- that are vital to the international commu- dence. Thank you. nity. And, again, if there is not enough Ruble: I’d like to thank each of the interest locally to solve these conflicts, it is panelists for what has been a very engag- all the more argument for engagement of ing conversation. I’d like to thank the 38 audience for being perhaps particularly provocative this morning. I especially would like to thank Ambassador Ciobanu for arranging the session. I have observed that it appears that we need to have a continued discussion on the fate of future federalism in Moldova at some future seminar. We opened the question; we didn’t answer it. Thank you very much.

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